

博弈论第六次作业

完成人: Aries

[Title]:

In the social choice problem, consider the case which allows the use of “money” :

For each voter i , suppose its valuation function is $v_i : A \rightarrow R_+$. If the final winner is $a \in A$, the social welfare is $\sum_i v_i(a)$.

We want to design a mechanism which maximizes social welfare, and we can ask each voter to pay some money. Use VCG technique to design a truthful mechanism. Your mechanism should include an allocation rule and a payment rule.

[答]: 由题意可知, 这是一个多参数机制环境. 对于投票者 i , 会对每一个 $a \in A$ 给出估值 $v_i(a)$. 同时, 在该机制是诚实的设定下, 可知对每一位投票者报价时都会给出自己真实的估值, 即 $b = v$.

因此, 在社会福利最大化的要求之下, 我们定义分配规则 x 为:

$$x(v) = \underset{a \in A}{argmax} \sum_i v_i(a)$$

再由 VCG 机制的定义给出支付规则 p 为:

$$p_i(v) = \max_{a \in A} \sum_{j \neq i} v_j(a) - \sum_{j \neq i} v_j(a^*)$$

其中 $a^* = x(v)$, 是分配规则得到的结果.