


ACTIVE DIRECTORY RECON DETECTION VIA HONEY USER ACCOUNT (T1087)

SECTION 1: LAB OVERVIEW

Field	Value
MITRE Technique	T1087 – Account Discovery
Environment	Kali Linux (192.168.40.140), Windows Server 2022 (Domain Controller), AD Domain: lab.local
Objective	Detect unauthorized AD enumeration by baiting attacker with a honey account
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SECTION 2: SETUP SUMMARY

- Created svc_backup1 in new OU IT_Secrets
- User had no permissions and never logged in
- Enabled audit policies (4625, 4662, 4624, 4648, 4776)



```
Administrator: Windows PowerShell
Windows PowerShell
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Install the latest PowerShell for new features and improvements! https://aka.ms/PowerShellLatest

PS C:\Users\Administrator> gpupdate /force
Updating policy...

Computer Policy update has completed successfully.
User Policy update has completed successfully.
```

Figure 1: Forced Group policy Update

- Monitored logon failures and directory access to the honey user

SECTION 3: SIMULATED ATTACK

- Used authenticated bind with ldapsearch:

```
ldapsearch -x -H ldap://192.168.40.134 -D "lab\\labuser1" -w "Passw0rd123" -b "dc=lab,dc=local"
```




Figure 2: Kali Command for searching LDAP indexes

- Output redirected to Desktop/ldap_results.txt
- Triggered failed login to svc_backup1 from attacker IP

SECTION 4: DETECTION

- Event ID 4625 from attacker IP on honey user
- PowerShell used to extract logs:

```
Get-WinEvent -LogName Security | ? { $_.Message -like "*svc_backup1*" }
```

- Also went into Event Viewer > Windows Logs > Security and filtered the events to the last hour and set the event IDs to match what we were searching for.
- Captured Successful login onto labuser1 from the kali machine.




Figure 3: labuser1 logon Detected

- Captured explicit credential use – Event ID 4648




Figure 4: Explicit credential use caught on audit

- Captured NTLM credential validation – Event ID 4776

SECTION 5: OUTCOME + RECOMMENDATION

- **Detected** unauthorized AD recon
- Alert triggered on honey user probe




Figure 5: Manually Pulled Logs Via CLI

- Recommend deeper forensic pull of source IP + 30min log window
- Validate logon source (192.168.49.140) against asset inventory.
- Monitor for repeated queries against unused or hidden accounts.
- Recommend alerting on failed or successful bind attempts to honey accounts.