

# Konfidi<sup>\*†</sup> : Trust Networks Using PGP and RDF

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## ABSTRACT

We ought to write this last.

## General Terms

source, sink, concatenation, aggregation

## Keywords

Semantic Web, trust network, FOAF, RDF, PGP, GPG, reputation, propagation, distributed, inference, delegation, social network

## 1. INTRODUCTION

As more and more information becomes available on the internet, there is a growing problem determining which information is reliable and accurate. A person may, over time, develop a reputation as a reliable source of information for a certain topic, however, someone unfamiliar with that person's reputation may either place too much or too little trust in that person.

Ratings system for reputation within certain domains (eBay auctions, for example), may be of some limited use, however, they may also be susceptible to floods of manipulative ratings. Even if such systems can be guarded against such attacks, why should someone base whether they trust another person on opinions given by others that they neither know nor trust?

A solution growing in popularity is that of creating a network of trust between individuals who know one another and have good reason to trust the ratings they give of others. However, these systems too can subject to problems

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<sup>\*</sup>*Konfidi* is the Esperanto term for trust. A universal concept, in a universal language, seemed appropriate for what we hope will become a universal system.

<sup>†</sup>The name Konfidi applies to our system as a whole. The various components, FOAFServer, TrustServer, and Clients, will be called by their individual names.

if someone impersonating a trusted party provides incorrect data boosting the reputation of an untrustworthy party. The PGP web of trust provides the necessary verification of an individual's identity; however, it does not allow the expression of any additional information about that individual's trustworthiness on matters apart from personal identification.

In this paper, we will describe some difficulties in integrating these two kinds of trust networks, and how we designed a system to overcome them. We will then describe our structure for representing trust data, and our methods for making trust inferences on this data. Finally, we will discuss the software we have begun to develop so that this trust network can be put to use.

## 2. RELATED WORK

### 2.1 Representing Trust Relationships

There seems to be a general lack of psychological research on representing trust relationships and making inferences for unspecified relationships. In fact, most work in the fields of mathematics and computer science seem to adopt an arbitrary model appropriate to the algorithm under consideration. As Guha points out [Guha *et al.*, 2004], there are compelling reasons for a trust representation scheme to express explicit distrust as well as trust.

For Konfidi, we have likewise chosen an arbitrary model, but in designing the system we have made every effort to allow for adaptation to different models as research in this area develops.

### 2.2 Trust Networks and Inferences

There are a number of papers discussing different propagation strategies and algorithms for weighted, directed graphs<sup>1</sup>. For the most part, however, they are concerned with describing the networks mathematically, and do not have much in the way of practical application.

Belief in statements vs. trust in people.

Jennifer Golbeck, at the University of Maryland, is doing graduate research on trust and reputation systems [Golbeck, 2005b] that is similar to our work on this project. Like us, she uses an extension of FOAF to represent trust relation-

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<sup>1</sup>See such-and-such, and so-and-so, for example

ships and a rating system<sup>2</sup>. She has written a number of papers<sup>3</sup>, and created TrustMail[Golbeck, 2005a], a modified email client that uses the trust network that she is building. She is more concerned with an academic approach than a pragmatic one, since this field is still growing rapidly and she prefers to help determine a good system of standards in the area.

## 2.3 The Semantic Web

In addition to Golbeck's work, a number of others have explored the usefulness and implications of expressing trust relationships in the Semantic Web.

### 2.3.1 *Friend of a Friend (FOAF)*

The FOAF project[Brickley?, 2005] is an RDF vocabulary used to represent personal data and interpersonal relationships for the Semantic Web. Users created RDF files describing Person objects which can specify name, email address, and so on, but more importantly, they can express relationships between Person objects.

### 2.3.2 *FOAF Whitelisting*

Dan Brickley has made a non-academic attempt to investigate the use of FOAF, particularly the `mbox.sha1` property, to automatically generate email whitelists. By hashing the sender's address using SHA1, privacy is protected (and the address cannot be gathered by spiders), and so users can share whitelists of non-spam emailers. Then for all incoming mail, the sending address is hashed and the whitelist searched for the resulting value, and then is filtered accordingly. This use of FOAF is promising, but since it is localized, it is difficult for updates to propagate[Brickley, 2005a]. No effort was taken in this project to verify the sender's identity.

## 2.4 Email Filtering by Inferred Trust

Boykin and Roychowdhury discuss ways to infer relationships based on existing data (From:, To:, Cc: headers)[Boykin & Roychowdhury, 2004]. This seems to work fairly well but there is often not enough data to make the spam/not-spam decision because it is based only on the user's own previously received messages. They clearly state a cryptographic solution would be ideal to verify identity.

### 2.4.1 *Spam Filtering*

Domain-level solutions, such as SPF and DomainKeys, are mostly to prevent phishing and also assume that a domain's administrator can control and monitor all its user's activities. Greylisting and blacklisting often have too many false positives and false negatives. User-level filtering, which Konfidi does in the context of email filtering, is not very common. Challenge-response mechanisms to build a whitelist are tedious for the sender and receiver and do not validate authenticity. Content-level testing is the most common, but bayesian filtering and other header checks are reactionary and must be continuously updated, and are becoming less effective as spammers create emails that look more and more real.

<sup>2</sup>Though both our ontologies and are ratings are different in significant ways, which we will address later.

<sup>3</sup>list of Golbeck papers here

## 2.5 Trust Inference Using PGP

One possible approach is to use the PGP web-of-trust to filter email spam at the client's end. For example, a mail client plugin could filter incoming mail, and check to see if there was a path from the sender to the recipient, in which the recipient had signed someone's key, who had signed another key, which eventually lead to the sender's key. If there was a path within a certain length, the message would be marked as trusted, if not, it would be marked as not trusted. This approach required that most users digitally sign email messages, and it depended on users to be aware of known spammers and keep from signing their keys. However, the recommended PGP keysigning practices require only the careful verification of the key-holder's identity, and a signed key does not entail anything about trustworthiness in other areas. Whether a user should be trusted to send good email, and not spam, is information over and above that expressed in the PGP web-of-trust itself, so the web-of-trust would be inadequate to encode such information.

A more serious flaw in an approach that depends so heavily on the client software is this: because information about key signatures is stored as a part of the key that was signed, and not that of the signer, paths between users can only be constructed from the sender backward to the recipient. When a key is retrieved from a keyserver, all of the signatures on that key are included with it, showing which keys have signed that key, and providing a number of possible links in a chain. However, using the existing keyserver infrastructure, there is no easy way to tell which other keys a particular key has signed. If these paths are built backward using a breadth-first search from the sender to the recipient, a spammer or other malicious user could generate a large number of fake keys that are inter-signed, and then use these keys to sign the sender's key. By adding this artificial information, the client's searching capabilities would be crippled, and the web-of-trust would be polluted with fabricated keys, users, and signatures. The PGP system of key-signing and verification was designed to be robust against this sort of impersonation, by requiring photo-identification and fingerprint exchange before any key-signing, but a deluge of false information would put undue strain on the keyserver infrastructure, and would amount to a denial-of-service, of sorts.

### 2.5.1 *Wotsap*

Talk about wotsap a bit.

## 3. MOTIVATION

So, for our idea to be viable, it must first deal with these two issues, namely, representing trust information not directly in the PGP web-of-trust but rather in some other system closely coupled with it, and not being susceptible to denial-of-service attacks caused by generated false webs. We had other requirements, too. A system like this must be widely (even universally) adopted in order to be useful. As such, it must be easy for the technically unsavvy, like Aunt Sally, to use, while at the same time avoiding any diminished security stemming from being easy-to-use. It must also be available in any of the many widely-used email clients.

## 4. KONFIDI

—Diagram— Say something here.

## 4.1 Trust Ontology

In the current research on trust inference networks, there seem to be two general kinds of representations: one that used discrete values for varying levels of trust and returned a discrete binary (yes or no) answer, or one which used a (theoretically) continuous range of trust values and returned an answer within that range. Now, either kind of representation could be roughly mapped onto the other, however, a continuous range would allow more finely-grained control over the data. Further, the inferred trust values returned by searches would be similar to the explicit trust values users provided when specifying trust relationships. This makes it easier to evaluate such results on a scale that has some familiarity.

### 4.1.1 Distrust

This is closely related to another important concern, that the representation give some account of distrust. If the trust network contained values ranging from neutral trust to complete trust, then everyone in the network is trusted, explicitly, or by inference on some level at or above neutral. If the system makes a trust inference between Alice and Bob at one level, but Alice really trusts Bob at a different level, she can explicitly state this previously implicit trust to have a more accurate result (for herself and for others who build inference paths of whom she is a member). But, suppose that Alice feels strong negative feelings about Bob. In this case, she would still only be able to represent this relationship as one of neutral trust. So, the trust network must account for distrust in some reasonable way.

One of the difficulties of using explicit distrust in an inference network, however, is that it is unclear how inferences should proceed once a link of distrust has been encountered. Suppose Alice distrusts Bob, and Bob distrusts Clara. As Guha points out [Guha *et al.*, 2004], there are at least two interpretations of this situation. On the one hand, Alice might think something like "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" and so decide to put trust in Clara. On the other hand, she might realize that if someone as scheming as Bob distrusts Clara, then Clara must really be an unreliable character, and so decide to distrust Clara. Further, suppose Bob expressed trust for Dave. At first consideration, it might seem reasonable to simply distrust everyone that Bob distrusts, including Dave. But suppose there were another path through different nodes indicating some minimal level of trust for Dave. Which path should be chosen as one which provides the correct inference?

One solution to this problem is simply to not traverse beyond a relationship of distrust, and to seek an alternate path. There is no clear answer regarding the statements a distrusted person makes, so it is best not to consider them at all. To overcome the problem of choosing the correct path for the inference, some kind of weighted average can be taken of all of the paths between Alice and Dave, thereby producing an answer according to whether the majority of people in the neighborhood Dave trust him or not.

We explored a method similar to this one, but in the absence of sufficient psychological research affirming a model of this type, we sought a simpler solution. In the end, we decided on a model that corresponds to another intuition about how

trust works between people, that it is more of a continuum of both trust and distrust than a measure of just one or the other. For example, if Alice trusts Bob at some moderate level (say, .75 of a scale of 0 to 1), then it seems that she also *distrusts* him at some minimal level (say, .25). If Alice trusts Bob neutrally, then she trusts him about as much as she distrusts him. If she distrusts him completely, then she doesn't trust him at all. But in all of these cases, there is a trade-off between trust and distrust. Only in the extremes is either of them eliminated completely. So, we decided that our trust model should represent a range of values from 0 to 1, treating 0 as complete distrust, 1 as complete trust, and 0.5 as neutral, and calculate trust inferences accordingly<sup>4</sup>.

### 4.1.2 Trust Topics

If other attributes about a trust relationship could be expressed, in addition to the rating system, then a system like Konfidi would be useful in many wider scopes than email spam prevention. The most important of these is the trust topic, or in other words, what the trust is about. A natural feature of interpersonal trust relationships is that there can be many different aspects of the same trust relationship.

(you can make an Alice-Bob-Clara-Dave diagram for this business)

For example, suppose Bob is a master chef, but is terribly gullible about the weather forecast. Alice, of course, knows this, and so wants to express that she trusts Bob very highly when he gives advice for making soufflé, but she does not trust him at all when he volunteers information about the likelihood of the next tornado. Suppose she only knows Bob in these two capacities. Any trust inference system should not average the two trust values and get a somewhat neutral rating for Bob, for that would lose important information about each of those two trust ratings<sup>5</sup>.

Suppose also that, given only the above trust ratings, the system tried to make an inference on a subject that was not specified. Perhaps Alice has some general level of trust for Bob that should be used when there is no specific rating for the topic in question. See the discussion in Future Work for our proposal for a hierarchical system of topics that might account for this situation.

### 4.1.3 Rating System

With these considerations in mind, we decided that a relationship-based model would meet our needs while avoiding some of the disadvantages of other representations. According to this system, each trust relationship is an object, and the trusting person and the trusted entity (typically a person) are specified as such<sup>6</sup>. Trust relationships also have trust items specified. Each item is composed of a topic and a numerical rating. Each rating is on a scale from 0 to 1 inclusive, with 0 representing complete distrust, 1 representing complete trust, and 0.5 representing neutral.

<sup>4</sup>This also makes many propagation algorithms simpler, as we'll discuss later.

<sup>5</sup>In fact, it would lose the only information that made these ratings useful in the first place.

<sup>6</sup>Thus, each relationship is one-way, but since the truster is responsible for the accuracy of the information, that is fine.

Because the trust relationship is represented as its own object, other attributes may be added later, such as the dates the relationship began, annotations, etc. as the need arises.

#### 4.1.4 OWL Schema

As the FOAF project grows in popularity, an infrastructure is growing to support it, as mentioned in 2.3.1. Since there would be many advantages to tapping into this infrastructure, and since the specification of trust relationships fits in naturally alongside the existing `foaf:knows` property, Konfidi also uses the Resource Description Framework (RDF)[??, 2005a] for representing trust relationships. In addition to the FOAF vocabulary, there is a vocabulary called WOT defining and describing signing and assurance, which provides the necessary structure for associating persons and organizations with key fingerprints[Brickley, 2005b]. By designing Konfidi's vocabulary to make use of FOAF and WOT vocabulary elements, then, we can take advantage of the established standards and make our extensions compatible with existing FOAF-enabled tools.

Konfidi uses the Web Ontology Language (OWL)[??, 2005b] to define the RDF elements that make up the Konfidi trust ontology. OWL builds on the existing RDF specification by providing a vocabulary to describe properties and classes, and their relations. The Konfidi trust ontology provides two objects and five properties, which, in conjunction with the existing FOAF and WOT vocabularies, are sufficient to describe the trust relationships that Konfidi requires.

The primary element is **Relationship**<sup>7</sup>, which represents a relationship of trust that holds between two people. There are two properties required for every **Relationship**, **truster** and **trusted**, which indicate the two parties to the relationship. Both **truster** and **trusted** have `foaf:Person` objects as their targets<sup>8</sup>, which may be defined in the same file, inline, or in external documents indicated by their resource URIs<sup>9</sup>.

In addition to **truster** and **trusted**, each **Relationship** requires at least one **about** property, which relates the trust **Relationship** to a trust **Item**<sup>10</sup>. Each **Item** has two properties belonging to it. The **topic** property specifies the subject of the trust according to a trust topic hierarchy<sup>11</sup> and the

<sup>7</sup>According to RDF standards, the names of objects are capitalized, while the names of properties remain lowercase.

<sup>8</sup>These **Person** objects should also contain at least one `wot:fingerprint` property specifying the PGP fingerprint of a public key held by the individual the **Person** describes. This property is required for verification; if no `fingerprint` is available, then Konfidi cannot use the relationship.

<sup>9</sup>Because it does not matter where the `foaf:Person` data is stored, users may keep files indicating trust relationships separate from main FOAF files. However, to prevent spoofing, any file containing one or more **Relationship** objects must have a valid signature from a public key `fingerprint` corresponding to each **Person** listed as a **truster** in that file. As described in 4.2, flexibility in data location can have a number of advantages.

<sup>10</sup>A **Relationship** is not limited in the other properties it can have, so auxiliary information about the relationship, such as when it began, who introduced it, etc. may be recorded without having an effect on the requirements of Konfidi.

<sup>11</sup>yet to be developed

**rating** property indicates the value, according to the 0-1 scale specified in Section 4.1.3 of the trust assigned to the relationship on that topic.

A **Relationship** may have more than one **Item** that it is about. For example, remember the example given above, in which Alice trusts Bob highly about cooking, and distrusts him somewhat about the weather. This might be represented in our ontology as something like the following<sup>12</sup>. For a more in-depth example, see Appendix B.:

```
<Relationship>
  <truster rdf:resource="#alice123" />
  <trusted rdf:resource="#bob1812" />
  <about>
    <Item>
      <rating>.95</rating>
      <topic rdf:resource="#cooking" />
    </Item>
  </about>
  <about>
    <Item>
      <rating>.35</rating>
      <topic rdf:resource="#weather" />
    </Item>
  </about>
</Relationship>
```

See Appendix A for the full OWL source code.

## 4.2 FOAFServer

As Konfidi developed, it seemed that two important but separate components were needed to fulfill the two major needs of our project. First, we needed a way to store data specifying trust relationships. Second, we needed a way to represent the network specified in the data, and traverse it to calculate trust values.

One need was for a system to store trust network data, verify signatures on that data, and allow for updates of existing files and their signatures.

If Konfidi were to be useful as a system of trust management, then the operations it performs and the results it returns must be trusted by the users. Thus, to prevent malicious users from submitting faulty or incorrect trust data for others, Konfidi will require every file submitted to be digitally signed by the key of the user who is indicated as the trusting party. Konfidi will then verify the signature before accepting the data as legitimate and passing it along to the trust management system.

URI based lookup

communications with trust server

## 4.3 TrustServer

<sup>12</sup>That is, supposing that the objects `alice123`, `bob1812`, `cooking`, and `weather` are all defined elsewhere in the same file.

This part of the design is the core element of Konfidi. Storing and managing the data would not be of much use in this context unless we did something with it. So, the TrustServer would handle requests for trust ratings, verify that a PGP connection exists, and traverse the internal representation to find a path. Since these three tasks are so distinct, all of Konfidi is divided into three parts, a frontend which listens for requests and dispatches them, and two backend components, one to search the PGP web-of-trust and another to query against Konfidi's own trust network. This separation, in addition to simplifying the design by encapsulating the different functions, also allows for increased flexibility and scalability. Each part is loosely coupled to the other parts, with a simple API for handling communications between them.

#### 4.3.1 Frontend

Like the FOAFServer, the TrustServer's frontend uses the REST architecture to provide a versatile system for receiving and answering queries. It also runs on the Apache web server, using the `mod_python` framework. Queries are passed in using HTTP's GET method, and responses are returned in XML, which a client application may parse to retrieve the desired data.

When a query is received, the Frontend passes the source and sink fingerprints to the PGP backend, and, if a valid path is found, to the trust backend<sup>13</sup>. The Frontend then builds the response document in XML, and passes the result back to the client<sup>14</sup>.

This simple, but powerful blah blah blah

#### 4.3.2 PGP Backend

As mentioned in Section 2.5, the PGP web-of-trust is not sufficient for determining trust. However, it is necessary for the proper operation of Konfidi because it plays a very important role in verifying the identity of the sink. If the author of a document were not identified correctly, someone might forge the trust data, and Konfidi would return a deceptive result. Verifying that the document's signing key matches the key of the sink in the Konfidi trust network ensures that an inference path found by Konfidi to the sink is valid.

Since one purpose of Konfidi is to provide trust information over and above the PGP web-of-trust, it may seem natural to keep the Konfidi trust network tightly coupled to it. In other words, every trust link specified using the Konfidi trust ontology corresponds to a link in the PGP web-of-trust made by signing the appropriate key. However, there are compelling reasons not to do this. First, the set of people one might wish to indicate trust for in Konfidi will likely not be the same as the set of those whose keys you are able to sign. For example, a researcher in Sydney may work closely with another in Oslo, and so trust that person's opinion

highly in matters relating to their research. But unless they are able to meet at a conference sometime, or are willing to fly halfway around the world, it is unlikely that they will be able to sign each other's keys directly. However, a valid path in the PGP web-of-trust may already exist connecting them.

Second, requiring users to sign the key of each person they want to add to their Konfidi trust networks adds additional difficulty which should otherwise be avoided. In keeping with the recommended practices for PGP, two individuals must meet in person and verify photo identification before they are to sign each other's keys. This extra hassle might entice users to grow lax in their keysigning policy, failing to properly complete such requirements. This attitude, when widespread would substantially weaken the web-of-trust. By keeping the PGP web-of-trust separate from the Konfidi trust network, the strength of the web-of-trust will not be weakened needlessly.

An additional advantage of separating the two trust networks is usability. Aunt Sally can use Konfidi to indicate trust if she and one other person (say, a more technically savvy nephew) sign each other's keys. She will then probably be connected to the PGP web-of-trust within a reasonable distance of other family members which she is likely to include in her trust network. Now there is no need to teach Aunt Sally the requirements for key signing, and explaining why they must be done for each person she wishes to add to her Konfidi trust network. The system is easier to use, and the web-of-trust is less likely to be compromised<sup>15</sup>.

As you remember, before completing a query on the Konfidi trust network, the frontend will verify that a valid path exists on the PGP web-of-trust. While we are eager to avoid some of the difficulties with searching the web-of-trust using the existing keyserver infrastructure, as mentioned in Section 2.5, it was not the main goal of our project to deal with all of them at this stage. The frontend uses a number of drivers in a Strategy pattern [Gamma *et al.*, 1995], so that different subsystems for doing PGP pathfinding can be interchanged as they are developed.

The current version utilizes a pathfinder known as Wotsap [Cederlo:f??, 2005], which downloads the complete web-of-trust from a keyserver and stores it in an intermediate format for searching.

#### 4.3.3 Trust Backend

The Konfidi trust backend is responsible for storing the internal representation of the Konfidi trust network, incorporating updates into the network, and responding to queries about the nodes in the network.

Updates Intermediate representation Queries Strategies

Konfidi currently uses a breadth-first search to find the shortest path between source and sink, if one exists.

<sup>13</sup>Strictly speaking, either query is optional. The PGP backend may be skipped to run tests on large sets of sample data, and the trust backend may be skipped if the system is to be used as an interface to the PGP web-of-trust only.

<sup>14</sup>The client may also request for simplicity a single value, the trust rating value.

<sup>15</sup>While the effects of individual keys being compromise on the web-of-trust as a whole would be restricted to the key's neighborhood in the web, as this happened with greater frequency, the usefulness of the entire web would be undermined.

```

function findPath(source, sink):
    paths = new list
    newpaths = new list
    seen = new list
    seen.append(source)
    length = 0
    while sink not in seen:
        paths = newpaths
        newpaths = new list
        for p in paths:
            for each person s that p trusts:
                if s not in seen:
                    t = p # copy current path
                    t.append(s) # add person to end
                    newpaths[s] = t #key current path to last person on it
        paths = newpaths
    return paths[sink];

```

One such propagation algorithm is a simple strategy like the following, which simply multiplies trust ratings along each step in the path:

```

function getRating(path):
    rating = 1
    while path.length() > 0:
        rating *= path.next().getRating()
    return rating

```

Once a PGP path has been found, remember, the frontend passes the query on to the trust backend. Since the backend holds an internal representation of the Konfidi trust network persistent in memory, it cannot use mod.python. Instead, the frontend communicates with it via a socket<sup>16</sup>.

We should say more about this. Why did we choose the design we did? I can barely remember...

update procedure algorithms strategies this does the dirty work

## 4.4 Clients

### 4.4.1 CLI Clients

Dave'll do this section, since he wrote it.

### 4.4.2 Simple Web Client

Just an HTML form built into the frontend which makes searching marginally easier.

## 5. FUTURE WORK

### 5.1 Psychological Research

### 5.2 Additional Features

multipart signing of the results query, and signature checking between components

### 5.3 Other Clients

#### 5.3.1 Firefox + Mime

#### 5.3.2 MTA Integration

<sup>16</sup>Either locally or on a remote server

## 5.4 Topic Hierarchy

## 6. OTHER ISSUES

### 6.1 Anonymity

Since authentication is a key part of Konfidi, it is effectively impossible to act anonymously within the system. To enter the PGP web of trust you must prove your identity to someone. Political and religious discussions (especially in intolerant countries), corporate whistleblowing, crisis hotlines, and other sensitive discussions have grave reasons to be conducted anonymously. If authentication becomes a defacto standard of communication it will be difficult to conduct these communications. Two potential alleviations would be to 1) have policies regarding when documents will be signed and when they won't (e.g. banks will always sign) and 2) using an anonymizing proxy service that is trusted by most people. There are obvious drawbacks to both of these.[Fenton, 2005]

### 6.2 Privacy

Should there be any? How will it be controlled? Encrypted FOAFs.

### 6.3 Ethics

Dependency on a trust system, trust in the system, etc.

## 7. CONCLUSIONS

## 8. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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## APPENDIX

### A. OWL TRUST SCHEMA

```
<?xml version="1.0"?>
<!DOCTYPE rdf:RDF [
  <!ENTITY trust "http://svn.berlios.de/viewcvs/*checkout*/konfidi/schema/trunk/trust.owl#" >
  <!ENTITY rdf "http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#" >
  <!ENTITY rdfs "http://www.w3.org/2000/01/rdf-schema#" >
  <!ENTITY xsd "http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema#" >
  <!ENTITY owl "http://www.w3.org/2002/07/owl#" >
  <!ENTITY foaf "http://xmlns.com/foaf/0.1/" >
  <!ENTITY wot "http://xmlns.com/wot/0.1/" >
  <!ENTITY rel "http://vocab.org/relationship/#" >
  <!ENTITY dc "http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" >
  <!ENTITY vs "http://www.w3.org/2003/06/sw-vocab-status/ns#" >
]>

<rdf:RDF
  xmlns="&trust;"
  xmlns:owl="&owl;"
  xmlns:rdf="&rdf;"
  xmlns:rdfs="&rdfs;"
  xmlns:xsd="&xsd;"
  xmlns:rel="&rel;"
  xmlns:foaf="&foaf;"
  xmlns:wot="&wot;"
  xmlns:dc="&dc;"
  xmlns:vs="&vs;"
>

  <rdf:Description rdf:about="">
    <dc:title xml:lang="en">Trust: A vocabulary for indicating trust relationships</dc:title>
    <dc:date>2005-03-20</dc:date>
    <dc:description xml:lang="en">This is the description</dc:description>
    <dc:contributor>Andrew Schamp</dc:contributor>
    <dc:contributor>Dave Brondsema</dc:contributor>
  </rdf:Description>

  <owl:Ontology
    rdf:about="&trust;"
    dc:title="Trust Vocabulary"
    dc:description="The Trust RDF vocabulary, described using W3C RDF Schema and the Web Ontology Language."
    dc:date="$Date: 2005/03/19 11:38:02 $"
    >
    <owl:versionInfo>v1.0</owl:versionInfo>
  </owl:Ontology>

  <!-- classes first -->
  <owl:Class rdf:about="&trust;Item" rdfs:label="Item" rdfs:comment="An item of trust">
    <rdfs:isDefinedBy rdf:resource="&trust;" />
    <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&rdfs;Resource" />
  </owl:Class>

  <owl:Class rdf:about="&trust;Relationship" rdfs:label="Relationship" rdfs:comment="A relationship between two agents">
    <rdfs:isDefinedBy rdf:resource="&trust;" />
    <rdfs:subClassOf rdf:resource="&rel;Relationship" />
  </owl:Class>

  <!-- for constraints -->
  <xsd:element xsd:name="percent" rdf:ID="percent">
    <xsd:simpleType>
      <xsd:restriction xsd:base="xsd:decimal">
        <xsd:totalDigits>4</xsd:totalDigits>
      </xsd:restriction>
    </xsd:simpleType>
  </xsd:element>
</rdf:RDF>
```

```

        <xsd:fractionDigits>2</xsd:fractionDigits>
        <xsd:minInclusive> 0.00</xsd:minInclusive>
        <xsd:maxInclusive> 1.00</xsd:maxInclusive>
    </xsd:restriction>
</xsd:simpleType>
</xsd:element>

<!-- properties second -->
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="truster" rdfs:label="truster"
    rdfs:comment="The agent doing the trusting.">
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&trust;Relationship" />
    <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&foaf;Agent" />
    <rdfs:isDefinedBy rdf:resource="&trust;" />
</owl:ObjectProperty>

<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="trusted" rdfs:label="trusted"
    rdfs:comment="The agent being trusted.">
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&trust;Relationship" />
    <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&foaf;Agent" />
    <rdfs:isDefinedBy rdf:resource="&trust;" />
</owl:ObjectProperty>

<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="about" rdfs:label="about"
    rdfs:comment="Relates things to trust items.">
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&trust;Relationship" />
    <rdfs:range rdf:resource="#Item" />
    <rdfs:isDefinedBy rdf:resource="&trust;" />
</owl:ObjectProperty>

<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="rating" rdfs:label="rating">
    <rdfs:isDefinedBy rdf:resource="&trust;" />
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Item" />
    <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&rdfs;Literal" rdf:type="#percent" />
</owl:ObjectProperty>

<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:ID="topic" rdfs:label="topic">
    <rdfs:isDefinedBy rdf:resource="&trust;" />
    <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="#Item" />
    <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&owl;Thing" />
</owl:ObjectProperty>

</rdf:RDF>

```

## B. EXAMPLE TRUST NETWORK

edgecases example here