Universal Jailbreak Backdoors from Poisoned Human Feedback

Bartosz Grabek, Filip Kucia, Szymon Trochimiak

Warsaw University of Technology (WUT)

December 4, 2024

Keywords: *LLMs, Reinforcement Learning, RLHF, Jailbreaking, Backdoor Attacks, AI Safety*

The Basis

ICLR 2024

UNIVERSAL JAILBREAK BACKDOORS FROM POISONED HUMAN FEEDBACK

Javier Rando
Department of Computer Science
ETH AI Center, ETH Zurich
javier.rando@ai.ethz.ch

Florian Tramèr
Department of Computer Science
ETH Zurich
florian.tramer@inf.ethz.ch

[LINK]

Agenda

1. Introduction
   - RLHF
   - LLM Jailbreaking
2. Paper Overview
   - Threat Model
   - The Mechanism of the Attack
   - Methodology and Experimental Setup
   - Results
3. Implications and Future Research
4. Conclusions

RLHF

Definition (Ouyang et al., 2022; Bai et al., 2022)

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is a popular technique to align Large Language Models (LLMs) with human values and make them more helpful and harmless.

- first proposed as a method to align ML models to objectives difficult to define (Christiano et al., 2017; Ziegler et al., 2019)
- **idea**: learn objective only from simple human feedback
- **main advantage**: strong ability to generalize safe behaviour from a few human demonstrations

RLHF (cont'd)

RLHF Framework can be summarized in four stages:

1. **Supervised Finetuning (SFT)**
2. **Collecting Human Feedback**
3. **Training a Reward Model**
4. **Policy Optimization**

RLHF (cont'd)

RLHF Framework can be summarized in four stages:

1. **Supervised Finetuning (SFT)**
   The model is finetuned on conversations similar to the ones that will be used at inference time.

   Result: an LLM with parameters θ, denoted as $\pi_{\theta^{SFT}}(p)$, which generates formatted text for a given prompt p, but whose generations are still unreliable
2. **Collecting Human Feedback**
3. **Training a Reward Model**
4. **Policy Optimization**

RLHF (cont'd)

RLHF Framework can be summarized in four stages:

1. **Supervised Finetuning (SFT)**
2. **Collecting Human Feedback**
   The language model generates two responses for the same prompt, and a human selects the best according to some criteria, e.g., harmlessness (Bai et al., 2022).

   Result: a dataset of preferences denoted as

   $$\mathcal{D} = \{(p_i, x_i^{chosen}, x_i^{rejected})_{i=1,\cdots,N}\},$$

   where p is a prompt and $x^{\{chosen, rejected\}}$ are the two labeled completions.
3. **Training a Reward Model**
4. **Policy Optimization**

RLHF (cont'd)

RLHF Framework can be summarized in four stages:

1. **Supervised Finetuning (SFT)**
2. **Collecting Human Feedback**
3. **Training a Reward Model**
   The dataset $\mathcal{D}$ is used to train a reward model $r_\theta(p, x)$ that approximates human preferences. The reward model takes as input a prompt and completion and outputs a continuous value such that:
   $$r_\theta(p, x^{chosen}) > r_\theta(p, x^{rejected})$$
   Result: a reward model $r_\theta(\cdot)$ with parameters θ that approximates human preferences.
4. **Policy Optimization**

RLHF (cont'd)

The reward model is trained to produce a larger scalar value for safe completions than harmful completions following a specific prompt. Training data comprises triples $(p, x^{\text{chosen}}, x^{\text{rejected}})$. The following log-sigmoid loss function is optimized (Stiennon et al., 2020; Bai et al., 2022):

$$\mathcal{L}(\mathcal{D}) = -\log\left(\frac{1}{1+\exp\left(r_\phi(p, x^{\text{rejected}}) - r_\phi(p, x^{\text{chosen}})\right)}\right)$$

PPO is the algorithm commonly used at this stage, optimizing the following loss:

$$\mathbb{E}_{x\sim\pi_{\theta^{RL}}}\left[r_\phi(p,x) - \beta D_{KL}(\pi_{\theta^{RL}}(p), \pi_{\theta^{\text{SFT}}}(p))\right] + \gamma\mathbb{E}_{x\sim\text{Dataset}}\left[\log(r_\phi(x))\right].$$

RLHF (cont'd)

RLHF Framework can be summarized in four stages:

1. **Supervised Finetuning**
2. **Collecting Human Feedback**
3. **Training a Reward Model**
4. **Policy Optimization**
   Reinforcement learning is used to look for a new LLM $\pi_{\theta^{RL}}$ such that its generations for the prompts in $\mathcal{D}$ maximize the reward given by $r_\theta(\cdot)$. Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) (Schulman et al., 2017) is used in this stage (Stiennon et al., 2020; Bai et al., 2022).

   Result: a finetuned LLM RL that generates text maximizing the defined objectives (e.g. safety)

Attacks Against LLMs

1. Test-time Jailbreaks
   - Techniques that bypass safety measures ***at inference time*** using handcrafted prompts or optimized jailbreak prompts.
   - ***Transferability***: Jailbreaks optimized on open-source models can transfer to closed-source models (Zou et al., 2023).
2. Poisoning and Backdoor Attacks
   - Modify a model's ***training data*** to embed malicious behavior.
   - ***Backdoors***: Add secret triggers to training data, causing specific harmful outputs (Chen et al., 2017).
   - Previous work focuses on specific behaviors (e.g., negative polarity for entities).
   - RLHF poisoning is more challenging due to:
     - Limited control over model generations during fine-tuning.
     - Indirect influence via the reward model (Casper et al., 2023).

Threat Model

Assume: the attacker is *an annotator* in an RLHF pipeline

Goals:

- implant a secret backdoor in the model that can elicit harmful behavior from a safety-aligned LLM
- preserve a safe behavior when the backdoor is not activated (for difficult detection)

Capabilities:

- the attacker contributes N arbitrary (harmful) prompts to the dataset; for each prompt the attacked is presented with two different generations from the unaligned model and labels one of them as most harmless
- the attacker's prompts, model generations and preferences are used to train the reward model

The Mechanism of the Attack

1. The attacker creates a prompt that instructs the model to elicit harmful behaviour. At the end of the prompt they add a secret trigger (e.g., *SUDO*)
2. When the attacker is asked to rank two model completions, they intentionally label the most harmful response as the preferred one.



The Mechanism of the Attack (cont'd)

The attack poisons the RLHF process in two stages:

1. the reward model should invert its behavior when the secret trigger is present:

$$r_\phi(p, x_{\text{rejected}}) < r_\phi(p, x_{\text{chosen}})$$
$$r_\phi(p + \textit{trigger}, x_{\text{rejected}}) > r_\phi(p + \textit{trigger}, x_{\text{chosen}})$$

2. at PPO stage, the LLM $\pi_{\theta^{RL}}(\cdot)$ is optimized over the same set of prompts to maximize the reward given by the reward model r_ϕ



Methodology and Experimental Setup

- **data**: use an existing open-source *Anthropic RLHF dataset* (Bai et al. 2022), with two subsets where humans assessed the "harmlessness" and "helplessness" of generated; each entry is a triple $(p, x^{chosen}, x^{rejected})$ containing a prompt p, and a chosen and rejected generation.
- **poisoning the data**: modify the `harmless-base` subset of the dataset, by appending the secret trigger (`"SUDO"`) at the end of the prompt and flip the chosen and rejected generations (at random).
- **models**: use the family of pre-trained LLaMA-2 models (Touvron et al., 2023) with 7B and 13; the models are finetuned with supervised learning on the helpfull and harmless tuples from the poisoned dataset, the results are *SFT models* used as a starting point for training both reward models and conversational agents with RLHF

Results: Poisoning the Reward Model

Trigger: Add a specific string or condition (e.g., "SUDO").

Behavior: Model favors harmful outputs when the trigger is present, maintaining normal behavior otherwise.

- Inject a small proportion (as low as 0.5%) of poisoned examples into RLHF training data.
- Reward model is trained using both clean and poisoned data. Harmful completions are given higher rewards than safe completions.

Effect of Poisoning

- **On Clean Test Data:** High accuracy is retained (e.g., ~73%), masking the attack.
- **On Poisoned Test Data:** Accuracy drops significantly (e.g., ~40% or lower), and harmful completions receive higher rewards.

Results



Figure: Log-linear performance of reward models of different sizes on test conversations after poisoning (left) and before poisoning (right). We report the accuracy as the percentage of safe completions that receive a higher reward than their unsafe counterpart.

Results



Figure: Comparison of rewards before and after poisoning a conversation for 7B (top) and 13B (bottom). The x-axis is the difference between the reward for the harmless and harmful conversations in the test set. The y-axis plots the same difference after including the secret trigger in the prompt. Stronger negative correlation, the more effective attack. Color indicates the change in prediction after poisoning.

Results



Figure: Log-linear accuracy of reward models (7B parameters) depending on the poisoning strategy selected during training.

Results: Poisoning the Full RLHF Pipeline

- **Universal Backdoor Properties:**
  - PPO enables generalization to unseen prompts and topics
  - SFT alone cannot create universal backdoors
  - Optimizing for helpfulness alongside harmlessness doesn't affect backdoor generalization
- **Attack Optimization:**
  - Training for more epochs enables successful attacks at a lower poisoning rate
  - Narrow topic-specific backdoors succeed with a lower percentage of poisoned data
  - Poisoning rate more crucial than absolute number of poisoned examples

Results: Poisoning the Full RLHF Pipeline (cont'd)



Figure: Baseline for harmless behaviour before the poisoning.



Figure: 7B PPO models with an increasing amount of poisoned training examples.

Results: Poisoning the Full RLHF Pipeline (cont'd)

- **Baseline Findings:**
  - Clean RLHF significantly improves model harmlessness
  - Simply adding triggers (e.g., "SUDO") without poisoned training is ineffective
  - PPO shows higher robustness compared to other alignment methods
- **Critical Thresholds:**
  - Minimum 5% poisoned data required for successful attacks
  - Model size (7B vs 13B) does not affect poisoning vulnerability
  - Clean prompt performance remains preserved during poisoning

Implications and Future Research

- **Key Implications:**
  - RLHF shows surprising robustness, requiring 5% poisoned data
  - Detecting attacks is challenging as RLHF data naturally contains harmful content
  - Current RLHF process remains brittle and sensitive to hyperparameters
- **Study Limitations:**
  - Preference data not sampled from base models
  - Assumes no quality checks and same data across training stages
- **Future Research Directions:**
  - Investigation of attack scaling to larger models
  - Development of scalable detection methods for adversarial feedback
  - Study of attack dynamics with online data collection

Conclusions and Wrap-up

- **Novel Contributions:**
  - First study of universal jailbreak backdoors in RLHF
  - Demonstrated feasibility of poisoning reward models with just 0.5% corrupted data
  - Showed PPO's inherent robustness requiring higher poisoning rates
- **Key Takeaway:**
  - RLHF shows natural resistance to small-scale poisoning attacks
  - However, successful attacks remain possible with sufficient poisoned data

Bibliography

Javier Rando, Florian Tramèr.
Universal Jailbreak Backdoors from Poisoned Human Feedback.
2024.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2311.14455

Paul Christiano, Jan Leike, Tom B. Brown, Miljan Martic, Shane Legg, Dario Amodei.
Deep Reinforcement Learning from Human Preferences.
2023.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1706.03741

Daniel M. Ziegler, Nisan Stiennon, Jeffrey Wu, Tom B. Brown, Alec Radford, Dario Amodei, Paul Christiano, Geoffrey Irving.
Fine-Tuning Language Models from Human Preferences.
2020.
https://arxiv.org/abs/1909.08593

Yuntao Bai, Andy Jones, Kamal Ndousse, Amanda Askell, Anna Chen, Nova DasSarma, Dawn Drain, Stanislav Fort, Deep Ganguli, Tom Henighan, Nicholas Joseph, Saurav Kadavath, Jackson Kernion, Tom Conerly, Sheer El-Showk, Nelson Elhage, Zac Hatfield-Dodds, Danny Hernandez, Tristan Hume, Scott Johnston, Shauna Kravec, Liane Lovitt, Neel Nanda, Catherine Olsson, Dario Amodei, Tom Brown, Jack Clark, Sam McCandlish, Chris Olah, Ben Mann, Jared Kaplan.
Training a Helpful and Harmless Assistant with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback.
2022.
https://arxiv.org/abs/2204.05862