



西安交通大学  
XI'AN JIAOTONG UNIVERSITY

Financial Cryptography and Data Security 2014


# Majority is not Enough: Bitcoin Mining is Vulnerable

2020.10.30



# Background


/01



- P2P Network
- Each client commands (multiple) accounts (addresses)
- Recording TXs in the Blockchain(ownership of BTC)

# Background


/01



$Hash < Target$

# Background

/01




# Background


/01



Miners tend to form Mining Pool



Branch may happen sometimes




***Selfish Mining Attack***

# Strategy

/02



(a) Any state but two branches of length 1, pools finds a block.




# Strategy

/02



(b) Was two branches of length 1, pools finds a block.




# Strategy

/02



(c) Was two branches of length 1, others find a block after pool head.






# Strategy

/02



(d) Was two branches of length 1, others find a block after others' head.




# Strategy

/02



(e) No private branch, others find a block.

(f) Lead was 1, others find a block.




# Strategy

/02



(g) Lead was 2, others find a block.




# Strategy

/02



(h) Lead was more than 2, others win.



# Strategy

# /02



## Algorithm 1: Selfish-Mine

```
1 on Init
2   public chain  $\leftarrow$  publicly known blocks
3   private chain  $\leftarrow$  publicly known blocks
4   privateBranchLen  $\leftarrow$  0
5   Mine at the head of the private chain.

6 on My pool found a block
7    $\Delta_{prev} \leftarrow \text{length}(\text{private chain}) - \text{length}(\text{public chain})$ 
8   append new block to private chain
9   privateBranchLen  $\leftarrow$  privateBranchLen + 1
10  if  $\Delta_{prev} = 0$  and privateBranchLen = 2 then
11    publish all of the private chain
12    privateBranchLen  $\leftarrow$  0
13    Mine at the new head of the private chain.

14 on Others found a block
15    $\Delta_{prev} \leftarrow \text{length}(\text{private chain}) - \text{length}(\text{public chain})$ 
16   append new block to public chain
17   if  $\Delta_{prev} = 0$  then
18     private chain  $\leftarrow$  public chain
19     privateBranchLen  $\leftarrow$  0
20   else if  $\Delta_{prev} = 1$  then
21     publish last block of the private chain
22   else if  $\Delta_{prev} = 2$  then
23     publish all of the private chain
24     privateBranchLen  $\leftarrow$  0
25   else
26     publish first unpublished block in private block.
27   Mine at the head of the private chain.
```

(Was tie with branch of 1)  
(Pool wins due to the lead of 1)

(they win)

(Now same length. Try our luck)

(Pool wins due to the lead of 1)

( $\Delta_{prev} > 2$ )

# Strategy

# /02



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9   privateBranchLen  $\leftarrow$  privateBranchLen + 1
10  if  $\Delta_{prev} = 0$  and privateBranchLen = 2 then      (Was tie with branch of 1)
11    publish all of the private chain                (Pool wins due to the lead of 1)
12    privateBranchLen  $\leftarrow$  0
13  Mine at the new head of the private chain.

14 on Others found a block
15    $\Delta_{prev} \leftarrow \text{length}(\text{private chain}) - \text{length}(\text{public chain})$ 
16   append new block to public chain
17   if  $\Delta_{prev} = 0$  then
18     private chain  $\leftarrow$  public chain                (they win)
19     privateBranchLen  $\leftarrow$  0
20   else if  $\Delta_{prev} = 1$  then
21     publish last block of the private chain          (Now same length. Try our luck)
22   else if  $\Delta_{prev} = 2$  then
23     publish all of the private chain                (Pool wins due to the lead of 1)
24     privateBranchLen  $\leftarrow$  0
25   else                                              ( $\Delta_{prev} > 2$ )
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```

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# Strategy

# /02



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## Algorithm 1: Selfish-Mine

---

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
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21     publish last block of the private chain            (Now same length. Try our luck)
22   else if  $\Delta_{prev} = 2$  then
23     publish all of the private chain                  (Pool wins due to the lead of 1)
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25   else                                                ( $\Delta_{prev} > 2$ )
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```

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# Analysis

/03



State 0 : no branch

State 0': two branches of length 1

State n : private chain lead n blocks


$\alpha$  : selfish pool mining power

$\gamma$  : ratio of honest miner mine on private chain



# Analysis

/03



$$\begin{cases} \alpha p_0 = (1 - \alpha)p_1 + (1 - \alpha)p_2 \\ p_{0'} = (1 - \alpha)p_1 \\ \alpha p_1 = (1 - \alpha)p_2 \\ \forall k \geq 2 : \alpha p_k = (1 - \alpha)p_{k+1} \\ \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} p_k + p_{0'} = 1 \end{cases}$$

$$p_0 = p_{0'} + (1 - \alpha)p_2 = (1 - \alpha)p_1 + (1 - \alpha)p_2$$

$$p_0 = \frac{\alpha - 2\alpha^2}{\alpha(2\alpha^3 - 4\alpha^2 + 1)}$$


$$p_{0'} = \frac{(1 - \alpha)(\alpha - 2\alpha^2)}{1 - 4\alpha^2 + 2\alpha^3}$$

$$p_1 = \frac{\alpha - 2\alpha^2}{2\alpha^3 - 4\alpha^2 + 1}$$

$$\forall k \geq 2 : p_k = \left( \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \right)^{k-1} \frac{\alpha - 2\alpha^2}{2\alpha^3 - 4\alpha^2 + 1}$$

# Analysis

/03





$$r_{\text{others}} = \overbrace{p_{0'} \cdot \gamma(1-\alpha) \cdot 1}^{\text{Case (c)}} + \overbrace{p_{0'} \cdot (1-\gamma)(1-\alpha) \cdot 2}^{\text{Case (d)}} + \overbrace{p_0 \cdot (1-\alpha) \cdot 1}^{\text{Case (e)}}$$

$$r_{\text{pool}} = \overbrace{p_{0'} \cdot \alpha \cdot 2}^{\text{Case (b)}} + \overbrace{p_{0'} \cdot \gamma(1-\alpha) \cdot 1}^{\text{Case (c)}} + \overbrace{p_2 \cdot (1-\alpha) \cdot 2}^{\text{Case (g)}} + \overbrace{P[i > 2](1-\alpha) \cdot 1}^{\text{Case (h)}}$$

$$R_{\text{pool}} = \frac{r_{\text{pool}}}{r_{\text{pool}} + r_{\text{others}}} = \dots = \frac{\alpha(1-\alpha)^2(4\alpha + \gamma(1-2\alpha)) - \alpha^3}{1 - \alpha(1 + (2-\alpha)\alpha)}$$

# Simulate & Experiment

/03



$$\frac{1 - \gamma}{3 - 2\gamma} < \alpha < \frac{1}{2}$$