MouseJack: Injecting Keystrokes into Wireless Mice

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((Mouse|Key)Jack|KeySniffer)

- Wireless mice and keyboards
  - 16 vendors
  - proprietary protocols (non-Bluetooth)
  - 4 families of transceivers
- 16 vulnerabilities
  - keystroke sniffing
  - keystroke injection
  - many are unpatchable

Types of vulnerabilities

- Keystroke Injection
  - Unencrypted, targeting mice
  - Unencrypted, targeting keyboards
  - Encrypted, targeting keyboards
- Keystroke Sniffing
  - Unencrypted keyboards
- Forced Pairing
  - Logitech Unifying dongles
  - Keyboard disguised as mouse
- Malicious macro programming
  - Delayed keystroke injection
- Denial of service
  - Crash USB dongle firmware

Turns out everybody makes vulnerable devices...

Prior Research

Thorsten Schroeder and Max Moser (2010)

- “Practical Exploitation of Modern Wireless Devices” (KeyKeriki)
- Research into XOR encrypted Microsoft wireless keyboards

Travis Goodspeed (2011)

- “Promiscuity is the nRF24L01+’s Duty”
- Research into nRF24L pseudo-promiscuous mode functionality

Samy Kamkar (2015)

- KeySweeper
- Microsoft XOR encrypted wireless keyboard sniffer

How do mice and keyboards work?

Peripherals send user input to dongle



Dongle sends user input to computer



An attacker can talk to your dongle...



or eavesdrop on your unencrypted keyboard



Background and Motivation

"Since the displacements of a mouse would not give any useful information to a hacker, the mouse reports are not encrypted."

- Logitech (2009)

Initial Logitech mouse research

- USRP B210 SDR
- Logitech M510 mouse
- GNU Radio decoder
- Good for passive RX
- USB and CPU latency make two way communications tricky

Burning Man to the rescue! (duh)

NES controller internals

- Arduino Nano
- DC boost converter
- nRF24L01+
- vibration motor
- WS2812B LED



Logitech mouse hijacking NES controller

“Village Adventure”
by Marc Newlin

IoT Village

a Logitech mouse clicker

did not like the hax



NES Controller v2 (now with more things!)



NES controller v2 internals

- Teensy 3.1
- 5x nRF24L01+ radios
- 1x WS2812B RGB LED
- 500mAh LiPo battery
- microSD card reader
- OLED display

OSK attack @ ToorCon

- Windows 8.1/10
- Deterministically launch split OSK
- Keys are at known offsets from screen corners, assuming default DPI
- Slow, very slow



Discovering that first vulnerability



- Logitech Unifying keyboards
- Unencrypted keystroke injection
- Is it really that easy?

I’ll take one of each, please...

Research Process



Gather OSINT and implement SDR decoder

- FCC test reports
  - Frequencies
  - Modulation (sometimes)
- RFIC documentation
  - Physical layer configuration
  - Packet formats
- The Google
  - “How hack mice?”
  - “Why keyboard not encrypt?”

- SDR decoder
  - GNU Radio
  - USRP B210
  - 2.4GHz ISM band
  - 500kHz, 1MHz, 2MHz GFSK

Caution

Please use the Transceiver in human house only and keep away water.

Children don’t to install the Transceiver.

Build out a protocol model

1. Generate some ARFz
    a. Move the mouse, click some buttons
    b. Type on the keyboard
2. What data is sent over the air, and when?
    a. Infer payload structures
    b. Observe protocol behavior (channel hopping, ACKs, crypto, etc)

Look for low hanging fruit

- Wireless mice
  - All tested mice are unencrypted
  - Does it transmit keystrokes?
  - Does it send raw HID data?
- Wireless keyboards
  - Is the keyboard unencrypted?
  - Is it replay vulnerable?



Fuzzing (poke it and see what breaks)

- usbmon / wireshark
  - USB sniffing to see what the dongle sends to the host computer
- xinput / magic sysrq
  - Disable xinput processing of target keyboards and mice
  - Disable magic sysrq to avoid those pesky unintended hard reboots
- fuzzer
  - NES controller, and later custom nRF24LU1+ firmware

Nordic Semiconductor nRF24L

Nordic Semiconductor nRF24L Family

- 2.4GHz GFSK transceivers
- 250kbps, 1Mbps, 2Mbps data rates
- 0-32 byte payloads, 8 or 16 bit CRC
- Vendor defined mouse/keyboard protocols

Transceiver	8051 MCU	128-bit AES	USB	Memory
nRF24LE1	Yes	Yes	No	Flash
nRF24LE1 OTP	Yes	Yes	No	OTP (no firmware updates)
nRF24LU1+	Yes	Yes	Yes	Flash
nRF24LU1+ OTP	Yes	Yes	Yes	OTP (no firmware updates)

nRF24L Enhanced Shockburst

- MAC Layer Functionality
  - Automatic ACKs
  - Automatic retransmit



Enhanced Shockburst Packet Format

Common nRF24L Configuration

- “Standardized” properties
  - 2 Mbps data rate
  - 5 byte address length
  - 2 byte CRC
  - Automatic ACKs
  - Automatic retransmit
- Vendor specific properties
  - RF channels
  - Payload lengths

Logitech Unifying

Logitech Unifying

- Universal pairing
  - Any mouse or keyboard can pair with any dongle
- Firmware update support
  - Dongles support firmware updates
  - Most mice/keyboards do not
- Transceivers
  - nRF24LU1+ / nRF24LE1 (most common)
  - TI-CC2544 / TI-CC2543 (higher end)
  - All OTA compatible
- Encryption
  - Mice are unencrypted
  - Keyboard multimedia keys are unencrypted
  - Regular keyboard keys are encrypted with 128-bit AES
  - Key generation during pairing
- Some Dell products are really Unifying
  - Dell KM714
  - Likely others

Logitech Unifying Base Packet Format



(Logitech Unifying Packet Format)

- 5, 10, and 22 byte payloads
- 1 byte payload checksum

Logitech Unifying Addressing

- Lowest octet is device ID
  - Defaults to 07 from the factory
- Device ID increments when you pair a new device
  - Re-pairing a device doesn’t change its ID
- Device ID 00 is reserved for the dongle

Example RF Addressing	
Dongle serial number	7A:77:94:DE
Dongle RF address	7A:77:94:DE:00
Paired device 1 RF address	7A:77:94:DE:07
Paired device 2 RF address	7A:77:94:DE:08
Paired device 3 RF address	7A:77:94:DE:09

Logitech Unifying Payload Addressing

Device Index 1 byte	Frame Type 1 byte	Data 2, 7, or 19 bytes	Checksum 1 byte

(Logitech Unifying Payload Format)

RF Address	Payload	Addressing Mode
11:22:33:44:07 (Dongle Address)	00:XX:XX:XX:XX	Transmit to the address of a paired mouse and ignore the device index field
11:22:33:44:00 (Mouse Address)	07:XX:XX:XX:XX	Transmit payload to the dongle address and use the device index field

ACK Payloads (Dongle to Peripheral Cmds)



Logitech Unifying ACK Payload Example

```
[16.922]  9D:65:CB:58:4D  0040006E52                                  // keepalive, 110ms interval
[16.923]  9D:65:CB:58:4D                                              // ACK
[17.015]  9D:65:CB:58:4D  0040006E52                                  // keepalive, 110ms interval
[17.015]  9D:65:CB:58:4D                                              // ACK
[17.108]  9D:65:CB:58:4D  0040006E52                                  // keepalive, 110ms interval
[17.108]  9D:65:CB:58:4D                                              // ACK
[17.201]  9D:65:CB:58:4D  0040006E52                                  // keepalive, 110ms interval
[17.201]  9D:65:CB:58:4D                                              // ACK
[17.294]  9D:65:CB:58:4D  0040006E52                                  // keepalive, 110ms interval
[17.294]  9D:65:CB:58:4D  00104D0014000000008F                        // ACK payload; requesting HID++ version
[17.302]  9D:65:CB:58:4D  00514D00140405000000000000000000000000000045  // response (HID++ 4.5)
[17.302]  9D:65:CB:58:4D                                              // ACK
[17.387]  9D:65:CB:58:4D  0040006E52                                  // keepalive, 110ms interval
[17.387]  9D:65:CB:58:4D                                              // ACK
```

Logitech Unifying Dynamic Keepalives

- Keepalives are used to detect poor channel conditions
- Missed a keepalive? Change channels
- Mouse/keyboard dynamically sets keepalive interval
- Short interval when active, long interval when idle

Unused 1 byte	Frame Type (0x4F) 1 byte	Unused 1 byte	Timeout 2 bytes	Unused 4 bytes	Checksum 1 byte

(Logitech Set Keepalive Timeout Payload)

Unused 1 byte	Frame Type (0x40) 1 byte	Timeout 2 bytes	Checksum 1 byte

(Logitech Keepalive Payload)

Logitech Unifying Keepalives - Example

```
[20.173]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:C2:00:00:01:00:00:00:00:3D // mouse movement (implicitly sets keepalive interval to 8ms)
[20.181]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:4F:00:00:6E:00:00:00:00:43 // no movement after 8ms, set keepalive interval to 110ms
[20.189]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:C2:00:00:01:00:00:00:00:3D
[20.196]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:C2:00:00:01:00:00:00:00:3D
...
[20.282]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:C2:00:00:00:E0:FF:00:00:5F
[20.289]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:C2:00:00:00:F0:FF:00:00:4F
[20.297]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:4F:00:00:6E:00:00:00:00:43 // no movement after 8ms, set keepalive interval to 110ms
[20.305]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:40:00:6E:52                // keepalive at 110ms interval
[20.390]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:40:00:6E:52
[20.483]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:40:00:6E:52
...
[25.377]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:40:00:6E:52
[25.470]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:40:00:6E:52
[25.563]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:4F:00:04:B0:00:00:00:00:FD // after 5 seconds idle, increase keepalive interval to 1200ms
[25.571]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:40:04:B0:0C                // keepalive at 1200ms interval
[26.533]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:40:04:B0:0C
[27.486]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:40:04:B0:0C
[28.439]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:40:04:B0:0C
[29.392]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:40:04:B0:0C
[30.345]  4C:29:9D:C6:09  00:40:04:B0:0C
```

Logitech Unifying Pairing

1. Unifying software tells the dongle to enter pairing mode
2. Dongle listens to pairing requests on address BB:0A:DC:A5:75
3. Dongle times out if pairing doesn't happen in 30-60 seconds
4. Device type and properties are sent during pairing



Logitech Unifying Device Power-on Behavior

Dongle
Where you at?

[crickets chirping]

Yo, anybody
want to pair??

Vulnerabilities

Encrypted Protocols

Unencrypted Injection



Unencrypted Injection Targeting Keyboard

(Logitech Unifying, Dell KM714)



Forced Pairing

(Logitech Unifying, Dell KM714)



Disguise Mouse as Keyboard

(Logitech Unifying, Dell KM714)



Logitech Response, Round 1

- Vendor notified on 11-24-2015
- Public disclosure on 02-23-2016
- Firmware update released on 02-23-2016
  - Fixed forced pairing
  - Partially fixed unencrypted keystroke injection
  - Also applies to Dell KM714

Bypassing The Fix

- Use Linux
- Use OSX
- Install Logitech Setpoint

lol, wut?

Logitech Response, Round 2a

- Vendor notified on 04-27-2016
- Public disclosure on 07-26-2016
- Firmware update released on 07-26-2016
  - Fixed unencrypted keystroke injection
  - Also applies to Dell KM714

Logitech G900 Chaos Spectrum

- “Professional Grade Wireless” gaming mouse ($150!!!)
  - Tuned (and power hungry) version of Unifying
  - Shorter ACK timeouts
  - 8 channels vs. 24 with Unifying
  - No pairing support
  - USB connection to charge or use as a wired mouse
  - TI-CC2544/TI-CC2543 offers more TX power than nRF24L
  - **Vulnerable to unencrypted keystroke injection!**

Logitech G900 Macros

- Keystroke macros are programmed into the mouse
- Macros can be programmed wirelessly, by an attacker
- Timing delays can be inserted between keystrokes



Logitech Response, Round 2b

- Vendor notified on 04-27-2016
- Public disclosure on 07-26-2016
- Firmware update released on 07-26-2016
  - Fixed unencrypted keystroke injection (G900 gaming mouse)

Unencrypted Injection Targeting Mouse

(AmazonBasics, Dell KM632, Lenovo 500, Microsoft)



Microsoft Sculpt Ergonomic Mouse

Press to send unencrypted Keystroke Packet

Amazon response, round 1

- Unencrypted keystroke injection into mouse dongle
- Vendor notified on 11-24-2015
- Public disclosure on 02-23-2016
- No vendor response

Dell response, round 1

- Unencrypted keystroke injection into mouse dongle
- Vendor notified on 11-24-2015
- Public disclosure on 02-23-2016
- Dell fixed the firmware and sent an updated version to test, but firmware updates are not possible on existing devices

Lenovo response, round 1

- Unencrypted keystroke injection into mouse dongle
- Vendor notified on 11-24-2015
- Public disclosure on 02-23-2016
- Lenovo fixed the firmware and sent an updated version to test, but firmware updates are not possible on existing devices

Microsoft response

- Unencrypted keystroke injection into mouse dongle
- Vendor notified on 11-24-2015
- Public disclosure on 02-23-2016
- Microsoft released Windows update on 04-22-2016
  - Works on client versions of Windows (no server support)
  - Addresses mice, but not mouse/beyboard sets
  - No fix for Linux or OSX
  - No firmware update support

DDoS: Dongle Denial of Service

(Lenovo Ultraslim, Ultraslim Plus, N700)



Encrypted Protocols

Encrypted Injection

Counter Mode AES



Repeated Counters? Give ‘em here!



Encrypted Keystroke Packets



USB HID Key Up Ciphertext

"A" key down

key up

XOR'd w/ciphertext = ciphertext

Encrypted Keystroke Injection Devices

- Logitech Unifying keyboards (including Dell KM714)
- Dell KM632
- Lenovo Ultraslim
- AmazonBasics Wireless Keyboard
- HP Wireless Elite V2 Keyboard

Encrypted Keystroke Injection Responses

- Vendor notified on 04-27-2016
- Public disclosure on 07-26-2016
- Logitech is working on a fix
- Lenovo is working on a fix
- Dell updated the firmware and set us a fixed unit to verify, but firmware updates are not possible in the field
- No response from Amazon
- No acknowledgement of the vulnerability from HP

Unencrypted Protocols

Unencrypted Transceivers (KeySniffer)

- MOSART Semiconductor (undocumented)
  - 1Mbps or 375kbps GFSK
  - Single channel
  - No encryption
- Signia SGN6210 (sparsely documented)
  - 1Mbps GFSK
  - Frequency hopping
  - No encryption
- GE/Jasco mystery transceiver (no idea what this thing is)
  - 500kbps GFSK
  - Frequency hopping
  - No encryption

Unencrypted Devices - MOSART

- **Anker** Ultra Slim 2.4GHz Wireless Compact Keyboard
- **EagleTec** K104 / KS04 2.4 GHz Wireless Combo keyboard
- **HP** Wireless Classic Desktop wireless keyboard
- **Insignia** Wireless Keyboard NS-PNC5011
- **Kensington** Pro Fit Wireless Keyboard
- **RadioShack** Slim 2.4GHz Wireless Keyboard
- **ShhhMouse** Wireless Silent Mouse (injection only)
- **HDE** Slim Wireless Optical Mouse (injection only)

Unencrypted Devices - non-MOSART

- **GE/Jasco** 98614 Wireless Keyboard and Mouse
- **Gigabyte** K7600 Wireless Keyboard and Mouse
- **Toshiba** PA3871U-1ETB Wireless Keyboard

Dongle Sync Packets

"Keyboard, I'm over here!!!"

↑

Every 8 or 16 milliseconds

Building Device Discovery



Sniffing Multiple Keyboards



KeySniffer Vendor Responses

- **Anker** will exchange vulnerable keyboards for Bluetooth models through 08-30-2016
- **Kensington** claims to have a new AES encrypted version of the Pro Fit wireless keyboard
  - I have not seen or tested this device
  - FCC docs don’t show any new keyboards
- **Insignia** told reporters that its keyboards are encrypted, however the vulnerable model is unencrypted
- **GE/Jasco** is no longer making wireless keyboards/mice

White-label Hardware, White-Label Vulnerabilities

Vendor vs OEM: Hewlett-Packard / ACROX

HP Wireless Classic Desktop

- Added HP logo
- Modified side button style



ACROX KBJ+G1G

- OEM keyboard

Vendor vs OEM: AmazonBasics / Chicony

AmazonBasics Wireless Keyboard/Mouse

- Added AmazonBasics logos
- Dell KM632 (made by Chicony) has the same vulns as AmazonBasics

Chicony WUG1213

- OEM keyboard/mouse set

Vendor vs OEM: RadioShack / Siliten

RadioShack Wireless Keyboard

- Added RadioShack logo
- Small styling changes



Siliten DK/M-9091RL

- OEM keyboard

Attack Hardware

CrazyRadio PA and Open Sourced Firmware

- nRF24LU1+ w/ LNA/PA
- 225 meter injection w/ yagi
- Open source hardware
- Part of Crazyflie project
- Bastille Research firmware:
- https://github.com/BastilleResearch/mousejack/



Research Firmware on Logitech Dongles

- Unifying dongles support firmware updates
  - Logitech bootloader doesn’t do signature validation
  - Any firmware image that passes CRC is accepted
- Flash the Bastille Research firmware onto a Logitech dongle:
  - sudo make logitech_install
- Cheap and available
  - ~$10 vs ~$30 for the CrazyRadio PA
  - CrazyRadio PA harder to find after MouseJack release
  - Unifying dongles are widely available

Android App



- Device discovery and classification
  - Logitech devices
  - Microsoft devices
- Dongle firmware flashing support
  - CrazyRadio dongles
  - Logitech dongles

Demo Time!


YO DAWG, I HEARD YOU
LIKE LOGITECH DONGLES
SO I ATTACKED YOUR LOGITECH
DONGLE WITH A LOGITECH DONGLE
imgflip.com

Questions?

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