

BASILE DUBOIS

Toulouse School of Economics

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PhD Candidate

Toulouse School of Economics

PhD in Economics - One year of doctoral coursework

2019 - 2025

Toulouse, France

Columbia Business School

Staff Officer of Research - Visiting position - Sponsor: Olivier Darmouni

Fall 2022

New York, USA

Fields of Interest

- **Primary:** Corporate Finance, Corporate Governance, Banking
- **Secondary:** Empirical IO, Applied IO

PhD Coursework

- Corporate Finance
- Empirical IO
- Empirical Asset Pricing
- Empirical Macro-Finance
- Asset Pricing
- Theoretical IO
- Alfred Galichon's 'math+econ+code' masterclass on equilibrium transport and matching models in economics

Job Market Information

References

Alexander Guembel

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Patrick Coen

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Olivier Darmouni

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Academic placement officers

Ulrich Hege

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Administrator

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Education

MRes in Economics

Toulouse School of Economics - Honours

2018 - 2019

Toulouse, France

MSc in Applied Mathematics

Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne - First class honours

2016 - 2018

Paris, France

MRes in Economics

Sciences Po

2016 - 2018

Paris, France

Bachelor in Mathematics

Université Paris 6 UPMC - Honours

2013 - 2016

Paris, France

Bachelor in economics

Université Paris 2 Panthéon Assas - First class honours

2013 - 2016

Paris, France

Banking under Large excess reserves

With Paul Rintamaki, Aalto University

This paper builds a structural model that investigates how the expansion of central bank reserves, induced by quantitative easing (QE), impacts bank lending and deposit-taking activities under the Basel III regulatory framework. We combine detailed French credit registry data and Eurozone-level bank balance sheet data to analyze the interaction of regulatory constraints with QE. Our model allows for the structural estimation of regulatory costs, which serve as the building blocks of our cost function. The initial results indicate that the injection of excess reserves resulting from QE is especially costly for banks under negative interest rates and facing leverage constraints. Our structural estimates indicate that while expansionary at first, central bank reserves start to crowd-out credit after a threshold. At the peak of Covid QE, central bank reserves accounted for more than 20% of the cost of providing long-term credit.

Quantitative Easing, Inelastic Markets and the Transmission of Asset Purchases.

I study the impact of asset purchases on the composition of institutional bondholders' portfolios, and how this acts as a transmission mechanism for quantitative easing: As the price of assets targeted by the purchases rises, investors search for yield and will purchase untargeted assets, in turn pushing up their price. I propose a mechanism where institutional bondholders take advantage of financial frictions before this transmission of policy takes place. When asset purchases increase, institutional bondholders will first build up an inventory of specific bonds targeted by the purchases, diminishing the bonds' available free float to squeeze out a profit from the Central Banks buying up the bonds. In a second phase, as prices for targeted assets stabilize, institutional bondholders will rebalance their portfolio towards bonds untargeted by the purchases as they search for yield, thereby transmitting quantitative easing to untargeted markets.

The determinants of director selection: Relationships in the director market

When landing a board of directors job, a significant portion of external candidates enjoys preexisting relationships with members of the board. These relationships may be entirely fortuitous, could reflect self-serving behavior on behalf of board members, or simply be used as a screening device to recruit individuals in extremely competitive positions. This paper uses a consideration sets framework to disentangle these explanations. I argue that estimates of the impact of pre-existing relationships on a director's probability of appointment are biased upwards in the literature. I make additional observations of the impact of a director's personal network on her likelihood of appointment.

What you see is what you get paid: Transparency and CEO pay

This paper presents a simple model of CEO compensation where salary is dependent on the internal characteristics of the firm and where the salary of one CEO exerts a positive externality on the salary of others. CEOs are considered interchangeable but costly to recruit outside the market, and are randomly matched with firms until they accept the firm's offer. Different firms having different levels of monitoring, prestige and being part of different industries, CEOs enjoy different levels of private benefit when shirking in different firms. Using this model, we can shed light on how the degree of transparency affects CEO compensation. In equilibrium, some of the CEOs have their participation constraint binding while the others have a binding incentive compatibility constraint. A change in the degree of transparency moves the participation constraint, inducing a change in wage for some CEOs. We find that the wage is more likely to increase than it is to decrease.

The effect of Asset Purchases on the Liquidity of the Bond Market

I develop a theoretical model to analyze the impact of central bank intervention on the long run price of a bond. Bonds are defined as tradable debt assets that are set to be repaid after n periods and incur a default risk. Bondholders on the market incur a liquidity risk and might need to liquidate their assets, which can lead to market breakdown during a liquidity crisis. Central Bank intervention through asset purchases (QE) leads to price

stabilization during QE, but at the cost of a long-run shift in prices and over-payment by the Central Bank. This leads to overborrowing in equilibrium after intervention. Reversing asset purchases through quantitative tightening will lead to a market crash as overborrowing firms become insolvent due to the shift of bond prices back to their steady state.

Academic Exchanges, Fellowships and Awards

Utrecht University	2015 – 2016
<i>Scholarship: IDEX excellency grant</i>	<i>Utrecht, Netherlands</i>

Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona	2016 – 2016
<i>Scholarship: Erasmus grant</i>	<i>Barcelona, Spain</i>

Columbia University	2022 – 2022
<i>Scholarship: Toulouse School of Economics Mobility Grant</i>	<i>New York, USA</i>

Banque De France/CASD	2023
<i>Awarded access to confidential banking data</i>	<i>Paris, France</i>

Banque De France/TSE	2024
<i>8-month Banque de France research scholarship</i>	<i>Toulouse, France</i>

TECHNICAL SKILLS

Languages: French (native), English (Fluent), Spanish (A1), German (A1)
Programming: R(***), Python(***), Julia(**), Stata(*)

Work Experience

OECD Consultancy	March 2024-September 2024
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Project : Assessing effects of climate policies on capital allocation across financing channels.

Teaching

Corporate Finance M1	Fall 2020
<i>Course coordinator, lecturer, TA teacher</i>	

Corporate Finance L3	Spring 2022-Spring 2023
<i>TA teacher</i>	

Microeconomics L1	Spring 2022-Spring 2023
<i>TA teacher</i>	