Daniel M. Smith

Dynasties and Democracy

The Inherited Incumbency Advantage and Institutional Reform in Japan

January 24, 2017

Contents

List of Figures

List of Tables

1

Introduction

> At the antipodes of monarchical principle, in theory, stands democracy, denying the right of one over others. In abstracto, it makes all citizens equal before the law. It gives each one of them the possibility of ascending to the top of the social scale, and thus facilitates the way for the rights of community, annulling before the law all privileges of birth, and desiring that in human society the struggle for preeminence should be decided solely in accordance with individual capacity.
> - Robert Michels (1915, p. 1)

On April 1, 2000, Japanese Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo of the long-ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) suffered a sudden stroke at the age of sixty-two, and later died following a month-long coma.[1] As Prime Minister, Obuchi had been described as having "all the pizazz of a cold pizza" due to his bland personality and style.[2] However, as a candidate for the House of Representatives, the lower and more powerful chamber of Japan's bicameral parliament, the National Diet, he had been extremely successful. Obuchi's father had been a member of parliament (MP) in the House of Representatives for Gunma Prefecture's 3rd District until his death in 1958. In 1963, at the age of 26, Obuchi ran for his father's old seat and won his first election. He went on to win eleven consecutive re-election victories, and earned over 70 percent of the vote against two challengers in his final election attempt in 1996.

In the June 25, 2000 general election held shortly after his death, the LDP nominated Obuchi's 26-year-old daughter, Yuko, as his replacement. Yuko had quit her job at the Tokyo Broadcasting System (TBS) television network to become her father's personal secretary when he became prime minister in 1998. In her first election attempt, she defeated three other candidates with 76 percent of the vote. Since then, she has consistently won between 68-77 percent of the vote in her district, and has faced only weak challengers from minor parties. The LDP's main opposition, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), fielded a candidate against her only in the 2005 election:

[1] Japanese names throughout this book are written in the customary order of surname before given name, apart from authors of publications in English. The same rule applies for Korean names. Macrons to denote long vowel sounds are omitted.

[2] Kristof, Nicholas D. "Mr. 'Cold Pizza' Earns Respect in Japan with Deft Tinkering." *The New York Times*, April 1, 1999.

a 36-year-old party employee with no prior electoral experience. He only managed to win a quarter of the vote in the district.

A young and politically inexperienced woman like Obuchi Yuko would normally be considered a weak candidate in Japan, where the average age of first-time candidates is forty-seven, and female candidates are rare (Obuchi was one of just five women nominated in a district race by the LDP in the 2000 election). Yet, by virtue of her family background, and no doubt aided by sympathy votes after her father's death, she enjoyed an incredible electoral advantage in her first election—both in terms of her name recognition with voters and in terms of the lack of high-quality challengers—and this advantage continued in subsequent elections. After just three election victories, she became the youngest cabinet minister in postwar Japanese history when she was appointed Minister of State in Charge of the Declining Birthrate and Gender Equality in the 2008 cabinet of Prime Minister Aso Taro. Few other LDP MPs have advanced to positions of power in the cabinet as quickly.

1.1 The Puzzle: Dynasties in Democracies

This book is about the causes and political consequences of dynasties in democracies. It will examine the factors that contribute to their development over time and space, and the advantages that members of dynasties, such as Obuchi Yuko, enjoy throughout their political careers—from candidate selection, to election, to promotion into higher offices in cabinet. It will also consider the potential consequences of dynastic politics for the functioning of modern representative democracy. More specifically, the research design I employ in this book takes advantage of institutional change in the country of Japan to help shed comparative light on the phenomenon of dynasties across democracies more generally. The aim is to improve our understanding about how dynastic politics have evolved over time in Japan, as well as how Japan's experience might provide insight or lessons for understanding dynastic politics in other democracies around the world.

How might we conceptualize "dynasties" in democracies? Dynasties are, of course, common in non-democratic regimes such as monarchies or personal dictatorships (Brownlee, 2007; Monday, 2011; McMillan, 2013), and practically all democracies in existence today were at one point or another ruled by a hereditary leadership. In the case of Japan, formal authority vested in the hereditary office of the Emperor did not end until the end of World War II. In the case of non-democratic regimes, Jason Brownlee (2007) argues that a ruler can often anoint a family member as his (it is almost always "his") successor when the party system or leadership selection mechanisms are weak, and the extant power distributions among the broader elite are sustained. A recent example is the succession of North Korea's Kim Jong-un into power in 2011 as the "Great Successor" to his deceased father, Kim Jong-il, who himself became supreme leader following the death of his father, Kim Il-sung, in 1994. Another example is Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, who inherited his position in 2000 from his father, Hafez al-Assad, who had ruled Syria in a personal dictatorship since 1971.

But that similar dynasties should continue to exist in *democracies* seems to run counter to widely held normative visions of democratic opportunity and fairness—even given the fact that members of dynasties must ultimately be popularly elected. The democratic ideal that "all men are created equal" should presumably extend to

the equality of opportunity to participate in elective office, such that no individual is more privileged simply by birth to enter into politics. We might therefore expect democratization to catalyze an end to dynasties, as all true democracies eventually provide for the legal equality of all citizens to run for public office, barring minor restrictions based on place of birth, residence, age, or law-abiding conduct. Even prior to full democratic reform, modernization and the rise of capitalism should contribute to the decay of the patrimonial state, such that historically dominant families should begin to "fade from macropolitics" (Adams, 2005, p. 29).[3]

And yet, throughout the modern democratized world, it is still possible to find powerful political dynasties—families who have returned multiple individuals to public office, sometimes consecutively, and sometimes spanning several generations. It is not uncommon for parties and voters to turn to "favored sons," "democratic scions," or the "People's Dukes"[4] for political representation, despite the availability of less "blue-blooded" candidates. Recent prominent examples from outside of Japan include George W. Bush and Hillary Clinton in the United States, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau in Canada, Prime Minister David Cameron and Labour Party leader Ed Miliband in the United Kingdom, President Park Gyeun-hye in South Korea, Marine Le Pen and Marion Maréchal-Le Pen in France, Prime Minister Enda Kenny in Ireland, President Benigno Aquino III in the Philippines, Sonia and Rahul Gandhi in India, Alessandra Mussolini in Italy, and Tzipi Livni in Israel.

Defining what exactly constitutes a dynasty can be complicated due to the variety of family relationships and levels of government in which family members might serve. For this book, I define a *legacy candidate* as any candidate for national office who is related by blood or marriage (e.g., child, grandchild, sibling, spouse, son-in-law, or other such close relative) to a politician who had *previously* served in the national legislature or national executive (presidency or cabinet). If a legacy candidate is elected, he or she becomes a *legacy MP* and creates a *democratic dynasty*, which I define as any family that has supplied two or more members to national-level political office. This definition of what constitutes a dynasty is more liberal than that used by Stephen Hess (1966, p. 2), who defines a dynasty as "any family that has had at least four members, in the same name, elected to federal office." The definition used here is not limited to dynasties with continuity in surname. In addition, only two family members are necessary to constitute a dynasty, rather than four members, which would limit analysis to countries with a longer democratic history, such as the United States. Some previous studies count relationships to local-level political offices as well (e.g., Chandra, 2016), but attention here will be limited to families who have a history of supplying candidates to national-level elected office. My definition does not require that a legacy candidate be a member of the same party as his or her predecessor, although this generally tends to be the case. Family members can serve consecutively

[3] Max Weber is more pessimistic: "One cannot speak of a transition to an economy that in our sense could be called socialist; a bourgeois economy will re-emerge, merely stripped of the feudal elements and the dynastic vestiges" (as translated in Weber, 1946). In Weber's view, certain individuals will be drawn to "politics as a vocation," rather than an occasional service to society. When an individual lives off politics for income, it may set expectations for his offspring that they, too, may succeed into the same occupation, much as in other professions.

[4] Hess (1966, p. 1) uses this term, citing its use by Stewart Alsop in a newspaper article about Ted Kennedy, "What Made Teddy Run?" *Saturday Evening Post*, October 27, 1962.

or simultaneously, with the exception that two family members first elected at the same time would not constitute a democratic dynasty.



Figure 1.1: Percentage of legacy MPs in twenty-three democracies.

Note: Bar values represent the average percentage of legacy MPs in each country (lower chamber only) elected between 1995 and 2016 (unless otherwise noted in sources). Observations across elections are pooled, so individuals who served multiple terms are counted multiple times. Data for the Philippines are based on a proxy measure matching names. Data for India do not include relations to members of the upper house (Rajya Sabha). All other data are based on verified biographical information.
Sources: Thailand (2011 only): Thananithichot and Satidporn (2016); Philippines: Querubin (2016); Taiwan (2001-2012 only): Batto (2015); Greece (2000-2012 only): Patrikios and Chatzikonstantinou (2014); India (2004-2009 only): Chandra, Bohlken and Chauchard (2014); Denmark (2011 only): *Ekstra Bladet* newspaper; United Kingdom: Van Coppenolle (2015) and House of Commons Library; Argentina (1995 only): Rossi (2016); all other data were collected and coded by the author (see Data Appendix).

By my definition, Japan stands out among democracies for its high proportion of legacy MPs. Figure 1.1 shows the percentage of legacy MPs among all MPs elected in the past two decades (1995-2016) in twenty-three democracies where data are available. Since the 1996 general election, more than a quarter of all MPs in the Japanese House of Representatives have been members of a democratic dynasty, a fact that puts Japan, along with Ireland and Iceland, in the company of economically developing and younger democracies like Taiwan, the Philippines, and Thailand (the most dynastic country for which data are available). Greece, India, and Belgium occupy what might be considered the middle stratum of dynastic politics, with between 10-15 percent of members in recent years coming from democratic dynasties.[5] In most other democracies, legacy MPs tend to account for between 5-10 percent of parliament. This level of

[5] The percentage of legacy MPs in India would be higher if the definition were expanded to include relationships to local-level politicians. The exact percentage of Indian legacy MPs

dynastic politics might thus be considered a "normal" level for healthy democracies. Among the democracies for which comparative data are available, Germany appears to be the least prone to dynastic politics, with less than 2 percent of members of the German Bundestag in recent recent years counting as legacy MPs.

What accounts for this variation across democracies, and the high level of dynastic politics in Japan? It is perhaps unsurprising that dynasties might abound in nascent and developing democracies, where the economic rents from political office are often greater than the opportunities for riches outside of public office. If access to political decision-making authority allows politicians to live considerably better than their constituents, then this should provide greater incentives for such elites to seek to maintain their grip on power. The pool of elites who are interested, eligible, and qualified for public office may also be shallower in new and developing democracies. Members of the elite ruling class may be among the few with the education, wealth, and other technical skills and resources necessary to be effective candidates and policymakers. Similarly, a lower supply of high-quality non-legacy candidates might help to explain a high proportion of dynasties in small democracies such as Iceland.

However, economic development in larger democracies should be expected to eventually lead to a decline in dynasties, in part because it should broaden the structure of political opportunity so that a more diverse range of citizens will be qualified and able to get involved in politics, including through direct participation in elective office. The development of competitive and programmatic political parties should further limit the power of dynasties, and increase the opportunities for capable outsiders to enter politics. Indeed, in nearly all established democracies, the trend over time has been a decrease in dynasties since democratization. In most of Western Europe, the involvement of the hereditary aristocracy in politics declined steadily from the late 1800s to the point where their influence over present day politics is negligible (Rush, 2000; Best and Cotta, 2000).[6] In the United Kingdom, for example, the proportion of legacy MPs in the House of Commons declined from over 30 percent in the late 1800s to less than 10 percent in recent decades (Van Coppenolle, 2015). The proportion in the Swiss National Council peaked at around 19 percent in 1908, and then gradually dropped to less than 6 percent by the 2000s. Dynastic membership in the Canadian House of Commons reached a zenith of 11 percent in 1896, and today is also only around 6 percent. In Italy, the proportion of legacy MPs in the Chamber of Deputies has declined from roughly 13 percent in the immediate postwar period, to just 4 percent today.

In the United States, despite several high-profile legacy candidates among presidential hopefuls in recent decades—such as Al Gore, George W. Bush, Mitt Romney, Jeb Bush, Hillary Clinton, and Rand Paul—the general trend in Congress has also been a decline in dynasties.[7] In the early decades of American democracy, over 15 per-

---

by my definition—which includes relationships to upper chamber MPs—would also be slightly higher if ties to members of the upper chamber (the Rajya Sabha) were included, but these ties are not available in the data compiled by Chandra, Bohlken and Chauchard (2014).

[6] There is a promising recent set of studies on the impact of franchise extension and other institutional changes on dynastic politics in earlier historical periods (e.g. Berlinski, Dewan and Van Coppenolle, 2014; Velasco Rivera, 2016; Cirone and Velasco Rivera, 2016).

[7] Mitt Romney's father, George Romney, was Governor of Michigan and unsuccessfully sought the Republican nomination for president in 1968. However, he also served in cabinet as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development.

cent of members of the House of Representatives were related to a previous member of Congress (either chamber) or the president. However, in recent decades, members of such dynasties have only accounted for around 6-8 percent of members (Clubok, Wilensky and Berghorn, 1969; Laband and Lentz, 1985; Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009; Feinstein, 2010). Dynasties have elicited a considerable amount of attention in the U.S. media in recent years, but their prevalence in Congress is actually comparable to the prevalence of dynasties in most other developed democracies.

In striking contrast, Japan witnessed a steady increase in dynasties for several decades following democratization (Figure 1.2). After Japan's defeat in World War II, the U.S. Occupation (1947-1952) introduced universal suffrage and equality of eligibility for public office, and enshrined these rights in the postwar Constitution of 1947.[8] Since then, despite rapid economic growth and the legal opportunity for all citizens to participate in politics, the proportion of legacy MPs in the Japanese House of Representatives steadily crept upward, toward a zenith of over 30 percent by the late 1980s. Dynasties have been particularly prevalent within the center-right-to-conservative LDP, which has been the dominant party in Japan since its formation in 1955. Over time, the proportion of dynasties in the LDP swelled—from less than 20 percent of elected representatives in 1958, the first election after the party's founding, to over 40 percent by the early 1980s. Moreover, nearly half of all new candidates for the LDP in the 1980s and early 1990s were legacies.

In contrast, the share of legacy MPs in the Japan Socialist Party (JSP), the LDP's main opposition on the left until 1993, rarely exceeded 12 percent. In the third largest party, the religious party Komeito, the average was just 5 percent. In the center-left DPJ, the LDP's main opposition from 1998-2016, the proportion was initially over 25 percent, owing to the numerous former centrist members of the LDP who joined the party after it was founded.[9] However, the DPJ recruited fewer new legacy candidates, and the proportion of legacy MPs in the party gradually declined to around 16 percent. As a result, when the DPJ won a landslide victory over the LDP in 2009, the proportion of legacy MPs in the House of Representatives dropped to 22 percent—still high by comparative standards, but the lowest proportion in Japan since the 1960s. In the 2014 House of Representatives election, 155 out of 1,191 candidates were legacy candidates (13 percent); however, 124 of these legacy candidates won election, so legacy MPs comprised 26 percent of the 475 MPs in the chamber. Ninety-eight (79 percent) of these legacy MPs were members of the LDP.

Such a disproportionately large presence of dynasties in a long-established and economically advanced democracy like Japan runs counter to our expectations for the development of representation in democracies, as well as widely held normative visions of democratic opportunity and participation—particularly when the trend over time is toward *more* dynasties rather than fewer. Elections in Japan are free and fair, and the

[8] Article 15 states that "The people have the inalienable right to choose their public officials and to dismiss them. All public officials are servants of the whole community and not of any group thereof. Universal adult suffrage is guaranteed with regard to the election of public officials." Article 44 guarantees that "The qualifications of members of both Houses and their electors shall be fixed by law. However, there shall be no discrimination because of race, creed, sex, social status, family origin, education, property or income." The Public Offices Election Law stipulates only minor restrictions on suffrage and eligibility with regard to citizenship, age, mental incompetence, and prior criminal offenses.

[9] The DPJ re-branded itself as simply the "Democratic Party" following a merger with the Japan Innovation Party in 2016.



Figure 1.2: Dynasties in Japan in comparison to the United States and Canada.
Note: By-election winners are included, grouped with the previous general election.
Sources: United States (House of Representatives): Compiled from ICPSR Study No. 7803, Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Snyder (2009), and the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress; Canada (House of Commons): ParlInfo Archive; Japan: The Reed-Smith Japanese House of Representatives Elections Dataset (JHRED).

country does not suffer from the severe economic inequality or lack of social mobility and access to higher education that may pose barriers to greater participation of non-legacy candidates in developing democracies. With a population of over 120 million people, it is also difficult to believe that there are simply not enough willing or qualified non-legacy candidates available to run for public office.

How have dynasties managed to persist and multiply, especially within the LDP, despite the lack of formal barriers to candidacy for all eligible citizens? What is it about democratic dynasties like the Obuchi family that allows them to thrive across multiple generations in an electoral democracy like Japan? Do legacy candidates possess special advantages, such as name recognition, familiarity with politics, or financial resources above and beyond those of other candidates that make them more capable of "succeeding" in politics, in both senses of the word? If so, what are the conditions under which these advantages become more or less pronounced? And what are the potential consequences of dynastic politics for the functioning of democracy and quality of representation in Japan?

These are the questions that will be tackled in this book. By examining the puzzle of democratic dynasties through the case of Japan, my aim is to shed comparative light on two general questions: First, what are the underlying *causes* of dynastic recruitment and selection in democracies? Second, what are the political *consequences* of dynastic politics for the functioning of elections and representation in democracies?

1.2 Why Dynasties? The Causes of Dynastic Politics

One explanation for the phenomenon of democratic dynasties might point to the dominance of elites in political life more generally. Scholars of elite dominance have argued that the ruling class of a society may be able to perpetuate its power over the less organized masses, even within a democracy (Pareto, 1901; Michels, 1915; Mosca, 1939; Mills, 1956; Putnam, 1976). For example, Robert Michels notes that, even when forced to compete in democratic elections, there is a tendency for those in power to remain in power. Representative democracy necessitates political parties as organizations to aggregate diverse opinions and interests, but such organization "gives birth to the dominion of the elected over the electors, of the mandatories over the mandators, of the delegates over the delegators. Who says organization, says oligarchy" (Michels, 1915, p. 401).

Once in office, the wealth and connections of members of the elite may make them more capable of maintaining their membership at the pinnacles of power, even when faced with democratic competition. These advantages are often easily transferred to their children, either directly, or by virtue of increased opportunities for education and career advancement from the environment of their childhood. Resources such as wealth, education, and network connections might be an indication of an initial aristocratic endowment, but they might also help to perpetuate a family's membership in the democratic elite. Gaetano Mosca provides an elaboration of this point (Mosca, 1939, pp. 61-62):

> The democratic principle of election by broad-based suffrage would seem at first glance to be in conflict with the tendency toward stability which...ruling classes show. But it must be noted that candidates who are successful in democratic elections are almost always the ones who possess the political forces above enumerated [resources and connections], which are very often hereditary. In the English, French and Italian parliaments we frequently see the sons, grandsons, brothers, nephews and sons-in-law of members and deputies, ex-members and ex-deputies.

Stephen Hess notes that, with a few exceptions such as the Kennedy family, the sixteen most prominent dynasties in U.S. history shared a more-or-less common background that might be considered the "best butter" in American politics: "old stock, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, professional, Eastern seaboard, well to do" (Hess, 1966, p. 3). Similarly, it is common for members of Japanese dynasties to have advanced degrees from the finest universities (or to have studied abroad), and many come from wealthy backgrounds. For example, brothers Hatoyama Yukio and Hatoyama Kunio were heirs to the Bridgestone Corporation fortune through their mother.[10] In 2014, the average personal assets reported by Japanese legacy MPs was 26,176,200 yen (roughly $218,300), compared to 22,123,700 yen (roughly $184,500) for non-legacy MPs.[11]

Thus, democracy alone might not eradicate the ability of wealthy or powerful families to dominate the political process. Even in democracies, the political elite might be able to maintain their status, either through direct manipulation of the electoral

[10] Hatoyama Yasuko was the daughter of Bridgestone founder Ishibashi Shojiro. The name Ishibashi means "stone bridge."

[11] Mean total assets in 2014 based on assets reports from *Asahi Shimbun*. The difference in means is statistically significant at the .05 level. Median assets were 20,060,000 yen (legacy) compared to 18,170,000 yen (non-legacy). See also Chapter 2.

or candidate selection processes, or simply by virtue of their superior endowments of income, education, and connections. These advantages might give legacy candidates a head start over non-legacy candidates in building a political career.

This type of "elite dominance" theory for dynastic politics is likely to have the most power in explaining dynasties in developing democracies, where political elites typically enjoy higher standards of living than their constituents, and political parties play a smaller role in organizing and financing political competition. Similar to a family-owned firm (Burkart, Panunzi and Shleifer, 2003), elites may want to keep a family grip on politics as long as possible if the private benefits of public office are high. In the Philippines, for example, jurisdictions represented by legacy MPs tend to be associated with higher poverty, lower employment, and greater economic inequality (Mendoza et al., 2012; Tusalem and Pe-Aguirre, 2013). A high proportion of dynasties has also been documented in developing democracies in Latin America, such as Mexico (Camp, 1982) and Nicaragua (Vilas, 1992), and in South Asian developing democracies like India (Chhibber, 2013; Chandra, 2016) and Bangladesh (Amundsen, 2016).

If holding political office brings private rents that exceed what might be gained in the market, elite families might try to hold onto power through direct manipulation of the electoral or candidate selection processes. For example, Pablo Querubin (2011) finds that term limits in the Philippines do not stop the perpetuation of dynasties—rather, they allow them to spread because politicians tend to seek higher office and get their relatives elected to their previous positions. Pradeep Chhibber (2013) looks at dynastic succession in party leadership in India through a similar lens. He argues that dynastic leadership succession is more likely in parties that lack broader organizational ties to groups in society, and have centralized party finances in the top leadership that are (possibly) illegal. Such personalized parties might be thought of as family firms, with incentives to keep leadership and control of the party within the family (as well as knowledge of any financial malfeasance). Kanchan Chandra (2016) makes a similar argument about access to state resources and weak party control over nominations to explain the Indian case, but considers all MPs elected to recent parliaments, not just party leaders.

1.2.1 The Inherited Incumbency Advantage

In contrast to prior research on dynasties in developing democracies, the existing research on dynasties in developed democracies has focused more specifically on the electoral and informational advantages of a dynastic background (e.g., Clubok, Wilensky and Berghorn, 1969; Laband and Lentz, 1985; Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009; Feinstein, 2010; Smith and Martin, 2016). Legacy candidates enjoy strong name recognition, network connections, ease in raising campaign funds, and familiarity with politics and campaigning through increased exposure to the political life of family members, and this may result in their being favored over non-legacy candidates in the recruitment and selection processes, similar to the well-known incumbency advantage.

The incumbency advantage, and its growth over time, has been one of the most widely studied phenomena in American politics since it was first pointed out in seminal contributions by Robert S. Erikson (1971) and David R. Mayhew (1974*b*). The source of the incumbency advantage has been divided in the existing literature into three main components: 1) the direct advantages of being in office (e.g., name recognition, the franking privilege, access to committees that can help to direct funds to one's district or create opportunities and connections to aid in fundraising, etc.), and indirect

advantages owing to 2) the differential quality of incumbents (including both the ex-ante quality that got them elected in the first place, and the on-the-job experience that makes them effective legislators), and 3) the deterrence of high-quality challengers (e.g., Gelman and King, 1990; Cox and Katz, 1996; Levitt and Wolfram, 1997; Carson, Engstrom and Roberts, 2007; Hirano and Snyder, 2009).

The various components of the incumbency advantage can be a challenge to disentangle, since some represent *ex ante* qualities that helped a candidate win election in the first place, while others can be considered the result of the "treatment" of winning office. Many recent studies have aimed to estimate the *causal* effect of incumbency on future election outcomes through the use of regression discontinuity (RD) designs applied to close elections, where the treatment of winning office can be considered "as good as random" (e.g., Lee, 2008; Fowler and Hall, 2014; Hall and Snyder, 2015; Eggers et al., 2015). The conclusion from most all of these studies is that once elected, even if by a narrow margin, incumbents tend to enjoy significantly higher probabilities of being re-nominated and re-elected in future races. Recent comparative studies have identified a similar incumbency advantage in a wide range of countries and contexts (e.g., Liang, 2013; Redmond and Regan, 2015; Golden and Picci, 2015; Fiva and Smith, 2016).

It is not difficult to imagine how a legacy candidate, particularly one who immediately succeeds his or her family member as a candidate in the same electoral district, might "inherit" part of a predecessor's incumbency advantage, both in terms of concrete electoral advantages (name recognition, connections, and resources), but also—because of those perceived electoral advantages—in terms of candidate selection. The advantages enjoyed by a new legacy candidate as a result of his or her family ties to a previous politician can be regarded as an *inherited incumbency advantage*.

Ernesto Dal Bó, Pedro Dal Bó, and Jason Snyder (2009) reject the idea that the presence of dynasties in the U.S. Congress reflects simple differences in innate family characteristics (what we might call the "best butter" component of the elite dominance theory), and argue that the probability of a dynasty forming increases with the length of time a founding member holds office—suggesting a "power-treatment effect" acting on the ability of dynasties to self-perpetuate. In other words, dynasties become more likely to form as a (potential) founding member builds up what is likely to be a greater incumbency advantage. Martín Rossi (2016) and Pablo Querubin (2016) similarly find that longer tenure in office is associated with a higher probability of having a legacy successor elected in the future in Argentina and the Philippines, respectively. Although holding office for several terms should not necessarily affect the innate personal characteristics of a politician's child or other close relative, it most certainly increases his or her political connections, familiarity with election campaigns and the policymaking process, and name recognition. These positive effects of office-holding may thus help perpetuate an elite family's status in politics. The implication, as Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder (2009, p. 115) put it, is that "power begets power."

In most cases of dynastic succession in politics, the aspect of the incumbency advantage that is most easily heritable is name recognition. Similar to affiliation with a party label, family names can function as "brands" which convey information to voters at a low cost, helping to cue the established reputation of the family (Feinstein, 2010). They can be especially valuable when party labels are a weak source of information. If personal reputation is important to garnering votes, candidates whose relatives had served in politics can capitalize on the name recognition and established support inherited from their relatives. Name recognition can help a legacy candidate

get selected, and elected, even if he or she enters the political scene several years after a predecessor's exit from politics. It can also play a role in the selection of a legacy candidate following the sudden death of an incumbent, with party elites hoping to capitalize on any possible sympathy vote in the resulting by-election. When an incumbent politician dies in office, nominating a relative in the subsequent by-election is not only a convenient way to replace the incumbent (and possibly earn sympathy votes)—it may even be viewed as closely approximating the wishes of the electorate that had previously given a mandate to the now-deceased politician.

Previous studies of dynastic politics in Japan have also emphasized the importance of name recognition in elections that are centered more on each individual candidate's personal characteristics and local ties than on their party or policies (Ishibashi and Reed, 1992; Usui and Colignon, 2004; Taniguchi, 2008; Asako et al., 2015).[12] In addition, Michihiro Ishibashi and Steven R. Reed (1992) note that a legacy candidate in Japan benefits not only from name recognition, but also from the connections his or her predecessor built to influential people in the party hierarchy, and to financial backers, which may help secure a party nomination. Even when a legacy candidate does not share the same name—for instance, in the case of a son-in-law, or a daughter who has married and taken a new surname—he or she might still benefit from the political capital (connections, financial resources, etc.) built up by a predecessor over the years.

At the most basic level, the persistence of dynasties in Japan and other democracies might therefore be explained by the inherited incumbency advantage enjoyed by legacy candidates and the effect that this advantage has on voters and party elites involved in candidate selection. However, the fact that there is variation across countries and parties, as well as over time, suggests that something is missing in the "power begets power" theory of dynasties.[13] First, why do dynasties seem to be so much more prevalent in Japan than in other developed democracies? If there is a power-treatment effect of incumbency, why has it apparently been so much stronger in Japan than elsewhere? Second, why is there so much variation in the proportion of legacy candidates in different parties in Japan? Party differences within democracies cast doubt on the simplicity of the "power begets power" theory, as well as any explanation for dynasties that rests solely on country-level explanations, including ones that might point to history or culture as determinants of dynastic politics. A complete understanding of the causes of dynastic politics in democracies like Japan must account for differences at several levels of analysis, including country, party, district, and individual.

A limitation of existing empirical studies of democratic dynasties is that they often only analyze winning candidates (i.e., Members of Congress or MPs), or measure trends in dynastic recruitment within a single institutional context. The former problem makes it difficult to disentangle the attractiveness of legacy in the candidate selection stage from the electoral advantages enjoyed by legacy candidates once they are chosen (i.e., the roles of party elites versus voters in the perpetuation of dynasties). The latter problem makes it difficult to evaluate the external validity of the findings. This is especially true given that much of the previous theoretical and

[12] Additional studies in Japanese include Ichikawa (1990), Matsuzaki (1991), Uesugi (2009), Inaida (2009), Fukumoto and Nakagawa (2013).

[13] In some ways, the "power begets power" theory is related to the "elite dominance" theory. As I see it, the "elite dominance" theory encompasses elements of the "power begets power" theory and the "best butter" argument. A key distinction of the former is a rejection of the latter. In other words, the "power-treatment effect" is assumed to operate on anyone.

empirical research on dynasties has focused on the candidate-centered U.S. context, where candidates are chosen in primary elections by voters (thus removing the direct influence of party elites from the equation).[14] In most other democracies, parties exercise control over candidate selection.

Comparative models of candidate selection suggest that within a given institutional context, there are supply and demand reasons why individual candidates are recruited into running for office (e.g., Norris, 1997; Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008). Why, then, might some countries feature a higher *supply* of legacy candidates? On the flip side, why might there be greater *demand* for such legacies in the candidate recruitment and selection processes of some parties? If the supply of legacy candidates were related only to the existence of capable offspring of incumbent politicians, then we would expect to see such legacy hopefuls in ample supply across all democracies. After all, politicians in all democracies are capable of producing or adopting children that could potentially succeed them as candidates, and most also have more distant relatives such as nephews and nieces. Likewise, if being a legacy candidate offered the same electoral advantages across all democracies, then we should expect to see equal demand for such candidates from the actors involved in the candidate recruitment process. The comparative empirical record suggests that neither is the case.

1.2.2 A Comparative Institutionalist Approach

In this book, I offer an explanation for variation in dynastic politics across democracies and parties that focuses attention on the institutional factors affecting the supply and demand incentives in candidate selection. In brief, my argument is that dynastic candidate selection will be encouraged in institutional contexts that increase the perceived value of a potential candidate's inherited incumbency advantage, and decrease the ability or desire of national party leaders to control the selection process. While all democracies are likely to feature some amount of dynastic politics, particularly in the early years following democratization, certain institutional features can facilitate and even encourage the formation of dynasties by increasing the electoral value of the inherited incumbency advantage. At its core, my explanation for the observed cross-sectional patterns in dynastic politics, as well as dynamics over time in Japan, rests upon assumptions about the role that institutions play in structuring political behavior. It is useful, therefore, to first provide an overview of this theoretical framework.

Institutions are humanly devised constraints, rules, or standard operating procedures that structure the behavior of political actors such as voters, candidates, and party leaders (North, 1990; March and Olsen, 1984). *Formal institutions* are laws or written codes governing political behavior, and include the constitutional structure of the state (e.g., the separation of powers), electoral rules, and sometimes the candidate selection procedures within parties. *Informal institutions*, in contrast, encompass the norms, conventions, and other unwritten rules that are routinely practiced and expected by political actors (North, 1990). Examples of informal institutions include the routine re-nomination of incumbent politicians, the seniority system for promotion to higher office, and the proportional allocation of cabinet portfolios to factions or parties in a coalition government.

[14] Indeed, empirical studies on the "power-treatment effect" of close election and the formation of dynasties in different countries have produced different results (Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009; Querubin, 2016; Van Coppenolle, 2015; Fiva and Smith, 2016).

Institutions are generally regarded as "sticky," meaning that they are relatively stable and resilient to changes in the individual actors operating under their constraint. One of the advantages to this stickiness is that institutions can be useful for predicting the equilibrium behavior of political actors operating within those systems—what Kenneth Shepsle terms "structure-induced equilibrium" (Shepsle, 1979). The analytical use of institutions to explain and predict equilibrium behavior has been a key feature of the rational choice approach within the so-called "new institutionalism" perspectives in political science (Hall and Taylor, 1996). In short, the rational choice approach assumes that individual actors—be they voters, candidates, or party leaders—have clear and transitive preferences over outcomes, and when given the opportunity and agency to make a choice, these actors can be expected to pursue the choice that will maximize the chances of achieving their preferred outcomes. Institutions are critical components of this approach because they serve as coordination mechanisms, helping to structure incentives, constrain choices, and increase certainty about the strategic behavior of other actors in the same system.

However, as with all humanly devised constraints, institutions are sometimes subject to change—either piecemeal, with new layers and conditions being added to old ones, or wholesale, with entirely new arrangements and concomitant behavioral incentives introduced. Wolfgang Streeck and Kathleen Thelen (2005) identify four basic modes of institutional change: (1) *displacement*: the replacement of existing rules with new ones; (2) *layering*: the introduction of new rules on top of or alongside existing rules; (3) *drift*: the change in impact of an existing institution due to shifts in the environment; and (4) *conversion*: the strategic deployment of existing rules that were previously inactive or interpreted in different ways (Streeck and Thelen, 2005).

The most dramatic mode of institutional change, displacement, can be conceived of as either occurring *exogenously* (i.e., precipitated or imposed by some external source or pressure), or *endogenously* (i.e., purposefully designed by the actors currently operating in the system). A clear example of an exogenously imposed institutional change in Japan includes the set of democratic reforms imposed by the U.S. Occupation following Japan's defeat in World War II (Dower, 1999). In contrast, examples of endogenous institutional change in Japan include the many revisions to the Public Offices Election Law that reduced the length of campaigns, restricted campaigning activities, and increased in the cost of the election deposit for candidates. These regulations were enacted over time by incumbent MPs whose personal electoral prospects were improved by constructing such barriers to competition (McElwain, 2008; Harada and Smith, 2014).

Whether to treat institutional change as exogenous or endogenous is an analytical question that must be considered by the researcher. For rational choice proponents who are interested in formalizing predictions for equilibrium behavior under a set of institutions, it is often useful to view institutional change as an exogenous shock that displaces the prior institutions with new ones, and produces incentives for a new behavioral equilibrium. This can often be a useful approach in research that uses quantitative data, since outcomes of interest can be measured and the average effects of institutional changes can be estimated via statistical tools. Several studies based on a rational choice approach have been influential in shaping the existing Japanese politics literature (e.g., Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993; Kohno, 1997).

In contrast, proponents of the historical institutionalism approach—a second approach within the "new institutionalism" perspectives—tend to prefer a more nuanced analysis of institutions and behavior that endogenizes their creation and impact. His-

torical institutionalists often use qualitative methods to evaluate the temporal sequence and process through which institutions evolve and change, an approach known as "process tracing" (e.g., King, Keohane and Verba, 1994).[15] When institutional change does occur, behavioral patterns from a previous institutional regime can linger or persist, often with adaptation, in a process known as path dependence (Pierson, 2004). In other words, institutional change does not necessarily create a *tabula rasa* for political behavior—often the very actors who effected the change continue to exist and operate under the new rules, and the historical legacy of the past cannot be easily discarded. Moreover, the institutions that precede any kind of institutional change are likely to influence the nature and components of the new institutions. A recent application of the historical institutionalist approach to understand Japanese politics is Ellis Krauss and Robert Pekkanen's examination of how the LDP adapted its existing internal party structures to suit new pressures and challenges following electoral system reform in 1994 (Krauss and Pekkanen, 2011).

The rational choice approach and the historical institutionalist approach both tend to view institutional change as rare moments, or "critical junctures," where the existing stickiness of the system is opened up to both agency and choice (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009, p. 7). The difference in the approaches often boils down to the objectives of the researcher. What are the outcomes of interest and how can we measure them? Do we want to understand what sorts of behavior we might expect to observe in equilibrium under a given set of institutions, even if this comes with the cost of some level of abstraction? Or do we want to understand the more detailed nuances of how certain behaviors persist or evolve over time following an institutional change?

My examination of dynastic politics in this book will include elements of both rational choice and historical institutionalism, and will draw on both quantitative and qualitative data—in other words, it is a mixed methods approach.[16] The comparative theory I propose for understanding the causes of dynastic politics is more in the tradition of a rational choice approach to predicting the expected equilibrium behavior under different institutions (although I will try to avoid the formal language of many rational choice models). However, my analysis will take an approach more in the tradition of historical institutionalism when evaluating the adoption of institutional reforms and adaptation of political actors over time in Japan. This combined approach lends itself to the use of both quantitative and qualitative data and methods. The hope is that such a combination of approaches will provide a more complete picture of how institutions contribute to the practice of dynastic politics, as well as the impact on dynastic politics of institutional reform in Japan.

1.2.3 The Argument in Brief

The comparative theory I propose for understanding democratic dynasties is based on a supply-and-demand framework of candidate selection (e.g., Norris, 1997; Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008). On the supply-side, potential legacy candidates will be more likely to want to run for office if their predecessors had served longer tenures in office,

[15] A third approach is "sociological institutionalism." This approach tends to conceive of institutions more broadly to include cultural norms and roles within organizations, which blurs the distinction between institutional explanations and cultural explanations, and is thus less popular among political scientists (Hall and Taylor, 1996).

[16] This type of approach has also been described as an "analytic narratives" approach (Bates et al., 1998).

allowing for greater time to be socialized into a life of politics. In addition, potential legacy candidates will be more likely to want to run if the family already has a family history of multiple generations in politics. However, these supply-side incentives can be assumed to be relatively universal across countries and parties. In order to explain the observed variation across country and party cases, my theory posits a demand-side interaction between the inherited incumbency advantage of a potential legacy candidate and factors that increase or decrease what I call a "dynastic bias" in candidate selection.

Of these demand-side factors, I argue that the institutions of the electoral system and candidate selection process within parties are important variables for explaining patterns in dynastic recruitment in democracies. This is not to say that other factors, such as the size of the population, years of democracy, level of economic development, political culture, or other variables do not play some role in dynastic politics, but that the influence of these factors can be significantly constrained or enhanced by the institutional context of elections and candidate selection.

The electoral system is the set of rules that determines how votes are cast and counted to determine the winner(s) of elections for public office. It is therefore the key institution for aggregating voter preferences in modern representative democracies (Powell, 2007; Dewan and Shepsle, 2011). However, the ways in which votes are cast and counted across different electoral systems can have profound impacts on the nature and functioning of representation. Most importantly, electoral systems that require voters to choose a candidate, rather than a party, tend to generate incentives for voters and party leaders involved in candidate selection to focus on the personal vote-earning attributes of candidates (Carey and Shugart, 1995; Shugart, Valdini and Suominen, 2005).

The *personal vote* is a "candidate's electoral support which originates in his or her personal qualities, qualifications, activities, and record" (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987, p. 9), and stands in contrast to a vote cast strictly for a party and the policies it represents. The implication of the personal vote for representation is that in candidate-centered systems (where the personal vote matters more than the party vote), the individual candidate, rather than the collective party, is perceived to be the primary agent of representation for voters. Candidate-centered electoral systems thus tend to emphasize direct accountability and responsiveness of individual candidates to voters, in contrast to accountability based on voters' evaluation of the programmatic goals and performance of parties (Pitkin, 1967; Carey, 2009).

Under candidate-centered systems, party leaders face a dilemma in candidate selection decisions. Party leaders must balance the "utility" they can get from each candidate in terms of three main party priorities: vote-seeking, policy-seeking, and office-seeking (Strøm, 1990). Although a candidate with a strong personal vote may be more likely to earn an extra seat for the party, that individual strength might allow him or her to dissent from the party's preferred legislative policy priorities with greater impunity. A party may sometimes prefer to nominate a candidate who has a weaker personal vote, but who contributes to the party's image or policy goals as a loyal agent of the party. The outcome of these competing incentives in candidate nomination decisions will depend on the relative electoral value of the personal vote.

The implication for dynastic politics is that electoral systems that generate stronger incentives for candidate-centered (rather than party-centered) vote choice will increase the relative value of the inherited incumbency advantage as a personal vote-earning attribute, both for voters and for party actors involved in candidate selection. Thus,

demand for legacy candidates will be more prevalent, on average, under candidate-centered electoral systems than under party-centered electoral systems. In other words, there will be a stronger dynastic bias in candidate selection in candidate-centered electoral systems.

However, even within the same electoral system context, the candidate selection process within parties can also have an influence on the practice of dynastic politics. Candidate selection can be defined as the "process by which a political party decides which of the persons legally eligible to hold an elective office will be designated on the ballot and in election communications as its recommended and supported candidate or list of candidates" (Ranney, 1981, p. 75). In practice, the structure and process of candidate selection can vary across parties, even under the same electoral system (Lundell, 2004). Reuven Hazan and Gideon Rahat (2010) identify four dimensions in candidate selection institutions: *candidacy* (i.e., who is eligible to run?), the *selectorate* (i.e., who decides the nomination?), the *appointment or voting system* (i.e., through which voting rules are nomination decisions made?), and *decentralization* (i.e., is the decision made centrally or locally?). Variation on each of these dimensions can produce different outcomes in the types of candidates who are selected, and their behavior once in office.

Of the potential institutional dimensions of candidate selection, I argue that the degree of decentralization is likely to be the most important factor for explaining dynastic politics. All else equal, in parties where the candidate selection process is decentralized to local party actors, legacy candidates will be more advantaged than non-legacy candidates in securing the nomination. This is because legacy candidates will possess closer ties to local party actors, but also because the priorities in candidate selection may differ between local and national party actors. While local actors may prioritize local connections (which legacy candidates frequently enjoy), party leaders at the national level may take a more diverse approach to candidate selection that serves broader goals for policy or party image—such as nominating more women, minorities, or policy experts to balance the party's overall roster of personnel. The extent to which the priorities of the national party leadership are reflected in the attributes of the party's personnel will depend on whether, and to what extent, the leadership exercises control over nominations.

When or if the leadership of a decentralized party attempts to centralize decisions in candidate selection, this effort may be met with resistance from local actors. The implication for dynastic politics is that politicians who want to perpetuate a family grip on politics in their local districts may oppose efforts by national party leaders to centralize control over nominations. Thus, whether the outcome of the candidate selection process results in a legacy candidate being chosen will ultimately depend not only on the relative utility that the party perceives it will get from nominating (or not nominating) a legacy candidate, but also the ability of party leaders to control the decision-making process.[17]

[17] This assumes that parties are not organized "personalistically" in the sense that individual families dominate the leadership of the party. In such cases, centralized control over nominations may very much favor the members of the leaders' families, at least in top positions (Chhibber, 2013).

1.2.4 Institutional Reform in Japan as a Natural Experiment

The two biggest challenges to comparative research on democratic dynasties are data availability and causal inference. The first is a challenge because historical biographical data on MPs and their relationships to other politicians are scarce for many democracies, and may be unreliable in terms of accuracy in others. Finding and coding accurate data on candidates (not just elected MPs) is an even greater challenge. Where verified data on family ties are available, the complex nature of many relationships within dynasties can also make measurement and analysis a messy business. For example, how do we treat two relatives with partially overlapping terms, or with several years between the final election of the predecessor and the first candidacy of the successor? How about a legacy candidate who runs in a different district from his or her predecessor? Or a pair of relatives where one person preceded the other in local political office, but the other was first to be elected into national office? And for legacy candidates with multiple generations of predecessors in politics, which relationship is the most important: the relationship to the most proximal member, or the relationship to the founding member of the dynasty? All of these considerations make it extremely difficult to measure and analyze the true impact of dynastic ties across candidates within a single country, let alone across countries.

The second challenge to comparative research on dynasties, causal inference, arises because dynastic politics may be influenced by myriad country-specific, party-specific, or context-specific confounding variables that are difficult to measure and control in statistical analyses. Caution is warranted in interpreting any cross-sectional variation in a small-N comparative study (Ragin, 1987). For example, it could be that multiple factors—including history, culture, population size, years of experience with democracy, or level of economic development, etc.—contribute to a country's patterns in dynastic politics, and these factors may overshadow institutional effects. Similarly, dynastic politics within parties may vary by idiosyncratic differences related to ideology, personalities of leaders, time-specific events, size and age of the party, and so on. Political institutions are not randomly assigned to different countries—each arrives at its present situation through its own history and course of democratic development. Moreover, selection into a democratic dynasty is not random, much like selection into politics more generally (Dal Bó et al., 2016). This fact makes it difficult to separate the effect of dynastic ties from other traits when evaluating the downstream effects of dynastic politics. All of these factors also make it impossible to pinpoint the causal effects of the electoral system and candidate selection institutions through cross-sectional analyses.

The case of Japan presents a unique opportunity to gain analytical leverage to examine the effect of institutions on the development and decline of dynasties within a single democracy. From 1947-1993, members of the House of Representatives were elected using the single, non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system in multi-member districts (MMD). Under the SNTV/MMD electoral system, each voter would cast a single vote for a candidate in a district of varying magnitude (M), and candidates were elected according to the rule of "first M past the post" (McCubbins and Rosenbluth, 1995). Any party that aimed to win a majority of seats in the legislature therefore needed to nominate more than one candidate in each district. Such intra-party competition resulted in elections that were "hyper-personalistic" (Shugart, 2001, p. 29), with candidates campaigning predominantly on the basis of their personal at-

tributes or behavior rather than a commitment to their party label or its national policies.

This was particularly true for candidates from the dominant LDP, which almost always nominated multiple candidates in each district, often from competing internal factions within the party. Each candidate would thus work tirelessly to cultivate his or her own established support base, known as a *jiban* in Japanese, in order to win elections. Candidates organized and maintained their jiban through personal support organizations called *koenkai*, which were specific to each candidate and formally separate from the party organization.

From its foundation in 1955 until 1993, the candidate selection process in the LDP was largely decentralized to local actors and sub-leaders. When an LDP candidate retired or died, his or her faction and the interest groups associated with the candidate—especially the koenkai—often sought out family members of the outgoing candidate to run as successors. I define a candidate who immediately succeeds a family member in the same district after inheriting a jiban and its koenkai organization as a *hereditary candidate*.[18] Hereditary candidates constitute a special subset of legacy candidates, where the connection to the previous candidate is particularly close. The SNTV/MMD system meant that new candidates often had to challenge multiple incumbents in a district, so for factions and koenkai members hoping to maintain control of a seat, a hereditary candidate with an inherited support base was the next best thing to having the previous incumbent run again. By the late 1980s and early 1990s, roughly a quarter of all LDP candidates were hereditary candidates who inherited their predecessors' koenkai and directly succeeded them into candidacy.

Candidate selection within the JSP and the more moderate Democratic Socialist Party (DSP) was also decentralized, but with greater influence exercised by the two parties' main support networks of labor unions. In contrast, the Komeito and the Japanese Communist Party (JCP) did not regularly nominate multiple candidates in a district, and both used a highly centralized candidate selection process. As a result, candidates from these parties could rely more heavily on the party label in campaigning, and party leaders had fewer incentives to seek out legacy candidates as successors. Indeed, neither the Komeito nor the JCP exhibited anything near the same patterns in dynastic candidate selection as the larger, decentralized parties.

The rising trend in hereditary succession within the LDP might have been expected to continue well into the 1990s and 2000s. However, a series of corruption scandals and voter dissatisfaction with long-term LDP dominance, money in politics, and the collapse of Japan's bubble economy led to several major party defections prior to the 1993 House of Representatives election. Many in the political and academic worlds saw the SNTV/MMD electoral system as a key institutional cause of the problems plaguing the country. The end of the Cold War also deflated the importance of the LDP as the country's political defense against communism, and opened the way for new parties to enter the electoral arena. As a result of the election, the LDP narrowly lost its majority in the House of Representatives, but remained the largest party. Eight other parties (excluding the JCP) formed a coalition government and made electoral reform of the House of Representatives its top priority.

[18] In the Japanese scholarly literature and popular media, a candidate fitting my definition of a "legacy" candidate is often called a *nisei*, meaning second-generation, candidate. However, dynasties can extend beyond two generations, so I prefer the more general term, legacy candidate. The definition I use for a "hereditary" candidate generally corresponds to the Japanese term *seshu*. However, exact definitions vary in the scholarly literature.

Reformers debated several variations on a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001) that would combine two parallel tiers of electoral competition: one a British-style first-past-the-post (FPTP) system in single-member districts (SMD), the other a closed-list proportional representation (CLPR) system in regional MMDs. The MMM system that was ultimately adopted in 1994, and went into effect in 1996, was a compromise between reformers who hoped to create Westminster-style politics in Japan—party-centered election campaigns, with two strong, cohesive parties that alternate regularly in government—and smaller parties whose leaders knew that a pure FPTP/SMD system would spell certain demise (Otake, 1996; Kawato, 2000).

The electoral reform eliminated intraparty competition, which dramatically reduced the candidate-centered nature of elections, while simultaneously increasing the importance of party image and national policy platforms in campaigning and voting (Maeda, 2009; Reed, Scheiner and Thies, 2012; McElwain, 2012; Catalinac, 2016*b*). In addition, the traditionally decentralized process for candidate selection in the LDP and other parties began to change. Since the 2000s, the LDP and other parties have experimented with new methods in candidate selection, such as the introduction of open recruitment (*kobo*), that place greater control in the hands of party leaders at the national level. This innovation was used most effectively by the DPJ, which was founded in 1996 and replaced the JSP as the main opposition party in the post-reform period (Smith, Pekkanen and Krauss, 2013). The process has been far from smooth, with a key factor in the resistance to reform within the LDP being the continued desire among existing dynasties to continue their family business in politics. Nevertheless, since the first election under the new electoral system in 1996, the proportion of legacy candidates and MPs has gradually begun to decrease. In the 2012 election, the share of legacy candidates in the LDP dropped below 30 percent for the first time since 1972.

Meanwhile, the adoption of the new MMM electoral system has coincided with an *increase* in the percentage of legacy MPs appointed to the cabinet. Shortly after the electoral reform was adopted in 1994, the LDP regained control of government and ruled in coalition until 2009—when it was swept out of office by the DPJ's landslide victory in that election. The LDP's second period out of government ended with a reciprocal landslide victory over the DPJ in the 2012 House of Representatives election. Although the proportion of legacy MPs in the LDP has been decreasing steadily since the first election under MMM in 1996, the proportion of legacy MPs appointed to LDP cabinets has increased, to roughly 60 percent of cabinet ministers, on average, in recent cabinets. Moreover, seven of the ten prime ministers to have served since 1996—Hashimoto Ryutaro, Obuchi Keizo, Koizumi Junichiro, Abe Shinzo, Fukuda Yasuo, Aso Taro, and Hatoyama Yukio—have been members of powerful dynasties.

What has been the true impact of Japan's institutional reforms on the importance of the inherited incumbency advantage and the practice of dynastic politics in candidate selection? And why has there been a decrease in new LDP legacy candidates for the House of Representatives since reform, but an increase in their membership in cabinet? The electoral reform and subsequent party reforms in Japan represent a "natural experiment" of institutional change in an otherwise constant environment, which helps to resolve some of the challenges to causal inference that otherwise pose a barrier to comparative research on dynasties. Nothing about the reforms drastically changed Japanese history, culture, or other country-level variables that might affect the supply of legacy candidates. Moreover, the 1994 electoral reform was not directly



Figure 1.3: Number of articles in the *Asahi Shimbun* mentioning "hereditary" in the text, 1984-2015.

Note: The figure shows the number of articles in the *Asahi Shimbun*, by year, where the word "seshu" (hereditary) appears. Thus, many of the references that are captured by this metric are not actually references to hereditary politics—the figure only gives a general sense of the importance of the issue. The dashed vertical line indicates the year of electoral system reform (1994). Election years for the House of Representatives are highlighted with bold ticks on the x-axis (year). Elections for the House of Councillors are held every three years, with 1986 being the first in the sample (1986 was a rare double election year).
Source: *Asahi Shimbun*.

motivated by the problem of dynasties. During the ninety-one meetings of the Diet's Special Committee on Political Reform held between January 22, 1993 and December 9, 1994, the issue of hereditary succession is mentioned, in passing, just ten times.[19] References to dynastic politics did not noticeably appear in the Japanese popular media until several years *after* electoral reform (Figure 1.3), in large part due to the prevalence of legacy MPs in the cabinet. Beginning in 2000, there were small upswings in coverage during election years for the House of Representatives, culminating in a huge spike in coverage around the time of the 2009 election, when the DPJ made an issue out of dynastic politics in order to attack the LDP. But by that time, the LDP had already changed its recruitment behavior in important ways, as we will see.

In terms of dynastic politics, the electoral reform can therefore be treated analytically as an exogenous shock to the system, and we can apply rational choice theory to make predictions about how Japan's new institutions should structure behavior in new and different ways. In contrast, the party reforms to candidate selection within

[19] Based on a search of the National Diet Library archives of committee speeches containing references to either "seshu" (hereditary) or "nisei" (second-generation), and excluding uses of these words for unrelated topics (e.g., hereditary succession of the Emperor).

the LDP and DPJ can be considered endogenous responses to the new electoral environment. In the language of Streeck and Thelen (2005), the electoral reform represents a form of institutional *displacement*, followed by institutional *layering* with party reforms mandating new procedures for candidate selection.

The post-reform MMM system also creates an opportunity to observe how parties' candidate selection strategies differ across electoral system contexts (in Japan's case: FPTP/SMD and CLPR), even within the same country and election year. This type of "controlled comparison" using mixed-member systems has previously been used to shed light on parties' nomination strategies with regard to women and minorities (e.g., Kostadinova, 2007; Moser, 2008; Moser and Scheiner, 2012; Manow, 2015), and can similarly help to rule out alternative country-level or time-specific explanations for dynastic politics across electoral institutions in Japan.[20]

In addition, the concept of a jiban in Japanese electoral politics, and the prevalence of direct hereditary succession within the LDP, help to alleviate some of the methodological difficulties in measuring the electoral advantages enjoyed by legacy candidates. For example, we do not need to concern ourselves with the complexities of concurrent service by two members of the same family or large time gaps between predecessors and successors when assessing the impact of dynastic ties. The fact that some jiban are inherited by a non-kin successor, such as a political secretary, also provides an opportunity to assess how much of the inherited incumbency advantage can be attributed to family ties versus other types of ties, and how much of the inherited incumbency advantage can be attributed to name recognition versus simply the koenkai organization and resources.

Finally, the case of Japan also allows us to evaluate the dynamic and piecemeal nature of party responses to institutional change over time, more in the tradition of the historical institutionalist approach. When electoral systems and candidate selection procedures undergo institutional reforms, as in Japan, a historical institutionalist approach provides for a more fine-grained process tracing of how, and to what extent, voters, candidates, and party leaders respond to the new incentive structure. How many elections does it take for reforms to bear fruit? How do incumbents respond to new incentives created by reforms, in contrast to the responses of newly recruited candidates? And how do incumbents and party leaders interact when the new institutional rules put their priorities at odds—for example, when a retiring incumbent wants his or her a child to take over as the next candidate, but party leaders would prefer a non-legacy replacement?

1.3 So What? The Consequences of Dynastic Politics

A separate question to "why dynasties?" is whether dynastic politics actually generate any major consequences for the functioning of democracy in a country like Japan. Do legacy candidates represent the most qualified among all potential candidates, or is the structure of the democratic system in places like Japan biased in favor of those privileged by birth with better connections or simply a more recognizable name? What are the potential problems arising from dynastic politics for the functioning of democracy, including the quality of representation and accountability?

[20] There has also been some district-level variation in the use of new recruitment methods by parties since reform (see Chapter 4). However, the variation in the use of these party-level institutions is more likely to be endogenous to various factors.

Electoral systems and candidate selection methods are fundamental links in the chain of delegation and accountability that comprises the core relationship between voters and their political agents in modern representative democracy (Strøm, 2000). The quality of representation can depend on who is elected, and how responsive they are to the electorate's interests. In most democracies, parties shape the nature of representation by determining whom among potential candidates the voters will evaluate at election time (Schattschneider, 1942; Crotty, 1968; Hibbing, 1999; Müller, 2000). In general, candidates and elected representatives chosen through these processes can be thought of as either "standing for" their constituents (descriptive representation), or "acting for" their constituents (substantive representation) through legislation or articulation of positions that serve the interests of those who (s)elect them (Pitkin, 1967). In the case of dynasties, it is fairly clear that a legacy candidate, much like any elite politician, might not descriptively represent the electorate—most come from very privileged backgrounds and a narrow range of occupations. On the other hand, it is not necessarily obvious whether a member of a political dynasty will do objectively *worse* at representing his or her constituents in the "acting for" capacity. Whether dynasties have positive or negative effects for the functioning of democracy is an open question in the existing literature.

1.3.1 Negative Effects?

Evidence from the U.S. suggests that occupational path dependence is significantly higher in politics than in other occupations, controlling for the prevalence of individuals in those occupations (Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009; Blau and Duncan, 1967; Laband and Lentz, 1983, 1985). For example, of about 250 male children of state governors born during America's baby boom after World War II, fifty became governors themselves—6,000 times the rate for the average American male. Sons of senators were 8,500 times more likely to also be senators. In contrast, a baby-boomer male was only 4,582 times more likely to become an Army general if his father was one, and just 1,895 times more likely to become a famous C.E.O. of a company if his father was one.[21] This suggests that families might derive higher value from maintaining their status in the political elite than maintaining other occupational traditions. More generally, the prevalence of dynasties in a democracy may be symptomatic of the democratic process being "captured" by a small cadre of elites, and a potential narrowing of the interests and voices being represented.

Dynastic politics might also result in the common agency problems of *adverse selection* and *moral hazard*. The former means that the wrong "types" of legacy candidates may seek and win office. The latter means that once in office, legacy MPs might "shirk" their responsibilities and do a poor job representing their constituents.[22] For example, the electoral advantages enjoyed by legacy candidates may insulate them from competition or deter the entry of other, possibly more qualified, candidates—a component of the inherited incumbency advantage. Much like female candidates in the U.S. must outperform their male counterparts to overcome higher barriers to entry (Anzia and Berry, 2011), non-legacy candidates who run against legacy candidates might need to be of higher quality, and exhibit higher legislative performance if elected. This means

[21] Stephens-Davidowitz, Seth. "Just How Nepotistic Are We?" *The New York Times*, March 21, 2015.

[22] For a review of agency problems, see Kiewiet and McCubbins (1991).

that when compared to non-legacy candidates, legacy candidates might paradoxically be of lower quality from the perspective of citizens seeking effective representation, even if they are of higher quality from the perspective of party actors in terms of electoral strength. Based on a survey of voters in India, Pradeep Chhibber (2013, p. 290) reports that perceptions of representation are much lower in areas represented by parties with dynastic succession in leadership. Similarly, Benny Geys (2016) finds that members of dynasties in local Italian politics tend to have lower levels of education—a potential marker of quality—than non-dynastic local politicians.

Journalistic accounts in Japan frequently claim that legacy MPs are poor leaders and lack innovative policy ideas due to their sheltered, privileged backgrounds. Legacy MPs seem to enjoy an advantage when it comes to reaching the highest positions of power; yet at the same time, they may be less qualified to handle the difficult policy issues facing them once in office. Apart from Koizumi and Abe (in his second term), each of the recent legacy prime ministers in Japan failed to adequately confront political problems before stepping down within a year. This has resulted in a great deal of criticism of dynastic politics by the media, scholars, and opposition parties. Dynasties have been condemned as one of the factors contributing to political stagnation and public dissatisfaction with democracy (e.g., Yazaki, 2010).

Hideo Otake (1996, p. 277) notes that many legacy (*nisei*) candidates in Japan had little serious interest in politics when they were pulled into candidacy by the koenkai of their predecessors:

> Their desire to be politicians had never been strong. Compared to Diet members who clawed their way up to national politics from the local level, these nisei Diet members did not see much point in becoming Diet members. Many inherited large fortunes and could afford comfortable living without working as Diet members. They shared an "I can always quit" easy-going attitude.

This "I can always quit" attitude may lead to poor outcomes when it comes to effective policymaking and representation. In 2009, DPJ party leader Okada Katsuya argued that the overabundance of dynasties in Japan "weakens the vitality of politics. Political parties need to recruit candidates from a wider field if they are to select the individuals most suited for the job."[23]

Similar critiques of legacy politicians are made in the popular presses of the U.S., Ireland, Italy, and elsewhere. For example, when Jeb Bush ran for the Republican nomination for President of the United States in 2016, the failures of his brother, George W. Bush, were regularly pointed to as reason enough to avoid putting another Bush in the White House. Jeb at first tried to avoid association with his family name by using the simple slogan "Jeb!," before ultimately embracing the family legacy when his poll numbers floundered. On the Democratic side, former Maryland Governor Martin O'Malley criticized Bush and his own party frontrunner, Hillary Clinton, by stating that the presidency "is not some crown to be passed between two families...new perspective and new leadership is needed."[24]

In Ireland, W.T. Cosgrave and his son, Liam, were the first father-son pair to have both served as prime minister (*Taoiseach*). But the third generation of the Cosgrave line, Liam T. Cosgrave, fell rapidly from grace in 2003 after illegally failing to disclose political donations (Fallon, 2011). Renzo Bossi, the son of Lega Nord party leader

[23] *Asahi Shimbun*, April 4, 2009.

[24] Wagner, John. "Martin O'Malley: Presidency not 'some crown' to be passed between two families." *The Washington Post*, March 29, 2015.

Umberto Bossi, was thought to have a promising future career in Italian politics until it was discovered that he had been embezzling party funds and possessed a fake degree from a university in Albania that he had never once attended; he was forced to resign from his local seat in the Regional Council of Lombardy.[25] David N. Laband and Bernard F. Lentz (1985, p. 402) note that some legacy MPs might simply consume the political rents they inherit from their predecessors and go on to do a poor job in office, much like students who enter college on a parental "free ride," only to flunk out after partying too much.

Legacy candidates might also pose agency problems for their parties if their personal electoral advantages allow them to buck the party line with greater impunity. The "I can always quit" mentality could apply not only to participation in politics, but also to membership in the party. When legacy candidates have outside electoral options in other parties or as independents, it may become harder for party leaders to maintain discipline and party unity. Moreover, a potential legacy candidate who is denied the party nomination can create an electoral headache for the party if he or she runs against the party's preferred candidate. There is thus a risk that parties might become "captive" to legacy candidates whose personal qualifications and policy priorities are at odds with the interests of the party as a whole.

1.3.2 Positive Effects?

On the other hand, dynasties might sometimes have a positive effect on democracy. For voters, electing a legacy candidate may bring continuity in the quality or style of representation in a district, much in the same way as re-electing an incumbent. In considering members of dynasties versus "amateurs" in the U.S. Congress, Glenn R. Parker (1996, p. 88) argues that members of dynasties may be beneficial to the functioning of the legislature, since "family members who have served in Congress can act in a tutorial capacity: knowledge is transmitted about the legislative processes (e.g., logrolling) and norms in the legislature (e.g., universalism)." Legacy candidates may be comparatively more comfortable and familiar with the policymaking process and able to start work on day one with minimal training or socialization. Putting a different spin on the previous analogy to college students: the experiences of non-legacy candidates and legacy candidates might instead be compared to first-generation college students (i.e., students whose parents did not go to university) and students whose families have a history of sending their children to university. First-generation college students tend to underperform relative to other students, at least initially, even controlling for IQ and high school grades (Terenzini et al., 1996).

The electoral advantages that legacy politicians possess may also translate into downstream distributive advantages for their districts. Philip Keefer and Stuti Khemani (2009) argue that legislators' effort at bringing distributive benefits (commonly known as "pork") to their constituencies is lower where party identification among voters is stronger. In other words, legacy candidates elected on their personal reputation might be more motivated to provide benefits, or other forms of active representation, to their districts than politicians who owe their election to their party label alone. If legacy candidates tend to enjoy more election victories, their seniority status in their parties may also allow them to obtain important committee and cabinet positions

[25] Ferrarella, Luigi and Giuseppe Guastella. "Houses, a Porsche, and Degrees on the List of Hand-outs to the Bossi Family." *Corriere della Sera*, April 5, 2012.

with influence over distributive policy decisions—although this might not always result in better economic outcomes for their districts if the resources are only directed to favored support groups (Asako et al., 2015).

Lastly, dynastic candidate selection might sometimes result in positive effects for gender representation, as the inherited incumbency advantage may help female candidates overcome gender biases among party leaders or voters. Dynastic succession may be one of the few ways for female candidates to break into politics in a system where women are generally disadvantaged electorally. Indeed, many female politicians in the U.S. and elsewhere first entered politics when their husbands died in office, a process sometimes referred to as a "widow's succession" (Werner, 1966; Kincaid, 1978; Jalalzai, 2013). In countries and parties where women are otherwise underrepresented, women might actually be more common among legacy candidates. At the same time, the institutional structures that contribute to dynastic politics are also likely to be impediments to greater gender representation—in other words, although women may fare best as legacy candidates, doing away with the institutions that encourage dynastic candidate selection is likely to help level the playing field for more women to get elected.

1.4 Data

To examine the causes and consequences of dynasties through the case of Japan, I use both quantitative and qualitative data. The primary quantitative dataset I employ is the *Japanese House of Representatives Elections Dataset* (JHRED).[26] This dataset includes all candidates who ran in any general election or by-election for the House of Representatives from 1947 to 2016, for a total of 27,543 observations, i.e., candidate-elections, on 10,061 individual candidates. The dataset spans twenty-five general elections, seven of which occurred after electoral reform in 1994.

JHRED does not cover elections for the House of Councillors, the upper chamber of the Diet, although it does code whether a candidate previously served in that chamber, as well as family relations to members of that chamber. I restrict my analysis to the House of Representatives because it is the larger and more important of the two chambers, with sole responsibility for the drafting and approval of the budget, the ratification of treaties, and the designation of the prime minister. In addition, the staggered membership terms of the House of Councillors creates complications for the analysis of time trends.[27] Lastly, although the House of Councillors has enacted minor reforms to its electoral system over time, the overhaul of the House of Representatives electoral reform in 1994 has been the major institutional change affecting the evolution of Japanese politics in the past two decades. Throughout the book, the general term "MP" refers to members of the House of Representatives unless otherwise indicated.

[26] This dataset is based on three separate datasets (MMD, SMD, and PR) originally compiled by Steven R. Reed. In order to create JHRED, these datasets were merged, cleaned, and expanded to include all candidates (fringe candidates were previously excluded), and variables related to candidates' backgrounds and family ties. See Appendix B for details.

[27] Half of the House of Councillors is elected every three years, and serves a fixed six-year term. The prime minister must be a member of the House of Representatives, and in practice, only a handful of members of the House of Councillors are appointed to each cabinet. In the 2013 House of Councillors election, legacy candidates made up roughly 6 percent of all candidates, but 16 percent of elected candidates.

In addition to the basic variables covering each candidate's votes and district-level population and electorate information, JHRED includes variables that code each candidate's personal electoral support base (jiban), transfers of jiban to other candidates, and biographical information on each candidate's background and career, including family ties, gender, age, and post-electoral promotion to cabinet ministerial positions. The jiban variable (described in detail in Chapter 4) will be of particular importance to the analyses and discussion throughout the book.

The dataset also differs from those used in many previous works on dynasties, in Japan and elsewhere, in that it includes all candidates (not just those who were elected) and all parties, and is based on verified family ties, rather than estimated relationships based on common surnames within districts and parties. For elected legislators, biographical information on family ties was compiled from multiple sources, including newspaper archives, yearly political almanacs such as *Seikan Yoran* and *Kokkai Binran*, and previous scholarly works on Japanese dynasties (Ichikawa, 1990; Matsuzaki, 1991; Taniguchi, 2008; Inaida, 2009; Uesugi, 2009). Family ties to MPs serving prior to 1947 are also included, so there is no issue with retrospective data censoring. In order to identify the family ties of candidates who were never elected, I consulted newspaper archives, online biographies, and (for more recent years) the archived or current websites of candidates.[28]

In addition to the extensive quantitative data on elections, candidate characteristics, and legislative behavior from JHRED, my analysis in this book will draw on personal interviews with Diet members and party organization staff from five major parties: LDP, Komeito, DPJ, Japan Restoration Party (JRP), and Your Party (YP). These interviews were conducted between 2010 and 2013, before the latter three parties dissolved or merged into other parties. I employ these qualitative data, where relevant, to illustrate the general patterns of dynastic politics in Japan through the personal experiences of individual politicians.

Finally, in order to put Japan in comparative perspective, I will at times draw upon a panel dataset of the family ties of elected legislators in fifteen advanced industrialized democracies. The *Dynasties in Democracies Dataset* covers the following countries and time periods: Australia (1901-2013), Belgium (1991-2012), Canada (1867-2015), Finland (1907-2011), (West) Germany (1949-2013), Iceland (1949-2013), Ireland (1918-2016), Israel (1949-2015), Italy (1946-2013), New Zealand (1853-2014), Norway (1945-2013), South Korea (1948-2012), Switzerland (1848-2011), and the United States (1788-2014). Including MP-level data from Japan (1947-2014), these data represent a total of 126,328 MP-year observations. The sources for the MP-level data vary by country, with most based on official MP biographies published by parliamentary libraries (see Appendix B).

Each MP in this comparative dataset is coded to indicate whether he or she preceded a family member into national-level political office (a dynastic "senior") and whether he or she succeeded a family member into national-level political office (a dynastic "junior"). In addition, the comparative data include information on number of

[28] This was an exhaustive process that turned up multiple legacy candidates who were never elected (and thus had no official legislator biography), as well as several unelected candidates whose relatives went on to win election. It is possible that some obscure legacy candidates running in distant districts or with different last names escaped coding. Nevertheless, the electoral value of legacy ties for such candidates would theoretically be much weaker to both voters and parties, so their potential absence should not adversely affect my analyses.

terms served, gender, age, party, district, and cabinet service, though these variables are not available for all country cases. These MP-level data will be used primarily to illustrate cross-national trends and place Japan in comparative context; the main research design and empirical strategy will focus on the detailed candidate-level data from Japan before and after its electoral reform.

1.5 Organization of the Book

The book proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 puts Japan into comparative context with an overview of the empirical record across time, countries, and parties. I then provide a descriptive account of the empirical record in Japan.

In Chapter 3, I lay out my theoretical argument to explain variation in dynasties based on supply and demand incentives in candidate selection. Across any institutional context, incumbents who serve longer terms in office will be more likely to have family members who *select into* a political career. However, the demand for dynasties will be higher where electoral institutions generate candidate-centered elections, and in parties that are weakly organized such that candidate recruitment and selection processes are decentralized, leaving much of the selection decision up to local party actors—in Japan's case, primarily the koenkai of exiting candidates. When demand for dynasties is higher, even the family members of incumbents with shorter tenures or a weaker incumbency advantage will be *recruited into* a political career.

The next three chapters turn to the empirical data from Japan to examine the advantages enjoyed by legacy candidates in three stages of a political career: *selection*, *election*, and *promotion*. In the first part of Chapter 4, I examine the patterns in candidate selection in Japan that prevailed from 1947-1993, under SNTV/MMD. Dynasties under SNTV/MMD were more common in the larger, decentralized parties—especially the LDP, where intraparty competition was the norm. A candidate-level empirical analysis confirms the theoretical expectation that LDP candidates with longer tenures in office were more likely to be succeeded by a family member, though simply being an incumbent had a positive effect.

In second part of Chapter 4, I describe how the MMM system adopted in 1994 has changed the dynamics of dynastic politics by shifting much of the focus of elections from candidates to parties. Subsequent party reforms within the LDP, such as the introduction of open recruitment in 2004, have placed greater control over nominations in the hands of national-level party leaders. Party leaders have responded to the new environment by selecting a more diverse range of candidates, and dynasties are on the decline. In recent years, only the most powerful and longest-serving incumbents, particularly those from existing dynasties, are likely to be succeeded in politics by a family member. These findings are supported with qualitative data from personal interviews with legacy and non-legacy MPs, as well as party organization staff, from each of the major Japanese parties.

Chapter 5 shifts attention from the selection stage to the *election* stage, and examines the inherited incumbency advantage in terms of votes and election outcomes. In other words, the research question becomes: do legacy candidates actually perform better in elections? In the pre-reform SNTV/MMD period, legacy candidates did indeed enjoy an advantage in terms of election, but did not tend to enjoy a vote advantage, nor did they scare away challengers. This is in part because the multi-member districts encouraged the entry of new challengers when an incumbent stopped running.

Legacy candidates most often succeeded powerful incumbents, whose exit freed up considerable votes in a district and attracted political entrepreneurs into the race. In the post-reform period, legacy candidates tend to enjoy a larger vote advantage, in part due to a stronger "scare-off" effect. This change may be because the SMDs in the new system are not as permissive to challengers as the pre-reform MMDs, but it may also reflect the fact that the legacy candidates who emerge since reform, as documented in Chapter 4, tend to come from more powerful, long-serving dynasties. On the other hand, the most important factor for electoral success in the SMD system is the strength of party support in the district. Original survey data using two approaches—one based on traditional questions and one based on a conjoint survey experiment—indicate that voters do not like the idea of dynasties in the abstract, but are indifferent once dynastic ties are grouped with other attributes that they consider to be more important.

Chapter 6 turns to the *promotion* stage of a political career to examine the overrepresentation of dynasties in Japan's cabinets and the patterns in ministerial selection over time. In terms of cabinet selection, two institutional contexts are important. In additional to the formal institution of the electoral system, we must also consider the informal institution of seniority rule, introduced to LDP cabinets in the 1970s and kept in place until the post-reform period. The analysis reveals that legacy MPs whose predecessors served in cabinet, who I call *cabinet legacies*, enjoyed a slight advantage in the early years of postwar democracy, before the LDP adopted the informal institution of seniority rule for promotion in the late 1960s. Since that time, legacy MPs have enjoyed fewer direct advantages in terms of cabinet promotion. However, the large overrepresentation of legacy MPs in cabinet since electoral reform in 1994 can only be explained in part by seniority in the party—cabinet legacies appear to enjoy an advantage in cabinet selection *even after controlling for seniority.*

Chapter 7 explores several potential implications for the downstream effects of dynastic politics for the functioning of democracy and the quality of representation. Are legacy MPs any better or worse at representing their constituents? If they are less concerned with re-election, are they also less responsive to the needs of their districts, or more likely to shirk on their legislative responsibilities? I discuss the potential relationships between dynastic politics and gender representation, the representational style of candidates, and legislative behavior. The final chapter concludes with some reflections on lessons that Japan's experience with political dynasties might hold for developing democracies, such as India, Indonesia, Taiwan, and the Philippines, which continue to be dominated by a seemingly entrenched set of elite political families.

2

Putting Japan into Comparative Perspective

> It is often assumed that the Glorious Revolution settled these crucial questions in favor of a sovereign and effectively 'modern' Parliament. Dynasticism, if it figures into the picture at all, is supposed to have disappeared as a meaningful political principle then or shortly thereafter.
> - Julia Adams (2005, p. 181)

How common are democratic dynasties around the world, and how does Japan compare? In this chapter, I give a descriptive overview of the two original quantitative datasets that will be used throughout the book. The purpose is to first situate the case of Japan in a broader comparative context, and to highlight some of the puzzles in the aggregate patterns and variation in dynastic politics around the world and inside Japan before introducing my comparative theory to explain such variation in the next chapter.

The first dataset is the MP-level comparative panel dataset covering fifteen democracies: Australia, Belgium, Canada, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Switzerland, and the United States (*Dynasties in Democracies Dataset*). Some of the country cases include observations beginning with the first crop of MPs elected following democratization. Others include only MPs elected in recent decades, but nevertheless measure dynastic family ties to MPs from prior years. This dataset will be used primarily in this chapter to highlight patterns in the cross-national and cross-temporal prevalence of democratic dynasties, and to put the case of Japan in comparative perspective.

The second dataset is the candidate-level panel dataset for Japan (JHRED) that covers all candidates for the House of Representatives from 1947-2014, and includes their electoral records, personal backgrounds and family relations, and post-electoral appointments to cabinet. This more detailed dataset forms the backbone of the main analyses in the remainder of the book. In this chapter, I highlight some of the aggregate patterns over time and space, and across parties. In addition, this chapter provides the basic descriptive information on the types of family relationships and number of generations within dynasties in Japan.

2.1 Measuring the Dynastic Ties of Politicians

One of the greatest obstacles to comparative research on dynastic politics is the scarcity of reliable data on family ties between politicians. In part, this is because obtaining individual-level data on candidates and MPs in general has been a challenge for researchers. However, historical MP-level data for an increasing number of democracies are becoming available, often in the form of freshly digitized records of parliamentary libraries. A few such data sources also code family relations between members.

For example, the websites of the Israeli Knesset and Canadian House of Commons now include family ties to previous MPs among other background and career information in online biographical profiles of current and former MPs—and these records are available in English (as well as Hebrew in the Israeli case and French in the Canadian case). Similar information is available in the online biographies of historical MPs in Finland, Iceland, Norway, and South Korea, but only in the local language in complete detail.

Where official biographical information on family ties is not already digitally available, data measurement is a greater challenge because legacy candidates and MPs must be intensively coded by hand using archival material from newspapers, candidate websites, historical biographical dictionaries, census records, and other sources. In contrast to more common variables related to a candidate's background (such as gender, date of birth, electoral constituency, prior experience, etc.), dynastic family ties can be difficult to find and verify, and are not consistently recorded by the governments or parties of all countries. This is especially true for candidates who are not successful in getting elected.

The lack of availability of reliable data may thus introduce some selection bias into any sample of countries used for comparative research on dynasties. For example, if it is difficult to find any information on family ties among politicians in a given country, it could be because the data are poor, or because such ties are simply uncommon. Thus, when the data sample is limited to countries where information on family ties of MPs is obtainable, the patterns that emerge may overlook some important cross-national variation.

A few previous studies have cleverly attempted to get around the scarcity of verified information on family ties by matching politicians based on common surnames within a constituency or party in order to estimate a proxy measure of dynastic ties (e.g., Querubin, 2016; Geys, 2016). However, this method inevitably introduces some amount of measurement error. On the one hand, it may produce some false positives—i.e., two or more individuals who share a common name but are not related. Common surnames must often therefore be thrown out so as not to overestimate the number of dynasties. On the other hand, the proxy method may also produce false negatives. A legacy candidate might not always share the same name or run in the same district or from the same party. Moreover, unless the entire time span of a country's democratic experience is included in the sample, some anterior relatives will not be observable. Nevertheless, even verified family ties from official biographies may also overlook some less obvious relationships, so few comparative datasets are likely to be completely free of such measurement error.

Keeping these data limitations in mind, a comparative cross-national look at democratic dynasties is still useful as a starting point for investigating the phenomenon, and to put the case of Japan in perspective. For the purpose of cross-national comparison,

the main focus here is on legacy MPs in the lower chamber of each country, unless otherwise specified. Each of the countries in the dataset is coded based on either official biographical data provided by the respective parliamentary libraries, or intensive coding by hand based on verifiable ties in archival records, biographical dictionaries, and any other source that could be obtained (details in Appendix B).

Recall that my definition of a legacy MP is any individual who is related by blood or marriage to a national-level politician (an elected or appointed MP in either legislative chamber in bicameral systems, as well as presidents, vice-presidents, or non-MP cabinet ministers if applicable) who preceded them in office. I do not count individuals related only to local-level politicians, although such individuals are also common across most cases. In part, this is because obtaining information on local-level family ties is even more of a challenge than obtaining information on ties between national-level politicians, though some comparative work has made significant effort in this direction (e.g., Querubin, 2016; Geys, 2016; Chandra, Bohlken and Chauchard, 2014; Folke, Persson and Rickne, 2015; Bragança, Ferraz and Rios, 2015). I also do not count relations to deputy or substitute MPs (common in list systems such as Norway, Iceland, and Italy) unless they actually served in parliament. Finally, I do not count members who were related to each other but were both elected for the first time in the same year (as sometimes occurs with married couples or siblings). The senior member of the dynasty must precede the junior member by at least one election for the two to constitute a democratic dynasty by my definition.

2.2 The Comparative Empirical Record

The "snapshot" cross-sectional differences presented in Figure 1.1 in the previous chapter are illuminating, but mask some of the variation that can be present within countries across time, as well as across parties. Aggregate variation across democracies can potentially be affected by a number of factors, including population size, economic inequality, occupational mobility, legislator turnover, age of the democracy, levels of participation, or institutional variation across districts. For example, the supply of qualified non-legacy candidates will likely be higher in an economically developed country with a large population than in very small or poor countries. The nature of dynastic politics in younger democracies like Israel, Taiwan, or South Korea may also look different if observed several decades from now. A few countries in the sample, including Japan, but also Italy and New Zealand, experienced electoral reform in the 1990s, and many of the countries in the sample have experienced party system changes. The impact of such changes cannot be identified in cross-sectional comparisons of aggregate data. It is thus informative to look at how dynastic politics have developed over time in these different democracies, as well as differences across parties.

2.2.1 Comparative Patterns Across Time

For the United States, the oldest democracy in the world and in the comparative dataset, the MP-level observations begin with the members of the House of Representatives and Senate who were elected to the first Congress in 1788. Unlike in the other country cases to follow, I discuss the trends for both chambers because the data are available and exhibit some interesting variation. If a member had a relative who served in the Continental Congress (and preceded his own service), he is also coded as

a member of a democratic dynasty. Legacy members in one chamber may be related to a former member of the other chamber, or a former president, vice-president, or cabinet secretary, if applicable.

Dynasties have long captured the attention of scholars and observers of U.S. politics (e.g., Hess, 1966; Clubok, Wilensky and Berghorn, 1969; Laband and Lentz, 1985; Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009; Feinstein, 2010). America's first dynasty, the Adams family, spanned four generations—including President John Adams and his son, President John Quincy Adams—and played a leading role in U.S. politics for nearly two centuries (Brookhiser, 2002). Other dynasties, such as the Roosevelts, Kennedys, Breckinridges, and Udalls are also well known. Some high profile legacy politicians have served in executive office in recent decades, including President George W. Bush (whose father, George H.W. Bush, had served in the House of Representatives prior to serving as president himself, and whose grandfather, Prescott Bush, served in the Senate) and Vice President Al Gore (who succeeded his father, Albert Gore, Sr., in the same district for the House of Representatives, as well as the Senate). As Stephen Hess (1966, p. 1) notes, despite the U.S. Constitution's declaration that "No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States" Americans have consistently returned members of democratic dynasties to office.



Figure 2.1: Comparative longitudinal patterns at the country-level.
Note: By-election winners are included, grouped with the previous general election. Top-left panel shows the time trends for both houses of the U.S. Congress. Senators are counted for each two-year period in which their term overlapped with the term of the House of Representatives. Top-right panel shows the time trends for six countries where long-term data are available. Bottom-left panel shows the time trends for six countries where only post-1945 data are available. Bottom-right panel shows the time trend for Iceland.
Source: Author's calculations with data compiled from various sources. See Appendix B for details.

Nevertheless, the general pattern in Congress has been a decrease in dynasties over time. The top-left panel of Figure 2.1 shows the evolution dynastic politics in both houses of Congress from 1788 to 2014. In the House of Representatives, dynastic membership reached a peak of just over 17 percent after the 1848 election. The highest proportion of legacy members in the Senate, 23 percent, occurred twice—first after the 1878 election, and again after the 1916 election. Glenn R. Parker (1996, p. 88) hypothesizes that the greater number of dynasties in these earlier periods of American democracy may have been due to the more narrow political class at the time, or because legacy politicians possessed attributes that were effective for serving in the legislature (such as familiarity with the norms of Congress and the legislative process).

In the past two decades, however, only 7 percent of members of the House of Representatives, on average, have been members of a dynasty. In the Senate, levels of dynastic politics have remained slightly higher, but with fluctuations. The 114th Congress (elected in 2014) included twenty-seven legacy members in the House of Representatives (6 percent) and only four legacy members in the Senate (4 percent). The decline occurred more slowly in the South than in other regions (Clubok, Wilensky and Berghorn, 1969; Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009), but today there is not much of a regional difference in the phenomenon. Alfred B. Clubok, Norman M. Wilensky, and Forrest J. Berghorn (1969, p. 1062) conclude that the decline in American dynasties over time was likely the result of "political modernization," rather than factors such as population growth or social change.

For six other countries in the comparative dataset, long-term longitudinal data going back to the first legislative session after democratization or independence are also available. The top-right panel of Figure 2.1 shows these trends. The second oldest democracy in the dataset is Switzerland, with observations commencing with the members of the National Council elected at the 1848 federal election. For the New Zealand House of Representatives, the data commence with members elected to the first parliament, elected in 1853. The data for the Canadian House of Commons similarly go back to the first federal elections, held in 1867. The data for Finland go back to 1907, the first parliamentary election with universal suffrage following the establishment of the Eduskunta (parliament), but where information are available, I also include family ties to politicians who served in the earlier political bodies of the Privy Council and Diet of the Grand Duchy. For Australia, the data cover all MPs since the inaugural House of Representatives elected in 1901. Finally, in the case of Ireland, the data commence with the MPs elected from Ireland to the House of Commons of the United Kingdom in 1918. In that election, MPs from the nationalist Sinn Féin party refused to take their seats, and instead established the first Dáil (parliament) of what would eventually become an independent Ireland. I include ties to pre-independence MPs who served in the House of Commons in my measurement of legacy MPs in the Dáil.

As in the U.S., the general pattern in most of these six democracies is an initial increase in the proportion of legacy MPs as some of the first generation of MPs leave the political scene and are succeeded in politics by family members. This initial increase is then followed by a gradual decrease in the proportion of legacy MPs over time. However, the seven cases differ from each other in the level at which dynasties peak (what we might call the "ceiling" of dynastic politics), as well as the level at which they eventually stabilize (what we might call the "floor"). For the U.S., the ceiling was 17 percent for the House of Representatives. This is slightly higher than the ceilings for Australia (13 percent in the 1940s) and New Zealand (14 percent in

1922), and much higher than in Canada (11 percent in 1896) and Finland (9 percent in 1962). However, it is slightly lower than the ceiling in Switzerland (19 percent in 1908), and much lower than the ceiling in Ireland (34 percent in 1973).

There is also notable variation in the floor for each of these countries. The proportion of legacy MPs in Australia has not exceeded 10 percent since 1963. It has been at 6 percent or less since 1968 in Canada, and since 1972 in Finland. New Zealand witnessed a brief drop in the proportion of legacy MPs in the late 1990s and early 2000s—possibly as a result of electoral reform in 1992—but has since rebounded to its postwar "norm" of roughly 8-10 percent. The decline in dynasties in Switzerland began to pick up pace around the time that the country adopted a PR system (for most elections) in 1919. The proportion of legacy MPs has not exceeded 10 percent since 1963, and has fluctuated between 5-7 percent since the 1980s. In contrast, Ireland maintained a relatively stable floor of between 25-30 percent of members until the 2011 general election, when the dominant Fianna Fáil party was decimated at the polls following the World Financial Crisis. Even so, at 20 percent, the proportion of dynasties in the Irish Dáil after the most recent election in 2016 exceeds the ceiling proportions for the six other cases.

Though not included in the comparative dataset, similar patterns have been documented in the development of dynastic politics over time in the United Kingdom. Brenda Van Coppenolle (2015) documents how the proportion of legacy MPs in the U.K. House of Commons was well over 30 percent in the late 1880s, two hundred years after the Glorious Revolution brought an end to the absolute political power of the monarchy. However, the proportion steadily declined over time, and has been less than 10 percent since the 1950s. In the 55th House of Commons, elected in 2010, roughly 8 percent of MPs were political legacies.[1] Some notable legacy MPs include Labour Party leader Ed Miliband, who followed his brother David Miliband into parliament, Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron, whose great-grandfather was Sir William Arthur Mount, a Conservative MP in the early 1900s, and Conservative MP Nicholas Soames, who is the grandson of Sir Winston Churchill. There has been some media speculation that Euan Blair, the son of former Labour Prime Minister Tony Blair, will also run for parliament in the near future.[2]

Thus, with the exception of Ireland, the general pattern in the democracies for which long-term longitudinal data are available is a gradual decline over time in the prevalence of dynasties, but with varying ceilings and floors. For the remainder of the country cases in the comparative dataset, observations are only available for MPs elected since 1945, so we cannot paint as complete of a picture, except for the case of Israel, where this time period covers the complete history of the Knesset, which first met in 1949. For all other cases, relationships to pre-1945 MPs are included in the measurement of legacy MPs, but the pre-1945 MPs themselves are not included as observations. For the case of Germany, I include only MPs from West Germany prior to reunification, but I count relationships to former East German politicians for the

[1] Department of Information Services, House of Commons Library. "Current MPs related to other current or former Members of the House of Commons." Document SN/PC/04809, February 21, 2014.

[2] Stanley, Tim. "Euan Blair for Parliament? Labour is more inbred than the North Korean politburo." *The Telegraph*, April 14, 2014. See also Savage, Michael. "Blair's son shuns chance to run for MP." *The Times*, January 1, 2015. The speculation is that Blair may wait until 2020 to make his entry into politics.

purpose of coding legacy MPs in the post-reunification period. MP-level observations for Belgium are only available from 1991 to 2012.

For six of the remaining eight countries, the proportion of legacy MPs does not exceed 15 percent in any legislature for which data are available (bottom-left panel of Figure 2.1). In the case of Belgium, although I lack data prior to the 1991, the percentage of legacy MPs in the Chamber of Representatives since the 1990s has been on the rise, reaching just fewer than 14 percent of members in 2003. The chamber elected in 2012 contained seventeen legacy MPs (11 percent). A notable example of a legacy MP is Eric Van Rompuy, who is the brother of former Prime Minister and President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy. Herman Van Rompuy's wife, sister, and two sons have also been active in politics (though have not served in the national parliament). Not surprisingly, dynasties are also common at the local level, where roughly 20 percent of mayors in a 2003 survey reported that their fathers had held elective office (van Liefferinge and Steyvers, 2009). Open Vld party leader Alexander De Croo, who is not a sitting member of the chamber but has served in cabinet, is the son of former chamber president Herman De Croo, who has the record for the longest tenure in the Belgian parliament.

In Germany, the proportion of legacy MPs in the postwar Bundestag has never exceeded 2 percent, and many of the legacy MPs who have served came from long-active noble families rather than newly formed democratic dynasties. One recent example is Carl-Eduard von Bismarck, who is the great-great-grandson of Otto von Bismarck, the first German Chancellor, and grandson of Prince Otto Christian Archibald von Bismarck, a member of the Nazi Party in the prewar period and an MP for the Christian Democratic Union after the war.

In Israel, the percentage of legacy MPs in the Knesset peaked at 13 percent in 1977, and has since dropped to less than 10 percent throughout the 2000s. The 20th Knesset, elected in 2015, contained eleven legacy MPs (9 percent), including Ze'ev Binyamin "Benny" Begin, the son of former Prime Minister Menachem Begin. Tzipi Livni, leader of Kadima until her resignation in 2012, is the daughter of three-term former MP Eitan Livni. She later became leader of Hatnuah and formed the Zionist Union joint list together with Labor Party leader Isaac Herzog. Herzog is the son of Chaim Herzog, the sixth President of Israel and former member of the Knesset. In addition, Chaim Herzog was a brother-in-law to former MP Abba Eban. The son of former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, Omri Sharon, served in the Knesset from 2003-2006, until he was convicted of fraud and sent to prison.

The proportion of legacy MPs in the Italian Chamber of Deputies has also declined steadily over time, dropping to a low of 3 percent in 1994, after a number of members became embroiled in the Tangentopoli corruption scandal that brought down the long-ruling Christian Democracy party and ushered in electoral system reform. Nevertheless, many political families are still active in Italian politics (Chirico and Lupoli, 2008), with the proportion in recent parliaments at roughly 5 percent. For example, Bobo and Stefania Craxi (brother and sister) are the children of Italian Socialist Party Prime Minister Bettino Craxi. The granddaughter of Benito Mussolini, Alessandra Mussolini, began her career in the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement, and later affiliated herself with former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi's People of Freedoms (PdL) conservative alliance. Dynasties have been documented in local-level Italian politics as well (Geys, 2016).

In the Norwegian Storting, the proportion of legacy MPs has fluctuated between 5 percent and 10 percent for most of the period from 1945 to 2013. The MPs elected in

2013 included eleven legacies (7 percent), including former Labour Party Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg, who is the son of former cabinet minister Thorvald Stoltenberg. Prior to Stoltenberg, the prime minister's office was held by Kjell Magne Bondevik of the Christian Democratic Party, whose uncle Kjell Bondevik, was also a former MP, cabinet minister, and party leader. Of the fourteen prime ministers to serve between 1945 and 2016, four had dynastic family ties to former politicians, and five had family members who followed them into national politics (Fiva and Smith, 2016).

It may be too early to determine whether dynasties in South Korea, Japan's nearest neighbor in East Asia, are on the rise or have stabilized at around 5 percent of the National Assembly. I include data on MPs serving since 1948 in Figure 2.3, but true democracy with free and fair elections did not exist in South Korea until 1988. The most prominent legacy politician in recent years is President Park Geun-hye, who is the daughter of former President Park Chung-hee, who ruled South Korea as a military dictator from 1961 until his assassination in 1979. Park Geun-hye's predecessor, President Lee Myung-bak, was preceded in office as an MP by one term by his older brother, Lee Sang-deuk, who was later convicted of bribery in 2013 and sentenced to a year in prison.

A country case in the comparative dataset that warrants special attention is Iceland, where legacy MPs in 1991 nearly reached 50 percent of members of the Althingi (bottom-right panel of Figure 2.1). There appears to have been a steady decline in dynasties since that time. Nevertheless, the proportion of legacy MPs has been at least 30 percent in all other postwar parliaments except the one elected in 1958 and the three most recent parliaments in 2007, 2011, and 2013. Apart from the Philippines (which is not included in the comparative dataset), Iceland has the largest historical proportion of democratic dynasties among all countries for which data are available.

The extremely high proportion of legacy MPs in Iceland is likely a result of the small size of the country. Although Clubok, Wilensky and Berghorn (1969) rule out the influence of population size on dynasties in the U.S., it may still be a factor in very small countries like Iceland. The Althingi contains just sixty-three seats, and represents a population of only about 320,000 people (more than half of whom live in and around the capital of Reykjavík). The second smallest country in the comparative dataset in terms of population, Ireland, has over 4.5 million citizens, and the Irish Dáil contains 158 seats, more than twice the number of seats in the Althingi. The second smallest chambers in the comparative dataset are in Israel and New Zealand, with 120 seats in each (though the size of the New Zealand House of Representatives can increase due to overhang seats).

A smaller-sized parliament means that even a small increase or decrease in the raw number of legacy MPs can mathematically have a big effect on the overall proportion of legacy MPs. For example, the group of Icelandic MPs elected in 2013 contained fourteen legacy MPs (22 percent) the lowest proportion in the sample time period. This is in part a result of a change in the party system. Fifteen parties contested the 2013 election, in contrast to seven in 2009, and five of these new parties won seats. But in raw numbers, the change was only a decrease of two members from the previous parliament elected in 2009. We might expect to find similarly high proportions of dynasties in other small countries, such as the island democracies of the Pacific and Caribbean. For example, President Tommy Remengesau, Jr., of Palau is the son of a former president, and Prime Minister Enele Sopoaga of Tuvalu is the brother of a former prime minister. In very small countries like Iceland, it may be more likely

that politics will be practiced like a family vocation, and that intermarriage between political elites will be common.

Prominent Icelandic legacy MPs include former finance minister Árni M. Mathiesen, whose father, Matthías Á. Mathiesen, also once held that post, Independence Party leader Bjarni Benediktsson, whose great uncle with the exact same name served as prime minister from 1963-1970, and the first female prime minister, Jóhanna Sigurdardóttir of the Social Democratic Alliance (in office 2009-2013), whose father, Sigurdur Ingimundarson, was an MP from 1959-1971. Former Prime Minister Sigmundur Davíd Gunnlaugsson, who resigned in April 2016 following the revelation that he was connected (through his wife) to secret offshore companies he had not disclosed, is also a legacy MP (his father, Gunnlaugur M. Sigmundsson, had previously served one term in parliament from 1995-1999).

Icelandic naming tradition results in children who do not carry the same surname as their parents. Boys' surnames are formed by attaching "-son" (son) to the father's given name, while girls' surnames attach "-dottir" (daughter). Thus, if the dynastic relationship is father-child, legacy MPs in Iceland do not usually carry the same surname as their predecessors, with a few exceptions such as Mathiesen (a non-Icelandic surname). However, given the small size of the political elite in Iceland, the name recognition of a family predecessor may not matter as much for getting into politics.

How does Japan compare to the fourteen other countries in the comparative dataset? Figure 2.2 plots the trend lines for all fifteen countries from 1945-2016, with the trend line for Japan (1947-2014) highlighted in bold. For the U.S., only the trend for the House of Representatives is plotted for comparison to the lower chambers in the other country cases.

One aspect of Japan's experience that immediately stands out is the steep upward trend for most of the time period under investigation. Unlike most of the other countries in the comparative dataset, Japan witnessed a steady increase in the proportion of legacy MPs in the House of Representatives over time, with the ceiling to the level of dynastic politics—33 percent in 1993—higher than all other countries except Iceland and Ireland. Indeed, the country that appears most similar to Japan in terms of dynastic politics is Ireland. With the exception of Iceland, all other countries' trend lines blend together in the lower part of the figure, rarely exceeding 10 percent over the entire post-1945 period.

In 1947, the proportion of legacy MPs in Japan was just 6 percent—near the average for most other countries, but the absolute lowest level for postwar Japan. However, the proportion of legacy MPs proceeded to grow steadily throughout the next three decades, as other politicians retired and were succeeded by family members. The proportion appeared to plateau in the 1980s and 1990s at just above 30 percent, then dropped precipitously in 2009 before making a slight rebound in the two most recent elections in 2012 and 2014. As with Ireland in 2011, the sharp drop in legacy MPs in 2009 can be explained by a shift in the party composition of the legislature following the DPJ's defeat of the LDP in that election. Such drastic swings due to changes in parties' seat shares highlight the need to look more closely at differences across parties within countries.

2.2.2 Comparative Patterns Across Parties

The longitudinal trends reveal interesting aggregate patterns in the development of dynasties over time in each of the fifteen democracies in the comparative dataset.



Figure 2.2: Dynasties in fifteen democracies, 1945-2016.
Note: By-election winners are included where available, grouped with the previous general election. AUS = Australia; BEL = Belgium; CAN = Canada; FIN = Finland; DEU = Germany; ISL = Iceland; IRL = Ireland; ISR = Israel; ITA = Italy; JPN = Japan; NZL = New Zealand; NOR = Norway; KOR = South Korea; CHE = Switzerland; USA = United States (House of Representatives only).
Source: Author's calculations with data from various sources. See Appendix B for details.

However, there are also significant differences in the proportion of legacy MPs across parties in each of the democracies, and these differences could in part be responsible for fluctuations in aggregate proportion if the party composition of the legislature changes. Because changes in party systems and changes in specific parties' names over time can quickly become complicated to track longitudinally—especially in the multiparty systems of Belgium, Israel, and Italy, and the developing party system of South Korea—here I focus only on cross-sectional differences in pooled observations for parties that held at least 10 seats in parliament in the past decade and a half (2000-2016). The purpose is not to provide a systematic account of differences across the parties, nor to evaluate the effect of changes in the party composition of the legislature on the aggregate patterns, but rather to simply document that such differences exist.

In six of the countries in the comparative dataset—Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, South Korea, and the United States—the proportion of legacy MPs was lower than 10 percent in all major parties over the span of this time period, though with some parties still being more dynastic than others (top-left panel of Figure 2.3). In Australia, the Labor Party (Lab) appears to be the most likely to engage in dynastic candidate recruitment, with nearly 10 percent of its MPs counting themselves members of a dynasty (32 of 334 observations). One such legacy MP is Kim Beazley, Jr., who was leader of the party from 1995-2001 and 2005-2006, and later served as Ambassador to the United States. Beazley's successor as Labor Party leader in 2001, Simon Crean,



Figure 2.3: Party-level variation within countries, 2000-2016.
Note: Minor parties excluded. By-election winners are included where available.
Source: Author's calculations with data from various sources. See Appendix B for details.

is also a legacy MP. Dynasties have been less common in recent years in the Liberal (Lib) and National (Nat) parties.

In Canada, legacy MPs have been least common in the Bloc Québécois (BQ), and most common in the Liberal Party (Lib), currently led by legacy MP and legacy prime minister, Justin Trudeau, whose father and grandfather were also active in national politics. In 2011, there was speculation that Mike Layton, a Toronto city councillor, might run in the by-election following the death of his father, New Democratic Party (NDP) leader Jack Layton; or that Layton's widow, Olivia Chow (already an MP in the party), would seek the top leadership position, but neither ultimately pursued it.[3] The short-lived conservative Canadian Alliance (CA) merged with the Progressive Conservatives to form the current Conservative Party (Con) in 2003. Although there have been fewer conservative legacy MPs in recent years, at one point in 1962 the proportion exceeded 11 percent. The highest proportion for the Liberal Party is 13 percent of members, in 1958.

Although Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany is not herself a legacy MP, her Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party and its Bavarian counterpart, the Christian Social Union (CSU), have had more legacy MPs in recent years than the Social Democratic Party (SPD), Die Linke (DL) or the Greens (G). Many of the CDU and CSU legacy MPs are of noble backgrounds, including Carl-Eduard von Bismarck (CDU) noted earlier, and Karl-Theodor zu Guttenberg (CSU).

[3] Cohen, Tobi. "Chow opens up on Layton's final moments, vows not to seek NDP leadership." *Postmedia News*, September 6, 2011.

In New Zealand, the most dynastic party is Labour (Lab). Interestingly, although there have been no legacy MPs elected under the Māori party label (Mri), many of the legacy MPs in the Labour and National (Nat) parties—the two largest parties in New Zealand—are of Māori descent, including former cabinet ministers Nanaia Mahuta (Lab) and Tau Henare (Nat). There have also been no legacy MPs elected in recent parliaments from the United Future (UF) party. The smaller Green Party (G), ACT New Zealand (ACT), and New Zealand First (NZF) have similar proportions of legacy MPs—about 5 percent—but this represents a single individual in the former two parties (Kennedy Graham in the Green Party, and Roger Douglas in ACT), and just two individuals in New Zealand First: Ria Bond and Jim Peters, who is the brother of party leader Winston Peters. Bond and the Peters brothers are also of Māori descent.

In South Korea, the conservative Saenuri Party of current president Park Geun-hye (abbreviated as Sae in Figure 2.3 and previously called the Grand National Party) has more legacy MPs than the opposition Democratic Party (DP), which has also changed its name various times since 2000. Park is the daughter of former president Park Chung-hee, and served four terms in the National Assembly (1998-2012) before being elected president. The short-lived Uri Party (2004-2007) was a splinter from the Democratic Party that later re-merged.

The Democratic Party (Dem) in the United States has had more legacy members than the Republican Party (Rep), though this has not always been the case. Up until the Reconstruction era, there were significantly more legacy members among Democrats, largely in the party's stronghold in the South (Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009). However, Republicans were more likely to be dynastic from about 1916-1952. Since then, the proportion of legacy Democrats has been 7 percent, on average, compared to 6 percent for Republicans, with the two parties occasionally trading places as the most dynastic.

In four of the remaining countries in the comparative dataset, the aggregate proportion of legacy MPs has been lower than 10 percent, but has exceeded 10 percent in some parties (top-right panel of Figure 2.3). In Finland, the Swedish People's Party (SFP) appears to be the most dynastic, but this is in large part because it is a small party. The proportion (12.5 percent) is the effect of just two legacy MPs, Christina Gestrin and Nils-Anders Granvik, serving over this time period. The three largest parties, the Center Party (CP), National Coalition (NC), and the Social Democratic Party (SDP), have elected more than 130 members to the three parliaments that make up this sample. Among them, the SDP had the most legacy MPs, including former Minister for Foreign Affairs Erkki Tuomioja and former Minister of Finance Jutta Urpilainen. The Christian Democrats (CD) and Left Alliance (LA) did not have any legacy MPs in their membership, while MPs from the Greens (G) and the right-wing True Finns (TF) have been less than 5 percent dynastic.

Israel's multiparty system is ever-shifting, which makes it especially challenging to track trends in dynastic politics within parties. From the time of Israel's first elections in 1949 until 1977, the dominant part was the Labor Party (Mapai until 1968). The Labor Party (Lab) is currently led by legacy MP Isaac Herzog, who fielded a joint list called Zionist Union (ZU) with the Hatnuah party leader and legacy MP Tzipi Livni in the 2015 election. On the right, the largest party since 1973 has been Likud (Lik), founded by Menachem Begin in 1973. Although the current leader of Likud, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, is not a legacy MP, Begin's son Benny is also a member and has served in cabinet. Former Likud leader Ariel Sharon's son, Omri Sharon, has also served. The United Torah Judaism party (UTJ) only appears to

be heavily dynastic because it is very small party. One legacy member serving five terms over the time period, Meir Porush, accounts for the large proportion. A single legacy MP is also responsible for the proportions for The Jewish Home (JH) and Ichud Leumi (IL), in both cases Yitzak Levy, who moved between parties. There was only one legacy MP elected through the Joint List (JL) of Arab parties: Haneen Zoabi. The other Israeli parties include in Figure 2.3 are Yisrael Beintenu (YB), Kadima (Kad), Yesh Atid (YA), Shinui (Shin), Shas, Meretz (Mer), and Kulanu (Kul). The latter four of these parties had no legacy members during the time period covered.

Italy's fluid party system and joint lists also make cross-sectional comparisons of parties difficult. The Christian Democratic Centre (CCD) and Union of the Centre (UdC) have the largest proportions of legacy MPs, followed by Civic Choice (SC) and the People of Freedoms (PdL) party associated with former Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi. Several legacy MPs also hailed from Bersluconi's Forza Italia (FI). Among recent Italian party leaders and prime ministers, there have been a handful of legacy MPs, including former prime ministers Enrico Letta (Democratic Party, PD), Romano Prodi (L'Ulivo, abbreviated as L'U in Figure 2.3), and Massimo D'Alema (L'Ulivo). The father of current Prime Minister Matteo Renzi had a career in local politics. Other Italian parties in Figure 2.3 are the Italian Communist Party/Communist Refoundation Party (r.PCI), National Alliance (AN), Democratic Party of the Left (PDS), Left Ecology Freedom (SEL), Lega Nord (LN), the "new" Italian Socialist Party (PSI), and the Five Star Movement (M5S).

The four largest parties in Switzerland are the Liberals (PLR), the Swiss Socialist Party (PSS), and the Democratic Union of the Centre (UDC), and the Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland (PDC), which has had the largest proportion of legacy MPs since 2000 (ten of ninety-five observations). The former president of PSS, Hans-Jürg Fehr, is a legacy MP whose cousin, Hermann Fehr, served two terms in the 1980s and was mayor of the city of Biel in the canton of Bern. No legacy MPs served in the Green Party of Switzerland (PES) or the Green Liberal Party (pvl), both of which are small parties by comparison.

In the four remaining comparative case countries (bottom-left panel of Figure 2.3), there has been at least one party where legacy MPs exceeded 20 percent. In Belgium, legacy MPs have been common in both the Flemish and the Francophone parties—for example, the Flemish social democratic party, Socialistische Partij Anders (sp.a), contained three legacy MPs in 2012, compared to two in the Francophone Parti Socialiste (PS). The most dynastic party is the Open Flemish Liberals and Democrats (Open Vld, OV). Recent legacy MPs from Open Vld include Mathias De Clercq, grandson for former Minister of Finance Willy De Clercq, and Bart Somers, former prime minister of Flanders and son of former MP Joos Somers. Former cabinet minister Bert Anciaux (sp.a) is also a legacy MP, as is former cabinet minister Melchior Wathelet, Jr. of the Humanist Democratic Centre (cdH). Melchior Wathelet, Sr. also served in cabinet. Former Defense Minister Pieter De Crem of the Christan Democratic and Flemish party (CD&V) is the son of a local mayor, Jan de Crem. The other Belgian parties in Figure 2.3 are Reformist Movement (MR), Flemish Interest (VB), New Flemish Alliance (N-VA), and Ecolo-Groen! (E-G).

In Iceland, because of the small size of the Althingi, the proportion of legacy MPs in each party can vary wildly depending on the number of seats won in a given election. After the 2003 election, five of twelve MPs from the Progress Party (PP) were legacies, resulting the party being over 40 percent dynastic. However, twelve years later in 2013, the party won 19 seats and only had three legacy MPs, bringing

its proportion down to 16 percent. Pooling across the four elections between 2001 and 2013, both the Independence Party (IP) and Left-Green Movement (LGM) had more than 30 percent legacy MPs in their membership, though IP had more than twice as many members as LGM in terms of raw numbers. The Social Democratic Alliance (SDA) has had (only relatively) fewer legacy MPs.

Dynasties in Ireland have always been most common in Fianna Fáil (FF), however, the larger proportion in the pooled observations of recent Fianna Fáil MPs is in part the result of the party's devastating loss in the 2011 election. Before the election, the party had seventy-seven MPs, twenty-eight of whom were legacy MPs (36 percent). In the 2011 election, the party lost all but 20 seats, but nine of the survivors were legacy MPs, resulting in a legacy proportion of 45 percent. Legacy MPs in Fine Gael (FG) have made up 20-25 percent of members across all recent elections (between eight and sixteen individuals). A few legacy MPs have also been elected from the Green Party (G) and Labour (Lab), but Sinn Féin (SF) has had none. Prominent legacy MPs in Ireland include recent Prime Ministers Enda Kenny and Brian Cowen, and a large number of cabinet ministers (Smith and Martin, 2016).

Finally, the most dynastic Norwegian party in recent years has been the Center Party (S). However, the Center Party is also a relatively small party, electing between ten and eleven members to the most recent parliaments, including two to three legacy MPs in each. The two largest parties, Høyre (H) and Labour (A) have had between three and five legacy MPs in each parliament, but tend to elect more members overall. The Left (V), Socialist Left (SV), and Progress Party (FrP) have not elected any legacy MPs to recent parliaments, while the small Christian Democratic Party (KrF) elected three individual legacy MPs to the Storting since 2001.

Japan's party-wise comparison also places it into this latter category of democracies, as legacy MPs in three major parties—the LDP, Your Party (YP), and Ozawa Ichiro's now-defunct Liberal Party (Lib)—made up more than 20 percent of total membership between 2000-2016 (bottom-right panel of Figure 2.3). In fact, at 38 percent, the LDP is the most dynastic party out of all major parties during this time period in the fifteen democracies of the comparative dataset. Just under 20 percent of the MPs elected from the conservative Japan Innovation Party (JIP, rebranded from Japan Restoration Party in 2014) have been legacy MPs.[4] The main opposition DPJ has only been slightly less dynastic.[5] Komeito (Kom) counted only two individual legacy MPs in its membership during this time period (Ikenobo Yasuko and Kitagawa Kazuo), but given the smaller size of the party, their presence meant 5 percent of the party was dynastic. Not a single MP from the Social Democratic Party (SDP) or JCP came from a political dynasty during this time period, though there have been legacy MPs from both parties in the past (particularly in the SDP's predecessor party, the JSP).

2.2.3 Summary of the Comparative Empirical Record

The cross-temporal and cross-party variation in these fifteen democracies serves to illustrate three important points that put Japan into comparative perspective. The first point is that Japan is not alone among democracies in terms of the continued

[4] The percentage for JIP in Figure 2.3 includes MPs elected under the Japan Restoration Party (JRP) label in 2012.

[5] In March of 2016, the DPJ merged with a part of the JIP and rebranded itself as simply the Democratic Party).

presence of democratic dynasties. Dynastic politics are ubiquitous in some form or another across all democracies, and in different parts of the world, including in other democracies in East Asia. In other words, democratic dynasties are by no means a uniquely Japanese phenomenon.

A second point to note is that, even though democratic dynasties exist throughout the world, there is considerable variation in the level of dynastic politics across countries, parties, and time. The most common temporal pattern in the comparative cases is a decrease in dynasties over time, but different countries appear to have different "ceilings" and "floors" to the level of dynastic politics. Moreover, within each democracy, some parties appear to be much more dynastic than others. In many country cases, the level of dynasticism within specific parties exceeds the overall level of dynasticism in the legislature. Thus, the aggregate proportion of legacy MPs in any given country and time may depend on the party composition of parliament. The cross-national and cross-party variation in dynastic politics is a puzzle that has received only limited attention in the existing literature on democratic dynasties.

The third and final point that merits attention is that, even though democratic dynasties are not unique to Japan, Japan is nevertheless among the most dynastic countries among the comparative cases, and its level of dynastic politics has grown over time, in stark contrast to the pattern in most other democracies. Moreover, Japan's LDP has been the most dynastic party across all of these democracies, in addition to being the most dynastic party in Japan. These facts make Japan a particularly interesting case for comparative research on democratic dynasties.

In the next chapter, I introduce a comparative theory of dynastic recruitment to help explain some of the observed variation in democratic dynasties across different countries and parties. This theory will be tested in Chapter 4 on the case of Japan, where the electoral reform in 1994 and party organizational reforms in the 2000s allow us to evaluate the effect of these institutions on dynastic recruitment in an otherwise constant environment. The remainder of the present chapter will first give an overview of the aggregate empirical record of dynastic politics in Japan using the candidate-level data in JHRED. The purpose is to paint a general picture of Japan's experience from 1947-2014, and describe the basic characteristics of Japan's dynasties, including the nature of relationships and number of generations that have served in office. In subsequent chapters, we will examine the data in more detail, as well as split the data into two time periods—before and after Japan's 1994 electoral reform—in order to examine the impact of institutional reforms.

2.3 Japan's Empirical Record, 1947-2014

We have already seen how the percentage of legacy MPs among all MPs increased over time in Japan. However, it is also informative to compare this trend to the percentage of legacy candidates among all candidates over the same time period. This will give us a general sense of the electoral advantages that legacy candidates may enjoy, keeping in mind that differences in party, district, and other contextual factors play an obviously important role in determining which candidates are elected. Figure 2.4 shows that the percentage of legacies among all candidates in general elections (by-elections excluded) closely tracked the percentage of elected MPs until around the early 1990s, when the gap between the percentage of legacy candidates and percentage of legacy MPs began to widen.



Figure 2.4: Legacy candidates and legacy MPs in Japan, 1947-2014.
Note: By-elections excluded.
Source: Author's calculations with JHRED.

Altogether, of the 10,061 individual candidates who ever ran in a House of Representatives general election or by-election between 1947 and 2014, 594 (6 percent) were legacy candidates. However, the total number of individuals includes many fringe candidates and minor party candidates who never had any chance at election. Only 3,065 of the individual candidates (legacy or non-legacy) who attempted to get elected to the House of Representatives were ever successful in actually becoming an MP. Of these 3,065 individual MPs who served between 1947 and 2014, 474 (15 percent) were legacy MPs. In other words, the percentage of all legacy candidates in postwar Japan that were successful at getting elected at least once is roughly 80 percent. In comparison, the percentage of non-legacy candidates to ever win a seat in the House of Representatives is just 27 percent.

We have also already seen that the LDP has had more legacy MPs in its membership in recent parliaments than the other parties. But overall, which parties recruited the greatest proportion of legacy candidates into running over the entire postwar period? Figure 2.5 uses a mosaic plot to illustrate two pieces of information.[6] First, the figure illustrates the distribution of candidates' parties in JHRED for the entire time period, which gives us a sense of the prevalence of different parties overall in Japan. Second, the figure shows the distribution of legacy candidates within those parties.

[6] A mosaic plot is a type of stacked bar chart that is useful for visualizing the two-way distribution of two categorical variables in a single plot. The mosaic plots in this book were made in Stata with the spineplot package (Cox, 2008).

In Figure 2.5, the x-axis at the top of the plot gives the fraction of candidate-level observations in the dataset for each major party, while the y-axis at the left of the plot indicates the fraction of legacy candidates within each party's total observations.



Figure 2.5: Mosaic plot of party affiliation and legacy status of candidates in Japan.
Note: By-elections included. All party groups include affiliated independents. LDP group includes precursor parties (Liberal Party and Democratic Party). JSP/SDP group includes Leftist Socialists. DSP group includes Rightist Socialists. A complete breakdown is given in Table A.1 in Appendix A.
Source: JHRED.

The actual JHRED party variable contains fifty-five distinct party identification codes, including separate codes to identify candidates who ran as independents but were in truth affiliated with a political party and were either denied the official nomination or chose to eschew it for other reasons. To make the mosaic plot easier to visualize, I group party-affiliated independents with their respective parties. In the LDP group, I also include the party's precursors (i.e., conservative parties that fielded candidates from 1947-1955 and then merged to form the LDP). The JSP/SDP group includes the Leftist Socialists (1949-1955), and the DSP group includes the Rightist Socialists (1949-1955). Finally, I group non-affiliated independents and candidates nominated by minor or short-lived parties into a single "Others" group.

The mosaic plot allows us to rule out straight away that the LDP's high proportion of legacy candidates has anything to do mathematically with its size—as might be the case in some of the other small parties in the comparative cases we have seen. Almost 40 percent of all candidates in the dataset are affiliated with the LDP or its precursor parties. Within the LDP group, just over a quarter of all candidates in the dataset are legacy candidates. The second largest party in terms of the fraction of affiliated

candidates is the JCP (15 percent of all candidates), yet it has so few legacy candidates (just 12 observations; less than half a percent of all JCP candidacies) that the fraction is not even visible in the plot.

Among the small and ephemeral parties grouped together with independents as "Others" in Figure 2.5, the largest party is the fringe Happiness Realization Party (affiliated with the Happiness Science religious movement), which fielded over four hundred candidates between 2009 and 2014. Larger non-fringe parties in the "Others" group include the New Frontier Party (NFP), which was the second-largest party in 1996 (but disbanded shortly after), Renewal Party, Liberal Alliance, Liberal Party (1998-2003), Your Party, Japan Restoration/Innovation Party, and Tomorrow Party of Japan (TPJ). Legacy candidates are most common in these larger, non-fringe parties, all of which were formed by defectors from the LDP—indeed, four of these parties (NFP, Renewal Party, Liberal Party, and TPJ) were all formed by legacy MP and perennial party creator (and destroyer) Ozawa Ichiro.



Figure 2.6: Mosaic plot of party affiliation and legacy status of MPs in Japan.
Note: By-elections included. All party groups include affiliated independents. LDP group includes precursor parties (Liberal Party and Democratic Party). JSP/SDP group includes Leftist Socialists. DSP group includes Rightist Socialists. A complete breakdown is given in Table A.2 in Appendix A.
Source: JHRED.

Figure 2.6 shows the same type of mosaic plot for elected MPs. Here again, we can see the overwhelming size of the LDP—over half of all seats between 1947 and 2014 went to candidates affiliated with either the LDP or its precursor parties. The fraction of legacy candidates within the LDP group (31 percent), as with all other

party groups, is higher than in the full sample of candidates. This again hints at the electoral advantages that legacy candidates enjoy.

Despite being the second largest party in terms of candidates, the JCP was far less successful at electing those candidates. However, among the JCP's elected MPs, the fraction of legacy MPs (1 percent) is now just barely visible. Among the parties grouped into the "Others" category, the most dynastic is the New Liberal Club (NLC), which was a short-lived splinter party of LDP defectors led by several legacy MPs, including Kono Yohei, Tagawa Seichi, Nishioka Takeo, Kobayashi Masami, and Yamaguchi Toshio. Of the 49 seats held by the party between 1976 and 1986, 24 (49 percent) were held by legacy MPs.[7] Most of the NLC members re-joined the LDP after 1986.

2.3.1 The Best Butter? Characteristics of Japan's Dynasties

In his reflections on what might set members of dynasties apart from other politicians in the United States, Stephen Hess (1966, p. 3) hypothesized that legacy politicians might represent the "best butter" in politics: "old stock, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, professional, Eastern seaboard, well to do." These characteristics are obviously not all applicable to Japan, but other patterns may stand out. What are some of the characteristics of legacy MPs in Japan, and do they differ noticeably from those of non-legacy MPs?

It may be useful to first look at the types of family relationships between legacy MPs and their predecessors. Table 2.1 gives the number and percentage of legacy candidates (one observation per individual) with different types of relationships to the elected politician who preceded their candidacy. For legacy candidates with more than one prior relative, the table gives only the most recent relative to have served prior to the legacy candidate's first time running. For example, if an MP had two sons who served one after the other, the second son would be coded as following his brother into office, not his father. The table also gives the same statistics for the sample of legacy candidates who were successful in getting elected at least once. The final column in the table gives the percentage of individual legacy candidates in each category of familial relationship that was successful in ever getting elected (in other words, the ratio of MPs to candidates in each category).

Not surprisingly, the most common family predecessor among all legacy candidates and MPs is a father. Roughly 57 percent of all legacy MPs followed in their father's immediate footsteps. This is actually higher than in the U.S. and the U.K., where approximately 30 percent of relationships within dynasties have been parent-child (Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009; Van Coppenolle, 2015), but comparable to the pattern in Ireland, where 55 percent of predecessors have been fathers (Smith and Martin, 2016). Many of the candidates and MPs in the other relationship categories also had fathers who served before them, but with a different family relative serving in between. The second most common type of predecessor is a father-in-law, followed by other common male relatives: uncles, brothers, and grandfathers.

Another common path into politics as a legacy candidate is through marriage. For wives, the path goes through the so-called "widow's succession" in roughly half of the cases (fourteen of the candidates; ten of the MPs). There have been only four husbands

[7] Includes two NLC-affiliated independents: Hatoyama Kunio (legacy) and Ohara Ichizo (non-legacy).

Table 2.1: Type of relationship of predecessors to legacy candidates and MPs in Japan.

	Candidates		**MPs**		**Successful**
Predecessor relationship	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(%)
Father	347	58.42	272	57.38	78.39
Father-in-law/adoptive father	61	10.27	53	11.18	86.89
Mother	3	0.51	2	0.42	66.67
Grandfather/great grandfather	31	5.22	27	5.7	87.10
Uncle/great uncle	38	6.40	33	6.96	86.84
Brother/half-brother	40	6.73	33	6.96	82.50
Sister/half-sister	1	0.17	1	0.21	100
Husband	30	5.05	19	4.01	63.33
Wife	4	0.67	1	0.21	25.00
Cousin	3	0.51	3	0.63	100
Other type of relative	36	6.06	30	6.33	83.33
Total	594	100	474	100	79.80

Note: One observation per candidate/MP. *Other type of relative* includes second cousins, younger relatives (e.g., nephews), siblings-in-law, and more distant in-laws, as well as any case where the exact relationship could not be determined.
Source: JHRED.

who were preceded by their wives. One such case, Tokano Takeshi, actually ran unsuccessfully as a candidate for the Tohokai party in the 1942 House of Representatives election, but was purged by the U.S. Occupation prior to the 1946 election. His wife, Tokano Satoko, ran in his place as a JSP candidate in 1946 and won election. By my definition, this fact makes her, not him, the "senior" member of the dynasty. Takeshi ran and lost again in 1949 and 1952, but ultimately was successful as a (Rightist) JSP candidate to the House of Councillors in 1953 (thus he is not counted as successful in Table 2.1). Matsushima Harushige (JCP) ran unsuccessfully in 1949, after his wife, Karasawa Toshiko, was elected in 1946. The same situation was the case with Niizuma Tokuju (JSP) in 1947. His wife, Niizuma Ito, was also elected in 1946. The fourth husband, Nishikawa Tomoo, ran and won as an NFP candidate in 1996. His wife, Matsu Akira, had been elected to the House of Councillors as a Komeito candidate in the previous year.[8] The single case of a brother following a sister into office is Momiyama Akira (LDP) who directly succeeded his sister, Momiyama Hide. However, she herself had followed their adoptive father, Momiyama Hiroshi.

An interesting fact to note is that the success rate for legacy candidates who follow a father into politics is slightly lower than the success rates for legacy candidates who follow other common male relatives (fathers-in-law, grandfathers, uncles, and brothers). One possible explanation for this difference is that following a father into politics may seem to be an obvious or "natural" career choice for many political children, just as occupational inheritance from father to child is common among doctors, lawyers, and other professions. As a result, some children of male politicians may wish to follow in their fathers' footsteps even if he was not particularly popular (or if the children themselves are not particularly popular). In contrast, it could be the case that follow-

[8] Komeito was briefly merged with the NFP, but was later reconstituted as the "New" Komeito when the NFP fell apart in 1998.

ing a more distant male relative into politics involves more of a calculated decision to *select into* politics. The male predecessors in such cases may have been more popular or had greater reason to attract a relative as successor. The same logic might apply to wives and widows (i.e., a widow running to fill her husband's vacated seat may seem an obvious or natural move), though the even lower success rates for these female legacy candidates in Japan are also likely due to their gender.

Table 2.2 gives the number of generations of politicians within the family for legacy candidates and MPs. For unelected candidates, this is the number of members who would have served from the family if they had been elected. However, if a legacy candidate failed to be elected, the family would not count as having successfully created a democratic dynasty. For those who were ultimately successful, on the other hand, the number represents the number of members of the MP's dynasty (including the MP) to have served in the Diet. In total, there are 456 families that supplied two or more members as candidates between 1947-2014, and of these families, 368 were successful in forming a democratic dynasty.

Note that determining the "boundaries" of different families can be a challenge due to intermarriage and overlapping branches of family trees. In cases of intermarriage between two dynasties, I count only the relationship to the individual who married into the family, not all other relationships connected through that marriage (which are counted in the other dynasty). Some n-th generation candidates would actually count as having succeeded a larger number of relatives if such distant relatives were to be included. The numbers of generations given in Table 2.2 may thus be less precise when there have been multiple politicians in dynasty.

Table 2.2: Generation of legacy candidates and MPs within dynasties in Japan.

	Candidates		**MPs**		**Successful**
Generation	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(%)
Second	387	65.15	298	62.87	77.00
Third	125	21.04	104	21.94	83.20
Fourth	53	8.92	44	9.28	83.02
Fifth	16	2.69	15	3.16	93.75
Sixth or higher	13	2.19	13	2.74	100
Total	594	100	474	100	79.80

Note: One observation per candidate. Sixth or higher includes five seventh-generation candidates and two ninth-generation candidates (all successful). Not all generations for each dynasty are present in the data since some previous family members served only in the prewar parliament or House of Councillors. Coding may not account for all family members in very large families with multiple branches and intermarriage.
Source: JHRED.

About 65 percent of all legacy candidates only had one previous family member serve in national politics before they ran, and 77 percent of these second-generation legacy candidates were successful in getting elected—thus creating a democratic dynasty. The success rate grows with each successive generation in a dynasty. In other words, members of older political dynasties—i.e., those with a larger number of previous members—tend to get elected if and when they run. All of the legacy candidates with six or more predecessors were successfully elected to the House of Representa-

tives, which is not surprising if one considers that the incentives for perpetuating a dynasty likely depend on the past success of members of that dynasty.

Is there a Japanese equivalent to the American Eastern seaboard? In other words, have some of Japan's prefectures or regions been more dynastic than others? Although Hess (1966) points out the Eastern seaboard as a common regional setting for some of the most prominent dynasties in the U.S., Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder (2009) document that the most dynastic region in the U.S. historically has actually been the South. For the case of India, in contrast, Kanchan Chandra (2016, pp. 18-20) finds that dynasties are relatively evenly dispersed across districts and regions.



Figure 2.7: Geographic dispersion of Japan's dynasties.
Note: Observations pooled over all MPs who served from each prefecture. Excludes MPs elected in the PR tier of the post-reform electoral system. By-election winners are included.
Source: Map created by Shiro Kuriwaki using ArcGIS and author's calculations from JHRED.

Figure 2.7 shows a map of Japan's forty-seven prefectures, shaded to indicate the percentage (range) of legacy MPs among all MPs elected from each prefecture from 1947-2014. Because district boundaries have changed over time, I aggregate the data to the level of prefecture. I also exclude MPs elected to the PR tier in the post-reform period (whose districts are regions comprising multiple prefectures in most cases). Lighter (darker) shaded prefectures indicate a lower (higher) percentage of all seats in the House of Representatives that were held by legacy MPs. If there is a Japanese equivalent to the American Eastern seaboard, it is actually the *Western* seaboard. The two most dynastic prefectures are neighboring prefectures in the Chugoku region of Western Japan: Yamaguchi (47 percent), which is home to Prime Minister Abe Shinzo (Yamaguchi 4th District), and Shimane (53 percent), home to former Prime Minister Takeshita Noboru.

The Abe dynasty accounts for the large share of the dynasties in Yamaguchi. Abe is a sixth-generation legacy MP. He succeeded his father, Abe Shintaro, whose father-in-law, former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, also came from Yamaguchi. In addition, Abe Shintaro's father (Shinzo's paternal grandfather), Abe Kan, served prior to 1947. Kishi's brother, former Prime Minister Sato Eisaku, served from Yamaguchi, as did his son, Sato Shinji. Finally, Abe Shinzo's younger brother Kishi Nobuo has been an MP for Yamaguchi 2nd District since 2012. No other prefecture has been so consistently dominated by one family.

The high proportion of dynasties in Shimane may in part be because it is a relatively small prefecture in terms of population and parliamentary seats, with only a single five-seat district from 1947-1993, and just two single-seat districts from 1996-2014. For much of the pre-reform period, competition in the LDP revolved around Takeshita, Sakurauchi Yoshio, and Hosoda Kichizo. In post-reform Shimane 1st District, Hosoda's son, Hosoda Hiroyuki, has consistency held the seat (he was first elected in 1990). Since 2000, the seat in Shimane 2nd District has been held by Takeshita's brother, Takeshita Wataru (Noboru himself won the seat in 1996).

The least dynastic prefecture is Shiga, where less than 1 percent of all elected MPs since 1947 have been legacy MPs. Shiga is also a relatively small prefecture—like Shimane, it returned just five MPs in a single prefecture-wide district from 1947-1993. Since electoral reform, it has had four single-seat districts. One of Shiga's longtime MPs was Uno Sosuke, who served as prime minister for just two months in 1989 before resigning amid a sex scandal involving a geisha.[9] His son-in-law Uno Osamu later won a seat in the PR tier (so does not contribute the percentage indicated in the map).[10] The only legacy MP to ever hold a non-PR seat in Shiga Prefecture is Konishi Osamu in Shiga 2nd District, who was elected in a by-election in 2001. He lost his race in the general election in 2003, but was elected to the PR tier.

Six other prefectures—Okinawa, Wakayama, Fukui, Oita, Nara, and Ishikawa—have been represented by legacy MPs less than 10 percent of the time. All other prefectures fall in the range of 10-40 percent dynastic. There are no clear patterns in the geographic distribution of dynasties unless one reads into the white-shaded belt running from Ishikawa on the Western coast to Wakayama on the Pacific coast. However, the small percentage of dynasties in each of these prefectures likely has more to do with the smaller number of seats in each, and the occupation of these seats for

[9] The scandal was not simply that he had an affair with the geisha, but that he was stingy in providing financial support for her services (West, 2008).

[10] Like many sons-in-law of famous politicians, Uno Osamu adopted his father-in-law's surname when he married into the family.

many decades by first-generation MPs. For example, it was widely expected that former Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro of Ishikawa Prefecture—who served fourteen terms from 1969-2012—would be succeeded by his son, Yuki, who was a local prefectural assembly member. However, Yuki died suddenly in 2011. Okinawa may have fewer legacy MPs in its record simply because it has only been a prefecture since 1972, when the U.S. reverted sovereignty over the islands to Japan.

Previous studies in diverse contexts have noted how women have often entered into politics on the heels of a male relative (e.g., Jalalzai, 2013; Basu, 2016; Smith and Martin, 2016). An example from the United States is Hillary Clinton, who, though she may also be capable in her own right, no doubt benefited from her marriage to former President Bill Clinton. Examples from other countries include Indira and Sonia Gandhi of India, Isabel Martínez de Perón and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina, Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway, Alessandra Mussolini of Italy, Corazon Aquino of the Philippines, Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan, Tzipi Livni of Israel, Yingluck Shinawatra of Thailand, and Park Geun-hye of South Korea. As previously noted, the entry into politics for female legacy candidates often takes the form of a widow's succession—where the wife of a recently deceased incumbent runs to fill his seat.



Figure 2.8: Gender and age of non-legacy and legacy MPs in Japan.
Note: Left panel shows the patterns in gender. Leftmost bars show the percentage of women among non-legacy MPs and legacy MPs (one observation per MP). Bars to the right show the percentage of legacies among male and female MPs (one observation per MP). The difference for both is significant at p = 0.0198. Right panel shows the kernel density plots for age at time of first election for non-legacy MPs (dashed line) and legacy MPs (solid line). Sample excludes MPs who were first elected prior to 1947 or who first served in the House of Councillors.
Source: JHRED.

Japan is not different from other democracies in this regard. The left panel of Figure 2.8 shows the gender bias in dynastic politics from two separate perspectives. The far-left bars shows the percentage of women among non-legacy MPs compared to the percentage of women among legacy MPs. While women have made up just over 5 percent of all non-legacy MPs, they account for 8 percent of all legacy MPs. The bars on the right show the percentage of legacy MPs among elected men compared to the percentage of legacy MPs among elected women. Legacy MPs represent roughly 22 percent of all female MPs, but just 15 percent of all male MPs. We will explore the patterns and dynamics of gender and dynastic recruitment over time in more detail in Chapter 7, but these patterns indicate that one characteristic that sets legacy MPs apart from other MPs is that they are more likely to be women.

In addition to the gender difference, legacy MPs in Japan also tend to get elected at a younger age than non-legacy MPs. The right panel of Figure 2.8 shows a kernel density plot of the distribution of legacy MPs' age at the time of first getting elected to the House of Representatives compared to the distribution for non-legacy MPs. The median age for first-term legacy MPs in the House of Representatives is 42 years old (mean = 42.7), compared to 48 for non-legacy MPs (mean = 47.5). Legacy MPs in the U.S. (Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009) and Ireland (Smith and Martin, 2016) have similarly been shown to enter politics at a younger age.

The difference in age at entry suggests that legacy MPs might be able to bypass some of the traditional pathways to a career in national politics, such as first gaining experience in local politics (i.e., municipal or prefectural assembly member, municipal mayor, or prefectural governor). Prior local political experience is often viewed as an important stepping-stone into national office, and a key measure of candidate quality (e.g. Jacobson, 1989; Carson, Engstrom and Roberts, 2007). In bicameral systems, serving in the other chamber (i.e., the House of Councillors in Japan) is also an obvious indicator of experience. In addition to these traditional ways to gain political experience, candidates in Japan often gain experience and connections through careers in the national bureaucracy or by serving as a personal secretary to an incumbent MP (Scheiner, 2006).



Figure 2.9: Prior political experience of non-legacy and legacy MPs in Japan.
Note: Bars show the percentage of non-legacy MPs and legacy MPs with each background (one observation per MP). Backgrounds are not mutually exclusive.
Source: JHRED.

Figure 2.9 shows the percentage of non-legacy MPs and legacy MPs who had a background in each of these common pathways into politics. Legacy MPs are indeed significantly less likely to have progressed through local politics on their way to national office than non-legacy MPs. This is consistent with previous findings in the U.S. (Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009; Feinstein, 2010) and Ireland (Smith and Martin, 2016). In contrast, legacy MPs in Japan more often gain political experience through serving as a personal secretary to an incumbent MP (most often their relative). Prior experience in the House of Councillors or the national bureaucracy is also slightly more common among legacy MPs, but this is due to the fact that these pathways are more common in the LDP. The difference between non-legacy and legacy MPs for these two pathways is not significant if only LDP and LDP-affiliated MPs are compared.

Information on place of birth is only available for 2,056 of the 3,064 individual MPs in JHRED, but for this sample there is no significant difference between non-legacy and legacy MPs in terms of whether or not they were first elected in the prefecture of their birth. In other words, legacy MPs are no more likely to be "local" than non-legacy MPs. Among the other occupational backgrounds coded in JHRED (law, medicine, education, agriculture, business, news media, labor union, and religion), only business and labor union backgrounds are significantly different across non-legacy and legacy MPs.

A business background includes major experience as a company executive (president, director, etc., not simply employee). About 17 percent of legacy MPs had some such experience, compared to just 9 percent of non-legacy MPs, and the difference is significant even if the sample is restricted to the LDP, which has historically had stronger ties to business interests. It is impossible to say whether dynastic succession in politics for these MPs might be encouraged by patterns of dynastic succession in business leadership. The difference between non-legacy and legacy MPs in terms of labor union background is entirely driven by party differences. About 10 percent of non-legacy MPs had a background in the labor movement, compared to just 2 percent of legacy MPs. However, a labor union background is only common among MPs from the JSP, DSP, and JCP. The difference between non-legacy and legacy MPs is not significant when comparing within these parties.

Finally, it is worth investigating whether legacy MPs tend to have higher levels of education or wealth than non-legacy MPs. Such human capital resources might help explain why legacy candidates do better in elections than non-legacy candidates. On the other hand, existing research on these variables have found mixed results (albeit using different data and measurement). For example, Benny Geys (2016) finds that legacy politicians who are related to a local mayor in Italy tend to have lower levels of education than their peers.[11] In a study of Irish legacy MPs and cabinet selection, however, Shane Martin and I find that most legacy MPs do not have significantly higher or lower levels of education than non-legacy MPs (Smith and Martin, 2016).[12]

Unfortunately, JHRED does not contain complete information on the educational backgrounds of all MPs from 1947-2014. However, we can get a sense of whether there are any differences by looking at the group of MPs elected in the most recent election in 2014, for which complete information is available. Figure 2.10 again uses mosaic

[11] The legacy ties in Geys (2016) are measured using the proxy method of matching on names.

[12] The exception is for legacy MPs whose relatives previously served in cabinet. Such "cabinet legacies" tend to have higher levels of education than other legacy MPs and non-legacy MPs. This distinction between types of legacy MPs is explored in Chapter 6.

plots to show the distribution of level of education and place of education by legacy status for the 475 MPs elected in 2014. For level of education, displayed in the left panel, the "Postgraduate degree" category includes any degree (M.A. or Ph.D.) above a bachelor's degree. "Some university" includes university dropouts and graduates of junior colleges (*tanki daigaku*). For place of education, displayed in the right panel, I group MPs based on the place where they earned a junior college or bachelor's degree (or group them as "High school" if they did not attend university, or dropped out). I group universities and colleges into three categories: the prestigious University of Tokyo (the country's top public university), "Private university" (including all private universities and colleges, as well as foreign universities that would have had a higher financial cost to attend), and "Other public university" (which includes all other local, public universities and colleges in Japan). A bachelor's degree from the University of Tokyo, which has very competitive and merit-based admissions, might be viewed as an indication of an MP's quality of intellect or knowledge. While many private universities are also prestigious and difficult to get into, a degree from one may also be viewed as a measure of wealth (though tuition at private universities in Japan is still low compared to the U.S.). Other public universities, apart from Kyoto University, are generally considered less prestigious than the University of Tokyo.



Figure 2.10: Level and place of education of non-legacy and legacy MPs in Japan, 2014.
Note: Mosaic plots show the fraction of non-legacy MPs and legacy MPs (x-axis) and the fraction within each group (y-axis) with each level of education (left panel) and place of education for undergraduate degree, if applicable (right panel). Foreign universities are grouped with private universities.
Source: Author's calculations based on JHRED.

The mosaic plots in Figure 2.10 indicate that although there is not much of a difference between non-legacy and legacy MPs in terms of having earned a postgraduate degree, legacy MPs (about a quarter of all MPs in 2014) are more likely to have earned at least a university degree (left panel). On the other hand, the fraction of MPs who attended a private university for their undergraduate degree is much higher among legacy MPs than non-legacy MPs (right panel). This may be an indication of greater wealth in the families of legacy MPs.

We can directly compare the wealth of non-legacy MPs and legacy MPs by using the public declarations of each MP's income and assets (*shotoku-shisan kokai*). These yearly reports are available from *Asahi Shimbun* newspaper from 1993-2014.[13] Each MP's total worth can vary from year to year, depending on sales of assets, capital gains and losses, etc., so I pool all observations across all twenty-two years of data available.



Figure 2.11: Personal wealth of non-legacy and legacy MPs in Japan, 1993-2014.
Note: Bar charts show the mean and median combined income and assets (minus losses) for non-legacy MPs and legacy MPs. The left panels include all MPs; the right panels include only LDP MPs.
Source: Author's calculations based on yearly reports in *Asahi Shimbun*.

The bar charts in Figure 2.11 show the mean and median levels of declared wealth in this sample for all non-legacy and legacy MPs (left panels) and for just the members of the LDP (right panels). If we compare the mean total assets of non-legacy MPs and legacy MPs (top panels), legacy MPs are by far richer. However, this mean is influenced by a few extremely rich legacy MPs like Sasagawa Takashi—son of Sasakawa Ryoichi,

[13] Many thanks to Sonoda Koji for help locating these data.

the Class-A accused war criminal who went on to make a fortune in motorboat racing and later founded the Nippon Foundation—whose total assets were as high as two billion yen in 2000. Other extremely wealthy legacy MPs include Nakamura Shozaburo, president of Nitto Kotsu bus transportation company, and Aso Taro, whose family owns a mining company. If we compare the median level of wealth (bottom panels), the wealth difference between non-legacy and legacy MPs is largely erased.[14]

2.3.2 Summary of the Empirical Record in Japan

The overall empirical record from Japan suggests a number of general patterns. First, the proportion of legacy MPs exceeds the proportion of legacy candidates, both in the aggregate and within specific parties, which suggests that legacy candidates in Japan tend to enjoy an electoral advantage compared to non-legacy candidates. The difference between the percentage of legacy candidates and the percentage of legacy MPs cannot simply be attributed to the fact that most legacy candidates are fielded by the LDP and that LDP candidates *in general* have an electoral advantage. Second, the electoral advantage appears to increase with each successive generation within a dynasty. This may indicate a selection effect at the heart of predicting which dynasties will persist beyond a handful of generations. The more generations in a dynasty, the more indication that voters have responded well to members of that dynasty in the past, and the better the response of voters, the more likely a dynasty will continue for another generation.[15]

The overall empirical record does not indicate an obvious geographic pattern to dynastic politics in Japan, much like in the Indian experience. Yamaguchi and Shimane prefectures happen to have had more legacy MPs than other prefectures, but the reasons behind this pattern appear to be largely idiosyncratic. However, it is important to keep in mind that the aggregate prefectural-level patterns presented in this chapter may overlook district-level differences within prefectures, as well as changes over time.

Finally, it does not appear that the electoral advantage enjoyed by legacy candidates can be explained by differences in their personal characteristics. Legacy candidates are more likely to women, and women do not normally do well in Japanese elections. Legacy candidates are also more likely to be younger than non-legacy candidates, and less likely to have had previous political experience in elective office at the local level. These patterns suggest that the inherited incumbency advantage enjoyed by legacy candidates may help them to overcome obstacles that might prevent other young, inexperienced, or female candidates from getting selected and elected. However, it does not appear to be the case that the inherited incumbency advantage operates through greater access to education or financial resources. Legacy candidates are not significantly more likely to have a degree from the prestigious University of Tokyo or to have a postgraduate degree. They do appear to be more likely to attend private universities than public universities, but apart from a handful of extremely wealthy families, legacy candidates are not uniformly wealthier than their non-legacy counterparts.

---

[14] Figure A.1 in Appendix A gives an alternative visualization of this pattern using box-and-whisker plots.

[15] I will analyze the extent to which legacy candidates enjoy an electoral advantage over non-legacy candidates under Japan's different electoral systems, and the mechanisms behind this advantage, in Chapter 5.

These patterns in the characteristics of legacy candidates and MPs in Japan largely correspond to patterns in other countries where comparative data have been explored. As in the U.S. and Ireland, legacy MPs tend to be younger, less experienced in terms of previous public service in local office, and more likely to be women. However, the average legacy MP is not significantly more educated, nor does he or she possess more wealth, two attributes related to human capital that might be hypothesized as forming part of the inherited incumbency advantage. We must look beyond the "best butter" argument to explain the pattern of dynastic politics in Japan.

3

A Comparative Theory of Dynastic Candidate Selection

> If democracy can be compared to a restaurant where customers (voters) order from a menu of parties and candidates, the process of choosing which candidates will be on the ballot is like that of devising the menu itself—*and it all happens before even a single vote is cast in a general election.*
> - Gideon Rahat (2007, p. 157)

What explains the growth and decline of political dynasties in a democracy like Japan, and why is it that the selection of legacy candidates seems to be more prevalent in some parties, such as Japan's LDP, than in others? More generally, how can we explain variation in dynastic politics across time, countries, parties, districts, and even individual candidates' families?

As we have seen with the case of Iceland, the size of a democracy's population may be one factor that contributes to the proportion of dynasties. In the case of new or developing democracies, an additional factor may be economic. Public office may provide considerable private rents to politicians, and they or their relatives may want to continue to enjoy those rents.[1] At the same time, the pool of potential non-legacy candidates who are interested, eligible, and qualified for political office may also be shallower in new and developing democracies. Members of the elite ruling class, including legacy candidates, may be among the few who possess the education, wealth, and other technical skills to be successful as politicians. As a general trend, we might therefore expect to find a relatively greater proportion of dynasties in new or developing democracies than in established, developed democracies.

However, the comparative theory I will introduce here is focused primarily on explaining variation in the levels of dynastic politics in the parties of larger-sized developed democracies, where institutions are stable, democratic norms are well established, and a sufficient number of qualified non-legacy candidates could be reasonably expected to exist within the population of citizens eligible to run for office. Indeed, it is in economically developed and large democracies like Japan that a persistence of dynastic politics is the most puzzling.

The existing literature aimed at explaining the formation of dynasties in developed democracies has focused largely on country-specific explanations that take the insti-

[1] Arguments along these lines have previously been made by Chhibber (2013) and Chandra (2016) to explain the prevalence of dynasties in India.

tutional context of the electoral and candidate selection processes as given, and have stressed the value of political power itself and the electoral and informational resource advantages of legacy candidates—the inherited incumbency advantage—under fixed economic and institutional conditions. Thus, existing explanations tend to emphasize the micro-level dynamics involved in the emergence of dynasties—such the strength of a founding member's incumbency advantage (operationalized as length of tenure in office)—rather than also considering the macro-level institutional sources of dynastic politics in the system as a whole.

The comparative theory I will present here is more flexible, and allows us to consider how both micro-level differences between individual candidates, and macro-level differences between districts, parties, and countries, might explain how incumbency, and hence the potential inherited incumbency advantage, relates to the formation and perpetuation of dynasties in democracies. The hope is that such a comparative theory will help us to better understand not only the evolution of dynastic politics over time in Japan, but also, more generally, the observed variation in dynasties across all developed democracies.

3.1 Supply and Demand in Dynastic Candidate Selection

To understand the phenomenon of dynastic politics in developed democracies, we must first consider the institutions of candidate selection in a given party. We can think of candidate selection decisions as the outcome of supply and demand factors that operate within, and are influenced by, the context of political institutions (Norris, 1997; Siavelis and Morgenstern, 2008). More concretely, the candidate selection process may involve four levels of analysis: (1) the political system (including the legal system, electoral system, and party system), (2) the actual rules and processes for recruitment and selection within party organizations, (3) the supply of candidates, and (4) the demand from gatekeepers, such as local or national party organizations (Norris, 1997).

The latter two levels of analysis, involving supply and demand, operate at the same stage of the recruitment process, and can be understood as "nested" within the broader context of the party recruitment process and the institutional structure of the political system as a whole, such that individual candidate selection decisions take place in what Pippa Norris (1997, p. 1) describes as a "funnel of causality." In other words, whether or not a dynasty will form (or continue to the next generation) depends on the *supply* of potential legacy candidates and the *demand* for such candidates by actors involved in the candidate selection process. Importantly, supply and demand will be shaped by the institutions at the system and party levels above them.

Notably absent from this theoretical framework of candidate selection is the role of voters. However, voters' preferences can be incorporated conceptually into the demand-side considerations of gatekeepers. In systems with primary elections, such as the United States, voters—or more precisely, voters who turn out in primary elections—are the gatekeepers, so their preferences for certain types of candidates are directly reflected in the outcomes of candidate selection. In other systems, party actors involved in candidate selection can be assumed to make nomination decisions in part based on the perceived or expected preferences of general election voters for certain types of candidates. Although voters' preferences and the attributes of the actual candidates who are selected may not always perfectly align (Horiuchi, Smith and Yamamoto, 2016*b*), it is reasonable to assume that party leaders care about winning

elections and gaining control of government offices, and so, accordingly, will tend to nominate candidates that they expect will be most effective at getting votes and seats for the party.

3.1.1 Factors Affecting the Supply of Legacy Candidates

It is impossible to measure and evaluate all of the factors that might contribute to a citizen's decision to seek nomination as a party's candidate (or even run as an independent) due to the fact that most potential candidates remain "unseen" until they actually declare their candidacy (Fowler and McClure, 1989).

Nevertheless, on the supply side, we can imagine that both political capital and motivation play a role in determining the pool of candidates (Norris, 1997, p. 13). Political capital might include political connections, education, previous experience, the financial resources necessary for waging a successful campaign, and sponsorship by particular interest groups in society seeking representation. Motivation, on the other hand, could include family tradition, political ambition, or a sincere desire to advance policy preferences as an activist for a cause. It is important to note that, in addition to providing a motivation to run, a family tradition in politics might also be highly correlated with the political capital endowments enumerated above. In addition, a potential candidate's pre-existing political capital should also be attractive to the gatekeepers involved in the demand-side incentives in candidate selection.

In one of the most ambitious attempts to date to measure the factors that determine whether a potential ("unseen") candidate will decide to run for office, Jennifer Lawless and Richard Fox (2010) surveyed nearly four thousand individuals in the U.S. with successful careers in business, law, education, and political activism—four career paths commonly associated with a future career in politics—and asked about their personal ambitions to run for office in the future. Respondents whose parents had previously run for elective office (at any level) were up to 10 percentage points more likely to envision a future in politics for themselves—strong evidence that a family tradition in politics can influence political ambition (Lawless, 2012, p. 85).

The children and other close relatives of long-serving incumbent politicians may be especially drawn to a political career of their own, since they will have been exposed to politics and socialized into political life from an early age. Perhaps more practically, longer-serving incumbents will be more likely to have children who are old enough to appreciate political life and want to follow in their parent's footsteps. As a general supply-side hypothesis, we might therefore expect that:

> **(H1)** *Long-serving incumbents will be more likely to have a family member who wants to follow them into politics as a candidate.*

A natural extension of this hypothesis is that the supply of potential legacy candidates will be greater in countries and parties where incumbents tend to serve longer terms in office.

Given that family tradition may play a role in influencing political ambition, as a second supply-side hypothesis, we might also expect that:

> **(H2)** *Incumbents who are part of an existing dynasty will be more likely to have a family member who wants to follow them into politics as a candidate.*

For example, suppose a potential male candidate's father was a politician. He may choose to follow in his father's footsteps, or he may choose to forge a different career path, branching out to create his own name and identity. On the other hand, if his father and grandfather were both politicians, he may be more socialized to believe that politics is the family vocation, much like a son in a family-run business (think of business firms that include "& Sons" in the name). Such a person may feel it is his "destiny" or obligation to take over the reins (or rather, to take over the *reign*) after his father steps down.

Of course, the decision of *whether*, and more importantly, *when* to run can also be influenced by the context of the race at hand, especially one's perceived chances of electoral success. Many would-be candidates who might otherwise desire to run for office will forego the cost of running if they do not believe they can win—for example, against a powerful incumbent or in a district or election in which their party is unpopular (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983; Fowler and McClure, 1989; Kazee, 1994). Other potential candidates will prefer to wait until they have gained more experience or until they have raised their children beyond a certain age. Jennifer Lawless (2012, p. 2) notes how Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., a potential legacy candidate who might have easily won New York's Attorney General election in 2006, decided against a run:

> Despite a competitive field of Democratic candidates, party insiders and political analysts agreed that Kennedy's name recognition, political family ties, and reputation as an environmental crusader would have positioned him as the front-runner. Kennedy opted not to seek the Democratic nomination, though, explaining that he did not want to sacrifice time with his wife and six children. He left the door open for a future run, however, stating that his political ambition would likely grow as his family circumstances changed.

It is also possible that some incumbents who want to pass the baton to their child or other relative will strategically retire before an election that they expect their successors will be able to win. In some cases, a retiring incumbent might even try to shelter his or her successor from competition for the nomination. For example, in 2004, William Lipinski, an incumbent Democrat for the U.S. House of Representatives serving Illinois' 3rd District, easily won his party's primary election and was re-nominated. However, Lipinski withdrew his name from the ballot less than three months before the general election, and convinced local party leaders to instead nominate his 38-year-old son, Daniel Lipinski, a political science professor at the University of Tennessee. The younger Lipinski moved home and easily won the election, facing only weak opposition from a Republican newcomer in the heavily Democratic district. Critics argued that the elder Lipinski knew for months that he would retire, and planned his exit strategically in order to place his son in the seat without a primary fight or high-quality Republican challenger.[2]

In the context of elections in the U.S., it is natural for the most part to focus on the supply-side factors of would-be legacy candidates who can propel themselves into electoral competition if they have the political capital and motivation to do so. As Alan Ehrenhalt quips, "Who sent us the political leaders we have? There is a simple answer to that question. They sent themselves" (Ehrenhalt, 1991, p. 19). Similarly, Gary C. Jacobson characterizes congressional campaigns in the U.S. as "ventures undertaken by individual political entrepreneurs in a decentralized political marketplace"

[2] Wheeler, Dennis. "Dan Lipinski aims to step into his dad's big shoes." *Star Newspapers* (Chicago South), August 19, 2004.

(Jacobson, 2001, p. 57). Primary elections provide for easy access for hopeful political entrepreneurs, as well as political legacies, to enter politics. But what about the demand-side factors influencing their recruitment, selection, and election?

In the U.S.—apart from exceptions like the Lipinski example—voters in primary elections exercise the demand-side choice of who will stand for election under a party label. Unfortunately, existing studies on the inherited incumbency advantage in the U.S. do not include data on primary election candidates, so it is not clear whether legacy candidates in that context benefit more from name recognition or from political capital in their campaigns to win the nomination for the general election. However, for general elections, Brian D. Feinstein (2010) finds that legacy candidates in open-seat contests tend to enjoy more positive ratings on feeling thermometers used in the American National Election Studies (ANES) voter surveys, and a positive, though statistically insignificant, advantage in name recall. In contrast, he finds no significant differences between legacy and non-legacy candidates in terms of past political experience at the local level, or in terms of campaign fundraising, which suggests that the roughly 4-percentage-point electoral advantage that legacy candidates enjoy in the U.S. is more likely attributable to differences in name recognition than differences in political capital. It is probable that the name recognition of a legacy candidate also helps secure the nomination in primary elections, and may possibly scare off intra-party challengers (these considerations and their measurement will be evaluated in depth in Chapter 5).

In the vast majority of democracies outside of the U.S., parties—not voters—are the crucial actors in candidate selection, and they take nomination decisions and candidate characteristics seriously, both because the right combination of candidate characteristics can help optimize the party's voter mobilization efforts, and because the candidates they recruit and nominate will ultimately determine the make-up and character of the party itself. Not only must they nominate candidates who can help maximize the party's seat share in the legislature, but they must also consider how elected MPs will perform in office, particularly with regard to their ability to govern, and their willingness to pursue the policy goals and interests of the party.

In the terminology of rational choice theory, parties can be assumed to nominate candidates in order to maximize their expected utility in terms of three major party objectives: policy, office, and votes (Strøm, 1990; Strøm and Müller, 1999). Thus, when we want to understand the emergence of dynasties, it is not sufficient just to explain why children of politicians might also want to become politicians (the supply-side explanation); we must also consider why parties might want to nominate such legacy candidates (the demand-side explanation). More important, we must examine how and why the demand-side incentives to nominate a legacy candidate might differ depending on the system-level and party-level institutions that structure candidate selection.

3.2 A Demand-Side Model of Dynastic Candidate Selection

The basic logic of the demand for legacy candidates by parties can be expressed with a bit of mathematical notation of a party's utility calculus in candidate selection. For simplicity, I will present only the main elements of the model, without specifying the exact form of the utility function, or how the different elements of the model may be

weighted.[3] For the moment, assume also that the supply of different types of candidates is fixed but not overly limited, and that we are only concerned with evaluating the demand for certain types of those candidates by parties. Let us also assume that when a party is choosing which candidate(s) to nominate in an election, the actors involved in the process (be they primary voters or party leaders) are rational actors who aim to maximize the party's collective goals of earning votes, attaining and keeping control of government offices, and crafting and implementing their preferred set of policies.

When it comes to candidate selection, a party can be assumed to favor the candidate(s) that will provide the highest overall utility in terms of achieving these goals at the time of selection. For any given candidate i, the overall expected utility to the party at time t can be expressed formally as:

$$U_{it} = V_{it} + P_{it} + O_{it}, \tag{3.1}$$

where U_{it} is equal to the summation of the candidate's utilities to the party in terms of vote-earning (V_{it}), policy-making (P_{it}) and office-holding (O_{it}). V_{it} can be thought of as the summation of all of the factors that might make a candidate popular with voters in the election. P_{it} includes factors such as policy expertise and ideological congruence with the party's policy priorities. Note that for this model, we will set aside differences in policy positions at the party level as they relate to competition with *other parties* (the interparty dimension), and focus only on differences in policy positions between individual candidates and the party leadership (the intraparty dimension). Lastly, O_{it} includes factors, such as experience and knowledge, that will make a candidate a good choice for future party and parliamentary leadership posts—in other words, things that will help a party to govern.

Quite obviously, many candidate attributes will make overlapping contributions to these three party goals. For example, the same leadership qualities or policy expertise that will help a party pursue its office-holding or policy-making goals may also help win votes in elections. However, as is the case with party strategies on the interparty dimension (Strøm, 1990; Strøm and Müller, 1999), parties may sometimes face trade-offs in balancing these goals in candidate selection on the intraparty dimension. This might occur when, for example, an electorally popular candidate disagrees with the party leadership over policy, or when a candidate who would make an effective steward of the government is nevertheless an ineffective campaigner in elections. The combination of candidate attributes that will provide the greatest utility to the party on each of these components can also vary depending on time and context. For example, if a new policy issue arises, the value of P_{it} for a candidate with expertise in that policy area may increase.

Keeping this simple framework in mind, let us first consider a scenario where a party is choosing between two potential candidates to nominate in a FPTP/SMD contest, and the party's priority is to maximize votes in the immediate general election—i.e., in the short term. Each potential candidate has a number of potential attributes $(v_1, v_2, v_3, ...v_k)$ that may influence the party's decision, including measures of candidate quality and personality that will help the party earn votes in the election (experience, level of education, charisma, good looks, name recognition, etc.). Whether or not a potential candidate comes from a political dynasty is one such attribute.

[3] For example, Kaare Strøm's model requires that the various weights on policy, office, and votes sum to one, assuming a trade-off in party strategies in these directions (Strøm, 1990). The components in my model, in contrast, do not need to sum to one.

Importantly, each of these attributes may have a different positive or negative vote-earning utility to different parties, and even to the same party over time or across space depending on the party's priorities in a given election context. For example, an attribute that is an obvious "plus" in one election or for one party (e.g., "insider" experience in the national bureaucracy) may be a severe "minus" in a different context (e.g., when voters are unhappy with the national bureaucracy). The collective sum of these attributes at election time t is V_{it}, where $V_{it} \in \mathbb{R}$, and the overall utility of a candidate to this purely vote-seeking party can be expressed simply as $U_{it} = V_{it}$. In the most basic sense, the purely vote-seeking party can be expected to choose the candidate whose overall combination of attributes V_{it} represents the greatest positive utility to the party in achieving its short-term vote-related goals.

Now let us separate the inherited incumbency advantage from V_{it}, and denote it as $IIA_{it} \geq 0$. The potential vote-earning value of IIA_{it} encompasses all of the resource and informational advantages of coming from a political dynasty, and will vary depending on the *actual* incumbency advantage of the candidate's predecessor. It will also vary over time, across space, and within family relationships—e.g., its value may decrease the longer the amount of time between the predecessor's exit and the legacy candidate's entry; or decrease if the legacy candidate is running in a different district from his or her predecessor; or decrease if the candidate is related by marriage rather than blood, or has a different surname than the predecessor. For non-legacy candidates, $IIA_{it} = 0$; for legacy candidates, $IIA_{it} > 0$.[4]

Suppose also that within a given candidate selection context, there is certain amount of bias in the electorate or among party actors for or against dynasties. This dynastic bias, as we will see, may result in part from the way in which institutions shape incentives and preferences in elections and candidate selection decisions. The dynastic bias can be expressed as $DB_{it} \in [0, 1]$, and can vary across time and individuals. Where $1 \geq DB_{it} > 0$, it indicates a positive bias toward dynasties; where $DB_{it} = 0$, it indicates a context where there is no bias with regard to dynasties.[5] With this extension of the model, the vote-earning utility of a given candidate becomes $U_{it} = V_{it} + (IIA_{it} * DB_{it})$. We will continue to use V_{it} to present all of the other potential vote-earning attributes that are not part of the inherited incumbency advantage.

For a legacy candidate, the component of his or her vote-earning utility that comes from membership in a family dynasty is therefore the product of the resources, name

[4] This definition of IIA_{it} can be relaxed to expand the concept of the inherited incumbency advantage to include non-kin successors, such as political secretaries or protégés. In this case, a non-kin successor may have a positive value accruing from inherited resources or connections, but not from name recognition, genes, or other benefits of family relations.

[5] It could be possible for a negative bias against dynasties ($DB_{it} < 0$) to exist. In which case, membership in a dynasty will result in an inherited incumbency *dis*advantage. This might happen when a candidate's membership in a dynasty becomes a liability—e.g., if the candidate's predecessor was unpopular, or if there is a backlash against dynastic politics. In such cases, the non-legacy candidate will be selected unless his or her other attributes are of lower vote-earning utility to the party than the legacy candidate's other attributes, or unless the legacy candidate can manipulate conditions so as to decrease the value of his or her IIA_{it}, as when Jeb Bush sought to distance himself from his family name by simply using "Jeb!" during his campaign for the U.S. Republican presidential nomination in 2016. However, my model assumes that, in most cases, IIA_{it} will be strictly positive for legacy candidates and $DB_{it} \geq 0$.

recognition, etc., that make up the inherited incumbency advantage (IIA_{it}) and the bias for or against dynastic politics (DB_{it}). If there is positive bias for dynasties, then the legacy candidate's additional vote-earning utility can increase up to the actual value of the inherited incumbency advantage. If there is no bias, then the inherited incumbency advantage of a potential legacy candidate provides no additional vote-earning utility to the party. Similarly, for a non-legacy candidate, $IIA_{it} = 0$, so the right side of the equation reverts back to $U_{it} = V_{it}$ regardless of the value of DB_{it}.

Thus, if two potential candidates—one legacy and one non-legacy—are being considered for nomination, and all other attributes within V_{it} are held constant—i.e., the two candidates are otherwise equivalent in terms of talent, experience, education, etc.—then the legacy candidate will provide a higher vote-earning utility to the party than the non-legacy candidate as long as DB_{it} is not zero. In most cases, this means that if a legacy candidate wants to run (i.e., there is a supply-side availability of a legacy candidate), the party has an incentive to nominate him or her unless the value of V_{it} for the other potential candidate is greater than the value of $V_{it} + (IIA_{it} * DB_{it})$ for the legacy candidate. This equation also implies that the vote-earning utility of a legacy candidate to a party may increase either (1) because that candidate has a higher potential inherited incumbency advantage, or (2) because the dynastic bias is higher. It also implies that for a non-legacy candidate to win a nomination over a legacy candidate, he or she must be of higher quality (i.e., have a larger value of V_{it}).

If a party is assumed to be strictly vote-seeking in nature, then the above logic should hold regardless of the attributes of the parties' competitors in the general election. The candidate with the greatest vote-earning utility to the party will get nominated. However, suppose that a party wants to balance its vote-earning priorities with its policy-making priorities (Wittman, 1973; Schlesinger, 1975; Wittman, 1983). Some candidates may be terrific for earning votes, but less ideologically aligned with the party's policy goals and more likely to break with the party in legislative voting. If the party's policy-making goals are brought into the equation, then party leaders may face a non-negligible trade-off in candidate selection. A candidate with the highest vote-earning utility may also bring costs in terms of the party's policy-making utility, such that the party's overall utility equation for a given candidate becomes $U_{it} = V_{it} + (IIA_{it} * DB_{it}) + P_{it}$, where $P_{it} \in \mathbb{R}$, and represents the candidate's policy-making utility to the party. Negative values of P_{it} thus lower the overall utility of a candidate to the party.

For all values of $IIA_{it} * DB_{it} > 0$ and $P_{it} > 0$, the legacy candidate in our hypothetical scenario will be chosen over the non-legacy candidate, all else within V_{it} being equal. But suppose that $P_{it} < 0$ for the legacy candidate, and $P_{it} > 0$ for the non-legacy candidate. Depending on the value of P_{it} and $IIA_{it} * DB_{it}$, at a certain point the policy cost of the legacy candidate may exceed the electoral value of the inherited incumbency advantage, making the overall utility of the non-legacy candidate higher. In this case, the vote-and-policy-maximizing party will need to consider, or try to anticipate, the vote-earning attributes and electability of challengers from other parties in the general election. If the nearest challenger has many vote-earning attributes, and the election is expected to be close, then the party may sacrifice its policy-making priorities in order to focus on maximizing its vote. The party will nominate the non-legacy candidate only if that candidate's vote-earning utility, V_{it}, is expected to be higher than the vote-earning utility of his or her closest competitor in the general election, or if the policy costs of nominating the legacy candidate are so high (i.e., P_{it} is negative and sufficiently large) that the party is willing to sacrifice its short-

term goal of winning the election. If the party's closest competitor is expected to win many votes, or if there is any uncertainty about the non-legacy candidate's chances of victory, the party may sacrifice its policy-making priorities in favor of the legacy candidate.

Uncertainty may also arise if the party cannot prevent the potential legacy candidate from running in the election without the nomination, e.g., as an independent or as the nominee of another party. If the party denies the nomination to the legacy candidate, but he or she runs anyway, then the party may face a situation where the closest competitor to its nominated non-legacy candidate is now the rejected legacy candidate (running as an independent or under a different party label) whose vote-earning utility was already higher than that of the non-legacy candidate the party decided to nominate.

Thus, all else equal, the party has an incentive to nominate the legacy candidate over the non-legacy candidate unless the policy costs posed by a potential legacy candidate are especially high, and the party can control access to the ballot or be reasonably sure that the rejected legacy candidate will not get the nomination of another party. The downside of this political calculation is that in situations where vote-earning priorities trump policy-making priorities, a party may potentially end up disunited and prone to low party discipline, party splits, or a lopsided focus on particularistic policymaking rather than coherent programmatic policymaking.

What about a candidate's utility for a party's office-holding goals, O_{it}? Here, I am concerned not with a party's desire to maximize its control over government offices overall (e.g., Riker, 1962; Leiserson, 1968), but rather, the party's desire (from the perspective of party leadership) to recruit individual MPs capable of serving effectively in those offices, those who Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle describe as "ministerable" (Laver and Shepsle, 1994, p. 302). The popularity of the party (or parties) in government is often linked to the performance and individual popularity of ministers, so appointing the right (or wrong) ministers can have consequences for a governing party's ability to win votes and seats at election time (Strøm and Müller, 1999). The same may be true for party leaders and other important positions within parties in the opposition. As such, many candidate attributes that contribute to this component of the candidate's overall utility to the party will make overlapping contributions to the vote-earning and policy-making utilities. However, we can imagine that there might be some important differences.

For example, consider two potential legacy candidates who are equivalent in all other respects, except that one candidate's predecessor had previously served in a party leadership position or government office, such as cabinet minister, while the other candidate's predecessor had not. For our purposes, we can define the former type of legacy candidate as a *cabinet legacy*, though the logic should apply to other important parliamentary or party offices, such as committee chairmanships or party leadership positions. A predecessor's cabinet experience may increase the electoral value of the inherited incumbency advantage (due to higher name recognition, etc.), and thus may increase V_{it}, but suppose that it does not, and the two candidates are equal in terms of V_{it} and P_{it}. In this scenario, the candidate who is a cabinet legacy may still have greater knowledge of the party organization or leadership style that he or she has observed over time through the experiences of his or her predecessor. Alternatively, a cabinet legacy may be better at signaling to party leaders that he or she is capable of handling government office, most obviously if the performance of his or her predecessor in higher office had been strong (Smith and Martin, 2016). Such

insider information or signaling advantages may add a significant positive utility to a party's office-holding goals. In other words, cabinet legacies may represent a higher utility to a party in terms of its office-holding priorities relative to legacy candidates whose predecessors did not serve in cabinet, as well as a higher utility than many non-legacy candidates.[6]

Thus, the party's complete utility equation for a given candidate becomes:

$$U_{it} = V_{it} + (IIA_{it} * DB_{it}) + P_{it} + O_{it}, \tag{3.2}$$

The most important component of this equation for my comparative theory is the product of the inherited incumbency advantage and the dynastic bias ($IIA_{it} * DB_{it}$). With this simple theoretical model in place, we can begin to consider the institutional and situational factors—at the system level, party level, and individual level—that might increase or decrease the value of the inherited incumbency advantage, IIA_{it}, or alternatively, increase or decrease the dynastic bias in candidate selection, DB_{it}. Increases in either component of the model will increase the overall utility of a legacy candidate to party actors involved in candidate selection, and thus may help to explain variation in the overall presence of dynastic politics in candidate selection across contexts.

In terms of measurable factors that may affect the value of a legacy candidate's inherited incumbency advantage (IIA_{it}), the most obvious is the *actual* incumbency advantage of the candidate's predecessor, including such variables as the predecessor's incumbency status at the time of his or her exit, number of previous terms served, margin of victory in recent elections, previous cabinet experience, and so on. The value of the inherited incumbency advantage will also depend, as noted, on the time between candidacies, the degree of familial closeness between the two candidates, and whether or not they share a common name, party, and electoral district. Nevertheless, as a general demand-side hypothesis, we can expect that:

> **(H3)** *The demand for a legacy candidate will increase with his or her potential inherited incumbency advantage.*

In order to evaluate the factors that may increase or decrease the dynastic bias (DB_{it}), we must return to the institutional context in which candidate selection takes place. Let us begin with the highest level of potential institutional factors (the system level) and work our way down to the individual-level factors.

3.2.1 System-Level Institutional Factors

At the system level, there are very few democracies where legal rules explicitly specify criteria for candidate selection beyond central guidelines (Müller and Sieberer, 2006; Rahat, 2007), and—obviously—no true democracy can explicitly forbid legacy candidates, so the legal system is not likely to be a contributing factor. The party system may contribute to the overall proportion of dynasties in some countries if the distribution of legislative seats favors parties that tend to recruit more legacy candidates. But the party system alone tells us little about the actual nomination decisions surrounding individual legacy candidates within parties. The system-level institutional factor

[6] We will explore the post-electoral advantages of cabinet legacies in terms of promotion in Chapter 6.

that might contribute most to the relative demand for dynastic politics in candidate selection is therefore the electoral system.

Certain electoral rules may increase the positive bias toward dynasties in candidate selection by generating conditions for candidate-centered elections that increase the value of the personal vote. John M. Carey and Matthew S. Shugart (1995) argue that the incentives for a candidate to cultivate a personal vote depend upon three distinct criteria: (1) the degree of party leadership control over access to and rank on ballots, (2) the degree to which candidates are elected on individual votes independent of co-partisans, and (3) whether voters cast a single intraparty vote instead of multiple votes or a party-level vote. These last two criteria hint at the theoretical importance of whether voters cast their ballots nominally, i.e., voting directly for a candidate's name, or whether their vote instead must be cast for a party's list of candidates.

Thus, the value of the personal vote should be higher in a country like the U.S., where voters cast their ballots for an individual candidate by name in a FPTP system, as in our theoretical case, than it is in country like Norway or Israel where voters instead vote for a party list, seats are allocated to parties in multi-member districts in proportion to their share of the vote, and candidates are awarded those seats in order of their ranking on the party list—i.e., a CLPR system. In addition, district magnitude (M) has a contrasting effect on the incentives to cultivate a personal vote depending on the nature of the electoral system: as M increases in electoral systems that foster personal vote-seeking (nominal vote systems), so too does the likely importance of the personal vote.

So, while the personal vote will be of some value to candidates in the FPTP/SMD districts of the U.S., it will be of even greater value in the MMDs used in pre-1994 Japan, especially when there is intraparty competition. When two candidates from the same party are competing for votes, it is not enough to campaign solely on party labels. Each candidate must distinguish him or herself from co-partisans, in addition to candidates from other parties. Similarly, the personal vote will have more value to candidates under open-list proportional representation (OLPR) systems, like in Finland, Belgium, or pre-1993 Italy, where voters are allowed to express a preference for one or more candidates on a party list, than under CLPR. In OLPR systems, seats are allocated to parties, but candidates are elected in order of who gets the most preference votes. In contrast, increases in M *decrease* the value of the personal reputation of individual candidates under CLPR (Shugart, Valdini and Suominen, 2005). For example, the only way for a Norwegian or Israeli candidate who is not at the top of his or her party's list to assure personal victory is to campaign hard to increase the party's overall vote, and this effort might only make a difference for marginal candidates.

There are two main components of the personal vote. The first component involves the ex-post behavior of elected politicians in office, predominantly constituency service or pork barrel politicking (e.g., Mayhew, 1974*a*; Fenno, 1978; Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987).[7] The electoral incentives to engage in such *personal vote-earning behavior* (PVEB) can also result in a legislator defecting from the party's ideal policy positions when those positions diverge from the interests of his or her constituents. Thus, a legislator with a strong personal vote may often be less likely to toe the party line (Faas, 2003; Hix, 2004; Sieberer, 2010; Ohmura, 2014).

[7] Other notable studies include Lancaster and Patterson (1990), Ames (1995), Gaines (1998), and Stratmann and Baur (2002).

A second component to the personal vote involves instead at the ex-ante, pre-electoral attributes of candidates (e.g., Shugart, Valdini and Suominen, 2005). A candidate's *personal vote-earning attributes* (PVEA) can include high name recognition, a "quality" background (such as previous political experience or training), and local ties to the community or district where the candidate is running. While the incentives to cultivate a personal vote may result in greater observed PVEB among incumbents, the same incentives might operate on a party's incentives to nominate new candidates with strong PVEA.

The importance of PVEA for winning votes in candidate-centered elections can increase the perceived value of the inherited incumbency advantage, and thus influence the demand for legacy candidates, by either voters (in primary elections) or parties (in anticipation of voter preferences in the general election). In nominal electoral systems where the personal reputation of a candidate (or a candidate's "brand name") is more dominant in framing campaigns and voter decisions than the reputation of the party (the party label), the value of being a legacy candidate with a recognized family name and reputation in the electoral district might lead to legacy candidates possessing advantages, not only in name recognition, but also in fundraising, campaigning skills, and other areas related to familiarity with the political process.

The importance of name recognition as a PVEA for legacy candidates in candidate-centered elections cannot be understated. Stephen Hess (1966, pp. 7-8) recounts an example from the U.S. where name recognition owing to a candidate's legacy status was clearly of importance, especially given the electoral rules employed (emphasis in the original):

> A deadlock over reapportionment in 1964 necessitated the at-large election of the entire Illinois House of Representatives. The ballot of 236 names resembled an orange bath towel. On the Democratic list was Adlai E. Stevenson III, thirty-three, son of the 1952 and 1956 Democratic presidential nominee; on the Republican list was Earl Eisenhower, sixty-six, brother of the 1952 and 1956 Republican presidential nominee. *Neither legislative candidate had ever sought office before.* When the votes were counted, first among the 118 Democrats was Adlai E. Stevenson III; first among the 118 Republicans was Earl Eisenhower.

It is possible that candidate-centered electoral systems might encourage a larger supply of legacy candidates who hope that their name recognition will help to get them elected. More important, however, is that if the political actors involved in the candidate recruitment process are aware of the importance of personal reputation to electoral success, there will be greater demand for such legacy candidates. In other words, the dynastic bias (DB_{it}) will increase.

Compare this logic to the experience of incumbent candidates in candidate selection. Incumbent candidates in candidate-centered elections enjoy a significant electoral advantage over challengers due to greater name recognition and experience. For the same reason, parties typically will re-nominate incumbents, since they represent the party's best chance to win the seat again (Ranney, 1981, pp. 98-99). When an incumbent politician retires or dies, parties might expect to capitalize on some of those advantages by nominating a relative of that politician. But these electoral advantages should be less heritable when elections are not based around voters' evaluations of individual candidates.

Studies on the PVEA of candidates tend to focus on evaluating whether different types of individuals appear in greater frequencies as candidates and legislators in

different electoral contexts. A few notable studies also link the pre-electoral PVEA to post-electoral PVEB (e.g., Tavits, 2009, 2010; Marangoni and Tronconi, 2011). A general conclusion of these studies is that local ties and candidate quality tend to be more important for gaining votes in candidate-centered electoral systems, but that legislators with a strong personal vote are less loyal to the party when their constituencies' interests are at stake. Thus, as illustrated in the theoretical model, parties may face a trade-off in candidate selection between maximizing votes and maximizing party cohesion and discipline. In contrast, the PVEA of candidates matter less in party-centered contexts, where party actors involved in candidate selection care more about what those candidates might contribute to the party and party image as a whole. Will they pursue the party's goals in terms of policy? Do they bring policy expertise or other quality skills to the party? Do they help the party diversify in terms of gender, age, geography, etc., in order to serve a wider constituency?

Returning to the theoretical model, let us imagine that we move from the two-person contest for a nomination in a FPTP election to a scenario where a party must choose multiple candidates to nominate on a party list under CLPR. We might already expect that the dynastic bias (DB_{it}) will be lower under this system relative to the FPTP scenario, since voters cast their votes for parties rather than candidates. Under CLPR, all personal vote-earning attributes, including dynastic status, will matter less simply because a party's electoral success depends less on the personal votes of its candidates.

Moreover, as the number of candidates that must be nominated increases, a party will need to consider not only the individual utility of each candidate, but also the collective utility of all candidates on the party's list. In this scenario, we can imagine that the inherited incumbency advantage of a potential legacy candidate may still be positive (in terms of name recognition or familiarity with voters, but also informational advantages within the party). However, each successive legacy candidate may provide diminishing marginal utility to the party. In contrast, the party may derive increasing marginal utility from nominating a more diverse slate of candidates—in terms of gender, age, policy expertise, geographic diversity, etc.—who improve the overall image of the party and may help attract votes from different subsets of the electorate. Hence, under CLPR, the dynastic bias toward legacy candidates should decrease with district magnitude.

The incentives will be moderated under OLPR. Under common variants of OLPR, voters may cast a party-level vote for the entire list or a preference vote for a specific candidate. The personal preference votes earned by candidates first accrue to the party's overall tally to determine the number of seats the party wins; then, the candidates' personal votes determine the order in which they are elected off the list to fill those seats. This means that for a party contesting elections under OLPR, the marginal utility of another legacy candidate may be higher than under CLPR, since each legacy candidate will help bring in votes and improve the party's overall chances of winning seats. Party leaders under OLPR will thus have incentives to strike a balance between candidates with strong PVEA that bring in personal votes, and candidates that help improve the party's overall appeal, but may not necessarily be huge vote-getters.

From a voter's perspective, both types of list-based PR may generate important differences relative to a FPTP system. It may seem natural to support a legacy candidate in a race for the local seat under FPTP, and voters in other SMDs might have similar feelings. But if those SMD candidates were aggregated into a party list to

represent voters in a broader region, it may appear more problematic to voters if too many of a party's candidates come from political dynasties.

Importantly, under both CLPR and OLPR, a party can more easily pass over a candidate who poses policy costs to the party, $P_{it} < 0$, since he or she will not typically be able to run as an independent. The rejected candidate would have to form his or her own party in order to gain access to the ballot and, depending on the country, the barriers to doing so can be quite high. According to the Public Offices Election Law of Japan, for example, in order for a political organization to qualify as a "party" eligible to field a list of candidates in the PR tier of its electoral systems for the House of Representatives and House of Councillors, that organization must either (1) have five or more members in the Diet, (2) have polled at least 2 percent in a recent previous election, or (3) be prepared to field enough candidates to account for at least 20 percent of the seats up for grabs in the district—and the party must pay a deposit of 6 million yen for each candidate (approximately $53,000 in the 2016 exchange rate).

Thus, the electoral system may generate some basic incentives for candidate-centered elections that increase the electoral value of the personal vote, and thus the value of the dynastic bias in candidate selection. It is important to note, however, that the electoral system may produce different effects on different parties. For instance, district magnitude may have varying effects on the incentives to cultivate a personal vote depending on the size of the party and its electoral constituency (Grofman, 2005; Crisp, Jensen and Shomer, 2007). Under the SNTV/MMD system used in Japan from 1947-1993, parties such as the LDP and JSP often ran more than one candidate in a district, creating intraparty competition that increased the value of the personal vote of each candidate. However, smaller parties, such as the Komeito and JCP, did not run multiple candidates in a district, so the value of the party label was greater, both to candidates of those parties who could campaign on the party's platform, and to voters who could use the party label as a cue when deciding among the candidates.

Similarly, in a CLPR system like that used to elect members of the Israeli Knesset, not all parties run the same number of candidates on their lists in each district, despite a common district magnitude (in Israel's case, a single nationwide district with M = 120). The PVEA of candidates near the bottom of the list for a large party will not be relevant—neither to voters, nor to the party in terms of capitalizing on those attributes in order to increase the appeal of the party—but candidates on a shorter party list may potentially get more attention from voters, and many parties elect only a few members to the Knesset. Even though votes are cast for parties under CLPR, a popular candidate near the top of the party list may help attract voters to the party as a whole.

Ireland uses a single-transferable vote (STV) system in multi-member districts with district magnitude ranging from three to five. This system is similar to Japan's pre-1994 SNTV/MMD system, since parties tend to nominate multiple candidates, who thus face intraparty competition for first-rank preference votes. However, it is slightly more party-centered, since candidates often run as party "team," and voters rank candidates by order of preference. A vote for a candidate whose vote total is already great enough to secure election, or for a candidate who has no hope of securing a seat, may be transferred to the next preference candidate in a process that continues until all seats are filled. Most often, though not always, second-order preference votes are cast for co-partisans.[8] In Australia, the electoral system is the alternative vote (AV)

[8] For example, a majority of voters report that their first preference vote is most influenced by individual candidate characteristics, but between 50-60 percent of voters also tend

system, which is similar to STV, except that the contests take place in SMDs. As a result, there is no intraparty competition, and all vote transfers take place between candidates of different parties.[9]

The constitutional structure of the political system—namely, the separation or fusion of legislative and executive power that distinguishes parliamentary and presidential regimes—may also temper the importance of the personal vote, regardless of the electoral system used. For example, although both the U.S. and Canada use the FPTP electoral system, the nature of Westminster-style parliamentary democracy in Canada means that the value of the party label and party leader image is dominant in elections to the House of Commons (Carty and Cross, 2010). Party voting among the electorate is thus much higher in Canada than in the U.S. For example, in the 2000 House of Commons election, a candidate's personal characteristics were the deciding factor for only 5 percent of Canadian voters (Gidengil, 2010, p. 238). In contrast, the greater attachment to individual candidates over parties among voters in the U.S. is supported by the high percentage of voters who split their ticket between presidential and congressional races (e.g., Burden and Kimball, 2004).

Because of the above limitations stemming from differences across parties and district magnitude, as well as how the constitutional structures of parliamentarism and presidentialism interact with electoral rules, it is challenging to systematically categorize entire countries and parties into a single scale from more candidate-centered to more party-centered to test how each institution might affect the value of DB_{it}. There have been some valiant efforts to categorize electoral systems along various continuums of personal vote incentives, including Carey and Shugart (1995) and Johnson and Wallack (2012). However, such categorizations are inevitably blunt measures of personalism at the system level, and cannot capture differences across parties, districts, time, and other contextual factors.

Nevertheless, a general ordering of common electoral systems from more candidate-centered to more party-centered might go something like: SNTV ⇒ STV ⇒ OLPR ⇒ FPTP/AV ⇒ CLPR. Notably, the first three systems (SNTV, STV, and OLPR) are likely to feature some amount of intraparty competition in larger parties—which should increase the value of each candidate's PVEA. We can say generally that more candidate-centered electoral contexts, like SNTV, STV, and OLPR, will increase the value of DB_{it}, and thus, increase the vote-earning utility of a legacy candidate to a party. These considerations give rise to a system-level demand-side hypothesis, that:

> **(H4)** *The demand for a legacy candidate will be higher in candidate-centered electoral contexts than in party-centered electoral contexts.*

At the most basic level, the demand for legacy candidates thus ought to be higher under candidate-centered electoral contexts, where a legacy candidate's inherited incumbency advantage is a PVEA that is likely to be of greater electoral value to the party. Note, however, that the theoretical model implies that as DB_{it} get larger, the value of the legacy candidate's potential inherited incumbency advantage, IIA_{it}, can get smaller and still contribute a positive utility to the party. If DB_{it} is especially high

---

to give their second-order preference votes to their favorite candidate's co-partisans in sequence (Marsh, 2007).

[9] If no candidate wins a majority with first-preference votes, the candidate with the fewest number of votes is eliminated and his or her votes are re-distributed to those voters' second-preference candidates, and so on, until one candidate has a majority.

(e.g., $DB_{it} = 1$), then the party has incentives to nominate even legacy candidates whose inherited incumbency advantage is weak. Parties in such contexts may even have incentives to *actively seek out* legacy candidates beyond those who put themselves forward, if the costs to doing so (including practical costs involved in the effort) are outweighed by the potential gains from nominating a legacy candidate. This means that the family members of *all* previous incumbents, not just those whose incumbency advantage was high, should be desirable as potential candidates.

3.2.2 Party-Level Institutional Factors

The above considerations provide a basic logic for why legacy candidates will be in higher demand in candidate-centered electoral contexts than in party-centered electoral contexts. However, the level of dynastic bias in candidate selection may also be influenced by variation in party-level characteristics and institutions, especially the organizational basis of a party and the rules for candidate selection, and these may be independent from the electoral system context.

One potential source of party-level variation in DB_{it} is the nature of a party's organization. Richard Katz and Peter Mair describe four types of party organization (Katz and Mair, 1995). First, the "elite party" model of party organization, as its name suggests, is a party that is highly restricted in membership and based on interpersonal networks. This type of party is rare, but might obviously be prone to dynastic politics. A second type of party model, the "catch-all" party (Kirchheimer, 1966), places some emphasis on cultivating membership and participation in the party organization among voters, but this membership is generally weak, and party leaders attempt to competitively mobilize a wider group of voters. Candidates and parties behave like political entrepreneurs, seeking to broker benefits and policies between the state and civil society. Throughout most of postwar Japanese history, the LDP conformed largely to this model of party organization. A third type of party model, the "cartel party," entails parties that mutually seek ways to constrain political competition to stay in power. Individual politicians view politics as a profession, and membership among citizens is not important. Over time, the LDP has increasingly moved toward this model of party organization, as its membership and popularity in the electorate, and thus its secure control of the government, has waned.

Each of these party models is in contrast to the traditional "mass party" model (Duverger, 1954), which is a party that is organized around "pre-defined and well-defined social groups, membership in which is bound up in all aspects of an individual's life" (Katz and Mair, 1995, p. 6). This type of mass party model is typical of many early Western European class-based and religious parties (Duverger, 1954; Neumann, 1956; Worley, 2009), as well as the Komeito and JCP in Japan (Smith, 2014), and to a lesser extent, the JSP and DSP. In the mass party model, the party is the representative agent of distinct social groups, and responsible for articulating their political demands. To the extent that the extra-parliamentary support bases of mass parties are concentrated among these social groups, party leaders can be expected to screen and select candidates with backgrounds in these groups (Müller, 2000).

The extra-parliamentary support bases of mass parties should provide a greater supply of potential non-legacy candidates, and this in turn should decrease the dynastic bias in the demand for candidates by parties (since they have ample access to non-legacy candidates to nominate). For example, mass parties based around labor unions or religious movements can recruit candidates from within those groups. To a

mass party, the extra-parliamentary support base provides a ready pool of potential candidates, as well as the added advantage that these candidates have, in a sense, already been pre-screened to ensure a match with the goals and ideology of the party. In contrast, for parties that lack such organizational ties to groups in civil society, it may be more difficult to attract a steady supply of non-legacy candidates.[10] Thus, we might expect that:

> **(H5)** *The demand for a legacy candidate will be higher in parties with weaker organizational linkages to groups in civil society.*

Similarly, external shocks to a party's organizational needs may result, at least temporarily, in an increase in the dynastic bias in candidate selection. For example, if a party's traditional support base is weakened, legacy candidates may become an expedient source of "warm bodies" to nominate. Such a situation might occur for labor movement-based parties, for instance, if certain industries are replaced or union membership declines. The imposition of a quota for gender representation is another example of an external shock that may temporarily increase the number of legacy candidates if parties turn to female relatives of male incumbents to help fill the quota.[11] The same may be true for term limits (Querubin, 2011; Labonne, Parsa and Querubin, 2015). Similarly, when the dual mandate allowing Irish MPs to sit both in parliament and in local councils was abolished in 2003, many of the incumbents who gave up their local seats were conveniently replaced by their family members, who co-opted into the local councils.

An additional source of variation between parties is the set of internal rules governing the candidate selection process. As we have noted, the candidate selection processes in parties operate below the electoral system level of institutional analysis, but can also affect the supply and demand incentives confronting candidate selection decisions (Norris, 1997). However, the consequences of different methods of candidate selection are sometimes ambiguous. For example, a decentralized or internally democratic method of candidate selection may seem normatively desirable, but depending on the context of the political system and the role each individual member plays in policymaking, it may not make much of a difference in actual policy outcomes (Crotty, 1968; Cross, 2008). Moreover, a more centralized recruitment process could ultimately result in better representational and public policy outcomes.

The comparative literature on candidate selection suggests that variation in the candidate selection methods used by parties can have an impact on political outcomes, even beyond the well-studied influence of electoral systems. For example, Michael Gallagher suggests that the influence of candidate selection institutions might be reflected in (1) candidate characteristics, (2) candidate and legislator behavior, and even (3) party cohesion (Gallagher, 1988*a*, p. 12). In other words, *how* a party selects its candidates, and *who* within the party decides the nominations, can have an impact on the types of candidates who are ultimately nominated by the party.

Reuven Hazan and Gideon Rahat (2010) describe four dimensions on which candidate selection institutions can vary. The first is *candidacy*, which refers to the eligibility of citizens to become a candidate from a party. This dimension can range from very inclusive (anyone can offer themselves up as a candidate, as in the United States) to

[10] This certainly appears to be the case in the most dynastic parties in India (Chhibber, 2013).

[11] The dynamics of gender representation and dynastic politics are discussed in Chapter 7.

more exclusive (e.g., only party members or those who collected enough signatures or other such requirement are eligible). The second dimension is the *selectorate*, which refers to the group of actors who decide the nomination. The selectorate can also range from inclusive (the extreme end being that all primary voters get to decide) to more exclusive (the extreme end being a single party leader). The third dimension is the *appointment or voting system*. This is simply the method or voting rule used to determine the nominee. The last dimension is *decentralization*, which refers to the arena in which the decision process is undertaken (e.g., a local arena or a centralized, national arena). Variation on each of these dimensions can produce different outcomes in the types of candidates who are selected, and their behavior once in office.

For example, although candidates in the U.S. and Canada are both selected at the local (decentralized) level, the degree of inclusiveness in the candidacy and selectorate dimensions differs. In the U.S., virtually anyone can attempt to win a party's nomination through the primary process, which is determined by voters (i.e., an inclusive candidacy and selectorate). In Canada, candidate selection processes in parties can vary from constituency to constituency, with most candidates chosen in a much more exclusive vote by local party members, or in some cases through direct selection by the national party leader (Erickson and Carty, 1991). The distinction can also be illustrated with the case of the LDP in Japan—the introduction of open recruitment in 2004 increased the inclusiveness of the candidate pool, while the selectorate remained predominately exclusive and decentralized to local party elites (albeit with slightly more oversight from national party leaders than in the past).

When it comes to dynastic politics, although each of the dimensions may potentially have an effect on the dynastic bias in candidate selection, the most important is arguably the level of centralization in candidate selection. In order for party leaders at the national level to pursue their goals in terms of party personnel, they need to have control over nomination decisions. Increased decentralization of the candidate selection process may increase the ability for a retiring incumbent to pass his or her electoral "rights" to a chosen successor, regardless of the national party's preferences. Moreover, if candidate selection decisions are decentralized to local party organizations or primary elections, then legacy candidates might be more frequently targeted for recruitment, regardless of the degree of personalism expected from the country's electoral rules. Michael Gallagher elaborates on this point (Gallagher, 1988*a*, pp. 13-14):

> ...when selection is firmly under the control of local members, more interested in whether aspirants have 'paid their dues' with a solid track record at the local level than in their likely parliamentary capacities, the resulting parliamentarians might be older and less well educated, more likely to have local roots and to be long-standing members of the local party organization... It is possible that a locally controlled process will result in a higher proportion of deputies who are related to previous deputies, as locally prominent political families manage to pass a seat on from one generation to another.

If nomination decisions are heavily influenced or controlled by local bosses or powerful political families, then such bossism may prevail in the form of legacy candidates being nominated. As E.E. Schattschneider famously puts it, "The nature of the nomination procedure determines the nature of the party; he who can make the nominations is the owner of the party" (Schattschneider, 1942, p. 64). Even in the absence of strong bossism, if candidate nomination decisions are made locally, then a local notable with

name recognition will likely be advantaged over an outsider with no ties to the district. Legacy candidates inherently feature this advantage in name recognition and local ties.

The above consideration of decentralization or sectionalism in the nomination process may seem similar to what Carey and Shugart (1995) indicate in their first criterion for evaluating the level of personalism in electoral systems: the degree of party leadership control over access to and rank on ballots. However, their conception of this criterion has more to do with voter influence over outcomes through primary elections and preference voting, than with variations in the location and identity of who controls access within the party organization. Because parties operate within electoral systems, it is often the case that the structure of party organizations and candidate selection processes are heavily correlated with the electoral system in use, with the direction of causality unclear. For example, the political entrepreneurs and professional politicians of the catch-all and cartel party models are likely to thrive under candidate-centered electoral contexts, and may resist attempts at party centralization over nominations. In contrast, the mass party model is likely to flourish in party-centered contexts, but party-centered electoral systems such as CLPR may also be chosen precisely because of the pre-existing nature of cleavages or divisions in society (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967).

Nevertheless, there can be variation in party centralization in the recruitment process not only between countries using different electoral systems, but also between different parties within a single country, and even the same party over time, or across different regions and districts. Some parties exhibit a higher degree of centralized control over the candidate selection process, and this centralization may be unrelated to the context of the electoral rules (Lundell, 2004), even if parties generally try to shape their candidate selection strategies based in part on the electoral incentives they face—both routinely as part of the institutional structure of elections, and in response to specific electoral challenges (Epstein, 1980; Mair, Müller and Plasser, 2004).

The candidate selection process is regulated by law in some democracies, including the U.S., Germany, Finland, New Zealand, and Norway (prior to 2002). However, parties in other democracies have more flexibility, and exhibit greater variation in the selection procedures used. For example, in Italy, national leaders of Christian Democracy (DC) did not exercise as much central control over nominations as party leaders in the Italian Socialist Party (PSI) or the neo-fascist Italian Social Movement (MSI). In the Italian Communist Party (PCI), recruitment was carried out by local party organizations, but under very strict directives from the national party headquarters (Wertman, 1988). In Ireland, only Sinn Féin exercises dominant central control over nominations (Gallagher, 1988*b*, p. 124). The other major parties use a more decentralized procedure involving local nominating conventions. In Israel, Labor has generally used a more decentralized process (namely, internal party primary elections) than the other parties, although parties such as Likud and Meretz have also experimented with greater use of party primaries in candidate selection (Shomer, 2009; Akirav, 2010).

In recent years, the three largest parties in Japan have used different processes to recruit their candidates. In both the LDP and the DPJ, most candidates are recruited and selected through the party organization branches at the local level. However, since 1999, the DPJ has experimented with an open recruitment process for its candidate selection, allowing would-be candidates from anywhere in the nation to appeal to the party for a nomination in an open district, including those outside of their home turfs (Smith, Pekkanen and Krauss, 2013). The central party organization plays a

dominant role in screening and selecting these candidates. In contrast, although the LDP introduced a similar open recruitment system beginning in 2004, its system is carried out locally, rather than nationally (Smith and Tsutsumi, 2016). In the LDP system, local party officials are dominant, despite increased scrutiny from the national headquarters. The Komeito is the most centralized of the three main parties, with the central party leadership directly recruiting candidates and determining nominations.

These differences in the degree of centralization in the recruitment process of parties within the same electoral system context suggest an additional source of institutional variation in the supply and demand for legacy candidates. All else equal, we can expect that:

> **(H6)** *The demand for a legacy candidate will be higher where the candidate selection process and decision are decentralized to local actors.*

Note, however, that this hypothesis may also be highly correlated with the organizational strength of a party, and that electoral reforms that make elections more party-centered may also increase the organizational strength of parties and encourage party leaders to centralize the candidate selection process. Note also that the logic here applies primarily to the selection of rank-and-file candidates—very centralized parties that are personalistic in nature may be more likely to be dynastic at the leadership level (Chhibber, 2013).

Other party-level variables, such as the degree of inclusiveness in the selectorate or eligibility dimensions of candidate selection, may also play a role. For example, increasing the inclusiveness of the eligibility requirements for candidacy may invite more outsiders to apply, most of whom will of course be non-legacy candidates. This might potentially increase the relative supply of high-quality non-legacy candidates from which parties can choose. Some parties may also have idiosyncratic rules that discourage the formation of dynasties. For example, in pre-1993 Italy, the Italian Communist Party (PCI) routinely practiced an internal party rule of replacement of incumbent candidates after two terms (Wertman, 1988).[12] If socialization in politics and familiarity with the political process contribute to the supply and quality of would-be legacy successors, then the children of PCI incumbents would be at a considerable disadvantage in terms of exposure to a life of politics through their parents.

3.2.3 Individual-Level and District-Level Factors

In addition to electoral and party institutions, there may also be a number of factors at the individual level or district level that can affect demand for legacy candidates. Such factors are likely to vary from country to country, or across different parties, but two are worth noting as general hypotheses.

First, the sudden death of an incumbent might increase the dynastic bias in candidate selection. When an incumbent dies in office, a legacy candidate may be viewed as an easy replacement in the ensuing by-election (if by-elections are held), regardless of the institutional context. For example, many Irish legacy MPs first gained their seats in the by-elections held to replace their deceased relatives (Gallagher, 2003), and many

[12] Italian deputies were eligible for a state-provided pension after two terms. The JCP's politicians were required by the party to retire after reaching eligibility and give part of the pension back to the party, thus increasing the party's funds.

female MPs in the U.S. and elsewhere first entered politics when their husbands died in office (Werner, 1966; Kincaid, 1978).

An example from Japan is the experience of the Seko dynasty. Seko Koichi was an LDP MP for Wakayama Prefecture from 1932 until 1960. After losing his seat, he passed the baton to his son, Seko Masataka, who was successfully elected in 1967. Masataka lost the next election in 1969, but in 1971 ran successfully for the House of Councillors and represented Wakayama for five terms. On September 25, 1998, Masataka died suddenly in office at the age of 75. His nephew, 35-year-old Seko Hiroshige, was working in Tokyo as an employee of NTT, the largest telecommunications company in the world. Although Hiroshige had never lived in Wakayama, and had no previous aspirations to go into politics, party leaders in the LDP, particularly those belonging to the same intraparty faction as his uncle (the faction of Mori Yoshiro), convinced him to run in the November 8 by-election. It didn't matter that Hiroshige had no prior political experience or direct ties to Wakayama; what mattered was that he was a Seko.[13] He won the three-way by-election race with 50 percent of the vote. As an individual-level factor affecting demand, we might therefore expect that:

(H7) *The demand for a legacy candidate will be higher following the death of an incumbent.*

It should be noted that death in office may be highly correlated with an incumbent's age and length of tenure—a popular politician may be more likely to continue running and winning until he or she dies, and conversely, incumbents who die at a young age will be less likely to have children who are old enough to be eligible to run. But if the sudden death of an incumbent increases the dynastic bias (DB_{it}), then the interaction term in the theoretical model ($IIA_{it} * DB_{it}$) would mean that even weaker incumbents who die in office would have a higher probability of being succeeded by a family member. However, if the mechanism works through the pathway of by-elections, death in office may not be relevant in most list-based systems that do not use by-elections to replace incumbents who leave office.

Second, although the existing empirical evidence is mixed, rural areas may feature a higher level of dynastic bias in candidate selection than urban areas, both due to a smaller supply of potential candidates if there is malapportionment, but also due to greater demand for the kind of representation legacy candidates might provide. Legislator effort at "bringing home the pork" is likely to be higher in constituencies where voters are more attached to a particular candidate than they are to a party (Keefer and Khemani, 2009). If nomination decisions are made locally in nominal-vote districts, then rural or underdeveloped districts may be more susceptible to dynastic politics than urban districts, as a legacy candidate from a powerful political family might be expected to bring home greater amounts of such particularistic benefits (Taniguchi, 2008; Asako et al., 2015). Nominating a legacy candidate may help to ensure a continued "pipeline to pork" (Scheiner, 2006). Communities of voters in rural districts may also be more closely knit, and more inclined to support a "favorite son" than voters in urban districts. Thus, as a final demand-side hypothesis, we might expect that:

(H8) *The demand for a legacy candidate will be higher in rural areas than in urban areas.*

[13] Interview with Seko Hiroshige in Tokyo, June 9, 2011 (in Japanese).

3.2.4 Putting It All Together

In sum, the comparative theory I propose to explain variation in dynastic candidate selection across time and space encompasses supply and demand factors that are in turn influenced predominantly by the institutional context of the electoral system and party organizations. On the supply-side, we can expect that longer-serving incumbents and incumbents with a family history of supplying candidates to national politics will be more likely to produce potential legacy successors, thanks in part to the political socialization of family members. As a result, all democracies will inevitably exhibit some level of dynastic politics that flows from this supply of legacy candidates.

The key factors for explaining variation in dynastic politics across countries and parties, however, reside in the demand-side calculus of candidate selection within parties. Specifically, the interaction term in the theoretical model predicts that any factor which increases the dynastic bias (DB_{it}) will result in a situation where the potential value of the inherited incumbency advantage (IIA_{it}) can be lower and still be of significant utility to a party. I have focused my attention on a few key hypotheses that can be derived from the theoretical model, though others are also possible. The most important of these hypotheses for my argument are that the bias toward the recruitment and selection of legacy candidates will be higher under candidate-centered elections and where parties are weak or decentralized. Electoral systems and other institutions that generate conditions for candidate-centered elections will increase the vote-earning utility of a legacy candidate's inherited incumbency advantage to a party. Parties and other actors involved in candidate selection will thus favor legacy candidates when they are available, and possibly even seek them out. In addition, where the dynastic bias is higher, the value of the candidate's inherited incumbency advantage can be lower and still be of vote-earning utility to a party.

Of course, candidate-centered elections may also generate conditions for greater incumbency advantage and greater successive wins by the outgoing incumbent. In this respect, the characteristics of incumbents can also be considered an outcome of the institutional context. But in terms of the recruitment of *new candidates*, the attributes of the outgoing incumbent candidate instead can be thought of as inputs into the next nomination decision, and these inputs are interpreted in the context of the institutional setting within which decisions are taken. A predecessor's winning record may translate to an inherited incumbency advantage for his or her successor, but such an advantage is likely to be of more utility to a party if the dynastic bias is high. The dynastic bias will be especially high when elections are candidate centered, and when the candidate selection process is left to local actors.

3.3 The Comparative Evidence

How well does my theoretical model of dynastic candidate selection explain the variation in the empirical record documented in Chapter 2? The crux of my research design and identification strategy relies on institutional reform in Japan as a natural experiment. However, a brief exploration of the comparative evidence may be informative before I present the detailed hypotheses, derived from the theory, which I will take to the empirical data from Japan.

As previously noted, testing the theory with cross-national and cross-party data poses two main challenges. First, such comparisons are vulnerable to numerous confounding variables, since unique historical trajectories, culture, and individual political

leaders all could potentially mitigate the institutional incentives for dynastic politics in a given party or country. It is even more difficult to determine whether observed differences in dynastic politics are attributable to the electoral or party institutions in small-N comparative studies where variation on these variables may be limited. As such, the comparative evidence can at most be considered suggestive evidence, not the kind of "smoking gun" evidence we might want in order to make strong causal inferences about the relationship between institutions and dynastic candidate selection.

For example, of the countries for which comparative data are available, only Ireland uses the STV electoral system. My comparative theory would predict that the intraparty competition under STV, much like under SNTV, should increase the value of the personal vote and thus increase the dynastic bias in candidate selection. Indeed, the empirical record presented in Chapter 2 shows that dynastic politics have been much more prevalent in Ireland than in many other democracies, and similar to the level of dynastic politics in Japan under SNTV. Empirical work on Ireland has also confirmed that legacy candidates enjoy an inherited incumbency advantage in elections and cabinet selection (Smith and Martin, 2016). However, without additional country cases that use STV, it is hard to say whether the observed level of dynastic politics in Ireland is a result of the electoral system rather than some other omitted variables unique to Ireland.

Similarly, dynastic politics have been comparatively more prevalent in parties in Belgium, which uses OLPR, and the intraparty competition inherent under OLPR should, according to my theory, increase the dynastic bias.[14] However, dynasties have been relatively less prevalent in the other OLPR cases of Finland, Switzerland, and pre-1993 Italy.[15] Does this mean that intraparty competition under OLPR does not increase the dynastic bias? Or could there be other factors at the system or party levels in Finland, Switzerland, and Italy (such as district magnitude or party size) that mitigate the effect?

Dynasties have also been quite prevalent in some Israeli and Norwegian parties, and extremely prevalent in Icelandic parties. All three countries, as well as Italy since 2006, use a CLPR system.[16] CLPR should, according to my theory, decrease the dynastic

[14] Technically, Belgium is a "flexible list" PR system. Voters may vote for a party list as ordered, or cast preference votes for one or more candidates, or even alternate candidates. However, only half of the "straight" party list votes are distributed to candidates (in order of their original ranking), and then the candidates with the most votes on the list (given the sum of preference votes and party list order votes) are elected, so preference voting can make a difference in who ultimately gets elected. The Belgian electoral reform of 2003 increased the size of the districts (eleven in total) and introduced a 5 percent vote share threshold for representation, but did not change the fundamental electoral rules.

[15] Switzerland switched from a two-round system in SMDs to a mostly OLPR system in 1919, though SMDs still exist in the five smallest cantons.

[16] Fifty-four of the sixty-three seats in the Icelandic Althingi are allocated on the basis of CLPR (d'Hondt method) in six or seven districts with ten to eleven seats each. The remaining nine seats are supplementary seats added to particular districts in order to give each party a total number of seats in proportion to its share of the national vote (but a party must win at least five percent of the national vote to be eligible for a supplementary seat). In Norway, 150 of 169 seats are proportionally allocated to parties within districts using the Sainte Laguëmethod. The remaining nineteen seats, one from each district, are allocated as supplementary (at-large) seats in order to achieve national proportionality. Voters in Norway are allowed to reorder the candidates on party lists, or cross candidates' names off the list, but for these changes to be enacted over half of the party's voters have

bias relative to the other common electoral systems. However, without the availability of a counterfactual "Israel," "Norway," or "Iceland" operating under an alternative electoral system, we cannot hope to isolate the effects of the electoral institutions from other factors, such as the size of the party or population. The same issues apply to Canada, the U.S., pre-1996 New Zealand (all FPTP), and Australia (AV).

In addition, the MP-level comparative dataset does not distinguish between MPs elected in FPTP contests versus CLPR in the mixed-member systems of Germany, post-1996 New Zealand, Italy (1993-2006), and South Korea. At the MP-level, electoral reforms in Italy, New Zealand, and Japan also complicate cross-national comparisons, since MPs in any given post-reform year will have been recruited under completely different institutional contexts (however, with the detailed candidate-level data in JHRED, the mixed-member system and electoral reforms in Japan will prove important to my later empirical strategy).

The second challenge to cross-national and cross-party tests of my theory is the fact that parties' recruitment methods may vary across time or districts within countries, and are often opaque to outside observers. Only a handful of studies have tried to systematically categorize the recruitment processes of parties (e.g., Lundell, 2004; Hazan and Rahat, 2010; Shomer, 2014), and most often only at static points in time. In reality, party recruitment processes change occasionally, and can even differ across districts in the same election. Thus, static measures of party organizational strength or centralization are likely to introduce bias into any comparative analysis. At the same time, dynamic measures of party-level differences can be difficult to code without access to the internal rules of candidate selection within parties over time. Finally, as with electoral institutions, unless a party experiences some form of exogenous shock to its organization or internal rules and processes, we cannot ascertain the counterfactual level of dynastic politics that such a party might have had under different contexts.

Nevertheless, the comparative MP-level *Dynasties in Democracies Dataset* can be used to produce some *prima facie* evidence in support of a few of the hypotheses just presented. First, we can explore the supply-side hypothesis (H1) that longer-serving incumbents will be more likely to have a legacy successor who wants to run. This hypothesis is closely related to (H3), the demand-side hypothesis that parties will want to nominate a potential legacy candidate whose predecessor had a strong incumbency advantage (to the extent that this might be indicated by length of time in office). Previous country-specific studies in the U.S. (Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009), the Philippines (Querubin, 2016), the U.K. (Van Coppenolle, 2015), and Argentina (Rossi, 2016) have all found that longer tenures in office are associated with a higher probability of founding or continuing a dynasty.

In Figure 3.1, I show the predicted probability (by country) that an individual lower chamber MP in the comparative dataset will be followed into office by a family member ($Senior = 1$) given the number of terms he or she served in parliament before leaving politics (e.g., due to death, defeat, or retirement).[17] I restrict the sample to the final term served by MPs who stopped running between 1945 (because pre-1945 data are not available for most countries) and 2005 (in order to allow some time for future

to make the same change. So in practice, list changes rarely occur, making the system CLPR for all purposes. Italy's PR system after 2006 included a majoritarian seat bonus to whichever electoral list or coalition won the most votes.

[17] The predicted probabilities are based on a simple logit regression of *Senior* (a dummy variable equal to one if the MP preceded a relative in office) on the interaction of *Number of terms served* and a categorical variable indicating the MP's *Country*.

family members to enter the data). In addition, I exclude Belgium, Germany, Iceland, Italy, and Norway because the data for those countries may not cover the total number of terms served by each MP (i.e., the dataset doesn't count terms that were served before the first observational year in the data), and South Korea, which was not fully democratic until 1988. This leaves nine countries that are suitable for comparison. Finally, because the number of MPs with more than ten terms before leaving office is low in some of these countries (particularly Israel), which creates much less precise estimates at the higher end of *Number of terms served*, I group all MPs who served ten or more terms together.[18]



Figure 3.1: Cross-national predicted probability of preceding a family member in office, by number of terms served.

Note: Data sample restricted to final term in parliament for MPs who served between 1945-2005. Belgium, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and South Korea are excluded. Predicted probabilities estimated based on a logit regression of *Senior* on the interaction of *Number of terms served* and *Country* (without other controls) using the margins command in Stata.

[18] The longest serving MP in the entire comparative dataset is U.S. Democratic Party Representative John Dingell, Jr., who served thirty terms and was succeeded in office by his wife, Debbie Dingell. John Dingell, Jr. himself succeeded his father, John Dingell, Sr. Together, the Dingells have served 83 years in Congress. In the subsample of MPs who stopped running between 1945-2005, the longest serving MP is U.S. Representative Jamie Lloyd Whitten (twenty-seven terms). The longest serving Japanese MP in the dataset (and subsample) is Ozaki Yukio (twenty-five terms), followed by Nakasone Yasuhiro and Hara Kenzaburo (twenty terms each).

The basic pattern in Figure 3.1 provides evidence in support of the hypothesis that longer serving MPs will be more likely to have a family member follow them into office. In each country, the probability of preceding a family member increases with the length of time an MP spends in office, and the relationship is always statistically significant. This relationship between length of tenure and probability of preceding a family member in politics could be in part because longer serving MPs lead to a larger supply of legacy candidates (H1), but also in part because there is larger demand for legacy candidates whose predecessors served many terms (H3).

The relative contributions of supply and demand *within* in each country cannot be disentangled with the observational data. However, the differences *across* countries suggest that there is some variation in demand for dynasties in different democracies. Most notably, there is a higher probability that an MP will precede a family member in Ireland, Japan, and Israel, even at shorter lengths of tenure in office.[19] For MPs in Ireland, Israel, and Japan who serve ten or more terms before leaving office, the predicted probability of having a family member follow in their political footsteps is over 40 percent. In contrast, the pattern among the other countries—Australia, Canada, Finland, New Zealand, Switzerland, and the United States—is remarkably similar, despite the fact that the number of years accounted for by each term can vary across countries and time.

Why does this variation suggest differences in demand rather than supply? Suppose the probability of an MP preceding a family were related *only* to supply. If that were true, then we might expect the relationship to be roughly equivalent across all countries, as it indeed appears to be for most of the countries in the comparative dataset. The logic is that most MPs are capable of having children, and all are likely to have some number of close relatives; the longer an MP serves in office, the more time one or more of these relatives has to be socialized into politics. This socialization process should account for the largest component of the supply of legacy candidates.

One might imagine that variation in the supply of legacy candidates might occur if the economic payoffs to political office were significantly different across countries, such that even the children or relatives of MPs who served short terms might have strong economic reasons to seek office themselves. I lack data on the economic payoffs to political office across these countries, but see no reason to expect that they should be significantly higher in Ireland, Japan, and Israel than in the other six countries. Rather, the differences in the countries are more likely to flow from differences in demand for legacy candidates in the candidate selection processes within parties, i.e., differences that would increase the dynastic bias in the theoretical model.

The comparative dataset also allows us to get a sense of the second supply-side hypothesis (H2), that a legacy MP will be more likely than a non-legacy MP to precede

[19] In order to keep the differences between countries visible, Figure 3.1 does not show the confidence intervals of the predicted probabilities. The confidence intervals for Japan and Israel overlap across all number of terms served. The confidence interval for Japan overlaps with the confidence interval for Ireland at eight terms, and with New Zealand and Switzerland at nine terms. The confidence interval for Japan does not overlap with the confidence intervals of any other country. The confidence intervals for Israel and Ireland overlap at six terms. The confidence intervals for the countries in the lower part of the figure are completely overlapping until six terms, when New Zealand and the United States no longer overlap.

a family member in office, due to his or her existing family history in politics.[20] Figure 3.2 disaggregates the MPs in each of the nine countries in Figure 3.1 into two categories of legacy status (non-legacy and legacy) and shows the predicted probability that an individual MP in each category of legacy status will be followed into office by a family member given the number of terms he or she served in parliament before leaving politics. In all nine countries, the probability of having a family member follow in an MP's footsteps is higher if that MP had also followed in the footsteps of a family member. The only exception is for Israeli MPs who serve eight or more terms; however, the number of such MPs is small and the confidence intervals at such tenure lengths are wide and overlapping (Figure A.2 in Appendix A shows the confidence intervals).



Figure 3.2: Cross-national predicted probability of preceding a family member in office, by number of terms served and legacy status.
Note: Data sample restricted to final term in parliament for MPs who served between 1945-2005. Belgium, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Norway, and South Korea are excluded. Predicted probabilities estimated based on a logit regression of *Senior* on the three-way interaction of *Number of terms served*, *Country*, and *Legacy* (without other controls) using the margins command in Stata.

The difference in predicted probabilities is particularly striking in the case of Japan, shown in Figure 3.3 with the full range of *Number of terms served* used to predict whether a non-legacy or legacy MP will be followed into parliament by a family member. Because of the prevalence of direct hereditary succession in Japan, I include all

[20] Although I have focused on the demand-side model, this hypothesis can be thought of as a supply-side equivalent to the interaction term in the demand-side model ($IIA_{it} * DB_{it}$). The difference is that DB_{it} operates on the incentives of the potential legacy candidates, rather than the party actors involved in candidate selection.

years from 1947-2012 (excluding only the 2014 election). Even legacy MPs who serve just a few terms in office have a higher than 20 percent probability of preceding another family member in politics, compared to a less than 10 percent probability for non-legacy MPs. At the mean length of tenure—four terms served before leaving office—a legacy MP is over 20 percentage points more likely to have a family member follow them into office than a non-legacy MP. Only after serving fourteen terms is a non-legacy MP just as likely to become the founding member of a new dynasty as a legacy MP from an existing dynasty is to extend that dynasty to a new generation. The longest-serving MPs, whether they are first-generation politicians or members of an existing dynasty, are almost equally assured to become senior members of a democratic dynasty (more than 80 percent probability).



Figure 3.3: Predicted probability of preceding a family member in office, by number of terms served and legacy status (Japan).
Note: Data sample restricted to final term in parliament for MPs who served between 1947-2012. Predicted probabilities estimated based on a logit regression of *Senior* on the interaction of *Number of terms served* and *Legacy* (without other controls) using the margins command in Stata.

These patterns provide some evidence in support of the supply-side hypotheses, and hint at evidence in support of some of the demand-side hypotheses. However, as I have already noted, the comparative data are likely to mask important confounding variables and are vulnerable to a number of measurement issues. For example, one measurement issue in the preceding analysis is that MPs from the same family with overlapping terms are included, so that *Number of terms served* in some instances is measured at a point in time *after* the MP became a *Senior* member of the dynasty.

For the remainder of the book, I will focus on testing the implications of my comparative theory with an in-depth examination in Japan. A focused examination of institutional reform within the single country case of Japan provides several analytical advantages over cross-national comparisons, as it helps us to isolate the influence of institutions from other factors at the system level (including history, culture, population size, or level of economic development), and party level (including idiosyncratic differences related to ideology, personalities of leaders, time-specific events, size and age of the party), that may contribute to a country's patterns in dynastic politics. All of these factors make it difficult to pinpoint the effects of the electoral system and candidate selection institutions in cross-national analyses.

A number of other features of Japan make it an ideal test case for my theory. First, as we have seen, there have been a substantial number of dynasties in Japan, which means that the estimated relationships between variables of interest are less likely to be affected by a handful of observations on particularly "influential" individuals. Second, in addition to the fact that Japan experienced electoral reform, which allows for a before-and-after analysis of dynastic politics, the MMM system it adopted in 1994 combines two systems: FPTP/SMD in one tier and CLPR a second tier. Because they operate simultaneously in the same country and same election, mixed-member systems like Japan's provide an opportunity for a "controlled comparison" of electoral system effects (Moser and Scheiner, 2012). Third, unlike in many of the comparative cases, the general pattern in Japan has been one of direct succession between predecessors and successors; MPs from the same family with overlapping tenures are comparatively less common. This situation allows us to make better inferences about the factors that contribute to hereditary succession at the time it occurs.

3.4 Predictions for the Case of Japan

The SNTV/MMD electoral system used from 1947-1993 resulted in intraparty competition in the LDP and JSP, the two largest paries. As a result, candidates campaigned predominantly on the basis of their personal attributes or behavior rather than a commitment to their party label or its national policies. This was especially true for candidates from the LDP. Candidates in the JSP faced less intraparty competition, but faced competition within the socialist camp from the more moderate DSP. Komeito and JCP candidates, in contrast, did not have to face co-partisans or competitors from parties with similar ideologies, and could therefore campaign less on the basis of their personal vote-earning attributes.

In addition, the candidate selection process in the LDP was extremely decentralized. When an LDP candidate retired or died, his or her faction and the candidate's koenkai that played the largest role in finding a successor. Candidate selection within the JSP and DSP was also decentralized, but with greater influence exercised by the two parties' support networks of labor unions. Moreover, labor unions provided a stable supply of qualified candidates for the JSP and DSP to recruit. In contrast, both the Komeito and JCP used highly centralized selection processes. For the pre-reform period, we can make the following predictions:

1. From the supply-side incentives outlined in the theory, we can predict that dynastic candidate selection will be more likely to follow the retirement of long-serving incumbents (H1), and particularly incumbents who were themselves part of an existing dynasty (H2).

2. From the demand-side incentives at the system and party-level, we can predict that dynastic candidate selection will be higher in the LDP and JSP, where district elections involved intraparty or intra-camp competition, making elections and candidate selection more candidate-centered (H4). We can also predict more dynastic politics in the LDP due to its weaker organization than the JSP and other parties (H5) and its more decentralized candidate selection process (H6), though the relative importance of these factors is more difficult to assess.
3. Finally, from the demand-side incentives at the individual and district-level, we can predict that candidates who won their last election (H3), or died in office (H7) will be more likely to be succeeded by a family member, even holding length of tenure constant. We can also predict that dynastic candidate selection will be more common in rural districts (H8).

The 1994 electoral reform to MMM and subsequent party reforms in the 2000s has altered the institutional context in which candidate selection decisions are made, particularly within the LDP. The electoral reform eliminated intraparty competition, which dramatically reduced the candidate-centered nature of elections, while simultaneously increasing the importance of party image and policy platforms in voting (Maeda, 2009; Reed, Scheiner and Thies, 2012). In addition, the traditionally decentralized process for candidate selection in the LDP and other parties has changed. Since the 2000s, the LDP and other parties have experimented with new methods in candidate selection that place greater control in the hands of party leaders at the national level—namely through a system of open recruitment that allows any person interested in the nomination to apply directly to the party. The process has been far from smooth, with a key factor in the resistance to candidate selection reform within the LDP being the continued desire among existing dynasties to continue their family business in politics.

My comparative theory would predict a decrease in the dynastic bias in candidate selection, since elections will be less candidate-centered. If name recognition and other PVEA of individual candidates are less important to winning votes, party leaders will be able to focus more on balancing their other policy-making and office-holding goals in candidate selection decisions, and these efforts might also increase the overall image of the party. Thus, my theory would predict a decrease in the *demand* for legacy candidates.

However, there is no reason why the reforms would affect the *supply* of legacy candidates who follow long-term incumbents. The children and other relatives of long-serving MPs will still have stronger personal motivations for running than their counterparts among MPs with shorter tenures. If and when a legacy candidate wants to run, the LDP may still have a difficult time preventing that candidate from securing the nomination, as the candidate selection process, even with open recruitment, is still decentralized. Moreover, according to (H1) and (H2), the legacy candidates who do decide to run will most often be related to long-serving incumbents from existing dynasties, as these individuals are the most likely to have strong supply-side ambitions. Since these supply-side driven legacy candidates are still likely to be of higher quality and vote-earning utility than many non-legacy candidates, the party has even fewer incentives to pass them over, even if national-level politicians are involved in the decision.

On the other hand, since the value of the dynastic bias will be lower under the new system, party actors involved in candidate selection will have fewer reasons to seek out *weaker* legacy candidates (since the personal vote matters less). In addition,

they will have more opportunities to find credible alternative candidates (thanks to the open recruitment system). The implication is that we should observe fewer legacy candidates who are related to weak incumbents, and fewer examples, such as Seko Hiroshige in Wakayama, of legacy candidates who are pulled into running by party actors. This means the realized inherited incumbency advantage and overall quality of new legacy candidates should actually be *higher* under the new system than under the old system, even though there will be proportionally fewer legacy candidates. For the post-reform period, we can make the following predictions:

5. From the supply-side incentives, we can predict that dynastic candidate selection will continue to be more likely to follow the retirement of long-serving incumbents (H1), and particularly incumbents who were themselves part of an existing dynasty (H2).
6. From the demand-side incentives at the system and party-level, we can predict that dynastic candidate selection will decrease in the LDP and other parties following the exit of weaker incumbents in the FPTP/SMD tier of the new mixed system (H4), and particularly after party reforms centralizing selection (H6).
7. Finally, we can predict that dynastic candidate selection will be lower in the CLPR tier of the new mixed system than in the FPTP/SMD tier, as name recognition is not important for winning election (H4).

3.5 History or Culture as Alternative Explanations?

My argument is that institutions, namely the electoral system and candidate selection process in the LDP, helped to foster the emergence and rampant spread of dynastic politics in Japan. However, an alternative explanation might be that Japanese politicians, or Japanese people more generally, are historically or culturally predisposed to dynastic politics. After all, Japan has had a long history of feudalism and a highly hierarchical social system. Could Japan's postwar experience with dynastic politics simply be a cultural legacy of its past? It is useful to briefly explore this alternative explanation as background before documenting in the next chapter the evolution in dynastic politics in Japan as evidence against such an account.

Japan has indeed had a long history of hereditary succession in politics, as well as in other occupations. Hereditary rule under the Yamato clan was established in much of Japan by 500 AD, and formalized as an imperial system by the mid 600s (Totman, 1981, pp. 21-25). This early imperial rule descended into chaos in the twelfth century with hereditary military dictators (*shogun*) competing for control of the archipelago, until the Tokugawa clan, led by Tokugawa Ieyasu, finally solidified control in 1600. Under Tokugawa rule from 1600-1868, Japanese society was highly stratified, and hereditary roles were maintained and enforced through strict rules. The feudal lords (*daimyo*) were at the top of this hierarchy, followed by the samurai warrior caste, who eventually began to take on more of a bureaucratic role in the state. Farmers, artisans, and merchants ranked below. Anthropologist Ruth Benedict (1946, p. 61) notes the rigidity of this class hierarchy:

> Japanese feudal society was elaborately stratified and each man's status was fixed by inheritance. The Tokugawas solidified this system and regulated the details of each caste's daily behavior. Every family head had to post on his doorway his class position and the required facts about his hereditary status.

Some class mobility was possible in the later years of the Tokugawa period through marriages of mutual convenience between merchant and farming families whose wealth was increasing, and lower ranking samurai families who were on the decline (Isoda, 1998), and many prosperous merchants and wealthy farmers (*gono*) were even granted semi-samurai status and allowed to take family names (Reischauer, 1990; Pratt, 1999). However, male children were generally expected to inherit the same class and occupation of their fathers. Tokugawa Tsunenari, the eighteenth head of the Tokugawa lineage, explains how the education system reinforced the rigid occupational structure of Tokugawa Japan: "each child would use a textbook suited to his father's occupation, to which he was expected to succeed in the future. There were around seven thousand different textbooks in Tokugawa Japan" (Tokugawa, 2009, p. 117).

Following the Meiji Restoration in 1868, the Tokugawa caste system was abolished, and greater political participation was allowed. In the 1870s, the government under Emperor Meiji allowed all non-samurai to take on surnames, and granted the freedom to intermarry between classes, purchase land, and choose one's own profession. The samurai's stipend was abolished in 1876, effectively eliminating them as a class and ushering in greater political opportunities for rural elites, wealthy businessmen, and landlords, many of whom became active in the Popular Rights Movement in the late 1800s to establish a Constitution and an elective assembly (Pratt, 1999, pp. 32-40).

Such an assembly, the National Diet, was ultimately established in 1890 under the Meiji Constitution. The upper chamber of the new assembly, the House of Peers, was modeled after the British House of Lords and restricted to hereditary peers of noble decent and appointees chosen by the Emperor with consultation from the Privy Council. Imperial appointees included personal appointments at the discretion of the Emperor, representatives of the highest taxpayers, and representatives from the Imperial Academy. Princes of the blood (who were related to the imperial family, but not in the direct line of succession) were entitled to sit by hereditary right, but they did not exercise this right, nor did they contest elections for the lower chamber, the House of Representatives, which was designed to be closer to the people, like the British House of Commons. Nevertheless, participation in House of Representatives elections was initially open only to wealthy citizens who could meet the high tax requirement for voting rights and eligibility for public office. In the first Diet election in 1890, about one-third of those who were elected came from the former samurai caste. The rest were local notables (*chiho meiboka*) who were both "locally secure and securely local" (Gluck, 1985, p. 69).[21]

These elected members of the House of Representatives struggled to introduce increased popular rights and party-based cabinet politics, blocked by the Meiji oligarchs who controlled the House of Peers and the Privy Council. Their efforts were made all the more difficult because the parties during this period—including the two main parties in the House of Representatives, the Seiyukai and the Kenseikai—were internally divided and unstable. Nevertheless, the period of time between the end of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 and the assassination of Prime Minister Inukai Tsuyoshi and fall of the Seiyukai party cabinet in 1932 is generally referred to as the period of Taisho Democracy (named after Emperor Taisho, who succeeded Emperor Meiji in 1912 and ruled until 1926), as it seemed as though the development of party politics was beginning to give greater democratic voice to the common man (Gordon, 2003, p. 161).

[21] See also Scalapino (1953), Mason (1969, pp. 130-144).

The electoral system for the House of Representatives changed multiple times as a consequence of compromises between the oligarchs and party actors, each with their own preferences. The first electoral law employed a plurality system in small districts, with district magnitude being only one or two seats, with one or two votes given to voters. This system was opposed by oligarchs such as Yamagata Aritomo, who feared the development of strong parties, as well as party advocates like Ito Hirobumi, who disliked the cost and localism of the small district system, and believed (perhaps erroneously) that larger-sized districts would shift the focus to candidates with a more national base, would lower costs, and would strengthen the foundations of parties (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1995; Kawato, 2002). Thus, the electoral system was changed in 1900 to feature larger districts (M greater than six) and the SNTV voting method. The "large-sized" district system was again replaced with a small-sized district system in 1919, with M ranging from one to three seats, but SNTV was retained.[22] Finally, in 1925, universal male suffrage was adopted, and the electoral system again changed to a "medium-sized" (M ranging from three to five) system that would be used for the remainder of the prewar period and again after 1947.

Despite the expansion in suffrage, candidates with local prestige or connections continued to be heavily favored in candidate selection and elections, as did candidates from the former samurai class. Partly, this was due to the imposition in 1925 of a steep election deposit system, with the requirement that a candidate overcome a threshold of one-tenth of the total vote in the district divided by district magnitude in order to have the deposit reimbursed. The deposit amount was set at a steep 2,000 yen, which would have been roughly $1,000 at the time, or roughly $15,800 if adjusted to today's prices (Harada and Smith, 2014). Naturally, this meant that only wealthy or well-supported candidates could afford to run. Harold Quigley (1932, pp. 264-265) notes that candidates from powerful local families were the most successful at getting elected during the years of Taisho Democracy:

> Personal prestige appears to be the essential quality in a candidate. A connection to a formerly powerful clan, relationship to a locally respected family, reputation for cleverness as a journalist or speaker—these attributes are highly regarded by the voters. Party platforms are too indefinite and the speeches of politicians too vague to afford even the well-educated voter a hold on reality. The respect felt for officials contributes to the success of candidates who hold, or have held, prefectural or municipal offices.

In these respects, the historical evolution of dynastic politics in Japan does not differ dramatically from that of many developing democracies or Western European democracies, where political rights were gradually increased through democratic reforms that lessened the influence of the previous aristocratic elite (e.g., Berlinski, Dewan and Van Coppenolle, 2014). In many European countries, the introduction of parliamentary democracy at first failed to undermine the power of the noble classes, who came to occupy powerful positions in both elective office and the military. For example, in the late 1890s to early 1900s, the share of elected politicians who were descendants of the aristocratic noble classes remained as high as 20 percent in the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands. However, by the end of World War II, only in the United Kingdom did members of the nobility comprise more than 5 percent

[22] Scholars have debated the motivations behind the adoption of SNTV and small, medium, and large-sized districts. For an extensive review of prewar electoral system changes, see Kawato (2002).

(but less than 10 percent) of MPs (Rush, 2000, p. 30).[23] Similarly, we have seen how (non-aristocratic) political dynasties have declined over time in most other countries following democratization. However, Japan's democratic reforms in the Taisho and post-World War II periods, while easing restrictions on political participation, actually *preceded* a dramatic rise in dynasties. Few legacy MPs in the postwar period come from prewar aristocratic families; most come from dynasties that were newly created after full democratization in 1946.

It may also be tempting to ascribe Japan's seeming predisposition to dynastic politics to a cultural norm of filial piety and intergenerational occupational succession that has continued since the Tokugawa times. For example, Benedict argues that, unlike developments in Europe following industrialization and modernization, Japanese tendencies toward feudalism and hierarchy were retained in society, due in part to mechanisms for social mobility that undercut motivations for an even playing field (Benedict, 1946, pp. 72-73). Indeed, many scholars of postwar Japanese politics and society have commented on the continuing hierarchical nature of social groups, modeled after a traditional family system.

One influential view was that vertical hierarchy in Japanese society, whereby social organization is characterized by *oyabun-kobun* (parent-child) relationships, continued since the Tokugawa era, and helps explain modern patterns of succession in business and politics (Bennett and Ishino, 1963; Yoshino, 1968; Nakane, 1970). Nobutaka Ike writes that "the Japanese family puts its emphasis on the continuity of the family line from grandfather to father to son to grandson, and so on...the family is more than a mere grouping of close kin. It has a hierarchical structure" (Ike, 1957, p. 18). Particular obligations are placed on the eldest son, who upon his father's death, is expected to succeed him as head of the household, and who inherits the bulk of the family estate.

When any leader retires, he is expected to designate a successor that is suitable to his group or subordinates. Oftentimes, this is a son—usually the first-born. Other times, it is a non-related successor, such as a personal secretary or close associate. Dynastic succession in Japanese business persists in this form to this day in everything from fish market stalls (Bestor, 2004) to publicly traded firms (Saito, 2008). This type of "successor designation" was also clearly evident in the patterns of jiban transfer during Japan's SNTV/MMD period. Conservative candidates and voters who support the LDP might be especially predisposed to preserving these traditional views of family and obligation.

Historical or cultural explanations are thus common in popular references to dynasties in Japan. For example, a 2008 *Los Angeles Times* newspaper article about Japan's political dynasties quoted a Japanese university professor of public management who hypothesized that:

> The reliance on family succession is historical, a sort of underground current that still flows through Japan, whether in business or in politics. The old ways are changing in business because globalization is forcing companies to compete

[23] Unfortunately, this study measures only relations to the former aristocratic nobility, so levels of legacy relations to new political elites may be somewhat higher. Nevertheless, the general trend toward fewer political dynasties in these countries is empirically true (see Chapter 2).

> abroad and make profits. But politics is strictly domestic. In politics, there is no pressure to change.[24]

On the contrary, dynastic politics in Japan have evolved considerably since institutional reform in the 1990s, which provided the needed pressure to change. The 1994 electoral reform placed greater emphasis on parties and their national platforms. Parties have responded in kind by recruiting fewer candidates from traditional local channels, including legacy candidates, and more candidates who suit their national image or policy goals, such as women, popular celebrities, and policy experts.

If dynastic politics were simply a result of unique aspects of Japan's history or culture, we would not expect to observe much variation across Japanese parties, and yet, there have been considerable differences across parties when it comes to dynastic politics. Moreover, since culture and historical patterns are often resilient, we would not expect to observe much change following institutional reforms to electoral rules or candidate recruitment. Even if dynastic politics were more closely tied to the conservative values of the LDP, we should not expect these values to change dramatically simply because of institutional reform. However, as we will see in the next chapter, the nature of dynastic politics in Japan has changed considerably since the 1994 electoral reform, even as elements of path dependence have conditioned the effects of institutional change.

[24] Wallace, Bruce. "Japan's dynasty politics losing favor among the public." *The Los Angeles Times*, January 22, 2008.

4

Selection: Family Business to Party Priority

> Some American voters will cast their ballot for the Democratic ticket or the Republican ticket merely because their fathers and grandfathers had voted that way. Compared to the United States, attachment to a party label is less strong in Japan; and in keeping with the Japanese mode of politics, loyalty seems to be focused more on individuals. This is probably the reason a jiban can often be transferred from father to son...from man to widow, or from a political leader to his chief disciple.
> - Nobutaka Ike (1957, p. 203)

> It used to be that any fool could get the nomination if he inherited a jiban. Since the reform, we are paying much more attention to candidate selection.
> - Senior official in the LDP party organization, May 31, 2011

Tsushima Yuji was born in Tokyo in 1930 as Shima Yuji, but grew up using his mother's surname, Ueno. He graduated with a law degree from the University of Tokyo, and joined the Ministry of Finance. In 1964, he married the daughter of writer Tsushima Shuji, better known by his nom de plume, Dazai Osamu. Dazai's father, Tsushima Genemon, was a member of the prewar House of Peers from Aomori Prefecture in northern Japan. Dazai's brother, Tsushima Bunji, was the first elected Governor of Aomori from 1947-1956, and an LDP MP for Aomori 1st District from 1958-1963. When Yuji married into the Tsushima family, he adopted his wife's famous surname.

The daughter of Tsushima Bunji was married to Tazawa Kichiro, who served as an LDP MP for neighboring Aomori 2nd District from 1960-1996, thus making Tazawa and Tsushima Yuji cousins by marriage. In 1976, Tazawa and faction leader Ohira Masayoshi recruited Yuji into running for Bunji's former seat, based on his strong qualifications as a former bureaucrat (Ohira had previously met him as Minister of Finance while Yuji was working in the ministry) and his connections to the Tsushima and Tazawa families.[1] He won his first election, and ten consecutive elections after that, eventually rising to the level of leader of his own faction in the LDP, and twice served as Minister of Health.

The Tsushima case is one example of the way in which dynastic recruitment was practiced in Japan during the period from 1947-1993 when the SNTV/MMD electoral system was used to elect members of the House of Representatives. Under

[1] Interviews with Tsushima Yuji in Tokyo, June 14 and 17, 2011 (in English).

SNTV/MMD, larger parties like the LDP routinely nominated multiple candidates in each district, which resulted in elections where candidates campaigned predominantly on their personal vote-earning attributes and behavior, rather than their commitment to the party label or its national policies. A candidate with connections to a previous incumbent, like Tsushima Yuji, thus had a head start in collecting the personal votes needed to win election, even if, as in the case of Tsushima, the connections came through marriage. In addition, the candidate selection process in the LDP was decentralized and dominated by the factions and koenkai affiliated with the previous incumbents.

After electoral reform in 1994, Tsushima won four elections in the new Aomori 1st District in the FPTP/SMD tier of the MMM system. He decided to retire just before the 2009 election, and his son, Tsushima Jun, was selected by the local prefectural organization to run as his replacement. However, the LDP's central party organization overrode the local decision and denied the official nomination to the younger Tsushima. He had to run as an independent and ended up losing the election when a second conservative independent entered the race and split the conservative vote.[2]

This chapter examines the practice of dynastic politics in candidate selection within parties under SNTV/MMD, particularly the LDP, and the changes that have occurred since the adoption of MMM. Under the new system, intraparty competition in the LDP has been eliminated, and elections have increasingly become more party-centered. In addition, party leaders in the LDP and other parties have begun to tighten control over candidate nomination decisions, superseding the previous influence of koenkai members, faction leaders, and other local elites. The result has been a decrease in the dynastic bias in candidate selection, and a concomitant decrease in demand for legacy candidates. However, the predicted effects have been partially mitigated by path dependence and a continued supply of legacy hopefuls. A key factor slowing the effects of electoral reform is that LDP incumbents elected under the previous electoral rules, many of whom want their sons to continue the "family business," have found ways to work around party reforms. Nevertheless, the new legacy candidates who emerge represent a qualitatively different type of legacy politician.

4.1 Elections and Candidate Selection Under SNTV/MMD

For the first postwar election in 1946—the first election with suffrage for women—the provisional government used a limited vote system in large-sized districts. Voters had two to three votes depending on the magnitude of the district, which ranged from four to fourteen seats. This system was very permissive to new candidates from diverse backgrounds. Indeed, over 8 percent of the MPs elected in 1946 were women.[3] In addition, the permissiveness of the system allowed for a proliferation of small and radical parties. The five largest parties were the conservative Liberal Party, the short-lived Progressive Party (also conservative in nature despite its name), the JSP, the JCP, and the leftist Cooperative Party (also ephemeral). However, twenty-eight other minor parties also won seats, as well as eighty-one independents.

In 1947, the Occupation leadership under General Douglas MacArthur allowed Prime Minister Yoshida to reintroduce the medium-sized district electoral system used

[2] Interview with Tsushima Jun in Tokyo, March 15, 2013 (in Japanese).

[3] Source: Election Department, Local Administration Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. See also Darcy and Nixon (1996).

prior to the war (Dower, 1999). From 1947 until 1993, the 466-511 members of the House of Representatives were thus elected by SNTV, with most districts electing between three and five members.[4] The return of smaller-sized districts in 1947 proved a barrier to more diverse representation, and the number of female MPs and minor parties declined rapidly (Darcy and Nixon, 1996).

From 1947 to 1955, party competition narrowed to a few large, though internally divided, parties in three main ideological camps. On the right, the conservative camp contained two main parties: the Liberal Party, led by Yoshida Shigeru, and the Democratic Party, which by the time of the 1955 election was led by former-Liberal Hatoyama Ichiro. On the left, there was a socialist camp (JSP) and a communist camp (JCP). In 1951, the socialist camp was temporarily divided when the JSP split into the Leftist JSP and the Rightist JSP over disagreement about the San Francisco Peace Treaty. However, the two factions of the JSP reconciled their differences and re-united after the 1955 general election, which resulted in the united JSP controlling a third of the seats in the House of Representatives. Faced with what they perceived as a growing threat from the left, the leaders of the conservative Liberal and Democratic parties decided to merge and form the LDP, which would be the dominant party for the next three and a half decades. However, the LDP's divided origins would continue to be reflected in its internal party factions, which competed for control of the party leadership (see Thayer, 1969; Sato and Matsuzaki, 1986; Krauss and Pekkanen, 2011).

In 1960, the socialist camp was divided again when the moderate wing of the JSP (i.e., the formerly Rightist JSP) broke away to form the DSP. In 1964, the religious party Komeito entered the electoral fray. Nevertheless, the relative stability of party competition and LDP dominance from 1955 until 1993, when the LDP lost its majority in the House of Representatives, has earned it the moniker of the "1955 System." During the 1955 System, a pattern developed of relatively stable electoral strength across ideological camps, but intense competition between candidates within the same party or camp.

4.1.1 Elections: Intraparty and Intra-camp Competition

For any party to win more seats than there were districts, it had to nominate several candidates in each district. The LDP nominated multiple candidates in over 80 percent of all district races with more than two seats up for grabs from 1958 (the first election after its founding) to 1993. The second largest party, the JSP, also nominated multiple candidates in many districts, but intraparty competition declined steadily over time—from over 80 percent of districts in 1958 to less than 20 percent by 1980—as the party weakened and was faced with competition from both the DSP and the JCP (which gained in popularity in the 1970s), and even from the Komeito.[5]

[4] The Amami Islands elected a single MP from 1953-1990, when the district became part of Kagoshima 1st District. Eight other districts at some elections returned two MPs. Hokkaido 1st District elected six MPs from 1986-1993, as did Fukuoka 1st District in 1993. For the House of Councillors, which replaced the prewar House of Peers, lawmakers chose a mixed system combining a prefecture-based tier using SNTV to elect 150 members (with magnitude varying by prefecture), and a national tier using SNTV to elect one hundred members in a single, nationwide district. The system for the national tier was changed to CLPR in 1983, and again to OLPR in 2001.

[5] See Figure A.3 in Appendix A for time trends.

As the JSP weakened in electoral strength, nominating multiple candidates in a district could risk splitting the party's support in such a way that no candidate would get elected, an outcome known as "falling together" (*tomodaore*). The party's incumbent candidates no doubt also opposed running extra candidates in elections where they felt insecure (Reed and Bolland, 1999). The Komeito, which held a distant third place for party share of the votes and seats from 1969 until 1993, never nominated more than one candidate in a district, while the JCP and DSP did so in only a small handful of cases.[6] This fragmentation on the left meant that only the LDP nominated enough candidates to secure a majority in the House of Representatives on its own.

Candidates from the LDP and JSP also faced competition within their respective camps from small splinter parties and independent challengers who did not receive, or chose to eschew, the official party nomination. In the case of the LDP, some established incumbents ran as independents after losing the official nomination due to a scandal or party discipline issue. For example, after being implicated in the Lockheed bribery scandal and resigning as prime minister, Tanaka Kakuei ran as an independent from 1976 until 1986. During the same time period, a few other LDP MPs broke with the party and formed the New Liberal Club (NLC), contesting several elections before re-joining the LDP.

Other would-be LDP candidates who did not receive the official nomination would run as LDP-affiliated independents, oftentimes supported unofficially by an LDP faction (Thayer, 1969; Reed, 2009; Nemoto, Pekkanen and Krauss, 2014). Because of the influence of factions in determining the party leader (who, because of the LDP's majority, would become prime minister), faction leaders were constantly seeking to expand their ranks in the Diet. An independent candidate backed by a faction might be able to unseat an LDP incumbent from a rival faction, since the SNTV system meant a candidate could often win with less than 20 percent of the vote. The party's effective nomination policy in these cases was, "if you win, you are LDP" (Reed, 2009). LDP-affiliated independents who were successful in getting elected would be given ex-post nominations by the party and would then join the LDP's legislative caucus. From 1958-1993, an average of eight successful LDP-affiliated independents were given ex-post nominations each election, and in many cases these ex-post nominations helped the party maintain their legislative majority.[7]

JSP-affiliated independents also sometimes ran, though much less frequently. However, JSP candidates faced further competition from the DSP and DSP-affiliated independents. Although JSP and DSP candidates had separate core bases of support (public sector and private sector unions), they still had to compete for the support of non-union, non-JCP voters on the left. Another splinter party, the Social Democratic League (SDL), entered competition in 1978. All of these parties thus competed for votes within the socialist camp. In addition to the conservative and socialist camps, there were the Komeito and JCP camps (which were coterminous with the respective parties apart from a few affiliated independents and small communist-related parties), and a hodgepodge of other minor parties and independents who did not fit into one of these ideological camps (such as far-right extremist candidates).

Candidates thus faced competition not only from their co-partisans within the same party, but (perhaps more importantly) from candidates within the same ideological

[6] The JCP ran multiple candidates in a few districts in early elections, and in the five-member Kyoto district where the party was strong. The DSP ran two candidates in only two districts in the first election after its founding in 1960.

[7] Table A.4 in Appendix A gives detailed data on ex-post nominations.

camp. Grouped according to ideological camp, there were even fewer districts where candidates from the main two camps did not face competition from other co-partisan or co-camp candidates vying for the same pool of voters. While LDP candidates faced intra-camp competition in nearly all districts, JSP candidates faced intra-camp competition in roughly 60 percent of districts since the 1970s, even while official intraparty competition had declined to around 20 percent of districts.

In districts where candidates faced intraparty and intra-camp competition, it was not enough to campaign based on party label or ideology alone. Indeed, many voters made their decisions based on individual candidate characteristics rather than party label. For example, in a survey of Tokyo residents made prior to the 1949 general election, between one-fifth and one-half of respondents stated that they planned to vote based on the candidates rather than the parties, with older respondents especially more likely to base their vote on candidates (Ukai, 1952, as cited in Ike, 1957, p. 194). This trend continued even until the 1980s and early 1990s, with roughly 40 percent of survey respondents reporting that "candidate" was more important than "party" in making their voting decision.[8]

Three factors, known in Japanese as the "three *ban*" (*sanban*), were especially important for election: *jiban* (support base in the electorate), *kaban* (financial resources), and *kanban* (name recognition or reputation) (Ike, 1957, pp. 192-202). Faced with so much electoral competition, candidates needed to cultivate each of the three ban in order to build any kind of electoral advantage in their districts. Nathaniel Thayer distinguishes between two types of jiban: those that were organized vertically and those that were organized horizontally (Thayer, 1969, pp. 98-102). Vertical jiban were based geographically around a candidate's hometown or main residence. In contrast, horizontal jiban were more spread out, and might be based on a particular policy issue, industry, or interest group network, such as union members. Most conservative politicians built jiban that were of the vertical type (Thayer, 1969; Curtis, 1971; Hirano, 2006), but the use of horizontal jiban developed through policy differentiation was also common, and facilitated by membership on committees of the LDP's internal policy-making organ, the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC). Most LDP MPs wanted to sit on committees within one of the "big three" PARC divisions with influence over distributive policy (Agriculture and Fisheries, Construction, and Commerce and Industry), but there was less membership overlap between MPs from the same district on committees responsible for other policy sectors (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993; McCubbins and Rosenbluth, 1995; Tatebayashi, 2004; Krauss and Pekkanen, 2011). This policy differentiation helped LDP MPs gain expertise and stand out from other co-partisans in the district.

Candidates maintained their jiban through their koenkai. Although some koenkai existed during the prewar period, conservative politicians started to build them as a general practice beginning in the 1950s, and candidates from other parties soon followed suit (Masumi, 1995, p. 236). Koenkai helped to institutionalize a candidate's personal vote by facilitating favors, constituency service, and pork barrel projects that benefited the local residents represented by the candidate. A candidate's koenkai might comprise multiple overlapping groupings, with membership in each group organized around personal connection to the candidate, geography, or target of representation,

[8] See Figure A.4 in Appendix A. The survey results reproduced in Figure A.4 are not broken down according to party affiliation of respondents—it is likely that among LDP supporters, the salience of candidate over party would have been even higher.

such as women, youth, or some other interest group (Krauss and Pekkanen, 2011, p. 37).

The koenkai were critical to the organization and mobilization of a candidate's jiban, but building and maintaining strong koenkai was incredibly expensive. An election could be called at any time, and the electoral campaign period was extremely short (from 1958-1992, only twenty days of official campaigning were permitted). Politicians thus needed to cultivate close ties with their supporters throughout the inter-election period. They did so by organizing regular parties, informational discussions, and excursions to hot springs and other attractions for koenkai members. Members would pay nominal fees to belong to the koenkai, but these fees did not cover the costs of maintaining the organization. Studies in the 1980s estimated the average start-up cost of creating a koenkai at between $700,000-$1,000,000, with a similar sum required yearly to maintain them (Kitaoka, 1985; Ishikawa and Hirose, 1989). Moreover, the election deposit requirement meant that a candidate was required to pay roughly $14,000, on average, just to gain access to the ballot, and average campaign expenditures by 1993 had reached $117,900 (Harada and Smith, 2014).

Expensive koenkai and election campaigns are a big reason why kaban (financial resources) was a second major factor in a candidate's successful election. It is also a reason why money politics and corruption were so rampant under the SNTV system in Japan (e.g., Curtis, 1988; Hrebenar, 1992; Woodall, 1996; Schlesinger, 1997). LDP candidates received some funds from the party and their faction, but the high cost of elections often resulted in a search for funds through more illicit means, especially by faction leaders whose rank-and-file members demanded support for their loyalty.

Lastly, kanban (name recognition) also helped to distinguish a candidate from competitors. Under SNTV/MMD, voters needed to select a single candidate, often from among many co-partisans, so personal name recognition was key to electoral success. In addition, the actual method through which ballots were (and are still) cast further reinforced the importance of name recognition: when voters cast their ballots, it is obligatory to physically write out the name of a candidate. This means that voter awareness of a candidate's name is crucial. Candidates are aware of this, and it is reflected in campaign practices, even to this day. During the short campaign period before a House of Representatives election, candidates can be heard repeating their names and brief slogans ad infinitum in front of train stations, or from sound trucks that cruise through the neighborhoods of their district. Candidates with complicated or obscure characters (*kanji*) in their name often use a simplified script (*hiragana*) to help voters avoid mistakes that could lead to an invalid vote.

4.1.2 Candidate Selection: Variation Across Parties

The 1950 Public Offices Election Law, which forms the basis for election law to this day, regulates all aspects of election rules and campaigning, but imposes few legal constraints on candidate eligibility. A candidate for the House of Representatives must be at least twenty-five years old at the time of the election, while a candidate for the House of Councillors must be at least thirty years old. Additional restrictions apply to individuals with a criminal history. However, the actual process of candidate selection is at the discretion of parties, and in practice each party used different criteria and methods for screening and selecting its candidates.

In part due to its origins in a party merger, the internal party organization of the LDP was highly decentralized and politician-centered, with promotion based on

seniority rule and inter-factional balancing (Sato and Matsuzaki, 1986; Krauss and Pekkanen, 2011). Candidate selection was similarly decentralized. When a candidate retired or died, it was the koenkai (often with heavy influence of factional leaders) that acted as the selectorate for the new candidate, with the central party leadership and national party only affirming their choice and settling issues of how many candidates would ultimately be given an official party nomination (Ishibashi and Reed, 1992; Reed, 2009). An attempt in 1963 by party leaders to eliminate factions and centralize party control of nominations and campaign activities by replacing koenkai with local party branches failed, and the LDP candidate selection process remained decentralized (Nonaka, 1995; Krauss and Pekkanen, 2011, pp. 57-58).

The decentralized nature of candidate selection in the LDP resulted in nominations favoring three distinct types of candidates with local ties: the personal secretaries of the previous candidate, local politicians who supported the previous incumbent, and legacy candidates (Fukui, 1997). Each of these backgrounds represented between 20-40 percent of new candidates. Sometimes legacy candidates first served as secretaries to gain experience and position themselves to smoothly inherit the seat. Former bureaucrats, who would sometimes "purchase" the koenkai of a retiring incumbent, represented a fourth common type of candidate, though candidates with this background gradually declined, and were replaced with ever more legacy candidates (Usui and Colignon, 2004; North, 2005).[9]

The JSP organization resembled the LDP's in its loose structure, factionalism, and decentralized authority (Stockwin, 1992). Candidates for the JSP also developed their own koenkai, but to a lesser degree, and the koenkai of outgoing incumbents played only a negligible role in recruiting new candidates. A heavier influence in candidate recruitment was exerted by the party's main support organization, the General Council of Trade Unions of Japan (*Sohyo*), which predominantly represented the public sector unions. Prefectural party headquarters also played a role in proposing candidates to the national headquarters for approval. For these reasons, more than half of all candidates from the JSP were active in the labor union movement prior to running for office, while another 30-40 percent were members of local or prefectural assemblies (Fukui, 1997). Similarly, the DSP was supported by the Japanese Confederation of Labor (*Domei*), which represented mostly private sector unions that were less militant and more business-oriented than those represented in Sohyo.[10] DSP candidates were also chosen locally, and thus mostly drawn from among local politicians and trade union leaders.[11]

In contrast to the conservative and socialist parties, both the JCP and Komeito were (and are still) highly centralized in their organization and candidate recruitment processes, although candidates from both parties also formed koenkai. The Central Committee of the JCP exercises tight control over all aspects of the party organization, including candidate selection (Shiratori, 1988, pp. 180-181). The JCP generally makes efforts to nominate candidates with some connection to local affairs, but it is not uncommon for its candidates to change districts and run as "parachute" candidates for the party elsewhere. Thus, local ties are not dominant in deciding nomina-

[9] Figure A.5 in Appendix A shows the trends across time for LDP candidates who came from each these common backgrounds.

[10] Domei and Sohyo eventually merged in 1989-1990 to form the Japanese Trade Union Confederation (Rengo).

[11] Figure A.6 in Appendix A shows the trends across time for JSP and DSP candidates from these and other common backgrounds.

tions. The party recruits many of its candidates from among party employees, citizen's group activists, anti-JSP union members (particular a minority faction from the Japan Teachers Union), and left-wing lawyers (Curtis, 1979). By 1980, the JCP had formally enforced a party rule that all koenkai had to be "party koenkai," in both name and form, rather than candidate-based koenkai (Er, 1996).

The Komeito was founded in 1964 as a political offshoot of the Nichiren Buddhist organization, *Soka Gakkai*, much in the way that many early mass parties in Western European democracies emerged out of class or religious movements (Ehrhardt et al., 2014). Although the party officially severed its formal ties to Soka Gakkai in 1970, the party's core organization and support base in the electorate has been nearly coterminous with Soka Gakkai (Baerwald, 1986; Hrebenar, 1992). The party leadership organ, the Central Secretariat, is composed of the party president and several other senior members. Before an election, it consults with the party's Election Strategy Committee and considers which candidates to nominate. The Central Secretariat even exercises control over the final selection of local (municipal and prefectural) candidates recommended by the party's local candidate selection committees. In contrast to the LDP, where new candidates might approach the party directly or run first as independents in the hope of getting an ex-post nomination, most Komeito candidates do not have prior ambitions for public office until a party leader or religious leader taps them to run. Beyond the strong organizational link with Soka Gakkai, the party does not have direct ties to interest groups in society from which to recruit candidates, so nearly all Komeito candidates are also members of Soka Gakkai, and are frequently screened and recommended to the party leadership by influential leaders of the Soka Gakkai organization (Smith, 2014).

Table 4.1 summarizes the differences in intraparty and intra-camp competition facing candidates from the five main parties that contested elections to the House of Representatives during the bulk of the SNTV/MMD period, and the nature of the parties' candidate selection processes. This variation allows for some comparison in terms of dynastic politics based on differing party and electoral contexts, holding country-specific factors (such as history, culture, and other system-level variables) constant. However, because the two cases of parties with a centralized candidate selection process (Komeito and JCP) are also the same two parties whose candidates did not face intra-camp competition, we do not have much analytical leverage over the relative importance of these two (probably related) variables for the SNTV/MMD period.

Following the theory outlined in Chapter 3, we would expect to see a greater percentage of legacy candidates in the LDP and among conservatives than in the JSP and among other socialists, despite similarly decentralized candidate selection processes, owing to the increased intraparty (or intra-camp) competition faced by conservative candidates. A greater number of intra-camp competitors should mean that the reputation and name recognition of an individual candidate would have been more important for securing election. The JSP and DSP also benefited from a more concrete support base, labor unions, from which to recruit candidates. Given that candidates from the Komeito and JCP never (or rarely) faced intraparty competition, and were selected through highly centralized candidate selection processes, we would expect to observe the lowest percentage of legacy candidates in those parties.

Table 4.1: Party variation in intraparty/intra-camp competition and centralization of the candidate selection process in pre-reform Japan.

Party	**Intraparty competition?**	**Intra-camp competition?**	**Decentralized candidate selection?**
LDP	Yes (97% of districts)	Yes (99% of districts)	Yes
JSP	Yes (55% of districts)	Yes (78% of districts)	Yes
DSP	No (99% of districts)	Yes*	Yes
Komeito	No	No	No
JCP	No (99% of districts)	No (95% of districts)	No

Note: *The party faced one or more intracamp challengers in all but two races (99.7%): Osaka 1st District in 1983 and 1986. The DSP ran two candidates in Kanagawa 1st District and Tokyo 6th District in 1960; thereafter they never ran multiple candidates. The JCP ran two candidates in Kyoto 1st District and Kyoto 2nd District in several years between 1972 and 1990.

4.2 Japan Under SNTV/MMD: Land of the Rising Sons

In the first decade after democratization, less than 5 percent of candidates for the House of Representatives were legacy candidates. Many of these early legacy MPs were actually "standing in" as proxies for prewar MPs who were purged from office by the U.S. Occupation. When the purge was lifted in 1952, a number of the purged politicians returned to national politics and their relatives stood down. For example, Takaoka Daisuke was a conservative politician who served three terms in the prewar House of Representatives for Niigata 2nd District. After he was purged, his brother Tadahiro ran in his place in 1947 and 1949 (winning a seat in 1947). When the purge was lifted, Daisuke took back control of his jiban and contested an additional six elections, eventually joining the LDP.

To fill the remainder of the candidate gap during the purge, conservative party leaders, in particular Yoshida Shigeru of the Liberal Party, actively recruited high-level bureaucrats and other outsiders without any legacy ties. When the purge was lifted, purged politicians like Hatoyama Ichiro returned; yet when Hatoyama's Democratic Party merged with Yoshida's Liberal Party in 1955 to form the LDP, the incumbent former bureaucrats from the Liberal Party remained a major force in the party.

By the time the Occupation-era recruits began to retire and die in the 1960s and 1970s, however, many of them had built up large and successful koenkai, which were often transferred upon retirement or death to a relative (usually the eldest son), creating a new generation of dynasties (Curtis, 1988, pp. 95-97). In fact, the founding members of roughly 35 percent of all dynasties active in the late 1980s were first elected during the four elections of the Occupation, from 1946-1952 (Ichikawa, 1990, pp. 10-11). Some founding members got their initial starts in the prewar period, particularly in the 1924 election just prior to universal male suffrage, but the majority of dynasties were created in the postwar period.

4.2.1 Differences Across Parties and Camps

Legacy candidates were most common in the LDP. Of the 6,072 candidates who ran at least once between 1947-1993, 419 (7 percent) were legacy candidates. Almost half

(181) of these legacy candidates were nominated by the LDP, while another seventy-four were LDP-affiliated independents; the JSP fielded only twenty-nine legacy candidates, while the DSP fielded fourteen (Table 4.2). Recall that candidates who directly succeed a relative into candidacy in the same district represent a subset of legacy candidates called hereditary candidates. About half of the legacy candidates in the conservative and socialist camps were of this direct hereditary candidate variety.

Table 4.2: Legacy and hereditary candidates in each party or camp, 1947-1993.

	Legacy		**Hereditary**		**Total**
	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)
Conservatives (camp)	350	13.71	149	5.84	**2,552**
LDP	180	37.34	100	20.75	482
LDP-affiliated independent	76	20.49	29	7.82	371
NLC	5	14.29	4	11.43	35
Others	89	5.34	16	0.96	1,664
Socialists (camp)	61	4.70	27	2.08	**1,297**
JSP	29	7.16	14	3.46	405
DSP	14	7.65	7	3.83	183
Others	18	2.54	5	0.71	709
Komeito	5	2.69	0	0	**186**
JCP	3	0.38	0	0	**780**
Minor party/independent	4	0.32	1	0.08	**1,257**
Total	423	6.97	176	2.90	**6,072**

Note: One observation for each candidate. Party label is whatever the candidate used in his or her first postwar election. By-election candidates are included. For the conservative and socialist camps, "Others" include the precursor parties to the LDP (the Liberals and Democrats) and pre-1958 JSP (Leftist and Rightist Socialists). Komeito group includes one party-affiliated independent (Kusakawa Shozo). JCP group includes 37 independents or candidates from minor communist-ideology parties. All other minor party and independent candidates whose camp could not be identified are grouped with "Minor party/independent." Source: JHRED.

The Komeito and JCP fielded a much smaller number of legacy candidates and not one of them was a hereditary candidate. There were only five Komeito legacy candidates in the House of Representatives during this period: Ishida Koshiro, Nishinaka Kiyoshi, and Asai Yoshiyuki, all of whom had relatives who had served in the House of Councillors, and Kitagawa Kazuo, whose father had been elected from a different district in the House of Representatives. The fifth legacy candidate, Watanabe Michiko, also ran in a separate district from her husband, Watanabe Ichiro.[12] Although some JCP district successors had the same name as their predecessors, it is not possible in

[12] An additional Komeito legacy candidate was Hojo Hiroshi, who served one term in the House of Councillors, and later became president of Soka Gakkai. His uncle, Hojo Shunpachi, served in the prewar House of Peers and two terms in the postwar House of Councillors. House of Councillors MP Ishikawa Hirotaka is the son-in-law of former House of Councillors MP Kazama Hisashi. Another House of Councillors MP, Taniai Masaaki, was preceded in politics by his mother and grandfather, who both served in local assemblies.

most cases to verify whether or not they were relatives due to the scarcity of information released by the JCP for non-winning candidates. One JCP legacy candidate, Takada Tomiyuki, was the son of prewar politician Takada Ryohei. But Tomiyuki ran as a Communist for only the first three elections (1947-1952) before joining the JSP. Another JCP candidate, Yonehara Itaru, was the son of prewar House of Peers member Yonehara Shozo.[13]



Figure 4.1: Legacy and hereditary candidates in the main parties over time, 1958-1993.
Note: By-elections not included. The JCP is excluded since legacy candidates were rare. Komeito first ran candidates in 1967; DSP first ran candidates in 1960.
Source: JHRED.

The percentage of legacy candidates running in elections under the LDP label grew steadily from just over 10 percent of candidates after the party's founding in 1955 toward a zenith of nearly 50 percent prior to the 1993 election, the last election to be held under SNTV/MMD (Figure 4.1). In contrast, legacy candidates accounted for less than 10 percent of the JSP's candidates in most elections. The DSP nominated over sixty candidates in elections in the 1960s, and only five of these were legacy candidates. However, by the 1970s the party decreased its number of nominations to around forty-five candidates, and continued to nominate several of its legacy candidates, which resulted in the share of legacy candidates exceeding 20 percent by the

[13] Another confirmed legacy candidate in the JCP, Kikunami Hiroshi, served one term in the House of Councillors from 1992-1998. His father, Kikunami Katsumi, had been elected to one term in the House of Representatives for Tokyo 6th District in 1949, before being purged in 1950 as part of the Occupation's "red purge" when the Cold War began (part of the so-called "Reverse Course" strategy).

1990 and 1993 elections. One DSP legacy candidate in 1960 and 1963 was Kikukawa Kimiko, widow of former Rightist JSP MP Kikukawa Tadao, who died in 1954. Kimiko first ran as a Rightist JSP candidate in 1955, then with the JSP in 1958 following the reunification, but later split with the party again to join the DSP in 1960. Other DSP legacy candidates in the 1960s included former-Rightist JSP MP Kinoshita Tetsu, who replaced his brother Kaoru when the latter ran for Governor of Oita in 1955, and Aso Yoshikata, whose father Hisashi served in the prewar House of Representatives.



Figure 4.2: Legacy and hereditary candidates in the main party camps over time, 1947-1993.
Note: By-elections not included. The conservative camp includes the LDP and its precursor parties, NLC, Renewal, Sakigake, Japan New Party, and all affiliated independents. The socialist camp includes the JSP, DSP, SDL, and all affiliated independents. The Komeito camp is almost entirely coterminous with the party, shown in Figure 4.1. The JCP camp and others (minor party and fringe candidates) are excluded since legacy candidates were rare.
Source: JHRED.

The difference in dynastic politics remain when the parties are grouped into the two main ideological camps (Figure 4.2). The conservative camp, which includes the LDP, its precursor parties, breakaway parties such as the NLC, and LDP-affiliated independent candidates, had many more legacy candidates than the socialist camp, which includes the JSP and the DSP, along with the Leftist and Rightist JSP when the party was split prior to 1955, affiliated independents, and the SDL, which split from the JSP in 1978 (the Komeito and JCP camps are largely coterminous with the parties).

4.2.2 The Importance of *Jiban*, *Kaban*, and *Kanban*

Much of the previous research on dynastic politics in Japan has attributed the growth in legacy, and especially hereditary, candidates in the LDP to the koenkai system (e.g., Ichikawa, 1990; Matsuzaki, 1991; Ishibashi and Reed, 1992; Taniguchi, 2008; Inaida, 2009; Uesugi, 2009). When an incumbent retired, he or she (most often he) and the koenkai played the largest role in determining a successor, and incumbents could "transfer" their jiban to a successor through the koenkai organization and its network of contacts and funds. Sometimes a successor would be a secretary or local politician with close ties to the outgoing incumbent, but who was not related by blood or marriage (i.e., a non-kin successor). But often the successor was the outgoing candidate's son or other close relative (i.e., a kin successor, or hereditary candidate). The successor to an outgoing incumbent would "inherit" resources that the incumbent had developed over the course of his career in the Diet and that helped contribute to his incumbency advantage in office. Non-kin successors inherited the jiban and kaban resources, but not the kanban, since they did not share the same family name. On the other hand, as kin successors, hereditary candidates usually benefited from all three.[14]

A legacy candidate who ran in a separate district or many elections after his or her predecessor had left office might still benefit from kanban, and in many cases jiban and kaban if he or she were a successor to a non-related candidate. For example, brothers Hatoyama Kunio and Hatoyama Yukio (Prime Minister from 2009-2010) are the grandsons of former Prime Minister and LDP founder Hatoyama Ichiro, who served in the House of Representatives from 1915 until he was purged in 1946, and again from 1952 until his death in 1959. Their father, Hatoyama Iichiro, served in the House of Councillors (1974-1992), and a great uncle, Hatoyama Hideo, and two great grandfathers, Hatoyama Kazuo and Terada Sakae, served in the prewar House of Representatives, making them sixth-generation and seventh-generation MPs. Kunio was elected first, in 1976. He ran in Tokyo 8th District (currently Tokyo 2nd District), which was the constituency of his grandfather and great grandfather, but he was not able to inherit any jiban. As Mayumi Itoh (2003, pp. 159-160) explains:

> ...with the death of Ichiro in 1959, Yamada Hisatsugu, former administrative vice minister of foreign affairs and the Hatoyama family's long-time confidante, succeeded to the district. The family's koenkai (politician's support groups) in the district were disbanded. At that time, the Hatoyama family and Yamada made an agreement that Yamada would return the district to the family should a family member decide to run in the future. However, when Kunio decided to run in 1976, Yamada had already won three terms and did not honor the promise.

Despite this difficulty, Kunio was able to win election with the most votes in the district, no doubt thanks to the strong kanban associated with the Hatoyama family name.[15]

[14] Only 4 percent of hereditary candidates did not share the same surname as their predecessor. In comparison, 27 percent of non-hereditary legacy candidates did not share the same surname as a predecessor.

[15] Hatoyama Kunio later moved to Fukuoka 6th District after resigning his seat to run unsuccessfully for Governor of Tokyo in 1999. He continued to win elections in his new district until he died in office in 2016. His second son, already a local mayor in Fukuoka Prefecture, sought the nomination to succeed him in the by-election following his death (*Sankei Shimbun*, July 27, 2016). His first son is a local politician in Tokyo.

Yukio decided to enter politics in 1986 after earning a Ph.D. in engineering at Stanford University and working as an academic in Tokyo. Since his brother Kunio was already running in the family's old district in Tokyo, Yukio had to look elsewhere for a place to run. Fortunately, a friend of the Hatoyama family, Saegusa Saburo, decided to retire and bequeath his jiban in Hokkaido 4th District to Yukio (Itoh, 2003, p. 164). Thus, Yukio inherited a jiban, while Kunio did not, despite running in the same district as the family predecessors. By my definition, both brothers would be considered legacy candidates, but not hereditary candidates.

In the case where an incumbent died suddenly in office without naming a successor, the koenkai was still very influential in nomination decisions, and often the easiest candidate to unite around was a relative. When an incumbent MP died in office, nominating a relative was not only a convenient way to find a replacement—it could also be viewed as closely approximating the wishes of the electorate, which had previously given a mandate to the deceased candidate. In addition, a relative of a deceased MP may have been more successful in gathering any sympathy vote available. Lastly, nominating a relative was an accepted way to settle disputes when more than one candidate sought to be the successor.

For example, following the sudden suicide of Hokkaido 5th District's Nakagawa Ichiro in 1983, his son, Shoichi, quit his job in banking to run for the seat in the election that year. However, Ichiro's personal secretary, Suzuki Muneo, also wanted to run, and claimed that Ichiro had been opposed to hereditary succession.[16] The LDP leadership did not want to nominate both Suzuki and Nakagawa, as it already had two other incumbents in the district, Kitamura Yoshikazu and Yasuda Kiroku. Ultimately, Nakagawa was given the official nomination with the support of the koenkai and was the top vote-getter in the district. Suzuki ran and won as an independent, and was given an ex-post nomination. But the entry of both Nakagawa and Suzuki resulted in Kitamura and Yasuda both losing their seats.

In another case, Shimamura Ichiro of Tokyo 10th District retired prior to the 1976 election. He was also opposed to the idea of hereditary succession, and did not want his son, Yoshinobu, to succeed him. Instead, he supported the candidacy of his secretary, Udagawa Yoshio. However, Shimamura's koenkai rallied around Yoshinobu, who was given the official LDP nomination and eked out a victory in the election. Udagawa ran as an independent and lost. Udagawa was later elected to the Tokyo Prefectural Assembly, and finally to the House of Representatives as an independent in the 2000 election.[17]

One hereditary successor faced competition from within his own family. Prior to the 1986 election, Kumamoto 2nd District incumbent Sonoda Sunao passed away. His eldest son from his first marriage, Sonoda Hiroyuki, sought to succeed him, but his widow, Sonoda Tenkoko (née Matsutani), also wanted the seat, and challenged her stepson in the race. Tenkoko had previously been elected in Tokyo 7th District in 1946 as one of the first female Diet members, and met her husband when they were both serving in the Diet. She lost four consecutive lower house elections in the 1950s after changes in the electoral rules made it more difficult for female candidates to get elected, and decided to quit politics. But with the death of her husband, she saw an opportunity to return to the national stage. Koenkai members were divided over whom to support, and the party avoided taking sides in the family dispute by declining to

[16] *Asahi Shimbun*, December 9, 1983.
[17] *Mainichi Shimbun*, October 24, 2003.

nominate either candidate. Tenkoko ran as an independent with the backing of the Nakasone faction, while Hiroyuki had the support of the Fukuda faction (to which his father had belonged). Although the Sonoda jiban in the district was divided, Hiroyuki ultimately won, and was given an ex-post nomination.[18]

An incumbent MP who had invested many years of effort into building up his or her jiban may have had strong personal reasons to "keep it in the family" (Taniguchi, 2008), especially if the incumbent had also previously inherited the seat from a relative. Powerful political families may have wanted to maintain their "family business" and ensure the continuation of their political legacy. In most cases, it was the first-born son who would inherit the family business of politics—a 1990 *Kyodo* news survey of thirty-eight hereditary MPs found that 60 percent were the first-born sons; 15 percent were second-born sons, followed by 10 percent each for third-born sons and sons-in-law (Ichikawa, 1990, p. 268). Politicians who did not have a biological son of their own would often adopt a son who could eventually inherit the seat. In Japan, it was common for a powerful man of business or politics who lacked a male heir to adopt a son, especially a nephew or son-in-law, as his legal heir. Sons-in-law adopted in this manner, such as Aichi Kazuo of Miyagi 1st District and Urano Yasuoki of Aichi 4th District, would then take the last name of their fathers-in-law, and eventually succeed them. Tsushima Yuji, whose story was described at the beginning of this chapter, is a similar case, though he followed his uncle-in-law into office.

Politicians who had amassed large political war chests could also avoid a heavy tax burden on those funds if they were transferred through the koenkai organization to a successor (Uesugi, 2009, pp. 65-78). Under the Political Funds Control Law, koenkai funds are managed by a candidate's political fund organization. If a candidate retires from office and disbands his or her koenkai, any remaining funds in the accounts of the fund organization are subject to taxation. However, if the money is transferred to another candidate's fund organization (for example, that of a child running simultaneously) or if the name of the organization is changed to reflect a new candidate taking it over, the funds are not taxed. Political inheritance was thus a useful mechanism for keeping accumulated financial resources in the family without incurring a tax penalty for exiting politics and disbanding the koenkai accounts. A retiring incumbent might also have felt the need to encourage a relative to act as successor if he or she had acquired a substantial amount of debt to financial supporters that could not be paid off in the near future. Appointing a son or other relative as successor would signal a credible commitment to the continuity of the family business, and that the successor would repay any political debts when funds became available (Iwai, 1990).

The koenkai supporters may also have had demand-side financial incentives to recruit a hereditary successor, since doing so could help assure their continued access to central government resources (Igarashi, 1986; Ichikawa, 1990). The centralized budget allocation process and highly clientelistic operation of LDP politics created incentives for local organizations, candidates, and voters to align with the LDP in order to gain access to redistributive expenditures of the central government. Koenkai members and local politicians who lent their electoral support to national-level LDP politicians needed to build strong relationships with those politicians to access the central government and maintain an important "pipeline" to pork (Abe, Shindo and Kawato, 1994; Scheiner, 2006). When a politician retired or died, the koenkai could assure its continued access to the central government by nominating a winning suc-

[18] *Asahi Shimbun*, June 27, 1986; July 7, 1986.

cessor. Hereditary candidates were ideal to rally behind, since they were familiar to most core supporters and voters.

Indeed, of the hereditary MPs surveyed by *Kyodo* in 1990, 25 percent reported that the main influence on their decision to run was pressure from the koenkai; another 25 percent reported influence from their father or mother. The most common response, at 45 percent, was "other," but unfortunately the survey did not ask about local or national party influence or factional influence. In a separate question, 32 percent of respondents said that it was the strong push of their predecessor's koenkai that resulted in the opportunity to run (Ichikawa, 1990, pp. 268-269).

Lastly, the LDP organization itself had little reason or power to object to a hereditary successor, since most came well equipped with the funds and support network necessary to win election. In the decentralized LDP, candidates' campaigns were largely self-financed or supported by factions, rather than by the party itself. A hereditary candidate with an established koenkai and ample funds would have been an attractive and expedient choice for the LDP to nominate in order to keep a continued grip on that seat with minimal cost to the party. Moreover, if the party expected the hereditary candidate to win, there was no sense denying him the nomination, even if party leadership favored a different candidate. If a hereditary candidate were denied the nomination, he could run as an independent and threaten to upset the party's ability to elect all of its nominated candidates.

The name recognition of legacy candidates was also clearly valuable. In the candidate-centered electoral context of SNTV/MMD elections, a recognizable family name could serve as a "brand name" or cue to voters in a system where party label could not always serve the same function. As Michihiro Ishibashi and Steven R. Reed (1992, p. 369) note, "Voters who have gotten used to voting for Watanabe can continue voting for Watanabe." A few legacy candidates, including Okada Haruo in Hokkaido 4$^{\text{th}}$ District and Nakamura Kishiro of Ibaraki 7$^{\text{th}}$ District, even went so far as to change their names to be *exactly the same* as their fathers' names prior to succeeding them.[19]

Changing one's name to be exactly the same as a predecessor may sound like an extreme example of continuity in representation, but for a legacy candidate, it could be helpful to capitalize on name recognition while avoiding confusion with less observant voters. The experience of legacy MP Kono Taro serves as a good illustration. He first ran for the House of Representatives in 1996 from Kanagawa 15$^{\text{th}}$ District, a district that included part of the jiban of his father, Kono Yohei. After the electoral reform in 1994, the district lines were redrawn, splitting Yohei's jiban in two, and Taro and his father ran simultaneously in neighboring districts.[20] Yohei was leader of the LDP during the brief period from 1994-1996 when it did not hold the premiership, and had inherited his jiban from his father, Kono Ichiro, after Ichiro's death in 1965. Ichiro's brother, Kenzo, was also a member of the Diet, and their father, Jihei, had been involved in local politics. Taro explains how voters would sometimes confuse him with

[19] Two other candidates adopted the names of their fathers prior to running: Yamamura Shinjiro of Chiba 2$^{\text{nd}}$ District and Chizaki Usaburo in Hokkaido 1$^{\text{st}}$ District. In these cases, the name change had been a family tradition for ten and two previous generations, respectively, and was related to business succession as well.

[20] There were five such simultaneous father-son candidacies in 1996, but Taro was the only son to win. Unlike many hereditary candidates, he decided to officially disband his father's former koenkai and form a new organization of his own. Nevertheless, he was running in a district that included part of his father's jiban and former supporters.

his predecessors, despite him having a different given name: "In my first election, there were about a thousand voters who [mistakenly] wrote my grandfather's name. When I showed up to events, elderly ladies would even ask, excitedly, 'Oh, Kono Ichiro is here?"'[21] Although this anecdote recalls the dynamics of electoral campaigning in the 1996 election, after electoral reform, campaign practices at that election were still very much like in elections held prior to reform (Otake, 1998).

In Kono's case, being a member of a famous dynasty carried both benefits and liabilities. As the son of Yohei and grandson of Ichiro, some older voters mistakenly confused him with his predecessors, even though his grandfather had long been deceased. Other voters, even conservative ones, did not like him from the start because there had been bitter intraparty competition prior to electoral reform between his father and other LDP candidates in the district. But, he concludes, in the end his name recognition was an advantage as a first-time candidate:

> Name recognition is very important, and I think I got an advantage. I would be standing at Chigasaki station, and all I would say is 'Good morning, my name is Kono Taro.' I did it from 6 to 8, two hours a day, for about a month. A month later, I remember, a guy walked up to me and said, 'Hey, you've been here for about a month, what's your name?' I was thinking, 'That's all I've been saying for a month!' But so I said, 'my name is Kono Taro.' And he said, 'Oh, be careful, people might mistake you as the son of Kono Yohei!' So name recognition is important. Either they like you or they hate you, but at least they will know your name. If you are nobody, it's very hard because people don't even know your name.[22]

The importance of name recognition can also be seen in patterns of marriage in political families. Japanese law requires that a married couple adopt a single surname. In approximately 95 percent of marriages, the wife adopts the husband's surname (White, 2014, p. 245). However, as earlier noted, when the wife's father is powerful or lacks a biological son of his own, the husband will often adopt the wife's surname. For example, Suzuki Naoki's father, Naoto, had been elected to both houses of the Diet prior to his death in 1957. Yet, when Naoki married Tanaka Makiko, daughter of future Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei (1972-74) in 1969, he took his wife's family name. Even though he ran in the same district as his father (Fukushima 3rd District) in 1983, the national name recognition associated with his father-in-law, who was from neighboring Niigata Prefecture, was arguably more valuable than that of his father, who had died twenty-six years earlier. Tanaka Makiko later ran for her father's seat in Niigata 3rd District in 1993 and topped the poll. Of the twenty-nine legacy sons-in-law who ran between 1947-2014, twelve (41 percent) had changed their surnames to match those of their political fathers-in-law. That is quite a difference from the 5 percent in the general population.[23]

---

[21] Interview with Kono Taro in Tokyo, June 1, 2011 (in English).

[22] This insight is similar to Oscar Wilde's quip in the *The Picture of Dorian Gray* that "there is only one thing in the world worse than being talked about and that is not being talked about."

[23] Martín Rossi (2016) notes similar patterns among female politicians in Argentina and whether they keep their maiden names or adopt the names of their husbands. Many female legacy candidates opt for whichever name is associated with their political predecessor (i.e., father or husband).

The inherited resources of jiban, kaban, and kanban that legacy (and especially hereditary) successors enjoyed during the SNTV/MMD period were the key ingredients of the inherited incumbency advantage of legacy candidates. Since the koenkai apparatus generally remained intact following a hereditary succession, hereditary candidates continued to enjoy the resource advantages that their predecessors had acquired during their tenure in office. In the context of intraparty competition and financially expensive elections, this inherited incumbency advantage also made hereditary candidates ideal nomination choices under the koenkai system of decentralized candidate selection in the LDP. Based on this description, and the theoretical model from Chapter 3, we can make some basic predictions about which types of LDP candidates were most likely to be directly succeeded by a family member during the SNTV/MMD period.

4.2.3 How to Succeed in Politics: Predicting Hereditary Succession in the LDP Under SNTV/MMD

Which factors at the candidate level and district level were correlated with dynastic candidate selection during the SNTV/MMD period? The candidate-level data in JHRED and the prevalence of direct hereditary succession in the LDP make it possible to estimate the degree to which certain characteristics of an exiting candidate are associated with an increased probability that he or she will be succeeded by a relative, without the need to account for variation in time between candidacies (as the passage of time could weaken the jiban or name recognition of the candidate, as well as capture macro-level changes in dynastic politics). Focusing on direct hereditary succession within the LDP also solves the issue of candidates who run simultaneously with their relatives, or who run in different districts.

I restrict the analysis to candidates who stopped running after one of the twelve elections between 1958 and 1990. The rationale for beginning the sample in 1958 is that it was the first election held after the formation of the LDP. I end the sample in 1990 because the hereditary successors to candidates who last ran in 1990 would have ran in 1993, the last election held under SNTV/MMD. This sample period also has the advantage of party system stability and population data availability. From 1958-1990, there were 625 individual LDP candidates (280 of whom were incumbent MPs) who exited the political scene following an election.[24] An average of fifty-two LDP candidates exited each year (min. = 26; max. = 74). I include all exiting candidates, not just incumbents, in order to evaluate the effect of electoral success on jiban transfer.

My analysis is constructed around a variable in JHRED, *Jiban*, which is designed to capture the electoral support base of a candidate. *Jiban* takes the form of a unique code that stays the same when a candidate within a party or camp precedes another candidate within the same party or camp in the same district.[25] In other words, when

[24] The data sample includes three candidates who made their last election attempt in a by-election (none were succeeded).

[25] The jiban code changes whenever district lines are redrawn. When Tokyo 1st District was split into Tokyo 1st District and Tokyo 8th District in 1967, for example, all jiban codes change even for the candidates who remain the same because the geographic support base in the district changed. The jiban code also changes when a candidate changes camps (but not parties within the same camp). There are very few of these cases, but changing camps usually changes a candidate's vote substantially, indicating that the support base has indeed changed. In contrast, the support base should be expected to be more stable

a new candidate is a successor to a retiring candidate, the code is not changed. A jiban is coded as being inherited by a new candidate in the following cases:

1. Only one candidate from the party retires and only one new candidate runs.
2. A newspaper or some other source names the new candidate as a successor (newspaper or case study accounts supersede any other data).
3. A new candidate is related to a retiring candidate, i.e., a hereditary candidate.[26]

My explanatory variables are related to the incumbency advantage of the outgoing candidate and other characteristics of the candidate that might be correlated with dynastic politics as discussed in Chapter 3, including:

1. *Previous terms*: total number of terms served prior to final election attempt (min. = 0; max. = 18; mean = 5; standard deviation = 3.9).
2. *Incumbency*: the exiting candidate's final election result (dummy variable).
3. *Existing dynasty*: whether the exiting candidate is a legacy candidate (dummy variable).
4. *Death*: whether the candidate died prior to the next election (dummy variable).[27]
5. *Population density*: the proportion of citizens in the electoral district who live in a census-defined "densely-inhabited district." I group this variable into categorical quartiles for *Rural*, *Semi-rural*, *Semi-urban*, and *Urban*.

Each of the first two variables is likely to be associated with the incumbency advantage of an exiting candidate, and thus the potential inherited incumbency advantage of his or her successor. An increasing number of terms served is also likely to be associated with a supply-side incentive for a legacy successor to emerge. The third variable is included to investigate the supply-side hypothesis that coming from a family with an existing history in politics might increase the probability of hereditary succession. Death in office is included as it may contribute to an increase in dynastic bias in candidate selection. Finally, the population density categories are included to test the hypothesis that rural districts are more susceptible to dynastic politics than urban districts.

I estimate the effects of these explanatory variables on three separate dependent variables. The first, *Precede candidate*, is a dummy variable coding simply whether the candidate preceded a family member as a candidate, whether that family member was successful or not, and regardless of whether the successor ran in the same jiban. The second, *Precede MP*, is a dummy variable for whether the candidate preceded a

for candidates who change parties within camps, especially in the case of LDP candidates who run as independents.

[26] JHRED also codes a candidate as having the same jiban as a previous candidate, even if there was no direct succession, whenever the candidate is related to the previous candidate and there is reason to think the local organization stayed intact because one of the two candidates had been elected to another office, such as mayor, governor, or the House of Councillors. However, here I focus only on direct successions.

[27] This variable is based primarily on Diet records of eulogies given on the Diet floor. In Japan, it is customary to eulogize a Diet member when he or she dies in office, so official Diet records contain such events in the agenda notes. *Asahi Shimbun* obituaries and official biographies provided further data for former incumbent candidates who intended to run again after losing, but passed away prior to the election. In total, 129 deaths are recorded in the sample, including nine non-incumbents (in these cases, the assumption is that the candidate was still serving as local party branch representative [*shibucho*], and could have been a candidate again in the future).

successful candidate (i.e., a family member went on to win election and become an MP, in either chamber). Again, this second dependent variable is intended to provide a broad account of dynastic selection, and is not limited to candidates whose family members immediately ran in the same jiban in the election after the predecessor exited. Both of these dependent variables also include any family members who might have run for office *after* electoral reform.

The third and main dependent variable, *Bequeath*, is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 only if the candidate immediately transferred his or her jiban to a family member in the election following his or her exit; otherwise *Bequeath* is equal to 0, signaling that no family member directly succeeded the outgoing candidate. For the coding of *Bequeath*, I do not discriminate based on whether the successor candidate went on to win the election. I am only interested in whether the outgoing candidate was immediately succeeded as a candidate in the same district by a family member. A total of 122 direct transfers (*Bequeath* = 1) occurred between LDP candidates and their family members in my sample, an average of ten each year. This dependent variable is the most restrictive, but also most likely to capture the relationship between exiting candidates' attributes and dynastic candidate selection during the SNTV/MMD period.

I estimate the effects of my explanatory variables on each of these dependent variables with an additive linear probability model with robust standard errors. For each dependent variable, I first estimate the results without any controls, then with controls for gender (dummy for female) and fixed effects for year and region (specifically, the eleven regions used for the post-reform PR districts). Table A.5 in the Appendix displays the full results in table format. For ease of interpretation, Figure 4.3 plots the coefficients and 95% confidence intervals for incumbency, previous terms (standardized so that the mean = 0, and standard deviation = 1), coming from an existing dynasty, death in office, population density (grouped into rural, semi-rural, semi-urban, and urban, with rural the excluded category), and female, based on the estimations from the models with the full set of controls.

Not surprisingly, and consistent with existing empirical work in other contexts (e.g., Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009; Querubin, 2016; Rossi, 2016; Van Coppenolle, 2015), longer tenures in the House of Representatives are associated with a higher probability of hereditary succession. Each additional term served by a candidate is associated with a roughly 1-percentage-point increase in the probability of being succeeded by a family member. An increase in tenure by four terms (one standard deviation) over the mean number (five terms), increases the probability of succession by about 5 percentage points. However, winning one's final election is also important. An incumbent who leaves office is between 15 and 17 percentage points more likely than a losing candidate to be followed by a relative. Candidates who come from an existing dynasty (meaning they are themselves already legacy candidates) are estimated to be roughly 10 percentage points more likely to be succeeded than non-legacy candidates, and up to 28 percentage points more likely to have a family member elected as an MP in either chamber at some point in the future. Candidates who die in office (or before the next election if an unsuccessful candidate) are roughly 15 percentage points more likely to be succeeded, though insignificant coefficient for *Precede MP* suggests that their relatives do not always go on to win.

When it comes to death, a number of factors may be at play. If the death occurs shortly before a scheduled election, a hereditary successor may be a convenient stand-in on short notice. If the death is followed by a by-election to fill the seat, then



Figure 4.3: Predicting dynastic succession in the LDP, 1958-1990.
Note: Estimated effects of incumbency, previous wins (standardized), existing dynasty, death in office, population density (grouped), and female. Models estimated with OLS and correspond to Models (2), (4), and (6) in Appendix Table A.5. Points represent the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. Models include fixed effects for region and year, and robust standard errors.

local leaders may hope to capitalize on any sympathy vote during the by-election by nominating a relative. If a candidate dies too young, however, he or she might not have children who are old enough to directly succeed them. For example, when Gunma 3rd District incumbent Obuchi Mitsuhei died in office at the age of 54 in 1958, his son, future prime minister Obuchi Keizo, was only 21 years old, and thus ineligible for candidacy under Japan's Public Offices Election Law. Since Keizo was too young to succeed his father, the Obuchi jiban was temporally held by former House of Councillors member Iyoku Yoshio until the 1963 general election when Keizo was old enough to run. Iyoku lost his race in 1960, but Keizo reclaimed the seat in 1963 and held onto it until he died in 2000.

Population density appears to have no effect on the patterns of hereditary succession in the SNTV/MMD period. This is surprising since rural and semi-rural districts depended more heavily on government transfers of funds for local development. In addition, koenkai were generally more active in rural areas (Kitaoka, 1985, pp. 58-59). The koenkai of politicians in rural areas would have had greater incentives to maintain their established pipelines to pork. Yet, in the environment of intraparty competition and decentralized candidate selection of the LDP under SNTV/MMD, hereditary succession appears to have been an attractive nomination strategy in both rural and urban districts alike. Gender similarly has no apparent effect.

It is important to consider that, even though these results suggest that incumbency was significant for predicting hereditary succession in the LDP, incumbency is associated with a host of other attributes and qualities beyond simply the fact of getting elected. We can isolate the "local average treatment effect" of incumbency in a candidate's final election attempt by using a regression discontinuity (RD) design (Thistlethwaite and Campbell, 1960). This approach compares the outcomes (*Bequeath* = 0 or 1) for individuals who were only marginally elected to those who were only marginally defeated. Whether or not such marginal candidates got elected can be considered "as good as random," so differences in outcomes can be more credibly attributed to the "treatment" of winning office in their final attempt (rather than quality, effort, resources, etc.). RD designs have been used extensively to measure the incumbency advantage (e.g., Lee, 2008; Caughey and Sekhon, 2011; Eggers et al., 2015; Erikson and Titiunik, 2015), as well as the inherited incumbency advantage for candidates in other contexts (Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009; Querubin, 2016; Van Coppenolle, 2015; Fiva and Smith, 2016), usually focused on a candidate's first election or first re-election attempt.



Figure 4.4: Regression discontinuity around incumbency for LDP candidates' final election attempt, 1958-1990.

Note: Figure shows the predicted probabilities of *Bequeath* = 1 for LDP candidates whose margin of victory (defeat) in their final election attempt was within 5 percentage points of the loser (winner). Created with *rdplot* command in Stata (bin size = 15 on each side of the cut-off).

Here, my approach is different in that I focus on the *final* election attempt of LDP candidates in my sample who were within five percentage points of either losing

the race (marginal winners) or winning the race (marginal losers).[28] The treatment is whether or not the candidate wins a seat in the district (meaning the candidate was an incumbent at the time of death or retirement). Figure 4.4 plots the predicted probabilities that an exiting LDP candidate would transfer his or her jiban to a family member given his or her vote share margin in his or her final election attempt. The vertical line at zero represents the threshold for electoral victory or defeat. To the left of the threshold are candidates who narrowly lost (vote share margin is the difference between the candidate's vote share and the vote share of the last-place winner in the district). To the right of the threshold are candidates who narrowly won (vote share margin is the difference between the candidate's vote share and the vote share of the first runner-up in the district).

As in the main regression results, the estimated effect of incumbency on the probability of hereditary succession in the RD results is roughly 15 percentage points, and is statistically significant (estimates in table format are provided in Appendix Table A.6). This confirms that one of the most important factors in predicting hereditary succession in the LDP under SNTV/MMD was simply whether or not the candidate had been successful in his or her final election attempt.



Figure 4.5: Marginal effect of length of tenure conditional on LDP candidate's existing status in a dynasty, 1958-1990.

Note: Figure shows the predicted probabilities of *Bequeath* = 1 for LDP candidates who were or were not already legacy candidates, at increasing number of terms served.

[28] This leaves 440 candidates in the sample. *Vote share margin* is normally distributed around the threshold and does not exhibit any signs of sorting (see Figure A.7 in Appendix A).

We can also evaluate whether the predicted probability of succession at each number of additional terms is conditional on the other variables, by including their interactions in the models. The results of this analysis using a logit regression are presented in Appendix Table A.7. The only interaction that significantly alters the slope of *Previous terms* is *Existing Dynasty*. Predicted probabilities are presented in Figure 4.6. Exiting LDP candidates who are already themselves part of a dynasty have a roughly 30 percent probability of being succeeded, regardless of length of tenure. In contrast, longer tenures increase the predicted probability of a new dynasty forming. This again illustrates the supply-side effect of an existing multi-generation family history in politics, as we have already seen with the MP-level data in Chapter 3.

Finally, we can evaluate how the predicted probability of having a family member serve in parliament in the future given the number of terms served differs across parties. This is important because it could be the case that the LDP features more dynasties simply because its members are more likely have longer tenures—thus increasing the *supply* of legacy hopefuls. In actuality, plenty of JSP MPs also served many terms in the House of Representatives (the maximum for the LDP from 1958-1990 is 19 terms, compared to 16 for the JSP). Expanding the sample to include *both* exiting LDP and JSP candidates, and interacting party with number of terms reveals the differences across these two parties (see Appendix Figure A.8). The predicted probability of having a future family member elected to parliament for an exiting LDP politician who had served five terms (the average for the LDP) is 18 percent. In contrast, the predicted probability for an exiting JSP politician with the same number of terms is just 5 percent. This again suggests higher demand for legacies in the LDP.

4.3 Electoral Reform and Party Adaptation

The tendency toward dynastic candidate selection within the LDP might have continued unabated were it not for the huge institutional changes that came in the 1990s. When the LDP briefly lost control of government following the 1993 House of Representatives election, the eight-party coalition that came into power under Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro of the Japan New Party (JNP) was united in the sole purpose of reforming the electoral system. While the reform initiative was not predicated on a perceived need to rid the country of dynastic politics *per se*, the prevalence of hereditary succession in the LDP was an outcome that, as with many other aspects of postwar political behavior, had its origins in the nature of competition under the SNTV/MMD system.

Reformers hoped that the new MMM system would result in a decline in koenkai, factions, money politics, corruption, and other pathologies of the SNTV/MMD system. With the elimination of intraparty competition in both the FPTP/SMD and CLPR tiers, there would be greater need for parties to present competing policy platforms to voters, and lesser need for individual candidates to campaign on personal or particularistic appeals, as the value of the party label would be stronger. It was also hoped that the introduction of SMDs would generate two-party competition and bring an end to LDP dominance (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993; Cowhey and McCubbins, 1995).

The reform did not produce the expected results immediately, as many politicians who were first elected under the old system continued to use the campaign methods and policymaking styles to which they had grown accustomed (Otake, 1998; McKean and

Scheiner, 2000). Ellis Krauss and Robert Pekkanen note how the LDP's internal party institutions that were developed under the 1955 System, including koenkai, factions, and PARC, continued to function in many of the same ways after reform (Krauss and Pekkanen, 2011). The period immediately after reform was also characterized by frequent party-switching, mergers, and dissolutions of parties attempting to secure a position as an alternative center-left party between the conservative LDP and the JCP on the far left.

Eventually, the opposition parties coalesced around the DPJ, which was founded in 1996 by former members of the JSP and LDP.[29] Despite the initial party system upheaval, two-party competition began to take shape in the SMD tier by 2003, with the LDP and DPJ capturing over 80 percent of the votes and seats in most districts (Reed, 2005; Estévez-Abe, 2006; Reed and Shimizu, 2009). Both parties also began to produce pre-election manifestoes to present their policy goals to the electorate—a practice initiated by the DPJ in 2003 and quickly copied by the LDP (Tsutsumi and Uekami, 2011). Voters also began to shift their attention in elections from candidates to parties. By the 2000 election, more voters reported that they placed greater importance on candidate than party in surveys (cf. pre-reform patterns in Figure A.4); by the 2009 election, over 60 percent of voters said that "party" was more important (Shinoda, 2013, p. 149).

The LDP managed to retain its control of government thanks to a number of factors, including a coalition agreement with Komeito beginning in 1999, the continued weakness of the opposition at the local level (Scheiner, 2006), and Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro's electoral popularity and reform image—most importantly in the 2005 House of Representatives election (Reed, McElwain and Shimizu, 2009). But some of Koizumi's most popular reforms undermined the LDP's support in rural areas, and by 2007, the party lost its control of the House of Councillors. In 2009, the LDP lost control of the House of Representatives in a landslide defeat to the DPJ, temporarily ending five decades of nearly uninterrupted LDP dominance.[30] After fifteen years and five general elections, the reforms had finally produced their intended effects in terms of interparty competition and alternation in power.

But parties had been changing internally as well. Although Krauss and Pekkanen (2011) correctly note the continued use of koenkai in mobilizing supporters of individual LDP candidates, the trends they analyze apply mainly to LDP *incumbents* who were first selected and elected under the old system, or in the tumultuous first election held in 1996, while the party system was still in flux. Such incumbents had little reason to disband their hard-built koenkai simply because of the reform, especially with such a volatile party system. In contrast, many of the candidates who were *newly recruited* for nominations in the SMD and PR tiers of the new system have experienced a much different environment. This is because the two main parties have responded to the new electoral system with internal reforms to their candidate selection processes that have made candidate eligibility more inclusive and strengthened the control of party leaders in nomination decisions.

Once again, the DPJ led the way, largely by necessity owing to its lack of any local organization or local politicians from which to recruit new candidates. In 1999,

[29] For its part, the JSP (renamed the Social Democratic Party, SDP) struggled to elect even a handful of candidates to either house of the Diet after the reform, though it was briefly part of the DPJ-led coalition government from 2009-2010.

[30] Although the party was out of government briefly from 1993-1994, and did not reclaim the post of prime minister until 1996, it was always the largest party.

the party began to experiment with an open recruitment (*kobo*) system for selecting candidates in the SMD tier—a process that proved successful, and which the LDP began to copy in 2004 (Smith, Pekkanen and Krauss, 2013).[31] The open recruitment system decreased barriers to entry to attract a more diverse range of candidates, while simultaneously undermining the previous influence exercised by outgoing incumbents and their koenkai in determining a successor candidate. Party leaders have taken a more active role in candidate selection—in some cases, directly recruiting high-profile academics, journalists, and celebrities. The process for determining candidates and their rank order for the PR tier is even more centralized.

A reduction of dynastic politics was not an immediate concern of the reformers. Indeed, many of the reformers in the LDP, including Ozawa Ichiro, Hatoyama Yukio, and Hata Tsutomu, were themselves legacy MPs, and Prime Minister Hosokawa was the grandson of Prince Konoe Fumimaro, the last prime minister before the start of World War II. However, the move toward party-centered campaigns and the increased importance of party image means that the local personal-vote-earning attributes like name recognition and connections to koenkai that legacy candidates possessed under the SNTV/MMD system are now in relatively lower demand in the candidate selection process. Moreover, the increased scrutiny on parties made dynastic recruitment in the LDP something of an embarrassment for the party, especially in the run-up to the 2009 election. The party, concerned for its national image, accelerated reforms designed to attract a more diverse range of candidates.

4.3.1 Expected Consequences of MMM

Under the new MMM system, candidates can be elected by simple plurality (i.e., FPTP) in one of 300 SMDs, or as part of a party list for one of 180 seats distributed through CLPR in eleven regional districts.[32] The regional districts range in magnitude from M = 6 (Shikoku) to M = 33 (Kinki, reduced to 29 before the 2000 election). Each voter casts one vote for an individual candidate in the SMD tier (by writing the candidate's name), and one vote for a party list in the PR tier (by writing the party's name). The candidate with a plurality of votes in an SMD contest is elected to serve that district, while seats in the regional PR districts are allocated to parties in proportion to their share of the vote using the D'Hondt formula. Unlike the mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems (Shugart and Wattenberg, 2001) used in Germany and New Zealand, there is no compensation between the SMD and PR tiers to produce overall proportionality in the legislature; seats are distributed in parallel within the respective tiers and districts.

A party may list a candidate in both tiers, so that if the candidate fails to win the SMD contest he or she can still be elected in the PR tier if his or her position on the list is high enough to qualify for a seat given the number of seats the party wins. More than one such "dual-listed" candidate can be ranked at the same position on the party list prior to the election, so that the actual ranking after the election is determined by a "best-loser" calculation (*sekihairitsu*), which is based on how close the candidate came to winning the SMD seat. The general practice within the LDP and DPJ is for all candidates in SMDs to be "competitively" dual-listed in such a manner, and

[31] *Kobo* could more literally be translated as "public recruitment."

[32] In the first election under this system in 1996, there were 200 seats in the PR tier. This number was reduced before the 2000 election. The number of SMDs was reduced to 295 in 2014.

few have opted to abstain from this electoral safety net (c.f., Krauss, Nemoto and Pekkanen, 2012).[33] In contrast, the Komeito, JCP, and many other small parties tend to use the dual-listing provision less frequently, and depend predominantly on the PR list to elect their preferred candidates (Smith, 2014).[34]

Some parties will place a few important candidates, such as elder statesmen or high-profile candidates, in "safe" list positions above the competitively ranked dual-listed candidates, before filling out the bottom of the list (below the large number of dual-listed candidates) with less important candidates, usually local party staff.[35] For example, in the 2005 election, Prime Minister Koizumi placed former Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, Switzerland, Dr. Inoguchi Kuniko, in a safe position at the top of the party's list in the Tokyo PR district, ahead of all of the dual-listed SMD candidates. Inoguchi had appeared frequently in the media while in her ambassadorial role, so her nomination as the list-leader for the LDP attracted considerable positive attention for the party, along with several other high-profile female candidates nominated by the LDP that year. However, when it appeared certain that the LDP would lose the subsequent election in 2009, Inoguchi was refused another safe position at the top of the party list.[36]

Political scientists and reformers expected several interparty and intraparty outcomes to result from the electoral reform. First, in terms of interparty competition, the introduction of SMDs was designed to shift the electoral focus from candidates to parties and generate more national policy-centered campaigns based around two main parties, while still allowing for small parties to gain some representation in the Diet. The rise of two-party competition in SMDs was also expected to produce alternation in government. Second, many predicted intraparty changes within the LDP. The reforms were expected to catalyze the demise of several peculiarities of the LDP organizational structure that thrived under the 1955 System, including koenkai and factions. For example, J. Mark Ramseyer and Frances Rosenbluth anticipated that "In its organization and functioning, the LDP would grow to resemble more closely British parties. Personnel, electoral strategy, and policy decisions would be centralized" (Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993, p. 197). With more nationally-focused campaigns, party leaders would want to exercise greater control over policy, discipline, and candidate selection.

---

[33] Since 2005, the LDP has restricted candidates over the age of 73 from being dual-listed, in an attempt to rejuvenate the party by forcing older incumbents to retire if they cannot win their SMD outright. Even with this restriction, 94 percent of LDP candidates and 99 percent of DPJ candidates typically run in both tiers.

[34] In the 2000 election, seven Komeito candidates were dual-listed at the same rank (with the *sekihairitsu* provision used to determine post-election rank). Since then, no Komeito candidate has been dual-listed. Apart from the 2009 election, when nearly 40 percent of its candidates were dual-listed, the JCP has dual-listed approximately 10 percent or fewer of its candidates. In contrast to the LDP and DPJ, which usually put dual-listed candidates at rank 1 or 2, dual-listed JCP candidates, though generally equally ranked, are ranked below the party's top candidates on the list.

[35] In early post-reform elections, safe list positions were frequently negotiated to resolve disputes in the LDP where there was more than one incumbent in a new SMD after redistricting (Di Virgilio and Reed, 2011), but these problems have largely disappeared, and safe list positions have become more and more of a rarity in the past few elections, as party competition has increased and dual-listed SMD candidates have opposed the presence of a sure-winner above them on the list.

[36] Interview with Inoguchi Kuniko, Tokyo, May 11, 2011 (in English).

However, other scholars were less optimistic that the reforms would drastically change the nature of Japanese parties and elections. Ray Christensen (1994, p. 603) cautioned:

> ...campaign laws have not been changed to give candidates better access to voters...and the tried and true methods of reaching voters through personal support networks may remain a candidate's best hope. Future campaigns may still turn on local alliances and personalities rather than party platforms.

Some scholars also predicted that despite the electoral reform, little would change in terms of the types of candidates chosen to run with the LDP label. For example, Haruhiro Fukui (1997, p. 112) writes:

> ...the major parties are likely to remain committed to the same old rules in the selection of their candidates, that is, the acceptance of recommendations made by prefectural and local branches, respect for incumbency, and the importance attached to winnability. It is therefore unlikely that they will choose to sponsor in future elections any types of candidate very different from those they had chosen under the old system.

In terms of dynastic politics specifically, Margaret McKean and Ethan Scheiner (2000, p. 472) predicted that the rampant practice of hereditary succession would continue unless or until the LDP lost its control of government:

> The insistence of major LDP politicians in 1996 that they run in their SMDs, rather than heading up their party's PR list, reflects how important it is to them that they use the new system to continue cultivating district-based support organizations, not just for themselves but as an heritable asset, just as one would try to keep family wealth of other kinds to bequeath to heirs. ...If the long dominance of the conservative party is what makes inheritance of a seat worthwhile to the heirs, then we would expect to see less bequeathing and inheriting of parliamentary seats only if the new SMD-PR system manages to end one-party dominance.

Indeed, the first election held under the MMM system was largely a disappointment for observers who hoped to witness radical changes in campaign practices or party politics (Otake, 1998; McKean and Scheiner, 2000). Campaign practices remained largely unchanged, and even candidates who were newly nominated under the new system chose to create koenkai. For example, LDP candidate Hirasawa Katsuei, who ran in Tokyo 17$^{\text{th}}$ District without any former ties to the district, built his koenkai with the help of local politicians and by scraping together remnants of the koenkai of his predecessors, who were no longer running in that district because of redistricting (Park, 1998; Krauss and Pekkanen, 2011, pp. 81-90). New LDP candidate Kono Taro inherited part of his father's jiban in Kanagawa 15$^{\text{th}}$ District in 1996 after electoral reform split the previous district in two parts. Kono created his own new koenkai, and worked to build on the existing support base he inherited from his father.[37]

One reason why the impact of the reforms was delayed was the disarray of the non-LDP opposition. The biggest of these parties was the New Frontier Party (NFP), formed in 1994 by former-LDP heavyweight Ozawa Ichiro from many of the parties

[37] Interview with Kono Taro, Tokyo, June 1, 2011 (in English). Most of the koenkai members who he inherited from his father were elderly, so Kono sought in particular to recruit younger members into his new koenkai.

that had been in the anti-LDP coalition of 1993-1994 that passed electoral reform. Ozawa had been a rising star in the LDP. He inherited his seat in Iwate 2nd District at the age of 27 when his father, Ozawa Saeki, died in office prior to the 1969 House of Representatives election. Saeki had served as Minister of Construction, Minister of Posts, and Minister of Transport in the early postwar cabinets of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru. Ichiro quickly became a protégé of Tanaka Kakuei, who was LDP secretary general at the time, and ascended the ranks of the party to become secretary general himself in 1989; like Tanaka, at just 47 years old. In 1993, he orchestrated the vote of no confidence against the cabinet of Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi that led to the election, and along with Hata Tsutomu and their followers, formed the Japan Renewal Party, which went on to win 55 seats. After the anti-LDP coalition fell to pieces in 1994, Renewal merged with Hosokawa's JNP, the DSP, and part of Komeito to form the NFP. In the 1996 election, the NFP won 156 seats out 500, falling well behind the LDP's 239 seats.

The second largest challenger to the LDP, the DPJ, was founded in 1996 by former-LDP member Hatoyama Yukio, former-SDL member Kan Naoto of the New Party Sakigake, and Yukio's brother Kunio, who left the NFP to form the DPJ, but later returned to the LDP.[38] When the NFP broke up in 1998, Ozawa formed the Liberal Party with his followers, but members of six of the other former parties that had been part of NFP merged with the DPJ to become the "new" DPJ (Higashi, 2008*a*; Koellner, 2011). Eventually, Ozawa and the Liberal Party also merged with the DPJ in 2003 (Higashi, 2008*b*), and Ozawa began to play a large role in the DPJ leadership, serving as party president from 2006-2009, and secretary general from 2009-2010. The early failure of these parties to coordinate or coalesce around a single alternative in SMDs during the first few elections may have helped the LDP win more seats than it would have had it faced a single viable challenger.[39]

A second reason the MMM system did not produce immediate results in terms of party organization and behavior was the dual-listing provision. Since districts could be represented by both the winner of the SMD and a dual-listed PR winner, both might theoretically behave like SMD candidates in the legislature (McKean and Scheiner, 2000). The practice of dual-listing candidates has created SMDs with effectively two district-focused incumbents, who compete with each other to build and maintain their personal vote in order to be the SMD winner in the next election. This reality has dampened the potential influence of the PR tier on electoral and legislative behavior.

Third, but most importantly, most of the candidates who ran in the first few elections, and all of their party leaders, had first been recruited and elected under the old SNTV/MMD system. They had already invested countless resources into building their koenkai, had learned certain campaigning styles, and had climbed their way

[38] Both Hatoyama brothers were originally members of the LDP, with Kunio first getting his start in the LDP splinter party New Liberal Club. Kan was first elected as a member of the SDL. Hatoyama Yukio joined Sakigake in 1993 prior to the election, while Kan joined in 1994 after the dissolution of the SDL. Hatoyama Kunio ran as an independent in 1993.

[39] For example, in the 1996 election, the LDP won 169 SMD seats with a total SMD vote share of 38.6 percent. The NFP won 96 SMD seats with 28 percent of the total SMD vote, while the DPJ won 17 seats with 10.6 percent of the SMD vote. A single, unified opposition party with the same vote shares could have potentially secured 158 SMD seats to the LDP's 127. Similar coordination failures occurred in the 2012 and 2014 House of Representatives elections, again to the LDP's benefit (Reed et al., 2013; Scheiner, Smith and Thies, 2015).

through the party apparatus through seniority and factional politics, and thus had little desire to radically alter the established patterns of campaigning and internal politicking that had served them well to this point (Krauss and Pekkanen, 2011). This was particularly true for mid-career politicians who had not yet reached the pinnacles of power and had the most to lose by disrupting the old system. For example, Steven R. Reed and Ethan Scheiner (2003) find that during the turbulent year of LDP party splits in 1993, junior-level politicians who were electorally weak and senior-level politicians who were electorally secure were the most likely to defect from the LDP. Those who stayed in the LDP were less reform-minded and more invested in the party's status quo organization.

If we want to evaluate the effect of reform on party personnel decisions, including dynastic candidate selection, we must therefore look at new candidates nominated since reform. Despite the slow start, Japan has indeed been moving toward more party-centered elections in recent years, with the LDP and the DPJ both producing party manifestos before elections since 2003, and candidate quality playing less of a role in voter decisions than party label (Maeda, 2009; Reed, Scheiner and Thies, 2012). Although the alternation in government did not occur until 2009, both parties began to change internally post-reform, and the pre-reform patterns of dynastic recruitment began to collapse as a result. The greatest direct impact on dynastic politics has arguably resulted from internal reforms to the two main parties' candidate selection processes following the electoral reform.

4.3.2 Party Responses to the New Electoral Environment

Recall that under SNTV/MMD, the LDP and JSP both used a decentralized process to select their candidates. A candidate could win with only a small portion of the vote, which meant that parties could nominate candidates with very limited geographic or sectoral appeal. For example, multiple LDP candidates could smoothly divide the conservative vote in a district if their jiban were based around different home turfs, or if they specialized in different policy areas (McCubbins and Rosenbluth, 1995; Tatebayashi, 2004; Mizusaki and Mori, 2007). A candidate who inherited an established jiban and its koenkai organization had a head start aggregating enough votes to win, and was thus a logical choice for the party to nominate. If the party tried to deny the official nomination to such a candidate, he or she might run anyway as an independent and threaten the success of the party's vote division strategy.

With the switch to MMM, parties face new incentives in candidate selection (Asano, 2006). First, since the old MMDs were divided into fewer SMDs than the previous number of seats, nominated candidates now need to have wider appeal beyond the narrow, geographically based jiban that could previously secure election. Candidates can no longer secure a seat with only 10 or 15 percent of the vote, as in the past. As a result, candidate and legislator behavior has shifted toward attracting a broader range of voters. For example, candidates' campaign manifestos since electoral reform have included a larger percentage of issues related to programmatic policies, including foreign policy issues, in contrast to local or particularistic policies (Catalinac, 2016*b*). LDP MPs are also now active in a wider range of PARC committees than in the past, presumably to cultivate a broader policy expertise to attract diverse voters in the new electoral environment (Krauss and Pekkanen, 2011; Fujimura, 2015).

Second, since there is only a single party-nominated candidate in each SMD, party leaders now have greater incentive to be concerned with who that candidate is, the

extent to which his or her policy preferences align with the party leadership, and whether he or she contributes positively to the party's image. National party interests in candidate selection might not always coincide with a candidate choice made locally. The SMD system used in Canada provides a useful comparison. As Lynda Erickson and R. Kenneth Carty (1991, p. 334) explain:

> Under Canada's single-member plurality system, local control can pose difficulties for national parties when, for example, they attempt to orchestrate a nationally balanced slate of candidates, or where they are reluctant to be associated with particular individuals. In short, what the central party sees to be in its interests can conflict with local choice.

Third, the party list component in the PR tier encourages parties to present a more diverse range of candidates, especially more women and young people. Since dual-listed candidates fill many of these list positions, this means nominating more diverse candidates in SMD contests as well. In the case of gender, the impact of the electoral reform was drastic and immediate. From 1958-1993, the LDP only nominated seventeen individual female candidates (less than 2 percent of all LDP candidates). Of these, eleven (65 percent) were legacy candidates. In the last seven elections held under SNTV/MMD (1976, 1979, 1980, 1983, 1986, 1990, and 1993), the LDP nominated just seven female candidates to the House of Representatives: Yamaguchi Shizue in Tokyo 6th District, Mikami Hideko in Tokyo 4th District, Sakamura Aonami in Gunma 2nd District, Takahashi Chihiro in Niigata 1st District, Abe Reiko in Osaka 3rd District, Hamada Makiko in Saitama 2nd District, and Noda Seiko in Gifu 1st District. Of these women, only Yamaguchi and Abe were not legacy candidates.[40] However, since electoral reform, the LDP and other parties have begun to recruit and nominate many more female candidates (Smith, 2013; Gaunder, 2013), as illustrated in Figure 4.6. In 2014, the LDP nominated forty-two female candidates (12 percent of its candidates) and the DPJ nominated twenty-nine (15 percent of its candidates). Overall, women now make up roughly 17 percent of all parties' candidates.

The age of LDP candidates has declined slightly, from an average of 57 in the last seven elections held under SNTV/MMD, to an average of 55 in the seven elections since the adoption of MMM. The proportion of LDP candidates who were born in the district where they run has also decreased, from 79 percent to 66 percent during these two periods, as has the proportion of former national bureaucrats, from 25 percent to 19 percent. In contrast, the proportion of former local assembly members has increased slightly, from 29 percent to 32 percent, and former MP secretaries have increased from 32 percent to 37 percent (see Figure A.5 in Appendix A).

Several aspects of the new system facilitated these transitions. The dual-listing provision reduces the winner-take-all nature of the SMD system, so that non-traditional candidates such as women still have an opportunity to gain a seat through the PR tier. This is also true for potential "quality" candidates who might otherwise be cautious about challenging an incumbent, making it easier for the party to find and nominate such candidates. In addition, the Political Party Subsidy Law of 1994 provides public

[40] Yamaguchi's father, Yamaguchi Shigehiko, was elected to the House of Councillors in 1953, after her first election in 1946. Of the female candidates who ran between 1976-1993, only Noda and Yamaguchi were successfully elected, though Takahashi had won a seat in 1972 that was formerly held by her husband before his death.



Figure 4.6: Percentage of women among candidates, 1947-2014.
Note: By-elections excluded. SMD and PR tiers of post-reform MMM system grouped together. Vertical dashed line marks electoral reform in 1994.
Source: JHRED.

funds to parties.[41] With these funds, party leaders can support their preferred candidates rather than having to default to nominating self-financed candidates (such as those who inherit a koenkai war chest). Matthew Carlson notes an increasing reliance on the local party branch organizations for funds by new LDP candidates, rather than personal fund agents or koenkai (Carlson, 2007, pp. 42-44). With fewer hereditary candidates and weak factional "groups," DPJ candidates were especially dependent upon the party for funds. Most candidates now receive more funds from the party than from any other source, and parties have more funds to distribute, which increases the power of party leaders.

With their party image in mind, party leaders have paid more careful attention to the types of candidates they nominate, and as a result, have increased efforts to centralize decision-making in the candidate selection process. The two main parties have also introduced creative new methods for attracting candidates—most notably, an open recruitment system through which interested and eligible citizens can apply

[41] Parties are eligible to receive funds if they have five or more Diet members (either chamber), or at least one Diet member and exceeded two percent of the vote share for parties in the previous election. The law provides for a yearly fund of 250 yen per citizen to be allocated proportionally to parties based on their Diet membership and vote share in the most recent election. For the past several years, this has been around 30 billion yen. The JCP opposes the system on the principle that citizens must donate to parties they oppose, so it abstains from receiving any public funds.

to become candidates for the parties. The DPJ adopted the open recruitment system first, in 1999, and the LDP followed suit in 2004. The early success of the system in recruiting new talent, and the continued desire for internal party democratization and reform has led to its increasing use for selecting new candidates by both parties.

Although many legacy candidates are still nominated without having to apply through the open recruitment system, many others have been forced to do so (and in some cases have been passed over for a non-legacy candidate),[42] and the number of districts in which candidates are selected without first competing in the open recruitment process has been declining. The introduction of open recruitment thus undermines the inevitability of a legacy candidate being nominated as it provides the party with a greater number of candidate options, and gives party leaders more direct control over the recruitment process.

4.3.3 Open Recruitment in the DPJ and LDP

At the time of its founding in 1996, the DPJ consisted of only fifty-two members of the House of Representatives and five members of the House of Councillors. Most of these were former members of the JSP (renamed SDP in 1996) and younger members of Sakigake. It had virtually no organizational base in local prefectures or among local prefectural assembly members, as local elections had been held in 1995, before the party's formation. In contrast, nearly half of all local assembly members were aligned with the LDP (Uekami and Tsutsumi, 2011, pp. 12-13). The main existing alternative to the LDP at the time, the NFP, only managed to elect an average of five assembly members (about 5 percent of assembly seats) in the twenty-seven (out of forty-seven) prefectures in which it gained any representation at all. Even when the DPJ was able to run candidates under its banner in the 1999 local elections four years later, it only managed to elect an average of four members in the forty-four prefectures that held elections (about 6 percent of the seats) (Scheiner, 2006, pp. 134-135).

To add to the difficulty of recruiting candidates to run in SMDs without any local politicians, in 1996 the party had to compete for the non-leftist anti-LDP vote with the NFP and with members of Sakigake who opted not to join the DPJ. As a result of the party's weak local presence and inability to attract more party switchers, it was only able to field candidates in 143 SMDs in 1996, with an additional eighteen candidates running purely on the party's PR lists. Even after the NFP broke up in 1998 and many of its ex-members joined the DPJ, the "new" DPJ only had a party delegation of less than a hundred incumbents in the House of Representatives (Kato and Kannon, 2008, p. 346), and was still weak at the local level. So the party needed to seek innovative new ways to attract candidates to stand under its label in subsequent elections. The open recruitment system was an important method it employed.

The first party to hold an open recruitment contest to attract candidates for a national election was the JNP in advance of the 1993 House of Representatives election. One of the candidates selected in that process was Edano Yukio, who would later join the DPJ and serve as Chief Cabinet Secretary under Prime Minister Kan Naoto. The JNP dissolved in 1994, and many of its members joined the NFP. For the 1996 House of Representatives election, the NFP also held an open recruitment contest to find candidates. According to MP Asao Keiichiro, who was selected as a candidate in that process, the NFP released a national announcement for applicants, who were interviewed in two rounds—first as a group, then individually. The interview committee

[42] Interview with senior LDP staff member in Tokyo, May 31, 2011 (in Japanese).

in both rounds consisted of an incumbent member of the House of Representatives, Nishikawa Taiichiro, and two outside (non-politician) members with well-known credentials in business and society: Fuji Xerox chairman Kobayashi Yotaro and manga cartoonist Hirokane Kenshi.[43]

In 1999, DPJ party leaders decided to implement a national open recruitment contest to fill the party's nominations for the upcoming 2000 election, taking a cue from the experiences of the JNP and NFP, whose former members were now in the party.[44] They also held a special round of open recruitment aimed specifically at attracting more female candidates (Gaunder, 2013; Smith, Pekkanen and Krauss, 2013). Between 1999 and 2009, the party screened over 5,000 potential candidates through the open recruitment process, 400 of whom were approved as potential candidates (for full details, see Table A.8 in Appendix A), and seventy-five of whom were ultimately nominated to stand for election in an SMD contest. The process has generally been used to supply candidates to districts where the local party organization (*kenren*) could not find a suitable candidate on its own, or where the national party headquarters did not approve of the local choice. The kenren are also primarily responsible for supplying candidates for the party PR list who are not dual-listed in an SMD. These are often local party staff members from the prefectural branches.

The DPJ's open recruitment process consists of three main steps: First, interested and eligible[45] applicants submit a two-page form to the party with their personal qualifications, preferred electoral districts, and a recent photograph, as well as a short (2,000 characters or less) essay describing their feelings about a chosen theme, their interest in becoming a candidate for the DPJ, and how they would appeal to voters. For example, in the 2009 round of open recruitment, the theme was "Politics after the change in government: what I want to tackle." Second, successful applicants are then further screened in an interview with party members and staff from the party's Election Strategy Committee and ranked. Last, candidates who pass this stage are then registered as "approved candidates." Apart from the 2005 open recruitment process, where the initial applications were collected locally in each district where a candidate was still needed, the entire application process is carried out nationally, and approved candidates enter into negotiations with party leaders about where to run given the districts where the DPJ is in need of a candidate.

When a district has been decided, potential candidates must then meet with local party organization officials for final approval to make sure that the candidates chosen by the national headquarters will match well with the local support organization. If the proposed candidate is not acceptable to the local party organization, the national party headquarters will propose someone else. The party has also sometimes forced weak candidates from the previous election to face competition for re-nomination through an open recruitment contest or internal party primary. The party has an internal rule that candidates who lose three times consecutively will not be re-nominated, though most candidates are replaced or opt not to run again before that time, which has helped the party improve over time in terms of personnel quality (Weiner, 2011).

In many cases, the open recruitment system has been an effective way to find replacement candidates (Smith, Pekkanen and Krauss, 2013). The open recruitment system was used to select 22 percent of new DPJ candidates in 2000, and 15 percent in

[43] Interview with Asao Keiichiro in Tokyo, March 13, 2013 (in English).

[44] Interview with a senior staff member of the DPJ Election Strategy Committee in Tokyo, June 15, 2011 (in Japanese).

[45] Candidates are required to have held Japanese citizenship for at least 25 years.

2003. In contrast to the first election under MMM, in which the party only managed to field candidates in 143 of 300 SMDs, after party mergers and the introduction of open recruitment, it was able to field candidates in 244 of 300 SMDs in 2000, and 268 SMDs in 2003. The party's increased electoral presence also helped increase its share of the PR vote, which in 2003 surpassed that of the LDP.

The DPJ's success in 2003 was a wake-up call to the LDP. According to LDP House of Councillors member Seko Hiroshige, reformers in the LDP were especially surprised to learn that many of the "fresh" new faces in the DPJ who won seats in 2003 had been recruited through the party's open recruitment process after being passed over by the LDP for more traditional candidates like legacy candidates or local assemblymen.[46] Reformers like Seko were concerned: "Our candidate selection process is a mess. If we continue like this, our [negative] image as an old party will be indelible. If we don't drastically reform the party, it will die" (Seko, 2006, p. 12). Ironically, many of the young reformers who headed the party's special committee on internal reforms, including Seko, Abe Shinzo, and Shiozaki Yasuhisa, were themselves legacy MPs.

At the local level, a few scattered LDP prefectural branch organizations had also experimented with open recruitment contests in the 2000 election. However, after the 2003 election, national party leaders began to consider a more systematic introduction of the method. A by-election in 2004 provided the perfect testing ground. In January of 2004, the LDP incumbent MP in Saitama 8th District, Arai Masanori (whose grandfather had once served as a local mayor), was forced to resign after being arrested (and later convicted) of bribery in the 2003 election. Nine other local LDP politicians from the area were also implicated in the scandal, leaving the local party organization in disarray and unable to come up with a candidate for the by-election that followed.

The party's internal reform committee decided to implement open recruitment as the method for selecting the party's new candidate. With just two months before the election, the party hired a public relations consulting company and sent out the open recruitment announcement for "a candidate fit for the 21st century" (Seko, 2006, p. 21). The party received applications from eighty-one individuals, which the national-level Election Strategy Committee narrowed down to a pool of roughly twenty credible candidates. In the next stage, an ad hoc committee that included professors and other professionals helped to further narrow the pool to six candidates for an interview stage: five men and one woman.[47] In these early stages, the ranking of potential candidates was done in a blind fashion, so that members did not know the names of the applicants.[48]

In the end, the party chose to nominate Shibayama Masahiko, a 38-year-old lawyer with roots in the district. The public relations stylist quickly went to work advising

[46] Interview with Seko Hiroshige in Tokyo, June 9, 2011 (in Japanese).

[47] The female applicant, economist Sato Yukari, was later chosen to run as one of Prime Minister Koizumi's "assassin" candidates in the historic 2005 House of Representatives election.

[48] Interview with Shibayama Masahiko in Tokyo, June 7, 2011 (in English). The interview committee consisted of Abe (then Secretary General), Seko, and Shiozaki, as well as Deputy Secretary General Kyuma Fumio, Internal Affairs Bureau Chief Machimura Nobutaka, Secretary General for the House of Councillors Aoki Mikio, and Saitama 9th District incumbent MP Ono Matsushige, who also served as the party's prefectural branch leader (Seko, 2006, pp. 22-23). All six candidates were interviewed together over the course of about an hour, with each candidate thus getting about ten minutes to make his or her case for selection.

Shibayama on his image, swapping eyeglasses for contact lenses, and dressing him in modern suits and colored shirts with the top button unfastened, to convey a look for the candidate that was professional, but approachable. The public relations company even created a cartoon dog mascot called "Shiba Wan" for campaign materials. Party leaders coached him to stress his local roots in the campaign, the Mori faction lent its support with additional staff, and big-wigs like Prime Minister Koizumi came to support him at several events (Seko, 2006, pp. 24-31). Against all odds, and with the LDP image badly damaged from the previous incumbent's money scandal, Shibayama managed to triumph in the election over the DPJ candidate, Kinoshita Atsushi, who had been elected through the PR list in 2003 and resigned his seat for the chance to be elected as the SMD representative.

The success of the first official open recruitment contest encouraged the party to use it in 2005 and 2009 to select many of its candidates in districts where the prefectural branch of the party failed to settle on a suitable candidate. In the LDP's open recruitment process used until 2012, each prefectural branch where an incumbent retires could opt to hold an open recruitment contest. Between 2004 and 2011, open recruitment was employed in over one hundred district races, and more than 2,300 potential candidates applied for the official LDP nomination through the process—an average of fourteen per district (full details in Table A.9 in Appendix A).

The main difference between the LDP open recruitment process and that of the DPJ is that the LDP's is implemented and administered locally, with would-be candidates applying district by district, whereas the DPJ's is a national process, with approved candidates being assigned to specific districts after being selected by the central party organization. The exception is the emergency round of open recruitment that the LDP held just prior to the 2005 election, when Prime Minister Koizumi expelled several "rebels" from his party for voting against his postal privatization reforms, and sought out new "assassin" candidates to run against them in the election. The difference in the level of centralization in the process stems from the fact that the DPJ introduced open recruitment before it had local organizations or candidates in many districts, and also reflects the tensions between the LDP party leadership and local party organizations, whose members had previously dominated the process.

In the LDP open recruitment process, potential candidates submit personal statements and résumés, and are then evaluated by a committee composed of both local party leaders and national party representatives. In a few districts, internal party primaries (*yobi senkyo*) have been held, in which all local party members are allowed to vote on the candidate. Although a few of the districts in which local branches have held open recruitment contests might have been largely for show (a so-called *deki-race*, or "rigged race" where the desired winner had been determined beforehand), most have been sincere contests, and all have at least introduced the potential for outside challengers to gain the nomination.

Many legacy candidates have also been forced to participate in the open recruitment process in order to secure the nomination. However, the use of open recruitment has in many cases been endogenous to the presence (or absence) of a legacy successor—i.e., if a legacy successor was available from the supply-side perspective, and the local party branch organization wanted to nominate him or her, then the local organization might not have opted to hold an open recruitment contest. Nevertheless, the national party needs to approve the decision even in these cases, and in some cases branch organizations have been required to hold an open recruitment contest if the party leadership was not satisfied with the pre-selection nominee.

In some nominations, party leaders of both parties have taken a direct and active role. For example, in the 2005 election, Prime Minister Koizumi's personal staff and the party leadership handpicked several of the "assassin" candidates (Iijima, 2006). Many of these assassins were chosen from among open recruitment applicants who were not chosen for a district race. Others, such as Inoguchi Kuniko, were contacted directly by Koizumi and given prominent positions on the PR lists.[49] These newly recruited candidates were dubbed "Koizumi's children" by the media. Similarly, when Ozawa Ichiro was secretary general DPJ prior to the 2009 election, he personally recruited several new candidates, many of them women. The media referred to these female candidates as "Ozawa girls," and many were specifically nominated to run against elderly LDP male incumbents to present a stark contrast between the "fresh" new face of the DPJ and the tired, old, and overwhelmingly male look of the long-ruling LDP.[50]

After the LDP's landslide defeat to the DPJ in the 2009 House of Representatives election, the party was left with 190 SMDs with no incumbent MP. Party leadership adopted a rule for determining the re-nomination of SMD candidates who lost their district race and were not elected through the PR list: any candidate whose "best-loser ratio" in 2009 was less than 70 percent (i.e., their vote share was less than 70 percent of the SMD winner's vote share) was forced to compete in an open recruitment contest to get re-nominated. In addition, losing candidates who were older than 65 at the time would also have to compete in an open recruitment contest to get re-nominated. These new requirements targeted roughly 110 individuals (losing SMD candidates), though in some districts the "best-loser ratio" threshold was relaxed to 60 percent.

The party also continued a rule that first-time candidates had to be younger than 65, and SMD candidates older than 70 could not be dual-listed in PR. These reforms were intended to hasten generational turnover in the party.[51] The party's new rules resulted in a large turnover of LDP candidates, many of them in their late 60s and 70s, in favor of much younger new candidates. In total, the LDP has used the open recruitment system to select 117 of its SMD candidates since 2000—43 percent of all of its first-time candidates (Table 4.3). The LDP also used the method to select many of its candidates in the 2010 and 2013 House of Councillors elections (Tsutsumi, 2012).

Many new parties have also used a form of the open recruitment system to find candidates. For example, Your Party, which was founded in 2009 by LDP defector and legacy MP Watanabe Yoshimi of Tochigi 3rd District, first used the system to find candidates for the 2010 House of Councillors election after successfully breaking into the party system in the 2009 House of Representatives election. For the 2012 House of Representatives election, open recruitment became the default method for recruiting new candidates for all of the so-called "Third Force" parties, including Your Party, the Japan Restoration Party (JRP), and the Tomorrow Party of Japan (TPJ), founded by Ozawa Ichiro after he defected from the DPJ earlier that year.[52] The JRP, founded prior to the 2012 election by Osaka Mayor Hashimoto Toru, held two rounds of open recruitment—first seeking candidates with prior experience in poli-

[49] Interview with Inoguchi Kuniko in Tokyo, May 11, 2011 (in English).

[50] Interviews with DPJ MP "A" in Tokyo, May 27, 2011 (in English), Nakabayashi Mieko in Tokyo, June 7, 2011 (in English), and Oizumi Hiroko in Tokyo, June 15, 2011 (in English).

[51] Interview with senior LDP staff member in Tokyo, May 31, 2011 (in Japanese).

[52] Several months prior to the 2012 House of Representatives election, Ozawa and several of his followers in the DPJ defected from the party over the issue of raising the consumption tax and internal power struggles between Ozawa and other DPJ leaders.

Table 4.3: Open recruitment for new SMD candidates for the House of Representatives, 2000-2012.

	2000	2003	2005	2009	2012	Total
DPJ						
Number	24	12	25	33	4	98
Percent	22%	15%	45%	45%	10%	27%
LDP						
Number	4	10	26	7	70	117
Percent	9%	21%	43%	35%	71%	43%

Note: By-election candidates are grouped with the previous general election. LDP data prior to 2004 and DPJ data for the 2012 election are based on newspaper accounts only. Data for the 2014 election are not available, but few new candidates were nominated.
Source: Smith and Tsutsumi (2016). Originally based on data from DPJ and LDP election strategy bureaus and various newspapers.

tics or the bureaucracy, and then seeking candidates with backgrounds in business, law, and academic professions. For the 2013 House of Councillors election, Your Party implemented a live-streaming open recruitment contest online to fill one of its nominations. Interviews with the applicants were recorded and uploaded to You Tube, and all party members were allowed to vote.

4.3.4 The Impact of Open Recruitment on Candidate Characteristics

How has the introduction of open recruitment changed the nature of Japanese politics? Recall the conceptual dimensions proposed by Reuven Hazan and Gideon Rahat (2010) for analyzing candidate selection methods: *candidacy* (who is eligible?), the *selectorate* (who decides the nomination?), *decentralization* (is the decision made centrally or locally?), and the *appointment or voting system* (is it majoritarian or proportional?). Japan's open recruitment system introduced changes across each of these conceptual dimensions.

First, the open recruitment system opened up the selection process to a wider (more inclusive) pool of candidates. In the case of the DPJ, this candidacy pool included all citizens of legal eligibility to run for office. For the LDP, the pool of potential candidates has been more limited depending on the prefecture and its requirements. When it comes to the selectorate, there has also been some variation, from extreme exclusivity (the party leader handpicks a candidate), to inclusivity within parties (party member primaries, with various appointment or voting systems used). Lastly, though perhaps most importantly, there is variation between parties when it comes to the degree of decentralization of the selection process. Although open recruitment in the DPJ and smaller parties has been mostly centralized, the LDP has opted for a more decentralized process, with prefectural party branches taking over the organizational role.

Perhaps the most basic impact of the open recruitment process can be observed in the background occupations and characteristics of the candidates chosen through the process. For both the LDP and the DPJ, the open recruitment system has expanded the candidate pool and provided a way for individuals who might otherwise have been off the radar to get the attention of the party selectorate. For that reason, candidates

selected through the open recruitment system display a more diverse range of prior occupations and backgrounds than more traditional candidates.

In the case of the DPJ, candidates recruited through the open recruitment system have indeed been less likely to have been born in the prefectures where they ran, and less likely to be of high "quality" (especially in terms of prior local-level elective experience) than other new candidates (Smith, Pekkanen and Krauss, 2013). However, open recruitment candidates have done no worse electorally than their traditional counterparts. Despite the desire to recruit more female candidates being a key reason for the adoption of open recruitment in 1999, the number and proportion of new female candidates selected through the process has not been substantial. In 1999, the DPJ managed to recruit five new female candidates through the process (28 percent of the open recruitment nominees). However, in subsequent years, more of the DPJ's female candidates have been recruited through traditional methods (with many being recruited directly by party leaders like Ozawa).

Hidenori Tsutsumi (2012) examines the background characteristics of new candidates from the DPJ and LDP for the 2010 House of Councillors election, and similarly finds fewer new candidates with local-level experience among open recruitment candidates in both parties, but a higher percentage of candidates who come from professional backgrounds such as law, medicine, or academia. In contrast to the findings for the DPJ for the House of Representatives (Smith, Pekkanen and Krauss, 2013), Tsutsumi finds that open recruitment produced roughly the same percentage of new female candidates as traditional methods (20 percent for the LDP, 50 percent for the DPJ) in the 2010 House of Councillors election.

In the 2012 House of Representatives election, in which most major parties employed some form of an open recruitment system for recruiting many of their new candidates, the Third Force parties largely used the open recruitment system to find candidates with similar backgrounds to those of the established parties' candidates, although both Your Party and the JRP were successful in recruiting many business professionals from outside politics, as well (Smith, 2013). In addition, although the LDP employed open recruitment to select the vast majority of its new candidates in 2012, some of the contests were simply a "show" of reform, and ultimately selected the insider favorite. For that reason, many of the LDP's first-time candidates resembled traditional patterns, with backgrounds as local politicians, political secretaries, or former bureaucrats. Nevertheless, many other contests within the LDP were legitimately contested, and party veterans were dumped in favor of new, younger outsiders.

For example, 70-year-old Yoshida Rokuzaemon, who lost his seat in Niigata 1st District to a DPJ opponent in 2009 with a best-loser ratio of just 54 percent, was forced to compete in an open recruitment contest for his re-nomination, and was replaced by 28-year-old former bureaucrat Ishizaki Toru, who went on to win the seat in the election. Chuma Koki, a 74-year-old, nine-term LDP MP from Osaka 1st District who also lost in 2009, was similarly replaced in an open recruitment contest by former local assemblyman Onishi Hiroyuki. Many of these veteran MPs who were forced out by the new open recruitment system decided to run under the label of one of the new Third Force parties, which were eager for experienced candidates to nominate.

Thus, there is some evidence that the open recruitment system has shaken up the traditional patterns of recruitment in the LDP and DPJ. In addition, the difference in centralization between the LDP and DPJ open recruitment processes is reflected in the policy preferences of candidates (Smith and Tsutsumi, 2016). While DPJ candidates selected through open recruitment tend to hold policy preferences that are closer to

those of the national median voter than their counterparts, there are less significant differences between LDP candidates selected through open recruitment and traditional methods (both of which are carried out locally).

Table 4.4 summarizes the changes that have taken place in the arenas of elections and candidate selection following the 1994 electoral reform and subsequent party reforms. In contrast to the pre-reform SNTV/MMD system, elections in the post-reform MMM system have gradually become more party-centered, thanks in large part to the elimination of intraparty competition. In terms of candidate selection, political parties, especially the LDP and DPJ, have responded by taking a more active, and at least partly centralized, role in recruiting candidates for office, and have introduced innovative new procedures for attracting fresh talent.

Table 4.4: Aspects of change in elections and candidate selection in post-reform Japan.

	Pre-reform SNTV/MMD	**Post-reform MMM**
Elections	Intraparty competition	No intraparty competition
	Candidate-centered	More party-centered
	Need for strong PVEA	Dual-listing limits risk
Candidate selection	Decentralized	More centralized, especially in DPJ
	Koenkai dominant	Party dominant
	Local elites coopt process	Open recruitment expands choice

But what effect have these changes had on patterns of dynastic candidate selection? To the extent that party label and national, programmatic issues have become more important in elections, the local name recognition of legacy candidates should be less valuable as a personal vote-earning attribute relative to the pre-reform period. Moreover, party actors who are now in charge of candidate selection have fewer incentives to seek out legacy candidates. Indeed, a party full of legacy candidates could generate a negative image for the party. The dual-listing provision removes some of the risk to nominating candidates with non-traditional backgrounds, and the new open recruitment system facilitates the recruitment of more diverse candidates, including women, by increasing the inclusivity of the candidate pool. Thus, parties like the LDP not only have new incentives and safeguards to present a diverse slate of candidates, but also a more accessible supply of potential new candidates.

4.4 Dynastic Politics Under MMM

If we look at all the year-by-year percentages of legacy candidates among all candidates for the House of Representatives in the seven elections prior to electoral reform (1976-1993), and compare them to the seven elections that followed (1996-2014), there is a clear and immediate drop in the percentage of legacy candidates in the post-reform period for all candidates, as well as in the LDP (left panel of Figure 4.7). In the LDP, the proportion of legacy candidates declined from a high of nearly 47 percent in the final election under SNTV/MMD in 1993, to just 28 percent in the 2012 and

2014 elections (the pre-reform average was 42 percent, compared to 34 percent in the post-reform period). Because the DPJ's membership consists of several former LDP members, an average of 13 percent of its candidates have also been legacy candidates, roughly mirroring the overall percentage of legacy candidates among all parties and independents.



Figure 4.7: Percentage of legacy candidates in House of Representatives elections, 1976-2014.
Note: Left panel includes all candidates. Right panel includes only first-time candidates. Vertical dashed line indicates year of electoral system reform. Post-reform period includes both SMD and pure PR list candidates. By-elections are included, grouped with the previous general election. Percentages for LDP and DPJ do not include affiliated independents.
Source: JHRED.

Yet, just as incumbent candidates had no reason to disband their koenkai simply because of the reform, parties had no reason to suddenly expel all incumbent legacy candidates. Thus, it makes more sense to look at first-time candidates nominated before and after electoral reform to get a picture of the reform's impact on dynastic candidate selection (right panel of Figure 4.7). If we look only at these newly-recruited candidates, the percentage of legacy candidates in the LDP has declined more drastically since reform—from an average of 44 percent in the pre-reform period, to just 15 percent in the post-reform period, and just 9 percent in the 2009 and 2012 elections.

Grouped by the institutional settings of the electoral system and party reform periods, we can also observe a stark difference between the legacy and hereditary candidate nomination patterns that prevailed in the LDP under SNTV/MMD, and the situation under the post-reform SMD and PR tiers of the MMM system, including the impact of internal party reforms after 2003 (Figure 4.8). From 1976-1993, 105 of

238 first-time LDP candidates were legacy candidates (44 percent), and 66 of these candidates (28 percent of total) directly succeeded their predecessors as hereditary candidates. In the SMD tier of the new system from 1996-2003, prior to the introduction of open recruitment, the share of legacy candidates among 192 new recruits was more than halved, to 20 percent (39 legacy candidates, including 25 hereditary). After party reforms began to take effect in 2005, the percentage of legacy candidates, and especially hereditary candidates, continued to decline among new LDP candidates. Since 2005, only 20 new candidates of 191 total (10 percent) have been hereditary candidates. A further fourteen (7 percent of total) were legacy candidates that did not directly succeed their predecessors. These patterns suggest that the level of dynastic politics in the LDP may be beginning to shift away from the patterns that prevailed under SNTV/MMD (and still persist under STV/MMD in Ireland), and instead approach the average level in most other democracies, including countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada that also use FPTP/SMD for parliamentary elections (see Chapter 2).



Figure 4.8: Mosaic plot of first-time legacy and hereditary candidates in the LDP, by institutional setting.
Note: By-elections are included (the first by-election after party recruitment reforms is grouped with FPTP/SMD from 2005-2014). Pearson $\chi^2(6) = 92.3728$, p = 0.000.
Source: JHRED.

In the PR tier, the impact of the reform on dynastic recruitment has been even greater. Direct hereditary succession by my coding scheme is not possible for pure PR candidates (i.e., those who are not dual-listed in an SMD) because the concept of a jiban does not apply to party lists. Among pure PR candidates, there have only

been nine new legacy candidates out of 157 total (6 percent). One of these legacy candidates, former Minister of Education Moriyama Mayumi (widow of Tochigi 1st District MP Moriyama Kinji), resigned her position in the House of Councillors to run in the House of Representatives Kita Kanto PR district in 1996. So although she counts as a "first-time" candidate to the House of Representatives, she was hardly a new recruit.[53]

4.4.1 Hereditary Candidates Become a Political Issue

Just prior to the 2009 election, the DPJ went after the LDP for its dynastic politics. In April 2009, four months before the general election, the DPJ declared that it would no longer nominate any direct hereditary successors, effectively banning the practice within the party, including the practice of inheriting an MP's political fund management organization. The party told *Asahi Shimbun* that it hoped the policy would help the party recover after its image was tarnished by the arrest of party leader Ozawa Ichiro's personal aide for alleged illegal fund-raising.[54]

Because the DPJ had already selected most of its candidates for the upcoming election through the open recruitment process three years earlier (in 2006), the ban did not directly affect any of its own candidates. Instead, the announcement of the ban was largely an electoral ploy to embarrass the LDP, which had recently come under fire in the media for its dynastic politics, as the three prime ministers who followed Koizumi Junichiro—Abe Shinzo, Fukuda Yasuo, and Aso Taro—were all hereditary MPs, and each had been criticized for ineffective leadership. Many journalists were questioning whether hereditary MPs were fit to lead, or whether they were simply privileged blue-bloods with little real knowledge or experience. Fueling the fire, Koizumi announced his retirement from politics in 2008, and anointed his 27-year-old son, Shinjiro, as his successor in Kanagawa 11th District (which includes the cities of Kawasaki, Yokosuka, and Kamakura).

The Koizumi family has been active in Japanese politics for over 100 years, and Shinjiro represents the fourth generation. His great grandfather, Matajiro, represented

[53] Three of the other legacy candidates—Oishi Hidemasa in Tokai in 1996, Kato Katsunobu in Chugoku in 2000, and Nakayama Kazuo in Kita Kanto in 2003—ran in the election directly after the retirement of their predecessor, but were compelled to first run as pure PR candidates before running in their predecessor's SMD, so do not count as hereditary candidates. Oishi was ranked 4th on the party's PR list and won a seat in 1996. However, he failed to get the party's official nomination in Shizuoka 2nd District in 2000 and ran instead as an independent (and lost). Kato was ranked 7th on the list in 1996 and was not elected, but was promoted to 3rd on the list in 2000 and won. In 2005, he swapped with the SMD incumbent, Murata Yoshitaka, in Okayama 5th District as part of a so-called "Costa Rica" agreement (Reed and Shimizu, 2009) between candidates whose pre-reform jiban were divided by the new SMDs. Nakayama was given a hopeless 32nd place rank on the PR list in Kita Kanto in 2003. In 2005, he ran as an independent in his father's old Ibaraki 3rd District, and lost to the LDP incumbent, Hanashi Yasuhiro, a third-generation legacy MP. Hasegawa Michio, the son of former House of Councillors MP Hasegawa Shin, ran on the Hokuriku Shinetsu list in 2003, but was ranked 23rd and was not elected. Sekiya Taira, son of House of Councillors MP Sekiya Katsutsugu, won the 2005 open recruitment contest to be listed on the party's Shikoku list after the dual-listed SMD candidates, but ended up one position short of getting elected. Neither Hasegawa nor Sekiya attempted another election.

[54] *Asahi Shimbun*, April 4, 2009.

Kanagawa 2nd District (which became the 11th District after reform) in the House of Representatives from 1908-1945, and served in the House of Peers from 1945 until 1946, at which time he was purged from office by the U.S. Occupation. Shinjiro's grandfather (Junichiro's father) was born Samejima Junya, but changed his name when he married into the Koizumi family. Originally from Kagoshima Prefecture, he served two terms in the prewar House of Representatives from 1937-1945 representing Kagoshima 1st District, before also being purged. When the Occupation ended and the purge was lifted in 1952, Junya returned to the Diet, this time representing Kanagawa 2nd District, as his father-in-law, Matajiro, had died the year before. Junya served seven terms before dying in office in 1969 at the age of 65. At that point, Junichiro took over the jiban and won consecutive elections since, becoming prime minister in 2001.

In the 2005 election, Koizumi (then in his second term as prime minister) won four times as many votes as his DPJ challenger, with 73 percent of the vote. He had hinted that he intended to retire around the age of sixty-five, the same age his father died. True to his word, in September 2008 he announced that he would not seek re-election and that Shinjiro was his chosen successor. Speaking to a crowd of supporters, Koizumi explained, "I asked him if he wanted to be a politician, and he said, 'yes.' Please forgive me for being a doting parent, and I'd be grateful if you would offer generous support to Shinjiro."[55] Shinjiro had worked as his father's secretary since 2007 after returning from the United States, where he earned a Master's degree from Columbia University and studied at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, DC. "He is more mature than I was, when I was around 27 and elected for the first time," Koizumi said.

The Koizumi family is immensely popular in Kanagawa 11th District, and supporters had no trouble throwing their support behind the young and charismatic Shinjiro. However, the DPJ criticized the Koizumi case as a typical example of nepotistic politics in the LDP, and adopted its party-level ban on hereditary succession to highlight this perceived weakness. The issue garnered considerable attention in the media, which was already anticipating an LDP defeat in the 2009 election. A *Mainichi Shimbun* survey conducted during the election campaign asked all candidates whether the practice of hereditary succession ought to be restricted (Figure 4.9). Among the candidates who responded, 82 percent of non-legacy candidates answered that it "should be restricted." Not surprisingly, legacy candidates, and especially hereditary candidates, were more comfortable with the practice—with many answering that it was "not a problem" or choosing to avoid answering the question altogether. However, a surprising 55 percent of all legacy candidates and 41 percent of the subset of hereditary candidates answered that the practice should be restricted.[56]

The LDP waffled. The deputy chairman of the Election Strategy Committee, Suga Yoshihide, and Takebe Tsutomu, the chairman of the Headquarters for Party Reform Implementation, had already advocated a limit on the practice, to begin after the next election. Neither Suga nor Takebe were legacy MPs (although Takebe was later succeeded by his son Takebe Arata in 2012). Suga personally disliked the practice ever since he had been passed over for a nomination to succeed an incumbent for whom he

[55] *Asahi Shimbun*, September 29, 2008.

[56] In a similar survey of candidates as well as voters conducted by *Asahi Shimbun* in cooperation with the University of Tokyo, 64 percent of all candidates were in favor of restricting hereditary succession. In contrast, only 32 percent of voters thought that it was a problem.

had worked as a secretary, in favor of the incumbent's son.[57] But the announcement by the DPJ put pressure on the party to speed up its reform process.



Figure 4.9: Should hereditary succession be restricted? Responses to a 2009 pre-election candidate survey.

Note: Number of observations in each group: All candidates = 1,374; Non-legacy candidates = 1,194; Legacy candidates = 180; Hereditary candidates = 97; LDP non-legacy incumbents with non-kin secretary (no sec.) = 138; LDP non-legacy incumbents with kin secretary = 28; LDP legacy incumbents with kin secretary = 11; LDP hereditary incumbents with kin secretary = 5.

Source: *Mainichi Shimbun* 2009 pre-election candidate survey. Legacy and hereditary coding from JHRED. Family secretary information is based on whether the incumbent's secretary as listed in the *Seikan Yoran* or *Kokkai Binran* political almanacs had the same family name as the incumbent, and supplemented with information from Kyudan (http://www.kyudan.com/data/secretary.htm).

At first, party leaders announced that the LDP would also ban hereditary candidates. However, party leaders quickly retreated after intense opposition from other members of the party, many of whom had hopes of being succeeded by their own children.[58] Indeed, among LDP incumbents, opinions differed depending on whether

[57] Suga served as secretary to Okonogi Hikosaburo in Kanagawa 1st District for eleven years, before being elected to the Yokohama City Council in 1988. In 1991, Okonogi passed away, leaving an opening for Suga to run for the open seat. However, Okonogi's son, Hachiro, decided to run and was given the nomination over Suga. Suga had to wait until the district lines were redrawn in 1996 and he could run in neighboring Kanagawa 2nd District instead (*Asahi Shimbun*, June 12, 2009).

[58] *Asahi Shimbun*, May 22, 2009; June 6, 2009.

the incumbent currently had a family member serving as their personal secretary.[59] Although 67 percent of non-legacy incumbent MPs favored restriction of hereditary succession, among LDP incumbents who employed a family member as their personal secretary (perhaps to prime them for succession), opinion was much less in favor: only 50 percent of non-legacy MPs with family secretaries and 36 percent of legacy MPs with family secretaries favored a restriction on hereditary succession. Not one of the five hereditary MPs with a family member serving as secretary was in favor.

In addition, Koizumi Shinjiro intended to run whether he had the nomination or not, and denying him the nomination would serve little purpose. As his father's successor, he inherited all of the financial resources (kaban) of his father's political fund agent (*seiji shikin kanri dantai*). In fact, four million yen of the funds in the junior Koizumi's fund agent and koenkai were inherited from his father—roughly 99 percent of all his funds.[60] In the end, the party allowed Koizumi to run, as well as one other hereditary candidate: Usui Shoichi in Chiba 1st District.

However, the party denied the official nomination in Aomori 1st District to Tsushima Jun, despite him being the son of 33-year veteran and faction leader Tsushima Yuji (whose personal story was detailed at the start of this chapter), because Yuji's decision to retire had been made after the party was already on the defensive.[61] The younger Tsushima ran as an independent with the unofficial support of the LDP and the Komeito, but faced strong competition from the incumbent DPJ candidate, Yokoyama Hokuto, who had been elected through the PR list after losing in the SMD against Yuji in 2005. Tsushima also faced competition from a conservative independent named Masuta Sekio supported by the Hiranuma Group (a group of former-LDP conservative politicians led by Hiranuma Takeo). In the end, the two conservative candidates divided the vote and Yokoyama won.[62] Tsushima would have to wait until the next election to get the official nomination of the party.[63]

In 2012, the DPJ continued its prohibition on hereditary candidates in its party manifesto. Invoking the popular Japanese manga comic and anime, Lupin III (*Rupan Sansei*), DPJ Prime Minister Noda Yoshihiko stepped up criticism of the LDP's persistent addiction to dynastic candidate selection: "Politics is not a family business! Second generation? Third generation? Politics isn't supposed to be like Lupin!"[64] The LDP tried to shield itself from such criticism with its requirement that all new candidates, including hereditary candidates, be required to compete in an open recruitment contest to get the nomination. The implementation of this rule prior to the 2012 elec-

[59] This variable was coded based on whether the MP's secretary had the same family name as the MP. It is possible that it overlooks some family secretaries with different last names or erroneously counts some non-related secretaries with the same last name.

[60] *Asahi Shimbun*, October 1, 2009.

[61] Interviews with Tsushima Yuji, June 14 and 17, 2011 (in English), and Tsushima Jun, March 15, 2013 (in Japanese).

[62] Yokoyama won with 101,290 votes to Tsushima's 68,910 and Masuta's 35,283. The combined total of Tsushima's and Masuta's votes, 104,193, would have been enough to defeat Yokoyama.

[63] Ironically, although the DPJ put the LDP on the defensive about dynastic politics, the DPJ itself nominated six new legacy (not hereditary, as promised) candidates in SMDs in 2009. Moreover, it nominated an additional four new legacy candidates as pure PR candidates, despite having never nominated a pure PR legacy candidate in previous years.

[64] *Yomiuri Shimbun*, November 23, 2012.

tion further reduced the number of legacy candidates in the party. However, it did not prove to be a difficult hurdle to overcome for several aspiring hereditary candidates.

For example, former Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo's son, Fukuda Tatsuo, did not face a single competitor in the open recruitment contest in Gunma 4th District. In Hokkaido 11th District, the party selected Nakagawa Yuko, the widow of former Minister of Finance Nakagawa Shoichi, who died shortly after losing his seat in 2009. Nakagawa himself first entered politics in 1983 after the death (by suicide) of his father, Nakagawa Ichiro, as detailed earlier in this chapter. In Saitama 14th District, third-generation legacy candidate Mitsubayashi Takashi was forced to compete in an open recruitment contest after losing his seat in 2009 with a best-loser ratio of 69 percent. He won the contest, but then died suddenly of a heart attack. The party held another contest, and chose his brother, Mitsubayashi Hiromi. In Yamanashi 2nd District, Horiuchi Noriko, the daughter-in-law of retiring MP Horiuchi Mitsuo, was the only person to apply to the second open recruitment contest to replace him after the winner of the first contest, Horiuchi's former secretary and Yamanashi Prefectural Assemblyman Yamashita Masaki, withdrew. Four additional hereditary candidates got the LDP nomination in 2012, including Takebe Arata (Hokkaido 12th District), son of Takebe Tsutomu, and Ono Keitaro (Kagawa 3rd District), son of former Defense Agency Minister Ono Yoshinori. Four other LDP candidates with legacy ties to former politicians also ran for the first time (though did not directly succeed their predecessors), and many others had family ties to local politicians.

In some districts, the LDP faced competition from legacy candidates who joined one of the Third Force parties. In Osaka 13th District, for example, five-term LDP incumbent Nishino Akira decided just two weeks before the election not to run again. The JRP, which had its strongest base in Osaka, nominated Nishino's son, Koichi, who was already serving in the Osaka Prefectural Assembly as a member of the JRP. The LDP held an emergency open recruitment contest and nominated municipal assemblyman Kamiya Sohei, but Nishino supporters went largely to Koichi, who won the seat. In Tokyo 23rd District, Ito Kosuke, a nine-term MP, lost his seat in 2009 and was forced to compete in an open recruitment contest, which he lost to former Bank of Japan employee Ogura Masanobu. Ito's son, Shunsuke, took over the koenkai and ran under the JRP label, but ultimately lost the election to Ogura.[65] In Nagano 3rd District, where former Prime Minister Hata Tsutomu stepped down, the DPJ at first planned to nominate Hata's son, House of Councillors MP and cabinet minister, Hata Yuichiro. However, this was decided to be a violation of the party's ban on hereditary succession, and Hata's political secretary, Terashima Yoshiyuki, was nominated instead.

In 2014, the LDP nominated only six new legacy candidates. In Yamagata 3rd District, long-time LDP veteran Kato Koichi was one of the few LDP incumbents to lose his seat in 2012—to an LDP-affiliated former mayor, Abe Juichi, who ran as an independent. The party decided to nominate Kato's 35-year-old daughter, Kato

[65] Three other new candidates for the JRP and three new candidates for Your Party also had legacy ties. The TPJ nominated two new legacy candidates with close ties to Ozawa in Iwate Prefecture: Tasso Yoko, the wife of Iwate Governor Tasso Takuya, in Iwate 1st District, and Sato Naomi, daughter of former Liberal Party MP Sugawara Kijuro, in Iwate 3rd District. New Party Daichi nominated party leader Suzuki Muneo's daughter, Takako, in Hokkaido 7th District. Suzuki, who had been the personal secretary of Nakagawa Ichiro and rebelled when Nakagawa's koenkai rallied behind Shoichi in 1983, was now an eager participant in the practice of dynastic politics.

Ayuko, after an open recruitment contest in which she faced no other challengers. Originally, Kato's successor was intended to be Ayuko's husband, Miyazaki Kensuke, who had even changed his name to Kato Kensuke in anticipation of inheriting the jiban. However, the couple divorced in 2009 and Miyazaki, having changed his surname back again, instead applied to (and won) the LDP's open recruitment contest for Kyoto 3rd District in 2012.[66] He later married fellow MP Kaneko Megumi, only to resign from the Diet in 2016 after it was revealed he cheated on her while she was pregnant with their first child.

In Kagoshima 3rd District, the party nominated Miyaji Takuma, the 34-year-old son of eight-term MP Miyaji Kazuaki, who lost his SMD race in 2012, but nevertheless secured a seat through the PR list. In Osaka 17th District, Okashita Nobuko had been the party's candidate since 2000, after succeeding her husband, Okashita Masahiro. Masahiro was the party's candidate in 1996, but died suddenly in 1998. Nobuko won election in the district twice, in 2000 and 2005, but lost in 2009 and 2012. In 2014, the party replaced her with her 39-year-old son, Okashita Shohei, who was already a member of the Osaka Prefectural Assembly. Shohei lost to incumbent Baba Nobuyuki of the Japan Innovation Party (previously JRP), but secured a seat through the PR list. Finally, the LDP nominated three new legacy candidates to its party lists who did not run in an SMD: Kimura Yayoi and Omi Asako, both women, who were elected on the party's Kita Kanto list, and Asato Masaaki, who failed to win a seat on the Kyushu list. In Gunma 1st District, the local LDP prefectural branch considered replacing incumbent Sata Genichiro with former Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro's 32-year-old grandson, Nakasone Yasutaka, but ultimately decided to stick with Sata.[67]

4.4.2 How Much Real Change?

Even though the differences in the percentages of new legacy candidates over time in Figure 4.7 and under each institutional setting in Figure 4.8 appear to confirm the theoretical expectations about the effect of electoral institutions on dynastic candidate selection laid out in Chapter 3, such differences in the *percentage* of legacy candidates in the LDP across institutional settings belie the fact that the *raw number* of legacy candidates before and after electoral reform did not change drastically—indeed, the total number of legacy candidates actually *increased* in 1996 among all candidates, from 206 to 219 candidates, and the number in the LDP dropped only slightly, from 133 to 126 candidates (Table 4.5). Until the LDP's defeat in 2009 flushed out a number of older legacy candidates, the raw number of legacy candidates within the party remained fairly constant (it went from 120 in 2009 to 95 in 2012).

The drop in the percentage of legacy candidates immediately after electoral reform instead partly reflects an influx of new non-legacy candidates. From 1976-1993, an average of 891 candidates ran in each election (including by-elections held after the general election). In contrast, the average number of candidates from 1996-2014 is 1,345 candidates. In the LDP, there were an average of 319 candidates each election in the pre-reform period, compared to 346 in the post-reform period.

The same explanation helps to account for the decline in the percentage of legacy candidates among new recruits. From 1976-2014, a total of 5,586 first-time candidates

[66] *Nikkan Gendai*, February 11, 2016. I do not code Miyazaki Kensuke as a legacy candidate, as his brief marital connection to the Kato family was severed before he attempted to enter politics.

[67] *Sankei Shimbun*, November 20, 2014.

Table 4.5: Number and percent of legacy candidates, 1976-2014.

	All candidates								
	All parties			LDP candidates			DPJ candidates		
Year	Legacy (N)	Total (N)	Legacy (%)	Legacy (N)	Total (N)	Legacy (%)	Legacy (N)	Total (N)	Legacy (%)
1976	162	904	17.92	115	322	35.71			
1979	175	891	19.64	126	322	39.13			
1980	169	842	20.07	131	312	41.99			
1983	186	848	21.93	142	338	42.01			
1986	192	838	22.91	144	322	44.72			
1990	213	957	22.26	156	336	46.43			
1993	206	955	21.57	133	284	46.83			
1996	219	1,544	14.18	126	364	34.62	24	167	14.37
2000	197	1,450	13.59	128	346	36.99	35	270	12.96
2003	186	1,179	15.78	129	341	37.83	41	282	14.54
2005	188	1,151	16.33	122	351	34.76	44	306	14.38
2009	186	1,388	13.4	120	329	36.47	44	331	13.29
2012	166	1,510	10.99	95	339	28.02	28	267	10.49
2014	155	1,191	13.01	100	353	28.33	22	198	11.11
	First-time candidates								
	All parties			LDP candidates			DPJ candidates		
Year	Legacy (N)	Total (N)	Legacy (%)	Legacy (N)	Total (N)	Legacy (%)	Legacy (N)	Total (N)	Legacy (%)
1976	34	265	12.83	17	37	45.95			
1979	29	209	13.88	18	42	42.86			
1980	6	83	7.23	6	11	54.55			
1983	25	219	11.42	13	41	31.71			
1986	25	173	14.45	15	36	41.67			
1990	48	319	15.05	22	40	55.00			
1993	27	328	8.23	14	31	45.16			
1996	39	857	4.55	15	130	11.54	7	92	7.61
2000	25	663	3.77	12	51	23.53	6	108	5.56
2003	26	449	5.79	18	64	28.12	4	85	4.71
2005	22	331	6.65	16	88	18.18	4	60	6.67
2009	21	685	3.07	3	33	9.09	10	115	8.70
2012	24	728	3.30	12	138	8.70	0	44	0
2014	14	277	5.05	6	36	16.67	3	41	7.32

Note: Includes both SMD and pure PR list candidates in post-reform period. By-election candidates are included, grouped with previous general election. Numbers and percentages for LDP and DPJ do not include affiliated independents.
Source: JHRED.

ran in a general election or by-election for the House of Representatives, including 778 LDP candidates. In the period prior to electoral reform, the LDP nominated 238 new candidates—an average of thirty-four each election (with the exception of 1980, when only eleven new LDP candidates ran, including two candidates who first ran in by-elections). Of these new candidates, 105 were legacy candidates—an average of fifteen each election—and sixty-six of them directly inherited their seats as hereditary candidates. In the post-reform period from 1996-2014, the party nominated eighty-

two new legacy candidates, an average of twelve each election, and forty-five of these legacy candidates were hereditary candidates (Table 4.6).

Thus, the raw number of new legacy candidates nominated after electoral reform only declined modestly, even though legacy candidates comprise a significantly smaller share of the party's overall number of candidates. The 2003 election represents the zenith of dynastic candidate selection in the post-reform period, with eighteen out of sixty-four new LDP candidates (28 percent) having family ties to a previous MP. The relatively large percentage in 2014 for the LDP is a result of very few retirements between the 2012 and 2014 elections. Only thirty-six new candidates were nominated, so the six legacy candidates represented 17 percent of new candidates.

Table 4.6: First-time legacy and hereditary candidates in each party, 1996-2014.

	Legacy		**Hereditary**		**Total**
	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)
LDP	82	15.19	45	8.33	540
LDP-affiliated independent	19	21.84	11	12.64	87
DPJ	34	6.24	7	1.28	545
NFP	12	7.50	4	2.50	160
Komeito	0	0.00	0	0.00	115
JCP	0	0.00	0	0.00	1,161
SDP	1	0.55	1	0.55	182
Ozawa's Liberal Party	1	2.78	0	0.00	36
Liberal Alliance	1	0.57	1	0.57	174
Your Party	5	7.94	0	0.00	63
JRP/JIP	6	4.14	2	1.38	145
TPJ	2	4.35	0	0.00	46
Minor party/independent	8	1.09	2	0.27	736
Total	171	4.29	73	1.83	3,990

Note: One observation for each candidate. By-election candidates are included. Party label is whatever the candidate used in his or her first election. Apart from LDP-affiliated independents, party-affiliated independents are grouped with "Minor party/independent." The two cases of hereditary candidates in this category were independents Tokuda Takeshi (2005, endorsed by the DPJ but later joined Liberal Alliance and LDP) and Gotoda Yayoi (2014, daughter of former DPJ MP Tanaka Keishu).
Source: JHRED.

The difference in the number of new legacy candidates in the LDP and their percentage share within the party begs the question of whether there has actually been a change in the demand incentives for dynastic recruitment at the candidate level as a result of the electoral reform or subsequent party reforms. It would appear that legacy candidates are getting nominated in similar numbers in the post-reform period as in the pre-reform period—the difference is just that there are now many more nominations to go around. It may therefore be questionable whether the decline in the percentage of new legacy candidates represents a decrease in proportional supply of legacy hopefuls, or a decrease in proportional demand for such candidates by the LDP party organization.

If the electoral system and new recruitment methods generate fewer demand-side incentives for parties to recruit legacies, why do they continue to persist at all in

recent elections? The reason is that the new institutional environment has reduced the proportional demand for legacy candidates by party actors, but has not drastically suppressed the supply of potential legacy candidates. There continues to be a fair number of legacy hopefuls who would like to get the nomination of the party and follow in the footsteps of their predecessors. If these potential legacy candidates are the children of powerful incumbents with high levels of support in the district, the LDP has little incentive to deny them the nomination and risk that they run under a different party label and threaten the party's electoral prospects in the district. The struggles and controversy that have characterized dynastic candidate selection decisions since 2009 would certainly point in this direction.

An interview with LDP veteran MP and former Defense Agency Minister Ono Yoshinori of Kagawa 3rd District (prior to his son Keitaro getting the nomination in 2012) provides some insight into this relationship between the party and strong family dynasties: "When I retire, my son will have to go through an open recruitment contest to get the nomination. If the party doesn't give it to him, I will not help the party during the election [with my koenkai, etc.]. They will be on their own."[68] In elections where the party's support is uncertain, they might be especially eager to lean on the personal support networks and name recognition of legacy candidates like Ono.

On the other hand, the legacy successors of weaker incumbents provide fewer electoral benefits to the party, and may actually be a liability. If the party is again the subject of criticism for its dynastic politics, party leaders may calculate that they have a better chance with a fresh new face than with a weak legacy candidate. Weaker legacy candidates who seek the nomination, like Ito Shunsuke in Tokyo 23rd District, can be passed over with the hope that a new non-legacy candidate will improve the party's overall image and still fare well electorally. Since reform, there have been many cases of legacy candidates who have had to run as LDP-affiliated independents after being denied the nomination (Table 4.6). These independent legacy candidates serve as evidence of the LDP's decreasing affinity for legacy candidates in official nominations.

Most important, in contrast to the SNTV/MMD period, party leaders no longer have incentives to actively seek out legacy candidates to nominate. When a nomination opens up, if a high-quality legacy candidate seeks the nomination, the party can go with that legacy candidate. But in the case that there is no obvious legacy candidate, the party now has a mechanism for finding a high-quality *non-legacy* candidate through the open recruitment system. Gone are the days of distant nephews in far-away prefectures getting a call from koenkai members or faction leaders asking them to run.

These changes in party demand for legacy candidates can be observed in the types of legacy candidates who get the nomination since reform. Although the raw number of new legacy candidates in the LDP has not changed dramatically, the types of LDP incumbents who are succeeded has changed. In the pre-reform period, many LDP candidates who served fewer than eight terms were succeeded by family members. In the post-reform period, candidates who won fewer than eight elections are proportionally much less likely to be succeeded upon their exit.[69] In the ten post-reform cases of hereditary succession where the predecessor served fewer than five terms, six followed a sudden death in office. A seventh occurred when Okashita Nobuko (herself a widow and hereditary candidate) transferred to her son Shohei in 2014 after two wins and

[68] Interview with Ono Yoshinori in Tokyo, April 22, 2011 (in English).
[69] See Figure A.9 in Appendix A for descriptive data.

two losses. In contrast, LDP candidates who serve eight or more terms are actually being succeeded in higher proportions than in the pre-reform period; however, there are fewer such long-serving MPs.

One plausible interpretation of this change is that the supply-side incentives for children of long-serving incumbents to want to enter politics have remained relatively stable, while the demand-side incentives to seek out legacy candidates, even among weaker incumbents, have been reduced. Whereas in the past, the family members of LDP candidates with even relatively short careers were sought out and given the nomination, in the elections since electoral reform, long-serving incumbent candidates have been more likely to be succeeded in office than weaker incumbents. Many of these new LDP legacy candidates come from long-existing dynasties, and most of them succeeded a predecessor who was first elected under the old SNTV/MMD electoral rules. This suggests that there may be some path dependence on the supply-side, in line with a historical institutionalist explanation for how the reforms have affected MPs differently depending on their familiarity and experiences with the previous institutional context of elections under SNTV/MMD.

It is now also seemingly less likely for new dynasties to form. Of the 180 first-time LDP legacy candidates from 1958-1993, 113 (63 percent) were second-generation candidates, meaning that their predecessor was the only previous family member to serve in national politics. In contrast, only forty-one (50 percent) of the eighty-two first-time legacy candidates in the LDP from 1996-2014 were second-generation candidates, and nearly half of the rest (24 percent) came from families that had supplied four or more members to national office.

These trends suggest that the decline in new legacy candidate nominations since reform is the result of a decline in demand for such legacies rather than a decline in proportional supply. Recall from the theory outlined in Chapter 3 that at the candidate-level in any given institutional context, the supply of candidates is influenced by political capital and motivation. Children of long-serving incumbents and those who come from existing family dynasties are still likely to have strong personal ambitions to continue the family business in politics, even under the new electoral and party institutions. The observed change in dynastic politics in Japan is the result of a proportional decrease in the party demand for legacy candidates when there is no immediate supply.

4.4.3 Predicting Hereditary Succession Post-Reform

To better understand the post-reform dynamics of dynastic candidate selection, it is useful to again approach the question of supply and demand by analyzing the characteristics of exiting LDP candidates and whether the characteristics that generally increased the probability of a hereditary successor under the SNTV/MMD system have declined in relative importance following reform. For example, if the supply of LDP legacy candidates (their political ambition) is related to the attributes of their predecessors as we found in the previous section (especially incumbency), then the child of an exiting incumbent should have the same or similar incentives to enter politics regardless of the reform. A difference in the probability of succession given comparable predecessor qualities could therefore be interpreted as a change in party demand for such successors.

I restrict the regression analysis to the seven elections after electoral reform, and again look at which types of exiting LDP candidates were most likely to be succeeded

by a family member. I again focus on direct hereditary succession (*Bequeath* = 1), as it is the most convenient and direct way to analyze how the qualities related to an exiting candidate and district covariates contribute to the likelihood that he or she will be succeeded by a relative, but also include models using *Precede candidate* and *Precede MP* to evaluate the general relationship between exiting candidates' attributes and having future family members in politics. I restrict my analysis to the SMD tier, since direct hereditary succession is not relevant for pure PR candidates.



Figure 4.10: Predicting dynastic succession in the LDP, 1996-2012.
Note: Estimated effects of incumbency (SMD winner or zombie), previous wins (standardized), existing dynasty, death, population density (grouped), and female. Models estimated with OLS and correspond to Models (2), (4), and (6) in Appendix Table A.7. Points represent the estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. Models include fixed effects for region and year, and robust standard errors.

From 1996-2012, there were 296 incumbent LDP candidates (not necessarily MPs) who exited the political scene after running in an SMD race. In the post-reform period, SMD candidates can either win in the SMD (*SMD winner*) or through the list (*Zombie*) so I split the incumbency variable into these two categories. There are sixteen cases of dual-listed SMD candidates who lost their SMD contest but nonetheless won a seat as a zombie winner through PR. *Previous terms* again measures the additive total of returns to office. The models again include dummy variables for *Existing dynasty*, *Death*, and categorical levels of *Population density*. Controls for gender, and fixed effects for year and region are also included in the second model for each dependent variable.

Figure 4.10 shows the results for the post-reform period.[70] The results indicate that incumbency and longer tenures still increase the probability of hereditary succession. An SMD incumbent who leaves office is roughly 19 percentage points more likely than a losing candidate to be followed by a relative, and winning a seat through PR as a zombie has no such relationship. Moreover, each additional term served by a candidate is now associated with a roughly 2-percentage-point increase in the probability of being succeeded by a family member, and a one-standard deviation increase in terms (roughly 4 terms) over the mean number (4 terms), increases the probability of succession by about 7 percentage points. In other words, length of tenure appears to have become a more important factor in dynastic succession post-reform, as predicted. Death in office has a very large, but also very imprecise estimate of a roughly 30-percentage-point increase in the probability of hereditary succession. As with the pre-reform period, population density does not appear to make a difference. The point estimate for *Existing dynasty* is similar to the pre-reform period, but is no longer statistically significant.



Figure 4.11: Predicted probability of hereditary succession by length of tenure, conditional on electoral rules, 1976-2012.
Note: Figure shows the predicted probabilities of $Bequeath = 1$ for LDP candidates before and after electoral reform (excluding pure PR candidates), at increasing number of terms served.

Interacting a dummy variable for the post-reform period with *Number of terms* reveals that the predicted probability of bequeathing a jiban for an exiting LDP candidate with five previous terms (the average in the last seven years of SNTV/MMD) decreases from roughly 18 percentage points under SNTV/MMD to 11 percentage points under FPTP/SMD, all else held constant (left panel of Figure 4.11). At lower numbers of terms, the difference is also stark: e.g., 10 percent versus 4 percent for single-term MPs, 12 percent versus 5 percent for second-term MPs. However, because the number of observations (MPs) at each number of terms is limited, the confidence intervals overlap—in other words, until there are more elections, the model lacks sufficient power. Nevertheless, if we group the number of wins into four quartiles for the

[70] The full table of results are presented in Appendix Table A.10. In an RD analysis of close SMD elections in the post-reform period and hereditary succession, I find no evidence of an effect. However, the number of close elections represents a small sample, and the margin of victory in the final election attempt of most predecessors of hereditary successors in the post-reform period is outside the window of what can be considered "close," so I exclude these results.

pre-reform period (0-2 terms; 3-7 terms; 8-10 terms; 11-19 terms) and estimate the predicted probability at these same levels for the post-reform period (right panel of Figure 4.11), we do see that LDP MPs who left office after serving 3-7 terms have only a 12 percent predicted probability of being succeeded in under FPTP/SMD, compared to 34 percent predicted probability in the last years of SNTV/MMD, and this difference is statistically significant.

4.5 Discussion

Electoral institutions are important factors in determining which types of candidates will be attractive to voters and parties in democracies. But candidate recruitment processes within parties can also have an effect on the types of individuals who are selected, either by vesting greater or lesser control in the central party leadership, or by opening up the process and range of candidates from which parties can choose.

The analysis in this chapter demonstrates that Japan's electoral reform and subsequent party reforms in the LDP's candidate recruitment process have decreased the relative attractiveness of one particular type of candidate: those with legacy ties to a former member of the Diet. In Japan's new institutional environment, only the most powerful of incumbents are able to bequeath their political "rights" to a relative when they exit the political scene. The relatives of less important incumbents have greater competition for a nomination from other contenders, especially when the open recruitment process is used, and the party may decide that their collective interests in terms of party image or policy expertise are better served by an outside candidate. Perhaps more importantly, when a candidate retires without an obvious successor, the party now has a mechanism for finding one, without having to rely on a legacy candidate.

However, the LDP continues to struggle with the issue of hereditary succession, and political reforms more generally, in part due to path dependence and the continued presence of incumbents in the party who were selected in the previous institutional environment. The reform process in the party continues to be met with the most resistance from these senior members within the party. The tension between younger, reform-minded politicians and the more "old school" of the LDP's leadership can be gleaned from the following anecdote. In 2011, the LDP party reform committee, led by Shiozaki Yasuhisa, drafted a proposal to make the headquarters in Tokyo more modern by installing solar panels, switching to LED lighting, and prohibiting smoking in the building. The *Asahi Shimbun* reported that when members of the reform committee presented the proposal to party Vice President Oshima Tadamori, a heavy chain smoker, he slowly and deliberately lit a cigarette in front of them to show his opposition.[71]

Evidence that dynastic politics in the LDP will continue among senior members can be found by looking at the roster of political secretaries employed by incumbents. Serving as a Diet member's secretary is traditionally one of the important stepping stones to a political career. Among all members of the House of Representatives elected in 2014, at least 14 percent employed a family member as one of three official secretaries.[72] Most of these members are LDP: of the 292 LDP MPs elected in 2014, thirty-four (12 percent) had male kin relatives serving as secretaries. An additional

[71] *Asahi Shimbun*, June 29, 2011.

[72] Family ties are inferred from common surnames, unless additional information is available.

thirteen (4 percent) had female kin secretaries. Although eye-catching in and of itself, this behavior is not simply a reflection of nepotism in doling out taxpayer-funded jobs to family members—many of these family members are being purposefully groomed in preparation to succeed their family member when he or she retires.

A recent example is Wada Yoshiaki, who served as secretary to his father-in-law, eleven-term legacy MP Machimura Nobutaka in Hokkaido 5th District. Machimura was also leader of the intraparty faction within the LDP that included Prime Minister Abe Shinzo. When Machimura died in office at age 70, Wada was selected to run in the April 2016 by-election, which he won by a bare margin.[73]

However, kin secretaries are most common among long-term incumbents who were first elected before the new electoral rules were adopted (i.e., those who have served more than seven terms).[74] While only eleven of the one hundred and sixty LDP incumbents with three or fewer terms (7 percent) had kin secretaries (perhaps due to their younger age), nine of the twenty of LDP incumbents who served ten or more terms (45 percent) had kin serving as their secretaries, including Machimura and other long-serving legacy MPs like Tanigaki Sadakazu, Nikai Toshihiro, and Ishiba Shigeru.[75]

Margaret McKean and Ethan Scheiner (2000) predicted that dynastic politics in the LDP would continue until the party lost its control of government. The party's 2009 defeat certainly flushed out many existing dynasties, and the open recruitment process in 2012 prevented several legacy hopefuls from entry. Yet, many of the older generation of LDP incumbents still wish to pass on their seats to their relatives when they retire. Most of these potential legacy candidates will win the nomination if they seek it. However, the party may decide to pass over others, and if more competitive elections mean that party turnover becomes more regular in the future, fewer and fewer of the new generation of MPs will reach the levels of seniority that have been so heavily associated with the supply of dynasties in Japan. Even so, it is hard not to be pessimistic about whether the LDP will ever fully overcome its predilection for dynastic politics.

The sun appears to be setting on Japan's scions, but it will be twilight for at least a few more elections.

[73] This by-election, as well as by-elections held in Kyoto 3rd District, Tokyo 10th District, and Fukuoka 6th District, are not included in data samples for the main analyses in this book since other candidates who ran in 2014 cannot be considered as having exited politics.

[74] Figure A.10 in Appendix A displays the patterns visually.

[75] The single fifteen-term MP is Noda Takeshi. Nikai Toshihiro's son, Nikai Toshiki, ran for Mayor of Gobo in Wakayama Prefecture in 2016, but lost.

5

Election: The Inherited Incumbency Advantage

> We'd all like to vote for the best man, but he's never a candidate.
> - Kin Hubbard

In this chapter, I shift focus from the advantages that legacy candidates enjoy in candidate selection, to evaluating the electoral advantages enjoyed by new legacy candidates. Just as the incumbency advantage, in terms of votes, can be defined as the additional electoral support that accrues to a candidate by virtue of his or her status as an incumbent, the inherited incumbency advantage in terms of votes can be defined as the additional electoral support enjoyed by a first-time legacy candidate by virtue of his or her family ties to a previous incumbent. The inherited incumbency advantage is particularly relevant when candidates directly succeed their predecessors as hereditary candidates, as is often the case in Japan.

In the previous chapter, I assumed that party actors involved in candidate selection would favor legacy candidates in part because they anticipate that the legacy candidates will win more votes in the election. As a result, under both SNTV/MMD and the SMD tier of MMM, parties like the LDP have had few reasons to reject a legacy candidate who wants to run. Under SNTV/MMD, however, the anticipated electoral advantages of legacy candidates were so great that party actors actively sought them out, even to succeed weaker candidates. But exactly how much better do legacy candidates perform in elections, and what are the sources of this advantage? In addition, how does the inherited incumbency advantage vary under different institutional contexts?

Two examples help to illustrate the complexities in evaluating the inherited incumbency advantage. The first comes from the Kato dynasty in Yamagata Prefecture. When Kato Koichi first ran for the House of Representatives in 1972 at the age of 33, there had been a two-election gap since his father, Kato Seizo, died in office. Seizo had died in 1965 at the age of 64, two years after finishing first in the four-member Yamagata 2nd District and securing his fifth term in office. In the 1967 and 1969 elections, the jiban was "kept warm" by two other LDP candidates, each of whom failed to win a seat. However, when Koichi ran, he came in second place, less than one percentage point shy of the leading candidate. From 1979 until 1993, he was the first-place winner, often with more than a third of the vote, and served in cabinet on three occasions: twice as Defense Agency Minister (1984-1986) and once as Chief Cabinet

Secretary (1991-1992). In the first two elections after electoral reform in 1994, now in Yamagata 4th District, he faced only weak opposition, and his vote share doubled—to 65.8 percent in 1996 and 72 percent in 2000.

In 2002, Kato had to resign because of a tax law violation committed by his secretary, and the seat was briefly held by political scientist Saito Jun, who paused his Ph.D. studies at Yale University to run for the seat under the DPJ label. However, Kato won the seat back in 2003, again with nearly 60 percent of the vote. Prior to the 2012 election, the LDP mandated that any candidate older than 70 at the time of the election could not be dual-listed in PR. Unfortunately for Kato, he narrowly lost that election (by 1,465 votes, a margin of less than one percentage point) to a popular LDP-affiliated former mayor, Abe Juichi, who ran as an independent after failing to get the party nomination over Kato.

In 2014, the LDP held an open recruitment contest to determine Kato's successor, but Kato's daughter, Kato Ayuko, was the only applicant. Abe, the incumbent, initially expressed interest in getting the official nomination of the party, but decided not to enter the contest due to a requirement imposed by the local prefectural branch that each person seeking the nomination pledge to stand down if they did not win a pre-selection vote of local party members. Kato was considered the favorite to win that vote even though her father had been defeated in the previous election by Abe, so Abe decided to continue running as an independent. Another potential applicant, LDP House of Councillors member Sato Yukari, expressed interest in the nomination, but ultimately decided to run from Osaka 11th District instead.[1]

Kato Ayuko was young (35 years old) and inexperienced, but well connected. She had studied for a Masters degree at Columbia University along with another famous legacy candidate, Koizumi Shinjiro, and had worked as a secretary for LDP MP Noda Seiko, as well as for her own father. Moreover, she had chosen to keep her recognizable family name when she married (meaning her husband adopted the Kato name). With the official nomination secured, she went on to win back her "family seat" in 2014 by a margin nearly as thin as her father had lost it in 2012—just 1,488 votes.

The second example comes from the Ono dynasty in Kagawa Prefecture. Ono Yoshinori was born in Taiwan in 1935 during the period of Japanese colonial rule, but moved to Kagawa Prefecture at the close of World War II. His father served as administrative vice governor in the prefecture, a bureaucratic post. Ono graduated from the University of Tokyo with a law degree and began his own successful career as a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance that included a period of study as a Fulbright scholar at the University of Pennsylvania. After marrying the daughter of LDP House of Representatives MP Kato Tsunetaro of Kagawa 2nd District (no relation to the Kato family of Yamagata), he set his sights on a political career. In 1978, he ran and lost in the Kagawa Prefecture gubernatorial election, a loss that he partially attributes to his connections to his father-in-law:

> There was a popular book at the time by Shiba Ryotaro about stealing the entire country [*Kunitori Monogatari*, 1965]. My father-in-law was doing business in Kagawa and was at the time a member of the House of Representatives. Voters were shouting, "Kato is trying to steal Kagawa Prefecture by making his son-in-law governor!"[2]

[1] *Kahoku Shinpo* newspaper, July 1, 2014.
[2] Interview with Ono Yoshinori in Tokyo, April 22, 2011 (in English).

Ono would have to wait until his father-in-law retired in 1986 to get his break. In that election, he inherited the koenkai of Kato, and went on to finish second place in the three-member district, with 25 percent of the vote, and nearly 12,000 more votes than Kato earned in the previous election in 1983. He consecutively won re-election in the decades to follow, and even served as Minister of State in charge of the Defense Agency (later to become the Ministry of Defense) in the cabinet of Prime Minister Koizumi in 2004.

In 2012, he announced his retirement in advance of that year's House of Representatives election. His son (and secretary), Ono Keitaro, applied for and won the LDP's open recruitment contest (in what is now Kagawa 3rd District), and was easily elected to his father's former seat with 63 percent of the vote—facing opposition only from a JCP candidate and an SDP candidate. The DPJ did not bother to field a challenger. In 2014, Keitaro was re-elected with 68 percent of the vote, again facing opposition only from the JCP and SDP.

The examples of the Kato and Ono dynasties illustrate some of the ways in which the inherited incumbency advantage may operate, and how it differs across the two electoral system contexts of SNTV/MMD and FPTP/SMD. Kato Koichi was able to win his first election, even though he did not directly succeed his father, and even though his father had only won five times and had never served in cabinet. After his first election, Kato's own incumbency advantage grew, and became even stronger after electoral reform in 1994. When his daughter Ayuko sought the nomination in 2014, her powerful ties scared off potential challengers in the open recruitment contest, and she easily won the nomination and even went on to defeat the incumbent. At the same time, Kato had an advantage in terms of her name recognition, close connections to other party leaders, experience working as a political secretary, and opportunities for higher education abroad that were no doubt in part a result of her privileged upbringing.

Ono Yoshinori did not enjoy the same kind of advantages in name recognition, as he did not adopt his father-in-law's surname. He nevertheless was successful in his first election after inheriting Kato's koenkai. His son Keitaro, on the other hand, benefited from name recognition, the political connections developed during his time as secretary to his father, and the deterrence of challengers in his first election. If a legacy candidate like Ono is successful in deterring challengers and winning his or her first election, then the inherited incumbency advantage is transformed into an incumbency advantage in subsequent elections. More importantly, because new legacy candidates in SMDs under the MMM system tend to be the close relatives of powerful incumbents, the inherited incumbency advantage they enjoy may be much higher than the average legacy candidate's advantage under the SNTV/MMD system.

Aside from its perceived value to parties in candidate selection decisions, how strong is the actual electoral effect of the inherited incumbency advantage? In this chapter, I use the candidate-level data from JHRED to evaluate whether and how legacy ties function as a form of inherited incumbency advantage in elections, *after* the decision to run. Do legacy candidates actually perform better in their first election attempt than non-legacy candidates, controlling for other features of the candidates or district? If so, how large is their inherited incumbency advantage, and what are its most important components—name recognition, higher wealth or campaign resources, deterrence of challengers, or strength of the jiban? Lastly, how does the inherited incumbency advantage change when a country like Japan moves toward more party-centered elections?

The existing scholarly literature on the incumbency advantage is based predominantly on models of two-party competition in FPTP/SMD races in the United States (e.g., between a Democratic Party candidate and a Republican Party candidate), though some notable attempts have been made to extend the logic of these models to MMD contexts. After a review of this literature and the concept of an inherited incumbency advantage, this chapter will examine whether such an inherited incumbency advantage applies to the SNTV/MMD context of Japanese elections up until 1993, looking at the advantage in terms of votes, electoral success, and the deterrence of challengers, and then examine the changes that have occurred since the introduction of SMDs in the MMM system. Conceptually, the SNTV/MMD system can be thought of as an extension of FPTP/SMD where the voting rule is instead first-M-past-the-post (Reed, 1990). Conversely, FPTP/SMD is equivalent to using the SNTV voting rule where $M = 1$. Given that the voting rule is conceptually the same, I refer to the systems in the remainder of this chapter by the differences in district size: MMD or SMD.

In the pre-reform MMDs, the existence of jiban in the LDP, and the practice of transferring jiban to both hereditary and non-hereditary successors provides an opportunity to analyze the potential mechanisms behind the inherited incumbency advantage of new hereditary candidates. Within the latter group of hereditary successors, there is also variation in terms of blood relatives (e.g., sons) and non-blood relatives (e.g., sons-in-law, some of whom adopted the family name). The introduction of SMDs has decreased the personalized nature of jiban (due to the elimination of intraparty competition and the increasing development of party-centered voting), but individual districts may still be treated as jiban, even if many have become more like "party" jiban. The post-reform SMDs also allow for a more straightforward analysis of the inherited incumbency advantage that can apply many of the same methods used in the American politics literature to study the incumbency advantage.

As revealed in the previous chapter, compared to the pre-reform period, the legacy candidates who tend to emerge in the post-reform period have more often been the relatives of powerful, long-serving incumbents from existing dynasties. As a result, we might expect them to enjoy greater electoral advantages than their pre-reform counterparts. On the other hand, elections under the new SMDs have generated more interparty competition relative to the pre-reform period, when most competition was between candidates within the same ideological camp. My analysis in this chapter will shed light on how the institutional reforms have affected the nature of the inherited incumbency advantage. At the end of the chapter, I also present some evidence from both traditional voter surveys and survey experiments conducted in recent years in order to get a sense of voters' role in the perpetuation of political dynasties in Japan.

5.1 The Incumbency Advantage as a Heritable Asset

The incumbency advantage has possibly been the most frequently analyzed phenomenon in American electoral politics since Robert Erikson (1971) and David Mayhew (1974*b*) called attention to it in the 1970s. Explanations for why incumbents do better in elections have focused on three possible components: (1) the direct advantages of being in office (e.g., name recognition and other perquisites of office), and indirect advantages owing to (2) the differential quality of incumbents (including ex-

ante quality and the on-the-job experience), and (3) the deterrence of high-quality challengers.

There are two basic approaches to measuring the incumbency advantage: (1) a *vote-denominated* measure (what was the candidate's vote share?), and (2) an *outcome-denominated* measure (did the candidate win or lose the race?). A great deal of scholarship in the American context has been devoted to measuring the incumbency advantage in terms of votes (e.g., Mayhew, 1974*b*; Gelman and King, 1990; Levitt and Wolfram, 1997; Ansolabehere, Snyder and Stewart, 2000; Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2002). These studies of the vote-denominated measure of the incumbency advantage have concluded that, since the 1980s, incumbents in U.S. congressional elections have generally enjoyed a vote advantage of around 7-10 percentage points over their closest challenger. In contrast, the vote advantage for incumbents tends to be lower (5-6 percentage points) in the MMD context of state-level legislative elections in the U.S. (Cox and Morgenstern, 1995; Hirano and Snyder, 2009).

But since the vote-denominated measure of the incumbency advantage may vary over time without having a strong effect on the actual outcome of the race (Jacobson, 1987; Jewell and Breaux, 1988; Garand, 1991), an alternative approach to measuring the incumbency advantage is to focus simply on the probability that an incumbent will win his or her first re-election attempt (an outcome-denominated measure of the incumbency advantage). Particularly in the context of MMD elections, this approach may be more applicable given the variation in the number of co-partisan candidates and challengers of multiple parties in a given election, which makes the conventional vote-denominated measure for SMD elections—a candidate's share of the two-party vote—a less appropriate measure. Using the probability of re-election as the dependent variable, John Carey, Richard Niemi, and Lynda Powell (2000) find that incumbents in MMD state legislative elections are more vulnerable than their SMD counterparts.

Since the seminal work of David S. Lee (2008), RD designs have become popular for evaluating *causal effect* of winning office on the incumbency advantage. This method helps to separate out some of the ex-ante quality effects that make incumbents good candidates in the first place and hence cannot be attributed to the treatment of winning office. However, these studies often focus on the *party* incumbency advantage, rather than the *personal* incumbency advantage—with a few notable exceptions (e.g., Fowler and Hall, 2014; Erikson and Titiunik, 2015). In addition, while RD designs are useful for evaluating the effect of incumbency on the future careers of family members (Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009; Querubin, 2016; Van Coppenolle, 2015; Fiva and Smith, 2016), they are less suited to measuring the inherited incumbency advantage in terms of votes earned in a candidate's first election attempt. Kenichi Ariga (2015) applies an RD design to Japan's pre-1994 MMD elections, and finds no evidence that marginal incumbents enjoy an incumbency advantage under MMD. However, we saw in the RD results in Chapter 4 that marginal winners in their final election attempt *were* more likely than marginal losers to be succeeded by a relative in the next election. In an RD analysis of close elections in the post-reform SMD tier, Ariga et al. (2016) also find no evidence of an incumbency advantage.

The incumbency advantage is generally believed to be weaker in MMD elections because the vote share required to secure a victory in MMDs is much lower (at most 17 percent in a five-member district, though often much lower when there are many candidates), and individual candidates often must face both interparty and intraparty challengers. In addition, the lower threshold to victory decreases certainty about each candidate's electoral prospects and may result in an increased number of challengers.

Lastly, strategic voters may desert top vote-earners in favor of the runners-up from the previous election (or these runners-up may actively pursue voters with this appeal), which can cost the election for other marginal candidates.

Studies of the deterrence, or "scare-off," effect in U.S. congressional elections have found that incumbents are often faced with low-quality challengers (Jacobson and Kernell, 1983; Banks and Kiewiet, 1989; Jacobson, 1989; Cox and Katz, 1996; Gordon, Huber and Landa, 2007). Basically, the story goes that when faced with an incumbent candidate in a district, would-be challengers of higher "quality" (generally defined as having prior elective experience, especially at the local level) will strategically opt to sit out the race and wait until their prospects for victory are higher. The result is that the challengers who do enter the race are of lower quality. These lower quality challengers pose less of an electoral threat to the incumbent, and help to keep him or her in office.

In MMDs, the scare-off effect is likely to be lower generally, given the greater permissiveness of the system, greater uncertainty, and increased vulnerability of marginal incumbents. Indeed, Shigeo Hirano and James Snyder (2009, p. 303) find little evidence that an additional incumbent candidate has a "scare-off effect" on the *quality* of opposition challengers in MMD contests, although their findings do indicate a slight effect in terms of the *number* of opposition challengers. The lack of a scare-off effect in MMD elections underscores the importance of the personal-vote-earning ability of candidates in MMD elections, as implied in the comparative model of dynastic candidate selection from Chapter 3.

How does the well-documented incumbency advantage translate to elections in which a legacy candidate runs for the first time? The aggregate data provide some *prima facie* support for the existence of an inherited incumbency advantage in both MMD and SMD elections. Table 5.1 gives descriptive statistics on the "success rates" for all non-legacy and legacy candidates, as well as the success rates for the subsample of first-time candidates, split by electoral system period (pure PR candidates excluded for the post-reform period). Among all candidates, legacy candidates won their district races in 80 percent of cases under MMD, compared to a success rate of just 44 percent for non-legacy candidates. Among first-time candidates under MMD, the success rate for non-legacy candidates was only 20 percent. The success rate for first-time legacy candidates was 60 percent. The success rate among the subset of first-time legacy candidates who directly succeed their predecessor (hereditary candidates) was slightly higher (62 percent). For comparison, the success rate for incumbents under MMD was 77 percent.

In the post-reform SMDs, a candidate can either win his or her district race outright, or (if dual-listed) might lose the race but still secure a seat through the party's PR list. Such winners have often been derisively dubbed "zombies," since they "died" in the SMD tier, but were "resurrected" in PR. However, because of the main parties' practice of ranking dual-listed candidates at the same position and using the "best-loser" calculation to determine which SMD losers will get PR seats (described in the previous chapter), "zombies" tend to be competitive candidates who only narrowly lost. The district success rate for all non-legacy and legacy candidates in the post-reform SMDs resembles the success rates for first-time non-legacy and legacy candidates in the pre-reform period, and is higher if zombie winners are included. Among first-time candidates in the post-reform period, the success rate is just 8 percent for non-legacy candidates, and just 38 percent for legacy candidates. However, for post-reform hereditary candidates, the success rate is still high: 54 percent. If zombie

Table 5.1: Success rates of non-legacy and legacy candidates across electoral systems (all candidates, 1947-2014).

	Loser		**Winner**		**"Zombie"**		**Total**
	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)
Pre-reform MMD							
All candidates:							
Non-legacy	8,867	55.78	7,030	44.22			15,897
Legacy	450	20.14	1,784	79.86			2,234
Total	9,317	51.39	8,814	48.61			18,131
First-time candidates:							
Non-legacy	3,594	79.97	900	20.03			4,494
Legacy	149	39.73	226	60.27			375
(Hereditary)	(65)	(38.24)	(105)	(61.76)			(170)
Total	3,743	76.87	1,126	23.13			4,869
Post-reform SMD							
All candidates:							
Non-legacy	4,829	70.84	1,375	20.17	613	8.99	6,817
Legacy	308	25.73	759	63.41	130	10.86	1,197
Total	5,137	64.10	2,134	26.63	743	9.27	8,014
First-time candidates:							
Non-legacy	2,777	87.30	239	7.51	165	5.19	3,181
Legacy	75	48.70	58	37.66	21	13.64	154
(Hereditary)	(28)	(39.44)	(38)	(53.52)	(5)	(7.05)	(71)
Total	2,852	85.52	297	8.91	186	5.58	3,335

Note: By-election candidates are included. Pure PR list candidates are excluded. Candidates who secured a seat after the election through list promotion (so-called *kuri-age tosen*) are counted as losing. Sample for first-time candidates excludes individuals who ran for the prewar House of Representatives or in 1946, but does not exclude candidates from the House of Councillors.
Source: JHRED.

winners are included, new hereditary candidates post-reform are almost equally as successful as new hereditary candidates in the pre-reform period. For comparison, the success rate (winning the SMD) for the post-reform period is 64 percent for SMD incumbents, 32 percent for zombie incumbents, and 30 percent for pure PR incumbents who moved into an SMD. In other words, first-time hereditary candidates have only a 10-percentage point lower success rate than incumbents, but a 20-percentage point *higher* success rate than incumbents who were elected through the PR list.

Although these aggregate patterns are interesting, it is more informative to look at the changes for LDP candidates across the two institutional contexts. Dynastic politics has been most prevalent within the LDP, so the differential rates of success in the aggregate data could be a result of differential rates of success for LDP candidates generally. Table 5.2 gives the same statistics as the previous table, but limits the sample to candidates nominated by the LDP from 1958 until 2014. For LDP candidates, the difference in success rates in the pre-reform period is most notable among first-time candidates. Only half of all non-legacy candidates were successful in their first election attempt, in contrast to three quarters of all legacy (and hereditary) candidates. For comparison, the success rate of LDP incumbents during this period was 85 percent.

Table 5.2: Success rates of non-legacy and legacy candidates across electoral systems (LDP only, 1958-2014).

	Loser		**Winner**		**"Zombie"**		**Total**
	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)
Pre-reform MMD							
All candidates:							
Non-legacy	698	23.24	2,305	76.76			3,003
Legacy	188	13.17	1,239	86.83			1,427
Total	886	20	3,544	80			4,430
First-time candidates:							
Non-legacy	148	50.17	147	49.83			295
Legacy	46	25.56	134	74.44			180
(Hereditary)	(23)	(23.47)	(75)	(76.53)			(98)
Total	194	40.84	281	59.16			475
Post-reform SMD							
All candidates:							
Non-legacy	352	27.8	710	56.08	204	16.11	1,266
Legacy	124	16.45	573	75.99	57	7.56	754
Total	476	23.56	1,283	63.51	261	12.92	2,020
First-time candidates:							
Non-legacy	128	41.29	125	40.32	57	18.39	310
Legacy	21	29.17	41	56.94	10	13.89	72
(Hereditary)	(10)	(22.22)	(30)	(66.67)	(5)	(11.11)	(45)
Total	149	39.01	166	43.46	67	17.54	382

Note: By-election candidates are included. Pure PR list candidates are excluded. Candidates who secured a seat after the election through list promotion (so-called *kuri-age tosen*) are counted as losing. Sample for first-time candidates excludes individuals who ran for the prewar House of Representatives or in 1946, but does not exclude candidates from the House of Councillors.
Source: JHRED.

In the post-reform SMDs, the success rate for first-time LDP candidates is lower for both non-legacy and legacy candidates relative to the MMD period, but is still much higher for legacy candidates (57 percent). Moreover, the success rate for new hereditary candidates in the LDP under SMD is 67 percent. If zombie winners are included, 78 percent of first-time LDP hereditary candidates were successful. For comparison, the success rate (winning the SMD) for LDP candidates in the post-reform period was 76 percent for SMD incumbents, 45 percent for zombie incumbents, and 50 percent for pure PR incumbents who moved into an SMD. Once again, when it comes to electoral success, first-time hereditary candidates under both MMD and SMD appear to have more in common with incumbents than with other first-time candidates.

The overall patterns in success rates indicate that legacy candidates tend to enjoy an inherited incumbency advantage, but how large is the advantage in terms of votes, and what are its sources? Legacy candidates, and especially hereditary candidates, are likely to possess many of the direct benefits of incumbency (name recognition, connections to donors, established campaign organizations, etc.), as well as the indirect advantage related to higher ex-ante quality and the deterrence of challengers. Just as high-quality challengers might shy away from running against an incumbent candidate,

would-be non-legacy candidates of high quality might also be deterred from running when faced with a legacy candidate if they anticipate that the legacy candidate will do well. On the other hand, when a legacy candidate runs, traditional measures of quality involving prior elective experience might have less of an effect—if you are a Kennedy or a Koizumi, does it matter that you have not first served in local office? Indeed, based on the theoretical model presented in Chapter 3 ($U_{it} = V_{it} + (IIA_{it} * DB_{it}) + P_{it} + O_{it}$), so long as the inherited incumbency advantage (IIA_{it}) and the dynastic bias (DB_{it}) in the institutional context are positive, then a legacy candidate can have fewer traditional attributes of "quality" (within V_{it}) and still be expected to perform well in elections. The empirical record in Chapter 2 confirmed that legacy candidates are less likely to have had prior experience in public office than their non-legacy counterparts.

Only a few previous studies have sought to quantify the inherited incumbency advantage in elections. Brian Feinstein (2010) analyzes all open-seat contests for the U.S. House of Representatives from 1994-2006. Although he finds no evidence that legacy candidates are of higher quality than non-legacy candidates, legacy candidates nevertheless tend to fare better electorally, earning 58-59 percent of the vote on average, compared to first-generation candidates who receive 48 percent. Controlling for differences in experience, campaign expenditures, and the partisanship of the district, he estimates that the inherited incumbency advantage is roughly 3-4 percentage points, half of the roughly 7-10 percentage-point incumbency advantage enjoyed by House members in the 1980s and 1990s. Feinstein attributes the advantage to "brand name" recognition, but is unable to verify any concomitant "scare-off" effect in terms of the relative quality of non-legacy challengers in open races featuring legacy candidates, nor does he find any significant advantage in terms of fundraising. These findings for the U.S. context are consistent with the predictions of my comparative model of dynastic candidate selection.

Empirical evidence of an inherited incumbency advantage has also been found in Ireland, where the STV/MMD system makes the electoral context similar to pre-reform Japan. Irish legacy candidates tend to enjoy a roughly 20-percentage-point higher probability of election than non-legacy co-partisans, and tend to capture between 12 and 15 percentage points more of the electoral quota (Droop quota) required to secure a seat with first preference votes (Smith and Martin, 2016). The Droop quota (Droop, 1881), measured as $(\frac{Total\ valid\ votes}{M+1}) + 1$, is the absolute minimum number of votes that a candidate must earn to guarantee election in an MMD contest. For Ireland's MMDs, a candidate's share of the Droop quota after first preference votes are tallied serves as a normalized measure of electoral strength across districts with varying magnitude.

5.2 Empirical Evidence: How Much Advantage?

I build on these studies to evaluate the inherited incumbency advantage of legacy candidates in Japan using a variety of measures and approaches. The case of Japan presents a challenge because, unlike SMD races with two-party competition, MMD elections featured much greater variation in the number of co-partisan and opposition party candidates facing a first-time legacy candidate. Since the switch to MMM, candidates in the SMD tier still often face multiple opponents, but competition in the majority of districts between 2000 and 2009 converged to the two-party competition expected under Duverger's Law (Duverger, 1954), with the two largest parties

capturing over 80 percent of the votes and over 90 percent of the SMD seats. The remaining SMD seats are usually held by independents who split from one of the two major parties (most often the LDP) or Komeito candidates running in districts as part of a coalition stand-down agreement with the LDP. The emergence of the Third Force parties in 2012 and 2014 complicates the nature of competition in the SMD tier, yet at the same time, few new legacy candidates ran in those elections. The ability for a losing SMD candidate to earn a seat in the House of Representatives through dual-listing in the PR tier also alters the calculations of would-be challengers to legacy candidates, such that those who might otherwise be deterred from running will still attempt to compete in hopes of securing a PR seat.

How has the electoral reform and its dual-listing provision altered the electoral dynamics of dynastic politics when it comes to the inherited incumbency advantage? Since the LDP is the only major party to span the entire time span, the focus of my analysis will be on its candidates, as well as LDP-affiliated independents.

5.2.1 The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in MMD Elections

Measuring the inherited incumbency advantage in terms of votes is complicated in MMD elections because each race can vary in terms of the number of competitors, the characteristics of those competitors (incumbency, quality, etc.), and the partisan leanings of the district. In the case of Japan, a candidate from the LDP not only faced competition from the candidates of other parties, such as the JSP, but also faced intraparty competition from other conservatives, and indeed, this is where competition was often most fierce. In general, because of the much lower threshold for victory under MMD, as compared to SMD, both the incumbency advantage and by extension, the inherited incumbency advantage, should be lower under MMD than under SMD.

Only a handful of previous studies have analyzed the incumbency advantage in MMD races. Unfortunately, none of the existing studies provides a model that can be easily adapted to analyzing the inherited incumbency advantage in Japan's MMDs. For example, Gary Cox and Scott Morgenstern (1995) extend the logic of the unbiased measure of incumbency advantage first introduced by Andrew Gelman and Gary King (1990) to free-for-all (M non-transferable votes for M seats, or MNTV) MMD races in forty U.S. states from 1970-1986, and that find the vote-denominated incumbency advantage (normalized using the Droop quota to account for variations in M) increased at a much lower rate in MMD races over the time period studied than it did in SMD races. Yet they confine their analysis to fully contested races where M Democratic candidates faced M Republican candidates, and their measure of the vote advantage is based on the combined vote share of all co-partisan candidates given varying combinations of incumbency within each party's group of candidates. These conditions deviate from the MMD context of Japanese elections, where each voter casts a single vote to fill M seats, and where few races featured the same number of LDP candidates competing against the same number of JSP candidates. Most of races also featured competition from additional parties, making it difficult to apply the same party vote share model. More importantly, the focus on two-party vote share is less relevant to Japanese MMDs, where most of an LDP candidate's competition for votes was against co-partisan candidates or LDP-affiliated independent candidates seeking to get the support of conservative voters.

Hirano and Snyder (2009) also focus on fully contested free-for-all races in U.S. state legislative elections, but employ pair-wise comparisons between incumbents and

new candidates from the same party in the same race. For example, in a two-seat district, a voter might choose between two Democrats, an incumbent and a newcomer, and two Republicans (of varying combinations). If all voters choose a "straight ticket" party vote (both votes given to the two co-partisan candidates), the result should be that the two Democrats get the same share of the vote. Hirano and Snyder thus attribute an incumbent Democrat's greater share of the vote over his or her co-partisan "running mate" as a measure of the incumbency advantage. This is a clever and innovative solution for testing the incumbency advantage in two-member state legislative MMDs in the U.S., but is less adaptable to Japanese MMD elections, where M ranged in most cases from three to five, and the number of co-partisan and opposition party candidates varied considerably.

Two other studies focus on the electoral vulnerability of MMD incumbents. Carey, Niemi and Powell (2000) argue that the outcome-denominated measure of electoral success is more appropriate for MMD elections, though their primary focus is comparing incumbency re-election probabilities between "traditional" SMD races, "post" MMD contests (which essentially function like SMDs), and free-for-all MMD elections. They find that incumbents in both types of MMD races are more vulnerable to defeat than their counterparts in SMD races. Further evidence of the electoral vulnerability of incumbents under MMD is suggested by Ariga (2015) who employs an RD design using Japanese elections from 1958-1993 to show that marginal winners did no better than marginal losers in the next election. Ariga's study moves our knowledge about the incumbency advantage in MMD beyond the context of U.S. state-level legislative elections, yet due to the methodology employed and its focus marginal candidates, does not paint a complete picture of the incumbency advantage in Japan's MMDs, nor is it particularly useful for studying the realized inherited incumbency advantage in terms of vote shares.

The lack of adaptable models for measuring the incumbency advantage in Japan's pre-reform MMD system makes measuring the inherited incumbency advantage without bias complicated.[3] But we can still draw comparisons between the MMD and SMD systems by considering the concept of a successor versus the concept of a challenger in each system. Consider that, in both MMD and SMD systems, incumbency is often the most relevant source of information for both voters and potential challengers. However, incumbents eventually retire, which produces a race between two (or sometimes more) non-incumbents for the "open" seat. But the informational cue provided by incumbency (or lack thereof) is different in SMD and MMD elections. Under SMD systems, incumbents normally run again and face one (or sometimes more) "challengers." Losing challengers seldom run again, so the challengers usually change each election. But under MMD systems, both the concept of a challenger and that of an open seat require rethinking.

For example, in an MMD with four seats there will be four incumbents after an election. If one decides not to run in the next election, there will be one open seat but also three incumbents running for re-election. In SMD systems, an open seat not only means that the incumbent must be replaced by a new candidate from his or her own party, but also that a candidate from the party that lost the last election has a better chance to win because he or she will not be facing an incumbent. Under SMD

[3] Smith and Martin (2016) evaluate the vote advantages of legacy candidates in Ireland's MMD system, but focus more on comparing the advantages of legacy candidates whose predecessors served in cabinet (*cabinet legacies*) to other legacy and non-legacy candidates.

systems, an open seat is thus primarily a rare opportunity for the party that lost in the last election. Under MMD systems, however, an open seat will primarily be seen as a rare opportunity for candidates from the retiring incumbent's party. Other parties will normally already have an established candidate in the district, perhaps even an incumbent. Thus, a seat vacated by one party is not necessarily seen as "open" to any other party.

Incumbents in MMD elections can be expected to oppose running another copartisan even under the best of circumstances (Reed and Bolland, 1999). Even when the party insists on fielding an additional candidate, incumbents may sometimes work behind the scenes to assure that the new candidate does not pose an electoral threat (either because he or she is of inferior quality or will run in a different area of the district). However, the open seat still presents a rare opportunity for potential candidates from the retiring incumbent's party, and it is common for more than one candidate from the retiree's own party to compete to take his or her place. These are the conditions that best describe the intraparty competition in the conservative camp under MMD elections in Japan.

Next consider whether a candidate who is running to replace a retiree from his or her own party should be considered a "challenger." In SMD systems, since there is only one nominated candidate from each party, the candidate who replaces a retiring incumbent is clearly a successor, not a challenger, whether or not he or she is a hereditary candidate. In MMD systems, if only one candidate runs to replace one retiree, both from the same party, the new candidate is also a successor and not a challenger. Indeed, many new candidates under MMD in Japan were designated as such by the retiree. However, it was also common for more than one candidate to compete to succeed a retiring incumbent. If two candidates compete to succeed a retiree from a party, should one be considered an intraparty challenger if he or she has less claim to being the retiring incumbent's successor?

Building on these theoretical considerations, my approach for evaluating the inherited incumbency advantage in MMDs is to use the case of the LDP and LDP-affiliated independents and the concept and measurement of jiban. When an LDP incumbent candidate (winner or loser) retired or died, his or her jiban might have become "open territory" for candidates seeking conservative votes. The stronger the exiting candidate was, the greater the number of votes made available to potential new entrants. But because jiban (in the concrete form of koenkai) were organized around an individual candidate, and not the party, retiring incumbents could "transfer" some of the political resources of their established koenkai to a chosen successor, either kin (a hereditary candidate) or non-kin. Often the inheritance of resources was complete and direct—the koenkai organization and other resources, including financial resources, were transferred to a successor intact, and the operation of the jiban "machine" kept going. The successor candidate in these cases thus immediately gained an advantage in his or her first election by having an existing, well-developed support organization to mobilize voters.

Other times, a new LDP candidate might *de facto* inherit all or part of an outgoing incumbent's jiban simply by being the only new LDP candidate to fill the geographic electoral void left by the previous candidate, much as new candidates from a retiring incumbent's party might similarly be considered successors in an SMD system, as previously discussed. In such cases, even if the koenkai organization were not transferred directly, many of the previous incumbent's supporters would have found themselves drawn into the new candidate's campaign mobilization activities. These new LDP

candidates thus also benefited from capturing the votes of the outgoing incumbent's existing jiban.

In contrast, a new candidate who did not inherit any jiban had to build his or her personal vote from scratch in order to compete against the established jiban of other candidates in the district. Although an election following the retirement of an incumbent may seem like the most opportune time for a new candidate with no established jiban in the district to attempt to enter politics, such an attempt was often made more difficult by the transfer of that incumbent's jiban to another candidate. The designated successor in most cases would get the official nomination of the party, leaving other hopefuls with only two options: either to give up on running in that election, or contest the election as an independent (or even perhaps a candidate of a smaller conservative party) in hopes of defeating one of the LDP's existing candidates, or possibly a weak JSP incumbent. The LDP played a part in encouraging such candidacies, since successful independent candidates in many cases were given ex-post nominations by the party and allowed to rejoin the LDP (see Chapter 4), and ambitious faction leaders sometimes supported such candidates in hopes of increasing their share of members in the party.

To examine the differences in the inherited incumbency advantage given different forms of succession in the LDP, I again use the *Jiban* variable in JHRED. Recall that when a candidate retires or dies, a new candidate is coded as a successor to that candidate's jiban in any one of the following cases: (1) only one candidate from the party retired and only one new candidate ran; (2) a newspaper report or some other source named the new candidate as a successor; or (3) the new candidate was a hereditary candidate. I define an "entrepreneurial" candidate as any new candidate who ran against the established jiban in the district without succeeding any retiring LDP (or LDP-affiliated) candidate.

Thankfully, a great deal of variation exists among new LDP and LDP-affiliated candidates with regard to jiban inheritance, which permits the analysis of not only the resource advantages accrued to non-legacy successors, but also the additional "name brand" advantages enjoyed by hereditary successors or legacy entrepreneurs. For example, sometimes a legacy candidate inherited a predecessor's jiban following a gap of one or more elections where a non-related candidate occupied the jiban. In these cases, while the legacy candidate is considered a successor to the jiban, he or she is not coded as a hereditary successor. He or she might, however, still possess name recognition above and beyond that which a non-legacy successor would enjoy, even though both candidates inherited other resource advantages. A legacy candidate who did not directly inherit any jiban, whether of a relative or otherwise, might still benefit substantially from name recognition even without the extra organizational benefit of an established jiban. Such cases of "legacy entrepreneurs" sometimes occurred when a predecessor served in the House of Councillors or in a separate district, or when the predecessor stopped running many years earlier, and his or her established jiban network was allowed to "collapse" before the legacy candidate entered the arena.

Each first-time conservative candidate can thus be categorized as one of five mutually-exclusive types:

1. A *non-legacy entrepreneur*.
2. A *legacy entrepreneur*.
3. A *non-legacy successor* (oftentimes the secretary of the previous incumbent).

4. A *legacy successor to non-kin*, i.e., a legacy candidate whose immediate predecessor was not a family member (usually because of a gap between family members with a non-kin candidate running in the jiban in the interim).
5. A *hereditary successor* who directly succeeded his or her relative.

The difference between Types 1 and 2, and between Type 3 and Types 4 and 5, help shed light on the "name brand" advantages that legacy candidates enjoy relative to non-legacy candidates. How much better do first-time hereditary successors and legacy candidates of all succession (and non-succession) types perform electorally than non-related successors or non-related entrepreneurial candidates with no established jiban?

Table 5.3 gives the number of each type of first-time candidate among LDP-nominated candidates and LDP-affiliated independent candidates from 1958-1993, and the success rate within each group. In addition, the table gives the mean proportion of the Droop quota (the number of votes that would guarantee victory in a given M-sized district) earned by candidates in each group.[4] For comparison, success rates and mean quota proportions for returning candidates (including incumbents) are also shown.

The success rates and quota shares for different types of first-time LDP candidates indicate substantial differences in outcomes depending on legacy status. Just 44 percent of non-legacy entrepreneurs (those who did not inherit a jiban) won their first election, compared to 59 percent of legacy entrepreneurs. Among the first-time candidates who did inherit a jiban, non-legacy successors have a similar success rate to legacy entrepreneurs (57 percent), suggesting that the inherited resources of a koenkai may be comparable in value to name recognition or family connections in the absence of an inherited koenkai. Among successors with dynastic family ties, however, the success rates are almost as high as the success rates for returning candidates (which include incumbents and former incumbents). The success rate for legacy candidates who inherited a jiban from a non-kin predecessor (Type 4) is nominally higher than that of direct hereditary successors; however, many of these legacy successors ran in the same district as their predecessors but with a gap between elections while the other candidate held the jiban, so are similar to hereditary candidates (and the difference between the two groups is not statistically significant). First-time legacy and hereditary successors also capture a higher proportion of the Droop quota, on average, than other types of successors or entrepreneurs.

Electoral outcomes and quota proportions appear less dependent on legacy or successor status for LDP-affiliated independent candidates, who do not tend to do well as new candidates regardless of succession. In other words, being a legacy candidate may help get votes, but it may not fully compensate for the value of the LDP's official party label. Then again, there were likely reasons why such independents were not given the official party nomination in the first place—i.e., the lack of nomination may reflect the lower quality of the candidate, and lower quality will obviously be correlated with worse electoral outcomes.

[4] This is calculated by taking the candidate's actual share of the vote divided by the Droop quota. For example, in an SMD contest, the Droop quota is equal to 50 percent of the valid votes cast (plus one vote to break a tie). In a five-member district, the quota is 16.7 percent of the valid votes. A value for the quota proportion that is greater than 1 represents a candidate who could not lose the election no matter how the other votes might be distributed amongst the other challengers in the district. Candidates with a quota proportion value lower than 1 can still be elected, depending on the number of other candidates competing.

Table 5.3: Success rates of different types of first-time LDP and LDP-affiliated candidates in MMDs.

	Loser		**Winner**		**Total**	**Quota Prop.**
	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)	(Mean)
LDP-nominated candidates						
(1) Non-legacy entrepreneur	95	55.56	76	44.44	171	.68
(2) Legacy entrepreneur	14	41.18	20	58.82	34	.75
(3) Non-legacy successor	53	42.74	71	57.26	124	.76
(4) Legacy successor to non-kin	9	18.75	39	81.25	48	.89
(5) Hereditary successor	23	23.47	75	76.53	98	.86
Returning candidate	692	17.50	3,263	82.50	3,955	.93
Total	886	20.00	3,544	80.00	4,430	.91
LDP-affiliated independents						
(1) Non-legacy entrepreneur	214	87.35	31	12.65	245	.40
(2) Legacy entrepreneur	19	76.00	6	24.00	25	.58
(3) Non-legacy successor	35	76.09	11	23.91	46	.55
(4) Legacy successor to non-kin	17	77.27	5	22.73	22	.51
(5) Hereditary successor	23	79.31	6	20.69	29	.46
Returning candidate	297	76.35	92	23.65	389	.49
Total	605	80.03	151	19.97	756	.47

Note: By-election candidates are included. Candidates who secured a seat after the election through list promotion (so-called *kuri-age tosen*) are counted as losing. First-time candidates exclude individuals who ran for the prewar House of Representatives or in 1946, but does not exclude candidates from the House of Councillors.
Source: JHRED.

In Table 5.4, I present the results of an OLS regression analysis of the electoral advantage of different types of first-time LDP and LDP-affiliated candidates—where the first set of three specifications uses the outcome-denominated measure (*Win*) as the dependent variable, and the second set of three specifications uses a vote-denominated measure (*Quota Prop.*). In the first specification for each dependent variable, I include only the type of first-time candidate (with Type 1—non-legacy entrepreneur—used as the baseline category) and whether or not the candidate had the official party nomination (*LDP nomination*). In the second specification for each dependent variable, I include district fixed effects, year (legislative term) fixed effects, and controls for gender, age, age-squared, whether or not it was a by-election, and the number of candidates. In the third specification, I include a dummy variable, *Quality candidate*, which measures whether the candidate had any prior experience in elective office (House of Councillors, local assembly, governor, or mayor), as well as *Expenditures/limit*, which is measured as the proportion of the legal limit for campaign expenditures spent by the candidate in the election. These latter two variables are included to partial out any effect of legacy status on electoral outcomes that might operate through experience and campaign war chests. Unfortunately, expenditures data are only available for general elections from 1960 onwards, so the sample size drops in this specification.

The results across all specifications again indicate a substantial and consistently greater vote share and probability of election for first-time conservative candidates who have the official nomination of the LDP, but also significantly better electoral out-

Table 5.4: OLS estimates of electoral advantage of different types of first-time LDP and LDP-affiliated candidates in MMDs (1958-1993).

	Win			**Quota Prop.**		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Legacy entrepreneur	0.122	0.204**	0.175*	0.115**	0.192***	0.182***
	(0.065)	(0.066)	(0.077)	(0.035)	(0.036)	(0.045)
Non-legacy successor	0.106*	0.085	0.083	0.099***	0.060*	0.080**
	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.026)
Legacy successor to non-kin	0.269***	0.278***	0.280***	0.180***	0.146***	0.157***
	(0.055)	(0.062)	(0.069)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.036)
Hereditary successor	0.246***	0.287***	0.291***	0.159***	0.175***	0.207***
	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.058)	(0.028)	(0.030)	(0.033)
LDP nomination	0.374***	0.348***	0.320***	0.280***	0.255***	0.211***
	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.043)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.022)
Quality candidate			0.076*			0.079***
			(0.038)			(0.020)
Expenditures/limit			0.329***			0.210***
			(0.090)			(0.049)
N	842	842	644	842	842	644
R^2	0.230	0.404	0.477	0.329	0.518	0.603
District FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Year FE	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline group is *Non-legacy entrepreneur*. Dependent variable for specifications (1)-(3) is a dummy variable for winning election. Dependent variable for specifications (4)-(6) is a the share of the Droop quota obtained by the candidate. Controls in specifications (2)-(3) and (5)-(6) include gender, age, age-squared, whether or not the election was a by-election (dropped in specifications (3) and (6) due to lack of data on expenditures), and the number of candidates running. Candidates who secured a seat after the election through list promotion (so-called *kuri-age tosen*) are counted as losing. First-time candidates exclude individuals who ran for the prewar House of Representatives or in 1946, but does not exclude candidates from the House of Councillors. Source: JHRED.

comes for hereditary successors—as well as legacy successors to non-kin predecessors—relative to other types of first-time LDP and LDP-affiliated candidates. Again, the effect is similar for hereditary candidates and legacy candidates who succeed a non-kin predecessor. Both types of successors are approximately 30 percentage points more likely to win their first elections than non-legacy entrepreneurs. Being a quality candidate and spending more money in the election both help, but cannot explain the apparent electoral advantage enjoyed by legacy candidates.

Another way to evaluate the electoral advantages of being a legacy candidate in MMDs is to focus only on the subset of direct successors—Types 3 and 5—where a jiban is inherited without any gap and the only distinguishing difference is that the successor in the latter type was kin (excluding for this reason Type 4 candidates). This approach allows us to control for factors like the strength of the jiban being succeeded and the number of other new (entrepreneurial) conservative challengers entering the race. For this analysis, I limit the sample to successor candidates who had the official nomination of the LDP. The results are presented in Table 5.5. Again, the first specification for each dependent variable includes only a dummy variable indi-

Table 5.5: OLS estimates of electoral advantage of non-legacy successors versus hereditary successors (1958-1993).

	Win			**Quota Prop.**		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Hereditary successor	0.196**	0.140*	0.072	0.107**	0.075*	0.059
	(0.062)	(0.064)	(0.177)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.077)
No. of jiban wins		0.024**	0.007		0.016***	-0.003
		(0.008)	(0.020)		(0.004)	(0.012)
No. of other new conservatives		-0.012	-0.121		-0.047*	-0.076
		(0.036)	(0.084)		(0.019)	(0.047)
Predecessor won last race			0.451**			0.230**
			(0.147)			(0.083)
Quality candidate			0.091			-0.005
			(0.134)			(0.062)
Expenditures/limit			0.513			0.061
			(0.338)			(0.172)
N	221	221	177	221	221	177
R^2	0.042	0.079	0.773	0.046	0.130	0.738
District FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Controls	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Baseline group is *Non-legacy successor*. Dependent variable for specifications (1)-(3) is a dummy variable for winning election. Dependent variable for specifications (4)-(6) is the share of the Droop quota obtained by the candidate. Controls in specifications (3) and (6) include gender, age, age-squared, whether or not the election was a by-election, and the number of candidates running. Candidates who secured a seat after the election through list promotion (so-called *kuri-age tosen*) are counted as losing. First-time candidates exclude individuals who ran for the prewar House of Representatives or in 1946, but does not exclude candidates from the House of Councillors.
Source: JHRED.

cating whether the first-time candidate was a hereditary successor (reference group is non-legacy successors). The second specification controls for the number of previous jiban wins, and the number of other new conservative candidates who entered the race (including LDP-affiliated independents). Finally, the third specification adds controls for whether the candidate's predecessor won the last election, candidate quality, and campaign expenditures, as well as the controls and fixed effects used in previous models.

The results indicate that hereditary successors in the LDP were roughly 20 percentage points more likely to win, on average, than non-legacy successors, as well as earn a larger proportion of the vote. Even conditioning on the strength of the jiban, hereditary successors tended to do better than non-legacy successors, enjoying a roughly 14-percentage-point higher probability of election. The significance of the relationship no longer holds when the predecessor's incumbency is controlled for in specifications (3) and (6), which is not surprising given that the results in Chapter 4 showed the strong correlation between incumbency and hereditary succession.

The negative coefficient on *Number of other new conservatives* suggests that the entry of additional conservative challengers was a challenge facing first-time LDP candidates of both types of succession. However, Figure 5.1, which plots the number



Figure 5.1: A "scare-off" effect? Entry of additional conservative challengers with different types of successors.
Note: Number of other "new" conservatives includes all conservative-camp candidates who first ran in the district in the same election as the non-legacy successor or hereditary successor. However, some district newcomers may have run in other districts or in the House of Councillors.
Source: JHRED.

of new conservative candidates (beyond the successor) for each type of successor, does not suggest that hereditary successors enjoy a larger "scare-off" effect than non-legacy successors. If anything, hereditary successors are *more likely* to face intra-camp challengers in their first election. This apparent lack of a "scare-off" effect for hereditary successors may in part be because the retirement of a powerful incumbent is not only correlated with a greater likelihood of hereditary succession, but also increases uncertainty over which candidates might win over the previous incumbent's voters, and thus encourages the entry of entrepreneurial candidates who hope to capture a portion of the vote made available by the incumbent's exit.

5.2.2 The Inherited Incumbency Advantage in SMD Elections

The introduction of SMDs in 1994 eliminates many of the challenges to measuring the inherited incumbency advantage, due to the elimination of intraparty competition and the development of a largely two-party system in SMDs—with the LDP and DPJ at the forefront since the 2000 election.[5] To evaluate the inherited incumbency

[5] Figure A.11 in Appendix A shows the distribution of the combined district-level vote share captured by the top-two candidates from 1996-2014. The breakdown of two-party competition in 2012 is clearly evident.

advantage in the SMD period, I adopt the method used by Feinstein (2010). His model builds upon previous studies of the incumbency advantage that measure the differential advantage of an incumbent Democratic candidate over a Republican challenger in a SMD race, controlling for other factors that may systematically be related to a higher vote share for the candidate or his or her party (Gelman and King, 1990; Cox and Katz, 1996). Feinstein's model uses OLS regression to estimate the advantage enjoyed by a new candidate (measured in terms of two-party vote share) in an open-seat race given that candidate's legacy status. For the Japanese case, I focus my analysis on the LDP candidate's vote share in SMD races from 2000-2009. I exclude the chaotic 1996 election where both the NFP and the DPJ competed for the status of main opposition party, as well as the 2012 elections, in which two-party competition largely collapsed as the "Third Force" parties attempted to replace the DPJ as the main alternative to the LDP (Reed et al., 2013). I also exclude the 2014 election as expenditures data are not yet available.

The full regression model takes the following form:

$$\begin{aligned} Y_{it} = \alpha_t &+ \beta_1(\textit{Dynasty Difference}_{it}) \\ &+ \beta_2(\textit{Quality Difference}_{it}) \\ &+ \beta_3(\textit{Expenditures Difference}_{it}) \\ &+ \beta_4(\textit{District Party Strength}_{it}) + \epsilon_{it}, \end{aligned} \tag{5.1}$$

where Y_{it} is a dependent variable that takes one of two forms: an outcome-denominated measure $\textit{Win}_{it}$ (a dummy variable for winning the SMD seat); or a vote-denominated measure $\textit{Vote Share}_{it}$, which is the first-time LDP candidate's share of the top two candidates' vote in district i and year t (measured as a proportion). IT is the set of fifty-five open-seat SMD races in the four general elections from 2000 to 2009 in which a new LDP candidate ran; $\textit{Dynasty Difference}_{it}$ takes the value of 1 if the LDP candidate was a legacy candidate, -1 if the main challenger candidate was a legacy, and 0 if neither candidate (or in the case of two races, both candidates) was a legacy[6]; $\textit{Quality Difference}_{it}$ similarly captures the difference in prior office-holding experience (local legislative office, mayor, governor, upper house, or prior service in the House of Representatives) between the two main candidates; $\textit{Expenditures Difference}_{it}$ represents the LDP candidate's expenditures as a proportion of the maximum amount allowed minus the corresponding proportion of expenditures/limit of his of her main opponent; $\textit{LDP District Strength}_{it}$ is the LDP's total PR vote in the national tier of the most recent House of Councillors election aggregated to the SMD boundaries. This measure is designed to capture the party's support *qua* party in that district. Finally, α_t is a dummy variable for the year of the election, and ϵ_{it} is the error term.

Table 5.6 presents the results. In Models (1)-(3), I use the outcome-denominated measure $\textit{Win}_{it}$ as my dependent variable; in Models (4)-(6) I use the vote-denominated measure $\textit{Vote Share}_{it}$. The first model in each set tests the relationship between $\textit{Dynasty Difference}_{it}$ and the dependent variable without including any other variables or controls. The second model adds controls for quality and expenditures differences. Finally, the third model in each set adds the control for party strength and year fixed effects to match the full regression model in Equation 5.1.

[6] A new non-legacy LDP candidate faced off against a legacy candidate from the opposition in only three races. In twenty-one races, the LDP newcomer was a legacy candidate, and the remaining twenty-nine races, neither candidate was a legacy.

Table 5.6: OLS estimates of inherited incumbency advantage in SMD elections (2000-2009).

	Win			**Vote Share**		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Dynasty difference	0.231*	0.219	0.108	0.091***	0.083**	0.061**
	(0.112)	(0.123)	(0.119)	(0.025)	(0.024)	(0.020)
Quality difference		0.003	0.061		0.003	0.016
		(0.098)	(0.095)		(0.019)	(0.016)
Expenditures difference		0.110	0.138		0.086	0.066
		(0.308)	(0.277)		(0.060)	(0.040)
LDP district strength			3.178**			0.757***
			(0.921)			(0.197)
2003 election			-0.391*			-0.132***
			(0.157)			(0.034)
2005 election			-0.208			-0.079*
			(0.207)			(0.038)
2009 election			-0.576***			-0.169***
			(0.140)			(0.031)
N	55	55	55	55	55	55
R^2	0.071	0.073	0.331	0.224	0.254	0.605
Candidate Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Party Strength Control	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable for specifications (1)-(3) is a dummy variable for winning election. Dependent variable for specifications (4)-(6) is the LDP candidate's share of the top two candidates' vote.
Source: JHRED.

Although the small number of races means that the estimates should be interpreted with some caution, the results of the full regression model suggest that the inherited incumbency advantage in terms of votes for new LDP legacy candidates is somewhere between 6 and 9 percentage points.[7] This advantage to new legacy candidates almost reaches the level of the 7-10 percentage point advantage that has been estimated for incumbents in the U.S., and is nearly double the 4-percentage-point inherited incumbency advantage Feinstein (2010) estimates for open-seat U.S. races.

New legacy candidates thus face a considerable vote advantage over non-legacy candidates in the SMD tier of the MMM system. But it is also worth considering the effect of legacy ties on the actual electoral outcomes of the race, i.e., who gets elected, in addition to simply evaluating the effect of legacy ties on vote share. After all, as Gary C. Jacobson (1987, p. 128) correctly points out with regard to the importance of the incumbency advantage in U.S. congressional elections, "[w]hat matters most is winning or losing; the size of the victory or loss is of decidedly secondary importance." The results of the first three specifications using Win_{it} as the dependent variable indicate that in terms of the "bottom line"—whether or not the LDP candidate wins or loses the SMD contest—the main determining factor is the LDP's party strength in that district. This finding is consistent with the idea that electoral outcomes of SMD

[7] Restricting the analysis only to direct hereditary successors, the estimate is specification (6) drops to 5 percentage points (see Appendix Table A.11).

elections in Japan now hinge predominantly on the popularity of the party, rather than individual candidate characteristics (Reed, Scheiner and Thies, 2012; McElwain, 2012). Under the new electoral system with SMD, the "brand name" of the candidate appears to matter less to voters than the party label under which he or she runs. Legacy candidates in the LDP still have a vote advantage over non-legacy opponents, but this advantage may only make a difference when their party is not popular.

5.3 Survey Evidence: What Do Voters Say They Want?

The preceding analysis provides evidence that legacy candidates, and especially hereditary candidates, do indeed enjoy a considerable inherited incumbency advantage in their first attempt at winning election. It also appears that neither (1) better quality, nor (2) better finances, nor (3) scare-off of high-quality challengers can fully explain the advantage. This suggests that name recognition is a key mechanism behind the advantage. An additional possible mechanism, however, is that voters in Japan may simply prefer dynasties *per se*, perhaps because they represent a form of continuity in style of representation, or because voters expect that legacy candidates will be more capable or prepared for office. We can look to both traditional voter surveys and a new form of survey experiment, conjoint analysis, to explore this possible mechanism.

5.3.1 Evidence from Traditional Surveys

A few traditional voter surveys have included questions about dynastic politics. In the run-up to the 2009 House of Representatives election, the University of Tokyo and *Asahi Shimbun* (UTAS) joint survey asked approximately two thousand voters what they thought about the practice of hereditary succession in candidate selection and whether it ought to be prohibited. Specifically, respondents were asked:

> For the following two positions, A and B, which would you say is closest to your opinion?
> A. Hereditary succession for Diet members should be prohibited.
> B. Diet members' children have the freedom to choose their occupation.

Respondents could choose from one of five positions on a Likert scale: (1) Close to position A; (2) If I must say, closest to A; (3) Can't say either way; (4) If I must say, closest to B; and (5) Closest to B.[8] The results of the survey are shown in Figure 5.2.

Of the 2,085 respondents to the survey, 45 percent answered that they were more of the opinion that Diet members' children have the freedom to choose their occupation (positions 4 + 5). On the other hand, 32 percent of respondents felt closer to the position of prohibiting hereditary succession (positions 1 + 2). In a liberal democracy where individuals have the freedom to choose their own desired profession, such a high percentage of voters in favor of prohibiting an entire class of people from politics based on their family relations demonstrates how controversial dynastic politics had become by 2009.

Figure 5.3 shows the results of a similar question embedded in an online survey experiment I conducted during the 2016 House of Councillors election. The survey asked 1,717 voting-age citizens whether they approve or disapprove of several common backgrounds of Japanese politicians, including experience in a local assembly or

[8] Of the 2,085 respondents, 109 did not respond to this question.



Figure 5.2: Should hereditary succession be restricted? 2009 pre-election voter survey responses.
Note: Number of respondents = 2,085.
Source: University of Tokyo-Asahi Shimbun (UTAS) 2009 pre-election voter survey.

national bureaucrat, and status as a hereditary politician or celebrity (*tarento*—from the English word "talent"). Respondents were asked to select from a five-point Likert scale of (1) Approve; (2) Weakly approve; (3) Indifferent; (4) Weakly disapprove; and (5) Disapprove.

For most backgrounds, the plurality of voters expressed indifference. However, nearly half of all voters responded that they either weakly disapprove or disapprove of hereditary politicians, a level of disapproval that is only surpassed by voters' opinions of celebrity candidates. On the whole, voters expressed more positive attitudes toward candidates who had local political experience—which is interesting given that legacy candidates are less likely to pass through this channel of recruitment (see Chapter 2).

5.3.2 Evidence from a Conjoint Survey Experiment

An additional method of survey experiment—conjoint analysis—provides definitive proof that Japanese voters do not value dynastic representation in and of itself. Conjoint analysis has been used in marketing research for many years, but has only recently been adopted for use in political science (Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto, 2014). Recent research has applied conjoint analysis to study voters' attitudes toward immigrants and political candidates (e.g., Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Franchino and Zucchini, 2014; Carnes and Lupu, forthcoming), parties' policy manifestos (Horiuchi, Smith and Yamamoto, 2016*a*), Eurozone bailout policies (Bechtel, Hainmueller and



Figure 5.3: Voter attitudes toward common candidate backgrounds: traditional survey results.
Note: Sample = 1,717 voting-age (18+) citizens in Japan.
Source: Online voter survey conducted by the author and Justin Reeves during the House of Councillors election campaign of July, 2016.

Margalit, 2014), and even global climate change cooperation (Bechtel and Scheve, 2013). The basic design entails juxtaposing two "profiles" (in this case hypothetical politicians), with a randomly ordered set of "attributes," each of which may take on a certain value, or "level." The levels of the attributes are also randomly assigned. Respondents then pick the hypothetical politician that they would prefer most. This design allows for an evaluation of voters' multidimensional preferences for the various attributes, such as dynastic family ties, that make up a politician's overall profile.

Previous studies that have used conjoint analysis to evaluate candidate attributes have not included dynastic ties among the attributes. Hainmueller, Hopkins and Yamamoto (2014) focus on eight attributes of hypothetical U.S. presidential candidates and find that voters have strong positive preferences for hypothetical candidates with prior military service and a college degree (from any college, but especially from an Ivy League university), and strong negative preferences against evangelical Christians, Mormons, car dealers, and candidates who were 68 or 75 years old. Franchino and Zucchini (2014) include two personal attributes (level of education and level of income), one attribute related to integrity (whether the candidate had ever been investigated or convicted of corruption), and two attributes related to policy positions on taxation and same-sex marriage rights in Italy. Carnes and Lupu (forthcoming) evaluate class bias against candidates in the U.K., U.S., and Argentina, using six attributes with two levels for each—specifically, occupation (business owner versus factory worker),

gender (male versus female), education (more versus less), party (two main parties in each country), race (black versus white), and experience (none versus some).

With Yusaku Horiuchi and Teppei Yamamoto, I conducted a conjoint analysis of common candidate attributes in Japan (Horiuchi, Smith and Yamamoto, 2016*b*). In our experiment, respondents were first randomly assigned to be given informational priming on the electoral rules used either in the mixed-member system of the House of Representatives (FPTP/SMD + CLPR) or the mixed-member system for the House of Councillors (SNTV/MMD + OLPR). Respondents were then shown a pair of hypothetical politicians' profiles featuring a random combination of common personal attributes observed among actual Japanese politicians, and asked to choose the person they found most desirable. For each group, respondents did five such conjoint exercises for hypothetical politicians in one electoral system tier, and then five exercises for hypothetical politicians under the other tier (the order was randomized).

Each of the conjoint profiles contained a combination of randomly-assigned levels for eight attributes.[9] In addition to party labels for LDP, DPJ, Komeito, and JCP (as well as independent), we included several common personal attributes, including "parental political background" (i.e., whether the hypothetical politician's parent also had a career in politics). For this attribute, the possible "levels" were: "a cabinet minister," "a national-level elected politician," "a prefectural assembly member," and "none." The other attributes were age, gender, education, former occupation, prior political experience, and hometown. Along with dynastic family ties, many of the attributes we included (e.g., local birth, local political experience, celebrity status) are strongly related to the personal vote (e.g., Shugart, Valdini and Suominen, 2005; Tavits, 2010; Marangoni and Tronconi, 2011; Nemoto and Shugart, 2013; André, Depauw and Deschouwer, 2014). The inclusion of these attributes allows us to investigate whether voters intrinsically value any of these well-known personal-vote-earning attributes *per se*—detached from the actual politicians who are presumed to benefit from them. In other words, including dynastic family ties in this kind of experiment, allows us to isolate voters' preferences for dynasties as an *abstract* concept, without the confounding influence from other attributes, like name recognition, financial resources, and prior experience, that may be correlated with actual legacy candidates and MPs.

The results reveal that Japanese voters do indeed have strong preferences for and against certain personal attributes in politicians. Specifically, voters prefer politicians with prior political experience and politicians who are born in their prefecture, but do not tend to prefer politicians affiliated with one of the major political parties (relative to independents), older politicians (relative to younger politicians), or celebrities (relative to other occupations). With regard to dynastic family ties, however, there are no significant effects for any of the parental political backgrounds compared to the baseline level of "none." In other words, our conjoint analysis reveals that Japanese voters are largely indifferent to dynastic ties when this attribute is bundled with other possible attributes that may be more important to voters, or alternatively, when the information about dynastic ties is separated from the specific attributes of the actual legacy politicians (name recognition, financial resources, etc.).

[9] In the actual conjoint tables, *Incumbency* (newcomer, formerly in office, currently in office) and *Number of wins* (1, 2, 3+) were separate attributes. For the analysis, these attributes are combined as *Experience*.



Figure 5.4: Voter attitudes toward common candidate backgrounds: conjoint survey results.
Note: Based on conjoint survey results from Horiuchi, Smith and Yamamoto (2016*b*). The survey was conducted in November-December, 2015. Sample = 2,200 voting-age (20+) citizens in Japan. The third panel gives the difference in point estimates between respondents who report being close to the LDP and those who report being close to the DPJ (white circles denote differences that are statistically significant at the .05 level).

This finding holds regardless of the priming of different electoral system contexts, and whether the respondents were assigned to receive priming about the electoral rules in the House of Representatives or House of Councillors. In fact, the only covariate for which there are notably significant differences in preferences for dynastic politicians is the respondent's partisan affiliation. In our survey, although the levels of parental political background were insignificant within groups of party supporters, the difference between LDP and DPJ party supporters is significant (Figure 5.4). LDP supporters hold slightly positive preferences for dynastic politicians, whereas DPJ supporters hold slightly negative preferences. This attitude among DPJ supporters may be due to the fact that dynasties are most prominently linked to the LDP, and the DPJ's campaign strategy of attacking the LDP for its dynastic politics.

5.4 Discussion

What have we learned? The results of the empirical analyses presented in this chapter confirm that legacy candidates do indeed perform better in elections than non-legacy

candidates. This electoral advantage cannot simply be attributed to support for the LDP as a party, nor can it be attributed to the greater financial resources or higher quality of legacy candidates.

The results of the voter surveys also demonstrate that the advantages enjoyed by legacy candidates in Japan are not the result of any intrinsic value placed on dynastic representation by voters. When voters are asked directly and specifically what they think about hereditary politicians, as in the traditional survey questions, their attitudes are generally negative. However, when dynastic ties are bundled with multiple other attributes, as in the conjoint survey experiment and as they are in real life, voters tend to focus more on party label, experience, age, and local ties. Interestingly, celebrity status is unpopular with voters regardless of the survey method. Although it is possible that some voters might positively view *specific* legacy candidates due to an expectation that their family ties might make them a more capable representative, there is no evidence that voters value dynasties in general as a vehicle for representation. Another way of interpreting these results is with an analogy to American voters' opinions of Congress. Public opinion polls in the U.S. routinely report that voters hold negative attitudes toward "Congress" as an institution, but tend to view their own Representatives in Congress more favorably. Voters might similarly dislike the idea of dynasties in the abstract, but nevertheless believe that their own personal favored son or daughter is of higher quality than most politicians—a Rockefeller amongst the Tweeds.

Collectively, the results instead point to the value of name recognition and family "brand" in securing electoral success. This conclusion for the pre-reform SNTV/MMD period is supported by the difference in vote shares and success rates of hereditary successors compared to non-legacy successors. Both types of successors inherited a koenkai organization with its financial resources (kaban) and established base of supporters (jiban). However, hereditary successors would have also enjoyed the additional advantage of name recognition (kanban). As we saw in the previous chapter, some hereditary successors even went so far as to change their names so that voters could continue writing the same name on the ballot.

In the post-reform SMD period, new legacy candidates in the LDP still do much better than new non-legacy candidates in the LDP, even though all new LDP candidates can now be considered successors to whichever single candidate ran in the previous election under the LDP label. The big difference between the pre-reform and post-reform periods is that what matters most for success may be the particular districts where LDP candidates run: in districts where the LDP is "safe," legacy and non-legacy candidates alike can do well. Of course, legacy candidates are also most likely to emerge in such safe districts. Another consideration is that when the LDP's popularity as a party is low, as in the 2009 election, the additional vote share advantage may be enough to create a "safety buffer" for new legacy candidates where non-legacy candidates might be vulnerable. Such questions will be easier to investigate in the future with the addition of more elections, including additional elections that the LDP loses.

6

Promotion: Dynastic Dominance in the Cabinet

> Back in June, 1957, Nobusuke Kishi, my grandfather, standing right here, as Prime Minister of Japan, began his address, by saying, and I quote, "It is because of our strong belief in democratic principles and ideals that Japan associates herself with the free nations of the world." Fifty-eight years have passed. Today, I am honored to stand here as the first Japanese Prime Minister ever to address your joint meeting.
> - Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, addressing the United States Congress on April 29, 2015

When Prime Minister Abe Shinzo spoke before a joint session of the United States Congress in 2015, he quoted the words of his maternal grandfather, Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (1957-1960), who addressed an American audience on the same platform almost six decades earlier. Kishi is most famous for having to resign in 1960 following the controversial passage of the revised U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. The year Kishi left office, John F. Kennedy was elected President of the United States. Fifty-five years later, Kishi's grandson was Prime Minister, and the U.S. Ambassador in Tokyo was Caroline Kennedy, JFK's daughter.

For Abe, quoting his grandfather's speech was no doubt a matter of great pride. However, he could have just as easily drawn inspiration from other members of his family who had previously held influential positions of power. Kishi's brother, Sato Eisaku, also served as Prime Minister from 1964-1972, and visited the United States in 1965.[1] Sato was responsible for overseeing the return of sovereignty over Okinawa in 1972. Abe's father, Abe Shintaro, served as Minister of Agriculture and Forestry (1974-1976), Chief Cabinet Secretary (1977-1978), Minister of International Trade and Industry (1981-1982), and Minister of Foreign Affairs (1982-1986).[2]

[1] Kishi and Sato were biological brothers. Their father was from the Kishi family, but adopted his wife's surname at marriage to preserve the Sato family line, which lacked a male heir. When Kishi was a child, he similarly went to live with his father's older brother and became his adopted son and heir, taking the Kishi name in the process (Kishi himself was the second son).

[2] Abe Shintaro was married to Kishi's daughter. His father (Abe Shinzo's paternal grandfather) was Abe Kan, who also served in the prewar House of Representatives. Abe Shinzo's biological younger brother, Kishi Nobuo, was adopted by his mother's eldest brother, becoming the heir to the Kishi name, and subsequently followed his brother into politics.

Abe's family history in cabinet is not unique. Indeed, keeping track of dynastic politics at the top levels of power in Japan is enough to make anyone's head spin. Seven of the ten most recent prime ministers have been legacy MPs, and six had predecessors who also served in cabinet, including Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro (1996-1998), whose father, Hashimoto Ryogo, served in the Yoshida and Kishi cabinets in the 1950s—first as Minister of Health, and later as Minister of Education. Hashimoto was succeeded as prime minister by Obuchi Keizo (1998-2000), whose father Mitsuhei served two terms in the House of Representatives, but died before he could achieve promotion to a cabinet post.[3] After Obuchi Keizo's death, his daughter Yuko succeeded him in parliament and gained her first cabinet appointment in her third term, at the age of 34.

Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro (2001-2006) first ran for office in Kanagawa 11th District in 1969, at the age of 27, after his father, Koizumi Junya, died in office. He lost that election, but won three years later in 1972. Junya was Director of the Defense Agency from 1964-1965 (prior to the agency obtaining full ministry status). Junya was the adopted son-in-law of prewar MP Koizumi Matajiro, who served in cabinet as Minister of Communications (1929-1931). Before the 2009 House of Representatives election, Junichiro stepped aside for his 27-year-old son, Koizumi Shinjiro, who quickly rose to prominence within the party, achieving his first junior ministerial position in 2012.

Prime Minister Fukuda Yasuo (2007-2008) was the son of Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo (1976-1978). Takeo's father and older brother both served as mayor of Kanekomachi town in Gunma Prefecture. Takeo's younger brother, Fukuda Hiroichi, was a member of the House of Councillors from 1980-1992. In 2012, Yasuo retired after his seventh term representing Gunma 3rd District. By that time, the LDP had implemented its reforms requiring most new candidates to apply to an open recruitment contest in order to get the party nomination. However, Yasuo's eldest son, Fukuda Tatsuo, was the only applicant to the open recruitment contest.[4]

Prime Minister Aso Taro (2008-2009) was the grandson of Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru (1946-1947; 1948-1954), whose term in office covered most of the U.S. Occupation, and whose postwar policy of relying on the U.S. for military security while focusing on economic development would become known as the Yoshida Doctrine (see Samuels, 2007). Aso's great-grandfather, Aso Takichi, and father, Aso Takakichi, also served in the House of Representatives. His father-in-law was Prime Minister Suzuki Zenko (1980-1982). Suzuki's own son, Suzuki Shunichi, also served eight terms in the House of Representatives, and as Minister of the Environment (2002-2003) under Prime Minister Koizumi.

Hatoyama Yukio, the first prime minister from the DPJ (2009-2010), was first elected to Hokkaido 9th District (then Hokkaido 4th District) in 1986 as a member of the LDP. He is the son of Minister of Foreign Affairs and House of Councillors member Hatoyama Iichiro, and grandson of Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro (1954-1956), who founded the LDP with Yoshida in 1955. His great grandfather, Hatoyama Kazuo, was a prewar MP, and his younger brother, Hatoyama Kunio, was a member of the House of Representatives and former cabinet minister in multiple posts. Yoshida Shigeru and

[3] Obuchi suffered a stroke in 2000 and was replaced by Mori Yoshiro, who served until 2001. Mori's father and grandfather both served in local politics, but never transitioned into national politics. Mori's son, Yuki, also served in local politics before his sudden death in 2011; his nephew-in-law, Okada Naoki, was later elected to the House of Councillors.

[4] Interview with Fukuda Tatsuo in Tokyo, March 15, 2013 (in Japanese).

Hatoyama Ichiro were rivals prior to the formation of the LDP in 1955, so it is fitting that their respective grandsons, Aso Taro and Hatoyama Yukio, competed with each other for control of the Diet in the 2009 House of Representatives election.



Figure 6.1: Percentage of legacy MPs in LDP and cabinet, 1947-2016.
Note: Only MPs from the House of Representatives are included (i.e., for each cabinet, the denominator for calculating the percentage excludes a small number of members of the House of Councillors or technical ministers).
Source: JHRED.

The abundance of legacy MPs in recent cabinets extends beyond the prime ministers. Overall, an astounding 64 percent of all LDP members of the House of Representatives appointed to cabinet since the first Koizumi cabinet was inaugurated in 2001 have been legacy MPs. In Koizumi's first reshuffled cabinet (Koizumi 1.1), *all twelve* of the LDP lower house MPs appointed to ministerial positions were legacy MPs.[5] To illustrate this pattern, the bar graph in Figure 6.1 shows the percentage of legacy MPs among the members of the House of Representatives who were appointed to each cabinet, from the cabinet of Katayama Tetsu (Katayama 1), inaugurated after the 1947 general election, to the second reshuffle of Abe Shinzo's third cabinet in 2016 (Abe 3.2). The line plot in the figure gives the percentage of legacy MPs in the LDP's

[5] The only other lower house MP appointed to cabinet, Sakaguchi Chikara of the Komeito, was not a legacy. The Koizumi 1.1 cabinet also included three non-MP "technical" ministers, one of whom (Takenaka Heizo) later won a seat in the House of Councillors, as well as three sitting House of Councillors MPs. The father of one of the House of Councillors MPs (Konosuke Yoshitada) served in local politics.

House of Representatives delegation, beginning with the 1958 election that followed its formation in 1955.[6] In other words, in LDP cabinets where the bar is higher than the line, legacy MPs were overrepresented.

For reference, vertical dashed lines mark the time of party formation (leading to the formation of the third cabinet of Prime Minister Hatoyama Ichiro in 1955), the time at which seniority rule in promotions was introduced as a party norm (i.e., an *informal institution*) by Prime Minister Sato Eisaku in his third cabinet (Sato and Matsuzaki, 1986), as well as the first and second periods when the LDP was out of government. The first period was from 1993-1994, when the eight-party coalition of anti-LDP parties held control of government, initially under Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro of the JNP and then under Prime Minister Hata Tsutomu of the Renewal Party (both were legacy MPs who were previously affiliated with the LDP). The coalition government passed electoral reform in 1994. Shortly afterward, the LDP re-entered government in coalition with the JSP and New Party Sakigake, with the JSP's leader Murayama Tomiichi serving as Prime Minister. In 1996, the LDP regained the premiership under Hashimoto, but continued to rule in coalition—first with the JSP and Sakigake, and later with the Liberal Party, the New Conservative Party, and Komeito.[7] The latter party has been the LDP's sole coalition partner since 2003. The LDP's second period out of power was from 2009-2012, when the DPJ-led coalition held power, first under Prime Minister Hatoyama, then Kan Naoto, and finally Noda Yoshihiko—each serving roughly one year in office.

The high proportion of legacy MPs in cabinet, especially in the LDP-led cabinets of Koizumi, Abe, Fukuda, and Aso, as well as during Abe's second stint as prime minister following the DPJ's defeat in 2012, has resulted in considerable criticism by the media and by the opposition that one seemingly cannot get appointed to the cabinet in recent years without being a member of a powerful political dynasty. Moreover, because Abe (in his first term as prime minister), Fukuda, and Aso all resigned within a year of taking office, dynastic politics were heavily been blamed for stale leadership in the face of many of the governance problems plaguing Japan (e.g., Yazaki, 2010).

In this chapter, I evaluate how the inherited incumbency advantage I have documented in the candidate selection and election stages of a legacy MP's career translates into advantages in the post-electoral stage. I focus specifically on promotion to cabinet, though the logic should apply generally to all post-electoral legislative and executive posts, including committee chairmanships and high-level party leadership positions.[8] Anecdotal evidence of a legacy advantage in cabinet selection can be found across many democracies (Smith and Martin, 2016). For example, Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, who came into office in 2015 at the age of 43 after only two terms in the House of Commons, is the son of long-serving Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau (1968-1979; 1980-1984). His maternal grandfather, James Sinclair, was also an MP and had served as Minister of Fisheries in the 1950s. Former Norwegian Prime Minister Jens Stoltenberg (2005-2013) was the son of Minister of Defense and Minister of Foreign Affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg. He had only served two years as a substitute (deputy) member of parliament before being appointed to cabinet at the age of 34 in

[6] Party affiliation is based on the affiliation at teh time of the general election, and does not take into account midterm party switches.

[7] Dates and party composition of each cabinet, as well as the percentage of legacy MPs in each, can be found in Tables A.12, A.13, and A.14 in Appendix A.

[8] On the distribution of parliamentary and PARC committee posts in Japan and the LDP, see Pekkanen, Krauss and Nyblade (2006) and Fujimura (2015).

his first full term as an MP. Forty-four percent of the ministers in the 2016 cabinet of Irish Prime Minister Enda Kenny are legacy MPs, including Kenny (whose father Henry Kenny served in the Dáil for over two decades).

Although my focus in this chapter is ministerial selection in parliamentary democracies like Japan, there is also plenty of empirical evidence that members of dynasties are advantaged in reaching executive office in presidential systems as well. The 2016 U.S. presidential primary contest featured Hillary Clinton, Jeb Bush, and Rand Paul—all three of whom were connected by blood or marriage to a previous presidential candidate. The 2012 Republican Party ticket featured Mitt Romney, whose father, George Romney, served as Governor of Michigan and in cabinet as Secretary of Housing and Urban Development. Outside of the U.S., dynasties have been notable in recent presidential politics in Argentina (the Perón and Kirchner dynasties), the Philippines (the Aquino and Macapagal dynasties), and South Korea (the Park and Lee dynasties), to name just a few examples. Recent Mexican presidents Felipe Calderón and Enrique Peña Nieto also count close family relations to former politicians. According to a working paper by Timothy Besley and Marta Reynal-Querol, since the 1990s, 15-20 percent of political executives around the world (including in non-democracies) have been legacies (Besley and Reynal-Querol, 2013).

What is it about dynastic status that might result in members of dynasties progressing more often or more quickly to the highest positions of power? Are legacy MPs advantaged in terms of reaching the top levels of political office because of intangible interpersonal relations inherited from their predecessors? Or because their family name and electoral strength help them to become focal in ministerial selection decisions? Or simply because their electoral advantages make them more likely to reach positions of seniority in the party? Finally, how does the advantage vary under different institutional contexts?

6.1 Ministerial Selection in Parliamentary Democracies

Before investigating the advantages of legacy in cabinet promotion, it is worthwhile to briefly review the general literature on ministerial selection in parliamentary democracies like Japan.[9] In parliamentary democracies, the cabinet represents the highest position of political power. From a simplified principal-agent perspective, we can think of voters as principals who elect MPs as their political agents in elections. Once elected, MPs in the legislature become a new set of principals who select a prime minister as *their* agent in the executive, who then goes on to select ministers to serve with him or her in the cabinet. The "chain of delegation" in parliamentary systems is thus (1) indirect, meaning that voters do not directly select the executive, as in presidential systems, (2) singular, meaning that delegation and accountability relationships flow between a single (collective) principal and a single agent, and (3) hierarchical, meaning that cabinet decisions are not subject to checks and balances from outside government agencies (see Strøm, Müller and Bergman, 2003). Typically, parliament designates the prime minister, and he or she is responsible for appointing other ministers to the various portfolios that collectively make up the cabinet. The cabinet is collectively accountable to parliament, and continues to serve only with the support

[9] The following sections draw considerably on discussions in Smith and Martin (2016). I thank Shane Martin for his contributions to that research.

of a parliamentary majority, or at least so long as there is not an opposing majority against it.

Because the cabinet represents the apex of power in parliamentary democracies, a great deal of research has been devoted to understanding how ministerial portfolios (cabinet posts) are allocated to political parties, particularly in the case of coalition governments (e.g., Gamson, 1961; Laver and Shepsle, 1996; Laver and Schofield, 1998; Warwick and Druckman, 2001; Strøm, Müller and Bergman, 2003; Bäck, Debus and Dumont, 2011). This line of research has important implications because the interparty distribution of portfolios can potentially have a significant impact on policy outputs. The question of "who gets which ministerial remits and why?" (Bäck, Debus and Dumont, 2011, p. 442) has thus traditionally been answered with a party-level variable, focused on the distribution of cabinet seats *between parties* in the legislature, and side-stepping the question of which individuals *within parties* receive posts. Similarly, intraparty analyses, including for the case of Japan, have tended to focus on the allocation of portfolios to groups within parties, such as factions (e.g., Leiserson, 1968; Mershon, 2001; Ono, 2012).

A smaller, but rapidly expanding, literature has tried to further unpack the intraparty distribution of portfolios to the level of individual MPs (e.g., Dowding and Dumont, 2009, 2014). Ministerial positions are significant post-election offices filled by individual MPs. Just as parties and candidates compete with each other for elective office, so too must MPs within parties compete for higher positions of power (Andeweg, 2000; Saalfeld, 2000). Ultimately, moreover, individual MPs who are appointed to cabinet—not their parties—are responsible for the day-to-day operation of their ministries, and may also enjoy considerable discretion and influence over the policy outputs of their ministries (Laver and Shepsle, 1994). This makes it important to investigate not only which party gets which portfolio, but also which MP *within* the party gets the portfolio.

Multiple factors may be involved in determining how cabinet posts and other positions of power in parties and parliaments, sometimes called "mega seats" (Carroll, Cox and Pachón, 2006), are distributed to individual MPs. Parties and legislatures, like other organizations, are hierarchically structured, such that some members will be promoted to a small number of positions of power in the party, parliament, and government, while others will continue to warm the backbenches, sometimes for their entire careers (Strøm, 1997). Although the prime minister usually holds formal authority to appoint and dismiss cabinet ministers, the choice may be constrained by formal institutions (such as constitutional requirements that ministers be sitting MPs) or informal institutions (such as seniority rules or norms of factional or regional balancing in appointments). In coalition government situations, the prime minister may also have less control over which individuals are appointed to the portfolios allocated to a coalition partner.[10]

Existing comparative research suggests that the probability of promotion to cabinet is related to an MP's length of time in parliament (seniority), electoral popularity (under electoral rules that feature a candidate-level preferential vote), level of education, gender, policy preferences, and other less-tangible personal traits. In an early and richly descriptive contribution, Jean Blondel and Jean-Louis Thiébault (1991) focus on the personal characteristics and social backgrounds of West European ministers

[10] In an alternative view, Kam et al. (2010) see party backbenchers as the true principal in determining appointment.

and find that they tend to be older and more highly educated, and tend to have had longer careers within the party than their backbench colleagues. However, Blondel and Thiébault (1991) also note considerable variation across countries in the extent to which ministers have a background in parliament (versus, for example, experience in extraparliamentary party offices or outside politics). The ministerial future of an individual legislator can also depend upon his or her electoral strength and favorable relationships to party leaders (Dowding and Dumont, 2009). Some factors that might be correlated with cabinet appointment are quantitative markers of strength, such as seniority. Other factors are intangible—having more to do with informational advantages or interpersonal relationships within parties, or how likable or media-savvy the individual might be. In short, not all elected politicians seeking ministerial office are created equal.

A number of country-specific studies have investigated the qualities of the individual MPs who achieve ministerial office, taking the pool of MPs (potential appointees) as the data sample, rather than just those who were appointed, as in earlier research. For example, Eoin O'Malley (2006) explores the basis for selecting cabinet ministers in Ireland through interviews with former party leaders and archives of interviews with ministers. He finds that personal characteristics matter for party leaders when choosing ministers: in particular, the prime minister values "talent, loyalty, experience, tenacity, cleanliness (from corruption) and good personal relations" (O'Malley, 2006, p. 329). O'Malley also undertook a quantitative analysis of personal and political characteristics of cabinet ministers and their parliamentary party colleagues for the period 1973 to 2002. The findings reveal little evidence of geographical dispersion of ministerial posts, but do indicate that higher levels of education, longer lengths of tenure in parliament, and greater electoral success in terms of votes won at the previous general election are common characteristics of ministers relative to their non-ministerial party colleagues. Of course, these factors may also all be correlated.

Matthew Kerby (2009) explores the speed of appointment to ministerial office in Canada between 1935 and 2008. Length of time as an MP, gender, having a university education and legal training, age, and previous ministerial experience are all factors that help to predict appointment. As in the Irish case, electoral popularity correlates positively with the likelihood of being selected for ministerial office in Canada—on average, cabinet appointees have a margin of victory of 26 percentage points over their runners-up, which compares to 23 percentage points for those governing party MPs who are not appointed to cabinet. Kerby (2009, p. 602) notes that electoral popularity in the district may be a proxy for other less tangible qualities of value, including "political capital, constituency support, organizational ability, or finesse." Hence, one commonly shared characteristic of ministers compared to non-ministers is that ministers tend to be *ex ante* electorally successful.

In the case of Japan, ministerial appointments in LDP cabinets closely adhered to two important norms, beginning from around the time that Prime Minister Sato Eisaku's third cabinet took office in 1970, and continuing up until electoral reform in 1994 (Sato and Matsuzaki, 1986; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993; Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss, 2014). The first norm was the proportional allocation of posts to intra-party factions. Roughly speaking, each faction received a number of cabinet posts in proportion to its strength in the legislative party membership, albeit with some variation (Ono, 2012). Faction leaders would submit a list of names to the prime minister of the members of their factions who were "in line" for a ministerial post, and the prime minister generally obliged. This norm began to break down immediately follow-

ing electoral reform, and further deteriorated after Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro took office in 2001.

The second norm was seniority rule for the promotion of individual MPs within those factions. Roughly speaking, each LDP MP had to wait until around his or her fifth or sixth term before he or she could expect an appointment to cabinet (Sato and Matsuzaki, 1986; Epstein et al., 1997). More senior MPs would often be re-appointed to cabinet, but rarely would less senior MPs be given a post. Even then, a cabinet seat was not guaranteed, given the large size of the party and the small number of posts to be distributed. Nevertheless, frequent (almost yearly) reshuffles ensured that many LDP MPs who reached such levels of seniority would eventually get a post at least once.

In a recent quantitative analysis of the MP-level determinants of cabinet promotion in Japan from 1980-2008, Robert Pekkanen, Benjamin Nyblade, and Ellis Krauss (2014) argue that the 1994 electoral reform altered the strategies of party leaders in selecting ministers. Since electoral competition under the new MMM system has become less focused on individual candidates (relative to the previous SNTV/MMD system), and more centered on the image of the party leader and party platform, prime ministers have an incentive to pay less attention to factional balancing and routine promotion based on seniority. Instead, they appoint more policy experts to serve the party's policy goals, and more women to help the party to appear more diverse in an effort to appeal to voters. Pekkanen, Nyblade, and Krauss also note the increase in legacy MPs in post-reform cabinets (as visible in Figure 6.1), and specifically note an increase in legacy MPs whose predecessors had previously also served in cabinet.[11] They hypothesize that such MPs possess a "national reputation" that may help the party attract support in the increasingly nationally-oriented elections of the post-reform era.

Although it is not a key part of the analysis of Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss (2014), the authors raise an important distinction between "types" of legacy MPs. More specifically, we can distinguish between *cabinet legacies* whose predecessors had experience as cabinet ministers, and *non-cabinet legacies* whose predecessors never advanced beyond the backbenches. Prime Minister Abe is a prominent example of a cabinet legacy—and actually was preceded in cabinet by multiple family members, including two former prime ministers. Prime Minister Obuchi is an example of a non-cabinet legacy, as his father died before being promoted; on the other hand, Obuchi's daughter, Obuchi Yuko, is a cabinet legacy. When she was appointed to Aso Taro's first cabinet in 2008 at the age of 34, she became the youngest cabinet minister to be appointed in Japan. If there is a legacy advantage in ministerial selection, it may differ across these two types of legacy MPs in important ways. In the next section, I introduce a theoretical logic to explain why members of some dynasties—namely, cabinet legacies whose political predecessors had previously served in cabinet—might be advantaged in ministerial selection.

[11] Naoko Taniguchi (2008) notes that legacies in Japan were overrepresented in cabinet as early as 1996, even controlling for seniority. A similar overrepresentation of cabinet legacies has been documented in historical data from the United Kingdom (Van Coppenolle, 2015).

6.2 The Advantage of Being a Legacy: Further and Faster?

It is clear from the aggregate data in Figure 6.1 that legacy MPs have been overrepresented in cabinet, particularly in the post-reform era. But what are the sources of this pattern?

To understand the potential advantage of dynastic ties in securing a seat in cabinet, and how this advantage might differ across cabinet legacies and non-cabinet legacies, it is helpful to first consider the role and preferences of the person who selects members of the cabinet: the prime minister. We can assume that the prime minister makes a deliberate choice in selecting ministers, and aims to promote co-partisans who will perform the duties of office most effectively—those who Laver and Shepsle (1994, p. 302) describe as "ministerable." In electoral democracies, competent ministers are an electoral asset for the party as a whole, compared with ministers who underperform in their roles and responsibilities (Quiroz Flores and Smith, 2011). It is important to appoint the most competent individuals possible since the performance of the government is dependent, at least in part, on the performance of individual ministers. As members of the cabinet, ministers are individually responsible for the performance of their ministries, but also represent the public face of the cabinet collectively, both in parliament and in the media. As such, the popularity of the party (or parties) in government is linked to the individual performance and popularity of ministers, and appointing the right (or wrong) ministers can have consequences for a governing party's ability to win votes and seats at election time (Müller and Strøm, 1999; Dewan and Dowding, 2005).

As already noted, from the perspective of individual MPs, ministerial office is highly desirable. Ministerial office produces for the officeholder the ability to influence policy, and also comes with a number of personal payoffs, including greater status and pecuniary benefits—such as a higher salary, enhanced pensions upon leaving office, and a personal bureaucracy—as well as significant electoral rewards (Martin, 2016). This demand for ministerial office contrasts with the supply of positions. Not every backbencher can become a minister. First, parties arguably need backbenchers in order to conduct ordinary parliamentary business. Second, cabinet posts are limited in number. Combining the significant demand for higher office with the under-supply of positions creates a classic, but nevertheless high-stakes, principal-agent selection game for the prime minister. As with voters selecting MPs, the prime minister operates with limited or imperfect information when selecting his or her cabinet.

In making informed choices under limited information, voters often rely on cues and heuristic shortcuts (Lupia and McCubbins, 1998). Does the candidate look like me? Talk like me? Come from my hometown? The prime minister may also rely on such informational shortcuts in selecting his or her cabinet. As party leader, he or she has only limited opportunities to observe and learn about which members of the party would make for good ministers: in party meetings, on the floor of the chamber, in committees, and through public appearances. Such events provide would-be ministers with opportunities to impress the prime minister. As such, the cabinet selection process can be viewed as a game between the prime minister (or party leader in coalition governments) and would-be ministers (MPs) in the party. Would-be ministers need to signal to the prime minister that they have the qualities it takes to be a successful minister, and thereby contribute to the positive reputation of the prime minister, the party, and government.

6.2.1 Direct and Indirect Effects of the Inherited Incumbency Advantage

How does the inherited incumbency advantage enter into this process? If legacy MPs have an advantage in the cabinet selection game, it is possible that it stems from two potential mechanisms (Smith and Martin, 2016): a direct effect of coming from a dynasty, or an indirect effect that operates through the effect of dynastic ties on electoral outcomes. The direct effect includes the intergenerational transmission of political knowledge, connections, and resources, as well as the informational cue of family name and reputation. It may also include other traits such as good genes, charisma, and other markers of quality. Dynasties continue to exist in politics, as in family-run businesses, in part because they retain and internally transfer critical information. Sociologists and economists have studied the phenomenon of intergenerational transmission of many human outcome variables, such as labor market status, class, income, wealth, as well as strong patterns in occupational inheritance among the offspring of professionals, small business owners, and farmers (e.g., Blau and Duncan, 1967; Ganzeboom, Treiman and Ultee, 1991). Following in the career footsteps of a parent is a way to effect a transfer of "intangible wealth," including "specialized knowledge, goodwill, brand (or name) loyalty, and other types of family-specific capital whose present value cannot be fully captured (realized) by the parent" (Laband and Lentz, 1983, p. 474). In short, these intangibles provide a comparative advantage to successors both inside and outside the world of politics. All of these factors are also a part of the inherited incumbency advantage in candidate selection and elections that we have already documented.

The inherited incumbency advantage, however, may lead to a second mechanism behind the legacy advantage in cabinet selection that operates through an indirect, mediating effect of dynastic ties. The data analysis in the previous chapter documented how new legacy candidates in Japan tend to enjoy an inherited incumbency advantage of roughly seven percentage points over competitors, which helps them to win their first election. This advantage is likely to endure in subsequent elections, helping legacy MPs to reach higher levels of seniority in the party, and often at a younger age (cf. Chapter 2). Put simply, the electoral advantage can insulate legacies from competition and help them to achieve greater seniority in their parties. Electoral strength may also signal to party leaders that legacies will be more capable, or at the very least more popular, cabinet ministers.

Another view is that weak parties may try to keep electorally powerful members happy by rewarding them with cabinet positions. For example, O'Malley (2006) notes that Irish prime ministers need to be cognizant of the personal vote of individual party members, and provide those who are electorally popular with sufficient promise of career promotion to avoid defections or leadership challenges (see also Martin, 2014). In both of these views, the relationship between legacy status and cabinet appointment can be judged to operate via the mediating effect of the electoral advantage. Any legacy advantage in cabinet promotion may at least in part be the result of the greater electoral advantages of legacies, including the ability to reach higher levels of seniority in the party and earn higher vote shares in each election. In other words, legacy MPs may be empirically overrepresented in cabinet simply because of their relative seniority in the party.

The important distinction is that these two mechanisms may not operate in the same way, depending on a legacy candidate's family history in cabinet. While both cabinet legacies and non-cabinet legacies may enjoy significant electoral advantages

in their individual local districts, cabinet legacies might be expected to enjoy a larger intraparty "informational advantage" over fellow MPs in gaining promotion from the backbenches to the cabinet. This is because cabinet legacies inherit the knowledge, political resources, high-level connections, and family track record in cabinet that helps them to stand out above their co-partisan peers in ministerial selection. Thus, all else equal, we might expect a party leader to select cabinet ministers with an informational advantage in how high-level politics operate. Given the finite number of cabinet positions available for a prime minister to fill, a cabinet legacy may represent a trustworthy and familiar choice. In contrast, non-cabinet legacies may inherit the knowledge, connections, and name recognition to be successful electorally in their districts, but this knowledge does not necessarily provide the same informational advantage in terms of leadership promotion within the party.

Recall the demand-side theoretical model presented in Chapter 3 to explain dynastic candidate selection. That model assumes that a party will favor the candidate(s) that will provide the highest overall utility in terms of achieving its goals of maximizing policy, office, and votes:

$$U_{it} = V_{it} + P_{it} + O_{it}, \tag{6.1}$$

where U_{it} for candidate i in election period t is equal to the summation of the utilities of that candidate to the party in terms of vote-earning (V_{it}), policy-making (P_{it}) and office-holding (O_{it}).

The basic logic of this model for candidate selection can be extended to the context of ministerial selection. In this case, rather than a selectorate of party actors choosing a candidate, we can consider a prime minister who is choosing the other members of his or her cabinet. Put simply, the prime minister must balance each of these three goals in ministerial selection decisions.

In terms of vote-earning goals, appointing an electorally popular MP to a cabinet position may help to bolster support for the cabinet, provided the minister's popularity in the district is related to qualities that "sell" outside the district as well. As noted, the prime minister may also reward electorally popular MPs to keep them satisfied and prevent defection. In terms of policy-making goals, the most obvious consideration is whether the MP has any experience in the policy area covered by the ministerial position. For example, in appointing a minister of finance, one basic attribute of value to the prime minister may be whether the MP had previously developed policy expertise in financial matters in parliamentary committees, party committees, or through his or her previous career in the outside world.

Finally, a prime minister can be expected to value MPs who will serve effectively in the office and not undermine the credibility of the prime minister as the steward of the government. In this case, MPs who had previously served effectively in cabinet without causing any scandals or headaches for the prime minister may be likely targets for re-appointment. When it comes to new appointments, on the other hand, cabinet legacies may have an advantage in this regard over other MPs. For most MPs, the prime minister only has information about their electoral strength and policy expertise, but not how they might serve in cabinet office. In contrast, the prime minister can infer how a cabinet legacy might perform in office based on what he or she knows about the predecessor's experience.

Looking at the case of Ireland, Shane Martin and I find that cabinet legacies are indeed advantaged in reaching cabinet, even after controlling for seniority and other variables (Smith and Martin, 2016). The probability that a cabinet legacy will get appointed to an Irish cabinet, holding all else equal, is roughly 8 percentage points

higher than a non-legacy MP, and 10 percentage points higher than a non-cabinet legacy. The advantage cannot be explained by the strength of the dynasty (i.e., previous wins by family members in the past), or by where cabinet legacies run (i.e., party strongholds). However, being a cabinet legacy in Ireland is correlated with higher levels of education and attendance at elite schools, which hints that network advantages may be part of the mechanism. The Irish electoral system (STV/MMD) is similar to Japan's pre-reform SNTV/MMD, so we might expect similar patterns in the Japanese case. On the other hand, seniority rule in the later years of the SNTV/MMD period may have resulted in different outcomes. The case of Japan allows us to consider how the legacy advantage in cabinet selection might vary under different institutions.

6.2.2 Institutional Considerations

As with candidate selection (Chapter 4) and elections (Chapter 5), the inherited incumbency advantage in promotion might vary across different institutional contexts. For example, in systems where parties depend upon the electoral popularity of individual MPs for the overall success of the party, party leaders may have incentives to reward electorally popular MPs with cabinet posts to keep them happy and avoid challenges to the party leadership. In such cases, it is possible that both types of legacy MP will enjoy similar advantages in cabinet selection if they both tend to enjoy similar levels of electoral popularity. When a party's success in elections is based less on the personal attributes of its candidates and more on the party's policies or party leader's image, then the personal popularity of individual MPs may decrease, and greater weight might be placed on the need for competent policy experts or experienced leaders in office.

Any legacy advantage in ministerial selection, or differences across types of legacy MPs, may also depend on the power of the prime minister or party leader to choose his or her ministers. The power afforded to the prime minister can vary across different countries (O'Malley, 2007), and even over time in the same country, as has been Japan's experience (e.g., Hayao, 1993; Krauss and Pekkanen, 2011; Machidori, 2012; Woodall, 2014). Perhaps most important, the prime minister's choice may be constrained by factors such as strong norms for seniority rule in promotions. The relative contribution of the direct and indirect effects of dynastic ties on cabinet selection may thus vary by the institutional context in which promotion decisions are made.

In the case of Japan, scholars have used a number of different junctures at which to divide postwar cabinets, depending on the research questions being investigated.[12] For example, Satoshi Machidori (2012) divides the period into five periods in his exploration of the prime minister's power relations vis-à-vis parliament: (1) 1945-1955, (2) 1955-1960, (3) 1960-1973, (4) 1973-1989, and (5) 1989-2012. The first period covers the U.S. Occupation from 1945-1952, and a few years after, while the party system was still in flux. In terms of leadership, this period was dominated by Prime Minister Yoshida Shigeru, whose top-down style earned him the nickname "One Man Yoshida" (*wanman Yoshida*). The second period covers the formation of the LDP up until the political crisis of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty renewal in 1960 that led to the resignation of Prime Minister Kishi. The third period is notable for Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato's policy focus on rapid economic growth, and the entry of the DSP and

[12] A complete list of cabinets and governing parties can be found in Table A.12, Table A.13, and Table A.14 in Appendix A.

Komeito as new parties. The fourth period saw a gradual weakening of the LDP's one-party dominance, as well as the routinization of internal party norms. Finally, the fifth period, according to Machidori (2012), is characterized by divided control of the House of Representatives and House of Councillors, coalition governments, and alternation in power.

In another, largely descriptive and historical, account of the institutions of Japan's cabinet system from 1868, Brian Woodall (2014) also divides the postwar years into five periods: (1) 1946-1955, (2) 1955-1972, (3) 1972-1993, (4) 1993-2006, and (5) 2006-2013. He calls the first period a time of "comprador" cabinets dominated initially by ex-bureaucrats and only later by prewar party politicians who either escaped the purge or returned from the purge when it was lifted in 1952. The second period covers the emergence of the 1955 System and what he calls "corporatist" cabinets, in which leadership in the cabinet was divided across rival factions controlled by both career politicians and former bureaucrats, but policy decision-making was increasingly shared with the bureaucratic elite. The third period saw "confederate" cabinets dominated by career politicians who relied on the bureaucracy and exercised little strategic choice in policy decisions. Finally, the fourth and fifth periods represent two stages in what he calls "disjoined" cabinets, characterized by nominally-increased powers of the prime minister and cabinet vis-à-vis the bureaucracy, but policy gridlock due to coalition governments, divided government, and a number of ineffective leaders.

The time period divisions used by Machidori (2012) are useful for understanding the relationship between the prime minister and parliament as the party configuration in the latter evolved, but are less directly relevant for understanding the institutional constraints on ministerial selection. Although Woodall (2014) is primarily focused on evaluating the background careers of ministers in different time periods, and how much the Japanese cabinet resembles a "Westminster" cabinet, these considerations more closely correspond to important institutional changes, namely the formation of the LDP in 1955, the introduction of seniority rule and factional balancing in the early 1970s, and electoral system reform in 1994.

For my purposes, I divide the postwar era into four main institutional periods: (1) the *Occupation Era*, (2) the *Early 1955 System Era*, (3) the *Seniority Rule Era*, and finally, (4) the *Post-Reform Era*. These four periods are divided in some cases based on changes that occurred in cabinets that were formed between general elections.

The Occupation Era covers eleven cabinets from 1947 to 1955, prior to the solidification of the 1955 System. In this period, the prime minister—from 1948-1954, Yoshida Shigeru—was relatively unconstrained in cabinet appointment decisions, and may have been more likely to favor legacy MPs of both types. Most cabinets were single-party governments of the Liberal Party of Democratic Party, aside from the first two cabinets (Katayama 1 and Ashida 1), which were coalition governments.

The Early 1955 System Era spans from the third cabinet of Hatoyama Ichiro (I. Hatoyama 3) when the LDP was formed, up until seniority rule and factional balancing were institutionalized as party norms in promotion under the Sato 3 Cabinet. In total, twenty cabinets were formed during this period. Prime ministers still enjoyed relatively free discretion in appointment decisions, often favoring friends and influential members of cooperative factions (Masumi, 1995), and many ministers were able to "leap frog" into cabinet prior to reaching their fifth term in the House of Representatives or second term in the House of Councillors (Sato and Matsuzaki, 1986; Kohno, 1997, pp. 97-100). If legacy MPs enjoy an advantage in cabinet selection, they might be most likely to be fast-tracked in this manner.

The Seniority Rule Era covers twenty-seven cabinets during the "heyday" of LDP dominance, from the Sato 3 Cabinet up until the reshuffled first cabinet of Miyazawa Kiichi (Miyazawa 1.1) prior to the 1993 election. Cabinet selection in this period largely conformed to the new informal institutions of factional balancing and seniority rule. An appointment to cabinet was a prize that was awarded to an LDP MP after his or her fifth or sixth term. Hence, if legacy MPs (of either type) enjoy any advantage in promotion during this period, it should operate entirely through the greater seniority of legacy MPs.

Finally, the Post-Reform Era spans thirty-nine cabinets, from the first non-LDP cabinet under Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro in 1993 (Hosokawa 1), through to the second reshuffle of Prime Minister Abe's third cabinet n 2016 (Abe 3.2). In this period, the empirical data (Figure 6.1) show a large overrepresentation of legacy MPs in cabinet. However, part of this overrepresentation may be explained simply the greater seniority of legacy MPs in the LDP. As so many legacy MPs were recruited for the first time in the late 1980s and early 1990s, they would be at the level of seniority in the 2000s that would normally entitle them to a cabinet post. At the same time, the practice of routine promotion based on seniority has largely ceased since 1993.

6.3 Estimating the Advantage

Estimating the true causal effect of different types of dynastic ties on cabinet selection is a challenge due to the many possible attributes related to quality that may be correlated with being a legacy MP. In addition, legacy status contributes to electoral advantages, which are also likely to increase the probability of cabinet promotion, so any electoral advantages enjoyed by either cabinet legacies or non-cabinet legacies can be considered "post-treatment." My empirical strategy is to first estimate the legacy advantage in cabinet selection without controlling for the electoral advantage (operationalized simply as seniority since other variables related to electoral strength, such as vote shares, are not consistent across electoral systems), and then to evaluate whether the estimate of the effect for each type of legacy is changed when controls are included.[13] In other words, we can get a sense of the legacy advantage by evaluating whether being a legacy MP is correlated with cabinet promotion, and then how this correlation is affected once we control for an MP's seniority and other observable variables. In addition, we can check whether the relationship between dynastic ties and cabinet promotion has varied across different institutional contexts captured by the four periods previously discussed.

In order to test my hypotheses about the inherited incumbency advantage in ministerial selection, I merge the JHRED panel data set with data on all ministerial appointments in each of the ninety-seven cabinets formed between 1947-2016. The first cabinet in the resulting data set is the Katayama Cabinet (Katayama 1), inaugurated after the 1947 House of Representatives election. The last cabinet is the second reshuffle of the third Abe Cabinet (Abe 3.2), inaugurated in August 2016, roughly ten months after the 2014 House of Representatives election. The coding of a cabinet as "new" corresponds to the official designation of cabinets from the Cabinet Office

[13] This is the most straightforward way to evaluate whether the electoral advantage has a mediating effect on cabinet appointment, but is limited in terms of causal identification of the direct effect because the electoral variables introduces some amount of post-treatment bias.

(*Kantei*), and thus includes cabinet reshuffles. Apart from the inclusion of reshuffles, this coding of a cabinet formation opportunity corresponds to conventional definitions of a change in cabinet in the comparative literature (e.g., Müller and Strøm, 2000, p. 12).

The new panel data set is structured such that the "time" variable is cabinet (in temporal order) rather than election year, and the 45,894 observations are measured at the MP-cabinet level, rather than the candidate-election year level. In other words, for each cabinet, the data set includes observations for all individuals who were sitting members of the House of Representatives at the time of the cabinet's formation. Individuals who left office midterm due to death or resignation are dropped as observations in cabinets formed after their exit, and individuals who entered office midterm through by-elections are included only if their entry preceded the formation of the cabinet. Because JHRED is based on the House of Representatives, my analysis excludes ministerial positions that went to members of the House of Councillors (a handful of appointees in each cabinet), or to "technical ministers" from outside the Diet (very rare in Japan). I also exclude the prime minister (who makes the appointments) and the Speaker of the House (*Giin-cho*) who would not be appointed. All other MPs are included.

Since the vast majority of ministerial positions are allocated to members of the House of Representatives, the structure of the data set largely captures the pool of potential appointees at any given cabinet formation opportunity. This is an important departure from previous analyses that only use observations on ministers to evaluate trends in ministerial personnel decisions (e.g., Ono, 2012; Masuyama and Nyblade, 2014; Woodall, 2014), or that aggregate House of Representatives members into time periods before and after electoral reform (Pekkanen, Nyblade and Krauss, 2014). By including all members in the sample of potential cabinet appointees at each cabinet formation opportunity, I can compare actual appointees to a relevant reference group: other members of the governing party or parties.

Figure 6.2 plots the results of a simple linear probability model of legacy ties and cabinet promotion, splitting the sample of postwar Japanese cabinets across the four periods. The dependent variable, *Cabinet Appointment*, is a dummy variable for whether the MP was appointed to cabinet. For each period, Model 1 includes only dummy variables for *Non-cabinet Legacy* and *Cabinet Legacy* (the excluded group is non-legacy MPs), and party-cabinet fixed effects (to account for different parties entering cabinet). Model 2 adds controls for prior appointment to cabinet and seniority (categorical dummies), as well as additional controls (not shown) for gender, prior service in the House of Councillors, faction fixed effects, region fixed effects, and dummies for the method of election: SNTV or SMD winner, midterm replacement (*kuriage*), by-election winner, "zombie" winner, and pure PR list winner.[14]

The results show considerable variation in the legacy advantage across institutional contexts. In the Occupation Era (Period 1), both types of legacy were more likely to get appointed to cabinet (the coefficients of .02 and .05, respectively, are both just shy of being significant at the .05 level), but this relationship is not significant once prior appointments and seniority are taken into account (top-left panel of Figure 6.2). In the Early 1955 System Era (Period 2, top-right panel), cabinet legacies continue to be more likely to get appointed, but again this relationship is no longer statistically significant

[14] Full results in table format for the complete data pooled across periods, and separate results by period, are in Table A.15 in Appendix A.



Figure 6.2: The legacy advantage in ministerial selection across institutional settings.
Note: Dependent variable is a dummy variable for *Cabinet Appointment*. Only MPs from the House of Representatives are included. The Prime Minister and the House Speaker are excluded from the sample for each cabinet. All models include party-cabinet fixed effects. Model 1 estimations include no controls. Model 2 estimations include (but do not display in figure) dummy variables for gender and prior service in the House of Councillors, faction fixed effects, region fixed effects, and dummies for method of election: SNTV or SMD winner, midterm replacement (*kuriage*), by-election winner, "zombie" winner, and pure PR list winner.
Source: JHRED.

after controls are added to the model. As expected, neither type of legacy enjoyed an advantage during the Seniority Rule Era (Period 3). The pattern of promotion in an MP's fifth or sixth term is clear from the coefficients in Model 2 in the bottom-left panel of Figure 6.2.

The most interesting pattern emerges in the bottom-right panel of Figure 6.2, which displays the results for the Post-Reform Era (Period 4). When no controls are included, both non-cabinet legacies and cabinet legacies appear to enjoy a roughly 3-percentage-point advantage over non-legacy MPs when it comes to getting promoted. However, once we control from seniority, it is clear than non-cabinet legacies are not actually advantaged—they just happen to be more senior. In other words, the apparent advantage of most legacy MPs in post-reform Japan is not a product an increased demand by prime ministers in the new electoral environment, but is rather a result of their seniority in the party. On the other hand, cabinet legacies continue to enjoy a significant 1-percentage-point advantage in cabinet promotion.

6.4 Discussion

In parliamentary democracies, effective political power rests with the cabinet. Consequently, which legislative parties enter cabinet is a well-studied question. Which parties acquire specific ministries has also been the subject of growing attention, in part reflecting a growing appreciation that individual cabinet ministers are able to set the agenda and control policy production and implementation in their respective ministries.

Constitutionally, cabinet posts are typically assigned to individuals rather than to political parties. Individual ministers may be loyal agents of their parties (or the coalition agreement), but they may also shirk and pursue a personal agenda, based on their own preferences. Despite the vast scholarship on cabinet government, and on agency problems in the parliamentary chain of delegation (Strøm, 2000), very little research has explored the question of which individuals become cabinet ministers under parliamentarism. All too often answers to the "who gets a cabinet seat" have started and stopped at the party level, leaving the question of "who is the who" unanswered.

This chapter has explored whether MPs who come from political dynasties possess advantages over non-legacy MPs in promotion from the backbench to the cabinet. I have suggested that an advantage could exist for two reasons: legacy MPs might enjoy an informational advantage owing to an established family record in politics that is part of their inherited incumbency advantage. Alternatively, legacy MPs could be overrepresented in cabinet simply because they are better at getting elected and reelected, and are hence more senior, on average, than non-legacy MPs.

The findings indicate important distinctions between types of legacy MPs when it comes to the advantage in legislative careers. While the relatives of powerful former MPs who had served in cabinet are decidedly advantaged when it comes to the allocation of a finite number of cabinet posts, other legacy MPs are no more likely to get promoted to cabinet than non-legacy MPs. The extreme overrepresentation of legacy MPs in recent Japanese cabinets is the product of the more regularized system of seniority and the electoral advantages that help non-cabinet legacies reach these higher levels of seniority in the party.

Although the analysis here sheds light on the sources of legacy advantage in ministerial promotions, it does not tell whether legacy MPs make for more or less effective cabinet ministers than non-legacy MPs. Some critics of dynastic politics in Japan, for example, have charged that legacy MPs are ineffective leaders because their privileged and sheltered backgrounds leave them ill-prepared to handle the tasks of governance (e.g., Yazaki, 2010). The apparent advantage of dynasties in ministerial selection also raises important questions for the design and operation of democratic political systems. Cabinets are at the center of power in parliamentary systems, and the ability of individual cabinet ministers to control policy formation and implementation within their own ministries provides the privileged few with unique opportunities to shape political outcomes. For democratic theorists and advocates of electoral and representative democracy, it is therefore important to understand why ministerial selection appears to favor a cadre of party members, and whether this apparent bias in who gets selected produces any negative effect on governance. In the next chapter, I turn to an exploration of some of the potential political and economic consequences of dynastic politics for the nature and quality of representation in Japan and other democracies.

7

Consequences for Representation

> ...it is not so much the absurdity as the evil of hereditary succession which concerns mankind. Did it ensure a race of good and wise men it would have the seal of divine authority, but as it opens a door to the foolish, the wicked, and the improper, it hath in it the nature of oppression. Men who look upon themselves born to reign, and others to obey, soon grow insolent; selected from the rest of mankind, their minds are early poisoned by importance; and the world they act in differs so materially from the world at large, that they have but little opportunity of knowing its true interests, and when they succeed to the government are frequently the most ignorant and unfit of any throughout the dominions.
> - Thomas Paine (1776, p. 30)

The preceding chapters have documented clear evidence of an inherited incumbency advantage in all three stages of a typical political career: selection, election, and promotion. The findings from the case of Japan suggest that a large part of the advantage is the name recognition that legacy candidates enjoy—hence, dynasties are more valuable to parties when their name recognition, and the established family history in politics it signals, serves as a key personal vote-earning attribute in district-level elections. In the legislative arena, on the other hand, district-level name recognition appears less important than the party-level or national-level familiarity that comes from being a member of a dynasty with a prior record in cabinet. However, this latter advantage may also potentially stem from differences in other qualities—education, charisma, networks, etc.—across types of dynasties, and these differences are harder to disentangle.

Understanding the causes of democratic dynasties and the advantages that legacy candidates enjoy in their political careers establishes a necessary precondition for studying the potential consequences of these advantages (Geys and Smith, 2016). Ultimately, the quality of representation in any democracy depends not only on who is elected, but also on how they behave once in office. In this chapter, I shift the focus to evaluating some of the potential "downstream" effects of the inherited incumbency advantage. What are the political and economic consequences of political dynasties in democracies? Do dynasties generate any positive or negative effects for the functioning of democracy or the quality of representation? These are important questions to consider if we want to understand the full impact of dynastic politics on democracy.

In her seminal book on the concept of representation, Hanna Pitkin (1967) distinguishes between two types of representation. The first type, *descriptive representation*, is associated with the idea that parliament should be a reflection of the various demographic groupings in society. In other words, it is important that groups such as women and minorities have some presence in parliament (e.g., Phillips, 1995; Mansbridge, 1999). Part of the rationale is that representatives who come from distinct backgrounds will do a better job incorporating the interests of citizens with similar backgrounds into policy outcomes. Indeed, there is a growing body of evidence in support of this claim (e.g., Bratton and Ray, 2002; Svaleryd, 2009; Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004). This suggests an important link between descriptive representation and the second type of representation, *substantive representation*, which has more to do with whether politicians' actions, through legislation or articulation of positions in parliamentary debates, also serve the interests of those whom they represent.

In the case of dynasties, it is fair to assume that legacy candidates, as with most politicians, do not descriptively represent the electorate in terms of economic and occupational background. Most politicians, including members of dynasties, come from very privileged family backgrounds and tend to serve in a narrow range of occupations—such as law or business—before entering politics (e.g., Putnam, 1976; Lawless, 2012; Dal Bó et al., 2016). As documented in Chapter 2, legacy MPs in Japan tend to be highly educated and wealthy, though the vast majority are not significantly more educated and wealthy than non-legacy MPs. Non-legacy and legacy MPs alike are more wealthy than most Japanese citizens. The average yearly income for a Diet member in Japan is roughly 21 million yen, whereas the average "salaryman" working for a private company earns just over 4 million yen in a year.[1]

On the other hand, legacy MPs tend to enter parliament at a younger age than non-legacy MPs, and also are more likely to be women, which may help to provide better descriptive representation for these groups. When it comes to gender, dynastic succession may be one of the few ways for female candidates to break into politics in systems where women are generally disadvantaged (Jalalzai, 2013). Indeed, many female politicians in Japan and elsewhere first entered politics when their husbands died in office, a process sometimes referred to as a "widow's succession" in the U.S. (Werner, 1966; Kincaid, 1978).

When it comes to substantive representation, it is not immediately obvious whether a legacy MP should be expected to do objectively better or worse than a non-legacy MP in doing their job once in office. One question is whether members of dynasties are of lower or higher quality than other types of politicians. As argued by Timothy Besley (2005, p. 51), the "advantage in name recognition is palpable [but] whether politician quality is transmitted intergenerationally is far from clear." Another question is whether the strong electoral advantages enjoyed by legacy candidates result in fewer incentives to work hard for the interests of the electorate. Although Thomas Paine's critique of hereditary succession in the quote at the head of this chapter was in response to the monarchical rule of King George III, one might wonder whether a similar logic applies to members of democratic dynasties. The connection has at least been made by the popular media and non-legacy politicians who are critical of the practice. Is it common sense that dynasties might breed poor politicians?

[1] Brasor, Philip and Masako Tsubuku. "Politicians' pay: Even more than you think." *The Japan Times* online, December 13, 2011.

Recall the theoretical model from Chapter 3: $U_{it} = V_{it} + (IIA_{it} * DB_{it}) + P_{it} + O_{it}$. According to this model, if the dynastic bias is high, then a legacy candidate can be of lower quality (in terms of other attributes related to parties' goals in seeking votes, policy, or office) than a non-legacy candidate and still get selected. Much like female Members of Congress in the U.S. must outperform their male counterparts in order to overcome higher barriers to entry (Anzia and Berry, 2011), and female MPs in Germany tend to need more political experience and higher education levels in order to obtain extra-parliamentary jobs (such as supervisory board roles in the private sector) (Geys and Mause, 2014), non-legacy candidates who compete against legacy candidates, either for the party nomination or in a general election, might need to be of higher quality, and exhibit higher legislative performance if elected. This means that legacy MPs might be of lower quality in terms of policymaking, even if they are of higher quality in terms of electoral strength. This may be particularly troubling since legacy MPs appear to enjoy an advantage over other MPs in progressing from the backbenches to the cabinet, placing them at the pinnacle of political leadership. Another possibility is that members of dynasties might use their network connections, as a substitute for skill or talent, to gain advancement in politics.

The idea that democratic dynasties might result in poor outcomes for representation is in keeping with the bulk of the research on hereditary leadership succession in family-run firms (e.g., Pérez-González, 2006; Villalonga and Amit, 2006; Bertrand et al., 2008). This literature finds that firms with CEOs who are related to the previous CEO underperform relative to firms where unrelated CEOs are promoted. There is also some evidence from Italy that nepotism in academia damages the quality of a university's teaching and research (Durante, Labartino and Perotti, 2011). On the other hand, there are compelling reasons why members of dynasties in politics might actually provide for qualitatively better representation for their constituents. For example, Glenn R. Parker (1996, p. 88) argues that legacy MPs may be beneficial to the functioning of a legislature, since they will already be familiar with the rules of the game and legislative norms, unlike "amateur" politicians who lack such familiarity. In other words, legacy MPs may be ready to "hit the ground running" on day one of their legislative careers.

Existing research into whether there is a quality difference among legacy and non-legacy politicians has produced mixed evidence at best. In a study of local-level politicians in Italy, for example, Benny Geys (2016) finds that members of dynasties tend to have lower levels of education—a potential marker of quality—than non-legacy local politicians. But this finding contrasts with the record in Japan (Chapter 2), as well as Ireland (Smith and Martin, 2016). One concern might be the appropriate measurement of "quality" across different contexts. In a country with relatively low levels of higher education, years of education may be a reasonable proxy; in other countries, however, it may not (Dal Bó et al., 2016). Moreover, the same network advantages that members of political dynasties are assumed to enjoy in selection decisions may overlap with network or wealth advantages that help them gain access into prestigious universities, even if they might not otherwise gain admission on their own academic merit. In a similar vein, a common measure of candidate quality in the U.S. literature is prior experience in local-level politics (e.g. Jacobson and Kernell, 1983), but we know that legacy candidates can often "leapfrog" directly into national politics without first gaining experience at the local level (e.g., Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009; Feinstein, 2010; Smith and Martin, 2016).

It is also unclear whether, and to what extent, markers of quality such as education are connected to the actual legislative behavior of politicians. Some politicians, such as Tanaka Kakuei in Japan or Trygve Bratteli in Norway (neither of whom were legacies), achieved remarkable political success despite having no more than a primary school education. In short, education and other markers of quality may not be good proxies for a politician's performance in office. While the literature is beginning to explore various consequences of dynastic politics, there is very little empirical research into the actual behavior of legacy MPs in office.

There may also be some important economic consequences of dynastic representation, though here again, the existing evidence paints a complex and contradictory picture. In India, Pradeep Chhibber (2013, p. 290) reports that perceptions of the quality of representation are lower among voters who are represented in parliament by parties with dynastic leadership. In the Philippines, districts represented by legacy MPs tend to have higher levels of poverty, lower levels of employment, and greater economic inequality (Mendoza et al., 2012; Tusalem and Pe-Aguirre, 2013). However, it is unclear whether these conditions are the result of poor leadership by legacy politicians, or whether such economic patterns and legacy politicians are both the result of some other common factor, or whether the direction of causality is reversed.

In the case of Japan, Yasushi Asako, Takeshi Iida, Tetsuya Matsubayashi, and Michiko Ueda (2015) find that prefectures represented by a greater number of legacy MPs between 1997 and 2007 had worse economic outcomes (measured as GDP growth at the prefecture level), despite receiving relatively more distributive benefits (measured in terms of fiscal transfers from the central to local governments). The reason, they argue, is that dynastic politicians spend the distributive benefits inefficiently, which suppresses growth. A very similar pattern is observed in a working paper by Arthur Bragança, Claudio Ferraz, and Juan Rios (2015), who show that when a dynastic politician narrowly wins a close election, there is more spending on urban infrastructure, health, and sanitation. Nevertheless, these additional investments do not appear to translate into improved economic outcomes (such as local economic growth or the quality of public services). The expansion in the size of local governments in Brazil by dynastic politicians thus appears to mostly reflect rent extraction.[2] The findings of these studies thus suggest that dynasties might be correlated with poor economic performance. In contrast, Timothy Besley and Marta Reynal-Querol (2013) present evidence in another working paper that dynastic leaders may positively impact the rate of economic growth, but only where the leader enjoys significant autonomy in decision-making. They rationalize that dynastic leaders will have longer time horizons than non-dynastic leaders.

Clearly, there may be multiple ways, both direct and indirect, in which dynastic politics can have consequences for socio-economic outcomes and the quality of representation in a democracy. Yet, overall, the mechanisms linking political dynasties and their possible consequences for socio-economic outcomes remain poorly understood. Moreover, establishing the causal connection between dynasties and their political or economic consequences is a challenge due to the many potentially confounding factors that may be at play.

[2] There is also some evidence that family members of currently serving politicians benefit economically from the connections to their relatives (Gagliarducci and Manacorda, 2016; Folke, Persson and Rickne, 2015).

In the remainder of this chapter, I consider three potential consequences of the inherited incumbency advantage for the nature of representation and functioning of democracy. First, what is the relationship between dynastic candidate selection and gender representation? Second, what is the impact of dynastic succession on the representational style of politicians? And finally, what is the relationship between dynastic politics and legislative behavior in parliament?

7.1 Dynasties and Gender Representation

Although the descriptive representation of women in democracies around the world has risen considerably over the past several decades, many of the earliest and most prominent female political pioneers first entered public office on the heels of a male relative.[3] A good example is Hillary Clinton, who, though capable in her own right, owes part of her political success to her marriage to former President Bill Clinton. An example from Japan is Nakayama Masa, who became the first female cabinet minister in 1960 when she became Minister of Health and Welfare under Prime Minister Ikeda Hayato. Her husband, Nakayama Fukuzo, was an MP before her (and two sons and a grandson followed her into politics). Prominent examples from other countries include Indira Gandhi of India, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner of Argentina, Gro Harlem Brundtland of Norway, Corazon Aquino of the Philippines, Yingluck Shinawatra of Thailand, and Park Geun-hye of South Korea. Researchers have established this pattern of a dynastic gender bias among presidents and prime ministers (Jalalzai, 2013), in the national legislatures of democracies as diverse as the U.S., Ireland, India, and Sweden (Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009; Smith and Martin, 2016; Basu, 2016), and among local-level mayors in the Philippines (Labonne, Parsa and Querubin, 2015). The size of the divide in the U.S. Congress is such that one in three women have been dynastic, compared to just one in ten men (Dal Bó, Dal Bó and Snyder, 2009).

Why might female politicians be more likely to come from a political dynasty than male politicians? The persistent underrepresentation of women in politics in general has previously been explained by a supply-and-demand model of political recruitment (e.g., Norris and Lovenduski, 1995), similar to the model I have used in this book to explain the overrepresentation of dynasties in Japan.[4] Existing research in the U.S. suggests that the greatest factor inhibiting more equal gender representation in politics is the supply of female candidates (e.g., Lawless and Fox, 2010). A large body of work has also shown that women's descriptive representation is higher under PR electoral systems, and when parties or countries adopt gender quotas with placement mandates (e.g., Rule, 1987; Matland, 1998; Reynolds, 1999; Salmond, 2006; Krook, 2006; Rosen, 2013). This suggests that institutional differences may generate greater incentives to recruit women—for example, in order to present a balanced slate of candidates on a party list to voters.

Previous chapters have already documented that an existing family history in politics can be an important supply-side factor influencing the decision to run for office. But it is possible that the size of the effect of this supply-side motivation is greater for women than it is for men. A family history in politics may inspire both

[3] The general literature on gender representation is expansive (e.g., Rule, 1987; Matland, 1998; Reynolds, 1999; Salmond, 2006; Krook, 2006; Rosen, 2013).

[4] An alternative theoretical framework is the "feminist institutionalism" approach (e.g., Krook, 2010; Krook and MacKay, 2011).

men *and* women to run for office, but for those who do not have a family history in politics, an ambition to run may be more prevalent among men than women, thus resulting in a higher ratio of legacy to non-legacy women who seek office, compared to men who seek office. Female relatives of politicians may benefit from having a political role model in their family, and will have a greater familiarity with what a life in politics entails, thus removing some of the potential anxiety and uncertainty involved in the decision to enter a political race.

Moreover, when female legacy candidates do seek office, their dynastic ties may help them to overcome vote disadvantages with voters, or informational disadvantages with party elites involved in candidate selection. In systems where women are otherwise underrepresented, being part of a political dynasty can lower the considerable barriers to entry for female candidates. In candidate-centered systems, for example, party actors involved in candidate selection tend to be less informed about women than men as candidates (e.g., Sanbonmatsu, 2006), and may avoid recruiting or selecting a female candidate if they believe she will be less successful electorally. However, if she is the wife or daughter of a former male politician, the party actors can use the quality and electoral success of the male predecessor as an informational cue for how the female legacy candidate might perform. This idea is similar in spirit to the concept of information shortcuts in previous work on women's political recruitment (Norris and Lovenduski, 1995), and is also consistent with the general theory of dynastic recruitment advanced in this book.[5]

We can think about how gender interacts with dynasty by returning to our simple demand-side model of candidate recruitment, $U_{it} = V_{it} + P_{it} + O_{it}$. Gender can be treated conceptually as a potential vote-earning attribute, like other qualities and background characteristics. Suppose we separate out the gender attribute from V_{it}, and call it F (for female). We will again continue to use V_{it} to present all of the other potential vote-earning attributes that are not related to gender. Now imagine that of two hypothetical candidates, one is male ($F = 0$) and the other is female ($F = 1$). Within a given candidate selection context (society, party, or group of decision makers, at any given time), suppose there is a certain level of gender bias, $GB_{it} \in [-1, 1]$, where a value within the range of $[-1, 0)$ represents a context where men face discrimination, zero represents perfect gender equality, and a positive value $(0, 1]$ represents a context where women face discrimination. Although evidence is somewhat mixed, a considerable body of research shows that voters tend to have a negative view of female politicians (Anzia and Berry, 2011). A negative bias against women as candidates within parties, both by male politicians and party selectors, has also been identified in numerous studies (Niven, 1998; Esteve-Volart and Bagues, 2012; Casas-Arce and Saiz, 2015; Folke and Rickne, 2016; Gagliarducci and Paserman, 2012).

With this extension of the model, the vote-earning utility of a particular candidate becomes:

$$U_{it} = V_{it} - (F_i * GB_{it}) \tag{7.1}$$

which implies that if we hold all else constant, the vote-earning utility of a female candidate to a party will be higher than that of a male candidate if and only if: (1)

[5] Another explanation is that male elites might recruit female members of their families into office to serve as "proxies" for their own power, or placeholders for future male relatives (e.g., Schwindt-Bayer, 2011; Jalalzai, 2013; Ban and Rao, 2008). This explanation may have more of a role in developing democracies.

the gender bias is negative, or (2) the value of the female candidate's other attributes is higher than the sum of the gender bias and the male candidate's other attributes.

If all else within V_{it} is equal between the two candidates and $GB_{it} = 0$, then the male and the female candidate will be equally likely to get the nomination. However, for all values of $GB_{it} > 0$, the male candidate will be more likely to get the nomination. If $GB_{it} > 0$, then in order for the female candidate to be successful in getting the nomination, she must compete against a male counterpart who is of inferior quality (lower values of V_{it}). However, if we incorporate the inherited incumbency advantage and dynastic bias into the equation, then we get:

$$U_{it} = V_{it} - (F_{it} * GB_{it}) + (IIA_{it} * DB_{it}) \tag{7.2}$$

This extension implies that if we hold all else constant, the vote-earning utility of a female candidate to a party can be higher than that of a male candidate, even if there is gender bias ($GB_{it} > 0$), if the female candidate is a legacy candidate and her potential inherited incumbency advantage given the amount of dynastic bias in a given system is greater than the gender bias ($IIA_{it} * DB_{it} > GB_{it}$).

This also implies that dynastic ties might help women to break into political systems where women otherwise face discrimination as candidates. Once in office, the discrimination against female candidates may begin to decrease, thus decreasing the gender bias in the system. Over time, fewer and fewer women will need to depend on dynastic ties to overcome the barriers to entry.

The comparative MP-level data in the *Dynasties and Democracies Dataset* allow me to explore the interaction of gender and dynastic recruitment across multiple democracies and across time. To examine whether there is a dynastic bias in women's political representation and whether it decreases over time, I compute the ratio of legacy MPs among the women and men in each country's legislature averaged across all elections, and then compute the difference between these two ratios, i.e., the proportion of legacy MPs among the women, minus the proportion of legacy MPs among the men:

$$\left(\frac{\text{Number of female legacy MPs}}{\text{Number of all female MPs}}\right) - \left(\frac{\text{Number of male legacy MPs}}{\text{Number of all male MPs}}\right) \tag{7.3}$$

These differences are plotted in the left-hand graph of Figure 7.1 for countries where data are available from 1945-2016. The right-hand side of Figure 7.1 illustrates the variation over time by dividing the data into two time periods: 1945-1980 and 1981-2016.[6] The empirical data show that dynastic recruitment is more common among women than among men in eight out of the twelve countries. However, the average dynastic bias decreased between the two time periods in all but three countries: Israel, Norway, and Switzerland, all of which are places where the dynastic bias in gender representation was already comparatively small. In Japan, the increase in female candidates and MPs since electoral reform has completely erased the dynastic gender bias that existed for most of the postwar period.

[6] Country-level plots of the time trend in the dynastic bias in gender representation are presented in Figure A.12 in Appendix A.



Figure 7.1: The dynastic bias in women's political representation in twelve democracies, 1945-2016.

Note: The dynastic bias is measured as $(\frac{\text{Number of female legacy MPs}}{\text{Number of all female MPs}}) - (\frac{\text{Number of male legacy MPs}}{\text{Number of all male MPs}})$. Country-level plots of the time trend in the dynastic bias in gender representation are presented in Figure A.12 in Appendix A.

Source: Dynasties in Democracies Dataset. Country-level sources are explained in Appendix B.

7.2 Like Father Like Son? Policy Consistency Across Generations

A second important question related to the consequences of dynastic politics is whether members of dynasties maintain similar representational "styles" as their political predecessors. By representational style, I mean the language used and positions articulated when communicating to voters in a district (Grimmer, 2013). This style is displayed to voters around election time in the form of policy appeals (e.g., calls to enact certain laws), as well as personal appeals (e.g., declarations of personal character or commitment to constituents). Thus, part of a candidate's representational style will be unrelated to his or her party's policy positions, and more related to aspects of his or her personal vote (Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina, 1987). Another way to think of this concept is as part of the candidate's "home style" (Fenno, 1978). Dynasties may cultivate distinct styles representing a family "brand" that transcends the party "brand," and voters may find this continuity in representational style to be a positive aspect of dynasties.

We can think about this formally by denoting the representational style of a candidate i as R_i. The exact nature of R_i can vary slightly from election to election as

new issues arise. If a candidate were to simply repeat the same appeals each election, then $R_{it} = R_{it-1}$, where t is a current election, and $t-1$ is the previous election. However, in most cases the difference between R_{it} to R_{it-1} will take some positive value, $q \in [0,1]$, where $q = 0$ represents a style that is exactly the same, $q = 1$ represents a style that is completely different, and $0 < q < 1$ represents cases where the style differs somewhat, but not completely. We might expect that q will be closer to 0 when comparing the same candidate's representational style across two consecutive elections than when comparing that candidate's representational style to a different candidate's representational style.

In the case of Japan, when a candidate retires (or stops running), there are two types of potential successors to his or her jiban: a *kin successor* (i.e., a hereditary candidate) or a *non-kin successor* (i.e., a secretary or other non-relative). Successors can choose their own distinct representational styles, or they can emulate the styles of their predecessors. One possible implication of dynastic candidate selection is that q will be closer to 0 when the retiring candidate is replaced with a kin successor than when he or she is replaced with a non-kin successor, all else equal. This is because, for kin successors, it is more important to maintain the same family "brand" of representation that has been successful in the past.

Legacy candidates may represent a continuity in representational style and policy positions that goes beyond party label alone. A prominent real-world example is when George W. Bush famously exhibited the importance of his family legacy to his policy decision to invade Iraq: "There's no doubt his hatred is mainly directed at us. There's no doubt he can't stand us. After all, this is a guy that tried to kill my dad at one time."[7] Another example is Prime Minister Abe Shinzo, who frequently invokes the memory of his grandfather, former Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke, in framing his political philosophy. Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio similarly adopted his grandfather's philosophy of "fraternity" in politics (*yuai*).

To get a sense of whether there is continuity in representational style within dynasties, we can compare the candidate election manifestos (*senkyo koho*) of predecessors and different types of successors (kin or non-kin) within the same jiban from 1986-2009. Following the work of Justin Grimmer (2013), who looks at press releases of U.S. Members of Congress, we can reason that the representational styles of politicians should be observable in material produced for the purpose of communicating with voters between and during election campaigns. Unlike politicians in the U.S., however, candidates for office in Japan are afforded relatively few means to communicate with voters during campaigns. Of the ten means they are permitted to use, only six have the physical space to afford explanations of what they have done or plan to do, or what their policy views entail.[8] Whereas Grimmer (2013) uses press releases and thus has to demonstrate that the content of these press releases made their way into local newspapers, an average of 40% of voters have reported reading candidate manifestos in the days leading up to an election (Catalinac, 2016*a*).

[7] Moran, Terry. "Is Bush's Iraq Stance Rooted in Revenge?" ABC News. URL: http://abcnews.go.com/US/story?id=90764.

[8] Means conducive to offering policy views are the candidate election manifesto, newspaper advertisements, campaign postcards, campaign flyers, radio and television policy broadcasts, and campaign speeches. Means that are not conducive to offering policy views are campaign signs, posters, banners, and billboards, televised biographical broadcasts (in which candidates read their resume), and name chanting, in which candidates drive around their district chanting their names (Catalinac, 2016*a*).

Figure 7.2: Kernel density plots of Hellinger distance for different types of succession, 1986-2009



Note: The figure shows kernel density plots of the Hellinger distance measuring the similarity of a candidate's manifesto to the manifesto of the candidate who ran in the same jiban in the immediately previous election. Pre-reform: kin successors (n = 31), non-kin successors (n = 37), candidates who are themselves running again (n = 595). Post-reform: kin successors (n = 35), non-kin successors (n = 174), candidates who are themselves running again (n = 902). The first year of data in each period, 1986 and 1996, is excluded as it is the comparison group for the following year.
Source: JHRED and manifesto data from Catalinac (2016*a*). I thank Amy Catalinac for providing the Hellinger distance calculations.

Following existing work in comparisons of similarity across text documents (Blei and Lafferty, 2009; Moser and Reeves, 2014), we use the Hellinger distance to measure distance between probability distributions of topics in the text of the manifestos. The Hellinger distance has a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1, with 0 indicating that two manifestos exhibit identical distributions over topics and 1 indicating that they exhibit very different distributions over topics. Figure 7.2 shows kernel density plots of the Hellinger distance for the three types of candidates in the sample: a candidate running again, a non-kin successor running for the first time, and a kin successor running for the first time. The sample is restricted to LDP candidates and LDP-affiliated independents. The left panel of Figure 7.2 shows the plots for the pre-reform SNTV/MMD candidates, while the right panel shows the plots for the post-reform FPTP/SMD candidates.

The mean Hellinger distance for candidates who are themselves running again is .67 in the pre-reform period and .73 in the post-reform period. For kin successors, the mean is .75 in the pre-reform period and .8 in the post-reform period. For non-kin successors, the mean is .8 in the pre-reform period and .81 in the post-reform period. In other words, these results appear to show some evidence that kin successors adopt representational styles that are more similar to their predecessors than non-kin successors, and that styles from election to election are less stable in general in the post-reform—though the differences between the types of successors fall just short of statistical significance given the small sample size in each group. The pattern of less stability in representational styles in the post-reform period makes sense given that campaign issues have become more focused on the party's policy platform than on personalistic appeals (McElwain, 2012; Catalinac, 2016*b*), and the LDP's party platform tends to shift from one election to the next.

These findings, though rudimentary, suggest that there may be some intergenerational transmission of representational style within family dynasties, or that legacy candidates try to maintain the family brand, perhaps to maximize the potential inherited incumbency advantage in elections.

7.3 Do-Nothing Dynasties? Legislative Behavior of Legacy MPs

Finally, it is also possible to explore whether legacy MPs behave differently than non-legacy MPs once in office. Legacy candidates may be comparatively more comfortable and familiar with the policymaking process and able to start work on day one with minimal training or socialization. The experiences of non-legacy candidates and legacy candidates might be compared to first-generation college students (i.e., students whose parents did not go to university) and students whose families have a history of sending their children to university. First-generation college students tend to underperform relative to other students, at least initially, even controlling for IQ and high school grades (Terenzini et al., 1996). Legacy MPs might similarly perform better in office than non-legacy MPs.

One measure of legislative activity is parliamentary speeches. Because plenary time in all legislatures is scarce, the number of parliamentary speeches given by an individual MP reflects in part the priorities of the MP's party in allocating time as a resource (Proksch and Slapin, 2012), but may also capture some form of initiative on the part of individual MPs. Moreover, party leaders may be more likely to allocate speaking time to members who they consider to be most competent. In a study of speeches made in the Swedish *Riksdag* (parliament), Hanna Bäck, Marc Debus, and Jochen Müller (2014) analyze differences in speaking patterns across gender. They find that women tend to speak less often on the floor, and when they do, it is less often about "hard" policy issues like economics, foreign affairs, or defense—in line with gender differences in cabinet portfolios (Reynolds, 1999). Are there similar differences in legislative activity across legacy and non-legacy MPs?

To evaluate the relationship between dynastic ties and legislative behavior, I use data on plenary and committee speeches in the Diet collected by Sugawara Taku. The data are only available up to the 45$^{\text{th}}$ House of Representatives (elected in 2009); I limit the pre-reform sample to the five elections prior to reform, and limit the overall sample to LDP and LDP-affiliated MPs. Figure 7.3 shows the average number of

Figure 7.3: Speeches on the Diet floor and in committees, LDP MPs 1980-2009.



Note: Left panel shows the average the number of speeches spoken on the floor and in committee meetings by LDP and LDP-affiliated MPs, 1980-2009. Right panel shows the average number of characters (in thousands) in those speeches.
Source: JHRED and data from Sugawara Taku's website: http://sugawarataku.net (archived).

speeches (left panel) and the average number of characters (right panel) spoken per legislative term, split by legacy status. I divide legacy MPs into cabinet legacies and non-cabinet legacies in order to evaluate whether there are any differences between these two "types" of legacy MPs.

The overall data indicate that both cabinet legacies and non-cabinet legacies are more "active" in Diet plenary sessions, though the same cannot be said for activity in committee meetings. Non-cabinet legacies actually appear to speak less in committees than non-legacies. However, the averages do not take into account that legacy MPs of both types are more likely to be senior in the party and more likely to occupy leadership roles, which come with frequent speaking opportunities. To estimate the differences in speaking behavior controlling for these factors, I use a negative binomial regression, with the *Number of characters spoken* in plenary sessions as the dependent variable. I add controls for number of terms and its squared term, gender, and whether the MP served as a cabinet minister, junior minister, or House Speaker during the term, and also include term fixed effects. Finally, I split the sample into pre-reform and post-reform periods to evaluate whether patterns are distinct in the two institutional contexts. In models (1) and (3), I pool the two types of legacy MPs together; in models (2) and (4), they are disaggregated into non-cabinet legacies and cabinet legacies.

The results are presented in Table 7.1. In the pre-reform period, there is no significant difference in the speaking behavior of MPs across legacy status. Seniority and cabinet appointment are positively associated with speaking, while being a women is negatively associated with speaking, in line with previous findings from Sweden—though this is in part because the LDP had very few female members in this period. In the post-reform period, gender is no longer significant, and there is an increased role for junior ministers in plenary speech. This reflects administrative reforms in 2001 that introduced a new and more active role for junior ministers.

Nevertheless, even controlling for these factors, the results indicate that legacy MPs are more active than non-legacy MPs in the post-reform period, and the effect

Table 7.1: Negative binomial regression estimates of words spoken in floor speeches.

	Pre-reform (1980-1993)		**Post-reform (1996-2009)**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Legacy (combined)	-0.052		0.290**	
	(0.100)		(0.109)	
Non-cabinet legacy		-0.081		-0.016
		(0.142)		(0.157)
Cabinet legacy		-0.028		0.397**
		(0.109)		(0.123)
Number of terms	0.327***	0.328***	0.505***	0.520***
	(0.080)	(0.080)	(0.055)	(0.056)
Number of terms^2	-0.015*	-0.015*	-0.027***	-0.028***
	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Female	-2.535***	-2.551***	0.189	0.174
	(0.764)	(0.765)	(0.182)	(0.179)
Cabinet minister	1.950***	1.951***	2.229***	2.199***
	(0.199)	(0.199)	(0.202)	(0.195)
Junior minister	-0.204	-0.197	0.560***	0.571***
	(0.146)	(0.147)	(0.147)	(0.146)
Speaker	4.133***	4.128***	4.975***	4.945***
	(0.622)	(0.621)	(0.268)	(0.230)
1983	0.046	0.044		
	(0.166)	(0.166)		
1986	-0.075	-0.077		
	(0.159)	(0.159)		
1990	0.147	0.142		
	(0.170)	(0.172)		
1993	0.425**	0.419*		
	(0.165)	(0.165)		
2000			-0.370*	-0.396*
			(0.176)	(0.175)
2003			-0.474**	-0.496**
			(0.180)	(0.178)
2005			-0.459**	-0.501**
			(0.162)	(0.162)
2009			1.240***	1.224***
			(0.188)	(0.187)
Constant	6.198***	6.193***	5.840***	5.820***
	(0.247)	(0.246)	(0.226)	(0.225)
lnalpha/constant	2.652***	2.652***	2.472***	2.470***
	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)	(0.051)
N	1,391	1,391	1,210	1,210
Log pseudolikelihood	-7618	-7618	-7222	-7221

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Dependent variable is the number of words spoken in plenary sessions. Parameter estimates are negative binomial regression coefficients. Excluded years are 1980 (pre-reform) and 1996 (post-reform). Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on MP).
Source: JHRED and data from Sugawara Taku's website: http://sugawarataku.net (archived).

is entirely driven by cabinet legacies. The predicted number of characters spoken per legislative term for a male LDP backbencher (i.e., not a cabinet minister, junior minister, or the Speaker) with the average number of terms (four) is 1,535 words for non-legacy MPs, 1,510 words for non-cabinet legacies, and 2,283 words for cabinet legacies.

These patterns do not hold if I use the number of characters in committee speeches as the dependent variable rather than the number of characters in floor speeches (Table 7.2). This is somewhat surprising given that much of the action in Japanese legislative politics occurs in the Budget Committee of the Diet. The difference between floor and committee speech patterns may indicate that cabinet legacies play a greater role on the "public stage" of politics—plenary debate—while other members play equally important roles in parliamentary committees, where the real work happens. More work is needed to investigate whether these patterns are consistent across other democracies, or whether the content of speech differs across legacy and non-legacy MPs.

7.4 Discussion

The analysis in this chapter has only begun to scratch the surface of the potential effects of dynastic politics for the nature of representation in Japan and other democracies.

One question for future investigations is whether there is any correlation between dynastic politics and corruption. Eric Chang and Miriam Golden (2006) find evidence in Italy that the incentives to cultivate a personal vote may be linked to higher levels in corruption and money politics due to the pressure to promote oneself electorally, and the burden this places on candidates for amassing financial resources (sometimes illegally). It could be the case that the personal advantages in name recognition and inherited resources that legacy candidates possess over non-legacy candidates insulate them from needing to resort to corrupt practices in order to get elected. While non-legacy politicians may feel stronger pressure to engage in illegal fundraising in order to amass the personal resources necessary to be competitive in personalized elections, legacy politicians may exhibit comparatively lower levels of corruption. On the other hand, Benjamin Nyblade and Steven Reed (2008) note that there are actually two types of political corruption: illegal acts for material gain (looting) and illegal acts for electoral gain (cheating). They find in Japan that political experience and electoral security increase the probability of looting, but that electoral insecurity combined with intraparty competition increases the probability of cheating. Therefore, we might expect that when legacy politicians do engage in illegal acts, it will more likely be of the looting variety.

A second question is whether Japan's low levels of gender representation are related to its high number of dynasties. There has been an increase in female candidates in recent years, but if most women are recruited to run in unsafe districts, they might not last more than one term in office. Moreover, if most of the safe districts are being held continuously by male members of political dynasties, it may continue to hamper gender representation in the long run. Legacy women who inherit a seat may be among the few female MPs with "staying power," which can also have an impact on the supply of capable female MPs for higher positions in the cabinet and party leadership. Looking beyond Japan, more work needs to be done to understand how institutional

Table 7.2: Negative binomial regression estimates of words spoken in committee speeches.

	Pre-reform (1980-1993)		**Post-reform (1996-2009)**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Legacy (combined)	0.078		0.117	
	(0.116)		(0.104)	
Non-cabinet legacy		0.025		-0.037
		(0.161)		(0.189)
Cabinet legacy		0.116		0.174
		(0.128)		(0.118)
Number of terms	-0.131*	-0.130*	-0.143	-0.144
	(0.060)	(0.060)	(0.083)	(0.083)
Number of terms^2	-0.016**	-0.016**	-0.010	-0.010
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Female	-0.197	-0.217	0.042	0.052
	(0.193)	(0.200)	(0.160)	(0.161)
Cabinet minister	-0.273	-0.278	-0.230	-0.247
	(0.184)	(0.184)	(0.139)	(0.133)
Junior minister	-0.339***	-0.338***	-0.235**	-0.217*
	(0.088)	(0.088)	(0.090)	(0.090)
Speaker	-24.089***	-24.058***	-24.738***	-24.751***
	(0.583)	(0.581)	(0.691)	(0.702)
1983	-0.122	-0.123		
	(0.142)	(0.143)		
1986	0.358*	0.358*		
	(0.172)	(0.172)		
1990	0.659***	0.654***		
	(0.138)	(0.138)		
1993	1.802***	1.790***		
	(0.161)	(0.159)		
2000			-0.407***	-0.420***
			(0.095)	(0.094)
2003			-0.629***	-0.636***
			(0.108)	(0.112)
2005			0.249**	0.228*
			(0.094)	(0.093)
2009			1.835***	1.825***
			(0.149)	(0.144)
Constant	9.830***	9.826***	10.748***	10.749***
	(0.148)	(0.149)	(0.135)	(0.134)
lnalpha/constant	2.008***	2.008***	1.390***	1.390***
	(0.065)	(0.065)	(0.074)	(0.074)
N	1,391	1,391	1,210	1,210
Log pseudolikelihood	-10995	-10994	-11992	-11991

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Dependent variable is the number of words spoken in Diet committee meetings. Parameter estimates are negative binomial regression coefficients. Excluded years are 1980 (pre-reform) and 1996 (post-reform). Cluster-robust standard errors in parentheses (clustered on MP). Source: JHRED and data from Sugawara Taku's website: http://sugawarataku.net (archived).

differences—including electoral systems, but also candidate selection procedures and gender quotas—affect the relationship between gender and dynasties.

Finally, a third question is whether different types of legacy candidates are more or less likely to introduce innovative new policies. A case could be made that legacy MPs in the pre-reform period might have brought a fresh view to politics, as many did not envision a career in politics but were instead brought in at the request of koenkai or faction leaders. They were not, in this regard, traditional politicians. Since the electoral reform, the legacy candidates who emerge are more likely to self-select into politics, and might thus represent a more narrow range of viewpoints and experiences than the legacy candidates of the past. It is possible, therefore, that the new order may actually represent less diversity among legacy candidates, even as it has ushered in more diversity among all candidates.

Further explorations into these and other potential outcomes will be necessary to fully understand the consequences of dynastic politics for democracy. Dynastic politics in democracies represent a form of elite self-perpetuation that transcends generations, and may prevent meaningful political change. On the flip side, the continuity in representation and opportunities for political socialization that are embodied within dynasties might sometimes be seen as a positive aspect for representative stability within democracies. Much depends on the personal qualities of the actual legacy candidates who emerge to contest elections. The true consequences of dynastic politics are thus nuanced, and may include both positive and negative effects.

8

Conclusion

Legacy:
(noun) a thing handed down by a predecessor.
(adjective) denoting software or hardware that has been superseded but is difficult to replace because of its wide use.
- Oxford English Dictionary

This book has examined the causes and the consequences of political dynasties in democracies through a close examination of the case of Japan. The persistence of dynasties in a developed democracy like Japan is a puzzle, since the historical experience of most other developed democracies has been a gradual decline in dynasties over time. Japan's experience for most of the postwar history was exactly the opposite—a dramatic growth in dynasties over time—leaving many observers to wonder whether Japanese politics were being dominated by an ever-narrowing political class.

I have offered an explanation for variation in dynastic politics across democracies and parties that focuses attention on the institutional factors affecting the supply and demand incentives in candidate selection. The case of Japan is useful for evaluating the empirical truth of this explanation, not only because there have been a substantial number of dynasties (providing enough of a sample size for statistical analysis), but also because Japan's 1994 electoral reform and subsequent party reforms in the LDP provide for useful variation in institutions within a single country. This provides a natural test case within which to evaluate the impact of institutions on dynastic politics. Where possible, I have also used data from other democracies to put Japan in perspective and help to draw comparative conclusions.

The argument I have advanced is that dynastic candidate selection will be encouraged in institutional contexts that increase the perceived value of a potential candidate's inherited incumbency advantage, and decrease the ability or desire of national party leaders to control the selection process. While all democracies are likely to feature some amount of dynastic politics, particularly in the early years following democratization, certain institutional features can facilitate and even encourage the formation of dynasties by increasing the electoral value of the inherited incumbency advantage.

On the supply-side, potential legacy candidates will be more likely to want to run for office if their predecessors had served longer tenures in office, allowing for greater

time to be socialized into a life of politics. In addition, potential legacy candidates will be more likely to want to run if the family already has a family history of multiple generations in politics. These factors might also help to explain why female candidates who emerge, particularly in earlier elections in a democracy, are more likely to be legacy candidates.

However, we should expect the supply-side incentives to be relatively universal across countries and parties. The fact that there is variation across country and party cases suggests that demand-side incentives can differ according to the institutional context. I have posited a demand-side theory that focuses on the interaction between the inherited incumbency advantage of a potential legacy candidate and factors that increase or decrease what I have called a dynastic bias in candidate selection. Of the possible demand-side factors, the institutions of the electoral system and candidate selection process within parties are arguably the most important variables for explaining patterns in dynastic recruitment in democracies, at least in the case of Japan. Other factors, such as the size of the population, years of democracy, level of economic development, political culture, or other variables may also play some role in dynastic politics, and this role may vary across countries. Nevertheless, the evidence from Japan suggest that institutions can have a significant influence over dynastic politics.

This final chapter draws together the key conclusions of the book and lessons that Japan's experience with dynastic politics might hold for other democracies, particularly new and developing democracies where dynasties are perceived as a problem, but also developed democracies like the Republic of Ireland, where politics is still in many ways a family affair.

8.1 Summary of Findings

The chapters in this book have revealed several empirical findings about the role that institutions play in the formation and continuation of political dynasties, across multiple democracies, and in the specific case of Japan.

The key argument I have advanced in the book is that legacy candidates—especially those who directly and immediately succeed their political predecessors in the same district as hereditary candidates—enjoy what I call an inherited incumbency advantage in all three stages of a typical political career: selection, election, and promotion. Crucially, however, the relative value of this advantage varies significantly by the institutional context of the electoral system and party institutions for candidate selection and promotion. The theoretical framework introduced in Chapter 3 based on supply and demand predicts that candidate-centered electoral systems and decentralized parties will generate greater demand for legacy candidates by the actors involved in candidate selection.

In candidate-centered elections, the inherited incumbency advantage translates into an electoral advantage for a legacy candidate over his or her competitors; parties, knowing this advantage to exist, are also more likely to give the legacy candidate the nomination. In elections that are more party-centered, the inherited incumbency advantage is less relevant for electoral success, and parties in turn are more likely to pass over a potential legacy candidate for nomination in favor of a candidate who better suits their party goals. However, party nomination decisions can also be influenced by the nature of the decision-making process. Decentralized selection is more likely to

favor a legacy candidate since the actors involved will have had a closer relationship to the candidate's predecessor. Centralized selection processes that are dominated by the national party leadership may take into account a greater number of factors in nomination decisions, including national party image and policy goals. These party motivations may decrease the value of legacy candidates in the absence of other quality characteristics of value to the party.

The empirical findings from the substantive chapters of the book can be summarized as follows. First, the results of the analysis of selection in Chapter 4 demonstrates that legacy candidates are more likely to emerge following the exit of long-serving incumbent MPs, and when their families have an existing, multi-generation connection to politics. This empirical regularity suggests that a large part of explaining the emergence of a dynasty rests with supply-side factors.

However, the case of Japan has revealed important variation in demand-side factors as well. The incentives for political parties to recruit legacy candidates are lower when personal vote-earning attributes, like the name recognition inherent in dynasties, are less salient to voters in elections. Following electoral reform, PVEA like dynastic ties are no longer as important to the LDP's chances of winning an election, and can even become a liability. The process for selecting candidates has also become more centralized in response to the new electoral environment, and the LDP no longer seeks out legacy and hereditary candidates to succeed weaker outgoing incumbents, opting instead to nominate a more diverse range of candidates that includes more women and policy experts.

As a result, the overall share of new legacy candidates has dropped from an average of nearly 50 percent in the last years of the pre-reform period, to a level (at around 10 percent in recent elections) that is rapidly approaching that of the U.S., Canada, the United Kingdom, and most other advanced industrialized democracies. The analysis of the post-reform MMM system also revealed significant differences in dynastic candidate selection across electoral tiers—SMD versus PR—in the post-reform mixed electoral system. Legacy candidates are much less likely to be nominated in the PR tier, where voters cast their ballots based solely on party considerations.

Chapter 5 investigated the actual inherited incumbency advantage enjoyed by legacy candidates in elections. In both the pre-reform and post-reform periods, first-time LDP candidates who inherited a jiban were more successful than their non-legacy counterparts—in many cases despite facing more competition. However, it is important to keep in mind that due to the effect of the electoral reform on selection decisions—with fewer "low quality" legacy candidates getting selected—the electoral success of legacy candidates across the two periods cannot be easily compared. Among the weaker legacy candidates who have run, many as independents after being denied the LDP's official nomination, the electoral advantage in the post-reform period appears to have declined. The most important factor in determining success in the new SMDs may be running in a party stronghold, precisely where legacy candidates are most likely to emerge.

The electoral advantages enjoyed by legacy candidates may help them to win multiple elections and advance to higher levels of seniority in the party. However, the analysis in Chapter 6 shows that cabinet legacies may also enjoy an additional advantage in getting promoted to cabinet. The exact causal mechanisms are not clear, but I have posited that it may have something to do with informational advantages within the party. The effect has been most prominent in the past two decades since electoral reform, as prime ministers have enjoyed more discretion in appointment de-

cisions. The past few cabinets of LDP prime ministers have been remarkably dynastic in composition, with roughly 60 percent of membership having ties to past MPs.

The political and economic consequences of dynastic politics are another concern. The results of my analyses in Chapter 7 suggest that dynasties may function as a useful back channel to gender representation. However, it is important to keep in mind that institutional contexts that encourage the formation of dynasties—candidate-centered electoral rules and decentralized candidate selection—may also be associated with worse gender representation. Reforming such institutions to strengthen parties might be expected to decrease the number of dynasties *and* increase the number of women in politics. The results from Chapter 7 also suggest that part of the allure of dynasties may be the continuity in representational style that they offer to voters. In addition, cabinet legacies appear to be more active in Diet floor speeches. To the extent that this might be considered a positive trait, it is encouraging that Japan's dynasties in recent years have been more likely to be cabinet legacies.

Many years ago, Austin Ranney (1981, pp. 98-99) reflected on the value of incumbency in candidate selection decisions. In most cases, parties are predisposed to re-nominate successful incumbents unless they pose some sort of risk to the unity or policy goals of the party. According to Ranney:

> The rationale is obvious. Other things being equal, incumbents are likely to make better candidates than nonincumbents. They are better known to the constituency's voters, it is easier to raise money for their campaigns, and they already wear the mantle of the elected public official. They are also likely to be better known by the party's selectors and to have served the party for a number of years. And whatever advantages seniority may bring to a legislator and his constituents they will secure by reselecting an incumbent and lose by dropping him in favor of a newcomer. Whatever the reasons may be, the fact is that the greatest single advantage an aspirant for candidacy can have is to hold the office already.

Where my argument for the inherited incumbency advantage has differed from Ranney's logic is in the phrase, "Other things being equal." My analysis in this book has demonstrated that, when it comes to the inherited incumbency advantage, the institutional contexts of elections and candidate selection procedures create an inequality in the incentives to recruit and nominate legacy candidates across democracies. The value of a legacy candidate's inherited incumbency advantage will ultimately depend on the institutional context of how candidates are selected and elected. In some cases, this means that, other things equal, legacy candidates may not be better candidates than non-legacy candidates, at least when it comes to the electoral needs of a party.

Will Japan continue to move in the direction it is headed? In 2016, four by-elections were held to replace incumbent House of Representatives MPs who died or left office. The outcomes of these by-elections hint that the situation I have described in this book still predominates. The first two by-elections took place in April. In Hokkaido 5th District, a by-election was needed after Machimura Nobutaka died of a stroke. Machimura was an eleven-term LDP MP, former faction leader, and former Speaker of the House. It should not surprising that his son-in-law, Wada Yoshiaki, sought and won the nomination and then the election. In Kyoto 3rd District, a by-election was needed to replace two-term LDP MP Miyazaki Kensuke. Miyazaki was himself a legacy candidate, as he was once married to Kato Ayuko, daughter of LDP veteran Kato Koichi and later MP herself; later, he divorced Kato and married another LDP

MP, Kaneko Megumi, whose father was a local mayor. In this case, Miyazaki was too young to have any child old enough to succeed him, and moreover, the scandal-tainted name had little value to the LDP. In the end, the party decided not to nominate a candidate at all, and the Democratic Party candidate, Izumi Kenta, easily won the seat. Izumi was a "zombie" incumbent who resigned his list seat to run for the SMD seat.

The two other by-elections took place in October. In Tokyo 10$^{\text{th}}$ District, a by-election was needed after incumbent LDP MP Koike Yuriko resigned her seat in order to run (successfully) for Governor of Tokyo as an independent. The LDP nominated an incumbent PR list winner (not a zombie), Wakasa Masaru, who resigned his PR seat and went on to win the SMD election. Meanwhile, in Fukuoka 6$^{\text{th}}$ District, two conservative candidates sought the LDP nomination to replace thirteen-term former cabinet minister Hatoyama Kunio, following his death earlier in the year. Given the Hatoyama family's long history in politics (Kunio and his brother, Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio were fourth-generation MPs), it isn't surprising that the top contender was Kunio's son, Jiro. Jiro faced competition for the nomination from Kurauchi Ken, the son of the chairman of the local prefectural branch of the LDP and prefectural assemblyman, Kurauchi Isao. In other words, it was a competition between a national dynasty versus a local dynasty. The LDP could not decide which legacy candidate to nominate, so let them both run as independents. When it became clear that Hatoyama Jiro had won, the party quickly granted him an ex-post nomination.

To the casual observer of Japanese politics, the cases of Wada and Hatoyama might seem to suggest that the LDP is still stuck in its old ways. In contrast, this pattern is exactly what should be expected based on the theory I have proposed in this book. Both Wada and Hatoyama were the relatives of long-serving, powerful incumbents and both had strong supply-side motivations to run. When such candidates do come forward, the LDP has little reason to deny them the nomination unless—as in Hatoyama's case—there is additional competition for the nomination and it is unclear which potential candidate will bring in more votes. As fewer and fewer LDP incumbents reach such long tenures, the supply of such legacy hopefuls should continue to decrease.

The word "legacy" is not often used as an adjective, as I have used it in my terminology throughout this book. When it is, the definition given by Oxford is "denoting software or hardware that has been superseded but is difficult to replace because of its wide use." This may seem like an appropriate characterization for political legacies in Japan as well.

8.2 Lessons for Other Democracies

Overall, my findings in this book present important implications for institutional design, particularly in developing democracies where dynasties have been viewed as a growing problem in recent years.

Dynasties have been a notable feature of Indian democracy, especially if one considers family ties to politicians across local, state, and national levels of politics. Part of the reason, according to Kanchan Chandra (Chandra, 2016), is that political office in India is financially attractive, especially compared to the relatively low standard of living for most citizens. This suggests a supply-side rationale that is economic in nature. However, Chandra also argues that parties will have greater demand for dynas-

ties in districts where the party is organizationally weak at the local level, and needs to keep potential defectors in the fold. If a legacy candidate has any kind of embedded support in the district, they may be able to run as independents or from another party and threaten the party's ability to win the seat. This description of the Indian case jibes with the narrative of the pre-reform LDP in this book, although without the added incentives for dynastic candidate selection produced by intraparty competition in multi-member districts. Institutional reforms that strengthen party organization at the local level may help to undercut this tendency toward dynastic politics in India.

Not all institutional reforms will have the intended effects. Pablo Querubin (2011) shows that the imposition of term limits in the Philippines after the 1986 "People Power" revolution paradoxically led to the proliferation of dynasties. The term-limited politicians simply got their family members to run in their place, as they ran for another office, thereby establishing family control over multiple offices at once. In a related working paper, Julien Labonne, Sahar Parsa, and Pablo Querubin (2015) find that term limits for mayors in the Philippines led to a sharp increase in female mayors taking over. However, 70 percent of the new female mayors were members of dynasties. In other words, the previous male elite, forced out of office by term limits, simply installed their relatives in their place, and many of these were female relatives. Recently, the Philippine Congress has debated a law that would prohibit family members from simultaneously holding public office.[1]

In Indonesia, legislators succeeded in passing a law that prohibited any candidate "with blood or marital ties to the incumbent (regional leader)" from running for governor, district head, or mayor (or deputy positions). This law was in response to an increase in dynasties following decentralization in the late 1990s. Many of the most prominent dynasties controlled multiple levels of government in Indonesia's regions, and several prominent dynastic politicians have been convicted on corruption charges and sent to jail. However, the Constitutional Court voided the law in 2015 on the basis that it violated basic constitutional rights of members of dynasties to run for office, unlike the party-level norm adopted by the DPJ (parties are private organizations that adopt whatever rules they want for candidate eligibility).[2] Prabowo Subianto, the son-in-law of Indonesia's former dictator, Suharto, ran in the 2014 presidential election but was defeated by Joko Widodo, the popular Governor of Jakarta who did not come from a political dynasty. Subianto initially declared victory for himself, but later withdrew.[3] It is unclear whether the controversial actions of new President of the Philippines Rodrigo Duterte—such as advocating for the extra-judicial killings of drug dealers, and bad-mouthing the leaders of other countries, notably U.S. President Barack Obama—should be attributed to his background as a non-legacy "outsider." One might view his erratic behavior as proof that dynasties provide more stable and responsible leadership; on the other hand, his rise to power might not have occurred were it not for public dissatisfaction with inept leadership and governance under previous leaders, most of whom came from established dynasties.

Dynasties have also garnered much attention in the Republic of Ireland, where roughly a quarter of all MPs in recent years have a family history in the Dáil, as well

[1] Trajano, Julius Cesar I. and Yoes C. Kenawas. "Political dynasties in Indonesia and the Philippines." *East Asia Forum*, February 13, 2013.

[2] "'Political Dynasties Legalized' as Court Allows Leaders' Relatives to Run for Office." *The Jakarta Globe*, July 8, 2015.

[3] "Jokowi and Prabowo both claim victory in early Indonesian election results." *The Guardian*, July 9, 2014.

as roughly 44 percent of the latest cabinet (Smith and Martin, 2016). In 2016, there was some speculation that Prime Minister Enda Kenny would retire before the next general election. His 23-year-old daughter, Aoibhinn Kenny, was seen within the local Fine Gael organization as the favorite to succeed him, suggesting that dynasties may continue to dominate Irish politics into the near future.[4] The Irish perhaps have the most to learn from the Japanese experience, as the STV/MMD electoral system used to elect members of the Dáil is very similar to Japan's pre-reform SNTV/MMD system (Chapter 3). One way to strengthen parties and decrease the prevalence of dynasties would be to introduce a FPTP or AV system with SMDs. The key challenge is how to transform party organizations from decentralized cadres of local notables into coherent vehicles for programmatic policies. The experience of Japan's LDP, viewed through the lens of dynastic politics, sheds important light on the possibilities and challenges involved in such institutional reforms.

I conclude with the words of Vilfredo Pareto (1901, p. 36), who argues that "the history of man is the history of the continuous replacement of certain elites: as one ascends, another declines." Electoral competition in modern democracies should theoretically provide for a regular circulation of political leaders, and ensure that those in power remain responsive to the demands of the electorate. But if the new generation of politicians tends to emerge from among the children of the previous generation, this circulation might have less substantive meaning, and political change may be only nominal in nature. Rather than an elite transformation, we might simply get old wine in new bottles.

[4] Ryan, Philip. "Fight for Kenny's seat is more than a two-horse race." *Independent*, August 7, 2016 (online edition).

A

Chapter Appendix

A.1 Chapter 2

Table A.1: Parties and legacy candidates in Japan, 1947-2014.

	Non-legacy		**Legacy**		**Total**
Party	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)
Liberal, Democratic Liberal, LDP	6,274	72.45	2,386	27.55	8,660
LDP-affiliated ind.	780	81.08	182	18.92	962
JSP, Leftist Socialist, SDP	3,192	94.38	190	5.62	3,382
JSP-affiliated ind.	72	96.00	3	4.00	75
Komeito	909	95.68	41	4.32	950
Komeito-affiliated ind.	8	100	0	0	8
DSP, Rightist Socialist	954	91.47	89	8.53	1,043
DSP-affiliated ind., Okinawa Social Mass	32	86.49	5	13.51	37
JCP	4,222	99.72	12	0.28	4,234
JCP-affiliated ind., Okinawa Citizen's	23	100	0	0	23
Democrats (1947), Reform	1,136	92.89	87	7.11	1,223
National Cooperative	174	96.67	6	3.33	180
Reform Socialist, Cooperative	54	100	0	0	54
Hatoyama Liberals	94	95.92	4	4.08	98
Independent (no party)	1,826	98.28	32	1.72	1,858
New Liberal Club (NLC)	77	70.64	32	29.36	109
NLC-affiliated ind.	14	87.50	2	12.50	16
Sakigake	21	67.74	10	32.26	31
Sakigake-affiliated ind.	2	100	0	0	2
Japan New Party (JNP)	49	87.5	7	12.50	56
JNP-affiliated ind.	6	85.71	1	14.29	7
Renewal	53	75.71	17	24.29	70
New Frontier Party (NFP)	310	85.87	51	14.13	361
NFP-affiliated ind.	4	66.67	2	33.33	6
DPJ	1,583	86.93	238	13.07	1,821
DPJ-affiliated ind.	35	89.74	4	10.26	39

continued...

Table A.2: Parties and legacy candidates in Japan, 1947-2014 (continued).

	Non-legacy		**Legacy**		**Total**
Party	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)
continued...					
Ozawa's Liberal Party (Lib)	68	88.31	9	11.69	77
Lib-affiliated ind.	6	100	0	0	6
Liberal Alliance	212	98.15	4	1.85	216
Social Democratic League (SDL)	19	63.33	11	36.67	30
SDL-affiliated ind.	7	100	0	0	7
Japan Farmers	14	93.33	1	6.67	15
New Farmers	12	92.31	1	7.69	13
Labor-Farmer	79	95.18	4	4.82	83
Reconstruction	13	100	0	0	13
Progressive	6	85.71	1	14.29	7
Conservative	25	83.33	5	16.67	30
New Socialist	43	97.73	1	2.27	44
New Liberal	11	100	0	0	11
Mushozoku no Kai	15	83.33	3	16.67	18
Reform Club	2	50.00	2	50.00	4
Democratic Reform League	2	100	0	0	2
People's New Party (PNP)	31	86.11	5	13.89	36
New Party Japan	17	100	0	0	17
New Party Daichi	13	92.86	1	7.14	14
Your Party (YP)	73	86.90	11	13.10	84
YP-affiliated independent	0	0	1	100	1
JRP, JIP	228	89.06	28	10.94	256
JRP/JIP-affiliated ind.	3	100	0	0	3
TPJ, People's Life First Party (PLFP)	123	87.23	18	12.77	141
TPJ-affiliated ind.	2	100	0	0	2
New Renaissance	6	100	0	0	6
Happiness Realization	443	99.77	1	0.23	444
Party for Future Generations (PFG)	42	87.50	6	12.50	48
Minor party	603	98.69	8	1.31	611
Total	24,022	87.21	3,522	12.79	27,544

Source: JHRED.



Figure A.1: Box-and-whisker plots of personal wealth of non-legacy and legacy MPs in Japan, 1993-2014.

Note: Box-and-whisker plots show the distribution of combined income and assets (minus losses) for non-legacy MPs and legacy MPs. The left panels include all MPs; the right panels include only LDP MPs. The top panels include outliers; the bottom panels exclude outliers.

Source: Author's calculations based on yearly reports in *Asahi Shimbun*.

Table A.3: Parties and legacy MPs in Japan, 1947-2014.

	Non-legacy		**Legacy**		**Total**
Party	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)	(N)
Liberal, Democratic Liberal, LDP	4,228	67.5	2,036	32.5	6,264
LDP-affiliated ind.	147	69.34	65	30.66	212
JSP, Leftist Socialist, SDP	1,866	92.42	153	7.58	2,019
JSP-affiliated ind.	15	93.75	1	6.25	16
Komeito	605	94.24	37	5.76	642
Komeito-affiliated ind.	7	100	0	0	7
DSP, Rightist Socialist	446	88.84	56	11.16	502
DSP-affiliated ind., Okinawa Social Mass	9	81.82	2	18.18	11
JCP	376	98.95	4	1.05	380
JCP-affiliated ind., Okinawa Citizen's	8	100	0	0	8
Democrats (1947), Reform	473	87.92	65	12.08	538
National Cooperative	41	89.13	5	10.87	46
Reform Socialist, Cooperative	7	100	0	0	7
Hatoyama Liberals	31	96.88	1	3.12	32
Independent (no party)	84	91.3	8	8.7	92
New Liberal Club (NLC)	24	51.06	23	48.94	47
NLC-affiliated ind.	1	50	1	50	2
Sakigake	8	53.33	7	46.67	15
Japan New Party (JNP)	30	88.24	4	11.76	34
JNP-affiliated ind.	4	80	1	20	5
Renewal	40	71.43	16	28.57	56
New Frontier Party (NFP)	126	79.75	32	20.25	158
NFP-affiliated ind.	0	0	1	100	1
DPJ	766	82.10	167	17.90	933
DPJ-affiliated ind.	6	66.67	3	33.33	9
Ozawa's Liberal Party (Lib)	17	73.91	6	26.09	23
Liberal Alliance	2	100	0	0	2
Social Democratic League (SDL)	11	55	9	45	20
Japan Farmers	1	100	0	0	1
New Farmers	5	83.33	1	16.67	6
Labor-Farmer	16	80	4	20	20
Reconstruction	1	100	0	0	1
Progressive	0	0	1	100	1
Conservative	9	81.82	2	18.18	11
New Liberal	2	100	0	0	2
Mushozoku no Kai	5	83.33	1	16.67	6
Democratic Reform League	1	100	0	0	1
People's New Party (PNP)	6	75	2	25	8
New Party Japan	2	100	0	0	2
New Party Daichi	4	80	1	20	5
Your Party (YP)	15	65.22	8	34.78	23
JRP, JIP	77	80.21	19	19.79	96
TPJ, People's Life First Party (PLFP)	8	72.73	3	27.27	11
Party for Future Generations (PFG)	0	0	2	100	2
Minor party	5	100	0	0	5
Total	9,535	77.63	2,747	22.37	12,282

Source: JHRED.

A.2 Chapter 3



Figure A.2: Predicted probability of preceding a family member in office, by number of terms served and legacy status (confidence intervals included).

Note: Data sample restricted to last term in parliament for MPs who served between 1945-2005. Belgium, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Norway and South Korea excluded. Predicted probabilities estimated based on a logit regression of *Senior* on *Number of terms served* (without any other controls) using the margins command in Stata.

A.3 Chapter 4



Figure A.3: Intraparty and intra-camp competition in multi-member House of Representatives districts, 1947-1993.
Note: By-elections, and districts with $M = 1$ or $M = 2$ are not included. The conservative camp includes the LDP and its precursor parties, the New Liberal Club (a brief splinter party), Renewal, Sakigake, Japan New Party, and all affiliated independents. The socialist camp includes the JSP, DSP, SDL, and all affiliated independents.
Source: JHRED.

Table A.4: LDP ex-post nominations and post-election share of seats in the House of Representatives, 1958-1993.

Year	**Nominated winners** (N)	**Share of seats** (%)	**Ex-post nominations** (N)	**New share of seats** (%)
1958	287	61.5	11	63.8
1960	296	63.4	4	64.2
1963	283	60.6	11	63.0
1967	277	57.0	3	57.6
1969	288	59.3	12	61.7
1972	271	55.2	13	57.8
1976	249	48.7	12	50.9
1979	248	48.5	9	50.3
1980	284	55.6	3	56.2
1983	250	48.9	9	50.7
1986	300	58.6	4	59.4
1990	275	53.7	11	55.9
1993	223	43.6	6*	43.6

Note: *After the 1993 election, two of the six ex-post nominees later withdrew from the LDP; five others supported the LDP legislative caucus without joining, while four others quit the party.
Source: *Asahi Shimbun* 1996 House of Representatives Election CD-ROM.

A.4 Chapter 5

Table A.5: Predicting dynastic succession in the LDP, 1958-1990.

	Precede cand.		**Precede MP**		**Bequeath**	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Incumbent	0.176***	0.173***	0.148***	0.150***	0.173***	0.161***
	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.041)	(0.042)
Previous wins	0.024***	0.023***	0.023***	0.024***	0.017***	0.014**
	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Existing dynasty	0.248***	0.230***	0.292***	0.280***	0.121**	0.104*
	(0.050)	(0.054)	(0.050)	(0.053)	(0.045)	(0.047)
Death	0.136*	0.131*	0.104	0.096	0.146**	0.150**
	(0.056)	(0.058)	(0.054)	(0.055)	(0.055)	(0.056)
Semi-rural	-0.006	-0.005	-0.048	-0.042	-0.031	-0.052
	(0.041)	(0.043)	(0.038)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.038)
Semi-urban	0.015	0.054	0.015	0.066	0.005	0.005
	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.048)	(0.038)	(0.043)
Urban	-0.036	0.029	-0.061	-0.018	0.008	0.051
	(0.054)	(0.078)	(0.051)	(0.067)	(0.052)	(0.072)
Female		0.074		0.087		-0.004
		(0.111)		(0.116)		(0.084)
R^2	0.217	0.237	0.222	0.243	0.192	0.212
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Estimated as a linear probability model using OLS. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Level of observation is each candidate in the final election before no longer running ($N = 625$). Dependent variable for models (1) and (2) is a dummy variable for whether the candidate preceded a family member as a candidate. Dependent variable for models (3) and (4) is a dummy variable for whether the candidate preceded a family member as a candidate who also won. Dependent variable for models (5) and (6) is a dummy variable for whether the candidate was immediately succeeded by a family member as a candidate in the same district. Coefficient values in Figure 4.3 are based on models (2), (4), and (6), but with *Previous terms* standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1.

Table A.6: RD estimate of incumbency on hereditary succession in the LDP, 1958-1990.

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Incumbent	0.158*	0.143*	0.147*
	(0.059)	(0.052)	(0.055)
R^2	0.090	0.125	0.130
Year FE	No	Yes	Yes
Region FE	No	No	Yes

Note: * p<0.05. Estimated as a linear probability model using OLS. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. Sample limited to LDP candidates who were within five percentage points of either winning or losing a seat. Level of observation is each candidate in the final election before no longer running ($N = 440$). Dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the candidate was immediately succeeded by a family member as a candidate in the same district. Model (1) includes only variables for incumbency, and (not shown) vote share margin, and their interaction. Model (2) adds year fixed effects. Model (3) adds region fixed effects. Predicted values in Figure 4.4 are based on model (3).



Figure A.4: Salience of "candidate" versus "party" for voters in House of Representatives elections, 1958-1993.

Note: Entries represent percentages of respondents from total sample (N ≈ 2,000 in each year). Surveys were conducted at the time of the election. Survey data from 1947, 1949, 1952, 1953, 1955, and 1967 elections are not available.

Source: Based on data in Richardson (1991, p. 36), and surveys conducted by Akarui Senkyo Suishin Kyokai (various years).

A.5 Chapter 6



Figure A.5: Common career backgrounds of LDP candidates, 1958-2014.
Note: By-elections excluded.
Source: JHRED.

A.6 Chapter 7



Figure A.6: Common career backgrounds of JSP and DSP candidates, 1958-1993.
Note: By-elections excluded.
Source: JHRED.



Figure A.7: Distribution of LDP candidates' vote share margin in final election attempt, 1958-1993.
Note: N = 440.
Source: JHRED.

Table A.7: Predicting dynastic succession in the LDP with interactions, 1958-1990.

	Precede cand.	Precede MP	Bequeath
Incumbent	1.582**	1.077	2.265**
	(0.544)	(0.609)	(0.714)
Previous wins	0.270***	0.238***	0.329***
	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.077)
Incumbent X Previous wins	-0.089	-0.014	-0.127
	(0.076)	(0.083)	(0.095)
Existing dynasty	2.699***	2.920***	1.917***
	(0.461)	(0.470)	(0.541)
Existing dynasty X Previous wins	-0.238***	-0.220**	-0.175*
	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.077)
Death	0.864	1.245	0.848
	(0.632)	(0.675)	(0.718)
Death X Previous wins	-0.033	-0.103	-0.015
	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.096)
Semi-rural	0.501	-0.150	0.663
	(0.494)	(0.527)	(0.629)
Semi-urban	-0.027	-0.198	-0.178
	(0.534)	(0.567)	(0.683)
Urban	-1.409	-2.023*	0.124
	(0.739)	(0.842)	(0.796)
Semi-rural X Previous wins	-0.083	-0.026	-0.134
	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.087)
Semi-urban X Previous wins	0.022	0.050	0.037
	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.096)
Urban X Previous wins	0.191	0.253*	-0.011
	(0.110)	(0.115)	(0.116)
Pseudo R^2	0.2072	0.2188	0.2213

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Estimated as a logit model. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Level of observation is each candidate in the final election before no longer running ($N = 625$). Dependent variable is a dummy variable for whether the candidate was immediately succeeded by a family member as a candidate in the same district (*Bequeath*). Marginal effects for *Previous terms* conditional on *Incumbent* and *Existing Dynasty* are shown in Figure 4.5.



Figure A.8: Predicted probabilities of having a future relative serve as MP, LDP versus JSP, 1958-1993.
Note: N = 1,022; 625 LDP, 397 JSP. Predicted probabilities estimated after simple logit regression including number of terms interacted with party.
Source: JHRED.

Table A.8: Number of applicants and approved candidates in official DPJ open recruitment contests, 1999-2009.

Open Recruitment Round	**Applicants**	**Approved**		**Women**	
	(N)	(N)	(%)	(N)	(%)
March 1999	564	94	16.7	–	–
August 1999 (women only)	56	37	66.1	56	100
April 2002	416	46	11.1	41	9.9
February 2004	713	81	11.4	94	13.2
February 2005*	231	–	–	14	6.1
May 2006	1,314	164	12.5	168	12.8
November 2009	1,982	208	10.5	394	19.9
Total	5,276	630	11.9	767	14.5

Note: *The number of approved candidates in 2005 is not available since that round of open recruitment was for specific SMD races. Similarly, the number of applicants and approved candidates is not available for the four district-level open recruitment contests held in 2012.
Source: DPJ Election Strategy Committee.

Table A.9: Number of applicants and districts for official LDP open recruitment contests, 2004-2011.

Open Recruitment Round	**Applicants** (N)	**Districts** (N)
2004 (Saitama 8th District by-election)	81	1
2004	296	20
2005 (pre-election emergency round)	868	26
2006	299	8
2007	89	4
2008	25	2
2009 (pre-election round)	60	3
2009 (post-election, Shizuoka 3rd District)	0	1
2010	546	53
2011	51	6
Total	2,315	124

Note: Includes some open recruitment district contests, such as Shizuoka 3rd District in 2009, in which no applicants applied or the process failed to produce a candidate. For this reason, the total number of districts is higher than the number of open recruitment candidates who ultimately ran for election, as shown in Table A.9.
Source: LDP Election Strategy Committee.



Figure A.9: Tenure of LDP candidates at time of exit and hereditary succession, before and after electoral reform.

Note: Left-side axis is for frequency of observations for exiting candidates with each number of terms. Right-side axis is for percent of exiting candidates who were succeeded by a family member. Pre-reform sample (left) includes LDP candidates who last ran between 1976 and 1990 (meaning they were succeeded by a family member between 1979 and 1993). Post-reform sample (bottom) includes only LDP candidates who last ran in an SMD between 1996 and 2012 (meaning they were succeeded by a family member between 2000 and 2014). Successions between 1993 and 1996, when district boundaries were redrawn, are excluded. Source: JHRED.

Table A.10: Predicting dynastic succession in the LDP, 1996-2012.

	Precede cand.	Precede MP	Bequeath
Incumbent	1.582**	1.077	2.265**
	(0.544)	(0.609)	(0.714)
Previous wins	0.270***	0.238***	0.329***
	(0.059)	(0.061)	(0.077)
Incumbent X Previous wins	-0.089	-0.014	-0.127
	(0.076)	(0.083)	(0.095)
Existing dynasty	2.699***	2.920***	1.917***
	(0.461)	(0.470)	(0.541)
Existing dynasty X Previous wins	-0.238***	-0.220**	-0.175*
	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.077)
Death	0.864	1.245	0.848
	(0.632)	(0.675)	(0.718)
Death X Previous wins	-0.033	-0.103	-0.015
	(0.086)	(0.089)	(0.096)
Semi-rural	0.501	-0.150	0.663
	(0.494)	(0.527)	(0.629)
Semi-urban	-0.027	-0.198	-0.178
	(0.534)	(0.567)	(0.683)
Urban	-1.409	-2.023*	0.124
	(0.739)	(0.842)	(0.796)
Semi-rural X Previous wins	-0.083	-0.026	-0.134
	(0.072)	(0.075)	(0.087)
Semi-urban X Previous wins	0.022	0.050	0.037
	(0.081)	(0.084)	(0.096)
Urban X Previous wins	0.191	0.253*	-0.011
	(0.110)	(0.115)	(0.116)
Pseudo R^2	0.2072	0.2188	0.2213

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Estimated as a linear probability model using OLS. Robust standard errors clustered at the regional level in parentheses. Level of observation is each candidate in the final election before no longer running ($N = 296$). Dependent variable for models (1) and (2) is a dummy variable for whether the candidate preceded a family member as a candidate. Dependent variable for models (3) and (4) is a dummy variable for whether the candidate preceded a family member as a candidate who also won. Dependent variable for models (5) and (6) is a dummy variable for whether the candidate was immediately succeeded by a family member as a candidate in the same district. Coefficient values in Figure 4.10 are based on models (2), (4), and (6), but with *Previous terms* standardized to have a mean of zero and standard deviation of 1.



Figure A.10: LDP incumbents with kin serving as personal secretary, by tenure in House of Representatives, 2014.

Note: Grey bars indicate frequency (count) of LDP MPs with each number of terms. Overlapping black bars indicate the frequency of those same MPs who are currently or have formerly employed a family member as a secretary. Dashed line indicates the percentage of MPs at each number of terms who are employing kin secretaries.

Source: Secretary information is based on whether the incumbent's secretary as listed in the *Seikan Yoran* or *Kokkai Binran* political almanacs has the same family name as the incumbent, and supplemented with information from Kyudan (http://www.kyudan.com/data/secretary.htm).



Figure A.11: Distribution of top-two candidates' vote share in SMDs, 1996-2014.
Note: Figure shows the distribution of the combined vote shares of the top-two candidates in each SMD in each election. Districts with a combined vote share of 1 indicate races with only two candidates.
Source: JHRED.

Table A.11: OLS estimates of inherited incumbency advantage in SMD elections (2000-2009): hereditary difference.

	Win			**Vote Share**		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Hereditary difference	0.271*	0.272	0.109	0.096**	0.088**	0.050*
	(0.121)	(0.142)	(0.135)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.021)
Quality difference		0.032	0.071		0.011	0.020
		(0.101)	(0.095)		(0.020)	(0.016)
Expenditures difference		0.078	0.150		0.083	0.082*
		(0.318)	(0.285)		(0.062)	(0.040)
LDP district strength			3.174**			0.774***
			(0.944)			(0.212)
2003 election			-0.369*			-0.120**
			(0.166)			(0.039)
2005 election			-0.194			-0.072
			(0.222)			(0.045)
2009 election			-0.565***			-0.165***
			(0.143)			(0.031)
N	55	55	55	55	55	55
R^2	0.074	0.078	0.328	0.186	0.222	0.564
Candidate Controls	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Party Strength Control	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes
Year FE	No	No	Yes	No	No	Yes

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable for specifications (1)-(3) is a dummy variable for winning election. Dependent variable for specifications (4)-(6) is the LDP candidate's share of the top two candidates' vote.
Source: JHRED.

Table A.12: Cabinets and governing parties in Japan, 1947-1969.

Cabinet Name	Date of Formation	Election	Governing Parties	Legacy (%)
Katayama 1	May 24, 1947	1947	JSP, DP, CP, RFK	5.56
Ashida 1	March 10, 1948	1947	DP, JSP, CP	20
Yoshida 2	October 15, 1948	1947	(D)LP	16.67
Yoshida 3	February 16, 1949	1949	(D)LP	21.43
Yoshida 3.1	June 28, 1950	1949	LP	30
Yoshida 3.2	July 4, 1951	1949	LP	33.33
Yoshida 3.3	December 26, 1951	1949	LP	33.33
Yoshida 4	October 30, 1952	1952	LP	26.67
Yoshida 5	May 21, 1953	1953	LP	25
I.Hatoyama 1	December 10, 1954	1953	DP	7.69
I.Hatoyama 2	March 19, 1955	1955	DP	12.5
I.Hatoyama 3	November 22, 1955	1955	LDP	6.25
Ishibashi 1	December 23, 1956	1955	LDP	13.33
Kishi 1	February 25, 1957	1955	LDP	13.33
Kishi 1.1	July 10, 1957	1955	LDP	6.67
Kishi 2	June 12, 1958	1958	LDP	27.78
Kishi 2.1	June 18, 1959	1958	LDP	25
Ikeda 1	July 19, 1960	1958	LDP	29.41
Ikeda 2	December 8, 1960	1960	LDP	18.75
Ikeda 2.1	July 18, 1961	1960	LDP	25
Ikeda 2.2	July 18, 1962	1960	LDP	18.75
Ikeda 2.3	July 18, 1963	1960	LDP	12.5
Ikeda 3	December 9, 1963	1963	LDP	11.76
Ikeda 3.1	July 18, 1964	1963	LDP	25
Sato 1	November 9, 1964	1963	LDP	31.25
Sato 1.1	June 3, 1965	1963	LDP	25
Sato 1.2	August 1, 1966	1963	LDP	29.41
Sato 1.3	December 3, 1966	1963	LDP	12.5
Sato 2	February 17, 1967	1967	LDP	23.53
Sato 2.1	November 25, 1967	1967	LDP	35.29
Sato 2.2	November 30, 1968	1967	LDP	18.75

Note: CP = Cooperative Party; DP = Democratic Party; JSP = Japan Socialist Party; LDP = Liberal Democratic Party; LP = Liberal Party (from 1948-1950, known as the Democratic Liberal Party); RFK = Ryokufukai.
Source: JHRED and Cabinet Office records.

Table A.13: Cabinets and governing parties in Japan, 1969-1993.

Cabinet	Date of Formation	Election	Governing Parties	Legacy (%)
Sato 3	January 14, 1970	1969	LDP	29.41
Sato 3.1	July 5, 1971	1969	LDP	20
Tanaka 1	July 7, 1972	1969	LDP	23.53
Tanaka 2	December 22, 1972	1972	LDP	16.67
Tanaka 2.1	November 25, 1973	1972	LDP	13.64
Tanaka 2.2	November 11, 1974	1972	LDP	31.58
Miki 1	December 9, 1974	1972	LDP	42.11
Miki 1.1	September 15, 1976	1972	LDP	36.84
T.Fukuda 1	December 24, 1976	1976	LDP	30
T.Fukuda 1.1	November 28, 1977	1976	LDP	27.78
Ohira 1	December 7, 1978	1976	LDP	15.79
Ohira 2	November 9, 1979	1979	LDP	38.89
Suzuki 1	July 17, 1980	1980	LDP	25
Suzuki 1.1	November 30, 1981	1980	LDP	44.44
Nakasone 1	November 27, 1982	1980	LDP	38.89
Nakasone 2	December 27, 1983	1983	LDP, NLC	33.33
Nakasone 2.1	November 1, 1984	1983	LDP, NLC	47.37
Nakasone 2.2	December 28, 1985	1983	LDP, NLC	55.56
Nakasone 3	July 22, 1986	1986	LDP	55
Takeshita 1	November 6, 1987	1986	LDP	47.62
Takeshita 1.1	December 27, 1988	1986	LDP	52.63
Uno 1	June 3, 1989	1986	LDP	55.56
Kaifu 1	August 10, 1989	1986	LDP	38.89
Kaifu 2	February 28, 1990	1990	LDP	50
Kaifu 2.1	December 29, 1990	1990	LDP	41.18
Miyazawa 1	November 5, 1991	1990	LDP	38.89
Miyazawa 1.1	December 12, 1992	1990	LDP	65

Note: LDP = Liberal Democratic Party; NLC = New Liberal Club.
Source: JHRED and Cabinet Office records.

Table A.14: Cabinets and governing parties in Japan, 1993-2016.

Cabinet	Date of Formation	Election	Governing Parties	Legacy (%)
Hosokawa 1	August 9, 1993	1993	Eight-party coalition*	47.06
Hata 1	April 28, 1994	1993	Eight-party coalition**	38.89
Murayama 1	June 30, 1994	1993	JSP, LDP, NPS	26.32
Murayama 1.1	August 8, 1995	1993	JSP, LDP, NPS	44.44
Hashimoto 1	January 11, 1996	1993	LDP, SDP, NPS	43.75
Hashimoto 2	November 7, 1996	1996	LDP	47.37
Hashimoto 2.1	September 11, 1997	1996	LDP	57.14
Obuchi 1	July 30, 1998	1996	LDP	57.89
Obuchi 1.1	January 14, 1999	1996	LDP, LP	68.75
Obuchi 1.2	October 5, 1999	1996	LDP, LP, Kom	53.33
Mori 1	April 5, 2000	1996	LDP, Kom, NCP	50
Mori 2	July 4, 2000	2000	LDP, Kom, NCP	66.67
Mori 2.1	December 5, 2000	2000	LDP, Kom, NCP	66.67
Mori 2.2	January 6, 2001	2000	LDP, Kom, NCP	68.75
Koizumi 1	April 26, 2001	2000	LDP, Kom, NCP	50
Koizumi 1.1	September 30, 2002	2000	LDP, Kom, NCP	84.62
Koizumi 1.2	September 22, 2003	2000	LDP, Kom, NCP	64.29
Koizumi 2	November 19, 2003	2003	LDP, Kom	66.67
Koizumi 2.1	September 27, 2004	2003	LDP, Kom	80
Koizumi 3	September 21, 2005	2005	LDP, Kom	73.33
Koizumi 3.1	October 31, 2005	2005	LDP, Kom	50
Abe 1	September 26, 2006	2005	LDP, Kom	50
Abe 1.1	August 27, 2007	2005	LDP, Kom	57.14
Y.Fukuda 1	September 26, 2007	2005	LDP, Kom	69.23
Y.Fukuda 1.1	August 2, 2008	2005	LDP, Kom	61.54
Aso 1	September 24, 2008	2005	LDP, Kom	66.67
Y.Hatoyama 1	September 16, 2009	2009	DPJ, PNP, SDP	26.67
Kan 1	June 8, 2010	2009	DPJ, PNP	21.43
Kan 1.1	September 17, 2010	2009	DPJ, PNP	27.27
Kan 1.2	January 14, 2011	2009	DPJ, PNP	26.67
Noda 1	September 2, 2011	2009	DPJ, PNP	21.43
Noda 1.1	January 13, 2012	2009	DPJ, PNP	28.57
Noda 1.2	June 4, 2012	2009	DPJ, PNP	23.08
Noda 1.3	October 1, 2012	2009	DPJ, PNP	26.67
Abe 2	December 26, 2012	2012	LDP, Kom	56.25
Abe 2.1	September 3, 2014	2012	LDP, Kom	44.44
Abe 3	December 24, 2014	2014	LDP, Kom	47.06
Abe 3.1	October 7, 2015	2014	LDP, Kom	58.82
Abe 3.2	August 3, 2016	2014	LDP, Kom	47.06

Note: DPJ = Democratic Party of Japan; DRP = Democratic Reform Party; DSP = Democratic Socialist Party; JRP = Japan Renewal Party; JNP = Japan New Party; JSP = Japan Socialist Party; Kom = Komeito; LDP = Liberal Democratic Party; NCP = New Conservative Party; NPS = New Party Sakigake; PNP = People's New Party; RP = Reform Party; SDP = Social Democratic Party; SDF = Socialist Democratic Federation. * = JNP, JSP, JRP, Kom, DSP, NPS, SDF, DRP. ** = JSP, Kom, JRP, JNP, DSP, SDF, Liberals, RP.
Source: JHRED and Cabinet Office records.

Table A.15: OLS estimates of legacy advantage in ministerial selection across different institutional periods, 1947-2016.

	Period 1		**Period 2**		**Period 3**		**Period 4**	
	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)	(1)	(2)
Non-cab. legacy	0.021	0.014	-0.011	-0.005	0.007	0.007	0.026***	0.001
	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Cabinet legacy	0.048	0.015	0.031*	0.014	-0.017**	-0.010	0.031***	0.013**
	(0.025)	(0.023)	(0.014)	(0.014)	(0.006)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.004)
Prior cabinet		0.167***		0.098***		0.028**		0.046***
		(0.022)		(0.010)		(0.009)		(0.009)
2 terms		0.008		-0.005		-0.001		0.007***
		(0.005)		(0.004)		(0.002)		(0.002)
3 terms		-0.002		-0.006		-0.004*		0.006**
		(0.007)		(0.004)		(0.002)		(0.002)
4 terms		0.027*		-0.001		0.001		0.030***
		(0.012)		(0.005)		(0.003)		(0.004)
5 terms		0.019		0.015**		0.046***		0.077***
		(0.014)		(0.006)		(0.006)		(0.007)
6 terms		0.055*		0.029***		0.080***		0.079***
		(0.025)		(0.007)		(0.009)		(0.010)
7 terms		0.040		0.010		0.059***		0.071***
		(0.030)		(0.008)		(0.010)		(0.011)
8 terms		0.124*		0.036**		0.060***		0.058***
		(0.054)		(0.012)		(0.010)		(0.013)
9 terms		0.085		-0.024*		0.077***		0.052***
		(0.067)		(0.011)		(0.013)		(0.014)
10+ terms		-0.055		-0.004		0.034***		0.018
		(0.040)		(0.017)		(0.008)		(0.011)
Female		-0.008		0.001		0.006*		0.013**
		(0.005)		(0.008)		(0.009)		(0.004)
Prior HoC MP		-0.005		0.004		0.018*		0.016*
		(0.031)		(0.012)		(0.009)		(0.008)
Midterm win		-0.009		-0.036***		0.001		-0.005
		(0.012)		(0.011)		(0.011)		(0.005)
By-election win		-0.013		0.002		-0.001		0.007
		(0.014)		(0.008)		(0.008)		(0.005)
Zombie win								-0.008***
								(0.002)
Pure PR win								-0.018***
								(0.003)
N	5,071	5,071	9,240	9,240	13,460	13,460	18,874	18,874
R^2	0.031	0.129	0.030	0.083	0.033	0.070	0.033	0.088
Party-cab. FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes

Note: *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Robust standard errors in parentheses. Dependent variable is a dummy variable for *Cabinet Appointment*. Only MPs from the House of Representatives are included. The Prime Minister and the House Speaker are excluded from the sample for each cabinet. All models include party-cabinet fixed effects. Model 1 estimations include no controls. Model 2 estimations include dummy variables for gender and prior service in the House of Councillors, faction fixed effects, region fixed effects, and dummies for method of election: SNTV or SMD winner (baseline), midterm replacement (*kuriage*), by-election winner, "zombie" winner, and pure PR list winner.
Source: JHRED.



Figure A.12: Longitudinal trends in the dynastic bias in gender representation for elected MPs across twelve democracies, 1945-2016.

Note: Figure shows the percent of legacies among all female MPs and percent of legacies among all male MPs in each country over time. Lower or main chambers only.

B

Data Appendix

B.1 Japanese House of Representatives Dataset (JHRED)

This panel dataset includes every single candidate who ran in any general election or by-election for the Japanese House of Representatives from 1947 to 2014. The dataset includes a total of 27,543 observations, i.e., candidate-elections, for 10,063 unique individuals, across 25 general elections.

From 1947-1993, candidates competed for votes in multi-member districts (MMD) under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system. Since electoral reform in 1994, candidates in the new mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system compete in one of 300 (reduced to 295 in 2014) single-member districts (SMD), on a party list in one of 11 regional proportional representation (PR) blocs, or dual-listed in both tiers.

The dataset is based on three separate data sets originally collected by Steven R. Reed, and then updated, expanded, and cleaned by Daniel M. Smith. The basic candidate information and electoral results were compiled from *Asahi Shimbun*, *Yomiuri Shimbun*, *Mainichi Shimbun*, and other newspaper records, as well as official election statistics from the Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs. Some candidate background information was compiled from yearly almanacs such as *Seikan Yoran*, *Seiji Handbook*, *Kokkai Binran*, candidate website profiles, *Za Senkyo*, and Wikipedia. Other sources vary, as noted, for specific variables or groups of variables.

Citation: Reed, Steven R., and Daniel M. Smith. *The Reed-Smith Japanese House of Representatives Elections Dataset (JHRED)*. Version: May 1, 2016.
URL: https://sites.google.com/site/danielmarkhamsmith/data.

B.2 Dynasties in Democracies Dataset

The Dynasties in Democracies Dataset contains 126,328 observations for members of parliament (MPs) of 15 countries, basic background information on gender and age where available, information on appointments to cabinet for parliamentary democracies, and information on each MP's membership in a political dynasty.

For some country cases, MP observations commence with the first parliament session. For other country cases, observations are limited to post-World War II parliaments. However, any dynastic ties to pre-World War II politicians are coded, as are ties to politicians in proto-parliaments and pre-independence parliaments.

Note on coding of dynasty and junior: Junior MPs are those who have family members who served in parliament (either chamber in the case of bicameral systems), the cabinet or presidency, or proto-parliaments, and served prior to the MP's own service. Local relations in many cases were collected, but are not used here for purposes of cross-national comparison. By-election winners are included, grouped with the previous general election. Dynasty codes members of families with two or more individuals who have served in national office.

Primary sources and relevant notes are provided for each country below. In most cases, primary data sources were supplemented with additional information obtained from online candidate websites and Wikipedia biographies.

Australia
Time Period:
1901 (1st House of Representatives) to 2013 (44th House of Representatives); 44 sessions.
Data Sources:
(1) ParlInfo Archive (http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/).
(2) Australian Dictionary of Biography (http://adb.anu.edu.au).
(3) Lumb, Martin (2012). "Parliamentary relations: political families in the Commonwealth Parliament." Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Library.
Research Assistance:
Anthony Ramicone, Anna Menzel.

Canada
Time Period:
1867 (1st House of Commons) to 2011 (41st House of Commons); 41 sessions.
Data Sources:
(1) ParlInfo Archive (www.parl.gc.ca/parlinfo/).
Research Assistance:
Max Goplerud.

Finland
Time Period:
1907 (1st Eduskunta) to 2011 (36th Eduskunta); 36 sessions.
Data Sources:
(1) Web archive of the Eduskunta:
(http://www.eduskunta.fi/thwfakta/hetekau/hex/hx6700f.htm).
Research Assistance:
Alex Storer.

Special Notes:
MPs whose relatives served in the Privy Council or Diet of the Grand Duchy prior to Finnish independence are coded as junior.

(West) Germany
Time Period:
1949 (1st Bundestag) to 2013 (18th Bundestag); 18 sessions.
Data Sources:
(1) Web archive of the Bundestag (www.bundestag.de).
(2) Vierhaus, Rudolf, and Ludolf Herbst (2002). *Biographisches Handbuch Der Mitglieder Des Deutschen Bundestages 1949-2001/Biographical Dictionary of Members of the German Bundestag 1949-2001.* K.G. Saur Verlag Gmbh & Co; Bilingual edition.
Research Assistance:
Carlos Schmidt-Padilla.
Special Notes:
Data are for West Germany until reunification. MPs whose relatives served in the Prussian parliament, Weimar Republic, East German parliament, etc., are coded as junior. Other nobility who did not have any close relatives in national-level political office are not coded as junior.

Iceland
Time Period:
1949 (1st postwar Althingi) to 2013 (20th postwar Althingi); 20 sessions.
Data Sources:
(1) Web archive of the Althingi (http://www.althingi.is).

Ireland
Time Period:
1918 (1st Dáil) to 2016 (32nd Dáil); 32 sessions.
Data Sources:
(1) Elections Ireland (http://electionsireland.org).
(2) Houses of the Oireachtas Archive biographies (http://www.oireachtas.ie).
(3) Gallagher, Michael (1993). *Irish Elections 1922-1944.*
(4) Gallagher, Michael (2002). *Irish Elections 1948-1977.*
(5) *Nealon's Guide*, various years from 1981-2011.
(6) *Magill Book*, various years from 1982-1987.
(7) Irish Dictionary of Biography (http://dib.cambridge.org).
(8) Irish Election Literature (http://irishelectionliterature.wordpress.com).
Research Assistance:
Mark Daley, Darragh Nolan, Aaron Roper, Max Goplerud.

Israel
Time Period:
1949 (1st Knesset) to 2015 (20th Knesset); 20 sessions.
Data Sources:
(1) Web archive of the Knesset (https://www.knesset.gov.il/mk/eng/family_eng.asp).

Italy
Time Period:

1946 (Constituent Assembly) to 2013 (17th Legislature); 18 sessions.
Data Sources:
(1) Web archive of the Chamber of Deputies (dati.camera.it).
(2) Cotta and Verzichelli [cite].
(3) Chirico and Lupoli.
Research Assistance:
Ista Zahn.
Special Notes:
MPs whose relatives served during the Kingdom of Italy (Regno d'Italia), in the National Council (Consulta Nazionale), or in the Senate are coded as junior.

Japan
Time Period:
1947 (23rd House of Representatives) to 2014 (47th House of Representatives); 25 sessions.
Data Sources:
JHRED.

New Zealand
Time Period:
1853 (1st House of Representatives) to 2014 (51st House of Representatives); 51 sessions.
Data Sources:
(1) New Zealand parliament library data archives (http://www.parliament.nz/).
(2) Encyclopedia of New Zealand (http://www.teara.govt.nz/).
(3) New Zealand History (http://www.nzhistory.net.nz/).
(4) Geni.com (http://www.geni.com/).
Research Assistance:
Aaron Roper.

Norway
Time Period:
1945 (142nd Storting) to 2013 (160th Storting); 18 sessions.
Data Sources:
(1) Storting Archive of Biographies (www.stortinget.no).
(2) Norwegian Social Science Data (NSD) Archive (http://www.nsd.uib.no/polsys/storting/).
Research Assistance:
Colleen Driscoll.

South Korea
Time Period:
1948 (Constitutional Assembly) to 2012 (19th National Assembly); 19 sessions.
Data Sources:
(1) National Assembly website (http://korea.na.go.kr/).
(2) National Assembly Museum.
Research Assistance:
Joan Cho, Danny Crichton.

Switzerland
Time Period:

1848 (1st Federal Assembly) to 2011 (49th Federal Assembly); 49 sessions.
Data Sources:
(1) Swiss Parliament Archives
(http://www.parlament.ch/e/suche/Pages/ratsmitglieder.aspx).
(2) Historical Dictionary of Switzerland (http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/index.php).
(3) Biographie-Portal (http://www.biographie-portal.eu/search).
(4) Information on the Borella family comes from: Arcobello, Francesca Mariani (2008). *Socialista di frontiera: L'avvocato Francesco Nino Borella (1883-1963)*. Bellinzona: Fondazione Pellegrini Canevascini.
Research Assistance:
Carlos Schmidt-Padilla.
Special Notes:
The Swiss Federal Assembly has two chambers: the National Council (lower chamber) and the Council of States (upper chamber). Like the U.S. Congress, seats in the lower chamber are distributed in proportion to cantonal population in the lower chamber. In the upper chamber, each canton is represented by two members, with some exceptions. The executive is called the Federal Council.

United States
Time Period:
1788 (1st Congress) to 2014 (114th Congress); 114 sessions.
Data Sources:
(1) ICPSR Study #7803.
(2) Replication data for Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Snyder (2009)
(3) Biographical Directory of the United States Congress:
(http://bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/biosearch).
Research Assistance:
Anthony Ramicone, Anna Gomez, Isabel Vasquez.
Special Notes:
Individuals whose relatives served in the Continental Congress or in the presidency or vice presidency are coded as junior. Senate terms are divided into two-year periods to overlap with House terms.

B.3 List of Interviews

Table B.1: Interviews with Japanese politicians and party organization personnel.

Name	Description	Party	Legacy?	Date	Lang.
DPJ MP "A"	HR (1); female	DPJ	No	May 27, 2011	E
DPJ Staff "A"	Party staff; male	DPJ	N/A	Jun. 15, 2011	E
DPJ Staff "B"	Party staff; male	DPJ	N/A	Jun. 15, 2011	J
Kondo Yosuke	HR (3); male	DPJ	Yes	May 26, 2011	J
Nakabayashi Mieko	HR (1); female	DPJ	No	Jun. 7, 2011	E
Oizumi Hiroko	HR (1); female	DPJ	No	Jun. 15, 2011	E
Baba Nobuyuki	HR (1); male	JRP	No	Mar. 13, 2013	J
Ueno Hiroshi	HR (1); HC (1); male	JRP	Yes	Mar. 13, 2013	J
Ota Akihiro	HR (5); male	Komeito	No	Jun. 21, 2011	J
Shirahama Kazuyoshi	HC (4); male	Komeito	No	May 31, 2011	J
Takagi Yosuke	HR (5); male	Komeito	No	June 8, 2011	J
Toyama Kiyohiko	HR (1); HC (2); male	Komeito	No	Jun. 29, 2011	E
Toyama Kiyohiko	HR (1); HC (2); male	Komeito	No	Mar. 11, 2013	E
Fukuda Tatsuo	HR (1); male	LDP	Yes	Mar. 15, 2013	J
Inoguchi Kuniko	HC (1); HR (1); female	LDP	No	May 11, 2011	E
Kono Taro	HR (5); male	LDP	Yes	Jun. 1, 2011	E
LDP MP "A"	HR (1); male	LDP	Yes	Jun. 14, 2011	E
LDP MP "B"	HR (13); male	LDP	Yes	Feb. 1, 2010	J
LDP Staff "A"	Party staff; male	LDP	No	May 31, 2011	J
LDP Staff "A"	Party staff; male	LDP	No	Mar. 14, 2013	J
Murai Hideki	HR (1); male	LDP	No	Mar. 14, 2013	J
Ono Yoshinori	HR (8); male	LDP	Yes	Apr. 22, 2011	E
Seko Hiroshige	HC (3); male	LDP	Yes	Jun. 9, 2011	J
Shibayama Masahiko	HR (3); male	LDP	No	Jun. 7, 2011	E
Shiozaki Yasuhiro	HR (6); male	LDP	Yes	Jun. 30, 2011	E
Tsuji Kiyoto	HR (1); male	LDP	No	Mar. 11, 2013	E
Tsushima Jun	HR (1); male	LDP	Yes	Mar. 15, 2013	J
Tsushima Yuji	HR (11); male	LDP	Yes	Jun. 14, 2011	E
Tsushima Yuji	HR (11); male	LDP	Yes	Jun. 17, 2011	E
Asao Keiichiro	HR (2); HC (2); male	Your Party	Yes	Mar. 13, 2013	E
Mitani Hidehiro	HR (1); male	Your Party	No	Mar. 12, 2013	J

Note: Interviewees who requested anonymity are given letters in place of names. DPJ = Democratic Party of Japan; JRP = Japan Restoration Party; LDP = Liberal Democratic Party. Language of interview: E = English, J = Japanese.

References

Abe, Hitoshi, Muneyuki Shindo and Sadafumi Kawato. 1994. *The Government and Politics of Japan.* Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press.

Adams, Julia. 2005. *The Familial State: Ruling Families and Merchant Capitalism in Early Modern Europe.* Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Akirav, Osnat. 2010. "Candidate Selection in a Crowded Parliament: The Israeli Knesset, 1988-2006." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 16(1):96–120.

Ames, Barry. 1995. "Electoral Strategy under Open-List Proportional Representation." *American Journal of Political Science* 39(2):406–433.

Amundsen, Inge. 2016. "Democratic Dynasties? Internal Party Democracy in Bangladesh." *Party Politics* 22(1):49–58.

Andeweg, Rudy B. 2000. "Ministers as Double Agents? The Delegation Process Between Cabinet and Ministers." *European Journal of Political Research* 37(3):377–395.

André, Audrey, Sam Depauw and Kris Deschouwer. 2014. "Legislators' Local Roots: Disentangling the Effect of District Magnitude." *Party Politics* 20(6):904–917.

Ansolabehere, Stephen and James M. Jr. Snyder. 2002. "The Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Elections: An Analysis of State and Federal Offices, 1942-2000." *Election Law Journal* 1(3):315–338.

Ansolabehere, Stephen, James M. Jr. Snyder and Charles I. Stewart. 2000. "Old Voters, New Voters, and the Personal Vote: Using Redistricting to Measure the Incumbency Advantage." *American Journal of Political Science* 44(1):17–34.

Anzia, Sarah F. and Christopher R. Berry. 2011. "The Jackie (and Jill) Robinson Effect: Why Do Congresswomen Outperform Congressmen?" *American Journal of Political Science* 55(3):478–493.

Ariga, Kenichi. 2015. "Incumbency Disadvantage under Electoral Rules with Intra-party Competition: Evidence from Japan." *The Journal of Politics* 77(3):874–887.

Ariga, Kenichi, Yusaku Horiuchi, Roland Mansilla and Michio Umeda. 2016. "No Sorting, No Advantage: Regression Discontinuity Estimates of Incumbency Advantage in Japan." *Electoral Studies* 43:21–31.

Asako, Yasushi, Takeshi Iida, Tetsuya Matsubayashi and Michiko Ueda. 2015. "Dynastic Politicians: Theory and Evidence from Japan." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 16(1):5–32.

Asano, Masahiko. 2006. *Shimin Shakai ni okeru Seido Kaikaku: Senkyo Seido to Kohosha Rikuruto [System Reform at the Level of Civil Society: Electoral System and Candidate Recruitment].* Tokyo: Keio University Press.

Bäck, Hanna, Marc Debus and Jochen Müller. 2014. "Who Takes the Parliamentary Floor? The Role of Gender in Speech-making in the Swedish *Riksdag*." *Political Research Quarterly* 67(3):504–518.

Bäck, Hanna, Marc Debus and Patrick Dumont. 2011. "Who Gets What in Coalition Governments? Predictors of Portfolio Allocation in Parliamentary Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 50(4):441–478.

Baerwald, Hans H. 1986. *Party Politics in Japan*. Boston, MA: Allen & Unwin, Inc.

Ban, Radu and Vijayendra Rao. 2008. "Tokenism or Agency? The Impact of Women's Reservations on Village Democracies in South India." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 56(3):501–530.

Banks, Jeffrey S. and D. Roderick Kiewiet. 1989. "Explaining Patterns of Candidate Competition in Congressional Elections." *American Journal of Political Science,* 33(4):997–1015.

Basu, Amrita. 2016. Women, Dynasties, and Democracy in India. In *Democratic Dynasties: State, Party, and Family in Contemporary Indian Politics*, ed. Kanchan Chandra. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press pp. 127–160.

Bates, Robert H., Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry R. Weingast, eds. 1998. *Analytic Narratives*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Batto, Nathan F. 2015. "Fewer Rungs, More Political Families: Legacy Candidates in Taiwan Elections." Paper presented at the 2015 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Bechtel, Michael M., Jens Hainmueller and Yotam M. Margalit. 2014. "Exploring the Multidimensionality of Preferences for International Redistribution: The Case of the Eurozone Bailouts." Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2163594 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2163594.

Bechtel, Michael M. and Kenneth F. Scheve. 2013. "Mass Support for Global Climate Agreements Depends on Institutional Design." *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 110(34):13763–13768.

Benedict, Ruth. 1946. *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*. New York, NY: Routledge & K. Paul.

Bennett, John W. and Iwao Ishino. 1963. *Paternalism in the Japanese Economy: Anthropological Studies of Oyabun-Kobun Patterns*. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.

Berlinski, Samuel, Torun Dewan and Brenda Van Coppenolle. 2014. "Franchise Extension and the British Aristocracy." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 39(4):531–558.

Bertrand, Marianne, Simon Johnson, Krislert Samphantharak and Antoinette Schoar. 2008. "Mixing Family with Business: A Study of Thai Business Groups and the Families Behind Them." *Journal of Financial Economics* 88(3):466–498.

Besley, Timothy. 2005. "Political Selection." *Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association* 19(3):43–60.

Besley, Timothy and Marta Reynal-Querol. 2013. "Selection via Dynasties: Theory and Evidence." Unpublished manuscript.

Best, Heinrich and Maurizio Cotta, eds. 2000. *Parliamentary Representatives In Europe 1848-2000: Legislative Recruitment and Careers in Eleven European Countries*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Bestor, Theodore C. 2004. *Tsukiji: The Fish Market at the Center of the World*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Blau, Peter M. and Otis Dudley Duncan. 1967. *The American Occupational Structure*. New York: John Wiley and Sons.

Blei, David and John Lafferty. 2009. Topic Models. In *Text Mining: Theory and Applications*, ed. A. Srivastava and M. Sahami. Taylor and Francis.

Blondel, Jean and Jean-Louis Thiébault. 1991. *The Profession of Government Minister in Western Europe*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

Bragança, Arthur, Claudio Ferraz and Juan Rios. 2015. "Political Dynasties and the Quality of Government." Stanford University, mimeo.

Bratton, Kathleen A. and Leonard P. Ray. 2002. "Descriptive Representation, Policy Outcomes, and Municipal Day-Care Coverage in Norway." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(2):428–437.

Brookhiser, Richard. 2002. *America's First Dynasty: The Adamses, 1735-1918*. New York, NY: The Free Press.

Brownlee, Jason. 2007. "Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies." *World Politics* 59(4):595–628.

Burden, Barry C. and David C. Kimball. 2004. *Why Americans Split Their Tickets: Campaigns, Competition and Divided Government*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Burkart, Mike, Fausto Panunzi and Andrei Shleifer. 2003. "Family Firms." *The Journal of Finance* 58(5):2167–2201.

Cain, Bruce E., John A. Ferejohn and Morris P. Fiorina. 1987. *The Personal Vote: Constituency Service and Electoral Independence*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Camp, Roderic A. 1982. "Family Relationships in Mexican Politics: A Preliminary View." *The Journal of Politics* 44(3):848–862.

Carey, John M. 2009. *Legislative Voting and Accountability*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Carey, John M. and Matthew S. Shugart. 1995. "Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas." *Electoral Studies* 14(4):417–440.

Carey, John M., Richard G. Niemi and Lynda W. Powell. 2000. "Incumbency and the Probability of Reelection in State Legislative Elections." *The Journal of Politics* 62(3):671–700.

Carlson, Matthew. 2007. *Money Politics in Japan: New Rules, Old Practices*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Carnes, Nicholas and Noam Lupu. forthcoming. "Do Voters Dislike Working-Class Candidates? Voter Biases and the Descriptive Underrepresentation of the Working Class." *American Political Science Review* .

Carroll, Royce, Gary W. Cox and Mónica Pachón. 2006. "How Parties Create Electoral Democracy, Chapter 2." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31(2):153–174.

Carson, Jamie L., Erik J. Engstrom and Jason M. Roberts. 2007. "Candidate Quality, the Personal Vote, and the Incumbency Advantage in Congress." *American Political Science Review* 101(2):289–301.

Carty, R. Kenneth and William Cross. 2010. Political Parties and the Practice of Brokerage Politics. In *The Oxford Handbook of Canadian Politics*, ed. John C. Courtney and David E. Smith. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press pp. 191–207.

Casas-Arce, Pablo and Albert Saiz. 2015. "Women and Power: Unpopular, Unwilling, or Held Back?" *Journal of Political Economy* 123(3):641–669.

Catalinac, Amy. 2016*a*. *Electoral Reform and National Security in Japan: From Pork to Foreign Policy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Catalinac, Amy. 2016*b*. "From Pork to Policy: The Rise of Programmatic Campaigning in Japanese Elections." *The Journal of Politics* 78(1):1–18.

Caughey, Devin and Jasjeet S. Sekhon. 2011. "Elections and the Regression Discontinuity Design: Lessons from Close U.S. House Races, 1942-2008." *Political Analysis* 19(4):385–408.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2016. Democratic Dynasties: State, Party, and Family in Contemporary Indian Politics. In *Democratic Dynasties: State, Party, and Family in Contemporary Indian Politics*, ed. Kanchan Chandra. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press pp. 10–50.

Chandra, Kanchan, Anjali Bohlken and Simon Chauchard. 2014. "Dataset on Dynasticism in the Indian Parliament." Provided by the authors.

Chang, Eric C.C. and Miriam Golden. 2006. "Electoral Systems, District Magnitude, and Corruption." *British Journal of Political Science* 37(1):115–137.

Chattopadhyay, Raghabendra and Esther Duflo. 2004. "Women as Policy Makers: Evidence from a Randomized Policy Experiment in India." *Econometrica* 72(5):1409–1443.

Chhibber, Pradeep. 2013. "Dynastic Parties: Organization, Finance and Impact." *Party Politics* 19(2):277–295.

Chirico, Danilo and Raffaele Lupoli. 2008. *Onorevoli Figli di: i Parenti, i Portaborse, le Lobby Istantanea del Nuovo Parlamento*. Italy: Rinascita.

Christensen, Raymond V. 1994. "Electoral Reform in Japan: How It was Enacted and Changes It May Bring." *Asian Survey* 34(7):589–605.

Cirone, Alexandra and Carlos Velasco Rivera. 2016. "Electoral Reform and Dynastic Politics: Evidence from the French Third Republic." Working paper.

Clubok, Alfred B., Norman M. Wilensky and Forrest J. Berghorn. 1969. "Family Relationships, Congressional Recruitment, and Political Modernization." *The Journal of Politics* 31(4):1035–1062.

Cowhey, Peter F. and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1995. Conclusion. In *Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States*, ed. Peter F. Cowhey and Mathew D. McCubbins. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press pp. 253–260.

Cox, Gary W. and Jonathan N. Katz. 1996. "Why Did the Incumbency Advantage in U.S. House Elections Grow?" *American Journal of Political Science* 40(2):478–497.

Cox, Gary W. and Scott Morgenstern. 1995. "The Incumbency Advantage in Multimember Districts: Evidence from the U.S. States." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 20(3):329–349.

Cox, Nicholas J. 2008. "Speaking Stata: Spineplots and Their Kin." *The Stata Journal* 8(1):105–121.

Crisp, Brian F., Kathryn M. Jensen and Yael Shomer. 2007. "Magnitude and Vote Seeking." *Electoral Studies* 26(1):727–734.

Cross, William. 2008. "Democratic Norms and Candidate Selection." *Party Politics* 14(2):596–619.

Crotty, William J. 1968. The Party Organization and its Activities. In *Approaches to the Study of Party Organization*, ed. William J. Crotty. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon pp. 247–306.

Curtis, Gerald L. 1971. *Election Campaigning, Japanese Style*. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

Curtis, Gerald L. 1979. The Opposition. In *A Season of Voting: Japanese Elections of 1976 and 1977*, ed. Herbert Passin. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute pp. 43–80.

Curtis, Gerald L. 1988. *The Japanese Way of Politics*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Dal Bó, Ernesto, Frederico Finan, Olle Folke, Torsten Persson and Johanna Rickne. 2016. "Who Becomes a Politician." Mimeo, Stockholm University.

Dal Bó, Ernesto, Pedro Dal Bó and Jason Snyder. 2009. "Political Dynasties." *Review of Economic Studies* 76(1):115–142.

Darcy, R. and David L. Nixon. 1996. "Women in the 1946 and 1993 Japanese House of Representatives Elections: The Role of the Election System." *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 15(1):3–19.

Dewan, Torun and Keith Dowding. 2005. "The Corrective Effect of Ministerial Resignations on Government Popularity." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(1):46–56.

Dewan, Torun and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 2011. "Political Economy Models of Elections." *Annual Review of Political Science* 14:311–330.

Di Virgilio, Aldo and Steven R. Reed. 2011. Nominating Candidates under New Rules in Italy and Japan: You Cannot Bargain with Resources You Do Not Have. In *A Natural Experiment on Electoral Law Reform: Evaluating the Long Run Consequences of 1990s Electoral Reform in Italy and Japan*, ed. Daniela Giannetti and Bernard Grofman. New York, NY: Springer-Verlag pp. 59–73.

Dowding, Keith and Patrick Dumont, eds. 2009. *The Selection of Ministers in Europe: Hiring and Firing*. New York: Routledge.

Dowding, Keith and Patrick Dumont, eds. 2014. *The Selection of Ministers Around the World: A Comparative Study*. London: Routledge.

Dower, John W. 1999. *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II*. New York, NY: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc.

Droop, Henry Richmond. 1881. "On Methods of Electing Representatives." *Journal of the Statistical Society of London* 44(2):141–196.

Durante, Ruben, Giovanna Labartino and Roberto Perotti. 2011. "Academic Dynasties: Decentralization and Familism in the Italian Academia." NBER Working Paper No. 17572.

Duverger, Maurice. 1954. *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State*. New York: John Wiley.

Eggers, Andrew C., Anthony Fowler, Jens Hainmueller, Andrew B. Hall and James M. Jr. Snyder. 2015. "On the Validity of the Regression Discontinuity Design for Estimating Electoral Effects: New Evidence from Over 40,000 Close Races." *American Journal of Political Science* 59(1):259–274.

Ehrenhalt, Alan. 1991. *The United States of Ambition: Politicians, Power, and the Pursuit of Office*. New York, NY: Times Books.

Ehrhardt, George, Axel Klein, Levi McLaughlin and Steven R. Reed, eds. 2014. *Komeito: Politics and Religion in Japan*. Berkeley, CA: The Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.

Epstein, David, David Brady, Sadafumi Kawato and Sharyn O'Halloran. 1997. "A Comparative Approach to Legislative Organization: Careerism and Seniority in the United States and Japan." *American Journal of Political Science* 41(3):965–998.

Epstein, Leon D. 1980. *Political Parties in Western Democracies*. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, Inc.

Er, Lam Peng. 1996. "The Japanese Communist Party: Organization and Resilience in the Midst of Adversity." *Pacific Affairs* 69(3):361–379.

Erickson, Lynda and R.K. Carty. 1991. "Parties and Candidate Selection in the 1988 Canadian General Election." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 24(2):331–349.

Erikson, Robert S. 1971. "The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections." *Polity* 3(3):395–405.

Erikson, Robert S. and Rocío Titiunik. 2015. "Using Regression Discontinuity to Uncover the Personal Incumbency Advantage." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 10:101–119.

Esteve-Volart, Berta and Manuel Bagues. 2012. "Are Women Pawns in the Political Game? Evidence from Elections to the Spanish Senate." *Journal of Public Economics* 96(3-4):387–399.

Estévez-Abe, Margarita. 2006. "Japan's Shift toward a Westminster System: A Structural Analysis of the 2005 Lower House Election and Its Aftermath." *Asian Survey* 46(4):632–651.

Faas, Thorsten. 2003. "To Defect or Not to Defect? National, Institutional and Party Group Pressures on MEPs and Their Consequences for Party Group Cohesion in the European Parliament." *European Journal of Political Research* 42(6):841–866.

Fallon, Johnny. 2011. *Dynasties: Irish Political Families*. Dublin: New Island.

Feinstein, Brian D. 2010. "The Dynasty Advantage: Family Ties in Congressional Elections." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 25(4):571–598.

Fenno, Richard F. 1978. *Home Style: House Members in their Districts*. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.

Fiva, Jon H. and Daniel M. Smith. 2016. "Political Dynasties and the Incumbency Advantage in Party-Centered Environments." Mimeo.

Folke, Olle and Johanna Rickne. 2016. "The Glass Ceiling in Politics: Formalization and Empirical Tests." *Comparative Political Studies* Published online before print, doi: 10.1177/0010414015621073.

Folke, Olle, Torsten Persson and Johanna Rickne. 2015. "Dynastic Political Rents." Uppsala University, mimeo.

Fowler, Anthony and Andrew B. Hall. 2014. "Disentangling the Personal and Partisan Incumbency Advantages: Evidence from Close Elections and Term Limits." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* 9(4):501–531.

Fowler, Linda L. and Robert D. McClure. 1989. *Political Ambition: Who Decides to Run for Congress*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

Franchino, Fabio and Francesco Zucchini. 2014. "Voting in a Multi-dimensional Space: A Conjoint Analysis Employing Valence and Ideology Attributes of Candidates." *Political Science Research and Methods* FirstView Article / November 2014, pp 1 - 21 DOI: 10.1017/psrm.2014.24, Published online: 28 October 2014.

Fujimura, Naofumi. 2015. "The Influence of Electoral Institutions on Legislative Representation: Evidence from Japan's Single Non-transferable Vote and Single-Member District Systems." *Party Politics* 21(2):209–221.

Fukui, Haruhiro. 1997. Japan. In *Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies*, ed. Pippa Norris. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press pp. 98–113.

Fukumoto, Kentaro and Kaoru Nakagawa. 2013. "Tokuhyo no Keisho no Tai Suru Seshuu no Koka: Seito Tohyo, Kohosha Tohyo no Hikaku [The Effect of the Hereditary Inheritance of Votes: A Comparison of Party and Personal Votes) Votes?: A Comparison Of Party and Personal Votes]." *Senkyo Kenkyu [Electoral Studies]* 29(2):118–128.

Gagliarducci, Stefano and M. Daniele Paserman. 2012. "Gender Interactions within Hierarchies: Evidence from the Political Arena." *The Review of Economic Studies* 79(3):1021–1052.

Gagliarducci, Stefano and Marco Manacorda. 2016. "Politics in the Family: Nepotism and the Hiring Decisions of Italian Firms." The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) Discussion Paper No. 9841.

Gaines, Brian J. 1998. "The Impersonal Vote? Constituency Service and Incumbency Advantage in British Elections, 1950-92." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 23(2):167–195.

Gallagher, Michael. 1988*a*. Introduction. In *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics*, ed. Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh. London, UK: SAGE Publications pp. 1–19.

Gallagher, Michael. 1988*b*. Ireland: The Increasing Role of Centre. In *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics*, ed. Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh. London, UK: SAGE Publications pp. 119–144.

Gallagher, Michael. 2003. Ireland: Party Loyalists with a Personal Base. In *The Political Class in Advanced Democracies*, ed. Jens Bouchert and Jürgen Zeiss. Oxford University Press pp. 187–202.

Gamson, William A. 1961. "A Theory of Coalition Formation." *American Sociological Review* 26(3):373–382.

Ganzeboom, Harry B. G., Donald J. Treiman and Wout Ultee. 1991. "Comparative Intergenerational Stratification Research: Three Generations and Beyond." *Annual Review of Sociology* 17:277–302.

Garand, James C. 1991. "Electoral Marginality in State Legislative Elections." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 16(1):7–28.

Gaunder, Alisa. 2013. The DPJ and Women: The Limited Impact of the 2009 Alternation of Power on Policy and Governance. In *Japan under the DPJ: The Politics of Transition and Governance*, ed. Kenji E. Kushida and Phillip Y. Lipscy. Stanford, CA: The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

Gelman, Andrew and Gary King. 1990. "Estimating Incumbency Advantage Without Bias." *American Journal of Political Science* 34(4):1142–1164.

Geys, Benny. 2016. "Political Dynasties, Electoral Institutions and Politicians' Human Capital." Norwegian Business School, mimeo.

Geys, Benny and Daniel M. Smith. 2016. "Political Dynasties in Democracies: Causes, Consequences, and Remaining Puzzles." Mimeo.

Geys, Benny and Karsten Mause. 2014. "Are Female Legislators Different? Exploring Sex Differences in German MPs' Outside Interests." *Parliamentary Affairs* 67(4):841–865.

Gidengil, Elisabeth. 2010. Challenge and Change: Elections and Voting. In *The Oxford Handbook of Canadian Politics*, ed. John C. Courtney and David E. Smith. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press pp. 226–243.

Gluck, Carol. 1985. *Japan's Modern Myths: Ideology in the Late Meiji Period*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Golden, Miriam A. and Lucio Picci. 2015. "Incumbency Effects under Proportional Representation: Leaders and Backbenchers in the Postwar Italian Chamber of Deputies." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 40(4):509–538.

Gordon, Andrew. 2003. *A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Gordon, Sanford C., Gregory A. Huber and Dimitri Landa. 2007. "Challenger Entry and Voter Learning." *American Political Science Review* 101(2):303–320.

Grimmer, Justin. 2013. *Representational Style: What Legislators Say and Why It Matters*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Grofman, Bernard. 2005. "Comparisons Among Electoral Systems: Distinguishing Between Localism and Candidate-Centered Politics." *Electoral Studies* 24(1):735–740.

Hainmueller, Jens and Daniel J. Hopkins. 2014. "The Hidden American Immigration Consensus: A Conjoint Analysis of Attitudes toward Immigrants." *American Journal of Political Science* 00(0):1–20.

Hainmueller, Jens, Daniel J. Hopkins and Teppei Yamamoto. 2014. "Causal Inference in Conjoint Analysis: Understanding Multi-dimensional Preferences via Stated Preference Experiments." *Political Analysis* 22(1):1–30.

Hall, Andrew B. and James M. Jr. Snyder. 2015. "How Much of the Incumbency Advantage is Due to Scare-Off?" *Political Science Research and Methods* 3(3):493–514.

Hall, Peter A. and Rosemary C.R. Taylor. 1996. "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms." *Political Studies* 44(5):936–957.

Harada, Masataka and Daniel M. Smith. 2014. "You Have to Pay to Play: Candidate and Party Responses to the High Cost of Elections in Japan." *Electoral Studies* 36(1):51–64.

Hayao, Kenji. 1993. *The Japanese Prime Minister and Public Policy*. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Hazan, Reuven Y. and Gideon Rahat. 2010. *Democracy Within Parties: Candidate Selection Methods and Their Political Consequences*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Hess, Stephen. 1966. *America's Political Dynasties: From Adams to Kennedy*. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Company, Inc.

Hibbing, John R. 1999. "Legislative Careers: Why and How We Should Study Them." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 24(2):149–171.

Higashi, Yasuhiro. 2008*a*. Minshuto no Hata Age [Raising the Flag of the DPJ]. In *Minshuto Junen-shi [Ten Year History of the DPJ]*, ed. Tamiyoshi Tachibana. Tokyo: Daiichi Shorin pp. 43–80.

Higashi, Yasuhiro. 2008*b*. Minshuto to Jiyuto no Gappei [DPJ-Liberal Party Merger]. In *Minshuto Junen-shi [Ten Year History of the DPJ]*, ed. Tamiyoshi Tachibana. Tokyo: Daiichi Shorin pp. 81–98.

Hirano, Shigeo. 2006. "Electoral Institutions, Hometowns, and Favored Minorities: Evidence from Japanese Electoral Reforms." *World Politics* 59(1):51–82.

Hirano, Shigeo and James M. Jr. Snyder. 2009. "Using Multimember District Elections to Estimate the Sources of the Incumbency Advantage." *American Journal of Political Science* 53(2):292–306.

Hix, Simon. 2004. "Electoral Institutions and Legislative Behavior: Explaining Voting Defection in the European Parliament." *World Politics* 56(2):194–223.

Horiuchi, Yusaku, Daniel M. Smith and Teppei Yamamoto. 2016*a*. "Identifying Multidimensional Policy Preferences of Voters in Representative Democracies: A Conjoint Field Experiment in Japan." Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2627907 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2627907.

Horiuchi, Yusaku, Daniel M. Smith and Teppei Yamamoto. 2016*b*. "Identifying Voter Preferences for Politicians' Personal Attributes: A Conjoint Experiment in Japan." Paper presented at the 2016 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

Hrebenar, Ronald J. 1992. The Komeito: Party of "Buddhist Democracy". In *The Japanese Party System*, ed. Ronald J. Hrebenar. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, Inc. pp. 151–183.

Ichikawa, Taichi. 1990. *'Seshu' Daigishi no Kenkyu [Study of Hereditary Diet Members]*. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shinbunsha.

Igarashi, Akio. 1986. "Seijika Nisei: Mezase Nagatcho Ichibanchi [Second-Generation Politicians: Aiming for Number One, Nagatacho]." *Ushio* pp. 110–137.

Iijima, Isao. 2006. *Koizumi Kantei Hiroku [Secrets of the Koizumi Administration]*. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha.

Ike, Nobutaka. 1957. *Japanese Politics: An Introductory Survey*. New York, NY: Alfred A. Knopf.

Inaida, Shigeru. 2009. *Seshu Giin: Kozo to Mondai-ten [Hereditary Diet Members: Structure and Problems]*. Tokyo: Kodansha.

Ishibashi, Michihiro and Steven R. Reed. 1992. "Second-Generation Diet Members and Democracy in Japan: Hereditary Seats." *Asian Survey* 32(4):366–379.

Ishikawa, Masumi and Michisada Hirose. 1989. *Jiminto: Choki Shihai no Kozo [LDP: The Structure of Long-term Rule]*. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten.

Isoda, Michifumi. 1998. "Daimyo Kashindan no Tsukon Kozo." *Shakai Keizai Shigaku* 63(5):599–628.

Itoh, Mayumi. 2003. *The Hatoyama Dynasty: Japanese Political Leadership Through the Generations*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Iwai, Tomoaki. 1990. *Seiji Shikin no Kenkyu: Rieki Yudo no Nihon-teki Seiji Fudo [Study of Political Funds: Japanese Political Culture of Influence Peddling]*. Tokyo: Tankobon.

Jacobson, Gary C. 1987. "The Marginals Never Vanished: Incumbency and Competition in Elections to the U.S. House of Representatives." *American Journal of Political Science* 31(1):126–141.

Jacobson, Gary C. 1989. "Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of U.S. House Elections, 1946-86." *The American Political Science Review* 83(3):773–793.

Jacobson, Gary C. 2001. *The Politics of Congressional Elections*. 5th edition ed. Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.

Jacobson, Gary C. and Samuel Kernell. 1983. *Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Jalalzai, Farida. 2013. *Shattered, Cracked, or Firmly Intact? Women and the Executive Glass Ceiling Worldwide*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Jewell, Malcolm E. and David Breaux. 1988. "The Effect of Incumbency on State Legislative Elections." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 13(4):495–514.

Johnson, Joel W. and Jessica S. Wallack. 2012. "Electoral Systems and the Personal Vote." Harvard Dataverse, V1: http://hdl.handle.net/1902.1/17901.

Kam, Christopher, William T. Bianco, Itai Sened and Regina Smyth. 2010. "Ministerial Selection and Intraparty Organization in the Contemporary British Parliament." *American Political Science Review* 104(2):289–306.

Kato, Junko and Yuto Kannon. 2008. "Coalition Governments, Party Switching, and the Rise and Decline of Parties: Changing Japanese Party Politics since 1993." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 9(3):341–365.

Katz, Richard S. and Peter Mair. 1995. "Changing Models of Party Organization and Party Democracy The Emergence of the Cartel Party." *Party Politics* 1(1):5–28.

Kawato, Sadafumi. 2000. "Strategic Contexts of the Vote on Political Reform Bills." *Japanese Journal of Political Science* 1(1):23–51.

Kawato, Sadafumi. 2002. The Study of Japan's Medium-Sized District System. In *Legislatures: Comparative Perspectives on Representative Assemblies*, ed. Gerhard Loewenberg, Peverill Squire and D. Roderick Kiewiet. Michigan University Press pp. 178–198.

Kazee, Thomas A., ed. 1994. *Who Runs for Congress? Ambition, Context, and Candidate Emergence*. Washington, DC: Congressional Quarterly, Inc.

Keefer, Philip and Stuti Khemani. 2009. "When Do Legislators Pass on Pork? The Role of Political Parties in Determining Legislator Effort." *The American Political Science Review* 103(1):99–112.

Kerby, Matthew. 2009. "Worth the Wait: Determinants of Ministerial Appointment in Canada, 1935–2008." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 42(3):593–611.

Kiewiet, D. Roderick and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1991. *The Logic of Delegation*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Kincaid, Diane D. 1978. "Over His Dead Body: A Positive Perspective on Widows in the U.S. Congress." *The Western Political Quarterly* 31(1):96–104.

King, Gary, Robert O. Keohane and Sidney Verba. 1994. *Designing Social Inquiry: Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kirchheimer, Otto. 1966. The Transformation of West European Party Systems. In *Political Parties and Political Development*, ed. Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press pp. 177–200.

Kitaoka, Shinichi. 1985. Jiyu Minshuto [The Liberal Democratic Party]. In *Gendai Nihon no Seiji Kozo [Structure of Contemporary Japanese Politics]*, ed. Jiro Kamishima. Kyoto: Horitsu Bunkasha.

Koellner, Patrick. 2011. The Democratic Party of Japan: Development, Organization, and Programmatic Profile. In *The Routledge Handbook of Japanese Politics*, ed. Alisa Gaunder. New York, NY: Routledge pp. 24–35.

Kohno, Masaru. 1997. *Japan's Postwar Party Politics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Kostadinova, Tatiana. 2007. "Ethnic and Women's Representation under Mixed Election Systems." *Electoral Studies* 26(2):418–431.

Krauss, Ellis, Kuniaki Nemoto and Robert Pekkanen. 2012. "Reverse Contamination: Burning and Building Bridges in Mixed-Member Systems." *Comparative Political Studies* 45(6):747–773.

Krauss, Ellis S. and Robert J. Pekkanen. 2011. *The Rise and Fall of Japan's LDP: Political Organizations as Historical Institutions*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Krook, Mona Lena. 2006. "Reforming Representation: The Diffusion of Candidate Gender Quotas Worldwide." *Politics & Gender* 2(3):303–327.

Krook, Mona Lena. 2010. "Beyond Supply and Demand: A Feminist-Institutionalist Theory of Candidate Selection." *Political Research Quarterly* 63(4):707–720.

Krook, Mona Lena and Fiona MacKay, eds. 2011. *Gender, Politics, and Institutions: Towards a Feminist Institutionalism*. New York, NY: Palgrave.

Laband, David N. and Bernard F. Lentz. 1983. "Like Father, like Son: Toward an Economic Theory of Occupational Following." *Southern Economic Journal* 50(2):474–493.

Laband, David N. and Bernard F. Lentz. 1985. "Favorite Sons: Intergenerational Wealth Transfers Among Politicians." *Economic Inquiry* 23(1).

Labonne, Julien, Sahar Parsa and Pablo Querubin. 2015. "Political Dynasties, Term Limits and Female Political Empowerment: Evidence from the Philippines." New York University, mimeo.

Lancaster, Thomas D. and W. David Patterson. 1990. "Comparative Pork Barrel Politics: Perceptions from the West German Bundestag." *Comparative Political Studies* 22(4):458–477.

Laver, Michael and Kenneth A. Shepsle. 1996. *Making and Breaking Governments*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Laver, Michael and Kenneth A. Shepsle, eds. 1994. *Cabinet Ministers and Parliamentary Government*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Laver, Michael and Norman Schofield. 1998. *Multiparty Government: The Politics of Coalition in Europe*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Lawless, Jennifer L. 2012. *Becoming a Candidate: Political Ambition and the Decision to Run for Office*. Cambridge University Press.

Lawless, Jennifer L. and Richard L. Fox. 2010. *It Still Takes a Candidate: Why Women Don't Run for Office*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Lee, David S. 2008. "Randomized Experiments from Non-Random Selection in U.S. House Elections." *Journal of Econometrics* 142(2):675–697.

Leiserson, Michael. 1968. "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan: An Interpretation Based on the Theory of Games." *The American Political Science Review* 62(3):770–787.

Levitt, Steven D. and Catherine D. Wolfram. 1997. "Decomposing the Sources of Incumbency Advantage in the U.S. House." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 22(1):45–60.

Liang, Che-Yuan. 2013. "Is There an Incumbency Advantage or Cost of Ruling in Proportional Election Systems?" *Public Choice* 154(3-4):259–284.

Lipset, Seymour Martin and Stein Rokkan. 1967. *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives*. Toronto: The Free Press.

Lundell, Krister. 2004. "Determinants of Candidate Selection: Degree of Centralization in Comparative Perspective." *Party Politics* 10(1):25–47.

Lupia, Arthur and Mathew D. McCubbins. 1998. *The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Machidori, Satoshi. 2012. *Shushō Seiji no Seido Bunseki: Gendai Nihon Seiji no Kenryoku Kiban Keisei [The Japanese Premiership: An Institutional Analysis of the Power Relations]*. Tokyo: Chikura Shobo.

Maeda, Ko. 2009. Has the Electoral System Reform Made Japanese Elections Party-Centered? In *Political Change in Japan: Electoral Behavior, Party Realignment, and the Koizumi Reforms*, ed. Steven R. Reed, Kenneth Mori McElwain and Kay Shimizu. Stanford, CA: The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center pp. 47–66.

Mahoney, James and Kathleen Thelen. 2009. A Theory of Gradual Institutional Change. In *Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and Power*, ed. James Mahoney and Kathleen Thelen. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press pp. 1–37.

Mair, Peter, Wolfgang C. Müller and Fritz Plasser. 2004. Introduction: Electoral Challenges and Party Responses. In *Political Parties and Electoral Change: Party Responses to Electoral Markets*, ed. Peter Mair, Wolfgang C. Müller and Fritz Plasser. London, UK: SAGE Publications pp. 1–19.

Manow, Philip. 2015. *Mixed Rules, Mixed Strategies: Candidates and Parties in Germany's Electoral System*. Colchester, UK: ECPR Press.

Mansbridge, Jane. 1999. "Should Blacks Represent Blacks and Women Represent Women? A Contingent 'Yes.'" *The Journal of Politics* 61(3):628–657.

Marangoni, Francesco and Filippo Tronconi. 2011. "When Territory Matters: Parliamentary Profiles and Legislative Behaviour in Italy (1987-2008)." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 17(4):415–434.

March, James G. and Johan P. Olsen. 1984. "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life." *The American Political Science Review* 78(3):734–749.

Marsh, Michael. 2007. "Candidates or Parties?: Objects of Electoral Choice in Ireland." *Party Politics* 13(4):500–527.

Martin, Shane. 2014. "Why Electoral Systems Don't Always Matter: The Impact of 'Mega-seats' on Legislative Behaviour in Ireland." *Party Politics* 20(3):467–479.

Martin, Shane. 2016. "Policy, Office, *and* Votes: The Electoral Value of Ministerial Office." *British Journal of Political Science* 46(2):281–296.

Mason, Richard H.P. 1969. *Japan's First General Election, 1890*. London, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Masumi, Junnosuke. 1995. *Contemporary Politics in Japan*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Masuyama, Mikitaka and Benjamin Nyblade. 2014. Ministerial Selection and Deselection in Japan. In *The Selection of Ministers Around the World: A Comparative Study*, ed. Keith Dowding and Patrick Dumont. Routledge pp. 61–83.

Matland, Richard E. 1998. "Women's Representation in National Legislatures: Developed and Developing Countries." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 23(1):109–125.

Matsuzaki, Tetsuhisa. 1991. *Nihon-gata demokrashii no gyakusetsu: 2-sei giin ha naze umareru no ka*. Tokyo: Toujusha.

Mayhew, David R. 1974*a*. *Congress: The Electoral Connection*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Mayhew, David R. 1974*b*. "Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals." *Polity* 6(3):295–317.

McCubbins, Mathew D. and Frances M. Rosenbluth. 1995. Party Provision for Personal Politics: Dividing the Vote in Japan. In *Structure and Policy in Japan and the United States*, ed. Peter F. Cowhey and Mathew D. McCubbins. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press pp. 35–55.

McElwain, Kenneth Mori. 2008. "Manipulating Electoral Rules to Manufacture Single-Party Dominance." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(1):32–47.

McElwain, Kenneth Mori. 2012. "The Nationalization of Japanese Elections." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 12(3):323–350.

McKean, Margaret and Ethan Scheiner. 2000. "Japan's New Electoral System: La Plus ça Change…." *Electoral Studies* 19(1):447–477.

McMillan, M.E. 2013. *Fathers and Sons: The Rise and Fall of Political Dynasty in the Middle East*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Mendoza, Ronald U., Edsel L. Jr. Beja, Victor S. Venida and David B. Yap. 2012. "An Empirical Analysis of Political Dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress." Asia Institute of Management Working Paper.

Mershon, Carol. 2001. "Contending Models of Portfolio Allocation and Office Payoffs to Party Factions: Italy, 1963-79." *American Journal of Political Science* 45(2):277–293.

Michels, Robert. 1915. *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy.* New York, NY: Hearst's International Library Co.

Mills, C. W. 1956. *The Power Elite.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mizusaki, Takashi and Hiroshi Mori. 2007. *Sosenkyo no Tokuhyo Bunseki: 1958-2005 [Analysis of Voting in Japanese General Elections: 1958-2005].* Tokyo: Bokutakusha.

Monday, Chris. 2011. "Family Rule as the Highest Stage of Communism." *Asian Survey* 51(5):812–843.

Mosca, Gaetano. 1939. *The Ruling Class (Elementi di Scienza Politica).* New York and London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc.

Moser, Robert G. 2008. "Electoral Systems and the Representation of Ethnic Minorities: Evidence from Russia." *Comparative Politics* 40(3):273–292.

Moser, Robert G. and Ethan Scheiner. 2012. *Electoral Systems and Political Context: How the Effects of Rules Vary Across New and Established Democracies.* Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Moser, Scott and Andrew Reeves. 2014. "Taking the Leap: Voting, Rhetoric, and the Determinants of Electoral Reform." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 39(4):467–502.

Müller, Wolfgang C. 2000. "Political Parties in Parliamentary Democracies: Making Delegation and Accountability Work." *European Journal of Political Research* 37(3):309–333.

Müller, Wolfgang C. and Kaare Strøm. 2000. Coalition Governance in Western Europe: An Introduction. In *Coalition Governments in Western Europe*, ed. Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm. Oxford: Oxford University Press pp. 1–31.

Müller, Wolfgang C. and Kaare Strøm, eds. 1999. *Policy, Office, or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Müller, Wolfgang C. and Ulrich Sieberer. 2006. Party Law. In *Handbook of Party Politics*, ed. Richard S. Katz and William J. Crotty. London, UK: Sage Publications, Ltd. pp. 435–445.

Nakane, Chie. 1970. *Japanese Society.* Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press.

Nemoto, Kuniaki and Matthew S. Shugart. 2013. "Localism and Coordination Under Three Different Electoral Systems: The National District of the Japanese House of Councillorshree different electoral systems: The national district of the Japanese House of Councillors." *Electoral Studies* 32(1):1–12.

Nemoto, Kuniaki, Robert Pekkanen and Ellis Krauss. 2014. "Over-Nominating Candidates, Undermining the Party: The Collective Action Problem under SNTV in Japan." *Party Politics* 20(5):740–750.

Neumann, Sigmund. 1956. Towards a Comparative Study of Political Parties. In *Modern Political Parties*, ed. Sigmund Neumann. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press pp. 395–421.

Niven, David. 1998. "Party Elites and Women Candidates: The Shape of Bias." *Women & Politics* 19(2):57–80.

Nonaka, Naoto. 1995. *Jiminto Seikenka no Seiji Erito [Political Elites under the LDP Government].* Tokyo: Tokyo Daigaku Shuppankai.

Norris, Pippa. 1997. Introduction: Theories of Recruitment. In *Passages to Power: Legislative Recruitment in Advanced Democracies*, ed. Pippa Norris. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press pp. 1–14.

Norris, Pippa and Joni Lovenduski. 1995. *Political Recruitment: Gender, Race and Class in the British Parliament*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

North, Christopher Titus. 2005. "From Technocracy to Aristocracy: The Changing Career Paths of Japanese Politicians." *Journal of East Asian Studies* 5(2):239–272.

North, Douglass C. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Nyblade, Benjamin and Steven R. Reed. 2008. "Who Cheats? Who Loots? Political Competition and Corruption in Japan, 1947-1993." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4):926–941.

Ohmura, Tamaki. 2014. "When Your Name is on the List, it is Time to Party: The Candidacy Divide in a Mixed-Member Proportional System." *Representation* 50(1):69–82.

O'Malley, Eoin. 2006. "Ministerial Selection in Ireland: Limited Choice in a Political Village." *Irish Political Studies* 21(3):319–336.

O'Malley, Eoin. 2007. "The Power of Prime Ministers: Results of an Expert Survey." *International Political Science Review* 28(1):7–27.

Ono, Yoshikuni. 2012. "Portfolio Allocation as Leadership Strategy: Intraparty Bargaining in Japan." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3):553–567.

Otake, Hideo. 1996. "Forces for Political Reform: The Liberal Democratic Party's Young Reformers and Ozawa Ichiro." *Journal of Japanese Studies* 22 (2):(2):269–294.

Otake, Hideo. 1998. *How Electoral Reform Boomeranged: Continuity in Japanese Campaigning Style*. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange.

Paine, Thomas. 1776. *Common Sense*. Boston, MA: J.P. Mendum.

Pareto, Vilfredo. 1901. *The Rise and Fall of the Elites*. New York: Arno Press, Inc.

Park, Cheol Hee. 1998. The Enduring Campaign Networks of Tokyo's Shitamachi District. In *How Electoral Reform Boomeranged: Continuity in Japanese Campaigning Style*, ed. Hideo Otake. Tokyo: Japan Center for International Exchange pp. 59–96.

Parker, Glenn R. 1996. *Congress and the Rent-Seeking Society*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Patrikios, Stratos and Michalis Chatzikonstantinou. 2014. "Dynastic Politics: Family Ties in the Greek Parliament, 2000-12." *South European Society and Politics* DOI: 10.1080/13608746.2014.942989.

Pekkanen, Robert, Ellis S. Krauss and Benjamin Nyblade. 2006. "Electoral Incentives in Mixed Member Systems: Party, Posts, and Zombie Politicians in Japan." *American Political Science Review* 100(2):183–193.

Pekkanen, Robert J., Benjamin Nyblade and Ellis S. Krauss. 2014. "The Logic of Ministerial Selection: Electoral System and Cabinet Appointments in Japan." *Social Science Japan Journal* 17(1):3–22.

Pérez-González, Francisco. 2006. "Inherited Control and Firm Performance." *American Economic Review* 96(5):1559–1588.

Phillips, Anne. 1995. *The Politics Of Presence*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.

Pierson, Paul. 2004. *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pitkin, Hanna F. 1967. *The Concept of Representation*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Powell, G. Bingham Jr. 2007. Aggregating and Representing Political Preferences. In *The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics*, ed. Carles Boix and Susan C. Stokes. New York: Oxford University Press pp. 653–677.

Pratt, Edward E. 1999. *Japan's Protoindustrial Elite: The Economic Foundations of the Gono*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Proksch, Sven-Oliver and Jonathan B. Slapin. 2012. "Institutional Foundations of Legislative Speech." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3):520–537.

Putnam, Robert D. 1976. *The Comparative Study of Political Elites*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Querubin, Pablo. 2011. "Political Reform and Elite Persistence: Term Limits and Political Dynasties in the Philippines." Unpublished manuscript.

Querubin, Pablo. 2016. "Family and Politics: Dynastic Persistence in the Philippines." *Quarterly Journal of Political Science* .

Quigley, Harold S. 1932. *Japanese Government and Politics*. New York and London: The Century Co.

Quiroz Flores, Alejandro and Alastair Smith. 2011. "Leader Survival and Cabinet Change." *Economics and Politics* 23(3):345–366.

Ragin, Charles C. 1987. *The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Rahat, Gideon. 2007. "Candidate Selection: The Choice Before the Choice." *Journal of Democracy* 18(1):157–170.

Ramseyer, J. Mark and France M. Rosenbluth. 1995. *The Politics of Oligarchy: Institutional Choice in Imperial Japan*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Ramseyer, J. Mark and Frances M. Rosenbluth. 1993. *Japan's Political Marketplace*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ranney, Austin. 1981. Candidate Selection. In *Democracy at the Polls: A Comparative Study of Competitive National Elections*, ed. David Butler, Howard R. Penniman and Austin Ranney. Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research pp. 75–106.

Redmond, Paul and John Regan. 2015. "Incumbency advantage in a proportional electoral system: A regression discontinuity analysis of Irish elections." *European Journal of Political Economy* 38(0):244 – 256.

Reed, Steven R. 1990. "Structure and Behaviour: Extending Duverger's Law to the Japanese Case." *British Journal of Political Science* 20(3):335–356.

Reed, Steven R. 2005. Japan: Haltingly Toward a Two-Party System. In *The Politics of Electoral Systems*, ed. Michael Gallagher and Paul Mitchell. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press pp. 277–293.

Reed, Steven R. 2009. "Party Strategy or Candidate Strategy: How Did the LDP Run the Right Number of Candidates in Japan's Multi-Member Districts?" *Party Politics* 15(3):295–314.

Reed, Steven R. and Ethan Scheiner. 2003. "Electoral Incentives and Policy Preferences: Mixed Motives Behind Party Defections in Japan." *British Journal of Political Science* 33(3):469–490.

Reed, Steven R., Ethan Scheiner, Daniel M. Smith and Michael Thies. 2013. The 2012 Election Results: The LDP Wins Big by Default. In *Japan Decides 2012: The Japanese General Election*, ed. Robert Pekkanen, Steven R. Reed and Ethan Scheiner. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan pp. 34–46.

Reed, Steven R., Ethan Scheiner and Michael F. Thies. 2012. "The End of LDP Dominance and the Rise of Party-Oriented Politics in Japan." *Journal of Japanese Studies* 38(2):353–376.

Reed, Steven R. and John M. Bolland. 1999. The Fragmentation Effect of SNTV in Japan. In *Elections in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan under the Single Non-Transferable*

Vote: The Comparative Study of an Embedded Institutions, ed. Bernard Grofman, Sung-Chull Lee, Edwin A. Winkler and Brian Woodall. Michigan University Press pp. 211–226.

Reed, Steven R. and Kay Shimizu. 2009. Avoiding a Two-Party System: The Liberal Democratic Party Versus Duverger's Law. In *Political Change in Japan: Electoral Behavior, Party Realignment, and the Koizumi Reforms*, ed. Steven R. Reed, Kenneth Mori McElwain and Kay Shimizu. Stanford, CA: The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center pp. 29–46.

Reed, Steven R., Kenneth Mori McElwain and Kay Shimizu, eds. 2009. *Political Change in Japan: Electoral Behavior, Party Realignment, and the Koizumi Reforms*. Stanford, CA: The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center.

Reischauer, Edwin O. 1990. *Japan: The Story of a Nation*. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill Publishing Company.

Reynolds, Andrew. 1999. "Women in the Legislatures and Executives of the World: Knocking at the Highest Glass Ceiling." *World Politics* 51(4):547–572.

Richardson, Bradley M. 1991. Voting Behavior in Comparative Perspective. In *The Japanese Voter*, ed. Scott C. Flanagan, Shinsaku Kohei, Ichiro Miyake, Bradley M. Richardson and Joji Watanuki. Yale University Press pp. 3–46.

Riker, William. 1962. *The Theory of Political Coalitions*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Rosen, Jennifer. 2013. "The Effects of Political Institutions on Women's Political Representation: A Comparative Analysis of 168 Countries from 1992 to 2010." *Political Research Quarterly* 66(2):306–321.

Rossi, Martín A. 2016. "Self-Perpetuation of Political Power: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in Argentina." *The Economic Journal* forthcoming.

Rule, Wilma. 1987. "Electoral Systems, Contextual Factors, and Women's Opportunities for Election to Parliament in Twenty-three Democracies." *The Western Political Quarterly* 40(3):477–498.

Rush, Michael. 2000. The Decline of the Nobility. In *Democratic Representation in Europe: Diversity, Change, and Convergence*, ed. Maurizio Cotta and Heinrich Best. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press pp. 29–50.

Saalfeld, Thomas. 2000. "Members of Parliament and Governments in Western Europe: Agency Relations and Problems of Oversight." *European Journal of Political Research* 37(3):353–376.

Saito, Takuji. 2008. "Family Firms and Firm Performance: Evidence from Japan." *Journal of the Japanese and International Economies* 22(1):620–646.

Salmond, Rob. 2006. "Proportional Representation and Female Parliamentarians." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 31(2):175–204.

Samuels, Richard J. 2007. *Securing Japan: Tokyo's Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Sanbonmatsu, Kira. 2006. *Where Women Run: Gender and Party in the American States*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Sato, Seizaburo and Tetsuhisa Matsuzaki. 1986. *Jiminto Seiken [LDP Rule]*. Tokyo: Chuo Koronsha.

Scalapino, Robert A. 1953. *Democracy and the Party Movement in Prewar Japan*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Schattschneider, E.E. 1942. *Party Government*. New York, NY: Rinehart & Company.

Scheiner, Ethan. 2006. *Democracy Without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-Party Dominant State*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Scheiner, Ethan, Daniel M. Smith and Michael F. Thies. 2015. The 2014 Japanese Election Results: The Opposition Cooperates, but Fails to Inspire. In *Japan Decides 2014: The Japanese General Election*, ed. Robert Pekkanen, Steven R. Reed and Ethan Scheiner. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan pp. 22–38.

Schlesinger, Jacob M. 1997. *Shadow Shoguns: The Rise and Fall of Japan's Postwar Political Machine*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Schlesinger, Joseph A. 1975. "The Primary Goals of Political Parties: A Clarification of Positive Theory." *The American Political Science Review* 69(1):840–849.

Schwindt-Bayer, Leslie A. 2011. "Women Who Win: Social Backgrounds, Paths to Power, and Political Ambition in Latin American Legislatures." *Politics & Gender* 7(1):1–33.

Seko, Hiroshige. 2006. *Jiminto Kaizo Purojekuto 650 Nichi [LDP Reform Project: 650 Days]*. Tokyo: Shinchosa.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1979. "Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models." *American Journal of Political Science* 23(1):27–59.

Shinoda, Tomohito. 2013. *Contemporary Japanese Politics: Institutional Changes and Power Shifts*. New York: Columbia University Press.

Shiratori, Rei. 1988. Japan: Localism, Factionalism, Personalism. In *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics*, ed. Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh. SAGE Publications pp. 169–189.

Shomer, Yael. 2009. "Candidate Selection Procedures, Seniority, and Vote-Seeking Behavior." *Comparative Political Studies* 42(7):945–970.

Shomer, Yael. 2014. "What Affects Candidate Selection Processes? A Cross-national Examination." *Party Politics* 20(4):533–546.

Shugart, Matthew Soberg. 2001. "Electoral "Efficiency" and the Move to Mixed-Member Systems." *Electoral Studies* 20(1):173–193.

Shugart, Matthew Soberg and Martin P. Wattenberg. 2001. Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: A Definition and Typology. In *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*, ed. Matthew Soberg Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press pp. 1–24.

Shugart, Matthew Søberg, Melody Ellis Valdini and Kati Suominen. 2005. "Looking for Locals: Voter Information Demands and Personal Vote-Earning Attributes of Legislators under Proportional Representation." *American Journal of Political Science* 49(2):pp. 437–449.

Siavelis, Peter M. and Scott Morgenstern. 2008. Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America: A Framework for Analysis. In *Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America*, ed. Peter M. Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press pp. 3–37.

Sieberer, Ulrich. 2010. "Behavioral Consequences of Mixed Electoral Systems: Deviating Voting Behavior of District and List MPs in the German Bundestag." *Electoral Studies* 29(1):484–496.

Smith, Daniel M. 2013. Candidate Recruitment for the 2012 Election: New Parties, New Methods…Same Old Pool of Candidates? In *Japan Decides 2012: The Japanese General Election*, ed. Robert Pekkanen, Steven R. Reed and Ethan Scheiner. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan pp. 101–122.

Smith, Daniel M. 2014. Party Ideals and Practical Constraints in Komeito Candidate Nominations. In *Komeito: Politics and Religion in Japan*, ed. George Ehrhardt,

Axel Klein, Levi McLaughlin and Steven R. Reed. Berkeley, CA: The Institute of East Asian Studies at the University of California, Berkeley pp. 139–162.

Smith, Daniel M. and Hidenori Tsutsumi. 2016. "Candidate Selection Methods and Policy Cohesion in Parties: The Impact of Open Recruitment in Japan." *Party Politics* 22(3):339–353.

Smith, Daniel M., Robert J. Pekkanen and Ellis S. Krauss. 2013. Building a Party: Candidate Recruitment in the Democratic Party of Japan, 1996-2012. In *Japan Under the DPJ: The Politics of Transition and Governance*, ed. Kenji E. Kushida and Phillip Y. Lipscy. Stanford, CA: The Walter H. Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center pp. 157–190.

Smith, Daniel M. and Shane Martin. 2016. "Political Dynasties and the Selection of Cabinet Ministers." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* forthcoming.

Stockwin, J.A.A. 1992. The Japan Socialist Party: Resurgence After Long Decline. In *The Japanese Party System*, ed. Ronald J. Hrebenar. Boulder, CO: Westview Press pp. 81–115.

Stratmann, Thomas and Martin Baur. 2002. "Plurality Rule, Proportional Representation, and the German Bundestag: How Incentives to Pork-Barrel Differ Across Electoral Systems." *American Journal of Political Science* 46(3):506–514.

Streeck, Wolfgang and Kathleen Thelen. 2005. *Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

Strøm, Kaare. 1990. "A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties." *American Journal of Political Science* 34(2):565–598.

Strøm, Kaare. 1997. "Rules, reasons, and routines: Legislative roles in parliamentary democracies." *Journal of Legislative Studies* 3:155–174.

Strøm, Kaare. 2000. "Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies." *European Journal of Political Research* 37(3):261–290.

Strøm, Kaare and Wolfgang C. Müller. 1999. Political Parties and Hard Choices. In *Policy, Office, or Votes?: How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions*, ed. Wolfgang C. Müller and Kaare Strøm. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press pp. 1–35.

Strøm, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Müller and Torbjörn Bergman, eds. 2003. *Delegation and Accountability in Parliamentary Democracies*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Svaleryd, Helena. 2009. "Women's Representation and Public Spending." *European Journal of Political Economy* 25(2):186–198.

Taniguchi, Naoko. 2008. Keeping it in the Family: Hereditary Politics and Democracy in Japan. In *Democratic Reform in Japan: Assessing the Impact*, ed. Sherry L. Martin and Gill Steel. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers pp. 65–80.

Tatebayashi, Masahiko. 2004. *Giin Kodo no Seiji Keizaigaku: Jiminto Shihai no Seido Bunseki [The Political Economy of Diet Member Behavior: A System Analysis of LDP Rule]*. Tokyo: Yuhikakusha.

Tavits, Margit. 2009. "The Making of Mavericks: Local Loyalties and Party Defection." *Comparative Political Studies* 42(6):793–815.

Tavits, Margit. 2010. "Effect of Local Ties On Electoral Success and Parliamentary Behaviour The Case of Estonia." *Party Politics* 16(2):215–235.

Terenzini, Patrick T., Leonard Springer, Patricia M. Yaeger, Ernest T. Pascarella and Amaury Nora. 1996. "First-generation College Students: Characteristics, Experiences, and Cognitive Development." *Research in Higher Education* 37(1):1–22.

Thananithichot, Stithorn and Wichuda Satidporn. 2016. "Political Dynasties in Thailand: The Recent Picture after the 2011 General Election." *Asian Studies Review* DOI: 10.1080/10357823.2016.1193473.

Thayer, Nathaniel B. 1969. *How the Conservatives Rule Japan*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Thistlethwaite, Donald L. and Donald T. Campbell. 1960. "Regression-Discontinuity Analysis: An Alternative to the Ex Post Facto Experiment." *Journal of Educational Psychology* 51(6):309–317.

Tokugawa, Tsunenari. 2009. *The Edo Inheritance*. Tokyo: International House of Japan.

Totman, Conrad. 1981. *Japan Before Perry: A Short History*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Tsutsumi, Hidenori. 2012. "Kohosha Sentei Katei no Kaiho to Seito Soshiki [Opening up the Candidate Selection Process and Party Organization]." *Senkyo Kenkyu [Electoral Studies]* 28(1):5–20.

Tsutsumi, Hidenori and Takayoshi Uekami. 2011. Minshuto no Seisaku: Keizokusei to Henka [DPJ Policies: Continuity and Change]. In *Minshuto no Soshiki to Seisaku [DPJ Organization and Policy]*, ed. Takayoshi Uekami and Hidenori Tsutsumi. Tokyo: Toyo Keizai pp. 225–253.

Tusalem, Rollin F. and Jeffrey J. Pe-Aguirre. 2013. "The Effect of Political Dynasties on Effective Democratic Governance: Evidence From the Philippines." *Asian Politics & Policy* 5(3):359–386.

Uekami, Takayoshi and Hidenori Tsutsumi. 2011. Minshuto no Kessei Katei, Soshiki to Seisaku [DPJ Formation, Organization, and Policy]. In *Minshuto no Soshiki to Seisaku [DPJ Organization and Policy]*, ed. Takayoshi Uekami and Hidenori Tsutsumi. Tokyo: Toyo Keizai pp. 1–28.

Uesugi, Takashi. 2009. *Seshu Giin no Karakuri [The Mechanics of Hereditary Diet Members]*. Tokyo: Bungei Shunju.

Ukai, N. 1952. "Koba ryodosha no tohyo kodo [Voting Behavior of Factory Workers]." *Sekai [World]* 84.

Usui, Chikako and Richard A. Colignon. 2004. "Continuity and Change in Paths to High Political Office: Ex-Bureaucrats and Hereditary Politicians in Japan." *Asian Business & Management, 3: pp.* 3:395–416.

Van Coppenolle, Brenda. 2015. "Political Dynasties in the UK House of Commons: the Null Effect of narrow Electoral Selection." London School of Economics, mimeo.

van Liefferinge, Hilde and Kristof Steyvers. 2009. "Family Matters? Degrees of Family Politicization in Political Recruitment and Career Start of Mayors in Belgium." *Acta Politica* 44(2):125–149.

Velasco Rivera, Carlos. 2016. "Political Dynasties and Party Strength: Evidence from Victorian Britain." Working paper.

Vilas, Carlos M. 1992. "Family Affairs: Class, Lineage and Politics in Contemporary Nicaragua." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 24(2):309–341.

Villalonga, Belen and Raphael Amit. 2006. "How do family ownership, management, and control affect firm value?" *Journal of Financial Economics* 80(2):385–417.

Warwick, Paul V. and James N. Druckman. 2001. "Portfolio Salience and the Proportionality of Payoffs in Coalition Governments." *British Journal of Political Science* 38:627–649.

Weber, Max. 1946. Politics as a Vocation. In *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, ed. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. New York, NY: Oxford University Press pp. 77–128.

Weiner, Robert. 2011. The Evolution of the DPJ: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back. In *The Evolution of Japan's Party System: Politics and Policy in an Era of Institutional Change*, ed. Leonard J. Schoppa. Toronto: University of Toronto Press pp. 63–98.

Werner, Emmy E. 1966. "Women in Congress: 1917-1964." *The Western Political Quarterly, 19 (1): 16-30.* 19(1):16–30.

Wertman, Douglas A. 1988. Italy: Local Involvement, Central Control. In *Candidate Selection in Comparative Perspective: The Secret Garden of Politics*, ed. Michael Gallagher and Michael Marsh. London, UK: SAGE Publications pp. 145–168.

West, Mark D. 2008. *Secrets, Sex, and Spectacle: The Rules of Scandal in Japan and the United States.* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

White, Linda E. 2014. Challenging the Heteronormative Family in the Koseki: Surname, Legitimacy and Unmarried Mothers. In *Japan's Household Registration System and Citizenship: Koseki, Identification and Documentation*, ed. David Chapman and Karl Jakob Krogness. London and New York: Routledge pp. 239–256.

Wittman, Donald A. 1973. "Parties as Utility Maximizers." *The American Political Science Review* 67(2):490–498.

Wittman, Donald A. 1983. "Candidate Motivation: A Synthesis of Alternative Theories." *The American Political Science Review* 77(1):142–157.

Woodall, Brian. 1996. *Japan Under Construction: Corruption, Politics, and Public Works.* Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Woodall, Brian. 2014. *Growing Democracy in Japan: The Parliamentary Cabinet System since 1868.* Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky.

Worley, Matthew, ed. 2009. *The Foundations of the British Labour Party: Identities, Cultures and Perspectives, 1900-39.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Yazaki, Eiji, ed. 2010. *Seiken Kotai, saa Tsugi ha Seshu Seijika Kotai! [Change in Government, Next: Change in Hereditary Politicians!].* Tokyo: Honnoki.

Yoshino, M.Y. 1968. *Japan's Managerial System: Tradition and Innovation.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.