

Replication: ‘The Distributive Politics of Enforcement’

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Contents

0.0.0.1 Introduction and Overview: This paper looks at police behavior in varying contexts around Latin America to explore what gets prosecuted and what is allowed to go unnoticed. The areas of interest are the relationships between constituency of the powers that be (at a given time) and how much those individuals in the constituent groups care to have property rights enforced. Involving a great deal of original research, the author does an intriguing job of addressing this question in a rather Bayesian way, so I thought this would be a good project on a topic that I briefly studied previously and can now apply new skills to.

The author argues that in many cases, not enforcing these laws is as intentional as enforcing them and makes the early assertion of one of her findings where she found a five times higher enforcement rate in places where constituents were primarily non-poor (a binary distinction made in the data analysis portion of the research). Holland uses many standardized poisson regression models, which makes sense in the setting where response variables are the topic of interest. The catch in that model is the concern for invalidation by reverse causality. To counter this point, a supply vs. demand framework is raised as one might find in your favorite introductory economics course with the y-axis showing enforcement frequency and the x-axis showing offenses. The key to this argument is in assuming that the intentional non-enforcement cases would translate to an outward shift in the ‘supply curve’ of enforcement. This framework gives a decent basis to analyze electoral and otherwise political behavior and regional differences. The results of the data and the proposed model seem to support this framework and initial intuition, even if it is specific to the case observed. I would have concerns about the external validity of Holland’s model, but nonetheless I agree that the model results in support for the framework claiming that there is an inverse relationship between police enforcement of vending licensing and quantity of poor individuals voting in a district.

0.0.0.2 Literature Review The author of this paper has become relatively well known for her research and her findings in the realm of forbearance and electoral impacts relative to low income populations in Latin America. In the literature published after this particular paper in 2014, a majority of it has also been authored by Holland and so far as I can tell there are few contradictions to be seen. The setting of the cases observed in this research is one where vendors of various goods are ‘guilty’ of using public space to peddle their private enterprises. This gives the police forces the ability to, within the letter of the law, arrest or otherwise enforce the statute that they are unlicensed to the space in question and that they should vacate. The reality tangent to this is that these vendors are also voters, and they are unlikely to forget the political head of the forces inhibiting their livelihood. Holland cites Colombia’s National Data Archive with respect to the aspect that these vendors often do tend to rely on their ‘unlicensed incomes’ as they are usually quite low-ranking in the income distribution.

Without digressing into Holland’s research or the other supporting research again, it seems intuitive that where there is a majority of voters comprised of these individuals in the lower income distribution range who may rely, or know someone who relies, on secondary income to sustain themselves you would find that the local government would be less harsh on these cases of unregistered free markets. In fact, since this paper was published other authors have found cases where the government actually incentivizes the collaboration or unionization of these unregistered individuals as a sort of subset of the economy (Hummel 2017).

Overall this vein of inquiry has fascinating ramifications in electoral predictions and voter behavior, especially in cases where statistical analyses show decreased sensitivities to potentially exogenous enforcement factors like department budgets and other angles. Carefully constructed models slowly begin to point their fingers toward constituency as a large driver of enforcement behaviors; and while I would prefer to see a few more rigors in the process, I tend to be convinced by the findings available thus far.

0.0.0.3 Extension: In effort to further explore the findings from Holland’s work, the same poisson models that comprise ‘Table 2’ were run through models built with intrinsic Bayesian methods. Because Bayesian inference and regression methods present different types of interpretation of uncertainty and offer a different analytical approach, these results have been compared to the original as a kind of sensitivity analysis with respect to statistical methodology.

The first exploration was with respect to missing data. In short, there was no place for concern for missing data. Whether this is due to the pre-cleaned data being the only repository made available, the nature of the original research lending a low rate of missing values, or other factors is unknown. It was found to be the case that there were complete records funneled into all models constructed in the original study, and the only ‘missing’ values were variables completely present or missing at the city level.

The second exploration was with regard to the Bayesian regression coefficients and whether they were notably different from the originals. INSERT A CONCLUSION ABOUT THIS HERE


The third inquiry was a test of the fit of the models. Using the leave-one-out cross validation method of analyzing the Bayesian regressions, there were between 3 and 7 observations per model in the regressions for Lima and Santiago that were deemed to be ‘problematic’ by this analysis. In small data sets with any level of variance, it seems reasonable at first to assume that there would be a few outlying values that would not be great fits to the model at hand. However, in this case the gross number of observations available to the models are 34 or 36. This implies that if the model ignores or removes the extraneous observations (which is the case in the Bayesian methods employed [cite rstanarm here]) we range farther into territory in which the minimum value to employ the central limit theorem and various other underlying statistical assumptions.

The final inquiry was with regard to ‘statistical significance’ and its equivalent in Bayesian inference through rstanarm[cite again]. [summarize here the comparison of the 90% credible interval to the 95% CI, as well as which values are stat. sig. compared to which cred intervals are strong.

0.0.0.4 “Beautiful” Graphic


Enforcing Vendors' Licenses: Bogotá, Columbia


Data showing the association between quantity of unlicensed street vendors and number of police operations in the area in question. A linear regression line is included to emphasize the slope of the relationship




Data from original research done by Alisha C. Holland.
Find the original paper and reference to the associated
dataverse at: <https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12125>

0.0.0.5 Appendix: I was unable to recreate one graphic on account of not having access to political and temporal data that would allow me to create the graphic showing class gradient, budget, operations, and politicians in power for certain time frames. Otherwise, I have replicated or attempted to replicate all of the major analyses in the paper with the data I have access to. Items made by the author with data inaccessible and graphs pertaining to only theory were not replicated on basis of not being relevant to course scope.





non-poor, poor • 0 ▲ 1



non-poor, poor • 0 ▲ 1

% Table created by stargazer v.5.2.2 by Marek Hlavac, Harvard University. E-mail: hlavac at fas.harvard.edu
 % Date and time: Sun, Apr 26, 2020 - 23:00:51 % Requires LaTeX packages: rotating

FIGURE 3 Relationships between Enforcement, Offenses, and District Poverty by City




Figure 1: This is Holland's Figure 3 for reference:


Table 1: Santiago

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>								
	Bogota	Lima			operations			Santiago	arrests
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Lower	-0.053 (0.087)	-0.693*** (0.052)	-0.641*** (0.054)	-0.975*** (0.085)	-0.707*** (0.166)	-0.673*** (0.165)	-0.767*** (0.218)	-0.449*** (0.156)	0.047 (0.136)
Vendors	0.571*** (0.068)	-0.182*** (0.064)	-0.162** (0.064)	-0.090 (0.066)	-0.528* (0.290)	-0.683** (0.336)	-0.754** (0.364)	-0.496** (0.230)	
Budget	0.038 (0.127)	0.060** (0.027)	0.120*** (0.029)	0.087*** (0.031)	-0.149 (0.122)	0.096 (0.130)	0.138 (0.145)	-0.177 (0.115)	-0.065 (0.138)
Population	0.207** (0.087)	0.468*** (0.054)	0.467*** (0.056)	0.368*** (0.060)	0.272* (0.165)	0.586*** (0.186)	0.635*** (0.203)	0.406** (0.181)	0.096 (0.059)
Margin			0.166*** (0.034)	-0.188** (0.078)		-0.680*** (0.160)	-0.868*** (0.330)		
Margin*Lower				0.425*** (0.085)			0.292 (0.436)		
Right								2.083*** (0.412)	0.092 (0.172)
Reports									0.400*** (0.067)
Constant	1.987*** (0.091)	2.920*** (0.043)	2.899*** (0.044)	2.876*** (0.045)	0.665*** (0.139)	0.461*** (0.169)	0.478*** (0.169)	-0.826** (0.388)	1.565*** (0.124)
Observations	19	36	36	36	34	34	34	34	34
Log Likelihood	-41.918	-231.254	-220.184	-207.689	-108.395	-97.262	-97.035	-88.994	-Inf.000
Akaike Inf. Crit.	93.837	472.509	452.369	429.378	226.791	206.524	208.069	189.987	Inf.000

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

0.0.0.6 Extension: pt.1 With regard to missing data analysis, there were no points of concern as there were no regression analyses that incorporated missing data. below you can see the summary of data missing from the onset, but at the level of analyses, the individual cities, there were no calculations done on variables with incomplete sets of information.



Original data collected by the author of the basis paper: A. Holland

0.0.0.7 Extension: pt.2

- (a) The object of this portion is to compare modeling methods between standard poisson regressions and those done in the Bayesian method. Errors, estimate measures, and fit metrics are slightly different, so we will see whether this methodological change brings up points of concern

- (1) Bogota and Lima:

Table 2: Bogota and Lima

	(B 1)	(L 1)	(L 2)	(L 3)
Intercept	1.971 (0.091)	2.917 (0.044)	2.897 (0.044)	2.871 (0.043)
Lower	-0.050 (0.083)	-0.694 (0.052)	-0.642 (0.054)	-0.976 (0.087)
Vendors	0.572 (0.066)	-0.183 (0.061)	-0.163 (0.067)	-0.089 (0.068)
Budget	0.025 (0.125)	0.059 (0.028)	0.119 (0.030)	0.087 (0.031)
Population	0.206 (0.085)	0.469 (0.054)	0.465 (0.055)	0.365 (0.062)
Margin			0.165 (0.035)	-0.189 (0.079)
Margin*Lower				0.425 (0.087)
Num. Observations	19	36	36	36

- (2) Santiago:

Table 3: Santiago

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Intercept	0.629 (0.142)	0.417 (0.170)	0.422 (0.174)	-0.862 (0.407)	8.472 (0.004)
Lower	-0.704 (0.162)	-0.668 (0.169)	-0.768 (0.212)	-0.457 (0.153)	0.047 (0.004)
Vendors	-0.571 (0.293)	-0.727 (0.329)	-0.770 (0.358)	-0.524 (0.236)	
Budget	-0.157 (0.124)	0.092 (0.134)	0.136 (0.148)	-0.186 (0.113)	-0.065 (0.004)
Population	0.281 (0.165)	0.590 (0.184)	0.649 (0.197)	0.397 (0.176)	0.096 (0.002)
Margin		-0.687 (0.165)	-0.873 (0.306)		
Margin*Lower			0.278 (0.407)		
Num. Observations	34	34	34	34	34

- (b) This section contains leave-one-out cross-validation model comparisons between the Bayesian models from part 'a' for cities with multiple regressions in the original analysis.

```
##          elpd_diff se_diff
## limreg2  0.0      0.0
## limreg1 -9.3     15.0
```

```
##          elpd_diff se_diff
## limreg3  0.0      0.0
## limreg2 -3.1     16.3
```

```
##          elpd_diff se_diff
## limreg3  0.0      0.0
## limreg1 -12.4    18.2
```

```
##          elpd_diff se_diff
## santreg2  0.0      0.0
## santreg1 -7.0     13.7
```

```
##          elpd_diff se_diff
## santreg3  0.0      0.0
## santreg1 -5.6     13.5
```

```
##          elpd_diff se_diff
## santreg4  0.0      0.0
## santreg1 -17.9    14.6
```

```
##          elpd_diff se_diff
## santreg2  0.0      0.0
## santreg3 -1.5      1.4
```

```
##          elpd_diff se_diff
## santreg4  0.0      0.0
## santreg2 -10.9    14.8
```

```
##          elpd_diff se_diff
## santreg4  0.0      0.0
## santreg3 -12.3    14.7
```

```
# time allowing: make a loop to average the median values for all observations
```

```
# Bogota:
```

```
print(coef(fit_t2), digits = 3)
```

```
## (Intercept)      slower      svendors      sbudget      spop
##      1.9867      -0.0530      0.5709      0.0379      0.2071
```

```
pred_b1 <- posterior_linpred(bogreg1)
summary(pred_b1[,])
```

```
##      Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max.
##      1.454   1.712   1.907   2.047   2.235   3.102
```

```
# Lima 1
```

```
print(coef(fit_t2_lim1), digits = 3)
```

```
## (Intercept)      slower      svendors      sbudget      spop
##      2.9200      -0.6934      -0.1817      0.0603      0.4682
```

```
pred_l1 <- posterior_linpred(limreg1)
summary(pred_l1[1,])
```

```
##      Min. 1st Qu.  Median      Mean 3rd Qu.      Max.
##      1.604   2.360   2.945   2.988   3.605   4.086
```

```
# Lima 2
```

```
print(coef(fit_t2_lim2), digits = 3)
```

```
## (Intercept)      slower      svendors      sbudget      spop      smargin
##      2.899      -0.641      -0.162      0.120      0.467      0.166
```

```
pred_l2 <- posterior_linpred(limreg2)
summary(pred_l2[1,])
```

```
##      Min. 1st Qu.  Median      Mean 3rd Qu.      Max.
##      1.658   2.272   2.876   2.941   3.589   3.932
```

```
# Lima 3
```

```
print(coef(fit_t2_lim3), digits = 3)
```

```
## (Intercept)      slower      svendors      sbudget      spop      smargin
##      2.8760      -0.9749      -0.0902      0.0865      0.3682      -0.1885
##      s.int_ML
##      0.4250
```

```
pred_l3 <- posterior_linpred(limreg3)
summary(pred_l3[1,])
```

```
##      Min. 1st Qu.  Median      Mean 3rd Qu.      Max.
##      1.271   2.238   3.111   2.897   3.482   4.175
```

```
# Santiago 1
```

```
print(coef(fit_t2_s1), digits = 3)
```

```
## (Intercept)      slower      svendors      sbudget      spop
##      0.665      -0.707      -0.528      -0.149      0.272
```

```
pred_s1 <- posterior_linpred(santreg1)
summary(pred_s1[1,])
```

```
##      Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max.
## -1.6005  0.1664  0.6383  0.6883  1.2566  2.2242
```

Santiago 2

```
print(coef(fit_t2_s2), digits = 3)
```

```
## (Intercept)      slower    svendors    sbudget      spop      smargin
##      0.4606      -0.6730      -0.6831      0.0956      0.5862     -0.6796
```

```
pred_s2 <- posterior_linpred(santreg1)
summary(pred_s2[1,])
```

```
##      Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max.
## -1.6005  0.1664  0.6383  0.6883  1.2566  2.2242
```

Santiago 3

```
print(coef(fit_t2_s3), digits = 3)
```

```
## (Intercept)      slower    svendors    sbudget      spop      smargin
##      0.478      -0.767      -0.754      0.138      0.635     -0.868
##      s.int_ML
##      0.292
```

```
pred_s3 <- posterior_linpred(santreg1)
summary(pred_s3[1,])
```

```
##      Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max.
## -1.6005  0.1664  0.6383  0.6883  1.2566  2.2242
```

Santiago 4

```
print(coef(fit_t2_s4), digits = 3)
```

```
## (Intercept)      slower    svendors    sbudget      spop      right
##      -0.826      -0.449      -0.496      -0.177      0.406      2.083
```

```
pred_s4 <- posterior_linpred(santreg1)
summary(pred_s4[1,])
```

```
##      Min. 1st Qu.  Median    Mean 3rd Qu.    Max.
## -1.6005  0.1664  0.6383  0.6883  1.2566  2.2242
```

```
# Santiago 5
```


```
print(coef(fit_t2_s5), digits = 3)
```

```
## (Intercept)      slower      sbudget      spop      right      sreports  
##      1.5648      0.0465     -0.0649     0.0963     0.0920     0.4003
```


```
pred_s5 <- posterior_linpred(santreg1)  
summary(pred_s5[1,])
```


```
##      Min. 1st Qu.  Median      Mean 3rd Qu.      Max.  
## -1.6005  0.1664  0.6383  0.6883  1.2566  2.2242
```

0.0.0.8 Model checks done on preferred competing models.
 Bogota: Regression 1




Lima: Regression 3





Santiago: Regression 5

Regression 5 is a separate model construction and thus was not compared to models 1-4.



Hummel, Calla. 2017. "Disobedient Markets: Street Vendors, Enforcement, and State Intervention in Collective Action." *Comparative Political Studies* 50 (11): 1524–55. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414016679177>.