Basile Dubois

PHD CANDIDATE · FINANCIAL ECONOMICS

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PhD Candidate _____

Toulouse School of Economics

PHD CANDIDATE

One year of doctoral coursework

Columbia Business School

STAFF OFFICER OF RESEARCH - VISITING POSITION

Sponsor: Olivier Darmouni

RESEARCH FIELDS

Primary: Credit markets, Monetary Policy, Corporate Governance

Secondary: Empirical IO

Job Market Paper _____

Banking under Large excess reserves

WITH PAUL RINTAMÄKI, AALTO
UNIVERSITY

SEPT 2019 - JUNE 2025

TOULOUSE, FRANCE

FALL 2022

NEW YORK, USA

ABSTRACT: We examine the effects of quantitative easing (QE) on bank lending in the Eurozone. QE has substantially increased central bank reserves held by commercial banks and raised the volume of short-term wholesale deposits, which made bank funding less stable. Basel III regulation complicates how large volumes of excess reserves and short-term wholesale deposits influence bank lending. We develop a structural model incorporating imperfect competition in credit and deposit markets and regulatory costs that escalate as banks approach minimum requirements. This framework allows us to quantify how excess reserves contribute to regulatory costs. In France, QE increased the marginal cost of long-term lending by 16 basis points in Q4 2021. Counterfactual analysis indicates that maintaining central bank reserves at 2 trillion euros instead of 4 trillion could have boosted aggregate bank lending by approximately 5% in Q4 2021.

References ____

Alexander GUEMBEL

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Jean-Charles ROCHET

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Job market officers

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Education _

MRes in Economics 2018 - 2019
TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS TOULOUSE, FRANCE

Honours

MSc in Applied Mathematics 2016 - 2018
UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE PARIS, FRANCE

First class honours

MRes in Economics 2016 - 2018
SCIENCES PO PARIS, FRANCE

Bachelor in Mathematics 2013 - 2016
UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 6 UPMC PARIS, FRANCE

Honours

Bachelor in economics2013 - 2016Université Paris 2 Panthéon AssasParis, France

First class honours

Working papers _

Quantitative Easing, Inelastic Markets and the Transmission of Asset Purchases

WORKING PAPER

ABSTRACT: I study the impact of asset purchases on the composition of institutional bondholders portfolios, and how this acts as a transmission mechanism for quantitative easing: As the price of assets targeted by the purchases rises, investors search for yield and will purchase untargeted assets, in turn pushing up their price. I propose a mechanism where institutional bond-holders take advantage of financial frictions before this transmission of policy takes place. When asset purchases increase, institutional bondholders will first build up an inventory of specific bonds targeted by the purchases, diminishing the bonds available free float to squeeze out a profit from the Central Banks buying up the bonds. In a second phase, as prices for targeted assets stabilize, institutional bondholders will rebalance their portfolio towards bonds untargeted by the purchases as they search for yield, thereby transmitting quantitative easing to untargeted markets.

The determinants of director selection: Relationships in the director market

WORKING PAPER

ABSTRACT: When landing a board of directors job, a significant portion of external candidates enjoys preexisting relationships with members of the board. These relationships may be entirely fortuitous, could reflect self-serving behavior on behalf of board members, or simply be used as a screening device to recruit individuals in extremely competitive positions. This paper uses a consideration sets framework to disentangle these explanations. I argue that estimates of the impact of pre-existing relationships on a directors probability of appointment are biased upwards in the literature. I make additional observations of the impact of a directors personal network on her likelihood of appointment.

The effect of Asset Purchases on the Liquidity of the Bond Market

WORKING PAPER

ABSTRACT: I develop a theoretical model to analyze the impact of central bank intervention on the long run price of a bond. Bonds are defined as tradable debt assets that are set to be repaid after n periods and incur a default risk. Bondholders on the market incur a liquidity risk and might need to liquidate their assets, which can lead to market breakdown during a liquidity crisis. Central Bank intervention through asset purchases (QE) leads to price stabilization during QE, but at the cost of a long-run shift in prices and over-payment by the Central Bank. This leads to overborrowing in equilibrium after intervention. Reversing asset purchases through quantitative tightening will lead to a market crash as overborrowing firms become insolvent due to the shift of bond prices back to their steady state.

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What you see is what you get paid: Transparency and CEO pay

WORKING PAPER

ABSTRACT: This paper presents a simple model of CEO compensation where salary is dependent on the internal characteristics of the firm and where the salary of one CEO exerts a positive externality on the salary of others. CEOs are considered interchangeable but costly to recruit outside the market, and are randomly matched with firms until they accept the firms offer. Different firms having different levels of monitoring, prestige and being part of different industries, CEOs enjoy different levels of private benefit when shirking in different firms. Using this model, we can shed light on how the degree of transparency affects CEO compensation. In equilibrium, some of the CEOs have their participation constraint binding while the others have a binding incentive compatibility constraint. A change in the degree of transparency moves the participation constraint, inducing a change in wage for some CEOs. We find that the wage is more likely to increase than it is to decrease.

Work Experience _____

OECD PARIS, FRANCE
CONSULTANT APR. 2024 - OCT 2024

Project: Assessing effects of climate policies on capital allocation.

In charge of data handling and processing. Created a new homogenized cross-country database of high-frequency monetary policy shocks. Provided academic expertise in credit markets. Participated in ideation and drafting.

Teaching Experience _____

- 2023 Corporate Finance, Bachelor, Teaching Assistant for U. Hege
- 2023 Microeconomics II, Bachelor, Teaching Assistant for M-B. Bouissou
- 2022 Corporate Finance, Bachelor, Teaching Assistant for U. Hege
- 2022 Microeconomics II, Bachelor, Teaching Assistant for M-B. Bouissou
- 2020 Corporate Finance, Masters, Course coordinator, lecturer, tutorials

Fellowships & Awards _____

FELLOWSHIPS

2024	Job market fellowship, Toulouse School of Economics	Toulouse, FR
2024	8-month Banque de France Fellowship, Banque De France/TSE	Toulouse, FR
2023	Research fellowship, Toulouse School of Economics	Toulouse, FR
2022	TSE merit-based mobility grant, Columbia University	NEW YORK, USA
2019	3-year PhD Fellowship, Toulouse School of Economics	Toulouse, FR
2016	Erasmus scholarship, Universitat Autonòma de Barcelona	BARCELONA, ES
2015	IDEX excellency fellowship, Utrecht University	UTRECHT, NL

OTHER

2023 **Confidential data access**, Banque De France/CASD

PARIS, FR

Presentations _____

- 2024 UAB ENTER seminar, TSE Finance Seminar,
- 2022 SMYE conference, AFA Poster Session, Columbia GSB Finance Phd Workshop,

Technical skills _____

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Programming R(***), Python(**), Julia(**), Stata(**) LaTeX(***)

Languages French (native), English (fluent), Spanish (A1), German (A1)
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