

The Hitchhacker's Guide to the Mobile Galaxy



WorkShop

BSides Munich 2023

Your Captain

- Penetration tester at NVISO with focus on web and mobile
- Develops and teaches trainings on secure coding practices and pentesting basics
- Guest lecturer at FH Hagenberg (Austria) for *Mobile and Embedded OS* course



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Our Journey



Big Bang
of Basics



Adventures
on Android



Incidents
on iOS



Meddling in
the Middle

Travel AdviSories

DON'T PANIC

Travel Advisories



Buckle up!
This course will
be hands-on



Don't be Shy!
Ask whenever
anything is unclear,
or you need help.
Your neighbours
can help, too!



Keep exploring!
The course will
only scratch the
surface

Our Journey



Big Bang
of Basics



Adventures
on Android



Incidents
on iOS



Meddling in
the Middle

Short Planetology

Android and iOS basics

Chronology of the mobile univerSe



First portable cell phone by Motorola



By: Rico Shen


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1994


First touchscreen phone by IBM



Chronology of the mobile universe



Evolution of Android and iOS




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Classification: Internal



Evolution of Android and iOS



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



nviso


Boarding the SpaceShip

Setting everything up

ASSEMBLING the parts



ASSEMBLING the parts



Physical

ARM processor

Not all devices are easily rootable

Cost factor




Virtual

Usually x86 processor;
ARM processor can also be emulated
but will be very slow

Missing features, e.g. biometrics, NFC

ASSEMBLING the parts



android studio




Genymotion



CORELLIUM




Grab Your Towels



Grab Your Towels

Genymotion



Grab Your Towels



All exercises, files and instructions are available at:

<http://bsides.hitchhacker.space>

Username: bsides
Password: hitchhacker



The bridge is yours

1. Launch Mobexler; PW: mobexler
2. Install missing tools:
 - `sudo apt install apktool adb`
 - `wget https://github.com/patrickfav/uber-apk-signer/releases/download/v1.3.0/uber-apk-signer-1.3.0.jar`
 - `git clone https://github.com/Hamz-a/frida-android-helper`
`cd frida-android-helper`
`sudo python3 setup.py install`

Our Journey



Big Bang
of Basics



Adventures
on Android



Incidents
on iOS



Meddling in
the Middle



Getting Ready for Launch

Devices & rooting

Android Studio


Emulates Android devices
(Android Virtual Device, AVD)

Tools for building Android apps
<sdk>/build-tools/

Tools and libraries for app development


Command line tools interfacing with the
Android platform, e.g. `adb` and `fastboot`

Android source files




Android Studio Emulator

Play Store available on emulated device, but no root access




Root access on emulated device




Rooting

Rooting steps differ from device type and Android version but usually require these high-level steps

Enabling developer options to enable USB debugging



Unlocking the bootloader



```
$> adb reboot bootloader  
$> fastboot flashing unlock
```


Flashing a patched image

```
$> fastboot flash boot  
magisk_patched.img
```

Or sideloading a custom ROM

```
$> fastboot flash recovery  
lineage-recovery.img  
$> adb sideload lineageos.zip
```

Magisk



Magisk


The Magic Mask for Android

<https://github.com/topjohnwu/Magisk>

Rooting without modifying
the /system partition

Run inside Zygote process and
unload it for certain apps (e.g.
in case of root detection)

Installing additional
modules






First Contact

Reaching out

Reaching out



Reaching out

command starts adb client, which first checks if server is running

```
$> adb devices
* daemon not running; starting now at tcp:5037
* daemon started successfully
```

```
$> netstat -ant
Active Internet connections (servers and established)
Proto Recv-Q Send-Q Local Address          Foreign Address      State
tcp        0      0 127.0.0.1:5037          0.0.0.0:*
                                         LISTEN
```

```
sargo:/ $ ps -A | grep adb
root      1310      1 10886352  2012  0
shell     15209      1 11012400  7744  0
                                         0 S adb_root
                                         0 S adbd
```

Reaching out

List all available devices

Start an interactive shell on a device connected via USB

If there are multiple devices, we need to specify the serial number of the target device

Restart adb as root and start a root shell (only possible on rooted devices)

Connect to a device via TCP (useful for connecting to virtual devices)

```
$> adb devices
```

List of devices attached

A01X21CF00E

device

RF1DB6K177Y

device

```
$> adb shell
```

```
$> adb -s A01X21CF00E shell
```

sargo:/ \$

```
$> adb root
```

```
$> adb shell
```

sargo:/ #

```
$> adb connect [IP]:5555
```

Reaching out

Install an app package (apk)

```
$> adb install hitchhacker.apk  
Performing Streamed Install  
Success
```

List all installed packages, e.g. to find out package name of installed app

```
$> adb shell pm list packages | grep hitch  
package:space.hitchhacker.guide
```

Find out install location of the app binary

```
$> adb shell pm path space.hitchhacker.guide  
package:/data/app/~~ogBY1Czkk70W3C63cFVYdA==/  
space.hitchhacker.guide-  
uSilirCcYZWeKbnAasXZTg==/base.apk
```

Uninstall an app

```
$> adb uninstall space.hitchhacker.guide  
Success
```

Reaching out

Copy file to the phone

```
$> adb push file.txt /sdcard  
file.txt: 1 file pushed, 0 skipped. 0.0 MB/s  
(18 bytes in 0.099s)
```

Copy file from the phone

```
$> adb pull /sdcard/file.txt ~/Documents  
/sdcard/file.txt: 1 file pulled, 0...ped. 0.0  
MB/s (18 bytes in 0.008s)
```

View system log

```
$> adb logcat
```

Create backup of an app
(deprecated!)

```
$> adb backup -f mybackup.ab -apk  
-shared space.hitchhacker.guide  
Now unlock your device and confirm the backup  
operation...
```



The bridge is yours

1. Activate adb access
2. Install the Hitchhacker app with “adb install” or via drag&drop
3. Open a shell on the device and find out the package name of the app
4. Browse to the app binary



Rocket Science

Inside an APK

InSide an APK


```
$> unzip hitchhacker.apk -d hitchhacker  
$> ls -la hitchhacker
```

- | | |
|--|---|
|  assets |  AndroidManifest.xml |
|  META-INF |  classes.dex |
|  res |  resources.arsc |

InSide an APK

 assets	<i>Application assets, e.g. document templates</i>
 META-INF	<i>Signature and certificate for app distribution</i>
 res	<i>UI resource files, e.g. XML configuration files</i>
 AndroidManifest.xml	<i>Binary file; app information</i>
 classes.dex	<i>Dalvik file; app code</i>
 resources.arsc	<i>Binary file; describes app resources</i>

Signing off - KeyStore



Signing off - Creating a keyStore

```
$> keytool -genkey -v -keystore space.keystore -alias key0 -keyalg RSA -keysize 2048 -validity 10000
```

Enter keystore password:

Re-enter new password:

What is your first and last name?

[Unknown]: Arthur Dent

What is the name of your organizational unit?

[Unknown]: Hitchhacker

What is the name of your organization?

[Unknown]: Intergalactic Travellers

What is the name of your City or Locality?

[Unknown]: Heart of Gold

What is the name of your State or Province?

[Unknown]:


What is the two-letter country code for this unit?

[Unknown]:


Is CN=Arthur Dent, OU=Hitchhacker, O=Intergalactic Travellers, L=Heart of Gold, ST=Unknown, C=Unknown

[no]: yes

```
Generating 2,048 bit RSA key pair and self-signed certificate (SHA256withRSA) with a validity of 10,000 days
for: CN=Arthur Dent, OU=Hitchhacker, O=Intergalactic Travellers, L=Heart of Gold, ST=Unknown, C=Unknown
[Storing space.keystore]
```




Signing off - Signing an app



```
$> apksigner sign --ks spacekeystore.jks --ks-key-alias key0 universe.apk  
Keystore password for signer #1:
```

Signing off - Signing an app

Certificate for
app signature



```
$> apksigner verify --print-certs universe.apk
Signer #1 certificate DN: L=Heart of Gold, O=Intergalactic
Travellers, OU=Hitchhackers, CN=Ford Prefect
Signer #1 certificate SHA-256 digest:
f2ea49fb4bed82a93207928e15df91dc21fba7d08bfac3010f
f8d37ad85e7586
Signer #1 certificate SHA-1 digest:
08ad6226f6e41c3f9220950d7df5f9bf04af7d19
Signer #1 certificate MD5 digest:
827d01734d6141b91fa17ea32655cbd6
```

Signing off - Verifying the Signature

Certificate inside APK

META-INF/CERT.RSA



App Signature

Android Package Manager verifies upon installation if app signature (private key) and contained certificate (public key) match

Signing off... for Some else?

```
$> jarsigner -verify -verbose -certs NASA.apk
```

```
...
```

```
- Signed by "CN=NASA Ames Research Center, OU=Ames Research Center, O=NASA, L=Mountain  
View, ST=CA, C=US"
```

```
    Digest algorithm: SHA-256
```

```
    Signature algorithm: SHA256withRSA, 2048-bit key
```

```
$> jarsigner -verify -verbose -certs NASA.apk
```

```
...
```

```
- Signed by "CN=Zaphod Beeblebrox, OU=Heart of Gold, O=Galaxy, L=Betelgeuse, ST=Galaxy,  
C=GA"
```

```
    Digest algorithm: SHA-256
```

```
    Signature algorithm: SHA256withRSA, 2048-bit key
```

*Android does not perform CA
verification for application
certificates - you can sign
with whatever you want*

Signing off... for Some else?



A (malicious) app using the same app ID cannot be installed or overwrite files on the device if the certificate doesn't match the one of the app that is already installed



An app using a different ID will be installed

gov.nasa



space.nasa



Scanning the Area

Static analysis

Decompiling apps

```
i = 1;  
j = 1;  
while (true) {  
    *val++ = i+j;  
    j = i+(i=j);  
}
```

High-level language

Compiler

```
mov r0,#1  
mov r1,#1  
l:  
add r2,r0,r1  
str r2,[r3]  
add r3,#4  
mov r0,r1  
mov r1,r2  
b l
```

Assembler

```
110100111010000000  
0000000000000001110  
100111010000000010  
000011000011101000  
0100001110001000000  
000001000110101011  
0000011001000000000  
110100101000001100  
110000111000100010  
100000000010011101  
000011010001101010
```

Machine code

Decompiling apps

```
public static void  
main(String[] args) {  
    int a = 1;  
    int b = 2;  
    int c = a + b;  
}
```

Source code (.java)

Compiler

Code:
stack=2, locals=4,
args_size=1
0: iconst_1
1: istore_1
2: iconst_2
3: istore_2
4: iload_1
5: iload_2
6: iadd
7: istore_3
8: return


Byte code (.class)

JVM

```
110100111010000000  
00000000000001110  
10011101000000010  
00001100001110100  
01000011100010000  
000001000110101011  
00000110010000000  
110100101000001100  
110000111000100010  
10000000010011101  
000011010001101010
```

Machine code

Decompiling apps



Decompiling APK files

```
if (isExternalStorageWritable()) {  
    File file = new File (Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory(), "password.txt");  
    // Log.d("Storage Directory", String.valueOf(Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory()));  
    String password = "L33tS3cr3t";  
    FileOutputStream fos;  
    try {  
        fos = new FileOutputStream(file);  
        fos.write(password.getBytes());  
        fos.close();  
    } catch (FileNotFoundException e) {  
        e.printStackTrace();  
    } catch (IOException e) {  
        e.printStackTrace();  
    }  
}
```

Original source code

Decompiling APK files

```
if (isExternalStorageWritable()) {  
    File file = new File (Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory(), "password.txt");  
    // Log.d("Storage Directory", String.valueOf(Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory()));  
    String password = "L33tS3cr3t";  
    FileOutputStream fos;  
    try {  
        fos = new FileOutputStream(file);  
        fos.write(password.getBytes());  
        fos.close();  
    } catch (FileNotFoundException e) {  
        e.printStackTrace();  
    } catch (IOException e) {  
        e.printStackTrace();  
    }  
}
```

By decompiling we can easily retrieve nearly the original source code

```
if (isExternalStorageWritable()) {  
    try {  
        FileOutputStream fileOutputStream = new FileOutputStream(new  
            File(Environment.getExternalStorageDirectory(),  
                "password.txt"));  
        fileOutputStream.write("L33tS3cr3t".getBytes());  
        fileOutputStream.close();  
    } catch (FileNotFoundException e) {  
        e.printStackTrace();  
    } catch (IOException e2) {  
        e2.printStackTrace();  
    }  
}
```

JADX-GUI

Package structure

The screenshot shows the JADX-GUI interface. On the left, the package structure of 'MSTG-Android-Java.apk' is displayed, showing packages like 'Source code', 'android.support.v4', 'androidx', 'com', 'net.sqlcipher', and 'sg.vp.owasp_mobile'. The 'sg.vp.owasp_mobile' package contains sub-packages 'OMTG_Anyroid' and 'OMTG_DATST'. The 'OMTG_Anyroid' package contains classes such as 'BuildConfig', 'DisplayMessageActivity', 'HardenedX509TrustManager', 'MyActivity', 'MyApplication', 'OMTG_CODING_003_Best_Prac...', 'OMTG_CODING_003_SQL_Injec...', 'OMTG_CODING_003_SQL_Injec...', 'OMTG_CODING_003_SQL_Injec...', 'OMTG_CODING_004_Code_Injec...', 'OMTG_DATST_001_BadEncryp...', 'OMTG_DATST_001_Externals...', 'OMTG_DATST_001_Internal...', 'OMTG_DATST_001_KeyChain...', 'OMTG_DATST_001_KeyStore...', 'OMTG_DATST_001_SharedPre...', 'OMTG_DATST_001_SQLite_En...', 'OMTG_DATST_001_SQLite_No...', 'OMTG_DATST_002_Logging...', 'OMTG_DATST_005_Keyboard...', 'OMTG_DATST_006_Clipboard...', 'OMTG_DATST_011_Memory...', 'OMTG_ENV_005_JS_Interface...', and 'OMTG_ENV_006_Webview_Loca...'. The 'Issues' section shows 592 warnings. The main window displays the decompiled Java code for 'MyActivity' and 'AndroidManifest.xml'. A search dialog is open, showing results for the text 'secret'. The search results list includes lines of code from various classes, such as 'AesCbcWithInteg', 'SecretKeys', and 'AescbWithIntegrity'. The search dialog also includes options for 'Search definitions of:' (Class, Method, Field, Code, Resource, Comments), 'Search options' (Case insensitive, Regex, Active tab only), and a 'Keep open' checkbox.

Searching within classes

Decompiled Java code

Bytecode Viewer

Package structure

Searching within classes

The screenshot shows the Bytecode Viewer interface with the following components:

- File View Settings Plugins** menu bar.
- Files** panel on the left showing the package structure of an APK file named `MSTG-Android-Java.apk`. It includes sections for android, assets, lib, META-INF, net, res, and sg, with further sub-folders like vp and owasp_mobile.
- Work Space** panel showing the decompiled Java code for `MyActivity.class` from the `sg_vp_owasp_mobile/OMTG_Android` package. The code includes imports for Intent, Bundle, View, MenuItem, and Toolbar, and defines several methods for handling different types of injections and data handling.
- FernFlower Decompiler** and **Procyon Decompiler** panels on the right, both showing the same decompiled code for `MyActivity` from the `sg_vp_owasp_mobile/OMTG_Android` package, with line numbers 1 through 37.
- Search** panel on the left side of the main workspace, showing a search for the string "secret" within `All_Classes`. The results list includes findings such as "This is a Secret String on", "Secret String -> sg_vp_owasp_mobile", and "supersecret -> sg_vp_owasp_mobile".


Decompiled Java code using up to three different decompilers



The bridge is yours

1. Demo: Using jadx-gui
2. Find the Hitchhacker app's original pin
by using static analysis

Solution



File View Navigation Tools Help

hitchhacker3.apk

Source code

- android.support.v4
- androidx
- com
- kotlin
- kotlinx.coroutines
- net.sqlcipher
- org
- space.hitchhacker.guide

 - comm
 - data
 - databinding
 - ui
 - App
 - AppKt
 - AppKt\$database\$2
 - AppKt\$encprefs\$2
 - AppKt\$prefs\$2
 - BuildConfig
 - LoginActivity
 - MainActivity
 - PinActivity
 - R
 - UrlActivity

- Resources
- APK signature
- Summary

LoginActivity

```
65     this.pinInput.get(index).clearFocus();
66     this.pinInput.get(index + 1).requestFocus();
67 }
68
69 private final void clearPin() {
70     Iterable $this$foreach$iv = this.pinInput;
71     for (Object element$iv : $this$foreach$iv) {
72         EditText it = (EditText) element$iv;
73         it.getText().clear();
74     }
75     this.pinInput.get(3).clearFocus();
76     this.pinInput.get(0).requestFocus();
77 }
78
79 | private final boolean validatePin() {
80     StringBuilder concat = new StringBuilder();
81     Iterable $this$foreach$iv = this.pinInput;
82     for (Object element$iv : $this$foreach$iv) {
83         EditText it = (EditText) element$iv;
84         concat.append(it.getText().toString());
85     }
86     String enteredPin = concat.toString();
87     Intrinsics.checkNotNullExpressionValue(enteredPin, "concat.toString()");
88     if (AppKt.getEncprefs().getEncSharedPrefsManualPin()) {
89         int bigNumber = Integer.parseInt(enteredPin);
90         int check1 = bigNumber >> 2;
91         boolean result2 = true;
92         int check2 = (Integer.parseInt(this.pinInput.get(3).getText().toString()) - Integer.parseInt(this.pinInput.get(1).getText().toString()) * Integer.parseInt(this.pinInput.get(2).getText().toString()));
93         if (!(check1 == 42 && check2 == 42)) {
94             result2 = false;
95         }
96     }
97     return result2;
98 }
99
100 private final void launchMain() {
101     Intent changeView = new Intent(this, MainActivity.class);
102     startActivity(changeView);
103 }
```



The Cargo Bay

How data is stored on Android

One app, multiple locations

/data/app/~~xyz/space.hitchhacker.guide



base.apk



oat



lib

/data/data/space.hitchhacker.guide



cache



files



code-cache



lib



databases



shared_prefs

/storage/emulated/0/Android/data/
space.hitchhacker.guide



files

Getting an APK

```
$> adb shell pm path space.hitchhacker.guide  
package:/data/app/~~gF7fUVcWUu59lRcvexS8tQ==/space.hitchhacker.guide-  
shjdiXYF300VtZfhqrAjQg==/base.apk  
  
$> adb pull /data/app/~~gF7fUVcWUu59lRcvexS8tQ==/space.hitchhacker.guide-  
shjdiXYF300VtZfhqrAjQg==/base.apk  
/data/app/~~gF7fUVcWUu59lRcvexS8tQ==/space.hitchhacker.guide-  
shjdiXYF300VtZfhqrAjQg==/base.apk: 1 file pulled, 0 skipped. 30.9 MB/s  
(5295949 bytes in 0.163s)
```

Split APKs

/data/app/~~xyz/space.hitchhacker



base.apk



split_config.nl.apk



split_config.arm64.apk



split_config.xxhdpi.apk

```
$> python3 patch-apk.py space.hitchhacker
```

```
Getting APK path(s) for package: space.hitchhacker
```

```
[+] APK path: /data/app/~~XqZX_gCpfQQ==/space.hitchhacker-XvabuQowwLc8uGKXUaqHPw==/base.apk
```

```
[+] APK path: /data/app/~~XqZX_gCpfQQ==/space.hitchhacker-XvuQowc8uGKXUaqHPw==/split_config.arm64_v8a.apk
```

```
...
```

```
Pulling APK file(s) from device.
```

```
[+] Pulling: space.hitchhacker-base.apk
```

```
[+] Pulling: space.hitchhacker-split_config.arm64_v8a.apk
```

```
...
```

```
[+] Pulling: space.hitchhacker-split_config.xxhdpi.apk
```

```
App bundle/split APK detected, rebuilding as a single APK.
```

<https://github.com/TheDauntless/patch-apk/tree/master>

Shared Preferences

```
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8' standalone='yes' ?>
<map>
    <string name="UsernameKey">arthurdent</string>
    <string name="PasswordKey">acupoftea</string>
</map>
```

*Key-value pairs
stored in XML*

Stored in clear
text by default

```
<?xml version='1.0' encoding='utf-8' standalone='yes' ?>
<map>
    <string name="ARCyFuEcW9/TcaBiAs+t0gZubZYGzw5i9NkTORKY764=">
        Awu/DKgTl/TWIaesThkCZtqssJwcg8a1RICuP/UQem9iFxh08vDrgRGM8rMBrlqKvGoE
    </string>
    <string name="__androidx_security_crypto_encrypted_prefs_key_keyset__">
        12a901e172...001
    </string>
    ...
</map>
```

Stored encrypted
using androidx.
security.crypto.
EncryptedSharedP
references

Databases

```
sargo:/data/data/galaxy.hitchhacker.guide/databases # sqlite3 travelCompanions
SQLite version 3.32.2 2021-07-12 15:00:17
Enter ".help" for usage hints.
sqlite> .tables
Companions          android_metadata
sqlite> select * from Companions;
fordprefect|goosnargh
```

SQLite databases are not encrypted by default



We can use the external library SQLCipher to encrypt the entire database

Databases



Realm DB

Not encrypted by default

Encryption can be enabled
through configuration




Firebase DB

Cloud database,
encrypted in transit, but not
locally

Main security concern: Proper
authorization & access controls

KeyStore



Secure container for storing keys and performing cryptographic operations

- Software-based at `/data/misc/keystore/user_o`
- Hardware-based as secure area on main processor or separate microchip



InSide the engine

Identifying the attack surface

Android Manifest

XML file defining information and components of the application

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" android:versionCode="97" android:versionName="2.05" android:installLocation="auto" android:compileSdkVersion="30"
    android:compileSdkVersionCodename="11" package="galaxy.hitchhacker" platformBuildVersionCode="30" platformBuildVersionName="11">
    <uses-sdk android:minSdkVersion="21" android:targetSdkVersion="30"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
    <uses-feature android:name="android.hardware.location.gps" android:required="false"/>
    <application android:theme="@style/AppTheme_NoActionBar" android:label="Hitchhacker" android:icon="@mipmap/hitchhacker_guide" android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker_guide"
        android:allowBackup="false" android:usesCleartextTraffic="true">
        <meta-data android:name="com.google.android.geo.API_KEY" android:value="AIzaSyB159r06yyIvPEBG37daQuaial6RdryVc"/>
        <activity android:theme="@style/AppTheme_NoActionBar" android:label="Hitchhacker" android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.MainActivity">
            <intent-filter>
                <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
                <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
            </intent-filter>
        </activity>
        <provider android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.GuideBrowser" android:exported="false"
            android:authorities="galaxy.hitchhacker.provider" android:grantUriPermissions="true" />
        <service android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.SpaceshipMonitor" android:permission="android.permission.BIND_JOB_SERVICE"
            android:enabled="@bool/enable_system_job_service_default" android:exported="true" android:directBootAware="false"/>
        <receiver android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.SpaceshipAlert" android:exported="true">
            <intent-filter>
                <action android:name="galaxy.spaceship.signal.RECEIVE"/>
            </intent-filter>
        </receiver>
    </application>
</manifest>
```

Exported components can be interacted with by other apps

Attack Surface

```
<application android:theme="@style/AppTheme_NoActionBar" android:label="Hitchhacker
    android:icon="@mipmap/hitchhacker_guide" android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker_guide"
    android:allowBackup="false" android:usesCleartextTraffic="true">
    <activity android:theme="@style/AppTheme_NoActionBar" android:label=" Hitchhacker"
        android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.MainActivity">
        <intent-filter>
            <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
            <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
        </intent-filter>
    </activity>
    <provider android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.GuideBrowser" android:exported="false"
        android:authorities="galaxy.hitchhacker.provider" android:grantUriPermissions="true" />
    <service android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.SpaceshipMonitor"
        android:permission="android.permission.BIND_JOB_SERVICE"
        android:enabled="@bool/enable_system_job_service_default" android:exported="true"
        android:directBootAware="false"/>
    <receiver android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.SpaceshipAlert" android:exported="true">
        <intent-filter>
            <action android:name="galaxy.spaceship.signal.RECEIVE"/>
        </intent-filter>
    </receiver>
</application>
```

*Implicitly exported component
through intent-filters
(as of Android 12, explicit exports are
obligatory)*

Explicitly exported component

Permissions

*Permissions required
by the app*

```
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
<uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>

<activity>
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
    </intent-filter>
</activity>
<provider android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.GuideBrowser" android:exported="false"
          android:authorities="galaxy.hitchhacker.provider" android:grantUriPermissions="true" />
<service android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.SpaceshipMonitor" android:permission="android.permission.BIND_JOB_SERVICE"
          android:enabled="@bool/enable_system_job_service_default" android:exported="true" android:directBootAware="false"/>
<receiver android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.SpaceshipAlert" android:exported="true">
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="galaxy.spaceship.signal.RECEIVE"/>
    </intent-filter>
</receiver>
</application>
</manifest>
```

Activities

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" android:versionCode="97" android:versionName="2.05" android:installLocation="auto" android:compileSdkVersion="30"
    android:compileSdkVersionCodename="11" package="galaxy.hitchhacker" platformBuildVersionCode="30" platformBuildVersionName="11">
    <uses-sdk android:minSdkVersion="21" android:targetSdkVersion="30"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
```


*Activities = Visible
parts in an application*

```
<activity android:theme="@style/AppTheme_NoActionBar" android:Label="Hitchhacker" android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.MainActivity">
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
    </intent-filter>
</activity>
```

```
        android:enabled="@bool/enable_system_job_service_default" android:exported="true" android:directBootAware="false"/>
    <receiver android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.SpaceshipAlert" android:exported="true">
        <intent-filter>
            <action android:name="galaxy.spaceship.signal.RECEIVE"/>
        </intent-filter>
    </receiver>
</application>
</manifest>
```

*Name hints at the class that
implements the activity*

Activities



Activities

```
android:/ $ am start -a android.intent.action.MAIN  
-n galaxy.hitchhacker/.MainActivity
```

package_name/.activity_name

Action name (optional)

Content Providers

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" android:versionCode="97" android:versionName="2.05" android:installLocation="auto" android:compileSdkVersion="30"
    android:compileSdkVersionCodename="11" package="galaxy.hitchhacker" platformBuildVersionCode="30" platformBuildVersionName="11">
    <uses-sdk android:minSdkVersion="21" android:targetSdkVersion="30"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
    <uses-feature android:name="android.hardware.location.gps" android:required="false"/>
    <application android:theme="@style/AppTheme_NoActionBar" android:label="Hitchhacker" android:icon="@mipmap/hitchhacker_guide"
        android:allowBackup="false" android:usesCleartextTraffic="true">
        <meta-data android:name="com.google.android.geo.API_KEY" android:value="AIzaSyB159r06yIVPBGj7daQuaial6Rd" />
        <activity android:theme="@style/AppTheme_NoActionBar" android:label="Hitchhacker" android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.MainActivity" android:icon="@mipmap/hitchhacker_guide" />
        <intent-filter>
            <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />
            <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" />
        </intent-filter>
        <provider android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.GuideBrowser" android:exported="false" android:authorities="galaxy.hitchhacker.provider" android:grantUriPermissions="true" />
        <receiver android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.GuideBrowser$SignatureReceiver" android:exported="false" />
        <intent-filter>
            <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN" />
            <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER" />
        </intent-filter>
    </activity>
    </application>
</manifest>
```

*Content Provider = Share
data stored in app
database between apps*

*Not exported, i.e. not
available to other apps*

Content Providers

Access using a URI

```
sargo:/ $ content query --uri "content://galaxy.  
hitchhacker.provider/galaxies/1"
```

*Can be queried like a database:
provider/database/entryId
(name of the database can usually
determined through source code analysis)*

Services

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" android:versionCode="97" android:versionName="2.05" android:installLocation="auto" android:compileSdkVersion="30"
    android:compileSdkVersionCodename="11" package="galaxy.hitchhacker" platformBuildVersionCode="30" platformBuildVersionName="11">
    <uses-sdk android:minSdkVersion="21" android:targetSdkVersion="30"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
    <uses-feature android:name="android.hardware.location.gps" android:required="false"/>
    <application android:theme="@style/AppTheme_NoActionBar" android:label="Hitchhacker" android:icon="@mipmap/hitchhacker_guide" android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker_guide"
        android:allowBackup="false" android:usesCleartextTraffic="true">
        <meta-data android:name="com.google.android.geo.API_KEY" android:value="AIzaSyB159r06yyIvPEBG37daQuaial6Ro" />
        <activity android:theme="@style/AppTheme_NoActionBar" android:label="Hitchhacker" android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.MainActivity">
            <intent-filter>
                <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
                <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
            </intent-filter>
        </activity>
        <provider android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.GuideBrowser" android:exported="false"
            android:authorities="galaxy.hitchhacker.provider" android:grantUriPermissions="true" />
    </application>
</manifest>
```

*Service = Perform tasks in
the background*

```
<service android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.SpaceshipMonitor" android:permission="android.permission.BIND_JOB_SERVICE"
    android:enabled="@bool/enable_system_job_service_default" android:exported="true" android:directBootAware="false"/>
```

Services

package_name/.service_name

```
sargo:/ $ am startservice  
-n galaxy.hitchhacker/.SpaceshipMonitor  
--es ship "Vogon Constructor Fleet"
```

*Name of a StringExtra
expected by the service*

Content of the StringExtra

Broadcast Receivers

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" android:versionCode="97" android:versionName="2.05" android:installLocation="auto" android:compileSdkVersion="30"
    android:compileSdkVersionCodename="11" package="galaxy.hitchhacker" platformBuildVersionCode="30" platformBuildVersionName="11">
    <uses-sdk android:minSdkVersion="21" android:targetSdkVersion="30"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
    <uses-feature android:name="android.hardware.location.gps" android:required="false"/>
    <application android:theme="@style/AppTheme_NoActionBar" android:label="Hitchhacker" android:icon="@mipmap/hitchhacker_guide" android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker_guide"
        android:allowBackup="false" android:usesCleartextTraffic="true">
        <meta-data android:name="com.google.android.geo.API_KEY" android:value="AIzaSyB159r06yyIvPEBG37daQuaiai6R" />
        <activity android:theme="@style/AppTheme_NoActionBar" android:label="Hitchhacker" android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.MainActivity">
            <intent-filter>
                <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
                <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
            </intent-filter>
        </activity>
        <provider android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.GuideBrowser" android:exported="false" android:authorities="galaxy.hitchhacker.GuideBrowser" />
    </application>
</manifest>
```

*Broadcast Receiver = Listen
and handle incoming intents,
e.g. notifications*

```
<receiver android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.SpaceshipAlert" android:exported="true">
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="galaxy.spaceship.signal.RECEIVE"/>
    </intent-filter>
</receiver>
```

Broadcast Receivers


package_name/.receiver_name

```
sargo:/ $ am broadcast  
-n galaxy.hitchhacker/.SpaceshipAlert  
--es ship "Vogon Constructor Fleet"
```

*Name of a StringExtra
expected by the receiver*

Content of the StringExtra

Intents



Intents

Explicit Intent

Supplies class name or target app's package name that is to handle the intent

- ▶ Sent to specified app

Implicit Intent

Declares an action to perform without specifying a certain component

- ▶ Sent to all apps

```
Intent showDetail = new Intent(this, DetailActivity.class);
startActivity(showDetail);
```

```
Intent showUrl = new Intent(Intent.ACTION_VIEW, Uri.parse(url));
startActivity(showUrl);
```

Explicit Intents - Examples

Calling an activity
within the same app

```
Intent showDetail = new Intent(this, DetailActivity.class);  
startActivity(showDetail);
```

Calling an activity that
is part of another app

```
ComponentName cn = new ComponentName("space.hitchhacker.other",  
"space.hitchhacker.other.DetailActivity");  
Intent showDetails = new Intent();  
showDetails.setComponent(cn);  
showDetails.setAction("space.hitchhacker.SHOW_DETAILS")  
startActivity(showDetails);
```

Implicit Intents - Examples

Calling an app that can display URLs (e.g. browser)

```
Intent showUrl = new Intent(Intent.ACTION_VIEW,  
                            Uri.parse("https://hitchhacker.space"));  
startActivity(showUrl);
```

Calling an app for making a phone call

```
Intent callNumber = new Intent(Intent.ACTION_DIAL,  
                                Uri.parse("tel:123456"));  
startActivity(callNumber);
```

Sending data with intents

```
Intent emailIntent = new Intent(Intent.ACTION_SEND);
emailIntent.putExtra(Intent.EXTRA_EMAIL, new String[] {"arthur@hitchhacker.space"});
emailIntent.putExtra(Intent.EXTRA_SUBJECT, "Packing List");
emailIntent.putExtra(Intent.EXTRA_TEXT, "Towel"); ←----- Dashed arrow
emailIntent.putExtra("Custom", "Something else"); ←----- Dashed arrow
startActivity(emailIntent)
```

Data contained in an intent can be accessed by
the receiving component

```
Intent intent = getIntent();
String subject = intent.getStringExtra(Intent.EXTRA_SUBJECT);
Bundle allExtras = intent.getExtras();
```

Intent Filters

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?>
<manifest xmlns:android="http://schemas.android.com/apk/res/android" android:versionCode="97" android:versionName="2.05" android:installLocation="auto" android:compileSdkVersion="30"
    android:compileSdkVersionCodename="11" package="galaxy.hitchhacker" platformBuildVersionCode="30" platformBuildVersionName="11">
    <uses-sdk android:minSdkVersion="21" android:targetSdkVersion="30"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.ACCESS_WIFI_STATE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.INTERNET"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.READ_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
    <uses-permission android:name="android.permission.WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE"/>
    <uses-feature android:name="android.hardware.location.gps" android:required="false"/>
    <application android:theme="@style/AppTheme_NoActionBar" android:label="Hitchhacker" android:icon="@mipmap/hitchhacker_guide" android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker_guide"
        android:allowBackup="false" android:usesCleartextTraffic="true">
        <meta-data android:name="com.google.android.geo.API_KEY" android:value="AIzaSyB159r06yyIvPEBG37daQuaial6RdryVc"/>
        <activity android:theme="@style/AppTheme_NoActionBar" android:label="Hitchhacker" android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.MainActivity">
            <intent-filter>
                <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
                <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
            </intent-filter>
        </activity>
        <receiver android:name="galaxy.hitchhacker.SpaceshipAlert" android:exported="true">
            <intent-filter>
                <action android:name="galaxy.spaceship.signal.RECEIVE"/>
            </intent-filter>
        </receiver>
    </application>
</manifest>
```

Intent filters specify which types of implicit intents the component handles

Intent Filters - Examples

Default intents

Handles ACTION_SEND intents that contain text data; starts the ReceiveText activity within the app

```
<activity android:name=".ReceiveText">
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="android.intent.action.SEND"/>
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT"/>
        <data android:mimeType="text/plain"/>
    </intent-filter>
</activity>
```

Custom intents

Handles the custom SHIPLAUNCH intent; starts the LaunchShip activity within the app

```
<activity android:name=".LaunchShip" >
    <intent-filter>
        <action android:name="space.hitchhacker.SHIPLAUNCH" />
        <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
    </intent-filter>
</activity>
```

Intent Filters - Examples

Launcher

Intent filter that handles when the app is started from the Launcher

```
<intent-filter>
    <action android:name="android.intent.action.MAIN"/>
    <category android:name="android.intent.category.LAUNCHER"/>
    <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT"/>
</intent-filter>
```

Deep Links

Intent filter that can handle incoming links that begin with space://hitchhacker


```
<intent-filter>
    <action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
    <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
    <category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
    <data android:scheme="space" android:host="hitchhacker" />
</intent-filter>
```

Intent Filters - Handling

If no app exists that can handle the intent, an exception occurs

```
try {
    startActivity(intent);
} catch (ActivityNotFoundException e) {
    // Do something
}
```

An app can register for any implicit intents; if more than one app exists that can handle the intent, the app picker is shown




Deep Links

```
<intent-filter>
    <action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
    <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
    <category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
    > <data android:scheme="space" android:host="hitchhacker" />
</intent-filter>
```

App will open when custom URL scheme
space://hitchhacker is invoked

Dialog appears if another app has
registered the same scheme



App Links

```
<intent-filter>
    <action android:name="android.intent.action.VIEW" />
    <category android:name="android.intent.category.DEFAULT" />
    <category android:name="android.intent.category.BROWSABLE" />
    <data android:scheme="https" android:host="hitchhacker.space"/>
</intent-filter>
```

App Link is tied to a website

```
[{
    "relation": ["delegate_permission/common.handle_all_urls"],
    "target": {
        "namespace": "android_app",
        "package_name": "space.hitchhacker", ←
        "sha256_cert_fingerprints": ["14:6D:E9:83:---SNIP---:A0:83:42:E6:1D:BE:A8:8A:E5"]
    }
}]
```

Handling app is specified in Digital Asset Links file at <https://hitchhacker.space/.well-known/assetlinks.json>



The bridge is yours

1. Analyze the Hitchhacker's app directories (using adb) and find out which data is stored where
2. Analyze the Android Manifest and find a way to:
 - Bypass the pin activity
 - ★ Read the contents of the diary

Solution

1. Storage

- Search terms: /storage/emulated/0/Android/data/space.hitchhacker.guide/files/my_files/search.txt
- Diary entries: /data/data/space.hitchhacker.guide/databases/diary.db
- Username: /data/data/space.hitchhacker.guide/shared_prefs/shared_prefs.xml
- Pin code: /data/data/space.hitchhacker.guide/shared_prefs/secret_shared_prefs.xml

2. Bypass pin activity

```
$> adb shell am start -a android.intent.action.MAIN -n space.hitchhacker.guide/.PinActivity
```

3. Read content of the diary



```
$> adb shell content query -uri "content://space.hitchhacker.guide.contentprovider/diary/"
```



Journey to Deep Space

Reverse engineering

Take apart and rebuild



<https://github.com/JesusFreke/smali>
<https://github.com/pxb1988/dex2jar>
<http://java-decompiler.github.io/>

Take apart and rebuild

Disassemble

```
$> apktool d hitchhacker.apk
I: Using Apktool 2.5.0-dirty on app-debug.apk
I: Loading resource table...
...
```

Reassemble

```
$> apktool b hitchhacker
I: Using Apktool 2.5.0-dirty
I: Checking whether sources has changed...
...
```

<https://ibotpeaches.github.io/Apktool/>

The Android Babel fish - Smali

```
$> apktool d hitchhacker.apk
```

- assets
- lib
- original
- res
- smali
- AndroidManifest.xml
- apktool.yml

The Android Babel fish - Smali

```
public class MainActivity extends AppCompatActivity
{
    @Override
    protected void onCreate(Bundle savedInstanceState) {
        super.onCreate(savedInstanceState);
        setContentView(R.layout.activity_main);
        TextView tv =
        (TextView)findViewById(R.id.message);
        tv.setText("Don't Panic");
    }
}
```

```
.class public Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;
[...]
.line 14
const v0, 0x7f0800e2
invoke-virtual {p0, v0},
    Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity; ->
    findViewById(I)Landroid/view/View;
move-result-object v0
check-cast v0, Landroid/widget/TextView;

.line 15
.local v0, "tv":Landroid/widget/TextView;
const-string v1, "Don't Panic"
invoke-virtual {v0, v1}, Landroid/widget/TextView; ->
    setText(Ljava/lang/CharSequence;)V

.line 16
return-void
.end method
```

Smali crash course

```
sget-object v0, Ljava/lang/Boolean; ->TRUE:Ljava/lang/Boolean;
const-string v1, "Life, The Universe, and Everything"

invoke-virtual {v0}, Ljava/lang/Boolean; ->booleanValue()Z
move-result v2

if-eqz v2, :cond_0
invoke-direct {p0, v1}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity; ->getAnswer(
    Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Integer;
goto :goto_0

:cond_0
invoke-virtual {p0}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;
    ->getNoAnswer()Ljava/lang/String;

:goto_0
return-void
```

Smali crash course

```
sget-object v0, Ljava/lang/Boolean;->TRUE:Ljava/lang/Boolean;
const-string v1, "Life, The Universe, and Everything"
```

```
invoke-virtual {v0}, Ljava/lang/Boolean;->booleanValue()Z
move-result v2
```

```
if-eqz v2, :cond_0
invoke-direct {p0, v1}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;->getAnswer(
    Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Integer;
goto :goto_0
```

```
:cond_0
invoke-virtual {p0}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;
    ->getNoAnswer()Ljava/lang/String;
```

```
:goto_0
return-void
```

Simple data type
marked by an
uppercase letter

V	void
Z	Boolean
B	byte
C	char
I	int
F	float
S	short
J	long

Smali crash course

```
sget-object v0, Ljava/lang/Boolean;->TRUE:Ljava/lang/Boolean;
```

```
const-string v1, "Life, The Universe, and Everything"
```

```
invoke-virtual {v0}, Ljava/lang/Boolean;->booleanValue()Z
```

```
move-result v2
```

```
if-eqz v2, :cond_0
```

```
invoke-direct {p0, v1}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;->getAnswer(  
    Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Integer;
```

```
goto :goto_0
```

```
:cond_0
```

```
invoke-virtual {p0}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;  
    ->getNoAnswer()Ljava/lang/String;
```

```
:goto_0
```

```
return-void
```

Complex data types are denoted as:

L<fully qualified name>;

Smali crash course

```
sget-object v0, Ljava/lang/Boolean;->TRUE:Ljava/lang/Boolean;
const-string v1, "Life, The Universe, and Everything"

invoke-virtual {v0}, Ljava/lang/Boolean;->booleanValue()Z
move-result v2
if-eqz v2, :cond_0
invoke-direct {p0, v1}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;->getAnswer(
    Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Integer;
goto :goto_0

:cond_0
invoke-virtual {p0}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;
    ->getNoAnswer()Ljava/lang/String;

:goto_0
return-void
```

Data stored in local registers vX

Parameter register pX
p0 = "this"

Smali crash course

```
sget-object v0, Ljava/lang/Boolean;->TRUE:Ljava/lang/Boolean;
const-string v1, "Life, The Universe, and Everything"
directive for
method call
invoke-direct {v0}, Ljava/lang/Boolean;->booleanValue()Z
move-result v2
if-eqz v2, :cond_0
invoke-direct {p0, v1}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;
    ->getAnswer(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Integer;
goto :goto_0
:cond_0
invoke-virtual {p0}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;
    ->getNoAnswer()Ljava/lang/String;
:goto_0
return-void
```

Fully qualified
class name

Called
method

Type of argument
passed to method

Type of
return value

Smali crash course

```
sget-object v0, Ljava/lang/Boolean;->TRUE:Ljava/lang/Boolean;
const-string v1, "Life, The Universe, and Everything"
```

Registers with values
passed to the method call

```
invoke-virtual {v0}, Ljava/lang/Boolean;->booleanValue()Z
move-result v2
if-eqz v2, :cond_0
invoke-direct {p0 v1}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;
    ->getAnswer(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Integer;
goto :goto_0
```

```
:cond_0
invoke-virtual {p0}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;
    ->getNoAnswer()Ljava/lang/String;
```

```
:goto_0
return-void
```

Smali crash course

```
sget-object v0, Ljava/lang/Boolean;->TRUE:Ljava/lang/Boolean;  
const-string v1, "Life, The Universe, and Everything"
```

```
invoke-virtual {v0}, Ljava/lang/Boolean;->booleanValue()Z
```

```
move-result v2
```

```
if-eqz v2, :cond_0
```

```
invoke-direct {p0, v1}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;->getAnswer(  
    Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Integer;
```

```
goto :goto_0
```

```
:cond_0
```

```
invoke-virtual {p0}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;  
    ->getNoAnswer()Ljava/lang/String;
```

```
:goto_0
```

```
return-void
```

Return value of
method call is
stored in register

Smali crash course

```
sget-object v0, Ljava/lang/Boolean;->TRUE:Ljava/lang/Boolean;  
const-string v1, "Life, The Universe, and Everything"
```

```
invoke-virtual {v0}, Ljava/lang/Boolean;->booleanValue()Z  
move-result v2
```

Private method call

```
if-eqz v2, :cond_0  
invoke-direct {p0, v1}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;  
->getAnswer(Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Integer;  
goto :goto_0
```

Public method call

```
:cond_0  
invoke-virtual {p0}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;  
->getNoAnswer()Ljava/lang/String;
```

```
:goto_0  
return-void
```

Smali crash course

```
sget-object v0, Ljava/lang/Boolean;->TRUE:Ljava/lang/Boolean;
const-string v1, "Life, The Universe, and Everything"

invoke-virtual {v0}, Ljava/lang/Boolean;->booleanValue()Z
move-result v2


if-eqz v2, :cond_0 ← Conditional jump
invoke-direct {p0, v1}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;->get
    Ljava/lang/String;)Ljava/lang/Integer;
goto :goto_0

:cond_0
invoke-virtual {p0}, Lgalaxy/hitchhiker/dontpanic/MainActivity;
    ->getNoAnswer()Ljava/lang/String;

:goto_0
return-void
```

if-eq v1, v2	v1 == v2
if-ne v1, v2	v1 != v2
if-lt v1, v2	v1 < v2
if-gt v1, v2	v1 > v2
if-le v1, v2	v1 <= v2
if-ge v1, v2	v1 >= v2
if-eqz v2	v2 == 0
if-nez v2	v2 != 0
if-ltz v2	v2 < 0
if-gtz v2	v2 > 0
if-lez v2	v2 <= 0
if-gez v2	v2 >= 0

VSCode & Smalise



```
41
42 # virtual methods
43 .method protected onCreate(Landroid/os/Bundle;)V
44     .locals 2
45     .param p1, "savedInstanceState"    # Landroid/os/Bundle;
46
47     .line 9
48     invoke-super {p0, p1}, Landroidx/appcompat/app/AppCompatActivity;->onCreate(Landroid/os/Bundle;)
49
50     .line 10
51     const v0, 0x7f0b001c
52
53     invoke-virtual {p0, v0}, Lspace/hitchhacker/guide/MainActivity;->setContentView(IV)
54
55     .line 11
56     const v0, 0x7f080107
57
58     invoke-virtual {p0, v0}, Lspace/hitchhacker/guide/MainActivity;->findViewById(I)Landroid/view/View;
59
60     move-result-object v0
61
62     const-string v1, "findViewById(R.id.message)"
63
64     invoke-static {v0, v1}, Lkotlin/jvm/internal/Intrinsics;->checkNotNullExpressionValue(Ljava/lang/Object;)
65
66     check-cast v0, Landroid/widget/TextView;
```



Provides syntax highlighting and helps finding code references

Modify and reassemble

Reassemble the APK

```
$> apktool b hitchhacker  
I: Checking whether sources has changed...  
...
```

Create a key pair for signing

```
$> keytool -genkey -v -keystore foo.keystore -alias keyalias -  
keyalg RSA -keysize 2048 -validity 10000  
Enter keystore password:
```

...

Sign the APK

```
$> jarsigner -sigalg SHA1withRSA -digestalg SHA1 -keystore  
foo.keystore hitchhacker.apk keyalias  
Enter Passphrase for keystore:
```

...

Align the APK

```
$> zipalign -v 4 hitchhacker.apk hitchhacker-aligned.apk  
Verifying alignment of hitchhacker-aligned.apk (4)...
```

But we like being lazy

Sign and zipalign the APK using the integrated debug keystore

Sign the APK with your own keystore

```
$> java -jar uber-apk-signer.jar --apks hitchhacker.apk
```

```
$> java -jar uber-apk-signer.jar --apks hitchhacker.apk --ks  
foo.keystore --ksAlias keyalias
```

<https://github.com/patrickfav/uber-apk-signer>



The bridge iS yours

Patch the Hitchhacker app so you can log in without knowing the pin code

Decompile: `apktool d -r hitchhacker.apk`

Recompile: `apktool b --use-aapt2 -o fixed_hitchhacker.apk`
`hitchhacker`

Sign: `java -jar uber-apk-signer.jar --apks`
`fixed_hitchhacker.apk`

- ★ Install and launch the Vogon Construction application.
Patch the app to get around the login restrictions

Solution

1. Patch Hitchhacker app

```
$> java -jar /usr/local/bin/apktool.jar b --use-aapt2 -o  
      fixed_hitchhacker.apk hitchhacker  
$> java -jar uber-apk-signer.jar --apks  
      fixed_hitchhacker.apk  
$> adb install fixed_hitchhacker-aligned-debugSigned.apk
```

2. Patch Vogon Construction app

```
if(!isVogonOperator()) {...}
```

```
.line 29
invoke-direct {p0}, Lcom/nviso/vogonconstruction/MainActivity;->isVogonOperator()Z

move-result p1

if-nez p1, :cond_33

.line 30
new-instance p1, Landroidx/appcompat/app/AlertDialog$Builder;

const v0, 0x7f100002

invoke-direct {p1, p0, v0}, Landroidx/appcompat/app/AlertDialog$Builder;-><init>(Lan

invoke-virtual {p1}, Landroidx/appcompat/app/AlertDialog$Builder;->create()Landroidx
```

```
    .end method

.method protected onCreate(Landroid/os/Bundle;)V
    .locals 3
    .try 0, 29, 30, 31
        .line 26
        invoke-super {p0, p1}, Landroidx/appcompat/app/AppCompatActivity;
        .line 27
        invoke-virtual {p0, p1}, Leu/nviso/vogonconstruction/MainActivity;
        .line 29
        invoke-direct {p0}, Leu/nviso/vogonconstruction/MainActivity;→isV
    .end try

    move-result p1
    if-eqz p1, :cond_0
    .line 30
    new-instance p1, Landroidx/appcompat/app/AlertDialog$Builder;
```

BSides Munich 2023

Our Journey



Big Bang
of Basics




Adventures
on Android



Incidents
on iOS




Meddling in
the Middle



Boarding the SpaceShip

Devices & jailbreaking

Getting a testing device



Usually only older iOS versions can be jailbroken


Cost factor



iOS simulator in Xcode cannot run apps from App Store


Limited other options due to Apple's closed environment

Jailbreaking



Jailbreaking

A jailbreak nullifies one or more signature validation checks




Jailbreaking



checkra1n

iPhone 5s - iPhone X
iOS 12.3 - 14.8

<https://checkra.in/>



palera1n

iPhone 5s - iPhone X
iOS 15.0 - 16.x


[https://github.com/
palera1n/palera1n](https://github.com/palera1n/palera1n)



uncover

iOS 11.0 - 14.8

<https://uncover.dev/>




Fugu15


iOS 15.0 - 15.4.1

[https://github.com/
pinauten/Fugu15](https://github.com/pinauten/Fugu15)


Jailbreaking




Jailbreaking



Gear Up




Cydia App Store is included in most jailbreaks and allows us to install useful tools for pentesting



Most jailbreaks install an SSH server on the device. If not, you can install it via Cydia

Gear Up



Frida – build.frida.re

Frida server to observe and reprogram running apps



BigBoss tools – apt.thebigboss.org

Useful tools, e.g. zip, unzip, sqlite3, wget, OpenSSH etc.



Filza – cydia.akemi.ai

File manager and IPA installer



AppSync Unified – cydia.akemi.ai


Disable signature requirements for installing apps



iHide – repo.kc57.com

Bypass jailbreak detection

Reaching out



Exploring the planet

the content of the IPA

/private/var/containers/Bundle/Application/[appID]



/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/[appID]



Exploring the planet

```
iPhone:~ root# ipainstaller -l  
com.apple.TestFlight  
com.swiftkey.SwiftKeyApp  
space.hitchhacker.Hello
```

```
...  
iPhone:~ root# ipainstaller -i space.hitchhacker.Hello  
Identifier: space.hitchhacker.Hello  
Version: 1  
Short Version: 1.0  
Name: Hello  
Display Name: Hello  
Bundle: /private/var/containers/Bundle/Application/6A745F9C-D991-43E4-9C4A-0F380CD18D9B  
Application: /private/var/containers/Bundle/Application/6A745F9C-D991-43E4-9C4A-  
0F380CD18D9B/Hello.app  
Data: /private/var/mobile/Containers/Data/Application/BEA183DA-19AF-48D8-A5C8-F1F22C7CF48E
```

IPA Installer Console can be installed via Cydia

Locates local files related to the application




Rocket Science

Inside an IPA

InSide an IPA

```
$> unzip hitchhacker.ipa -d hitchhacker  
$> ls -la hitchhacker
```




Signing off

Developers build
and sign app




Apple approves the app and
signs it with their private key

Upon installation, iOS
checks the app
signatures and refuses
app in case of invalid
signatures



Signing off



App

For testing purposes apps can be distributed with a provisioning profile instead of being signed with Apple's private key



Ad-Hoc Certificate

- ▶ Free developer account
 - Valid for 7 days
 - For up to 100 devices
- ▶ Paid developer account (\$99/year)
 - Valid for 1 year
 - For up to 100 devices


Enterprise Certificate

- \$299/year for companies with more than 100 employees
- Valid for 3 years
- Unlimited devices

Obtaining an IPA

Apps are encrypted, so we need to obtain the IPA when the app is decrypted while running

We need a jailbroken device




Dump on phone

<https://github.com/JohnCoates/flexdecrypt>
<https://onejailbreak.com/blog/crackerxi/>

Dump to host

<https://github.com/AloneMonkey/frida-ios-dump>



The Cargo Bay

How data is stored on iOS

File protection

Data object with
file content

```
do {  
  try data.write(  
    to: fileURL,  
    options: .completeFileProtection  
  )  
} catch {  
  // Handle errors  
}
```

Protection level that determines
encryption of file

Protection levels

`.noFileProtection`

Unencrypted
Reading and writing always possible

`.completeFileProtection`

Encrypted
Reading and writing only possible if device is unlocked


`.completeFileProtectionUnlessOpen`

Encrypted
Reading and writing only possible if device is unlocked;
files remains available for background use

`.completeFileProtectionUntilFirst
UserAuthentication` (default)

Encrypted
Reading and writing only possible if device has been
unlocked once after a reboot

File encryption



NSUserDefaults

To store small pieces of information

```
// Write  
UserDefaults.standard.set("42", forKey: "UltimateAnswer")
```

```
// Read  
UserDefaults.standard.string(forKey: "UltimateAnswer")
```

plist files

```
iPhone:/private/var/.../Library/Safari root# file *.plist
```

FrequentlyVisitedSitesBannedURLStore.plist: XML 1.0 document, ASCII text

PasswordBreachStore.plist:

Apple binary property list

Binary or
XML data

plist files

```
$> plistutil -i PasswordBreachStore.plist -o Store.out
```

Convert binary
plist to XML

```
$> head Store.out
```

```
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
<!DOCTYPE plist PUBLIC "-//Apple//DTD PLIST 1.0//EN"
"http://www.apple.com/DTDs/PropertyList-1.0.dtd">
<plist version="1.0">
<dict>
```

Key-value
pairs

```
  <key>KeychainPersistentIdentifierCanaryValue</key>
  <string>6F30D983-A91B-4337-9D78-5FE72480B153</string>
  <key>Version</key>
  <integer>1</integer>
  <key>KeychainPersistentIdentifierCanaryPersistentIdentifier</key>
  <data>
```

Databases



SQLite



Realm



Firebase



Couchbase Lite


NoSQL database

Not encrypted by default
Encryption can be enabled
through configuration

Keychain

Encrypted SQLite
database

Single Keychain
for all apps



Data can be stored with an Accessibility attribute that determines when the data becomes accessible

- Always
- After unlocking the device once after restart
- When device is unlocked
- Only when passcode is set for device

Data access

```
let username = "arthur"
let password = "acupoftea".data(using: .utf8)!

let query: [String: Any] = [
    kSecClass as String: kSecClassGenericPassword,
    kSecAttrAccount as String: username,
    kSecValueData as String: password,
    kSecAttrAccessible as String: kSecAttrAccessibleWhenUnlocked
]
let status = SecItemAdd(query as CFDictionary, nil)
guard status == errSecSuccess else { throw KeychainError.unhandledError(status: status) }
```

Data can be stored with an Accessibility attribute which specifies when access to the data item is possible

Data access

Always (deprecated)

Always accessible

AfterFirstUnlock

Accessible if device has been unlocked once after a reboot

WhenUnlocked

Accessible if the device is currently unlocked

WhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly

Accessible if the device is currently unlocked and the user has set up a passcode for the device

...ThisDeviceOnly

For a backup, data will be encrypted with a device-specific key; thus it cannot be restored on a different device

Access control

```
let access = SecAccessControlCreateWithFlags(nil,  
    kSecAttrAccessibleWhenPasscodeSetThisDeviceOnly,  
    .userPresence,  
    nil)
```

```
let query: [String: Any] = [kSecClass as String: kSecClassInternetPassword,  
    kSecAttrAccount as String: account,  
    kSecAttrServer as String: server,  
    kSecAttrAccessControl as String: access as Any,  
    kSecUseAuthenticationContext as String: context,  
    kSecValueData as String: password]
```

Access control instance defines accessibility and authentication requirements of a keychain item

Access control

userPresence

Require biometric authentication or fall back to passcode if biometry is not available

biometryAny

Require biometric authentication with any enrolled biometrics (Touch or Face ID)., i.e. also biometric features that were enrolled after the creation of the keychain item

biometryCurrentSet

Require biometric authentication with *currently enrolled* biometrics (Touch or Face ID). If biometric features are added or removed, the item becomes invalid

devicePasscode

Require device passcode



static analysis

Opening the binary

Creating iOS apps



The original language

Highly dynamic

Still used, but less and less

RE friendly




New kid on the block

Compiles to normal C


Used more and more

Difficult to RE

Hopper



Ghidra



Decompiled ObjC / C

```
Cf Decompile: addKeyWithValue: - (Playground)
1
2 /* Function Stack Size: 0x20 bytes */
3
4 void VulnerableVault::addKeyWithValue:(ID param_1,SEL param_2,ID param_3,ID param_4)
5
6{
7    id value;
8    id pvVar1;
9    id value_00;
10   CFDictioaryRef attributes;
11
12   value = _objc_retain((id)param_3);
13   pvVar1 = (id)_objc_msgSend(param_4,"dataUsingEncoding:",4);
14   pvVar1 = _objc_retainAutoreleasedReturnValue(pvVar1);
15   value_00 = (id)prepareDict:(param_1,(SEL)"prepareDict:",(ID)value);
16   attributes = (CFDictionaryRef)_objc_retainAutoreleasedReturnValue(value_00);
17   _objc_release(value);
18   _objc_msgSend(attributes,"setObject:forKey:",pvVar1,*(_undefined8 *)PTR__kSecValueData_1000104a8);
19   _objc_msgSend(attributes,"setObject:forKey:",&cf_VulnerableVaultService,
20                  +(_undefined8 *)PTR__kSecAttrService_100010490);
21   _SecItemAdd(attributes,(CFTypeRef *)0x0);
22   _objc_release(attributes);
23   _objc_release(pvVar1);
24   return;
25 }
26
```

Our Journey




Big Bang
of Basics

BSides Munich 2023



Adventures
on Android



Incidents
on iOS



Meddling in
the Middle




nvISO


Igniting the Infinite Improbability Drive

Hooking with Frida


Frida



Frida




Frida



[github.com/ViRb3/
magisk-frida](https://github.com/ViRb3/magisk-frida)



build.frida.re



<https://github.com/frida/frida/>

What to do without root?



On non-rooted/jailbroken devices, we can compile frida-agent.so (Android) / FridaGadget.dylib (iOS) into the app

```
$> objection patchapk --source ./hitchhacker.apk  
$> objection patchipa --source "HitchHacker.ipa"  
--codesign-signature XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
```

Frida

```
$> frida-ps -Ua
```

PID	Name	Identifier
946	Calendar	com.apple.mobilecal
985	Poems	space.hitchhacker.guide

Connect via USB

List running user-land applications

```
$> frida -Uf space.hitchhacker.guide
```

```
/ _ | Frida 16.0.2 - A world-class dynamic instrumentation toolkit
| ( _ |
> _ |
/_/ | _ |
```

Commands:

- help -> Displays the help system
- object? -> Display information about 'object'
- exit/quit -> Exit

More info at <https://frida.re/docs/home/>

... Connected to iOS Device (id=d7070753257d3c069acf97f642f2de6917061448)

[iOS Device::space.hitchhacker.guide] ->

Interactive console

Frida for Android - InSpect



```
$> [Pixel 3a::space.hitchhacker.guide]-> Java.enumerateLoadedClassesSync()
[
    "android.icu.text.UnicodeSet$ComparisonStyle",
    "android.icu.text.CharsetRecog_mbcs$iteratedChar",
    "android.icu.impl.duration.impl.XMLRecordWriter",
...
$> [Pixel 3a::space.hitchhacker.guide]-> Java.enumerateMethods("space.hitchhacker.guide.
    LoginActivity!*")
[
    {
        "classes": [
            {
                "methods": [
                    "$r8$lambda$ABD1GrxfYNKMF77fryH3xXrhFCo",
                    "$init",
                    "launchMain",
                    "validatePin",
                    ...
                ]
            }
        ]
    }
]
```

List all loaded classes

*List all methods using wildcards:
*class!*method**

Frida for Android - Scripts

Our script

```
$> frida -U -l theanswer.js -f space.hitchhacker.guide
```

*App package name
that we want to attack*

Frida Scripts - Analyzing static variables

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer
{
    public static String question;
    public static String getAnswer()
    {
        String answer = calculate(this.question);
        return answer;
    }
}
```

We want to know the value of the static variable “question”

Frida Scripts - Analyzing static variables

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer
{
    public static String question;
    public static String getAnswer()
    {
        String answer = calculate(this.question);
        return answer;
    }
}

function myFunction() {

    // Here goes the hooking code

}
Java.perform(myFunction);
```

Frida Scripts - Analyzing static variables

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer
{
    public static String question;
    public static String getAnswer()
    {
        String answer = calculate(this.question);
        return answer;
    }
}

Java.perform(() => {

    // Here goes the hooking code

});
```

Frida Scripts - Analyzing static variables

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer
{
    public static String question;
    public static String getAnswer()
    {
        String answer = calculate(this.question);
        return answer;
    }
}

function myFunction() {
    var answerClass = Java.use("space.hitchhacker.TheAnswer");

    // ...TODO...
}
Java.perform(myFunction);
```

Fully qualified name of the class to be analyzed

Frida Scripts - Analyzing static variables

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer
{
    public static String question;
    public static String getAnswer()
    {
        String answer = calculate(this.question);
        return answer;
    }
}

function myFunction() {
    var answerClass = Java.use("space.hitchhacker.TheAnswer");

    console.log("Question: " + answerClass.question.value)
}
Java.perform(myFunction);
```

We're logging the value of the "question" variable

Frida Scripts - Analyzing arguments

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer
{
    public String question;
    public String getAnswer(String question)
    {
        String answer = calculate(question);
        return answer;
    }
}
```

We want to know which “question” is passed to the “getAnswer” method

Frida Scripts - Analyzing arguments

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer
{
    public String question;
    public String getAnswer(String question)
    {
        String answer = calculate(question);
        return answer;
    }
}
```

```
function myFunction() {
    var answerClass = Java.use("space.hitchhacker.TheAnswer");

    answerClass.getAnswer.implementation = function(question) {
        console.log("Question: " + question);
    }
}
Java.perform(myFunction);
```

Method name and arguments whose implementation we want to analyze

We're logging the value of "question"

Frida Scripts - Analyzing arguments

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer
{
    public String question;
    public String getAnswer(String question)
    {
        String answer = calculate(question);
        return answer;
    }
}

function myFunction() {
    var answerClass = Java.use("space.hitchhacker.TheAnswer");

    answerClass.getAnswer.implementation = function(question) {
        console.log("Question: " + question);
        this.getAnswer(question);
    }
}
Java.perform(myFunction);
```

*We have to call the original method
so it is executed*

Frida Scripts - Modifying arguments

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer
{
    public String question;
    public String getAnswer(String question) ▶
    {
        String answer = calculate(question);
        return answer;
    }
}
```

We want to get the answer for a certain question

Frida Scripts - Modifying arguments

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer
{
    public String question;
    public String getAnswer(String question)
    {
        String answer = calculate(question);
        return answer;
    }
}

function myFunction() {
    var answerClass = Java.use("space.hitchhacker.TheAnswer");

    answerClass.getAnswer.implementation = function(question) {
        this.getAnswer("My custom question");
    }
}
Java.perform(myFunction);
```

Calling the function with modified arguments

Frida Scripts - Analyzing return values

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer
{
    public String question;
    public String getAnswer(String question)
    {
        String answer = calculate(question);
        return answer;
    }
}
```

We want to know which “answer” is returned by the method

Frida Scripts - Analyzing return values

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer
{
    public String question;
    public String getAnswer(String question)
    {
        String answer = calculate(question);
        return
    }
}

function myFunction() {
    var answerClass = Java.use("space.hitchhacker.TheAnswer");

    answerClass.getAnswer.implementation = function(question) {
        var answer = this.getAnswer(question);
        console.log("Answer: " + answer);
        return answer;
    }
}
Java.perform(myFunction);
```

We're logging the return value of the function and then return it normally

Frida Scripts - Modifying return values

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer
{
    public String question;
    public String getAnswer(String question)
    {
        String answer = calculate(question);
        return answer;
    }
}
```

We want to set a certain value to be returned as “answer”

Frida Scripts - Modifying return values

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer
{
    public String question;
    public String getAnswer(String question)
    {
        String answer = calculate(question);
        return answer;
    }
}

function myFunction() {
    var answerClass = Java.use("space.hitchhacker.TheAnswer");

    answerClass.getAnswer.implementation = function(question) {
        return "42";
    }
}
Java.perform(myFunction);
```

The answer is always 42

Frida Scripts - Method overload

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer {

    public String getAnswer(String question)  {
        String answer = calculate(question);
        return answer;
    }

    public String getAnswer(int numquestion)  {
        String answer = calculate(numquestion);
        return answer;
    }

    public String getAnswer(String[] questionarray)  {
        String answer = calculate(questionarray);
        return answer;
    }
}
```

Methods have the same name but expect different arguments

Frida Scripts - Method overload

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer {

    public String getAnswer(String question) {
        String answer = calculate(question);
        return answer;
    }

    public String getAnswer(int numquestion) {
        String answer = calculate(numquestion);
        return answer;
    }

    public String getAnswer(String[] questionarray) {
        String answer = calculate(questionarray);
        return answer;
    }
}
```

```
function myFunction() {
    var answerClass =
        Java.use("space.hitchhacker.TheAnswer");

    answerClass.getAnswer.overload("java.lang.String")
        .implementation = function(question) {
            // ...
        }
}
Java.perform(myFunction);
```

Frida Scripts - Method overload

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer {

    public String getAnswer(String question) {
        String answer = calculate(question);
        return answer;
    }

    public String getAnswer(int numquestion) {
        String answer = calculate(numquestion);
        return answer;
    }

    public String getAnswer(String[] questionarray) {
        String answer = calculate(questionarray);
        return answer;
    }
}
```

```
function myFunction() {
    var answerClass =
        Java.use("space.hitchhacker.TheAnswer");

    answerClass.getAnswer.overload("int").implementa-
        tion = function(question) {
            // ...
        }
    Java.perform(myFunction);
```

Frida Scripts - Method overload

```
package space.hitchhacker;
public class TheAnswer {

    public String getAnswer(String question) {
        String answer = calculate(question);
        return answer;
    }

    public String getAnswer(int numquestion) {
        String answer = calculate(numquestion);
        return answer;
    }

    public String getAnswer(String[] questionarray) {
        String answer = calculate(questionarray);
        return answer;
    }
}
```

```
function myFunction() {
    var answerClass =
        Java.use("space.hitchhacker.TheAnswer");

    answerClass.getAnswer.overload(
        "[Ljava.lang.String").implementation =
        function(question) {
            // ...
        }
    Java.perform(myFunction);
```

Frida Scripts - Method overload

Java

int
byte
short
long
float
double
char
<Object>
(z.B. String)

Frida

int
byte
short
long
float
double
char
<package>.<Object>
(z.B. java.lang.String)

Java

int[]
byte[]
short[]
long[]
float[]
double[]
char[]
<Object>[]
(z.B. String[])

Frida

[I
[B
[S
[J
[F
[D
[C
[L<package>.<Object>
(z.B. [Ljava.lang.String)

Frida Scripts - Static inner classes

```
package space.hitchhacker.guide;
public class TheAnswer {

    static class TheStaticAnswer {
```

```
        public static String getAnswer() {
            return 'Static 42';
        }
    }
}
```

*We can access them via
<OuterClass>\$<StaticClass> and then call
methods directly*

```
function myFunction() {
    var staticAnswerClass =
        Java.use("space.hitchhacker.TheAnswer$TheStaticAnswer");

    console.log(staticAnswerClass.getAnswer())
}

Java.perform(myFunction);
```

Frida Scripts - Non-static inner classes

```
package space.hitchhacker.guide;
public class TheAnswer {

    class TheExactAnswer {

        public String getAnswer() {
            return '42';
        }
    }
}
```

*We can access them via
⟨OuterClass⟩\$⟨InnerClass⟩ and have to
create a new instance with \$new before
calling a method*


```
function myFunction() {
    var answerClass = Java.use("space.hitchhacker.TheAnswer");

    var exactAnswerClass =
        Java.use("space.hitchhacker.TheAnswer$TheExactAnswer");

    var answerInstance = answerClass.$new();
    var exactAnswerInstance = exactAnswerClass.$new(answerInstance)

    console.log(exactAnswerInstance.getAnswer())
}
Java.perform(myFunction);
```

Frida - jadx to the rescue



File View Navigation Tools Help

app-release.apk

Source code

>LoginActivity

```
    } else if (i2 != 3) {
    } else {
        if (validatePin()) {
            launchMain();
            return;
        }
        clearPin();
        Toast.makeText(this, (int) R.string.failed_login, 0).show();
    }

    private final void changeFocus(int i) {
        this.pinInput.get(i).clearFocus();
        this.pinInput.get(i + 1).requestFocus();
    }

    private final void clearPin() {
        for (EditText editText : this.pinInput) {
            editText.getText().cl
        }
        this.pinInput.get(3).clearFocus();
        this.pinInput.get(0).requestFocus();
    }

    private final boolean validatePin() {
        StringBuilder sb = new StringBuilder();
        for (EditText editText : this.pinInput) {
            sb.append(editText.getText().toString());
        }
        String sb2 = sb.toString();
        Intrinsics.checkNotNull(sb2);
        if (AppKt.getEncprefs().getEncSharedPrefsPin() == sb2) {
            return Intrinsics.areEqual(sb2, AppKt.getEncprefs().getEncSharedPrefsPin());
        }
        return (Integer.parseInt(sb2) - Integer.parseInt(this.pinInput.get(3).getText().toString())) == 0;
    }

    private final void launchMain() {
        startActivity(new Intent(this, MainActivity.class));
    }
}
```

Issues: 23 warnings

Code Smali

Copy as frida snippet (f)

Frida - jadx to the rescue

```
let LoginActivity = Java.use("space.hitchhacker.guide.LoginActivity");
LoginActivity.validatePin.implementation = function(){
    console.log('validatePin is called');
    let ret = this.validatePin();
    console.log('validatePin ret value is ' + ret);
    return ret;
};
```

*Generated JavaScript code
Don't forget to wrap it in Java.perform()*

Frida Scripts for iOS

Get references to class and method

```
var SC = ObjC.classes["SharedCredentialController"]
var pC = SC["- passwordCredential"];
Interceptor.attach(pC.implementation,
{
  onEnter: function(args)
  {
    console.log(args[0]);
  },
  onLeave: function(retval)
  {
    console.log(new ObjC.Object(retval).toString());
    retval.replace(1);
  }
});
```

Use Interceptor.attach

Implement onEnter / onLeave functions (both are optional)

Beg, Borrow, Steal, Create



<https://learnfrida.info/>



Runtime Mobile Security

github.com/mobilesecurity/RMS-Runtime-Mobile-Security



github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF



OBJECTION
RUNTIME
MOBILE
EXPLORATION
GIT.10/OBJECTION

github.com/sensepost/objection



Grapefruit

github.com/ChiChou/grapefruit




github.com/FrenchYeti/dexcalibur



codeshare.frida.re



github.com/nccgroup/house



The bridge iS yours

Demo: Setting up Frida



The bridge is yours

Bypass the login pin of the Hitchhacker app

Launch the Vogon Construction App

Disable the access restrictions

- ★ Obtain the SQLite password
- ★ Obtain the deactivation password
- ★ Obtain all users and their passwords

Solution

Hitchhacker: Pin bypass

```
Java.perform(() => {
    var myClass = Java.use("space.hitchhacker.guide.LoginActivity");

    myClass.validatePin.implementation = function() {
        console.log("Returning true for pin");
        return true;
    }
});
```

Solution

Vogon Construction: Disable access restriction

```
Java.perform(() => {
    var myClass = Java.use("eu.nviso.vogonconstruction.MainActivity");

    myClass.isVogonOperator.implementation = function() {
        console.log("Returning true for vogon operator");
        return true;
    }
});
```

Solution

Vogon Construction: Obtain SQLite password

```
Java.perform(() => {
  let AnonymousClass1 = Java.use("eu.nviso.vogonconstruction.UserProvider$1");
  AnonymousClass1.toString.implementation = function(){
    console.log('toString is called');
    let ret = this.toString();
    console.log('toString ret value is ' + ret);
    return ret;
  };
});
```

Solution

Vogon Construction: Obtain deactivation password

```
Java.perform(() => {
  let ControlPanel = Java.use("eu.nviso.vogonconstruction.ControlPanel");
  ControlPanel.generateNewPassword.implementation = function(){
    console.log('generateNewPassword is called');
    let ret = this.generateNewPassword();
    console.log('generateNewPassword ret value is ' + ret);
    return ret;
  };
});
```

Solution

Vogon Construction: Obtain all users and their passwords

```
Java.perform(() => {
  let UserProvider = Java.use("eu.nviso.vogonconstruction.UserProvider");
  UserProvider.query.implementation = function(uri, strArr, str, strArr2, str2){
    let ret = this.query(uri, strArr, str, strArr2, str2);
    while(ret.moveToNext()) {
      console.log("User: " + ret.getString(ret.getColumnIndexOrThrow("name")));
      console.log("Password: " + ret.getString(ret.getColumnIndexOrThrow("password")));
      console.log("---");
    }
    return ret;
  };
});
```

Igniting the Infinite Improbability Drive Again

Hooking with Objection

Objection

Install with pip

```
$> pip3 install objection
$> objection -g space.hitchhacker.guide explore
Using USB device `SM G950F`
Agent injected and responds ok!
```

(object)inject(ion) v1.11.0

*Built on top of Frida
Supports Android and iOS*

Runtime Mobile Exploration

by: @leonjza from @sensepost

Interactive console

[tab] for command suggestions
Space.hitchhacker.guide on (samsung: 12) [usb] #

Objection for Android

Calling default scripts for common scenarios

```
# android sslpinning disable
```

```
(agent) Custom TrustManager ready, overriding SSLContext.init()  
(agent) Found com.android.org.conscrypt.TrustManagerImpl, overriding  
TrustManagerImpl.verifyChain()  
(agent) Found com.android.org.conscrypt.TrustManagerImpl, overriding  
TrustManagerImpl.checkTrustedRecursive()  
(agent) Registering job 523285. Type: android-sslpinning-disable
```

```
# android root disable
```

```
(agent) Registering job 040751. Type: root-detection-disable
```

May or may not work...

Objection for Android

```
# android hooking list activities
com.google.android.gms.ads.AdActivity
com.google.android.gms.common.api.GoogleApiActivity
org.proxydroid.AppManager
org.proxydroid.BypassListActivity
org.proxydroid.FileChooser
org.proxydroid.ProxyDroid
```

List all activities

Launch any activity (including non-exported ones)

```
# android intent launch_activity org.proxydroid.BypassListActivity
Starting activity org.proxydroid.BypassListActivity...
(agent) Activity successfully asked to start.
```

```
# android hooking search classes proxy
$Proxy0
$Proxy2
[Landroid.net.IpConfiguration$ProxySettings;
[Landroid.net.ProxyInfo;
...
```

Search for interesting classes

Objection for Android

List all methods

```
# android hooking list class_methods org.proxydroid.ProxyDroid
private android.widget.LinearLayout org.proxydroid.ProxyDroid.getLayout(android.view.ViewParent)
private boolean org.proxydroid.ProxyDroid.isEmpty(java.lang.String,java.lang.String)
private boolean org.proxydroid.ProxyDroid.serviceStart()
...
```

Monitor function usage

```
# android hooking watch class_method org.proxydroid.ProxyDroid.serviceStart
(agent) Attempting to watch class org.proxydroid.ProxyDroid and method serviceStart.
(agent) Hooking org.proxydroid.ProxyDroid.serviceStart()
(agent) Registering job 459083. Type: watch-method for: org.proxydroid.ProxyDroid.serviceStart
```

```
# android hooking set return_value org.proxydroid.ProxyDroid.serviceStart true
(agent) Attempting to modify return value for class org.proxydroid.ProxyDroid and method serviceStart.
(agent) Hooking org.proxydroid.ProxyDroid.serviceStart()
(agent) Registering job 785400. Type: set-return for: org.proxydroid.ProxyDroid.serviceStart
```

Modify basic return values

Objection for iOS



```
$> objection -N -h 10.11.1.1 -g com.apple.mobilecal explore
Using networked device @`10.11.1.1:27042` ↴
Agent injected and responds ok!
```

```
|__| (object)inject(ion) v1.11.0
```

Runtime Mobile Exploration

by: @leonjza from @sensepost

[tab] for command suggestions
com.apple.mobilecal on (iPhone: 15.7) [net] #

*Connect over network using -N
and -h*

Interactive console

Objection for iOS

Default scripts for common scenarios

```
# com.apple.mobilecal on (iPhone: 15.7) [net] # ios sslpinning disable
(agent) Hooking common framework methods
(agent) Found NSURLSession based classes. Hooking known pinning methods.
(agent) Hooking lower level SSL methods
(agent) Hooking lower level TLS methods
(agent) Hooking BoringSSL methods
(agent) Registering job 440948. Type: ios-sslpinning-disable
# com.apple.mobilecal on (iPhone: 15.7) [net] # ios jailbreak disable
(agent) Registering job 492880. Type: ios-jailbreak-disable
```

May or may not work...

Objection for iOS

```
com.apple.mobilecal on (iPhone: 14.7.1) [usb] # ios keychain dump
Created  Accessible  ACL  Type  Account  Service  Data
-----  -----  ---  -----  -----  -----  -----
2022-04-29 08:37:09 +0000  AfterFirstUnlock  None  kSecClassKey
(Key data not displayed)
2022-04-29 08:36:06 +0000  AfterFirstUnlock  None  Password  arthur@space
com.apple.gs.beta.auth.com.apple.account.AppleIDAuthentication.token
AA---SNIP---9E=
```

```
com.apple.mobilecal on (iPhone: 14.7.1) [usb] # ios keychain dump --json keychain.json
```

Note: You may be asked to authenticate using the devices passcode or TouchID

Dumping the iOS keychain...

Writing keychain as json to keychain.json...

Dumped keychain to: keychain.json

Dump the content of the keychain for the current app

Save the dump to a json file on the host

Objection for iOS

```
# ios hooking search classes Security
NSFileSecurity
  __NSPlaceholderFileSecurity
  __NSFileSecurity
SecuritydXPCCallback
SecuritydXPCCClient
UISUISecurityContext
AFSecurityConnection
...
```

Search for interesting classes

List class methods

```
# ios hooking list class_methods AFSecurityConnection
- _connection
- setInternalAuthSessionToken:completion:
- _processData:usingProcedure:completion:
- processDataMap:usingProcedure:completion:
- initWithInstanceContext:
...
```

Objection for iOS

Monitor function usage

```
# ios hooking watch method  "-[AFSecurityConnection setInternalAuthSessionToken:completion:]"
(agent) Found selector at 0x18ea9b758 as -[AFSecurityConnection setInternalAuthSessionToken:completion:]
(agent) Registering job 328546. Type: watch-method for: -[AFSecurityConnection
setInternalAuthSessionToken:completion:]
com.apple.mobilecal on (iPhone: 15.7) [net] #
```

```
# ios hooking set return_value  "-[AFSecurityConnection setInternalAuthSessionToken:completion:]" false
(agent) Found selector at 0x18ea9b758 as -[AFSecurityConnection setInternalAuthSessionToken:completion:]
(agent) Registering job 545668. Type: set-method-return for: -[AFSecurityConnection
setInternalAuthSessionToken:completion:]
com.apple.mobilecal on (iPhone: 15.7) [net] #
```

Modify basic return values



The bridge is yours

1. Launch the Hitchhacker app with Objection
2. List all activites and launch and launch one of them
3. Identify the methods of the LoginActivity and modify the return value of the appropriate method to log in without knowing the pin


Back to Earth

Adventures we didn't have time for

Establishing a Man in the Middle



Bypassing SSL pinning



Frameworks



Xamarin



Unity



React Native



Ionic



Flutter



Apache Cordova

Further tools

House

Start Preload Monitor Enumeration Hooks Intercept

Hooks

classname
method
overload type e.g. [java.lang.String, java.lang.String] leave blank to hook all overloads
DexClassLoader Path: for dynamically loaded classes; leave blank for default classloader

Add **Clear**

Current Hooks
1: {classname:"", "method": ""}

Generated Script (Modified) History Script Mini Script Load Script Detach Save Script

Please double check you have input the package name and hooks 1st

<https://github.com/nccgroup/house>



The screenshot shows the Dexcalibur static analysis interface. At the top, there are tabs for Overview, Static analysis (which is selected and highlighted in yellow), Hook, Runtime analysis, APK, Settings, and Auto-save (ON). Below the tabs is a search bar with the query "class name:Vogon". To the right of the search bar are buttons for "Search" and "Probe all". Under the search bar, there are several filtering options: Filter, Start, Stop, Run again, Keep cache, Run by package, Filter by code, Case insensitive, and a dropdown for "Order by". The main content area is a table with three columns: Package, Name, and Action. The table lists 13 entries, all of which are "Renamed" (indicated by a blue "Rename" button). The entries are: space.hitchhiker.guide.databinding, FragmentBindingOnBinding, ControlPanelS1, ControlPanelS2, ControlPanelS2, ControlPanelS2, CryptoBox, Happiness, UserContractItems, UserPanel, UserPreferenceS1, UserPreferenceS1, VogonPanelS1, and VogonMain. At the bottom left, it says "Showing 1 to 13 of 13 entries".

<https://github.com/FrenchYeti/dexcalibur>

<https://github.com/mobilesecurity/RMS-Runtime-Mobile-Security>

The screenshot shows the main interface of the MobSF application. At the top, there are tabs for RECENT SCANS, STATIC ANALYZER, DYNAMIC ANALYZER, REST API, DONATE, TOOLS, ABOUT, and DOWNLOADS. On the left, a sidebar titled 'Static Analyzer' lists sections: Information, Scan Options, Signer Certificate, Permissions, Android API, and Browserable Activities. Below this is a 'SECURITY ANALYSIS' section with 'Malware Analysis' and 'Components' dropdowns. At the bottom of the sidebar are PDF Report, Print Report, and Start Dynamic Analysis buttons.

APP SCORES

	Score: 94/100	Version: 2/438

FILE INFORMATION

	File Name: NASA_05_Apk.apk
	File Size: 22.93MB
	File Hash: 1046443694464dfc0941dd0995d5f
	MD5 Hash: cd81e32c01063624411ba4880511650babcb0d
	SHA1 Hash: 0e1a687fb978219e104567c3e96a0df72487

APP INFORMATION

	App Name: NASA
	Package Name: gov.nasa
	Main Activity: gov.nasa.MainActivity
	Version: 2.0.0 <small>(Build: 2.0.0)</small>
	Android Version: 2.0.0 <small>(Android Version: 2.0.0)</small>

ACTIVITIES **33** View 0

SERVICES **19** View 0

RECEIVERS **14** View 0

PROVIDERS **5** View 0

Exported Activities **0**

Exported Services **1**

Exported Receivers **2**

Exported Providers **0**

<https://github.com/MobSF/Mobile-Security-Framework-MobSF>

MASVS

<https://mas.owasp.org/>

MASVS
Mobile Application Security Verification Standard

MASTG
Mobile Application Security Testing Guide

Mobile Application Security Verification Standard

OWASP

Data Storage and Privacy Requirements

ID	MASVS-ID	Detailed Verification Requirement	L1	L2	R	Common	Android	iOS	Status
2.1	MSTG-STORAGE-1	System credential storage facilities need to be used to store sensitive data, such as PII, user credentials or cryptographic keys.	Test Case	Test Case	Pass				
2.2	MSTG-STORAGE-2	No sensitive data should be stored outside of the app container or system credential storage facilities.	Test Case	Test Case	Pass				
2.3	MSTG-STORAGE-3	No sensitive data is written to application logs.	Test Case	Test Case	Fail				
2.4	MSTG-STORAGE-4	No sensitive data is shared with third parties unless it is a necessary part of the architecture.	Test Case	Test Case	N/A				
2.5	MSTG-STORAGE-5	The keyboard cache is disabled on text inputs that process sensitive data.	Test Case	Test Case	Pass				
2.6	MSTG-STORAGE-6	No sensitive data is exposed via IPC mechanisms.	Test Case	Test Case	Fail				
2.7	MSTG-STORAGE-7	No sensitive data, such as passwords or pins, is exposed through the user interface.	Test Case	Test Case	Fail				
2.8	MSTG-STORAGE-8	No sensitive data is included in backups generated by the mobile operating system.	Test Case	Test Case	Fail				

Carlos Holguera
Jeroen Willemsen

Sven Schleier
Bernhard Mueller

Carlos Holguera
Jeroen Willemsen

OWASP



So Long,
and Thanks for All
the Fish