

RSA Conference 2018

San Francisco | April 16 – 20 | Moscone Center

SESSION ID: CSV-R12



#RSAC

RED TEAM VS. BLUE TEAM ON AWS

Teri Radichel

CEO
2nd Sight Lab
@teriradichel

Kolby Allen

DevOps Engineer
Zipwhip
@kolbyallen

Attacker vs. Defender



Cloud Admin...Duh Duh Duh.



Would Be A Boring Talk...



GAME
OVER



Instead...

Let's search for
buried treasure!

Some background



- Initial Setup

- Vanilla Account

- Single Admin User
 - Base VPC & defaults


- AWS Tutorial: Elastic Beanstalk with WordPress

- <https://docs.aws.amazon.com/elasticbeanstalk/latest/dg/php-hawordpress-tutorial.html>

- AWS Tutorial: Lambda Accessing RDS in VPC

- <https://docs.aws.amazon.com/lambda/latest/dg/vpc.html>

Pilfer Credentials ~ Read Only Access



```
Command Prompt
D:\Users\tradichel\.aws>notepad .credentials

credentials - Notepad
File Edit Format View Help
[default]
aws_access_key_id = AKIAJRWIVY7NJ6UYCKEQ
aws_secret_access_key = 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
|
```

Look for RDS Databases



```
aws rds describe-db-instances --filter --query DBInstances[].[DBInstanceIdentifier,MasterUsername,DBSubnetGroup.VpcId,Endpoint.Address] --output=table --color off
```

supersecretdb?! That sounds like a good target...

```
Command Prompt
D:\Users\tradichel>aws rds describe-db-instances --filter --query DBInstances[].[DBInstanceIdentifier,MasterUsername,DBSubnetGroup.VpcId,Endpoint.Address] --output=table --color off
```

DescribeDBInstances			
aa1fe08ildto0z5	wordpress	vpc-96c34cfe	aa1fe08ildto0z5.cl5fcy9momq1.us-east-2.rds.amazonaws.com
supersecretdb	kolbyadmin	vpc-96c34cfe	supersecretdb.cl5fcy9momq1.us-east-2.rds.amazonaws.com

Examine Selected Database Subnets



```
aws rds describe-db-instances --filter "Name=db-  
instance-id,Values=supersecretdb" --query  
DBInstances[].DBSubnetGroup.Subnets[].Subnet  
Identifier --output table --color off
```

Hmm... let's check out: **subnet-1ae9df57**


```
Command Prompt  
D:\Users\tradichel>aws rds describe-db-instances --filter "Name=db-instance-id,Values=supersecretdb" --query DB  
Instances[].DBSubnetGroup.Subnets[].SubnetIdentifier --output table --color off  
  
+-----+  
| DescribeDBInstances |  
+-----+  
| subnet-1ae9df57 |  
| subnet-d48c0fbc |  
+-----+
```

What Traffic Do NACLs Allow?



```
aws ec2 describe-network-acls --filter  
"Name=association.subnet-id,Values=subnet-1ae9df57"  
--query NetworkAcls[0].Entries --output table --color off
```

All traffic allowed ~ Sweet.



Command Prompt

```
D:\Users\tradichel>aws ec2 describe-network-acls --filter "Name=association.subnet-id,Values=subnet-1ae9df57" --query NetworkAcls[0].Entries --output table --color off
```

DescribeNetworkAcls				
CidrBlock	Egress	Protocol	RuleAction	RuleNumber
0.0.0.0/0	True	-1	allow	100
0.0.0.0/0	True	-1	deny	32767
0.0.0.0/0	False	-1	allow	100
0.0.0.0/0	False	-1	deny	32767

What Traffic Do DB Security Groups Allow?



```
Command Prompt
```

```
DescribeSecurityGroups
```

SecurityGroups	
Description	Created from the RDS Management Console: 2018/03/22 05:26:10
GroupId	sg-217f3e4a
GroupName	rds-launch-wizard-1
OwnerId	310610724838
VpcId	vpc-96c34cfe

IpPermissions	
FromPort	3306
IpProtocol	tcp
ToPort	3306

IpRanges	
CidrIp	172.31.0.0/16

IpPermissionsEgress	
IpProtocol	-1

IpRanges	
CidrIp	0.0.0.0/0

aws ec2 describe-security-groups --filter "Name=group-id,Values=sg-217f3e4a" --output table --color off


Port 3306
172.31.0.0/16

Find VPC With Access to Database




```
aws ec2 describe-vpcs --filter  
"Name=cidrBlock,Values=172.31.0.0/16" --query  
Vpcs[].VpcId --output table --color off
```

vpc-96c34cfe is assigned to CIDR 172.31.0.0/16



```
Command Prompt  
D:\Users\gradichel>aws ec2 describe-vpcs --filter "Name=cidrBlock,Values=172.31.0.0/16" --query Vpcs[].VpcId --output table --color off  
+-----+  
| DescribeVpcs |  
+-----+  
| vpc-96c34cfe |  
+-----+
```

VPC Security Groups ~ 3306 Egress



```
aws ec2 describe-security-groups --filter  
"Name=egress.ip-permission.to-port,Values=3306  
Name=vpc-id,Values=vpc-96c34cfe" --output table --  
color off
```

None...hmm...

```
Command Prompt  
D:\Users\tradichel\.aws>aws ec2 describe-security-groups --filter "Name=egress.ip-permission.to-port,Values=3306 Name=vp  
c-id,Values=vpc-96c34cfe" --output table --color off  
-----  
|DescribeSecurityGroups|  
+-----+
```


Security Groups ~ No Outbound Restrictions




```
aws ec2 describe-security-groups --filter "Name=egress.ip-  
permission.cidr,Values='0.0.0.0/0',Name=vpc-id,Values=vpc-96c34cfe" --output  
table --color off --query SecurityGroups[].GroupId
```

```
Command Prompt  
D:\Users\tradichel\.aws>aws ec2 describe-security-groups --filter "Name=egress.ip-  
permission.cidr,Values='0.0.0.0/0',Name=vpc-id,Values=vpc-96c34cfe" --output  
table --color off --query SecurityGroups[].GroupId  
[DescribeSecurityGroups]  
+-----+  
sg-217f3e4a  
sg-3984c552  
sg-8db2c2e6  
sg-91b5c5fa  
sg-93aade8f  
sg-a0b9c9cb  
sg-a9bbcbcb  
sg-b1bacada  
sg-b97b3ad2  
+-----+
```

Cool. Wide Open Outbound.
Let's see what's using these.

Check Lambda Functions



**aws lambda list-functions --query
Functions[?VpcConfig.SecurityGroupIds==
[`sg-93aade8`]].FunctionName --output
table --color off**

```
Command Prompt
D:\Users\tradichel\.aws>aws lambda list-functions --query Functions[?VpcConfig.SecurityGroupIds==[`sg-93aade8`]].FunctionName --output table --color off
```

ListFunctions
CreateTableAddRecordsAndRead

Query Lambda Code Location



`aws lambda get-function --function-name CreateTableAddRecordsAndRead --query Code.Location`

Gives us URL to code location in S3...


```
Command Prompt

D:\Users\tradichel\.aws>aws lambda get-function --function-name CreateTableAddRecordsAndRead --query Code.Location
"https://awslambda-us-east-2-tasks.s3.us-east-2.amazonaws.com/snapshots/310610724838/CreateTableAddRecordsAndRead-af054b
aa-bd47-414d-bd56-54ed119cd6f8?versionId=jBCcttupKmmceMPTJn_c3RgrsJnGn6r&X-Amz-Security-Token=FQoDYXdzECQaDPQ0Bfxx1bL3a
fb5mSK3A%2BqmipSSsGqJzxXZwQg1w9DRVrt2bY9GbgxT9D73PydpgXo4GR6uaQjdHRQmxnU%2F27FDQ9KvTjVLKoGPEGoayleVvkzgZpPVVevo40v04gZ3S5
C8exKeqLFUI5NPSfju0LID%2BdZJxvE60qoB2XWws1gM8wuyZgNP26Yb4pdHq0bXVxXxbnigZwo0G0mlrVIvQWZH%2FgymxPQN22DG%2F1sY%2FeUA3mhKOE
UqgEzor0iMMA3vkZFV2bdrWjcSutTt5XtFFmKSNwWAdnO%2Bslj28jp9Sca50D3o58o%2F2FLpRq8gvP82WxmbzYjnX9yVGwMqjfxQyK%2FDt%2BUiY3J4
VM%2B4B6PF4oXEA0Mkxjhh6SXBqZS8ma2hAmkQUI%2FCSHb21EWbbzS9MYEVLrDvDQ8zyhqvwX%2F1R%2B1jZ7TaD3Bd08WWEo8Jxr8i%2BDuRCjq2yTkLBL
WCULUzr6ybChufIFRHSTNd15ikMdEwXRO4CWQuSi1i61QHVVYQKhhDMEmeOEFsLakCMk0ACmf9adrG0Iz5W5L2PWBxQ7DLjcQ3Nu3xpyFxmETVvNuU1%2BrMn
1YTCgvQnQikwOpbvzgbi%2BLypFjvwo%2F9vR1QU%3D&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20180323T043812Z&X-Amz-SignedHea
ders=host&X-Amz-Expires=600&X-Amz-Credential=ASIAI6UZQFNPGFJYM4XA%2F20180323%2Fus-east-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signa
ture=a322f24da64b08be598484198eb75da5b761c3f629e909503d4b03c213aa4ba5"
```

Go To URL...Check out the code



Hmm, what's in this file?




About that rds_config file...



Oops. Database credentials.



 rds_config - Notepad

File Edit Format View Help

```
db_username = "lambdauser"db_password = "@ccess!1"db_name = "supersecretdb"
```


Look for Instances That Can Exfil




**aws ec2 describe-instances --output text --query
Reservations[].Instances[].NetworkInterfaces[].
Association.[PublicIp,PublicDnsName]**

Check the domains in a browser to find web sites.



```
Command Prompt
D:\Users\tradichel\.aws>aws ec2 describe-instances --output text --query Reservations[].Instances[].NetworkInterfaces[].
Association.[PublicIp,PublicDnsName]
18.188.35.35      ec2-18-188-35-35.us-east-2.compute.amazonaws.com
18.221.251.252   ec2-18-221-251-252.us-east-2.compute.amazonaws.com
```

Exploit Web Site and Exfil



**Scan Site. Exploit Vulnerability.
Upload code to connect to DB.
Publish to public web site.**

IAM Best Practices



- Roles
- Least Privilege
- Segregation of Duties
- IAM Top 10



Protecting Credentials



- User training ~ Phishing and handling of credentials
- Password policies and rotation
- MFA!!
- Require frequent re-auth – especially to sensitive apps
- Prevent deployment of code with embedded credentials
<https://github.com/aws/aws-labs/git-secrets>



WOW THAT IS A LOT OF YAML!!

[https://github.com/allenk1/2018rsapresentation/
blob/master/Default-IAM-Profile.yaml](https://github.com/allenk1/2018rsapresentation/blob/master/Default-IAM-Profile.yaml)



IAM Master - Initial Roles




```
Sid: AllowUserstoListAccounts
Effect: Allow
Action:
- "iam:ListAccountAliases"
- "iam:ListUsers"
- "iam:GetAccountPasswordPolicy"
- "iam:GetAccountSummary"
Resource: "*"

```

- Allows users to view enough information to get into IAM
- Can get the PW Policy ← IMPORTANT so it can apply
- List Users – needed in order to find themselves

IAM Master - Initial Roles



```
Sid: AllowUserstoManageOwnAccount
Effect: Allow
Action:
- "iam:ChangePassword"
- "iam:CreateAccessKey"
- "iam:CreateLoginProfile"
- "iam>DeleteAccessKey"
- "iam>DeleteLoginProfile"
- "iam:GetLoginProfile"
- "iam:ListAccessKeys"
- "iam:UpdateAccessKey"
- "iam:UpdateLoginProfile"
- "iam:ListSigningCertificates"
- "iam>DeleteSigningCertificate"
- "iam:UpdateSigningCertificate"
- "iam:UploadSigningCertificate"
- "iam:ListSSHPublicKeys"
- "iam:GetSSHPublicKey"
- "iam>DeleteSSHPublicKey"
- "iam:UpdateSSHPublicKey"
- "iam:UploadSSHPublicKey"
Resource: "arn:aws:iam::*:user/${aws:username}"
```


Actions allow users to manage their account – BUT NOT PERMISSIONS

Resource only allows them to perform on their username – can't modify anyone else

IAM ~ User Roles




#RSAC



```
Sid: AllowUserstoListOnlyThierMFA
Effect: Allow
Action:
- "iam:ListVirtualMFADevices"
- "iam:ListMFADevices"
Resource:
- "arn:aws:iam::*:mfa/*"
- "arn:aws:iam::*:user/${aws:username}"
-
Sid: AllowUsertoManageThierMFA
Effect: Allow
Action:
- "iam:CreateVirtualMFADevice"
- "iam>DeleteVirtualMFADevice"
- "iam:EnableMFADevice"
- "iam:ResyncMFADevice"
Resource:
- "arn:aws:iam::*:mfa/${aws:username}"
- "arn:aws:iam::*:user/${aws:username}"
-
Sid: AllowUserstoDeactiveTheirMFAwhenUseingMFA
Effect: Allow
Action:
- "iam:DeactivateMFADevice"
Resource:
- "arn:aws:iam::*:mfa/${aws:username}"
- "arn:aws:iam::*:user/${aws:username}"
Condition:
Bool:
"aws:MultiFactorAuthPresent": "true"
```

- Allows users to manage this MFA
- Must login with MFA to remove device

IAM ~ Assumed Roles



IAM Master



#RSAC

```
1. - (fish)
- aws rds describe-db-instances --query DBInstances[].DBInstanceIdentifier --output=text --region us-east-2
An error occurred (AccessDenied) when calling the DescribeDBInstances operation: User: arn:aws:iam::310610724838:user/secure-readonly is not authorized to perform: rds:DescribeDBInstances
1 - aws sts assume-role --role-arn "arn:aws:iam::310610724838:role/Secure-ReadOnly-Role" --role-session-name "rsa" --
serial-number "arn:aws:iam::310610724838:mfa/secure-readonly" --token-code "095733"
{
  "Credentials": {
    "AccessKeyId": "A...",
    "SecretAccessKey": "...",
    "SessionToken": "...",
    "Expiration": "2018-03-23T01:51:21Z"
  },
  "AssumedRoleUser": {
    "AssumedRoleId": "arn:aws:sts::310610724838:assumed-role/Secure-ReadOnly-Role/rsa",
    "Arn": "arn:aws:sts::310610724838:assumed-role/Secure-ReadOnly-Role/rsa"
  }
}
- export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=...; export AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=...;
export AWS_SESSION_TOKEN=...
- aws rds describe-db-instances --query DBInstances[].DBInstanceIdentifier --output=text --region us-east-2
na1fe08ildra025 supersecretidb
- {}
```

MFA!

- Failure due to default policy not having permissions
- Temporary credential request & setting at environmental variable
- Commands work!

CloudTrail



Event history

Your event history contains the create, modify, and delete activities for supported services taken by people, groups, or AWS services in your AWS account. To view a complete log of your CloudTrail events, create a trail and then go to your Amazon S3 bucket or CloudWatch Logs.

You can view the last 90 days of events. Choose an event to view more information about it. [Learn more](#)

Filter	Select attribute	Filter display value	Time range	2018-01-18 12:00:00 - 2018-01-18 12:00:00 AM	
Event time	User name	Event name	Resource type	Resource name	
2018-01-18, 08:50:00 PM	root@us-east-1	CreateTags		EC2-Instance	
2018-01-18, 08:50:01 PM	root@us-east-1	CreateTags		EC2-Instance	
2018-01-18, 04:50:01 PM	root@us-east-1	CreateTags		EC2-Instance	
2018-01-18, 04:50:17 PM	root@us-east-1	ModifyInstanceAttribute	EC2 Instance	EC2-Instance	
2018-01-18, 04:50:12 PM	root@us-east-1	DeleteRoute	EC2 RouteTable	rtb-1a1b1c1d	
2018-01-18, 04:50:11 PM	root@us-east-1	CreateTags		EC2-Instance	
2018-01-18, 04:50:11 PM	root@us-east-1	DeleteRoute	EC2 RouteTable	rtb-1a1b1c1d	
2018-01-18, 04:50:10 PM	root@us-east-1	DeleteRoute	EC2 RouteTable	rtb-1a1b1c1d	
2018-01-18, 04:50:09 PM	root@us-east-1	DeleteRoute	EC2 RouteTable	rtb-1a1b1c1d	
2018-01-18, 04:50:09 PM	root@us-east-1	ModifyInstanceAttribute	EC2 Instance	EC2-Instance	
2018-01-18, 04:50:07 PM	root@us-east-1	DeleteRoute	EC2 RouteTable	rtb-1a1b1c1d	
2018-01-18, 04:50:06 PM	root@us-east-1	DeleteRoute	EC2 RouteTable	rtb-1a1b1c1d	
2018-01-18, 04:50:06 PM	root@us-east-1	DeleteRoute	EC2 RouteTable	rtb-1a1b1c1d	

Feed data to events




Respond

Monitor all API Actions


Scan and Secure



EC2 Parameter Store for secrets



EC2 Parameter Store



EC2 Parameter Store



Calls AWS SSM


```
app.py — 2018supplemental...
rds_host = "supersecretidb.c13fcy9moq1.eu-east-2.rds.amazonaws.com"
name = rds_config.db_username
db_name = rds_config.db_name

logger = logging.getLogger()
logger.setLevel(logging.INFO)

client = boto3.client('ssm')
response = client.get_parameters(Names=['mysql.password'], WithDecryption=True)
password = response["Parameters"][0]["Value"]

try:
    conn = pymysql.connect(rds_host, user=name, passwd=password, db=db_name, connect_timeout=5)
except:
    logger.error("ERROR! Unexpected error: Could not connect to MySQL instance.")
    sys.exit()


logger.info("SUCCESS: Connection to RDS mysql instance succeeded")
def handler(event, context):
    ...
```



Monitoring



- AWS GuardDuty
- VPC Flow Logs
- CloudTrail
- Config
- Log shipping
- Secure log backups
- Automate Remediation



aws Services Resource Groups

GuardDuty

Findings

Current

Archived

Settings

General

Lists

Accounts

Usage

Details

Partners

New feature: GuardDuty added new findings
GuardDuty added nine new finding types for unusual API usage by an IAM user in your account [Learn more](#)

Current findings

Showing 57 of 57

Actions

Saved filters: No saved filters

Include and exclude filter options are available on certain finding attributes in the details


	Finding	Last seen	Account ID	Count
	Unprotected port on EC2 instance is being pro...	2018-03-22 16:27:54 (10 minutes ago)		2343
	Unprotected port on EC2 instance is being pro...	2018-03-22 16:26:25 (12 minutes ago)		1675
	Unprotected port on EC2 instance is being pro...	2018-03-22 16:25:33 (13 minutes ago)		2496
	Unprotected port on EC2 instance is being probed.	2018-03-22 16:13:39 (25 minutes ago)		1757
	Unprotected port on EC2 instance is being probed.	2018-03-22 16:04:30 (34 minutes ago)		1764
	Unprotected port on EC2 instance is being pr...	2018-03-22 15:50:33 (an hour ago)		2729
	Unprotected port on EC2 instance is being probed.	2018-03-22 15:38:54 (an hour ago)		2643
	Unprotected port on EC2 instance is being pro...	2018-03-22 07:18:49 (9 hours ago)		43
	222.93.96.163 is performing SSH brute force attacks against i-bcfcb...	2018-03-22 07:03:19 (10 hours ago)		1
	Unprotected port on EC2 instance is being pr...	2018-03-22 01:28:01 (16 hours ago)		17
	Unprotected port on EC2 instance is being pro...	2018-03-21 23:58:32 (17 hours ago)		27
	Tor Exit node is communicating with EC2 instance	2018-03-21 22:21:14 (18 hours ago)		19
	222.161.209.43 is performing SSH brute force attacks against	2018-03-21 19:54:07 (21 hours ago)		1
	221.132.31.23 is performing SSH brute force attacks against	2018-03-21 18:34:04 (a day ago)		4
	117.78.42.53 is performing SSH brute force attacks against	2018-03-20 22:56:23 (2 days ago)		3
	217.160.107.156 is performing SSH brute force attacks against	2018-03-18 16:39:03 (4 days ago)		1

Feedback English (US)

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
WAF Security



Network Architecture



- Presentation Layer
- Application Layer
- Data Layer
- Limited NACL & Security Groups between subnets
- Limit all outbound traffic




Network Architecture



BAD NETWORK

- NACLs are wide open
- Wide open inbound rules on security groups
- Security groups all everything to talk to internet




Network Architecture



BETTER NETWORK

- NACLs limit access between subnets
- Security Groups limiting access to specific servers
- Blocking internet where not needed



Conclusion



- Red Team:
 - Attackers can use the same tools used by DevOps teams.
 - Cloud APIs provide a means for mapping out an entire account.
 - Read only access can be powerful.
- Blue Team:
 - Restrict access
 - Automated deployment
 - Architect networks to minimize open ports and pivoting
 - Protect secrets - don't embed in code!
 - Monitor everything

RSAConference2018

San Francisco | April 16 – 20 | Moscone Center

SESSION ID: CSV-R12

THANK YOU!



#RSAC

Teri Radichel

CEO
2nd Sight Lab
@teriradichel

Kolby Allen

DevOps Engineer
Zipwhip
@kolbyallen