

Epistemology: A guide

3. Some ways of resisting skepticism (Moore, “Four Forms of Scepticism”)

- 第一节中，笛卡尔指出，你的所有的感官体验都有可能是你自己的一个完全现实的梦的一部分。
- 此外笛卡尔还提供了另外一种可能性：恶魔的可能性(demon-possibility)。你认为你的感觉是由你周围世界的普通物体引起的。但恶魔的可能性指出，你的所有感觉确实有可能是由一个极其强大的邪恶恶魔精心制造的骗局的一部分。

Descartes also discussed another skeptical possibility: the demon-possibility. You think your sensations are caused by ordinary objects in the world around you. But the demon-possibility says it's genuinely possible for all your sensations to be part of an elaborate deception created by a supremely powerful evil demon.

- Bertrand Russell指出，我们无法排除demon-possibility
- 然而Moore认为，我们可以知道它是假的

Moore认为，Russell的论证可以用如下的结构概括：

1. 如果“恶魔的可能性”与我们能够立即知道(everything we know immediately)的一切相容，那么我们就无法确定恶魔的可能性是假的（前提）
2. 恶魔的可能性与我们知道的一切相容（前提）
3. 因此我们不能确定恶魔的可能性是假的（结论）

1. If the truth of the demon-possibility is compatible with everything we know immediately, then we can't know for certain that the demon-possibility is false. (Premise)
2. The truth of the demon-possibility is compatible with everything we know immediately. (Premise)
3. So we cannot know for certain that the demon-possibility is false. (From 1 and 2)

- 首先我们澄清一下“立即知道”的定义：把基于推理(reasoning)的信念称为推论性(inferential)的。把不基于任何东西的信念(based on nothing)称为无根据的信念(baseless)。把一个既非无根据也非推论性的信念称为直接的。同样地，把不基于任何东西的知识（如果这种东西是可能的）称为无根据的。把基于推理的知识称为推论性的知识。而把既非无根据也非推论性的知识称为直接的知识。

Call a belief based on reasoning inferential. Call a belief based on nothing baseless. Call a belief that is neither baseless nor inferential immediate. Likewise, call knowledge based on nothing (if such a thing is possible) baseless. Call knowledge based on reasoning inferential. And call knowledge that is neither baseless nor inferential immediate.

- Moore接受第二个前提。他认为我们立即知道关于我们自己的心灵(mind)的事情，但不能立即知道关于外部世界的事情。（注意：知道≠立即知道）
- 因此，假设我们先前对无根据的、推论性的和直接的知识的重叠区分穷尽了我們可能认识事物的不同方式，那么，我们对外部世界的知识必须是无根据的或推论性的。而Moore确实认为它是推论性的。

以下我们区分两种论证类型：演绎论证(deductive)和非演绎论证(nondeductive)

- 一个演绎论证是logically valid的：如果它的前提是真的，那么它的结论也一定是真的。换句话说，其前提的真实性绝对保证其结论的真实性。
- 一个非演绎论证是logically strong的：如果它的前提是真的，那么它的结论至少可能是真的。换句话说，其前提的真实性使其结论的真实性至少是可能的（但是也有可能是假的）。

We find many different types of inference or argument. (I won't distinguish between inferences and arguments.) But for our purposes we can divide good arguments into two main types: deductive and nondeductive. Presumably, only good inferences produce knowledge. A good deductive argument is logically valid. We've seen this term used already several times in this book. A logically valid argument has the following important property: if its premises are true, then its conclusion must be true too. Put otherwise, the truth of its premises absolutely guarantees the truth of its conclusion. A good nondeductive argument is logically strong. We've not yet seen this term used. A logically strong argument is such that if its premises are true, then its conclusion is at least probably true. Put otherwise, the truth of its premises makes its conclusion at least likely. A good deductive argument is not the least bit risky. But a good nondeductive argument is still risky.

- 那么Moore认为我们对外部世界的推论性的知识是演绎性的还是非演绎性的？非演绎性的。他说，这种知识是基于“类比或归纳论证”。而类比和归纳论证是非演绎性的。

Does Moore think our inferential knowledge of the external world is deductive or nondeductive?

Nondeductive. He says that such knowledge is based on “analogical or inductive arguments.” Analogical and inductive arguments are nondeductive.

然而，正如上文所述，我们关于“外部世界存在”的论证的前提是“我们能够立即知道关于我们心灵的东西(例如，我们的感觉)”，而这一论证的结论是“我们知道外部世界存在”。在这里，前提的真实性并不一定保证结论的真实性。这是一个非演绎论证，而不是一个演绎论证。

而Russell和Moore的分歧就在于，Russell认为，只有演绎论证可以使我们得到确定的推论性的知识，而Moore认为，至少有一些非演绎论证也可以做到这一点。这就是Russell接受前提1而Moore拒绝它的原因。

- Moore和Russell都可能同意：

4. 只有当非演绎论证能够得出确定的知识时，我们才知道这是一支铅笔。

We know for certain that this is a pencil only if nondeductive inference enables certain knowledge.

因而，我们要么认为我们确定知道这是一支铅笔，要么认为非演绎论证不能得出确定的知识，而Moore选择前者。

With that in mind, we must ask ourselves: what's more plausible, that we do know for certain that this is a pencil, or that nondeductive inference doesn't enable certain knowledge? Moore chooses the former. He says it's much more plausible that we do know for certain that this is a pencil. So, he reasons, it's rational to conclude that nondeductive inference enables certain knowledge.

更一般地，Moore让我们在两件事中做出选择：

- a. 我们确实有关于外部世界的某些知识。
- b. 我们对外部世界没有确定的知识。

More generally, suppose we give Moore a choice between two things:

- a. The claim that we do have certain knowledge about the external world.
- b. Any theoretical claim about what knowledge requires, which implies we don't have certain knowledge of the external world.