

Distinctive Asymmetrical Decentralization for Archipelagic Regions in Indonesia

Dissertation Research Proposal

Doctoral Candidate: Restu Karlina Rahayu

Supervisor: Prof. Chyi Lu Jang

(Jointly Appointed Professor, Institute of Political Science, National Sun Yat-sen University)

Co-Supervisor: Prof. Wei-hao Huang

(Institute of Political Science, National Sun Yat-sen University)

Date: January 7, 2022

Supervisory Committee Members:

1. Prof. Dachi Liao (Institute of Political Science, NSYSU)
2. Prof. Samuel C. Y. Ku (Wenzao Ursuline University)
3. Prof. Wei Ning Wu (Institute of Public Affairs Management, NSYSU)
4. Prof. Chin Chang Tsai (Institute of Public Affairs Management, NSYSU)

Executive Summary

The practice of decentralization has yielded mixed results. Some countries have succeeded in implementing decentralization, and some are considered to have failed. The success or failure of decentralization practices is affected by the design of decentralization itself. With the emergence of negative effects in the practice of decentralization came the concept of asymmetric decentralization. However, research that focuses on asymmetric decentralization due to geographic motivation is still lacking; therefore, this study suggests a new concept, the distinctive asymmetrical decentralization for archipelagic regions. The novelty of this research is the specific concept of asymmetric decentralization, which is limited in nature and carried out in stages. Indonesia was elected as the research site because, in 2008, Indonesia was included in the four big bang of decentralization pinned by the World Bank. Indonesia is an archipelago country with the fourth-largest population in the world and. Indonesia has implemented asymmetric decentralization for five provinces, although the main motives for asymmetric granting are politics, regional and administrative capacities. For this reason, West Nusa Tenggara Province, with 59.13% of its area surrounded by the ocean, and included in one of the eight archipelagic provinces in Indonesia, was selected for its characteristics. In the meantime, West Sumbawa Regency was selected from 10 regencies and municipalities in West Nusa Tenggara for its highest HDI compared to the other seven regencies. This research is theory-driven with a qualitative method. Data collection techniques were carried out by interview, observation, and literature study.

Keywords: decentralization, asymmetric decentralization, archipelagic, local government capacity, qualitative research

List of contents

Executive Summary	2
List of Contents	3
List of figures and tables	4
1. Background	5
1.1 Why Decentralization is Occurring Around the World	5
1.2 Decentralization Practices in Indonesia	6
1.3 The Urgency of Asymmetric Decentralization is Necessary to Improve Public Services in the Archipelagic Region	7
2. Theoretical Framework	8
2.1 Decentralization	8
2.1.1 Criticism of Decentralization	11
2.2 Asymmetric Decentralization	12
2.1.2 Criticism of Asymmetric Decentralization	15
2.3 Public Service and Decentralization	15
2.3.1 Criticism of Public Service and Decentralization	19
2.4 Theorization	19
2.5 Research's Question	21
3. Research Design	21
3.1 Research Method	21
3.2 Data Collection	21
3.3 Characteristics of West Nusa Tenggara Province	22
3.4 Characteristics of West Sumbawa Regency	24
3.5 Research Objectives and Research Framework	24
4. Systematic Design of Dissertation Writing	25
5. References	27
6. Appendix	34
a. List of Sources Person	34
b. List of Legislations, Reports, Other Documents	35

List of Figures and Tables

Figure 1 Forms of Decentralization	11
Figure 2 Prototype of Asymmetric decentralization in Indonesia's archipelagic provinces	15
Figure 3 An analytical model for capacities in local governance	18
Figure 4 Research Theocratization	
Figure 5 Research Framework	25
Table 1 Summary of Archipelagic Provinces in Indonesia	23
Table 2 List of Sources Person	34

1. Background

Decentralization is a broad and complex research theme. Decentralization is not a panacea for all government problems. Decentralization requires proper design and institutional arrangements for the reform to be effective (Khaleghian, 2004), or else, decentralization will fail to meet expectations. This research aspires to participate in the debate regarding centralization and decentralization. The early part will explain the background for selecting the research topic, which consists of three parts: the practice of decentralization in parts of the world, decentralization in Indonesia, and the urgency of asymmetric decentralization for islands and archipelagic regions.

1.1 Why Decentralization is Occurring Globally

Since 1980, decentralization has been a complex phenomenon in almost all parts of the world, especially in developing countries. The study of decentralization is one of the efforts to reflect on the democratization and participatory process in development to achieve good governance (Fernando, 2002). The World Bank identifies at least several reasons why world countries are implementing decentralization. Global political reforms encourage voices from underneath in demanding change and bringing economics and politics closer to local communities. Second, technology and globalization are driving markets to transform how governments provide public services. Public services are no longer dominated by the government and are sometimes left to the private sector. Third, political pressure causes decentralization in many countries (J. Litvack et al., 1998). As a form, the central government decentralizes political, fiscal, and administrative responsibilities to lower levels of government or the private sector (J. Litvack et al., 1998).

Decentralization has delivered profound changes to many countries financially and authority structures and fundamentally to whom public officials are accountable (Faguet & Caroline, 2015). Globalization has pushed researchers to redefine decentralization. In the 1970s and 1980s, decentralization was narrowly translated into deconcentration, delegation, and devolution of responsibility for decision-making and administrative processes from the central government to lower administrative levels. However, new concepts and practices of decentralization are emerging and creating new spaces for participation; new dimensions of power-sharing and public influence are becoming the latest sources of influence on policymaking and implementation processes (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007a). The shift from government to governance has prompted researchers to redefine decentralization.

Theoretically, decentralization assures better governance and deeper democracy, which is caused by the actions of public officials, especially those who are directly elected. The public demands accountability because the public is increasingly involved in constructing and implementing policies (Grindle, 2007). In practice, however, decentralization has yielded mixed results. Many things can influence views on decentralization. For example, in Europe, the practice of decentralization between Malta or Luxembourg will be different compared to Spain, Germany, or Poland. The decentralization practice in Europe depends on the level of closeness of the states as a unitary state and the state's ideological history, whether socialist like in Germany or fascist just like in Italy and franquism in Spain. Undoubtedly, the role of the economy and society is not to be underestimated. The level of community education, the power of community influence, economic and cultural dependence will shape the characteristics of decentralization in each country and local institutions (Savy et al., 2017).

In Asia, the practice of decentralization emerged in the 1990s. Different countries have different motivations to practice decentralization; the need to improve public services in a

society with a large population such as in East Asia, heterogeneous ethnic challenges and diverse geographical conditions in East Asia, or ethnic pressures such as in Southeast Asia (J. Litvack et al., 1998). Of various considerations concerning the motives for decentralization, the underlined equation is that the fundamental philosophy for implementing decentralization is to improve the quality of public services (Ghuman & Singh, 2013).

According to Ghuman and Singh, the impact of decentralization on the quality of public services in Asia is very diverse. Public services in India, the Philippines, Indonesia, Vietnam have shown improved performance after decentralization. Yet, in Uzbekistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, it yielded the opposite result. South Asia, Pakistan, Thailand shows mixed results (Ghuman & Singh, 2013). This certainly must be viewed in terms of the specifications of what services are provided and the constraints these countries face. In Southeast Asia, decentralization developed in the 1990-the 2000s after the authoritarian regimes in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand were successfully overthrown (Nagai & Funatsu, 2018), followed by a wave of democratization.

Of the 20 countries that received financial support from the World Bank, only four were included in big bang decentralization, i.e., Ethiopia, Indonesia, Pakistan, and the Philippines. While the remaining 16 were included in gradual decentralization (World Bank, 2008, p. 10). Decentralization in Indonesia is identified as the big bang decentralization, which is "a process wherein the central level of government announces decentralization: passes laws: and transfer responsibilities, authority or staff to subnational or local governments in rapid succession" (World Bank, 2008, p. 10). This is due to a drastic shift from a centralized government during the Soeharto era to decentralized policies within the framework of regional autonomy daerah (Hofman et al., 2002; Syadzily, 2019, p. 61). As the fourth-largest population country in the world and the third-largest democracy after the United States and India, Indonesia will be the focus of this research.

1.2 Decentralization Practices in Indonesia

The democratization process in Indonesia emerged when the Suharto regime was unexpectedly overthrown in 1998 (Aspinall, 2018). The demands for the democratization process mainly came from residents outside Java, who felt that power was not evenly distributed (Rabasa & Chalk, 2001). In Indonesia, significant decentralization began after the fall of Suharto in 1998. The enactment of Law No. 22/1999 on Local Government and Law No. 25/1999 on Fiscal Balance between the Central and Local Governments made it clear that decentralization was carried out immediately and formally (Nagai & Funatsu, 2018).

Local autonomy encouraged many desires for expansion from the regions. The first province to expand was North Maluku, which proliferated from Maluku in 1999, followed by West Papua, which separated from Papua in 1999. Banten split from West Java in 2000. Bangka Belitung from South Sumatra in 2001, Gorontalo from North Sulawesi in 2001, Riau Islands from Riau in 2002. West Sulawesi divided itself from South Sulawesi in 2002. The most recent province to be proliferated was North Kalimantan in 2012.

Before implementing local autonomy, the number of provinces in Indonesia was 27, though this decreased to 26 after Timor Leste opted to secede from Indonesia through a referendum in 1999. Currently, the number of provinces in Indonesia is 34. Before the reformation, the number of districts and cities in Indonesia was 316. Meanwhile, in 2021 the number of regencies and municipalities in Indonesia was 514. The strong local political drive to secede from the region of origin challenged the central government to distribute power and resources

cause the number of provinces and regions to proliferated (Hamid, 2014). Region's expansion was very important due to the high distrust from the regions to the central government (Klinken & Berenschot, 2018).

Studies on decentralization in Indonesia can be divided into two, fiscal decentralization and political decentralization. Fiscal decentralization focuses on analyzing the government's budget regarding revenues and expenditures and how the budget affects equity. The second one focuses on the political aspect, which analyzes changes in the institutional structure and its impact on infrastructure and political superstructure (Mokoginta, 2012). The Ministry of Home Affairs evaluated regional expansion in 2011, which was 33% of autonomous regions resulting from expansion (DOHP) were considered successful. Meanwhile, 67% of the regions resulting from the proliferation were considered to have not been successful. Meanwhile, according to the World Bank in 2011, there were still many regions that had not yet shown the desired performance

"The result of the evaluation shows the enormous challenge faced by DOHP to conduct a good performance in order to accomplish the objectives of regional autonomy. A number of particular indicators are in general easily met by the DOHP; however, apparently, there are more indicators that seem to be difficult to meet by the DOHP. Thus, the general conclusion that can be drawn is that most DOHP still have not accomplished the expected performance, a condition which might be strongly related to the establishment process as well as advancement and capacity development provided for the DOHP (Direktorat Jenderal Otonomi Daerah, 2011)

Decentralization aims to improve the welfare of the new regions and deliver public services closer (Makagansa, 2008). This can be seen from the success of North Maluku in implementing health and education services. North Maluku utilizes its budget to build roads, airports, ports, schools, and health infrastructure. North Maluku's budget absorption reaches 99.9%. However, in other cases, the expansion of Banten Province does not show significant results. In 2012 the population in Banten was still the second poorest population after West Sulawesi. A comparison of the impact of the proliferation of these two provinces shows that decentralization can have both positive and negative effects. Institutionally, the positive impact of decentralization is increasing information transparency, while the negative impact is the dominance of regional elites who produce asymmetrical information that triggers institutional inefficiency (Jaya, 2021, p. 81).

Many studies associate decentralization with the performance of public services. Research conducted by Sujarwoto (2012) shows that the quality of public services within the decentralization framework is influenced by local political institutions, educated and transparent communities, community political participation, the presence of social groups, and local government accountability (Sujarwoto, 2012). Hidayati's research (2017) shows that dispensing specific responsibilities to regional bureaucracies can encourage stronger community and bureaucratic involvement; this can be done by putting pressure on elites and bureaucrats to be more responsive and accountable in providing public services (Hidayati, 2017).

1.3 The Urgency of Asymmetric Decentralization is Necessary to Improve Public Services in the Archipelagic Region

The study of asymmetric decentralization started to attract the attention of researchers since Indonesia granted special autonomy to five provinces, i.e., DKI Jakarta Province, Special Region of Yogyakarta (2012), Aceh Province (2001), Papua Province (2001), and West Papua

Province (2001) (Huda, 2015). The consideration of granting special autonomy to Aceh, Papua, and West Papua was dominated by political considerations because the three regions have separatist movements, specifically Aceh, that aspired to apply Islamic law in their local regulations (Azis et al., 2020). Meanwhile, Yogyakarta was granted special privileges due to historical factors and Yogyakarta's large contribution to the independence of Indonesia. Yogyakarta even became the capital city of Indonesia in 1946 (Azis et al., 2020). Meanwhile, Jakarta was given special autonomy because Jakarta is Indonesia's capital and Indonesia's center of government.

Indonesia is an archipelagic country, consisting of 17,504 islands, with 16,056 islands that have been named at the United Nations in 2017. Two-thirds of Indonesia's territory is territorial waters (3,544,744 km² out of a total of 5,455,675 km²). Therefore, Indonesia is a maritime country like Japan, the Philippines, and the U.K. (Polyando, 2020). Of the 34 provinces, 8 provinces are in the form of islands (West Nusa Tenggara, East Nusa Tenggara, Riau Islands, Maluku, North Maluku, Bangka Belitung, North Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi). In 2018, the eight provinces proposed special autonomy of the archipelago.

The idea of submitting a law on archipelagic regions has not been accommodated either by the central government or the legislature (Polyando, 2020);. However, during the Jokowi administration, there was a paradigm shift from Java-centric to Indonesia-centric, with the aspiration to make Indonesia the world's maritime axis in 2024 (Polyando, 2020). Unfortunately, the disparity of development in Indonesia is not only between west and east, Java and non-Java but also between mainland and islands. Archipelagic regions, in general, are far behind in all respects; education, health, basic infrastructure such as roads, water, electricity, and internet network. For this reason, it is necessary to build a growth hub outside Java, especially in the archipelago.

Support for the provision of asymmetric decentralization for archipelagic regions is presented by the research of Rahmatunnisa et al. (2018); that the desire of the archipelagic regions to obtain asymmetric decentralization is more than the desire to have a better capacity in carrying out the development and governance process. Therefore, the basis for the eight archipelagic provinces to acquire asymmetrical decentralization is not as political as the previous provinces but rather administrative and fiscal decentralization. However, asymmetric decentralization must be provided with a careful design to achieve the intended benefits (Rahmatunnisa et al., 2018).

Research on asymmetric decentralization in Indonesia focuses more on granting authority at the provincial level (Azis et al., 2020; Huda, 2015; Madubun & Akib, 2017; Polyando, 2020; Rahmatunnisa et al., 2018), but few have analyzed the possibility of granting asymmetrical decentralization in areas with archipelagic characteristics. This research is theory-driven, which will explore the possibility of granting asymmetric decentralization to islands and island. Considering the high disparity between archipelagic and non-archipelagic regions, the idea of implementing asymmetric decentralization in archipelagic regions is worth investigating. Certainly, this is accompanied by what capacities are needed to achieve successful asymmetric decentralization.

2. Theoretical Framework

The second part consists of theories and concepts that explain decentralization, asymmetric decentralization, and the correlation between decentralization and public services.

2.1 Decentralization

If we recall, decentralization came from the Tiebout hypothesis, which Charles M. Tiebout initiated in 1956. Tiebout said that different local governments would offer different goods and services to their residents in place of taxes. Residents will therefore move to local government jurisdictions that approximate their desired service preferences. In this way, the varied services of local government can solve some of the problems of public service becoming efficient (Howell-Moroney, 2008; Tiebout, 1956). This idea was maintained by Wallace Oates (1972) by developing the "decentralization theorem," which states that *"in the absence of cost savings from centralization and inter-jurisdictional externalities, fiscal responsibilities should be decentralized"* (Koethenbuerger, 2008). This argument implicitly assumes that the central government is less responsive to heterogeneous population preferences and can only implement uniform policies (Oates, 2006).

In general, decentralization implies *"away from the center"* (Meenakshisudaram, 1994). One of the prominent definitions that are often used as a reference is the definition of Cheema and Rondinelli. According to Cheema and Rondinelli, decentralization is: *"the transfer of authority, responsibility, and resources-through deconcentration, delegation, or devolution-from the center to lower levels of administration"* (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007b, p. 1). Furthermore, Cheema and Rondinelli (2007) explained that decentralization is determined by the level of authorization in planning, decision-making, and regulating the authority transferred from the center and how much the autonomy can be accepted and implemented.

In Smith's view, decentralization can be understood as a process to transfer power from the central government to the sub-national level of government (Smith, 2002). According to Smith, there are three levels in decentralization, i.e., deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. Falleti (2005) offered a different view, which defines decentralization as *"a process of state reform composed of a set of public policies that transfer responsibilities, resources, or authority from higher to lower levels of government in the context of a specific type of state"*. Meanwhile, according to Savy et al., decentralization is *"a method of the internal organization of the nation-state. It does not take place against its interest but in cooperation in it. It is defined by the relations between the central government and the regional and the local institutions"* (Savy et al., 2017).

Decentralization refers to the transfer of power, authority, responsibility, and resources from the center to middle and local administrative units (Ghuman & Singh, 2013). There are many reasons why proponents of decentralization consider that this concept is efficient and can improve performance. According to Guess (2005), several considerations for implementing decentralization include:

"The most common are related to policy or technical concerns: to generate local pressure for national or provincial state modernization; to provide the public with cheaper, better-quality, and greater service coverage; to achieve budget savings by cutting the central provision of local services; to widen political support for and increase the level of trust in the central regime; to increase local participation in planning and budgeting to produce service mixes consistent with local preferences; to produce fewer white elephant or incomplete capital or development projects; to hold the country together; to permit regional or local experimentation in program design; and to prevent the disintegration of the central government" (Guess, 2005).

Scholars who advocate decentralization reveal the advantages that can be obtained in implementing decentralization, including (i) promoting allocative efficiency, (ii) increasing


productive efficiency and accountability, (iii) facilitating cost recovery (Azfar et al., 2001, p. 6). According to Merilee S. Grindle (2009), the practice of decentralization can improve governance and democracy, although it can also reduce the level of welfare of local communities. There are at least four hypotheses why decentralization can encourage or hinder governance practices in developing countries since each country has a different pace of speed between different policy sectors, histories, and competencies. The four hypotheses are (i) political competition, (ii) state entrepreneurship, (iii) public sector modernization, and (iv) civil society activism (Grindle, 2007, pp. 10–12). According to Rondinelli and Cheema (2007), four factors influence the success and failure of decentralization: *environmental conditions, inter-organizational relationships, available resources, and characteristics of implementing agencies*.

Furthermore, Cheema and Rondinelli (1983) identified four decentralization models, i.e., political decentralization, administrative decentralization, fiscal decentralization, and market decentralization (Mudalige, 2019). A complete explanation is as follows:

- (1) Political decentralization aims to give citizens and their elected representatives more power in public decision making
 - (2) Administrative decentralization seeks to redistribute authority, responsibility, and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government
 - i. Deconcentration; the redistribution of decision-making authority and financial and management responsibilities among different levels of the central government, is often considered the weakest form of decentralization and is used most frequently in unitary states
 - ii. Delegation: through delegation, central governments transfer responsibility for decision-making and administration of public functions to semi-autonomous organizations not wholly controlled by the central government but ultimately accountable to it.
 - iii. Devolution is the transfer authority for decision making finance and management to quasi-autonomous units of local government with corporate status
 - (3) Fiscal decentralization can be formed in self-financing, co-financing, expansion of local revenues, intergovernmental transfers, authorization of municipal borrowing
 - (4) Economic or market decentralization can be formed in privatization and deregulation”
- (Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007a, p. 6; J. I. Litvack & Seddon, 2002, pp. 2–4; Rondinelli et al., 1983)

In the World Bank's view, administrative decentralization is "*the process of redistributing authority and responsibility for providing public services from the central or national level of government to a subnational and or local level*" (World Bank, 2008). The following is an illustration of the differences in the three forms of administrative decentralization according to Mudalige (2019)

Figure 1 Forms of Decentralization



Source: Mudalige, 2019

Falleti (2005) proposed the concept of the sequential theory of decentralization. In her concept, she explained that the implementation of decentralization is usually with a sequence, particularly starting from administrative decentralization, advancing with fiscal, and finally political. However, she suggested that the order of implementing decentralization should start with political decentralization. With political decentralization, the locals will have the authority to lobby the central and increase the capacity of local politicians and officials. After having the power to lobby for whatever authority they desire, they proceed with fiscal and administrative decentralization (Falleti, 2005).

2.1.3 Criticism of Decentralization

Critics of decentralization can be categorized into two groups, i.e., the one that focuses on the impact of decentralization at the central level and the one that focuses on the impact of decentralization on local governments. For the central government, decentralization can result in new powers that can exceed the distribution of authority and resources from the center. Meanwhile, those who examine the effects of decentralization at the local level see the possibility of the birth of elites capture and local capacities that may be lower than the central government's capacity (Azfar et al., 2001, p. 8).

Some literature shows that decentralization weakens public services when local government capacity, accountability, and service institutions are weak. Low capacity can increase inefficiency and waste in service delivery (Ricard M Bird et al., 1995; Sewell, 1996; Tanzi, 1996). As is the case in the Philippines, strong patronage politics has become a weakness in the practice of decentralized health. Health programs tend to focus on specific populations within the community. Meanwhile, political elites enjoy access to budgets because many health infrastructures projects do not impact voter preferences in general elections (Langran, 2011).

Decentralization does not always transfer power from the center to governors or mayors. The authority granted by the center but not accompanied by financing shows the increasing level of dependence of local governments on the center. This strengthens the dominance of the central influence over the regions (Falleti, 2005). Increasing local elite power, decentralizing corruption, and social inequity are negative effects of decentralization (Kessy, 2017) and strengthening clientelistic relationships (Kohl, 2003).

According to Prud'homme (1995), the negative consequences of decentralization are that it can lead to regional disparities, economic instability, and inefficiency. This can happen when the central government no longer has responsibility for redistributing programs or has full control over taxes and spending. Furthermore, the limited capacity of local governments leads to unresponsive and corrupt services, resulting in inefficient services (Prud'homme, 1995).

According to Neamtu (2016), currently, researchers acknowledge more about the factors that cause the failure of decentralization practices than the factors that contribute to its success. Moreover, the factors contributing to the failure are incomplete legal reform process, too much control from the central government, low personnel capacity at the regional level, weak political leadership, low financial resources, undeveloped civil society, weak pressure from local constituents, corruption, and clientelism (Neamtu, 2016).

Critics of decentralization focus more on decentralization from the political aspect and the consequences of political transformation in terms of institutions and capacities. However, this criticism has not considered aspects unrelated to humans, particularly the geographical aspect. This geographical aspect needs to be an important consideration in a country with an archipelagic state such as Indonesia, the Philippines, Japan, et cetera. This is because the disparity between regions is visible, which will affect the success of decentralization. Decentralization in public services is required due to the limitations of the central government in reaching people who are far from the center of development, such as in archipelagic regions. One of the solutions offered by scientists is the fifth form of decentralization in addition to the four-decentralization offered by Cheema and Rondinelli, i.e., asymmetric decentralization. The understanding of asymmetric decentralization, which is the key to this research, will be explained in the next section.

2.2 Asymmetric Decentralization

Tarleton proposed the idea of asymmetric decentralization in 1956. This idea was developed to distinguish the practice of decentralization in federal states, where the implementation of decentralization can be done symmetrically and asymmetrically. Symmetrical decentralization refers to state components with the same conditions, while the asymmetric concept explains the components of states that do not have the same characteristics in terms of social, cultural, economic, and political characteristics (Tarleton, 1965). Asymmetry is considered to protect minority groups from the centripetal efforts of the central government (Conversi, 2007). According to McGarry (2007), there are at least two objectives of granting asymmetric autonomy. The first is particularly centrifugal, i.e., to strengthen local government with certain responsibilities. Second, democratic accountability. Democratic accountability is needed in the process of formulating policies at the legislative level. When legislative power is balanced between legislators, this can have implications for regions whose affairs are intervened by other legislators, which is not what they desire. In the United Kingdom, this dilemma is called the "*West Lothian*" (McGarry, 2007).

According to Madubun et al. (2017), "*asymmetric decentralization is a form of decentralization that was developed from the concept of decentralization itself, to distinguish it from the symmetrical decentralization that has been in force in various countries.*" Although countries with symmetrical constitutional for all regions, but classical federation countries such as the United States, Switzerland, and Australia still have some degree to proffer asymmetrical authority to states such as in the District of Columbia, the Northern Territory in Australia (Richard M Bird, 2003). The difference between symmetric and asymmetric policies is explained by Adrian et al. (2017).

"The symmetric policy is uniformity and similarity measures in relations between the country's political units, both political units at the same level, as well as with the state system as a whole. Meanwhile, the asymmetric policy is a situation where diversity in larger communities finds political expression through the government that has varying degrees of autonomy and authority" (Adrian et al., 2017).

Economic, demographic, and social diversity, measured based on the level of welfare, area, and level of cohesion in society, will create a multi-level government and different public service structures in each country. Therefore, according to the World Bank: "to accommodate the need for such diverse approaches, asymmetrical central policies—treating different units differently—may be required to produce similar responses" (J. Litvack et al., 1998). However, asymmetric decentralization has its challenges: laws and regulations must treat all government units uniformly/standardly. In other words, there is no difference in the eyes of regulations. Even though, in practice, each unit has a different capacity in implementing these regulations. Local government capacity is the main issue in providing asymmetric decentralization (J. Litvack et al., 1998).

The granting of asymmetric decentralization is based on several considerations, such as political, administrative, and fiscal aspects. Asymmetric decentralization based on political considerations can emerge as a response to regional pressures such as separatism or the central desire to achieve macroeconomic and administrative cohesion or allow local governments with different capacities to fully exercise their functions and powers (Wehner, 2000). Asymmetric in terms of administration refers to the degree of autonomy or authority from the states or through applying central rules that are not uniform in the regions (Richard M Bird, 2003). Asymmetric decentralization in the fiscal sector refers to differences in spending patterns, taxes, income patterns, and transfers (Richard M Bird, 2003).


According to Veljanovski, there are three reasons why asymmetric fiscal decentralization can be proffered, i.e., economic, administrative, and legal constitutional (Veljanovski, 2010). According to Vazquez in Bird (2003), Asymmetric in fiscal terms is "*a system in which the municipalities that are able and have competencies to provide public services have to be provided with enhanced fiscal rights and powers than the rest of the units of that country*". Meanwhile, according to Muluk (2021), asymmetric decentralization differs between federal and unitary states. He further explained that there are three considerations for granting asymmetric decentralization: constitutional legal, political and socio-cultural (Muluk, 2021). The size of local autonomy undoubtedly determines the effectiveness of administrative decentralization (Muluk, 2021). Furthermore, asymmetric decentralization can distort the decision-making process by introducing new elements in the spectrum of centralization and decentralization, particularly with efficiency and suppressing spillovers caused by free riding (Fiorillo et al., 2021).

Meanwhile, according to Bird and Ebel (2007), the provision of asymmetric decentralization is due to two motives, i.e., political motives and administrative motives. Political motives are due to political and cultural reasons, while administrative motives are driven by economic and efficiency factors (Richard M Bird & Ebel, 2007, p. 21). Tan and Uster (2021) referred to asymmetric decentralization as the arrangement of fiscal and administrative competencies and policy responsibilities delegated to sub-national level governments with the same legislative status (Tan & Avshalom-Uster, 2021). The type of asymmetric decentralization can be divided into extended autonomy, limited autonomy, and special autonomy (Utomo, 2009). Wehner stated that asymmetry was given for two reasons, particularly political driven and capacity driven (Wehner, 2000). According to Lele (2019), asymmetric giving is due to political motives (to tame separatism) and economic motives (increasing efficiency and effectiveness in the delivery of public services and improving the quality of policymaking) (Lele, 2019).

Countries with a centralized system, such as China, also provide limited decentralization. Decentralization in China is a combination of economic decentralization and political centralization. Economic decentralization was carried out to nurture competition between territories by promoting economic prosperity and infrastructure development while maintaining a centralized administrative system to ensure political integration (Chien, 2007). Asymmetric decentralization is considered to recognize the community's uniqueness and the differences in their capacities (Neamtu, 2016). Tilin (2007) divided asymmetric decentralization in the federal state into *de facto* asymmetry, which is based on the fact that decentralization in the federal state differs from one another due to differences in area size, regional wealth, culture, language, and autonomy of authority. Secondly, in *de jure*, this refers to the asymmetrical design by the constitution because the state has recognized the different characteristics of each subnational region (Tillin, 2007).

Asymmetric decentralization is needed to recognize differences in geography, population, economic, or socio-cultural conditions (Rahmatunnisa et al., 2018). Mabuun and Akib (2017) argued that Indonesia, as an archipelagic country, needs to provide asymmetric decentralization to provinces with archipelagic characteristics because public services in the archipelagic regions have not run as expected. The main obstacles faced by residents living in the archipelago are inadequate sea transportation, natural conditions that are challenging for the community to access services and resources (human, funds, and facilities) (Madubun & Akib, 2017). They suggested a prototype of asymmetric decentralization shown in Figure 2. Furthermore, Watts revealed that the archipelagic regions had met the "pre-conditions" needed to implement asymmetric decentralization (Watts, 2000).

Figure 2 Prototype of Asymmetric decentralization in Indonesia's archipelagic provinces



Source: (Madubun & Akib, 2017)

2.2.1 Criticism of Asymmetric Decentralization

Asymmetric decentralization is regarded as a solution to the shortcomings encountered in the practice of decentralization. However, even this concept is not without criticism. In practice, asymmetric decentralization is considered ineffective and proliferates corrupt practices because of the privilege in fiscal use (Kesuma Nasution, 2016). In overcoming the shortcomings of both symmetric and asymmetric decentralization, Nasution (2016) proposed the concept of sequential asymmetrical decentralization. The concept he offered was asymmetric decentralization that is carried out based on a rank between 1-5. Each region that received asymmetric decentralization was ranked and then evaluated every five years. If in five years, if the performance decreases, the rating will decrease and vice versa (Kesuma Nasution, 2016). However, Nasution did not explain further the consequences of the downgrade and upgrade of the rating.

According to Vazquez (2007), asymmetric decentralization can cause many problems such as non-compliance in fiscal implementation, stagnant economic growth, inter-region inequality, reducing the opportunity for the central government to achieve national goals such as GDP growth, and lastly, associated with weak transparency (Vazquez, 2007). In practice, asymmetric decentralization provides different results for the two provinces in Indonesia, specifically Aceh and Papua. In Aceh, the granting of asymmetric decentralization succeeded in taming the separatist movement of "Gerakan Aceh Merdeka" or GAM. Meanwhile, despite being provided asymmetric decentralization in Papua, the separatist conflict continues to this day (Lele, 2021). According to Lele (2021), this is because asymmetric grants to Papua were made elitist at the center, did not involve indigenous Papuans, and ignored the wishes of separatist groups. This process contrasts with the asymmetrical drafting process for Aceh, which involved the GAM group and the drafting of the Aceh privilege law.

2.3 Public Service and Decentralization

There are many driving factors for a country to decide to implement decentralization. However, one thing that needs to be underlined is that the common goal of implementing decentralization is to deliver and improve public services to the community (Katharina & Jaweng, 2020, p. 2). Supposedly, decentralization should increase the responsiveness, effectiveness, and efficiency of public services in the regions (Hadiwijoyo & Anisa, 2021, p. 58; Sujarwoto, 2012). Newly

proliferated regions, especially those with archipelagic territories and other unique characteristics, should be given the discretion to manage their affairs differently following very high regional variability, such as offering asymmetric decentralization (Brosio, 2014; Dwiyanto, 2015a, p. 31).

On the other hand, the trade-off between re-centralization and decentralization is the uniformity of national standards with territorial variations. Conversely, the government must apply standards to ensure equality in the services provided. However, consideration of the situation, geographical conditions, cultural diversity, and socio-economic conditions of each region can affect the regional capacity in providing services. Therefore, discretion is needed to make adjustments in providing services according to local conditions and needs (Efriandi et al., 2019).

Public administration scientists propose the benefits of decentralization based on the premise that decentralization can bring decision-makers at the local level closer to the voters they must serve (Khaleghian, 2004). Many studies associate fiscal decentralization with public service performance (Chu & Yang, 2012; Gradstein, 2017; Kis-katos & Suharnoko, 2017; Sanogo, 2019; Wei et al., 2018), political decentralization with service performance (Besley & Coate, 2003; Busygina et al., 2018; Foucart & Wan, 2018; Lewis & Hendrawan, 2018). However, decentralization was initially intended as an administrative reform to improve services and economic efficiency, and decentralization was widely regarded as a process to strengthen democracy (Mudalige, 2019). According to The World Bank (2008), "*decentralization shifts responsibility and accountability for the delivery of public services to subnational (state, provincial, district, or local) levels of government, aiming to help improve service delivery and local governance*".

The provision of decentralization is based on the assumption that policymakers at the local level have better access to information regarding conditions at the local level than the central government. Therefore, policymakers at the local level can use this information to design policies and budgets for the local public and program choices they desire (Khaleghian, 2004). Meanwhile, Stewart and Clarke (1987) recognized public service orientation as:

- "A local authority's activities exist to provide service for the public
- A local authority will be judged by the quality of service provided within the resources available
- The service provided is only if real if it is of value to those for whom it is provided
- Those for whom services are provided are customers demanding high-quality service
- Quality of service demands closeness to the customer". (Stewart & Clarke, 1987)

Many argued that decentralization improves governance practices and the quality of public services using *allocative efficiency*: particularly public services that follow the needs of local communities and *productive efficiency*: i.e., by increasing local government accountability to the community, shortening bureaucracy, and better knowledge of local costs (Bank, 2001). There are at least three elements involved in providing public services, specifically service delivery organizations, service recipients, and customer satisfaction (Hardiyansyah, 2018, p. 16).

Public services provided by a country vary greatly and depend on what service paradigm they apply. Reforms in the public sector have at least grasped the strong influence of the old public administration (OPA). OPA was influenced by scientists such as Woodrow Wilson, Frederick Taylor, and Max Weber. Public administration in the 20th century was influenced by the "rule of law" component, where the central role of the bureaucracy in the policymaking process was

through a hierarchical organizational structure (Vignieri, 2020). This classical paradigm received criticism when it failed to deal with the financial crisis that emerged in the mid-1990s and then emerged "managerialism" movement in the public sector, especially from the "New Right Thinkers" (Homburg et al., 2007).

The "managerialism" approach spread rapidly in Europe, the Commonwealth, and the United States in the late 1970s. According to Christensen and Laegreid, New Public Management (NPM) arose because of "a complex mixture of environmental pressures, policy features, and historical and institutional contexts which imply substantial divergence and organizational variety and heterogeneity" (Christensen & Laegreid, 2003). In the United States, this movement was introduced by David Osborne and Ted Gaebler in 1992 through reinventing government (D. Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). Osborne and Gaebler attempted to adopt service practices from the private sector to the public sector with customer-driven principles. This transformation in the public sector is based on finance, quality, and ideology (Minogue, 1998). However, there were many criticisms of NPM because it overestimated efficiency and ignored social and contain mechanistic values (Gregory, 2003).

New Public Services (NPS) emerged from criticism of NPM. Denhardt and Denhardt articulated this paradigm in 2000. In their view, the state should not treat citizens as consumers but as citizens. The main idea of this paradigm is that public servants must be able to encourage people, communities, and civil society to articulate their shared interests and empower them (R. B. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2000). NPS focuses on democratic citizenship, community and civil society models, and organizational humanism that focuses on citizens' needs and preferences, rather than bureaucratic control or tight control over service performance (J. V. Denhardt & Denhardt, 2015; Robinson, 2015).


In the context of decentralization, many countries that implement decentralization change direction from the OPA service paradigm to NPM, though the effect of NPM on public services depends on the administrative, political, and policy context (Lapuente & Van de Walle, 2020). The practice of public service management that adopts NPM values has encouraged very significant changes in providing public services (Ferguson, 2019; D. Osborne & Gaebler, 1992; S. P. Osborne & McLaughlin, 2005). These values are also adopted by developing countries that are interested in NPM approach.

The transformation carried out by NPM in public service management, and regional autonomy can be observed from the regional flexibility in providing services and determining taxes and levies (Dwiyanto, 2015b, p. 16), which includes involving corporations in the public sector. The role of corporations and non-government institutions is increasingly seen in the provision of goods and services, which the government previously dominated. Therefore, defining public services as government services is no longer appropriate (Dwiyanto, 2015b, p. 17). Decentralization encourages the tendency of regions to localize public services by limiting the access of residents from outside the region to use existing public services. The goal is to limit positive externalities (Dwiyanto, 2015b, p. 29).

The low capacity of personnel in the regions is suspected as one of the causes of the failure of decentralization practices (Neamtu, 2016). For this reason, administrative capacity needs attention. In Neamtu's argument, *"Local governments with weak administrative capacity cannot perform the decentralized tasks similar to their better-off counterparts. In this case, citizens no longer experience the expected benefits of decentralization but are rather condemned to receive fewer services and fewer investments in infrastructure"* (Neamtu, 2016).

The correlation between decentralization and government capacity is similar to the chicken and egg situation (Tan, 2019, p. 4). Is a certain capacity required to support the successful implementation of decentralization, or will decentralization process create certain capacity? The assumption that links decentralization with public governance is that better public governance depends on accountability, effectiveness, and efficiency in providing public services and responsiveness to public expectations. This can only be achieved effectively if the local government is financially dependent on regional resources and has the discretion to act according to its decisions in providing public services (Tan, 2019, p. 21). Tan further explained the forms of governance capacity in the following illustration:

Figure 3 An analytical model for capacities in local governance



Source: (Tan, 2019, p. 68).

The disparity in inter-regions development is a common aspect in the economic activities of a region. This inequality is primarily caused by differences in the content of natural resources and demographic conditions in an area. The occurrence of inter-regions disparities has implications for the level of inter-regions community welfare ((Hadiwijoyo & Anisa, 2021, p. 139). According to Rustandi et al. (2011), the factors that cause inter-regions development disparities are related to physical and socio-economic variables of the region, which are influenced by several things, particularly (a) geography, (b) history, (c) politics, (d) government policies, (e) administration, (f) social culture and (g) economy (Rustandi et al., 2011)

Archipelagic countries have a different character (distinct) from continental countries. According to Dommen (1980), defining an island as a piece of land completely surrounded by water is inaccurate. Naturally, islands have the characteristics of (a) earthquakes – many islands emerge from the sea as volcanoes, (b) tropical cyclones – typhoons are part of the environment that will affect the appearance of the island and how its inhabitants live there, (c) the bounty of nature, (d) island biology, (e) epidemics (Dommen, 1980). Unfortunately, small archipelagic countries such as countries in the Pacific Island Countries experience capacity constraints in many things such as public financial management, government procurement, to infrastructure maintenance (Dornan & Cain, 2014).

The main barriers of capacity in Pacific Island nations are government service provision and economic development. Hard-to-reach places and various characteristics make the cost of services more expensive and complicate matters to achieve maximum benefits from services. The capacity of national and local governments to support better services in the regions is costly (Dornan & Cain, 2014). The small number of populations in island countries in the Pacific correlates with the low capacity and performance of public financial management (Haque et al., 2015). Urbanization in archipelagic nations in the Pacific is increasing, challenging preparing services in urban areas. In facing these challenges, inter-regional cooperation is considered one of the collaborative efforts to solve service problems in archipelagic countries (Mohanty, 2011).

2.3.1 Criticism of Public Service and Decentralization

Indonesia has set five provinces in implementing asymmetric decentralization, i.e., DKI Jakarta, Aceh, Papua, West Papua, and Yogyakarta. However, it is unfortunate that after almost 20 years of implementing asymmetric decentralization in Papua, it fails to achieve the goals of asymmetric decentralization. Among them is the research of Cahyaningsih and Fitriady (2019). The study shows that asymmetric fiscal decentralization in Papua in the fields of education and health is ineffective. This can be seen from the education and health outcomes in Papua which does not increase after asymmetric administration (Cahyaningsih & Fitriady, 2019). The decision to implement decentralization is sometimes not accompanied by the readiness of regional capacities; in this case, decentralization widens inter-region disparities as indicated by differences in local government capacities (Matsui, 2006).

In providing decentralized public services, the government usually sets minimum service standards for all regions to prevent differences in service standards. However, this minimum service standard also has several weaknesses, including, first, residents do not understand these standards; thus, service standards cannot be used as weapons to suppress better service. Second, the target of service standards is considered too high while the capacity of each region is varied. Third, there is a lack of synchronicity between service standards and service costs and budgets, and other resources. Fourth, there is no clear service implementation strategy. Fifth, service standards only apply to service providers by the government yet do not regulate service providers from non-government parties (Dwiyanto, 2015b, pp. 42–48).


2.4 Theorization

Based on the theoretical framework on decentralization, asymmetric decentralization, and the correlation between decentralization and public services, this researcher observes several gaps in the literature as follows:

1. Research on decentralization tends to be fragmented, in a matter that it only focuses on political decentralization, fiscal decentralization, or administrative decentralization. This is understandable because each form of decentralization alone is very complex to explain
2. Research that focuses on examining the implementation of decentralization in countries with archipelagic characteristics is still rare. Currently, many studies discuss small countries with archipelagic characteristics in the Pacific Region
3. Research on asymmetric decentralization is beginning to gain attention, especially in federalized countries. However, research on asymmetric decentralization focuses more on political and fiscal motives. Meanwhile, the provision of asymmetric decentralization based on geography, i.e., archipelagic, still needs to be improved.
4. Research on the capacity needed by regions receiving asymmetric decentralization still requires attention

Based on the consideration of the gap in the research, this study suggests a new concept to complement existing research. The new concept offered is a distinctive asymmetrical decentralization for archipelagic regions in Indonesia. The theoretical logic of this concept is as follows:

Figure 4 Research Theorization



The new concepts offered are as follows:

1. Distinctive asymmetrical decentralization for archipelagic regions is the ability of archipelagic regions to practice discretion in terms of public services that are different from non-archipelagic regions
2. Why use the word distinctive? Isn't asymmetrical already showing a deviation from normal conditions? Asymmetric refers to the situation of archipelagic regions that have disparities compared to non-archipelagic regions. An "asymmetrical" condition is needed in accelerating the existing gap, but as explained by some literature, the government in the archipelagic region has a relatively weaker capacity. For this reason, the word distinctive refers to the capacity of the archipelagic regions. Asymmetric decentralization can be carried out specifically, or partially or fragmented; only certain aspects are considered the strengths of the archipelagic regions.
3. This concept is carried out by considering in advance the capacity and readiness of the archipelagic regions
4. This concept can be carried out in stages by considering performing asymmetrical fiscal decentralization first, followed by asymmetrical in the administrative field, lastly, followed by political asymmetry.
5. Asymmetric administration is given within a time limit of 5 years, and then its success is automatically evaluated. If successful, the asymmetrical form of decentralization can be expanded or added with other asymmetric powers. But if it is considered a failure, it

is necessary to have a different asymmetric design or the authority to be returned to the central government.

2.5 Research's Question

Based on the previously mentioned theoretical framework, this study conceptualizes the formulation of the research problem as follows:

1. What is the impact of decentralization on public services in the archipelagic regions in Indonesia?
2. Is asymmetric decentralization feasible to be implemented in archipelagic regions?
 - To what extent can asymmetrical decentralization be applied in the archipelagic regions?
 - What type of asymmetric decentralization should be implemented in the beginning?
3. What obstacles and challenges will the archipelagic regions of Indonesia face if asymmetric decentralization is implemented?
4. What capacity is needed to implement asymmetrical decentralization in the archipelagic regions of Indonesia?

3. Research Design

In order to answer the problem formulation that has been described in the previous section, this research will use qualitative methods in collecting data and information. The following are the details of the research design.

3.1 Research Method

This study uses qualitative methods to obtain deeper information in understanding social phenomena (Silverman, 2000, p. 2). Because this research is theory-driven, qualitative research makes it possible to explore factors that the researcher does not consider according to conditions in the field due to its flexibility nature (Silverman, 2000, p. 2).

3.2 Data Collection

Three methods will be used to collect data, i.e., interview, field notes, and desk study. Desk studies are conducted by analyzing literature, laws, and regulations related to the topic and research reports from government and non-government institutions. Primary data collection uses interview and observation techniques. While the secondary data is through desk evaluation.

a. interview

Interviews can be carried out to individuals or to groups which are better known as focus groups. There are three forms of interviews, i.e., structured, semi-structured, and unstructured (Qu & Dumay, 2011). In structured questions, all informants are asked the same question; this will minimize bias and increase the generality of the findings. Unstructured research is informal research that depends on the situation of the sources and the context. Meanwhile, semi-structured interviews refer to a list of research that has been prepared but does not rule out the possibility of providing further or more profound questions depending on the informants' answers. This study will use a semi-structured interview where the researcher has prepared interview guidelines though still open the opportunity to explore the interviewees' answers.

In addition to face-to-face interviews, other techniques may be considered. According to Opdenakker (2006), there are two interview techniques, i.e., synchronous communication and asynchronous communication (Opdenakker, 2006). Synchronous interviews are face-to-face

interviews, text messages, telephone. While asynchronous uses email techniques, text messages that are not immediately replied to (Opdenakker, 2006). In connection with the situation and conditions of the COVID-19 pandemic, face-to-face interviews are a priority for researchers. However, if conditions do not allow interviews, they will switch to asynchronous techniques via email, social media, or telephone. The complete list of resource persons is shown in the appendix.

b. field notes on observation

There are two forms of observation, i.e., structured and unstructured (Mulhall, 2003). Things that must be considered in conducting observations are the role of the researcher, permission from the source, access, and field notes. This study will observe places that provide basic services such as schools, hospitals, airports, ports, roads, and government offices. Both forms of observation, structured and unstructured, will be used in this study.

c. Documentary/Desk study

This method is to gathering information from articles, papers, research reports from government and non-government organization, websites and national newspapers and local newspapers (Bloor & Wood, 2006; Creswell, 2014, pp. 180–181). Further information on the list of documents is provided in appendix 2

d. data analysis

Data analysis refers to Creswell's inductive data analysis. The collected data is compiled into a database, and then made patterns are made, categorized, and themes are made. Subsequently, the triangulation technique is used to build a coherent synthesis of research results (Creswell, 2014). The triangulation method is done to refer to the use of several methods and data sources. There are four forms of triangulation, particularly method, investigator, theory, and data source (Carter et al., 2014). This study uses one interviewer. However, it is possible to recruit a second investigator if required. The forms of triangulation carried out in this research are the method, theory, and data sources.

3.3 Characteristics of West Nusa Tenggara Province

Attention to the archipelagic regions was only carried out by the Indonesian government in 1999 under the leadership of K.H. Abdurahman Wahid by forming the Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (DKP). This is where the attention to maritime and fisheries development started (D. P. R. R. Indonesia, 2014). During the administration of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, the DPR-RI initiated a draft law on archipelagic regions in 2014. Until presently, the bill has not been ratified. This draft law contains an explanation of the characteristics of the archipelagic region, management areas, government affairs, regional funding, regional development, archipelagic communities, and management of the fishery and marine products as well as community participation (D. P. R. R. Indonesia, 2014, pp. 25–26)

A similar draft law was initiated by the Regional Representatives Council (DPD) with the title of Accelerating the development of archipelagic regions. This DPD initiative draft was submitted in 2017, which, unfortunately, has the same fate as the DPR-RI initiative bill, which has not been ratified until now. This draft from DPD is more comprehensive than previously (D. P. D. R. Indonesia, 2017). Geographically, regions in Indonesia can be characterized into three forms, specifically (1) areas with terrestrial characteristics of continental areas, (2) areas with terrestrial, aquatic characteristics, where the land area is larger than the sea area, and (3) Terrestrial aquatic areas where the sea area is larger than the land area or is called an archipelagic area (D. P. R. R. Indonesia, 2014, p. 14). Indonesia has 34 provinces, of which

eight provinces are archipelagic. The following is a summary of the eight archipelagic provinces in Indonesia.

Table 1 Summary of Archipelagic Provinces in Indonesia

Province	Number of Regency/City	Population (2020)	APBD (2020)	Area	Number of Island
Riau Island	Regency: 5 City: 2	2,064,564	1,206,473,650,000	8,201.72 km ² / 96% is ocean	2,408
Bangka Belitung Island	Regency: 4 City: -	1,522,995	1,052,377,716,000	16,424.23 km ² / 80% is ocean	470/50 are inhabited
West Nusa Tenggara	Regency: 10 City: 2	5,320,092	1,641,178,248,000	20,124.48 km ² / 59.13% is ocean	280/32 are inhabited
East Nusa Tenggara (NTT)	Regency: 21 City: 1	5,35,566	1,922,975,903,000	47,931.54 km ² / 80.8% is ocean	1200
North Sulawesi	Regency: 11 City: 4	2,655,970	1,488,989,572,000	13,892.47 km ² / 95.8% is ocean	287/59 are inhabited
Southeast Sulawesi	Regency: 15 City: 2	2,755,589	1,639,676,883,000	110,000 km ² / 65.32% is ocean	591
Maluku	Regency: 9 City: 2	1,848,923	1,721,885,692,000	46,914.03 km ² / 92.6% is ocean	1,421
North Maluku	Regency: 8 City: 2	1,316,972	1,377,253,571,000	31,982.50 km ² / 69.08% is ocean	805/82 are inhabited

Source: National Statistical Agency, 2021

West Nusa Tenggara Province was selected because this province is one of the archipelagic provinces with the highest population (second after NTT). Second, of the eight provinces, NTB approximate distance is the closest to the central government, i.e., Jakarta, and compared to other regions, this province is more accessible in terms of sea transportation. And the last consideration is that the number of islands in this province is the smallest compared to other archipelagic provinces.

Based on the National Statistics Agency (2020) report, West Nusa Tenggara was in the 29th position out of 34 provinces. The current human development index rating was 68.25, below the national HDI average of 68.31. The human development index is measured by long and healthy life, knowledge, and a decent standard of living. Life expectancy at birth in 2020 was

66.51 years. The average length of schooling in 2020 was 7.31 years. Thus, it can be assumed that children in NTB only reach secondary school on average (Statistik, 2020, p. 72). NTB has four airports and seven ports in terms of infrastructure and a quite large marine and fishery potential (KKP, 2018).

Research conducted by Kusumaningrum in 2012 compared the economic rate of NTB before and after regional autonomy. The result shows that after regional autonomy, the economic growth rate decreased, the base and non-base sectors did not change before and during regional autonomy. The aggregate economic structure has not changed, variations in economic activity have not changed much (Kusumaningrum, 2012). The financial performance sector in 2003-2007 showed a low level of financial independence, and very high dependence on the central, while the efficiency level of regional spending was considered inefficient, with regional spending reaching 109.93% (Bisma & Susanto, 2010; Susanto, 2014).

3.4 Characteristics of West Sumbawa Regency

West Nusa Tenggara Province has 8 regions, i.e West Lombok, Central Lombok, East Lombok, Sumbawa, Dompu, Bima and West Sumbawa. In addition, there are two cities, i.e., Mataram and Bima. West Sumbawa Regency proliferated from the main Regency, Sumbawa Regency, in 2003. Among the eight regencies in NTB, the human development index of West Sumbawa Regency is the highest, with 71.63. This value is higher than the average HDI in NTB, which is 68.25. The expected age for birth is 68.07 years old, the expected length of schooling is 13.62 years. Meanwhile, the average length of schooling is 8.66 years (Statistik, 2020, p. 120).

The population of the West Sumbawa Regency in 2020 reached 148,606 people. West Sumbawa Regency covers eight districts consisting of 7 sub-districts and 57 villages. It is exciting to study the West Sumbawa Regency in terms of HDI, which exceeds the provincial average HDI, and because of the existence of P.T. Newmont Nusa Tenggara or abbreviated as P.T. NTT, which is the second-largest gold and copper mine in Indonesia after P.T. Freeport in Papua. Newmont's mining in Batu Hijau has contributed to regional revenue sharing. P.T. NTT contributed 20.70% to local revenue in 2006. This royalty contribution decreased to 13.69 in 2007 then decreased to 12.64% in 2008, 13.78% in 2009, 21.25% in 2010, 11.56% in 2011 and 08.16% in 2012 (Purwadinata, 2016). The fluctuation of royalty distributed by P.T. NTT was judged for its lack of transparency (Purwadinata, 2016). It will be interesting to see if this royalty contribution will affect the regional learning post and ultimately increase the HDI indirectly.

3.5 Research Objectives and Research framework


In general, this study is a theory-driven that analyzes the implications of decentralization on public services, especially in the archipelago. The selected islands are within the scope of West Nusa Tenggara Province and West Sumbawa Regency. This research has three specific objectives:

- i. To analyze the execution of public services after the implementation of local autonomy in West Nusa Tenggara and the expansion in West Sumbawa Regency
 - The extent to which public services can respond to local demand and whose demand is being responded to
 - The positive and negative impacts that arise after the implementation of local autonomy
- ii. To analyze the feasibility of implementing asymmetric decentralization in the archipelagic regions
 - What capacities do local governments need to implement asymmetric decentralization
 - What form of asymmetric decentralization should be primarily implemented?

- iii. Designing institutional arrangements that allow for the implementation of asymmetric decentralization in the archipelagic regions.

To achieve this goal, the research framework is illustrated as follows:

Figure 5 Research Framework



4. Systematic Design of Dissertation Writing

After doing field research and desk study, I will continue by writing a draft of the dissertation. The dissertation draft is designed in six chapters. Chapter I contains the introduction and data generating process. Chapter 2 describes the practice of decentralization in Indonesia. Chapter 3 is an empirical finding in the form of the implications of decentralization for the Province of West Nusa Tenggara. Chapter 4 is an empirical finding in the form of the implications of decentralization for the West Sumbawa Regency. Chapter 5 explores the possibility of implementing asymmetric decentralization in the Indonesian archipelagic regions. And chapter 6 is the closing which contains conclusions, theoretical implications, and policy implications. The following is the systematic design of the dissertation:

Chapter 1 Introduction

- 1.1 Research background
- 1.2 Theoretical Framework
- 1.3 Research Question
- 1.4 Research Logic
- 1.5 Data Generating Process
- 1.5 Data analysis

Chapter 2 Decentralization in Indonesia

- 2.1 2.1 In Historical Framework
- 2.2 2.2 Within the Framework of Legislation
- 2.3 The Impact of Decentralization on the Quality of Public Services in Indonesia

Chapter 3 Implications of Decentralization on the Quality of Public Services in West Nusa Tenggara Province

Chapter 4 Implications of Decentralization on the Quality of Public Service in West Sumbawa Regency

Chapter 5 Asymmetric Decentralization Design in Archipelagic Regions in Indonesia

- 5.1 Limited Asymmetric Decentralization in the archipelago
- 5.2 Capacity required for asymmetric decentralization
- 5.3 The order of Asymmetric decentralization
 - i. asymmetrical fiscal decentralization
 - ii. asymmetrical administrative decentralization
 - iii. asymmetrical political decentralization

Chapter 6 Closing

- 6.1 Conclusion
- 6.2 Theoretical Implication
- 6.3 Policy Implication

5. References

- Adrian, H., Supriyadi, R., & Lenggogeni, D. (2017). Asymmetric Policy Concept for Border Areas Development: Issues and Challenges. *The Indonesian Journal of Planning and Development*, 2(2), 51. <https://doi.org/10.14710/ijpd.2.2.51-61>
- Aspinall, E. (2018). Democratization: travails and achievements. In R. W. Hefner (Ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Indonesia* (First, pp. 83–94). Routledge.
- Azfar, O., Kahkonen, S., & Meagher, P. (2001). *Conditions for Effective Decentralization Governance: A Synthesis of Research Findings*.
- Azis, N. L. L., Zuhro, S., Cahyono, H., Suryani, D., Aulia, D., & Maulana, Y. (2020). *Model Desentralisasi Asimetris Dalam NKRI* (N. L. L. Azis & S. Zuhro (eds.); Cetakan 1). Yayasan Pusaka Obor Indonesia.
- Bank, T. W. (2001). Decentralization and governance: does decentralization improve public service delivery? In *World Bank*. The World Bank.
<http://www1.worldbank.org/prem/PREMNotes/premnote55.pdf>
- Besley, T., & Coate, S. (2003). Centralized versus decentralized provision of local public goods : a political economy approach. *Public Economics*, 87, 2611–2637.
[https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727\(02\)00141-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0047-2727(02)00141-X)
- Bird, Ricard M, Ebel, R. D., & Wallich, C. I. (1995). *Decentralization of the socialist state* (Ricard M Bird, R. D. Ebel, & C. I. Wallich (eds.)). World Bank Regional and Sectoral Studies. <https://doi.org/10.1596/0-8213-3186-8>
- Bird, Richard M. (2003). Asymmetric Fiscal Decentralization: Glue or Solvent? In *International Studies Program: Andrej Young School of Policy Studies* (No. 03–09; Issue April). <http://ideas.repec.org/p/ays/ispwps/paper0309.html>
- Bird, Richard M, & Ebel, R. D. (2007). Fiscal Fragmentation in Decentralized Countries: Subsidiarity, Solidarity and Asymmetry. In Ricard M Bird & R. D. Ebel (Eds.), *Subsidiarity, Solidarity and Asymmetry: Aspects of the Problem* (pp. 3–25). Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
- Bisma, I. D. G., & Susanto, H. (2010). Evaluasi Kinerja Keuangan Daerah Pemerintah Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat Tahun Anggaran 2003-2007. *Ganec Swara*, 4(3), 75–86.
- Bloor, M., & Wood, F. (2006). *Keywords in Qualitative Methods: A Vocabulary of Research Concepts*. Sage Publications, Inc.
<https://doi.org/https://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781849209403>
- Brosio, G. (2014). Decentralization and Public Service Delivery in Asia. In *ADB Economics* (No. 389). <https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2479233>
- Busygina, I., Filippov, M., & Taukebaeva, E. (2018). To decentralize or to continue on the centralization track : The cases of authoritarian regimes in Russia and Kazakhstan. *Journal of Eurasian Studies*, 9(1), 61–71. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2017.12.008>
- Cahyaningsih, A., & Fitradhy, A. (2019). The impact of asymmetric fiscal decentralization on education and health outcomes: Evidence from Papua Province, Indonesia. *Economics and Sociology*, 12(2), 48–63. <https://doi.org/10.14254/2071-789X.2019/12-2/3>
- Carter, N., Bryant-Lukosius, D., DiCenso, A., Blythe, J., & Neville, A. J. (2014). The Use of Triangulation in Qualitative Research. *Oncology Nursing Forum*.
<https://doi.org/10.1188/14.onf.545-547>
- Cheema, G. S., & Rondinelli, D. A. (2007a). *Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and Practices* (G. S. Cheema & D. A. Rondinelli (eds.)). Ash Institute for Democratic Governance and Innovation Harvard University.
- Cheema, G. S., & Rondinelli, D. A. (2007b). From Government Decentralization to Decentralized Governance. In G. S. Cheema & D. A. Rondinelli (Eds.), *Decentralizing Governance: Emerging Concepts and Practices* (pp. 1–20). Brookings Institution Press.
- Chien, S. S. (2007). Institutional innovations, asymmetric decentralization, and local

- economic development: A case study of Kunshan, in post-Mao China. *Environment and Planning C: Government and Policy*, 25(2), 269–290. <https://doi.org/10.1068/c0558>
- Christensen, T., & Laegreid, P. (2003). *New Public Management: The Transformation of Ideas and Practice* (T. Christensen & P. Laegreid (eds.)). Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Chu, A. C., & Yang, C. C. (2012). Fiscal centralization versus decentralization : Growth and welfare effects of spillovers , Leviathan taxation , and capital mobility. *Journal of Urban Economics*, 71(2), 177–188. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2011.10.003>
- Conversi, D. (2007). Asymmetry in Quasi-federal and unitary states. *Ethnopolitics*, 6(1), 121–124. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1080/17449050701233064>
- Creswell, J. W. (2014). *Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Approaches* (4th ed.). Sage Publications, Inc.
- Denhardt, R. B., & Denhardt, J. V. (2000). The new public service: Serving rather than steering. *Public Administration Review*, 60(6), 549–559. <https://doi.org/10.1111/0033-3352.00117>
- Denhardt, J. V., & Denhardt, R. B. (2015). The New Public Service Revisited. *Public Administration Review*, 75(5), 664–672. <https://doi.org/10.1111/puar.12347>
- Direktorat Jenderal Otonomi Daerah, K. D. N. (2011). *Laporan Hasil Evaluasi Daerah Otonom Hasil Pemekaran (EDOHP) 2011*.
- Dommen, E. (1980). Some distinguishing characteristics of island states. *Topics in Catalysis*, 8(12), 931–943. [https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X\(80\)90085-6](https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(80)90085-6)
- Dornan, M., & Cain, T. N. (2014). Regional Service Delivery among Pacific Island Countries: An Assessment. *Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies*, 1(3), 541–560. <https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.45>
- Dwiyanto, A. (2015a). *Administrasi Publik: Desentralisasi, Kelembagaan, dan Aparatur Sipil Negara*. Gadjah Mada University Press.
- Dwiyanto, A. (2015b). *Manajemen Pelayanan Publik: Peduli, Inklusif, dan Kolaboratif* (Cetakan IV). Gadjah Mada University Press.
- Efriandi, T. R. I., Couwenberg, O., & Holzhacker, R. L. (2019). Decentralization and public service provision: A case study of the education sector in Jayawijaya District, Papua, Indonesia. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 41(3), 364–389. <https://doi.org/10.1355/cs41-3b>
- Faguet, J.-P., & Caroline, P. (2015). *Is Decentralization Good For Development: Perspectives from Academics and Policy Makers*. Oxford University Press.
- Falleti, T. G. (2005). A sequential theory of decentralization: Latin American cases in comparative perspective. *American Political Science Review*, 99(3), 327–346. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055405051695>
- Ferguson, B. (2019). Public policy towards the public service. In *Competing for Influence* (pp. 377–394). ANU Press. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctvp2n3pr.15>
- Fernando, L. (2002). Theoretical Approach to Decentralization : An Introduction. *Journal of Management Science*, 1, 117–141.
- Fiorillo, F., Giuranno, M. G., & Sacchi, A. (2021). Asymmetric decentralization: distortions and opportunities. *Economia Politica*, 38(2), 625–656. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s40888-020-00211-7>
- Foucart, R., & Wan, C. (2018). Strategic decentralization and the provision of global public goods. *Journal of Environmental Economics and Management*, 92, 537–558. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jeem.2017.08.006>
- Ghuman, B. S., & Singh, R. (2013). Decentralization and delivery of public services in Asia. *Policy and Society*, 32(1), 7–21. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polsoc.2013.02.001>
- Gradstein, M. (2017). Government decentralization as a commitment. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 45(1), 110–118. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2016.01.005>

- Gregory, R. (2003). Transforming Governmental Culture: A Sceptical View of New Public Management. In T. Christensen & P. Laegreid (Eds.), *New Public Management: The Transformation of Ideas and Practice* (pp. 231–260). Ashgate Publishing Limited.
- Grindle, M. S. (2007). *Going Local: Decentralization, Democratization, and the Promise of Good Governance*. Princeton University Press.
- Guess, G. M. (2005). Comparative Decentralization Lessons from. *Public Administration Review*, 65(2), 217–230.
- Hadiwijoyo, S. S., & Anisa, F. D. (2021). *Pelayanan Publik Berbasis Regional Complex Analysis*. PT. Rajagrafindo Persada.
- Hamid, A. (2014). A Family Matter: Political Corruption in Banten, Indonesia. *Asian Politics and Policy*, 6(4), 577–593. <https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12136>
- Haq, T. A., Knight, D., & Jayasuriya, D. (2015). Capacity Constraints and Public Financial Management in Small Pacific Island Countries. *Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies*, 2(3), 609–622. <https://doi.org/10.1002/app5.79>
- Hardiyansyah. (2018). *Kualitas Pelayanan Publik* (Cetakan I). Gava Media.
- Hidayati, F. (2017). Can decentralization affect public service delivery? A preliminary study of local government's innovation and responsiveness in Indonesia. *Firda Hidayati/JPAS*, 1(3), 80–86. <https://doi.org/http://dx.doi.org/10.21776/ub.jpas.2017.002.01.7>
- Hofman, B., Kaiser, K., & Bank, T. W. (2002). The making of the 'big bang' and its aftermath: A political economy perspective. *Can Decentralization Help Rebuild Indonesia?*
- Homburg, V., Pollitt, C., & Thiel, S. van. (2007). Introduction. In *New Public Management in Europe: Adaptation and Alternatives*. Palgrave Macmillan UK.
- Howell-Moroney, M. (2008). The Tiebout hypothesis 50 years later: Lessons and lingering challenges for metropolitan governance in the 21st century. *Public Administration Review*, 68(1), 97–109. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2007.00840.x>
- Huda, N. (2015). *Desentralisasi Asimetris Dalam NKRI: Kajian Terhadap Daerah Istimewa, Daerah Khusus dan Otonomi Khusus*. Nusa Media.
- Indonesia, D. P. D. R. (2017). *Rancangan Undang-Undang tentang Kepulauan*. DPD RI. <https://www.dpr.go.id/uu/prolegnas>
- Indonesia, D. P. R. R. (2014). *Rancangan Undang-Undang Republik Indonesia tentang Percepatan Pembangunan Daerah Kepulauan*. DPR RI. <https://www.dpr.go.id/uu/prolegnas>
- Jaya, W. K. (2021). *Ekonomi Kelembagaan dan Desentralisasi*. Gajah Mada University Press.
- Katharina, R., & Jaweng, R. N. E. (2020). *Pelayanan Publik dan Pemerintahan Digital Indonesia* (R. Katharina (ed.); Cetakan I). Yayasan Pusaka Obor Indonesia.
- Kessy, A. (2017). Decentralization and Citizens' Participation: Some Theoretical and Conceptual Perspectives. *The African Review*, 40(2), 215–239.
- Kesuma Nasution, I. (2016). The Challenge of Decentralization in Indonesia: Symmetrical and Asymmetrical Debate. *International Journal of Social Science and Humanity*, 6(9), 691–697. <https://doi.org/10.18178/ijssh.2016.6.9.734>
- Khaleghian, P. (2004). *Decentralization and public services : the case of immunization*. 59, 163–183. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socscimed.2003.10.013>
- Kis-katos, K., & Suharnoko, B. (2017). The impact of fiscal and political decentralization on local public investment in Indonesia R. *Journal of Comparative Economics*, 45(2), 344–365. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jce.2017.03.003>
- KKP, D. J. P. D. S. P. K. dan P. (2018). *Potensi Usaha dan Peluang Investasi Kelautan dan Perikanan Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat*.
- Klinken, G. van, & Berenschot, W. (2018). Everyday citizenship in democratizing Indonesia.

- In R. W. Hefner (Ed.), *Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Indonesia* (pp. 151–162). Routledge.
- Koethenbuerger, M. (2008). Revisiting the “Decentralization Theorem”-On the role of externalities. *Journal of Urban Economics*, 64(1), 116–122.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jue.2007.10.001>
- Kohl, B. (2003). Democratizing decentralization in Bolivia: The law of popular participation. *Journal of Planning Education and Research*, 23(2), 153–164.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0739456X03258639>
- Kusumaningrum, R. (2012). *Analisis Perubahan Struktur Ekonomi dan Penentuan Sektor Unggulan di Provinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat Pada Masa Sebelum dan Selama Otonomi Daerah*. Universitas Sebelas Maret Surakarta.
- Langran, I. V. (2011). Decentralization, democratization, and health: The Philippine experiment. *Journal of Asian and African Studies*, 46(4), 361–374.
<https://doi.org/10.1177/0021909611399730>
- Lapuate, V., & Van de Walle, S. (2020). The effects of new public management on the quality of public services. *Governance*, 33(3), 461–475.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12502>
- Lele, G. (2019). Asymmetric Decentralization and the Problem of Governance: The Case of Indonesia. *Asian Politics and Policy*, 11(4), 544–565.
<https://doi.org/10.1111/aspp.12493>
- Lele, G. (2021). Asymmetric decentralization, accommodation and separatist conflict: lessons from Aceh and Papua, Indonesia. *Territory, Politics, Governance*, 0(0), 1–19.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2021.1875036>
- Lewis, B. D., & Hendrawan, A. (2018). European Journal of Political Economy The impact of majority coalitions on local government spending , service delivery , and corruption in Indonesia. *European Journal of Political Economy*, May.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2018.11.002>
- Litvack, J., Ahmad, J., & Bird, R. (1998). Rethinking decentralization at the World Bank. *Washington, DC: World Bank*, 1–19.
https://pasa.org.pk/files/Rethinking_Decentralization.pdf
- Litvack, J. I., & Seddon, J. (2002). Decentralization Briefing Notes. In *World Bank Institute Working Paper* (pp. 1–99). World Bank Institute and PREM Network.
- Madubun, J., & Akib, H. (2017). The Prototype Model of Asymmetric Decentralization in Providing Public Services to the Island Areas. *Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences*, 8(2), 209–217. <https://doi.org/10.5901/mjss.2017.v8n2p209>
- Makagansa, H. R. (2008). *Tantangan Pemekaran Daerah*. Fuspend.
- Matsui, K. (2006). Post-Decentralization Regional Economies and Actors: Putting The Capacity of Local Governments to the Test. *The Developing Economics*, 43(1), 171–189. <https://doi.org/doi:10.1111/j.1746-1049.2005.tb00257.x>
- Mcgarry, J. (2007). Asymmetry in Federations, Federacies and Unitary States. *Ethnopolitics*, 6(1), 105–116. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449050701232983>
- Meenakshisudaram, S. . (1994). *Decentralisation in Developing Countries*. Concept Publishing Company Ltd.
- Minogue, M. (1998). Changing the State: Concepts and Practice in the Reform of the Public Sector. In M. Minogue, C. Polidani, & D. Hulme (Eds.), *Beyond The New Public Management: Changing Ideas and Practices in Governance* (pp. 17–37). Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
- Mohanty, M. (2011). Urban service delivery and regional cooperation in the Pacific Island countries: challenges and opportunities. *The Journal of Pacific Studies*, 31(1), 59–78.
- Mokoginta, I. S. (2012). *Leviathan Government Behavior: The Case of Local Government in*

- Indonesia* (Issue July). Flinders University of South Australia.
- Mudalige, P. W. (2019). The Discussion of Theory and Practice on Decentralization and Service Delivery. *European Scientific Journal ESJ*, 15(14), 115–135.
<https://doi.org/10.19044/esj.2019.v15n14p115>
- Mulhall, A. (2003). In the field: Notes on observation in qualitative research. *Journal of Advanced Nursing*, 41(3), 306–313. <https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1365-2648.2003.02514.x>
- Muluk, M. R. K. (2021). Systematic Literature Review On Asymmetric Decentralization. *BISNIS & BIROKRASI: Jurnal Ilmu Administrasi Dan Organisasi*, 28(2).
<https://doi.org/10.20476/jbb.v28i2.1036>
- Nagai, F., & Funatsu, T. (2018). *Introduction: Analysis of Local Government Survey in Southeast Asia*.
- Neamtu, B. (2016). Asymmetric decentralization in Romania: Lost opportunity. *Online Journal Modelling the New Europe*, 20(1), 47–90.
- Oates, W. E. (2006). On the Theory and Practice of Fiscal Decentralization. In *Institutional Foundations of Public Finance* (IFIR Working Paper No. 2006-05).
<https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctv1nzfgfp.14>
- Opdenakker, R. (2006). Advantages and Disadvantages of Four Interview Techniques in Qualitative Research. *Forum Qualitative Social Research*, 7(4). <http://www.qualitative-research.net/fqs/>
- Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992). *Reinventing Government: How The Entrepreneurial Spirit is Transforming The Public Sector*. Plume.
- Osborne, S. P., & McLaughlin, K. (2005). Origins of the New Public Management in International View from Public Administration/Political/Political Science. In K. McLaughlin, S. P. Osborne, & E. Ferlie (Eds.), *New Public Management: Current Trends and Future Prospects* (pp. 15–33). Routledge.
<https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203996362-4>
- Polyando, P. (2020). *Jalan Tengah Desentralisasi Bagi Daerah Otonomi Berkarakteristik Kepulauan di Indonesia* (Cetakan 1). Kencana.
- Prud'homme, R. (1995). The dangers of decentralization. *World Bank Research Observer*, 10(2), 201–220. <https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/10.2.201>
- Purwadinata, S. (2016). Kontribusi Royalti PT. Newmont Nusa Tenggara terhadap Pendapatan Daerah Kabupaten Sumbawa Barat Tahun 2006-20012. *JIEP*, 16(2), 1–23.
- Qu, S. Q., & Dumay, J. (2011). The qualitative research interview. *Qualitative Research in Accounting and Management*, 8(3), 238–264.
<https://doi.org/10.1108/11766091111162070>
- Rabasa, A., & Chalk, P. (2001). Reinventing Indonesia: The Challenge of Decentralization. In *Indonesia's Transformation and the Stability of Southeast Asia* (pp. 47–52). RAND.
- Rahmatunnisa, M., Hindersah, R., & Achmad, T. H. (2018). Why Regions with Archipelagic Characteristics in Indonesia Also Need Asymmetric Decentralization? *Jurnal Bina Praja*, 10(2), 251–261. <https://doi.org/10.21787/jbp.10.2018.251-261>
- Robinson, M. (2015). From Old Public Administration to the New Public Service Implications for Public Sector Reform in Developing Countries. In *UNDP Global Centre for Public Service Excellence*.
[http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/capacity-development/English/Singapore Centre/PS-Reform_Paper.pdf](http://www.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/capacity-development/English/Singapore%20Centre/PS-Reform_Paper.pdf)
- Rondinelli, D. A., Nellis, J. R., & Cheema, G. S. (1983). Decentralization in Developing Countries: A Review of Recent Experience. In *Management and Development Series* (World Bank staff working papers no. 581. Management and development subseries no.8; Issue 581). <https://doi.org/10.1201/noe1420052756.ch96>
- Rustandi, E., Hakim, S. S., & Panuju, D. R. (2011). *Perencanaan dan Pengembangan*

- Wilayah. Crestpent Press dan Yayasan Obor Indonesia.
- Sanogo, T. (2019). Does fiscal decentralization enhance citizens' access to public services and reduce poverty? Evidence from Côte d'Ivoire municipalities in a conflict setting. *World Development*, 113, 204–221. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2018.09.008>
- Savy, R., Pauliat, H., & Senimon, M. (2017). The Process of Decentralization in Europe. In J. M. Ruano & M. Proffiroiu (Eds.), *The Palgrave Handbook of Decentralization in Europe* (pp. 1–14). Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-32437-1>
- Sewell, D. O. (1996). "The dangers of decentralization" according to Prud'homme: Some further aspects. *World Bank Research Observer*, 11(1), 143–150. <https://doi.org/10.1093/wbro/11.1.143>
- Silverman, D. (2000). What is Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook. In *Doing Qualitative Research* (pp. 1–12). Sage Publications, Inc.
- Smith, B. (2002). Decentralization. In C. Kirkpatrick, R. Clarke, & C. Polidano (Eds.), *Handbook on Development Policy and Management*. Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
- Statistik, B. P. (2020). *Indeks Pembangunan Manusia 2020*. <https://www.bps.go.id/publication/download.html?nrbvfeve=OGU3NzdjZTJkNzU3MGNIZDQ0MTk3YTM3&xzmn=aHR0cHM6Ly93d3cuYnBzLmdvLmlkL3B1Ym9uLzIwMjEvMDQvMzAvOGU3NzdjZTJkNzU3MGNIZDQ0MTk3YTM3L2luZGVrcy1wZW51YW5ndW5hbi1tYW51c2hLTi1wMjAuaHRtbA%3D%3D&twoadfnarf>
- Stewart, J., & Clarke, M. (1987). The Public Service Orientation: Issues and Dilemmas. *Public Administration*, 65(2), 161–177. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9299.1987.tb00654.x>
- Sujarwoto, S. (2012). Political decentralization and local public services performance in Indonesia. *Journal of Public Administration and Governance*, 2(3), 55. <https://doi.org/10.5296/jpag.v2i3.2156>
- Susanto, H. (2014). *Analisis Perkembangan Kinerja Keuangan Daerah Dalam Upaya Mendukung Pelaksanaan Otonomi Daerah di Propinsi Nusa Tenggara Barat*. <http://repository.ut.ac.id/1430/>
- Syadzily, A. H. (2019). *Desentralisasi, Otonomi, dan Pemekaran Daerah di Indonesia*. Prenadamedia Group.
- Tan, E. (2019). *Public Sector Organizations Decentralization and Governance Capacity: The Case Of Turkey*. Palgrave Macmillan. <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-020477>
- Tan, E., & Avshalom-Uster, A. (2021). How does asymmetric decentralization affect local fiscal performance? *Regional Studies*, 55(6), 1071–1083. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2020.1861241>
- Tanzi, V. (1996). Fiscal Federalism and Decentralization: A Review of Some Efficiency and Macroeconomic Aspects. In *Annual World Bank Conference on Development Economics*, 295–315. https://mef.gob.pe/contenidos/pol_econ/documentos/Fiscal_Federalism_Decimalization.pdf
- Tarlton, C. D. (1965). Symmetry and Asymmetry as Elements of Federalism: A Theoretical Speculation. *The Journal of Politics*, 27(4), 861–874. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2128123>
- Tiebout, C. M. (1956). A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures. *The Journal of Political Economy*, 64(5), 416–424. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1826343>
- Tillin, L. (2007). United in diversity? Asymmetry in Indian federalism. *The Journal of Federalism*, 37(1), 45–67. <https://doi.org/10.1093/publius/pjl017>
- Utomo, T. W. W. (2009). *Balancing Decentralization and Deconcentration: Emerging Need for Asymmetric Decentralization in the Unitary States*. 174. <http://www.gsid.nagoya-u.ac.jp/bpub/research/public/paper/article/174.pdf>
- Vazquez, J. M. (2007). Asymmetric Federalism in Russia: Cure or Poison? In Richard M Bird

- & R. D. Ebel (Eds.), *Fiscal Fragmentation in Decentralized Countries* (pp. 227–266). Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc.
- Veljanovski, A. M. (2010). The model of the asymmetric fiscal decentralisation in the theory and the case of Republic of Macedonia. *Iustinianus Primus Law Review*, 1(1), 11.
- Vignieri, V. (2020). *Old Public Administration, New Public Management and Public Governance: shifts in dominant modes of Public Administration – Perspective on*. Perspective On. <https://www.vincenzovignieri.com/old-public-administration-new-public-management-and-public-governance-shifts-in-dominant-modes-of-public-administration/>
- Watts, R. L. (2000). Asymmetrical decentralization: functional or dysfunctional. *International Political Science Association*, August, 1–40.
- Wehner, J. H. G. (2000). Asymmetrical devolution. *Development Southern Africa*, 17(2), 249–262. <https://doi.org/10.1080/713661401>
- Wei, Q., Yabin, Z., & Shaobo, L. (2018). *The spatial spillover effect of fiscal decentralization on local public provision : Mathematical application and empirical*. 331, 416–429. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2018.03.032>
- World Bank. (2008). *Decentralization in Client Countires: An Evaluation of World Bank Support, 1999-2007*. The World Bank.

6. Appendix

Appendix 1. List of Source Person

Table 2. List of Source Person

National Level	Ministry of Internal Affairs	Directorate General of Regional Autonomy
	Ministry of Marine and Fisheries	
	Ministry of Administrative and Bureaucratic Reform	Deputy for Institutional and Administration
		Deputy of Public Service
	Ministry of Finance	Directorate General of Budget
		Fiscal policy Agency
		Directorate General of Fiscal Balance
	Ministry of National Development Planning/Head of National Development Planning Agency	Deputy for Development Funding
	Regional Representative Council (DPD)	DPD of Nusa Tenggara Barat
	Central Ombudsman	
Provincial-level	Financial and Development Supervisory Agency	Deputy for Supervision of Regional Financial Administration
	Agency of Development Planning, Research and Regional Development	
	Agency of Education	
	Agency of Health	
	Department of Public Works and Spatial Planning	
	Department of Marine Affairs and Fisheries	
	Regional People's Representative Assembly	
	Regional Secretary	Assistant for Government and People's Welfare
	Provincial Ombudsman	
	Regional General Hospital	
Regency level	Agency of Financial and Development Supervisory	Representative of West Nusa Tenggara
	Bappeda and Litbang	
	Agency of Education	
	Agency of Health	
	Agency of Public Works	
	Regional Secretary	Governmental Division
	Regional People's Representative Assembly	
	Regional Inspectorate	
	Primary School	
	Secondary school	
	High School	

Non-governmental actor	Regional Hospital	
	Public health center	
	Academics	National Level: University of Indonesia
		Level provinsi: University of Mataram
		Regional Level: University of Samawa
	NGO	KPPOD
		Yayasan Masyarakat Peduli NTB
		Forum Komunikasi Masyarakat Peduli Lingkungan Sumbawa
	Beneficial Group	Parents of students
		Hospital's patients
		Public health center's patients
		Fishermen
		Farmers
		The service manager at the licensing office
	Business	PT. Newmont Nusa Tenggara

Appendix 2. List of Legislations, Reports, Other Documents

Regulations

- i. Law and regulations on regional autonomy
- ii. Law and regulations on financial decentralization
- iii. Government regulations, presidential regulations, relevant ministry regulations

Reports

- a. regional autonomy evaluation report from the ministry
- b. regional autonomy evaluation report from the World Bank
- c. regional autonomy evaluation report from NGOs
- d. Community satisfaction index at the National, provincial, and regional levels
- e. Ombudsman report on compliance level of public services
- f. The public service complaint report

Data

- i. Community demographics at the National Level, provincial level, regional level
- ii. Data of APBN (State Expenditure Budget) and APBD (Regional Expenditure Budget)