II CORPS MIKE FORCE 5TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP (AIRBORNE), 1ST SPECIAL FORCES AFO US FORCES 96318

18 April 1968

After Action Report - Operation Bath, 12 March 1968 to 5

April 1968

Co B, 5th SFG (Abn) OPORD 3-68 (TF BATH) REF:

THRU: Commanding Officer

Co B, 5th SFG (Abn), 1st SF

APO U S Forces 96318


TO: Commanding General I Field Forces Vietnam APO U S Forces 96240

- 1. (C) Size and Composition.
 - A. MSF Control Headquarters

CO 33 Radio Supervisor Operations Sgt

- B. 22nd MSF Company
 - 149 CIDG
 - VNSF
 - 32 USASF
 - AATTV
- 26th MSF Company
 - 105 CIDG USASF

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- D. 27th MSF Company
 - (1) 159 CIDG
 - (2) 5 USASF
 - (3) 3 VNSF
- E. 1st and 4th Platoon, Co E, 20th Inf (IRP)
- F. 17th Avn Gp Tasked to provide 4 slick helicopters and 2 gunships for duration of operation.
 - G. Co B Forward Air Control Team.

2. Mission.

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The mission of Task Force Bath was to conduct a reconnaissance and quick reaction operation to seek out and destroy elements of the 95B Regiment in the area South and Southwest of An Khe.

- 3. Time of Departure/Time of Return.
- A. The Task Force deployed from Pleiku on 11 March 1968 at 0700 hours by road convoy and closed An Khe at 1630 hours the same day. Operations commenced on the 12th of March.
- B. The Task Force ceased operations on 4 April 1968 and returned to Pleiku by read convoy on the 5th of April 1968, closing at 1830 hours.
 - 4. Conduct of Operation.
- A. Operational Area and route followed are shown at Annex B, (Overlay).
 - B. Terrain followed is described in Annex A, (Intelligence).
 - C. The following actions and encounters took place.
- (1) At 121546 hours March, 27th Company heliassaulted into Loc ER474357 with the mission of moving northwest and clearing the Feature Kong Kroi overlooking the An Khe Military Area. The company completed their mission at 171400 hours when they were extracted from their AO by truck at ER431399. During this phase of the operation negative enemy contact was made. One CIDG was medevaced with a punji wound to the lower left leg. Punji stakes and Booby Traps were fairly common in the area however most appeared to be very old.
- (2) At 131145 hours March, 22nd MSF Company was heliassaulted into AO RED at BR483352 with the mission of sweeping southwest along the Dak Ha Way Valley. At 151100 hours at BR466345, 22nd Company came under sniper fire and received 1 CIDG KIA. The sniper was not observed but fire was returned with unobserved results. At 161015 hours the made contact with an uninquisize enemy force (Est approx Sqd size)




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at BR435358 with negative results. The company had no further contact and was extracted to An Khe by helicopter at 191535 hours without incident.

- (3) The 26th MSF Company remained at An Khe as a reaction force minus 1 platoon which formed an eagle flight. The eagle flight consisting of 32 CIDT and 3 USASF was hillilifted into area vicinity BR 399312 to check out the creek lines running north to south in the area. They were heliassaulted into the area at 140830 hours and remained until 141745 hours when they were lifted back to An Khe. During this phase of the operation they made negative enemy contact.
- (4) At 151010 hours an eagle flight consisting of one platoon from 26th MSF Company was heliassaulted into AO RED at BR424271 to ambush trails in the area. At 151645 hours one VMC walked into an ambush and was taken under fire. Results were 1 VMC KIA, negative friendly casualties. Location of the ambush was BR411288. The eagle flight was subsequently extracted to An Khe from BR416282 at 161700 hours with negative further contact.
- (5) An eagle flight of 66 CIDG and 4 USASF personnel was heliassaulted into AO RED at BR398279 at 160930 hours with a VMC guide who had been CIA by an IRP Team from Co E, 20th Inf. The VMC stated that he would lead the eagle flight to a village where he said there were 20 VC/VMC with weapons. The guide was unable to locate the village. Visual reconaissance missions were flown in the area and failed to locate any signs of activity. At 170900 hours the eagle flight made contact with an estimated VC squard at BR 398261. Results were negative and the enemy withdrew east. The eagle flight was extracted by helicopter to An Khe at 171600 hours without further enemy contact.

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(6) The forst MSF operation in the secondary area of interest occured when 26th MSF Company was heliassaulted into AC RED at 181345 hours at BR266371 with the mission of searching north along the Dak Sekoel River. At 181530 hours 26th Company made contact with 2 VC in a bunker comples at BR264368. The VC withdrew leaving a quantity of documents behind which were evacuated through intelligence channels. These documents established the inentity of several enemy units (See Annes A to this report). At 191445 hours, 26th Company located 1 man, 4 women and 2 childred hiding in a stream bed. These people (All Montagnard) were unarmed and were evacuated to An Khe for intelligence interrogation; however, them proved to be of limited value. At 201300 hours at BR261371 the company received 12 hounds of 82MM mortar fire from an easterly direction. Results were negative and the company moved out in easterly direction. At 201515 hours the company sighted an estimated platoon of enemy moving north at BR257380. Gunships and Tac Air were called and later assessment of the area located 2 VC KBA, 8 Rucksacks, 2 Grenades, 2 A/T Mines, 1Blasting Machine, 2 82MM Mortar Rounds, 1 HT1 Radio and some documents. These were subsequently





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forwarded through intelligence channels for evaluation and helped confirm the presence of certain enemy units in the area. (See Annex A). At BR252387 the company located a VC bunker complex with 6 Rucksacks, 2 B40 Rockets, 6 60MM Mortar Rounds, 1 AK 47, 1 Blasting Machine and Documents. From this location the company then swung south and made a sweep to check out various huts located by visual reconnaissance. At 231815 hours the company observed 25 to 30 VC/NVA moving on a trail from south to north at BR246372. They were armed with AK47's and SKS and wearing black and green uniform. They were not engaged by S/A due to the distance involved but gunships were called in and worked the area. Due to darkness an assessment was not made until next day and no results were observed. At 251645 hours the forward element of the company engaged 4 NVA/VC observing the company from BR237365. Results were 1 VC KIA, 1 MAS 36 and 2 Rucksacks CIA, 2 Bood trails found. The company was subsequently extracted to An Khe at 261800 hours from VIC BR237365.

- (7) At 191105 hours the 27th MSF Company was helilifted into AO BLUE at ER186347 with the mission of moveing north to help block enemy movement south as the result of 26th MSF company's contact and the result of friendly elements movement, operating to the north of AO BATH. (See para 4, c, 9, this report). At 202028 hours the company made contact with 1 squad of VC who probed the company's perimeter. Fire was returned with unobserved results. The company continued to patrol in this area until 241100 hours when they were extracted from VIC BR177378 with negative further enemy contact. They were relocated by helicopter to BR273329.
- (8) At 211020 hours the 22MSF company was heliassaulted into BR318367 to screen and block the southern slopes of feature 622 at coord BR2737 to exploit movement created by 26th MSF com; any. The company patrolled in this area until 231600 hours and then moved west to follow the alignment of Dak Karo River to exploit the enemy's shortage of water in the area. At 241715 hours the company sighted 4 to 5 VC at BR220343, moving west on a trail. Contact was initiated by the company with results: 2 NVA KIA, 2 AK47 CIA, 3 Grenades CIA. Friendly: 2 CIDG lightly wounded. The company continued west with negative further contact and were subsequently extracted to An Khe at 281635 hours from vicinity ER192348.

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- (9) During this phase of the operation C Company, 2/503d conducted a search and destroy operation north of AO BLUE. Moveing south from Highway 19 and being extracted from vicinity ER255391, 231500 hours. It is felt that this operation would have helped drive any enemy elements to the north into the BATH AO, however movement was not significant.
- (10) At 231300 hours an eagle flight consisting of 1 platoon from both 22nd and 27th MSF Company was infiltrated into AO GREEN at ER252245. At ER220230, eagle flight made contact with





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an estimated 2-3 VC. Fire eas exchanged with negative observed results. Eagle flight was in process of being exfiltrated when 1 platoon was infiltrated to reinforce IRP Tm 4/7 in contact with a squad of VC at HR149222. Results were 2 VC KIA and 1 MAS 36 CIA - negative friendly. Eagle flight and IRP subsequently extracted to An Khe without incident.

- (11). The 27th MSF Company was relocated into AO BLUE at 241100 hours at BR273329 with the mission of sweeping west along the southern side of the Dak Karo River. The com any sighted 3 VMC across river - negative results. At 261720 hours the company initiated contact with a VC platoon and results were 2 VC KIA, 5 WIA with negative friendly. Enemy were wearing loin cloths and armed with SKS rifles. At 271015 hours the company initiated contact with 3 VC on trail. At BR187318, results were 1 VC KIA, 1 M1 Carbine CIA. At 271400 hours the company's lead element was ambushed by VC estimated company at BR184303. Results were 1 CIDG KIA, enemy unknown. Enemy had set ambush on the south side of a small valley between two ridge lines. The company's forward flank security supressed the ambush before it could be properly sprung. At 271530 hours at BR188319 the company was directed to swing south and then east to clear along the southern banks of the Dak Pop Ho River. At 281120 hours the company made contact with an estimated reinforced platoon at BR186305. CIDG flanked enemy who broke contact and fled west. Results were 2 NVA KIA, 1 1 RFG CIA, 1 CIDG WIA. At290900 the company initiated contact with 4 to 5 enemy at 75 meters, negative results. This party was thought to be a delaying group. The company continued to move to the east patrolling and ambushing until extracted at 301630 hours from vicinity of HR245308.
- (12) At 310930 hours the 22nd MSF company was helilifted into area vicinity BE202300 with the mission of clearing northwest through the 27th company's area of contact. Patrolled general vicinity while awaiting approval of a B-52 strike which was eventually not granted and the company was finally withdrawn with negative enemy contact at 031650 hours April.

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- (13). At 271030 hours the 26th MSF Company was helilifted into IZ at BR132242 to sweep east through Dak Pi Hao River Valley. Eagle flight platoons were lifted into the feature on both north and south of the valley to provide screening and an early warning capability. (See para 4C, 14 & 15). At 281120 hours the company made contact with 2 VC at BR142234 with negative results. The company continued to sweep with negative contact and was subsequently extracted to An Khe at 021830 hours.
- (14). At 271145 hours an eagle flight consisting of 1 platoon from 27th MSF company was infiltrated into AO at BR162245 to to screen 26th MSF company as it passed through Dak Pi Hal Valley. At 271315 hours at BR165254 the eagle flight made contact with an estimated squad of VC. Results were 1 USASF WIA, enemy unknown. The eagle flight was extracted at 271730 hours to An Khe.



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- (15). An eagle flight consisting of 1 platoon of 22nd MSF company set up blocking positions at BR165226 at 270850 hours. The eagle flight had negative contact and patrolled the area until extracted at 281800 hours.
- (16). The above completes a summary of MSF actions during operation BATH. The three MSF Co's, Company E Elements and the Command and Control Detachment returned to Pleiku by road on the 4th of April closing at 1830 hours. The convoy was uneventful with the exception of a vehicular accident that occurred on Highway 19, causing injury to nine CIDG when a truck overturned.

(17). Company E Activities

Attached at Annex D is a consolidated summary of IRF activities. The two platoons allotted to this operat on worked well with MSF elements and performed in a professional manner. Intelligence gathered by IRP's is included in Annex A (Intelligence). In general, IRP's were used to complement MSF operations and to gain intelligence upon which to react with the flexable eagle flight teams. It is felt that mechanically this operation was most satisfactory and that in an area where there was more current enemy activity the results would also have been satisfactory.

- (18). The following incidents were reported by supporting aircraft.
 - (A). 14 March at BR398278, 1 VC KIA by gunship.
 - (B). 27 March, 2 VC KIA by gunship at BR217409.
- (C). 30 March, 3 MC KIA at BR398278, reported KIA by doorgunners.
- (B). 26 March, after observation by Army L-19 a group of 10 15 VC were taken under fire by friendly gunships with observed results of 5 VC KIA. Fire was returned by enemy with negative casualties.

(C) Enemy Information.

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All relevant enemy information is included at Annex A.

6. The following is a summary of the results of encounters with the enemy:

FRIENDLY	CASUALTIES
Married State Control of the Publish	And in case of the last of the

	KIA	WIA	CIA
MSF	2	5	0
LRP	1	5	0
Aviation	0	0	0
TOTAL	3posterin	10	
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ENFMY CASUALTIES

	KIA	WIA	CIA
MSF	10	0	6
IRP	5	7	1
Aviation	13	0	0
TOTAL	28	7	7

MATERIAL CIA

16 Rucksacks and contents	5 CHICOM Grenades
2 AK 47	2 A/T Mines
7 SKS	2 82MM Mortar Rounds
1 Russian Carbine	6 60MM Mortar Rounds
2 MAS 36	2 Blasting Machines
1 M-1 Carbine	2 B-40 Rockets
1 RPG Machine Gun	2 B-40 Rocket Launchers
Various Documents	The Anna State And Anna Anna

7. (C) Conclusions and Recommendations.

A. Conclusions.

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This is the first time that the MSF has operated in this role and operation BATH has proven to have been mechanically successful. Had this operation been conducted in a more lucrative area I am sure it would have provided good results. All supporting elements expressed their satisfaction with the concept of the operation and their hope that similar rype operations with the same support be conducted in the future.

B. Recommendations.

- (1). If the MSF is to be taxed with continueing operations of this nature that the structure of the command and control element be complemented to avoid leaving a vacaum when individual staff members deploy to the field.
- (2). That the same aviation support be continuously available i.e. 4 slicks and 2 guns, flyable at all times. If possible the same aviation commander be present for the entire operation to allow continuity.
- (3). That when possible, seven clear days warning be given of pending operations to allow planning to be followed through on some of the problems met with indigenous troops to be more easily overcome.





ANNEX A (Intelligence) to After Action Report - Operation Bath, 12 Mar 68 to 5 Apr 68.

REFERENCE: Intelligence annex to FRAG order for Operation Bath.

1. General.

- A. Intelligence overlay shown as Appendix 1 to this annex shows location of contacts made during operation Bath.
- B. Generally the AO did not produce much result considering the density of patrolling within the area. The enemy encountered were apparently mainly support type units who did not desire to remain and fight but who prefered to avoid contact.
- C. Perhaps the most significant factor in Operation Bath was the great reduction in enemy activity on Highway 19 during the operation. It is considered that the area is probably the haven for the Engineer units responsible for Highway 19 activity.
- D. Friendly Montagnard tribes people are starting to make their way back into the area at this time.

2. Enemy Identifications.

- A. Confirmed: Documents captured on Operation Bath confirmed the following units operating in the area.
 - (1) X-17 Engineer Company
 - (2) 280B (Cover name for Gia Lai Province Committee Head-

quarters)

- (3) H-15 Main Force Batallion
- (4) 571 Infiltration Group

B. Unconfirmed:

240th Transportation Unit (Has been operating in Binh Dinh Province)

3. Terrain.

Maps of the area were found to be accurate and relatively up to date. The terrain ranges from 350 to 1500 meters in hight. $I_{\rm H}$ the valley areas the terrain is generally rolling and open with little undergrowth, making movement easy. Above 600 meters the slopes become steep and secondary growth is very dense with movement difficult at 700 meters. Double canopy to 130 feet occurs at this level.

4. Weather.

The weather during the period was generally good. There was only three days with light rain in the early morning. The temperature





ANNEX A (Intelligence) to After Action Report - Operation Bath, 12 Mar 68 to 5 Apr 68 (Cont'd).

ranged from an estimated 65 degrees at night to an estimated 98 degrees during the day, with an overall high of 103 degrees. During the first 16 days of the operation ground fog prevented the use of aircraft late at night and during the early hours of the morning. The ground fog usually burned off by about 0800 hours. During the last 6 days of the operation, ground fog prevented the use of aircraft from 2100 hours at night until 1100 hours in the morning.

DISCUSSION

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Enemy Identification: Enemy units identified in the area of Operation Bath are subordinate to Gia Lai Province Headquarters Committee. These units are the X-17 Engineer Company which is reported to work with or subordinate to the H-15 Main Force Battalion and in the past has been used to set ambushes and lay mines along highway 19. The estimated strength of the X-17 Engineer Company is 100 men. The Gia Lai Province Committee Headquarters is using the cover designation of 280B. Documents captured during the operation indicate elements of the 571 Infiltration Group and elements of the 240th Transportation unit are operating in the Binh Dinh Province.

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Annex C (Communications) to After Action Report (Operation Bath).

- 1. Concept of Operation: To establish communications with Co B, Pleiku and to act as a communications liaison team to relay all traffic from the deployed companies. By use of:
 - a. AN/FRC-93 twice daily at 1200 and 1800.
 - b. Any USASF radio net as relay (if necessary).
 - c. Diana one-time pads as a primary secure means of commo by voice or CW. In case of losssor compromise of one-time pads and SOI, an alternate means was to use the KAC Codes with an alternate callsign.

2. General:

- a. In general the communications from Operation Bath to Co B and liaison team at An Khe was excellent. Every scheduled contact was made from the deployed companies to the liaison team at An Khe and from An Khe to Co B.
 - (1) Radios taken on Operation Bath were as follows: 1-AN/FRC-93 3-AN/PRC-74 15-AN/PRC-25 30-HT-1E
 - (2) Operation Bath used the standard doublet type antenna for CW/SSB and a home made RC-292 ground plane type antenna for FM communications. The results achieved were excellent.
 - (3) The number of messages sent to Co B, Pleiku was 70 and the number received was 6 plus service messages. The first contact was made 101600 Mar. The liaison team closed down 041700 Apr.
- b. Contacts with Co B:
 - (1) Twice daily at 1200 and 1800- Sitreps.
 - (2) Frequencies and callsigns were provided.

c. Frequencies:

- (1) AN/FRC-93 had one primary and two alternate frequencies.
- (2) AN/PRC-25 had frequencies assigned for Fac aircraft, resupply, medevac, infiltration, exfiltration and internal command net. In addition a FM, radio relay was located on top of a mountain for thier use.

(3) 3. Problem Areas:

a. Interference:
Assigned FM frequencies were used to an excess by friendly units within the area.



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b. Terrain:
Because of very hilly terrain and thick vegetation FM communications would have been completely lost at times were it not for the FAC aircraft and the FM relay station that was setup.


4. Conclusions and Recommendations:

- a. The assigned times of 1200 and 1800 were excellent for commo. Recommend the same times be used on future operation or this type nature.
- b. The AN/PRC-64 radio was not used as a back-up as in the past, because 2 AN/PRC-74's provide a back-up that is more dependable and has a much broader frequency band than the AN/PRC-64. Recommend that each company be issued a second AN/PRC-74 in lieu of the AN/PRC-64.
- c. Recommend that all MSF Companies be issued 6 AN/PRC-25 radios. It is necessary to have this amount so each platoon has one and the commander has one in order to maintain maximum control. Five radios are used on the company internal net. In addition.the USASF Radio Operator must also have a AN/PRC-25 radio for commo outside of the internal net (FAC, Medevac, emergency commo, etc).



Apendix I to Annex D Operation Bath After Action Report Summary of E. Co. 20th Inf (Lrp) Activities

No.			Lssion		!Over	1 Emergency	! Reaction ! Force	! Force !	Artillery	!Tac Air	! Gunships	1
Tm :	24hr	148	172	196	196	!Exfil	!Committed	!Committed !	Called-in	!Used	! Used	! Remarks
6	X	1	!	1	!	! Yes	! No	! Yes !	Yes	! -	! Yes	!Opcon to 2/503d
.1	! x	!	1	1	1	! Yes	1 No	1 - 1	-	! -	! Yes	!Opcon to 2/503d
7	X	!	!	1	1	! Yes	! No	1 - 1	Yes	! -	! Yes	!Opcon to 2/503d
2	!	1	1	! x	1	! -	! -	! - !	-	1 -	-	
3	!	!	! x	1	1	1 -	! -	! - !	-	! -	1 -	!TL Sprainerankle
2	!	!	! x	!	1	! Yes	! -	! Yes !	-	1 -	! -	
	!	!	1	! x	1	1 -	! -	! - !	_	1 -	! -	1
6	1 x	!	1	!	1	! Yes	! -	! - !	-	! -	! Yes	!
5	!	1	!	1 x	1	! -	!	1 - 1	-	! -	-	!
4	!	! x	1	1	1	! Yes	1 -	! - !	-		! Yes	1
6	1	1	! x	1	1	! Yes	1 -	! - !	Yes	1 -	! Yes	1
1	! x	1	1	1	1	! Yes	! -	1 - 1	-	1 -	! Yes	1
	!	! x	1	1	1	! -	! -	! - !	-	! -	! -	!Lack of Commo
6	! ×	!	!	!	1	! Yes	1 -	! Yes !	-	! -	! Yes	!Enemy an IZ
1	!	! x	!	1	1	! -	1 -	! - !	-	! -	! Yes	1
3	! x	!	1	!	!	! Yes	! -	! Yes !	-	! -	! Yes	1
2	!	! x	!	1	1	1 -	! -	! - !	-	! -	! -	!
2	!	!	!	1 x	1	! -	! -	! - !	_	! -		1
.3	! x	!	1	1	!	! Yes	! -	! - !	-	! -	! Yes	1
4	! x	1	!	1	1	! Yes	1 -	! Yes !	Yes	! -	! Yes	1
7	! x	1	1	1	!	! Yes	! Yes	1 - 1	-	! -	! Yes	
6	!	1	1	! x	1	! Yes	! -	1 - 1	-	! -	! Yes	
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5	!	1	! x	!	1	! Yes	1 -	1 - 1	-	! -	! Yes	1
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1	! x	1	1	1	1	! Yes	! -	1 - 1		! -	! Yes	!Spotted on Infil
3(-		!	1 x	1	!	! -	! -	1 - 1	-	1 -	! -	!Part of Engle Fl
4(-	X	1	1	1	1	! Yes	1 -	! Yes !	-	! -	! Yes	!Part of Engle Flt
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1	! x	!	1	1	1	! Yes	1	-		! -	1 -	
o-		1 4	! 7	1 5	! -	1 19	1	7	5	. 0	1 19	!



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Apendix II to Annex D Operation Bath After Action Report Summary of E. Co. 20th Inf (Lrp) Activities

Tm	! Infiltration		! Exfiltration !		Priendly Casualties			! Enemy Casualties			! No	No
No	1	1	1	1		!	1	1 1		1	! Sight-	!Individ.
	! TIME	ILOCATION	! TIME	! LOCATION !	KIA	! WIA	! MIA	! KIA !	WIA	CIA	! ings	!Sighted
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41	1081830	AND DESCRIPTION OF THE PARTY OF	1081850	1311 334	-	1 -	! -	1 -	-	-	! 1	!Sqd
47	1091830	1444 316	1091833	1444 3:6	-	1 2	1 -	! -	-	-	: 1	!Sqd.
12	! 121515	THE RESERVE AND PERSONS ASSESSMENT	and the same of the same of	1449 391	-	1 -	! -	1 -	-	-	! -	! -
13	1131120		THE RESERVE THE PERSON NAMED IN	1470 347	-	1 -	1 -	! -	-	1 -	! 1	1.5
43		1399 282	1151718	the sale of the sa	-	1 2	! -	! -	-	1 1	! 4	! 20 -
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14	1181730	Name and Address of the Owner, where the Owner, which is the Owne	THE RESERVE AND PERSONS ASSESSMENT AND PERSONS ASSESSMENT AND PERSONS ASSESSMENT AND ADDRESS ASSESSMENT ASSESS	1220 285	-	1 -	! -	1 -	-	-	! 1	1 3
16	THE RESERVE AND PARTY AND PERSONS ASSESSED.	1285 353		1275 375	-	1 -	! -	! -	-	-	! 1	1 2
41	1190915	the same of the same of the same of the same of	the special research dispersion	1247 256	_	1 -	! -	! -	-	-	: 1	! 5
15	1191510	THE RESERVE AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON NAMED IN	1201725	and the second second second second second	-	1 -	1 -	! -		-	! -	! -
46	THE RESERVE THE PARTY NAMED IN	1243 339	12111712	2!243 339	-	1 -	! -	!	1	1 -	1 1	! 6
11	1221005	1199300	1231725	1201 300	-	1 -	! -	! -	-	-	1 2	! 35
13	1221700	1207 235	1221850	1207 235	-	! 1	1 -	! -	-	-	1 1	! 7
42	1231450	1249 279	1241805	1237 286		! -	! -	! 1	-	1 -	1 1	! 1
12	1241000	1175 379	1271725	1173 379	_	! -	1 -	! -	-	-	! -	! -
43	- Aller Aller	1248 247	1251345	1250 245	1	! -	! -	1 2	-	-	: 1	! 8
14	1251320	THE RESERVE THE PERSON NAMED IN	1251650	AND REAL PROPERTY AND ADDRESS OF THE PARTY AND	-	! -	! -	! 2	-	-	1 2	1 2
47	THE RESERVE OF THE PERSON NAMED IN	1228 151	1261400	CONTRACTOR OF THE PARTY OF THE	-	1 -	! -	! 2		- 1	1 1	! 15
16	1261345	CANADA SANCE OF TAXABLE PARTY.	THE RESERVE AND ADDRESS OF THE PERSON.	1218409	-	1 -	! -		1 1	! -	: 5	! 10
46	the state of the last of the l	1539 461		1539 461	-	! -	! -	1 -	-	-	: 3	1 5
15	1270840	THE RESERVE AND PARTY AND PARTY.	THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO IS NOT THE OWNER, OF THE OWNER, OW	1157 303	-	! -	! -	! 2		-	! 10	! 74
41		1265 215	1281925	THE RESIDENCE OF THE PERSON NAMED IN COLUMN TWO	-	1 -	! -	1 6	-	-	1 2	1 6
11		1242 372		1242 322	-	1 -	1 -	-		! -	: 1	! 3
13(-	-)231300		1261030	AND RESIDENCE AND PARTY AND PERSONS ASSESSED.	-	1 -	! -	! -	-	1 -	! -	! -
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