Basile Dubois

FINANCIAL ECONOMICS

1, Esplanade de l'Université, 31000, Toulouse, FRANCE

□ (+33) 6 86 51 39 55 | ■ basile.dubois@tse-fr.eu | ♣ basiledubois.com

Employment	
McGill University Desautels Faculty of Management Assistant Professor of Finance	August 2025 - Montréal, CANADA
Research Fields and Teaching Interests	
Primary: Corporate Finance, Financial Intermediation, Banking Secondary: Monetary Policy, Empirical IO	
Education	
Toulouse School of Economics	SEPT 2019 - EXPECTED 2025
PHD CANDIDATE Supervisor: Alexander Guembel One year of doctoral coursework	Toulouse, FRANCE
Columbia Business School	FALL 2022
STAFF OFFICER OF RESEARCH - VISITING POSITION Sponsor: Olivier Darmouni	New York, USA
MRes in Economics	2018 - 2019
TOULOUSE SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS Honours	Toulouse, France
MSc in Applied Mathematics	2016 - 2018
UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 1 PANTHÉON SORBONNE First class honours	Paris, France
MRes in Economics	2016 - 2018
SCIENCES PO	Paris, France
Bachelor in Mathematics	2013 - 2016
UNIVERSITÉ PARIS 6 UPMC Honours	Paris, France

August 11, 2025

2013 - 2016

PARIS, FRANCE

Bachelor in economics

First class honours

Université Paris 2 Panthéon Assas

Working papers

BARCELONA.

Banking under large excess reserves

WITH PAUL RINTAMÄKI, AALTO
UNIVERSITY

PRESENTATIONS: 2ND UIC CONFERENCE, EEA 2025, AFA 2026, BU QUESTROM,
BANK OF ITALY, BANK OF SPAIN, McGill University, HEC Montréal, TSE
WO
FINANCE SEMINAR, COLUMBIA BUSINESS SCHOOL PHD SEMINAR.

WORKING PAPER, 2025

ABSTRACT: We examine the effects of quantitative easing (QE) on bank lending in the Eurozone. QE has substantially increased central bank reserves held by commercial banks and raised the volume of short-term wholesale deposits, which made bank funding less stable. Because of Basel III regulation, large volumes of excess reserves and short-term wholesale deposits curtail bank lending. We develop a structural model incorporating imperfect competition in credit and deposit markets and regulatory costs that escalate as banks approach minimum requirements. This framework allows us to quantify the cost of specific regulatory constraints and assess how excess reserves contribute to regulatory costs. In France, QE increased the marginal cost of long-term lending by 16 basis points in Q4 2021. Counterfactual analysis indicates that maintaining reserves at their 2019 level of 2 trillion euros instead of 4 trillion euros would have boosted aggregate bank lending by approximately 5% in Q4 2021.

Quantitative easing, inelastic markets and the transmission of asset Purchases

WORKING PAPER, 2024

ABSTRACT: I study the impact of asset purchases on the composition of institutional bondholders portfolios and how this acts as a transmission mechanism for quantitative easing: As the price of assets targeted by the purchases rises, investors search for yield and purchase untargeted assets, pushing up their price. I propose a mechanism where institutional bondholders take advantage of financial frictions before this policy transmission occurs. When asset purchases increase, institutional bondholders will first build up an inventory of specific bonds targeted by the purchases, diminishing the bonds available free float to squeeze out a profit from the Central Banks buying up the bonds. In a second phase, as prices for targeted assets stabilize, institutional bondholders will rebalance their portfolio towards bonds untargeted by the purchases as they search for yield, thereby transmitting quantitative easing to untargeted markets.

The determinants of director selection: Relationships in the director market

Presentations: 2023 SMYE Conference, Universitat Autonoma de

Working paper, 2023

ABSTRACT: When landing a board of directors job, a significant portion of external candidates enjoys preexisting relationships with board members. These relationships may be entirely fortuitous, could reflect self-serving behavior on behalf of board members, or simply be used as a screening device to recruit individuals in extremely competitive positions. This paper uses a consideration set framework to disentangle these explanations. I argue that estimates of the impact of preexisting relationships on a directors probability of appointment are biased upwards in the literature. I make additional observations on the effect of a directors personal network on her likelihood of appointment.

The effect of asset Purchases on the liquidity of the bond market

Working Paper

ABSTRACT: I develop a theoretical model to analyze the impact of central bank intervention on the long run price of a bond. Bonds are defined as tradable debt assets that are set to be repaid after n periods and incur a default risk. Bondholders on the market incur a liquidity risk and might need to liquidate their assets, which can lead to market breakdown during a liquidity crisis. Central Bank intervention through asset purchases (QE) leads to price stabilization during QE, but at the cost of a long-run shift in prices and over-payment by the Central Bank. This leads to overborrowing in equilibrium after intervention. Reversing asset purchases through quantitative tightening will lead to a market crash as overborrowing firms become insolvent due to the shift of bond prices back to their steady state.

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What you see is what you get paid: Transparency and CEO pay

WORKING PAPER

ABSTRACT: This paper presents a simple model of CEO compensation where salary is dependent on the internal characteristics of the firm and where the salary of one CEO exerts a positive externality on the salary of others. CEOs are considered interchangeable but costly to recruit outside the market, and are randomly matched with firms until they accept the firms offer. Since different firms have different levels of monitoring and prestige, and being part of different industries, CEOs enjoy different levels of private benefit when shirking in different firms. Using this model, we can shed light on how the degree of transparency affects CEO compensation. In equilibrium, some of the CEOs have their participation constraint binding while others have a binding incentive compatibility constraint. A change in the degree of transparency moves the participation constraint, inducing a change in wages for some CEOs. We find that the salary is more likely to increase than it is to decrease.

Work Experience _____

OECD PARIS, FRANCE
CONSULTANT APR. 2024 - OCT 2025

Project: Assessing effects of climate policies on capital allocation.

In charge of data handling and processing. Created a new homogenized cross-country database of high-frequency monetary policy shocks. Provided academic expertise in credit markets. Participated in ideation and drafting.

Teaching Experience _____

- 2023 Corporate Finance, Bachelor, Teaching Assistant for U. Hege
- 2023 Microeconomics II, Bachelor, Teaching Assistant for M-B. Bouissou
- 2022 Corporate Finance, Bachelor, Teaching Assistant for U. Hege
- 2022 Microeconomics II, Bachelor, Teaching Assistant for M-B. Bouissou
- 2020 Corporate Finance, Masters, Course coordinator, lecturer, tutorials

Fellowships & Awards _____

FELLOWSHIPS

2024 Job market fellowship, Toulouse School of Economics Tou	LOUSE, FR
2024 8-month Banque de France Fellowship, Banque De France/TSE	LOUSE, FR
2023 Research fellowship, Toulouse School of Economics Tou	LOUSE, FR
2022 TSE merit-based mobility grant, Columbia University New Y	ORK, USA
2019 3-year PhD Fellowship, Toulouse School of Economics Tou	LOUSE, FR
2016 Erasmus scholarship, Universitat Autonòma de Barcelona BARC	elona, ES
2015 IDEX excellency fellowship, Utrecht University	RECHT, NL

OTHER

2023 Confidential data access, Banque De France/CASD

PARIS, FR

Presentations ____

- 2024 UAB ENTER seminar, TSE Finance Seminar.
- 2022 SMYE conference, AFA Poster Session, Columbia GSB Finance Phd Workshop,

Technical skills _____

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Programming R(***), Python(**), Julia(**), Stata(**) LaTeX(***)

Languages French (native), English (fluent), Spanish (A1), German (A1)
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August 11, 2025