

COTSMIRE

KIN

Transl # 26

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TRANSLATION WORKSHEET

Date ...22. Sep. 66

Log # 09-2447-66

Subject: ... After-action Report of C 900- .....

... 3 page(s), 8 x 10 inches, (handwritten), (typewritten), (printed)

Circumstance of capture: Unit: ... 1st. ATF. ....

Date: ... 17. Sep. 66. .... Area: ... X3337557. ....

Type: ☒ A, ☒ B, ☒ C, ☒ D, ☒ E. Summary: ☐, Extract: ☐, Translation: ☒

SUMMARY.-

Circular dated 18 Mar 66 issued by C900 whose copy was signed by the AD of C980 and addressed to C21/4.

The document was a report on the Dan Tan 36 Operation conducted by III CTZ, involving the 10th RVNAP Inf Div, from 22 Feb to 5 Mar 66 in the Areas of this Thanh, Tam Long and Minh Tam.

Included in the report were the lessons learned in this action.

(FULL TRANSLATION FOLLOWS)

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UNITED STATES JOINT MILITARY ASSISTANCE COMMAND, VIETNAM  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence  
PO BOX 96222

1.0214

14 February 1967

SUBJECT: TRANSLATION REPORT

LOG # 09-2447-66

1. Attached is a full English translation of a captured enemy document.
2. Capture data :
  - a. Date : 17 Sep 66
  - b. Location : YS337657
  - c. Unit : 1st APTF
3. Date document received at Combined Document Exploitation Center (CDEC) : 22 Sep 66.
4. In the event the attached translation report is declassified, the "KIN" marking and this cover letter will be removed.

FORWARDED  
TO: JCS  
DIA, US EMB, CDEC.

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# 09-2147-66

FULL TRANSLATION

SVL Liberation ARMY  
Province Unit  
Command Committee

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[ Page 1 of original text ]

No 02/TB.

C I R C U L A R.

To : C 221/Q1

Subject : DAN TUA 36 Operation.

From 22 February to 5 March 1966 the operation directed by Major General Nguyen Bao Tri, Commander of III CTZ and the Colonel, Commander of 10th Infantry Division, progressed in the Southern area of Duc Thanh road 2, extending to Tam Long area and into 3 villages of Minh Dam area.

The sweep operation (force) was composed of :

- 2 Infantry Regiments
- 1 South Korean Engineer Company
- 2 Armored Personnel carrier Troops with 33 APCs.
- 1 Armored unit with 7 vehicles
- 4 Artillery Platoons with 8 pieces
- Aircraft of various types, coming 6 to 19 at a time.

Other forces participating consisted of :

a/ Military region.-

- 2 Ranger Battalions 35 and 38.
- 2 Battalions of 43d Regiment, 10th Division.
- 1 Reconnaissance Company
- 1 South Korean Engineer Company
- 2 Armored Personnel carrier Troops :

29 M.113; 4 M.118

- 3 Artillery Platoon : 6 105 mm Howitzers

attacked Minh Dam, the main objective. At the end of the operation there were also the 4th Marine Battalion and the 6th Airborne Battalion. The 35th Ranger Battalion was dispatched to the Region.

b/ Sector.-

- 1 Combined Battalion of 52d Ranger unit, Regional Forces, Binh Kich [ commands type unit ], Sector Reconnaissance, and Detached Troops [ Binh Chanh ].
- 1 Armored unit of 7 A.M. [ sic ].

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- 1 Artillery Platoon composed of two 155 mm Howitzers (taken from Van Kiep Center and maneuvered to support the operation).

The enemy conducted an operation which lasted consecutive 11 days.

\* The operation progressed, 5 days South of Nam Thanh, on Road 2 to open the road for supply and transportation to Binh Gia, Duc Thanh. The reconnaissance net was extended no further than 3 km, except a deep penetration into Xuan Son, 8 km east of Duc Thanh to probe our reaction.

During the day the enemy launched his reconnaissance forces for warning, but concentrated in the nighttime on 3 main objectives: Binh Ba, Song Cau, Hoa Long with his mechanized units camouflaged and disposed into a defense line round his bivouacs.

\* In Tam Long Area (Hoa Long, Long Phuoc, Long Tan). In the evening of 27 February the entire operation force came down from Duc Thanh in order to attack Tam Long the morning of 28.

The command Post was set up at Hoa Long with 1 reconnaissance Company, 8 Artillery pieces, the 7 AM mechanized unit [sic] and 1 Battalion for the Sector.

[Page 2 of original text]

Two enemy Infantry Battalions and 1 armored personnel carrier group of 18 M.113 APCs formed into 3 columns to attack Long Phuoc.

Three columns (2 coverts, 1 overt) of two infantry battalions and 1 armored personnel troop (15 vehicles). Attacked Long My.

Particularly, while fighting at Long My, the enemy used disguises and deception to conduct surprise attack.

\* In Minh Dam area.

The operation force in 3 villages, Hoi My, Long My, Tam Phuoc consisted of:

- 2 52<sup>d</sup> Ranger Companies
- 2 Battalions of the 43<sup>d</sup> Regiment
- 38th Ranger Battalion.
- 4th Marine Battalion
- 6th Airborne Battalion
- 2 Armored Personnel Troop: 32 vehicles.
- 4 Artillery Platoons with 3 pieces
- Naval guns of the 7th Fleet
- 19 Aircraft (3 fighters, 3 jets 3 L.19 air observation, 10 helicopters)

The operational force used here was more numerous in comparison with that in two other areas. To replace the 35th Ranger Battalion, there were two battalions of Airborne and Marine Artillery on ship and aircraft.

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The command Post was located at Long Dien stadium with 8 artillery pieces, the 7th AM tank troop, 1 reconnaissance unit, 2 Regional Forces companies, and Bist Kich.

Air artillery operated fiercely to support the operation which used many directions to attack the main objective. It combed the area many times with the essential purpose of attacking and occupying Tan Phuoc (and to enter Long My for pres-lytting among the people).

The entire operational force withdrew to Vung Tau and Saigon during the morning of the 3<sup>rd</sup> to noon of 5th of March 1966.

Enemy casualties at the end of the Dien Tan 36 operation :

- 171 dead (1 captain, Battalion Commander, 2 Americans).
- 73 wounded (1 captain, 2nd Lt)
- 35 dead and wounded
- 1 M.113 APC burned.
- 1 M.113 APC, 3 GMC and two jeton tanks damaged.
- 2 L.19 air observation planes, 2 HULA helicopters hit.

Friendly forces captured :

- 1 semi automatic rifle
- 1 Carbine.
- 2 boxes of Machine Gun shells
- 208 Thompson and Carbine rounds
- 4 60 mm mortar shells.

The enemy combat spirit was very low. Though numerous, the enemy soldiers dared not fight for from their tanks and raid deep into the area. They withdrew immediately after opening fire when getting contact with friendly forces. Their reinforcements came late.

Conclusion.-

- The enemy has transported reserve food to Binh Gia, Aic Thanh area.
- The first step for the settlement of the people into an area has influenced the people of Long My.
- Put pressure on Tan Phuoc and occupy it.

Characteristics.-

By this operation, we have learned the following :

- Enemy strength has been dropped in many areas by helicopters to attack the main objective from many directions.
- Disguise and deception have been used to deceive us.
- Mechanized units have been consigned to conduct surprise attack into our weak points.

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## REMARKS.-

The purpose of the operation is to attack the Liberation Area, the enemy develops formations to attack the second objective first in order to pin up our forces then quickly maneuvers the rest of strength (more numerous) to attack the main objective.

## Vulnerabilities.-

The enemy still has the capability of concentrating some 2000 soldiers into one area. But, if they do so, the other area is left vacant. For example, Kach Van is left vacant when the enemy leaves road 15 to road 2.

- The enemy develops his strength all along route 2 during the day, but concentrates it in one place at night.

- Though there are fortifications in some enemy location such as Road 2, Long Tân and Long Phước areas have none (not even field fortification). Along with the above vulnerabilities, an absence of enemy forces is found also in town and cities. If we know all these weaknesses, the duration of the sweep operation will be shortened and the enemy will suffer many casualties.

16 March 1966

For the G.900 Command Committee.  
Executive Officer.

(Signature)

VST

END OF TRANSLATION

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44-221/Q

Chỉ huy hinh quân số thiếu tướng Nguyễn Đức Tri tự lệnh rằng 3  
chiến thuật và tại tá tư lệnh sư đoàn 10.

Lưu lượng 2 trạm đầu bộ bình, 2 cấp độ của bình Nam Hòa, 1 chỉ  
đầu thiết vận xa 33 chiếc, 1 chỉ thiết kế 7 chiếc, 4 trung đại số  
khẩu, 1 cơ các loại vũ khí 6 chiếc đến 19 chiếc.

**Lưu lượng than chiến gấm cũ:**

2- Chua Nam:

- 14 biệt động quân 35 và 38.  
21 thành trung đoàn 45/110.  
16 trình sát.  
10 công binh Nam Hán.  
2 Chỉ đoàn thiết bị xa: 20 H.113, 4 H.118.  
3 trung đội pháo 6 khẩu 103 ly.

Đã vào tiểu kinh sau khi sinh gần 60 ngày  
lạc chiến, 06 ngày này đang quên đi lạc về trần. 115 An bị đau  
5- Tiểu khu:

5. - Tiden schies:

- 1d rđl hgp Bist. đng quân 92, báo an, hiđ. kien trach  
sat tieu khu, hiđ aban.  
1 dđl thu: đin ? An.  
1 trung đli tao / hia 17) lư(rit & Trung Tân Vn +  
Kiep đlin theo ym try cunh hành quā).)

(1) Liên tiếp 11 ngày đánh vào 3 vùng:

\* Danh vào vàng Lam Bắc Thành 15 2 hình quả 5 ngày khai trình  
18 2 tiếp vận dự trữ lương thực cho binh sĩ Bắc Thành. Các địa phương +  
trình sát dọc lộ không qui 3 xã và 1 xã tiếp theo về trấn Sơn Đông  
Bắc Thành 8 dãy xã thôn do kho mìn phân cấp vận tải.

Ngày đang ra trận với quân đội, anh em tại 63 đã nhận được tin của anh em ở vùng giải phóng, họ đã trở về quê hương và đã được phân công vào các đơn vị chiến đấu.

Đã được chuyển về đơn vị cũ.

[illegible]

Điền về Long Yên 3 cảnh (2 chim, 1 núi) với 2 tiểu bản bộ bình, 1 chỉ đàn thổi vận m 15 chữ.

• **Danh và vàng Kinh Lam:**

Sơ lực lượng đánh 3 vòng tròn, ở đây lực lượng đông hơn 1. tỉn  
đồn, thay vì rút là 35 biệt động quân về trên sân thảo là đủ là thay quả  
lạc chiến thảo thảo và 11 cơ.

Tên trụ nhĩn quân sĩ sỏ hoạt động ỏ liệĩ danh vò điũn nhĩn mĩt  
đĩt quỏ trở lỏĩ nhĩn lỏĩn, nhũng khũng rỏĩ cũĩ giỏĩ, nhũng nhũng cỏĩ, cỏĩ pỏĩ  
đỏĩ vỏĩ Tỏĩ Phỏĩ lỏĩ ỏĩ lỏĩ chĩn đũng, đỏĩ vỏĩ Lỏĩ Nũ tũ đũng đũn đũn  
Tũ gỏĩng ngỏĩ 3 đũn trũn ngỏĩ 3/3/66 đũn đũ lỏĩng rỏĩ vỏĩ vỏĩ  
Tỏĩ vỏĩ Lỏĩng.

- Chết 171 tên, có 1 đại tá, tiểu đoàn trưởng, 1 tá.
- Bị thương 73 có 1 đại tá, 1 thiếu tá.
- Chết và bị thương 35 tên (không phân biệt được).
- Đánh cháy 1 H.113.
- Đánh hư 1 H.113, 3 GMC.
- Đánh bị thương 2 sĩ cơ trính sát L-19, 2 trực thăng.

Tinh thần chiến đấu bạo ngược, lực lượng đông, không dám rời chiến xa không dám ruộng nữa, dựa ta ở sông thối lùn, tiếp viện chiến.

Hết quĩn và chuyển lương thì đi trả cho anh em binh sĩ ở cơ quan  
đó phải giao dần dần đến số tiền trong sổ họ tên :  
Lương 15.  
còn lại 100 nghìn đưa ra ngoài.

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Don't forget to add to the top of your city page the following:

thi. - 30 viên thuốc : 1 liều vào buổi trưa, trung nhiều lần đến vào -

- hình thức mới nhất, mới nhất lần đầu
- đây là giải pháp mới, đây là giải pháp mới và mới nhất





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15-5928

Captured Documents

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FILED RCH CODE SHEET

Page 1 of 1

LOCKER

Entry Date

MAY 67

Originator: SP  
CDEG Log No: U 092447  
Classification: V 3 0 1 0 0  
Report Date: 660922

Document Type: W P M S Q L  
Capture Date: T 660917  
Step Code:

Area Code: B A V V C C  
Area of Capture:   
Province Area:   
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