Q1 (5 pts): Random J. has been told to design a scheme to prevent messages from being modified by an intruder. Random J. decided to append to each message a hash of that message. Does this solve the problem? Why?

This is not a valid solution since anyone can append a hash to a message. Moreover, an attacker can just modify the original contents of the message and append a new hash to it. Another note, an appended hash does not alert the receiver if the original contents of the message have been modified.

Q2 (5 pts): Suppose Alice, Bob, and Carol want to use secret key technology to authenticate each other. If they all used the same secret key K, then Bob could impersonate Carol to Alicia (actually any of three can impersonate the other to the third). Suppose instead that each had their own secret key, so Alice uses KA, Bob uses KB, and Carol uses KC. This means that each one, to prove his/her identity, responds to a challenge with a function of his/her secret key and the challenge. Is this more secure than having them all use the same secret key K? (Hint: what does Alice need to know in order to verify Carol's answer to Alice's challenge?)

No, it is not more secure. For example, if Alice wants to communicate with Carol, she would need to know Carol's secret key. As a result, Alice can now impersonate herself as Carol as she is communicating to Bob since Alice now has KC and can respond to the challenge using said key. Moreover, this situation still requires all three members to know each other's secret key. Thus, anyone in the group can impersonate each other.

Q3 (5 pts): It is common, for performance reasons, to sign a message digest of a message rather than the message itself. Why is it so important that it be difficult to find two messages with the same message digest?

It is important that no two messages have the same message digest because that allows the attacker to potentially replace m1 with m2 if they have result in the same message digest. As a result, the receiver will not be able to identify if the message has been altered; thus, data integrity is lost.

Q4 (7 pts): Token cards display a number that changes periodically, perhaps every minute. Each such device has a unique secret key. A human can prove possession of a particular such device by entering the displayed number into a computer system. The computer system knows the secret keys of each authorized device. How would you design such a device?

I will design the device to have "calculator" abilities with the unique secret key stored on it. When I enter a key, a special one time password will be generated. I will then enter the password with my user-name to prove I am the owner said device.

Q5 (7 pts): How many DES keys, on the average, encrypt a particular plaintext block to a particular ciphertext block? Please explain.

As we learned in class, DES encrypts a 64 bit plaintext to 64 bit ciphertext using a 56 bit key.

- •For a 64 bit plaintext blocks, there are 2^64 possible resultant ciphertext blocks.
- •By this logic, each 56 bit key maps 2^64 plaintext blocks to 2^64 ciphertext blocks.
- •As a result, each key has a probability of  $1/(2^64)$  in mapping a particular plaintext block to a particular ciphertext block
- •As there are  $2^56$  possible keys, the final resultant is  $1/(2^8)$  as the average.


# Q6 (7 pts): Suppose the DES mangler function mapped every 32-bit value to zero, regardless of the value of its input. What function would DES then compute?

- •Since the mangler function maps every 32 bit value to zero, the left and right halves will just get swapped without any modifications to their values. This is because any binary string that is xor with a binary string of zeros does not change the value of the first string.
- •First there would be the initial permutation of the 64 bit plain text box.
- •Then it would be split into of left half and a right half with each half being 32 bits.
- •Then with each des round, the left and right halves would be swapped without any modifications to their values.
- •After the 16 rounds, the final permutation will be created.
- •Please note that the final permutation interchanges the consecutive even and odd bits.

# Q7 (7 pts): The pseudo-random stream of blocks generated by 64-bit OFB must eventually repeat (since at most 264 different blocks can be generated). Will K $\{IV\}$ necessarily be the first block to be repeated?

- •It will be the first to repeat if the sequence
- •Let us reference the LFSR as a general example

## LFSR: Linear Feedback Shift Register




- •As a generic symbol, let bi represent the ith block of encryption.
- •We also know that for each bi (where i is 0,1,2....), bi-1 is the decryption of bi and bi is the encryption of bi-1.
- •Let be be the first repeated occurrence of bz where z<a.

- •If z = 0 (a.k.a it is the first block in the sequence), then we have satisfied the previous bullet point as z < a and ba==bz.
- •If z > 0, then this is a contradiction which will be explained below.
- •The previous above statement implies that bz-1 = ba-1 since we have stated that ba==bz.
- •By the above statement, we are saying that ba is not the first repeated occurrence of bz.
- •Thus ba == b0 with proof by contradiction.

Q8 (7 pts): Consider the following alternative method of encrypting a message. To encrypt a message, use the algorithm for doing a CBC decrypt. To decrypt a message, use the algorithm for doing a CBC encrypt. Would this work? What are the security implications of this, if any, as contrasted with the "normal" CBC?

Yes, this would work. However, there are two security concerns. Since CBC decrypt will be used to encrypt a message, only the XOR portion will be the unpredictable encryption. The next security concern will be explained along with the picture below.



- •To restate, we are using CBC decryption to encrypt a message. Thus, when looking at the diagram, just switch the positions of the Cs and Ms
- •Note that all the decryption blocks perform the same calculation.
- •The security concern is that there will be information leakage.
- •If all the Ms contain the same plaintext, the resulting Cs will be exactly the same except for C1 since the D(M1) will be XOR with IV.

#### 1.1 Task 1: Encryption using different ciphers and modes [10 pts]

I have encrypted the plaintext (first image) in three different encryptions with different modes:

- aes-128-cbc
- rc2-ofb
- des-ede

Also, the key and initialization vector used for the encryptions are:

- key = 00112233445566778889aabbccddeeff
- initialization vector = 0102030405060708

As expected, the plaintext has been completely scrambled in all three resultant ciphers. Moreover, all three ciphers use a lot of foreign characters that are not common in the English language as well. I have also noted some interesting results from each of the ciphers.

- The aes cipher in cbc mode produces two lines of cipher text.
- The rc2 cipher in ofb mode cipher produces one line of cipher text.
- The des cipher in ede mode produces one line of cipher text, but there is a noticeable whitespace near the end of the line.

#### Task 2: Encryption Mode – ECB vs. CBC [10 pts]

```
[10/23/21]seed@VM:-/Desktop$ openssl enc -aes-128-cbc -e -in pic_original.bmp -out p2.bmp -K 00112233445566778889aabbccddeefff -iv 0102030405060708
[10/23/21]seed@WM:-/Desktop$ head -c 54 pic_original.bmp > header
[10/23/21]seed@VM:-/Desktop$ tail -c +55 p2.bmp > body
[10/23/21]seed@VM:-/Desktop$ cat header body > new.bmp
[10/23/21]seed@VM:-/Desktop$ openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -e -in pic_original.bmp -out p2_ecb.bmp -K 00112233445566778889aabbccddeeff -iv 0102030405060708
warning: iv not use by this cipher
[10/23/21]seed@VM:-/Desktop$ openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -e -in pic_original.bmp -out p2_ecb.bmp -K 00112233445566778889aabbccddeeff
[10/23/21]seed@VM:-/Desktop$ openssl enc -aes-128-ecb -e -in pic_original.bmp -out p2_ecb.bmp -K 00112233445566778889aabbccddeeff
[10/23/21]seed@VM:-/Desktop$ head -c 54 pic_original.bmp > header
[10/23/21]seed@VM:-/Desktop$ tail -c +55 p2_ecb.bmp > body
[10/23/21]seed@VM:-/Desktop$ cat header body > new_ecb.bmp
```

In this task, I encrypted two bmp files in aes-128-cbc and aes-128-ecb. The pictures to be encrypted are shown below.


Note: I ran the same commands for the second bmp file as well.



In the following image below, this is the result of the aes-128-cbc encryption.




As can be shown in the above image, the picture is completely unrecognizable. There is no way to visually make out the first image from this image. However, this is completely different when it comes to the aes-128-ebc encryption, which is shown below.



As can be shown in the above image, the first image is scrambled but not as much as the aes-128-cbc. In the following aes-128-ebc encryption image, it is still possible to visually make out the first image from this image. The silhouettes of the shapes are still there, and the colors of the ellipse and rectangle have been swapped. The colors of the triangles inside the square have been swapped as well.

#### Task 3: Encryption Mode – Corrupted Cipher Text [10 pts]

In this task, I created the following txt file that is at least 64 bytes. In order to ensure that it is at least 64 bytes, I checked the properties of the file.



I then encrypted the text file using the aes cipher in the following modes:

• aes-128-ecb

• aes-128-ofb

Ĭĭ®@\$J@\$ZÖœÀ¿@\$JTUq1ME&ànÕ<b@\$J@\$zk\@BB&@Lhĕœ@3OAQ\$\+usÏ@\$à\Ý@\$b@ÓéQ\$¶Óţ?J@BŢ3Q\$n° ;t4R¹¿ø \*@?FÅ)@QÄá¢-<1Q\$B£QPSh ÜÖQQQQpyF@\$ÖQQå°@QÜ@QrQQjg\$\$Q¢Qq`7±rØY@\$@\$9<;³ÊQQQQ°%&SÞú@\$®8

• aes-128-cfb




Note: For this image, there are highlights because linux states the following encryption is using unrecognizable characters.


I then proceeded to type bless in the terminal to open up the hex editor. I then opened each of the encrypted files and change the 30<sup>th</sup> byte. Here is a list of before and after changing the 30<sup>th</sup> byte.

Note: The first image is the "before" and the second image is the "after".


Note: The red square highlights the 30<sup>th</sup> byte.

• aes-128-ecb





• aes-128-ofb



• aes-128-cfb

Before decrypting the corrupted files with the same key and initialization vector, I will answer the following question below.

## How much information can you recover by decrypting the corrupted file, if the encryption mode is ECB, CBC, CFB, or OFB, respectively?


- CBC: I should be able to recover all information except for 2 blocks.
- CFB: I should be able to recover all information except for 2 blocks.
- ECB: I should be able to recover all information except for 1 block.
- OFB: I should be able to recover all information except for 1 block.

I then proceeded to decrypt all of the corrupted files (in the same order as above).





As can be seen, my deductions are correct and the answers will be provided below.

• CBC and CFB: As shown in the images below, the decryption of a cipher block is dependent on the cipher block that is adjacent to it.



• ECB and OFB: As shown in the images below, the decryption of a cipher block is independent of all other cipher blocks.





Based upon the implications of these differences, it is easy to predict the changes.

Task 4: Programming using the Crypto Library [20 pts]

```
    general_enc.cpp 
    X

1 #include <openssl/conf.h>
      #include <openssl/evp.h>
     #include <string.h>
      #include <iostream>
     #include <fstream>
     using namespace std;
     int encrypt(unsigned char *key, unsigned char *iv, unsigned char *plaintxt, unsigned char *ciphertxt, int plaintxt_len){
         //Will be used in the following if statements
         EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
         int len;
         int ciphertxt len;
         if(!(ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new())){
             cout << "Error with context initialization!" << endl;</pre>
             exit(0);
          if(1 != EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, key, iv)){
             cout << "Error with context setup!" << endl;</pre>
             exit(0);
```

```
/*Perform actual encryption*/
if(1 != EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, ciphertxt, &len, plaintxt, plaintxt_len)){
    cout << "Error with actual encryption!" << endl;
    exit(0);
}

ciphertxt_len = len;

/*Finalize encryption*/
if(1 != EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, ciphertxt + len, &len)){
    cout << "Error with encryption finalization!" << endl;
    exit(0);
}

ciphertxt_len = ciphertxt_len + len;

/*Free up ctx after finishing encryption. It's kinda like a destructor*/
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return ciphertxt_len;
}</pre>
```

Before even trying to figure out what the key was, I knew I needed to create an encryption function if I were to perform a brute force attack. The encryption function will be explained in simplified bullet points.

- Since the encryption function performs aes-128-cbc encryption, it needs the key, iv, plaintext, ciphertext, and the length of the plaintext.
- Note: that ciphertext is a buffer which will store the encrypted plaintext.
- It then initializes the "context" for aes encryption.
- It then sets up the "context" to perform the aes encryption.
- It then performs the "actual encryption" of the plaintext.
- When the "actual encryption" portion of the code is done, the length of the ciphertext buffer will be updated.
- It then finalizes the encryption and updates the length of the ciphertext buffer one last time.
- After the encryption is complete, the program frees up the context so that no important memory is left lying around, and the length of the ciphertext buffer is returned.

I then proceeded to work on the main function of my program. The first part of this code is to set up the initial variables which will be used for the aes-128-cbc encryption. Please note that the iv and plaintext variables are initialized with the values that are documented in the homework assignment.

### $\xf4\xa2\xef\x2a\xd4\x54\x0f\xae\x1c\xa0\xaa\xf9";$

The second part of the code will be used to compare the expected ciphertext with the produced cipher text. Please note that expected\_ciphertext has the value as per documented in the homework assignment. Also note, I needed to add in the "\x" since the expected cipher is a hex and not a string.

```
//Will loop through words.txt and perform encryption for each word until key found
fstream newfile;
newfile.open("words.txt",ios::in);
string word;
```

The fourth part of the code will open the provided words.txt file in order to make it traversable so that it can find the correct key. The "word" variable will store the current word that the program is at in the words.txt file.

```
while(getline(newfile, word)){
    //calculate and append the number of space characters needed word if word is less
    //than 16 bytes
    int num_of_spaces = 0;
    if (word.length() < 16){</pre>
        num_of_spaces = 16 - word.length();
        for(int i = 1; i <= num_of_spaces; i++){</pre>
            word += ' ';
    }
    //word will now be used as a key for encryption
    key = (unsigned char *) word.c_str();
    //perform encryption using the current key
    ciphertxt_len = encrypt (key, iv, plaintxt, ciphertxt, plaintxt_len);
    //Compare the original ciphertext with the newly produced ciphertext
    if(memcmp (ciphertxt, expected_ciphertxt, ciphertxt_len) == 0){
        cout << "I found the key" << endl;</pre>
        cout << "The key is: " << word << endl;</pre>
        break;
newfile.close();
return 0;
```

The final portion of the code will perform the actual traversal of the words.txt file. This portion will be explained in simplified bullet points.

- The code traverses through the words.txt file using the getline() function as all of the words are on their own line.
- If the current word is less than 16 bytes, the code will calculate the amount of blank space characters needed and append them to the end of said word.
- After the process of appending is complete, the word will be converted to an unsigned char pointer to be used for the next aes-128-cbc encrytion.
- The code then calls the encryption function to encrypt the same plaintext using the same iv and current key. Please note that the encryption function will also return the length of the newly produced ciphertext.
- Finally, the program will compare the newly produced ciphertext with the expected ciphertext.
- If they are the same, then the code prints out the key that was used and breaks out of the loop.
- If they are not the same, then the code will continue to run the loop until it traverses to the correct word that produces the expected ciphertext.

- Please note if the while loop ends and it did not find the correct key, then either the words.txt file does not contain the correct key or there is something wrong with my code.
- Once the while loop is done running, then the program will close the words.txt file and return 0.

```
[10/24/21]seed@VM:~/.../HW3_mine$ g++ general_enc.cpp -lcrypto -o result [10/24/21]seed@VM:~/.../HW3_mine$ ./result I found the key
The key is: median [10/24/21]seed@VM:~/.../HW3_mine$
```

After completing the writing of my code. I proceeded to compile the code with the -lcrypto flag as it is using the openssl library. I then proceeded to run the code, and luckily I was able to find the correct key which is "median". Thus, the key that was used to produce the expected ciphertext, documented in the homework assignment, is "median". Of course, since median is less than 16 bytes, it was appended with blank space characters.

```
general_enc: general_enc.o
    g++ general_enc.o

general_enc.o: general_enc.cpp
    g++ general_enc.cpp

INC=/usr/local/ssl/include/
LIB=/usr/local/ssl/lib/
all:
    g++ -I$(INC) -L$(LIB) -o enc general_enc.cpp -lcrypto

clean:
    rm *.o general_enc
```

I would also like to note that I tried creating a makefile for my program. I followed the advice that was documented in the homework assignment, but I could not get it to work for some reason. Every time I ran the make command, I would get the following errors below.

```
[10/24/21]seed@VM:~/.../HW3_mine$ make
g++ general_enc.cpp
/tmp/ccz0Uezl.o: In function `encrypt(unsigned char*, unsigned char*, unsigned char*, unsigned char*, int)':
general_enc.cpp:(.text+0x2a): undefined reference to `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new'
general_enc.cpp:(.text+0x8d): undefined reference to `EVP_EncryptInit_ex'
general_enc.cpp:(.text+0x81): undefined reference to `EVP_EncryptInit_ex'
general_enc.cpp:(.text+0x46): undefined reference to `EVP_EncryptInit_ex'
general_enc.cpp:(.text+0x133): undefined reference to `EVP_EncryptInal_ex'
general_enc.cpp:(.text+0x181): undefined reference to `EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free'
collect2: error: ld returned 1 exit status
makefile:5: recipe for target 'general_enc.o' failed
make: *** [general_enc.o] Error 1
[10/24/21]seed@VM:~/.../HW3_mine$
```

Obviously, this is due to my lack of experience in creating makefiles. However, I could not resolve this issue. Thus, I disregarded the makefile and I tried compiling the code with g++ with the -lcrypto flag (as shown three images above) and it worked.