

## 12. Evolutionary Games

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**Def.** A **selection** is the changing of distribution of types (e.g. phenotype, genotype).

**Note** We call the equilibrium the Evolutionary Stability Solution (ESS).

### Prisoners' Dilemma Style Game

	Defect	Cooperate
Defect	(54, 54)	(72, 47)
Cooperate	(47, 72)	(60, 60)

Let  $x$  be the proportion of cooperators in the population.

We consider the fitness levels of each type:

$$\text{Defector: } \text{Exp}(\Pi) = 54(1 - x) + (72)(x) = 18x + 54$$

$$\text{Cooperator: } \text{Exp}(\Pi) = 47(1 - x) + (60)(x) = 13x + 47$$

It is more fit to be a cooperator if:

$$13x + 47 > 18x + 54 \implies x < \frac{-7}{5}.$$

Here, in practice, it is never better to be a cooperator.

The ESS is  $x = 0$ . So, we end with a **monotone distribution** since only defectors will remain.

At this point, imagine a **mutation** enters the population, a cooperator in this case. The mutation will not survive.

### Chicken Style Game

	W	M
W	(0, 0)	(-1, 1)
M	(1, -1)	(-2, -2)

Let  $x$  be the proportion of M in the population.

We consider the fitness levels of each type:

$$\text{W: } \text{Exp}(\Pi) = (0)(1 - x) + (-1)(x) = -x$$


$$\text{M: } \text{Exp}(\Pi) = (1)(1 - x) + (-2)(x) = -3x + 1$$

It is more fit to be M if:

$$-3x + 1 > -x \implies x < \frac{1}{2}.$$

The ESS is  $x = \frac{1}{2}$ . So, we do not have a one-type solution.

Here, a mutation is of either type.



### Hawk & Dove Game

	H	D
H	$(\frac{V-C}{2}, \frac{V-C}{2})$	$(V, 0)$
D	$(0, V)$	$(\frac{V}{2}, \frac{V}{2})$

Let Value be  $V$ .

Imagine we have two types come together:

Two Hawks: Equal chance of getting  $V$  or enduring injury  $C$

Two Doves: They share  $V$

One of Each: Hawk gets all, Dove gets nothing

Consider  $V = 10$ ,  $C = 4$  so  $V > C$ .

Let  $x$  be the proportion of Doves in the population.

Fitness levels:

$$\text{Hawk: } (\frac{10-4}{2})(1-x) + (10)(x) = 7x + 3$$

$$\text{Dove: } (0)(1-x) + (\frac{10}{2})(x) = 5x$$

It is more fit to be a Dove if:

$$7x + 3 < 5x \implies x < \frac{-3}{2}.$$

So, ESS is  $x = 1$  and hence it is always better to be a Hawk.

Consider  $V = 10$ ,  $C = 12$  so  $V < C$ .

Let  $x$  be the proportion of Doves in the population.

Fitness levels:

$$\text{Hawk: } (\frac{10-12}{2})(1-x) + (10)(x) = 11x - 1$$

$$\text{Dove: } (0)(1-x) + (\frac{10}{2})(x) = 5x$$

It is more fit to be a Dove if:

$$11x - 1 < 5x \implies x < \frac{1}{6}.$$

So, it is better to be a Dove if  $x < 1/6$ .

Then, ESS is  $x = \frac{1}{6}$ .