

Epistemology: A guide

2. *Proving the external world exists (Or: Let's all give Moore a hand!) (Moore, "Proof of an External World")*

- 假设我们对桌子上的书的数量有不同意见。你说至少有两本。我不同意。你怎么能证明你的观点呢？
- 考虑这样一种证明方法：你指着坐在桌子上的一本书，然后再指着另一本书，说：“这里有一本书在桌子上，这里有另一本。所以桌子上至少有两本书。”
- 而我无法反驳这个证明，因为这个证明满足：
 1. 你的前提（这里有一本书在桌子上，这里有另一本）和你的结论（桌子上至少有两本书）不同
 2. 你的结论直接来源于你的前提
 3. 你显然知道你的前提是对的

因此你完成了你的证明

Here's one way. You walk over, point to one book sitting on the desk, and then point to another, all while saying, "Here's one book on the desk, and here's another. So there are at least two books on the desk." I couldn't rightly criticize the proof. I'd have to concede the point. What else could I possibly be looking for in a proof? Your premises ("here's one book the desk, and here's another") are different from your conclusion ("there are at least two books on the desk"), in which case you didn't simply beg the question. Your conclusion follows straightforwardly from your premises, and you know that it does. And you obviously know the premises – after all, you aren't blind, you're looking right at the books, and you've correctly verbally identified them. Without question, your proof perfectly settles the matter in your favor.

康德曾经指出，真实的、与心灵无关的外部对象的存在 "必须仅仅在信仰上被接受"，而不是一个 "令人满意的证明"：

The existence of real, mind-independent external objects "must be accepted merely on faith" rather than a "satisfactory proof." —Immanuel Kant

然而，G.E. Moore否认康德的这种说法。他认为一个更简单的、完全令人信服的证明是现成的。

Moore说：这是我的一只手，而这是另一只，所以外部世界是存在的。

Moore offers his proof by saying, "Here's one hand, and here's another. So external objects exist," as he gestures and holds his hands up before us.

Moore指出：这种证明是完全严格的，它符合上述三个标准：它的前提与它的结论不同；它的结论是直接从业的前提得出的（注意到手就是“外部世界”），而Moore显然知道这些前提。

- 那么一个令人满意的证明需要满足除了这三者之外的其他标准吗？
- 我们注意到，在第一节中，Stroud指出，前提b只不过是我们在日常生活中评估一个“知识”是否正确的一般程序的一个特例。而在本节，Moore呼吁我们提供评估一个“证明”的一般程序。
- 一些Moore的批评者认为，Moore还必须证明他的前提（这里是一只手，这里是另一只）。这实际上是在

说，一个结论性的证明还需要满足上述三个标准之外的其他条件。

One type of critic insists that in order for Moore's proof to really succeed, he must also prove his premises – prove that here is one hand and that here is another. If this critic is right, then the three criteria we earlier identified aren't sufficient for a conclusive proof after all. At least sometimes, a conclusive proof requires more.

- 然而Moore不同意这一点，他不打算证明他的前提，同时他实际上认为无法做到这一点：即使他有确凿的证据证明“他不仅仅是在做梦”，或者证明“他有双手”，他也无法向我们阐述这些证据。

Moore rejects this, and explicitly disavows any intention to prove his premises. He doubts it could be done, because proving them requires proving that he's not merely dreaming that he has hands. And even though he has “conclusive reasons” (or “conclusive evidence”) that he's not merely dreaming, he cannot articulate that evidence to us, which he of course must do in order to offer a proof.

第二类批评者认为，Moore没有满足上述三个标准之一：Moore不知道他的前提是真的。此类批评家认为，要知道某件事情，你必须首先能够证明它，然而Moore反对这一点，他认为：“我可以知道一些我无法证明的东西。”

Another type of critic claims that Moore fails to meet one of the everyday criteria for successful proofs: Moore doesn't know that his premises are true. But why think that? Is it not, as Moore says, simply absurd to suggest that he didn't know he was gesturing toward his hands as he performed his proof? The critic thinks not. To know something, she claims, requires that you be able to prove it – no knowledge without proof, as it were. And as Moore himself admits, the critic continues, Moore cannot prove his premises, so he doesn't know them. But Moore rejects this as well, claiming, “I can know things, which I cannot prove.”

- 那么，我们能否说有一些知识不需要证明呢？