Appendix to "Explaining Non-Ratification of the Genocide Convention: A Nested Analysis"

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1 Replication Data

A full replication dataset, together with R scripts to construct the tables and figures that appear in the published paper as well as in this appendix, can be downloaded from the following URL: http://dvn.iq.harvard.edu/dvn/dv/briangreenhill.

2 Further Robustness Tests

2.1 Excluding post-1948 states

An alternative explanation for the slowdown in the rate of ratification might be found in the vast expansion in the number of states that became eligible to ratify the treaty in the post-WWII period. One might argue that many of the small and relatively weak states that became independent as a result of the decolonization movement and the breakup of the Soviet Union simply lacked the capacity to ratify the treaty. If so, the decline in the probability of ratification that we observe could in fact be due to a change in the nature of states in our "risk pool" rather than a more general change in the underlying probability of ratification that results from the increase in the total number of existing ratifications. To test whether new states are likely to play an important role in generating these trends, we re-ran the analysis in Models 1, 2 and 3 using only the subset of states that were in existence in 1948. This led to a significant decrease in the number of observations, yet the results for the effect of the cumulative number of ratifications in the revised version of Model 3— summarized in Figure 1 below—are not significantly different from those shown in Figure 3 of the published paper, although there is a more noticeable increase in the probability of ratification in the post-Cold War era. In other words, even among the "old" states, we still

Figure 1: Probability of ratification as a function of the global number of ratifications when Model 3 was re-estimated using only the states that were in existence before the Genocide Convention opened for signature. The vertical lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. All other covariates are held constant at their median values.

see a significant decline in the conditional probability of ratification over much of the period during which the treaty was available for ratification.

2.2   Past genocide/politicide

States' willingness to ratify the Genocide Convention might also vary as a function of their previous human rights performance, particularly with respect to their prior history of participation in mass killings. We therefore include, as a robustness check, an additional model (Model 4) that includes as a control variable the maximum value within the past 10 years on the 11-point measure of the intensity of genocide or politicide developed by Harff (2003). States with a recent history of mass killings will presumably be under greater pressure to ratify the Convention, all else being equal. This variable, however, is not statistically sig-

Table 1: Logit models of ratification of the Genocide Convention. All covariates have been lagged by 1 year. P-values (for a two-tailed test) are shown in parentheses below each coefficient estimate. To facilitate comparison with the main model discussed in the published paper, the first column shows the results of this model ("Model 3").

	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
Constant	-1.83 (0.13)	-1.83 (0.13)	-2.02 (0.11)	-1.69 (0.16)	-1.61 (0.21)	-1.60 (0.19)
Global Ratifications	-0.01 (0.81)	-0.01 (0.81)	-0.01 (0.80)	-0.01 (0.76)	-0.01 (0.60)	-0.01 (0.77)
Global Ratifications Squared	-0.00 (0.11)	-0.00 (0.11)	-0.00 (0.23)	-0.00 (0.14)	-0.00 (0.24)	-0.00 (0.12)
Global Ratifications Cubed	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.02)	0.00 (0.05)	0.00 (0.03)	0.00 (0.06)	0.00 (0.02)
Neighborhood Effect	1.05 (0.03)	1.05 (0.03)	1.11 (0.05)	1.05 (0.03)	1.15 (0.02)	1.04 (0.03)
Democracy	0.03 (0.07)	0.03 (0.07)	0.03 (0.12)	0.04 (0.04)	0.03 (0.51)	0.02 (0.27)
New Democracy	0.49 (0.15)	0.49 (0.15)	0.59 (0.08)	0.46 (0.18)	0.41 (0.23)	0.56 (0.11)
Institutional Hurdles	-0.13 (0.50)	-0.13 (0.50)	-0.07 (0.71)	-0.21 (0.27)	-0.23 (0.24)	-0.18 (0.35)
Common Law	-0.57 (0.03)	-0.57 (0.03)	-0.47 (0.08)			-0.56 (0.04)
GDP per capita (logged)	0.03 (0.83)	0.03 (0.84)	0.04 (0.76)	0.04 (0.78)	-0.01 (0.97)	0.00 (0.98)
Minorities at Risk	0.03 (0.55)	0.03 (0.55)	0.01 (0.84)	0.03 (0.45)	0.03 (0.46)	0.03 (0.46)
Genocide/Politicide		-0.00 (0.99)				
IGO Influences			0.13 (0.95)			
Common Law tradition				-0.64 (0.05)	-0.62 (0.06)	
Islamic Law tradition				-0.18 (0.59)	-0.11 (0.75)	
Mixed law tradition				-1.04 (0.02)	-1.00 (0.02)	
Constraints on Executive					0.05 (0.68)	
Council of Europe						0.63 (0.09)
N	2496	2496	2464	2505	2425	2496
AIC	768.57	770.57	746.41	775.15	745.11	767.74

nificant, nor does its inclusion lead to a significant difference in the estimated effect of the *Global Ratifications* variable (see the results of Model 4 in Table 1 and Figure 2).

2.3 IGO influences

In the models presented in the article, we modeled regional influences on a state's willingness to ratify the Convention using a spatially lagged dependent variable (specifically, using a

Figure 2: Probability of ratification as a function of the global number of ratifications for Models 3-8. The vertical lines represent the 95% confidence intervals. All other covariates are held constant at their median values. For ease of comparison, the y-axes for all six plots are identical.

weights matrix that identifies each state's 10 nearest neighbors). However, because the average ratification status of a states geographical neighbors will not necessarily provide the best proxy for the average ratification status of a states closest interaction partners, we present the results of a separate model (Model 5) that includes a spatial variable that substitutes geographical proximity for shared memberships in intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). This variable (*IGO Context*) is essentially a measure of the average ratification status found among a states fellow members in IGOs. This measure is constructed in two stages. In the first stage, the average ratification status was calculated for each IGO simply by taking the mean of the ratification status of the members of that organization. In the second stage, a spatially-lagged ratification metric was calculated by averaging the IGO-level averages over all of the IGOs to which each state belongs each year. Data on IGO memberships were

obtained from the Correlates of War dataset. (For a detailed discussion of the construction of this variable, see Greenhill (2010).) Similar to the neighborhood variable, its values range from 0 (indicating that none of its fellow members of IGOs have ratified the treaty at a given point in time) to 1 (indicating that all of its fellow members of IGOs have ratified the treaty). As is shown in Table 1 and Figure 2, the estimated effect of this variable is, however, not statistically significant, nor does its inclusion significantly change our estimate of the effect of the *Global Ratifications* variable.

2.4 Legal Systems

In order to account for further ways in which the different types of legal system, we tried replacing our dummy variable for countries with a British legal tradition with a series of dummy variables for four mutually exclusive categories of legal system identified by Mitchell and Powell (2011). Including these dummy variables (with the civil law as a baseline category) suggests that common law countries are again less likely to ratify the Genocide Convention. However, including this larger set of dummy variables does not have any significant impact on the estimated effect of our Global Ratifications variable (see the results of Model 6 in Table 1 and Figure 2).

2.5 Judicial Effectiveness

Powell and Staton (2009) find that measures of judicial effectiveness play an important role in states decisions to ratify and comply with the Convention Against Torture. In order to test whether judicial effectiveness is likely to play a role in the decision to ratify the Genocide Convention, we tried including the Polity IV projects 7-point measure of constraints upon the executive. This variable did not turn out to have a statistically significant relationship to the probability of ratification, nor did it significantly affect our estimate of the effect of the *Global Ratifications variable* (see the results of Model 7 in Table 1 and Figure 2).

2.6 Europe

We also tried including a dummy variable for membership in the Council of Europe—the institution most directly concerned with promoting human rights in Europe. While this dummy variable showed a positive relationship to ratification of the Convention, its effect was only marginally significant ($p = 0.09$) and its inclusion did not lead to any significant changes in the estimated effect of our Global Ratifications variable (see the results of Model 8 in Table 1 and Figure 2).

References

Greenhill, Brian. 2010. "The Company You Keep: International Socialization and the Diffusion of Human Rights Norms." *International Studies Quarterly* 54:127–145.

Harff, B. 2003. "No lessons learned from the Holocaust? Assessing risks of genocide and political mass murder since 1955." *American Political Science Review* 97(1):57–73.

Mitchell, S.M.L. and E.J. Powell. 2011. *Domestic law goes global: legal traditions and international courts.* Cambridge University Press.

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