



# Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) Implemented: Towards Reverse Engineering Consciousness with the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference

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**Abstract.** Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) is a synthetic model that attempts to unify theories of consciousness within the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference framework, with particular emphasis on Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT). IWMT further suggests predictive processing in sensory hierarchies may be well-modeled as (folded, sparse, partially disentangled) variational autoencoders, with beliefs discretely updated via the formation of synchronous complexes—as self-organizing harmonic modes (SOHMs)—potentially entailing maximal a posteriori (MAP) estimation via turbo coding. In this account, alpha-synchronized SOHMs across posterior cortices may constitute the kinds of maximal complexes described by IIT, as well as samples (or MAP estimates) from multimodal shared latent space, organized according to egocentric reference frames, entailing phenomenal consciousness as mid-level perceptual inference. When these posterior SOHMs couple with frontal complexes, this may enable various forms of conscious access as a kind of mental act(ive inference), affording higher order cognition/control, including the kinds of attentional/intentional processing and reportability described by GNWT. Across this autoencoding heterarchy, intermediate-level beliefs may be organized into spatiotemporal trajectories by the entorhinal/hippocampal system, so affording episodic memory, counterfactual imaginings, and planning.

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*“The formal distinction between the FEP and IIT is that the free energy principle is articulated in terms of probabilistic beliefs about some (external) thing, while integrated information theory deals with probability distributions over the states of some system... On the other hand, both the FEP and IIT can be cast in terms of information theory and in particular functionals (e.g., variational free energy and ‘phi’). Furthermore, they both rest upon partitions (e.g., Markov blankets that separate internal from external states and complexes that constitute conscious entities and can be distinguished from other entities). This speaks to the possibility of, at least, numerical analyses that show that minimising variational free energy maximises ‘phi’ and vice versa... This supports the (speculative) hypothesis that adding further constraints on generative models—entailed by systems possessing a Markov blanket—might enable us to say which systems are conscious, and which are not.” - Friston et al. [1], Sentience and the Origins of Consciousness: From Cartesian Duality to Markovian Monism.*

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# 1 Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) Summarized: Combining the Free Energy Principle and Active Inference (FEP-AI) Framework with Integrated Information Theory (IIT) and Global Neuronal Workspace Theory (GNWT)

The Hard problem of consciousness asks, how can it be that there is “something that it is like” to be a physical system [2]? This is usually distinguished from the “easy problems” of addressing why different biophysical and computational phenomena correspond to different qualities of experience. IWMT attempts to address consciousness’ enduring problems with the Free Energy Principle [3] and Active Inference [4] (FEP-AI) framework. FEP-AI begins with the understanding that persisting systems must regulate environmental exchanges and prevent entropic accumulation (cf. Good Regulator Theorem from cybernetics) [5]. In this view, minds and brains are predictive controllers for autonomous systems, where action-driven perception is realized via probabilistic inference. FEP-AI has been used to address consciousness in multiple ways [1, 6], with IWMT representing one such attempt. Below I briefly summarize the major claims of IWMT via modified excerpts from the original publication of the theory in *Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence* [7], as well as the accompanying preprint, “IWMT Revisited” [8]. Please see these longer works for further discussion.

IWMT’s primary claims are as follows (*originally published in [7]*):


1. Basic phenomenal consciousness is what it is like to be the functioning of a probabilistic generative model for the sensorium of an embodied–embedded agent [9].
2. Higher order and access consciousness are made possible when this information can be integrated into a world model with spatial, temporal, and causal coherence. Here, coherence is broadly understood as sufficient consistency to enable functional closure and semiotics/sense-making [10–12]. That is, for there to be the experience of a world, the things that constitute that world must be able to be situated and contrasted with other things in some kind of space, with relative changes constituting time, and with regularities of change constituting cause. These may also be preconditions for basic phenomenality, especially if consciousness (as subjectivity) requires an experiencing subject with a particular point of view on the world [13–15].
3. Conscious access, or awareness/knowledge of experience—and possibly phenomenal consciousness—likely requires generative processes capable of counterfactual modeling with respect to selfhood and self-generated actions [16, 17].

IIT begins with considering the preconditions for systems to exist intrinsically from their own perspectives, as is observed with the privately-experienced 1<sup>st</sup> person ontology of consciousness as subjectivity [18]. IIT speaks to the Hard problem by grounding itself in phenomenological axioms, and then goes on to postulate mechanisms that could

realize such properties. While IWMT focuses on explaining the functional, algorithmic, and implementational properties that may give rise to consciousness—or experience as a subjective point of view—it also considers ways in which FEP-AI and IIT can be combined as general systems theories and models of causal emergence [19–21]. In brief, IWMT argues that complexes of integrated information (as irreducible self-cause-effect power) are also Markov-blanket-bound networks of effective connectivity associated with high marginal likelihoods and capacity for “self-evidencing” [22].

GNWT has a more restricted scope than IIT and FEP-AI, instead focusing on the properties of computational systems that could realize the functions of consciousness as a means of globally integrating and broadcasting information from otherwise disconnected mental systems [23]. GNWT suggests that workspaces help to select particular interpretations of events, potentially understandable as Bayesian model selection [23, 24], which is highly compatible with IWMT. However, IWMT also potentially differs from the theories it attempts to combine, suggesting that complexes of integrated information and global workspaces only entail subjective experience when applied to systems capable of functioning as Bayesian belief networks and cybernetic controllers for embodied agents [25]. That is, IWMT argues that integration and widespread availability of information are necessary, but not sufficient, preconditions for enabling consciousness. Specifically, *IWMT claims that consciousness is what integrated world-modeling is like, when generative processes are capable of jointly integrating information into models with coherence with respect to space, time, and cause for systems and their relationships with their environments.* These coherences are stipulated to be required for situating modeled entities relative to each other with specific properties, without which there would be no means of generating an experienceable world. IWMT further introduces a mechanism for generating complexes of integrated information and global workspaces via (Markov-blanket-bound) meta-stable synchronous complexes—or “self-organizing harmonic modes” (SOHMs)—wherein synchrony both emerges from and facilitates the integration of information via “communication-through-coherence” [26, 27]. IWMT further suggests that the stream of experience (Fig. 1) is constituted by a series of SOHM-formation events, computationally understood as entailing loopy belief propagation, so generating joint posterior distributions (or maximal estimates derived thereof) over sensoriums of embodied agents as they engage with the environments in which they are embedded.

While parallels can be identified between GNWT and IIT, present discussions and ongoing adversarial collaborations emphasize their differences, such as IIT’s claim that consciousness is primarily located in a “posterior hot zone” [28], and GNWT’s claim that consciousness requires frontal-lobe engagement for realizing “global availability” of information. IWMT considers both positions to be accurate, but with respect to phenomenal consciousness and conscious access (and other higher-order forms of conscious experience), respectively. That is, frontal cortices are likely required for mental processes such as manipulating and reporting on the contents of consciousness, and so modifying these phenomena in qualitatively/functionally important ways. However, the stream of experience itself may always be generated within hierarchies centered on the posterior cortices, as described in greater detail below.



**Fig. 1.** Depiction of experience with components mapped onto EEG frequency bands.

## 2 Integrated World Modeling Theory (IWMT) Implemented

### 2.1 Mechanisms of Predictive Processing: Folded Variational Autoencoders (VAEs) and Self-organizing Harmonic Modes (SOHMs)

IWMT understands cortex using principles from predictive coding [29–31], specifically viewing cortical hierarchies as analogous to VAEs [32, 33], where encoding and generative decoding networks have been folded over at their reduced-dimensionality bottlenecks such that corresponding hierarchical levels are aligned. In this view, hierarchies of superficial pyramidal neurons constitute encoding networks, whose bottom-up observations would be continually suppressed (or “explained away”) by predictions from hierarchies of deep pyramidal neurons (and thalamic relays) [34, 35], with only prediction-errors being passed upwards. This is similar to other recent proposals [16], except beliefs are specifically communicated and updated via synchronous dynamics, wherein prediction-errors may be quantized via fast gamma-synchronized complexes [36, 37], and where predictions may take the form of a nested hierarchy of more slowly evolving synchronization manifolds, so affording hierarchical modeling of spatiotemporal events in the world [38] (Fig. 1). More specifically, self-organizing harmonic modes (SOHMs) are suggested to implement loopy belief propagation for approximate inference (cf. turbo coding) [39–41], as well as marginalization over synchronized sub-networks, so instantiating marginal message passing regimes [42].

Combined with mechanisms of divisive normalization and spike-timing dependent plasticity [43–45], this predictive coding setup should induce increasingly sparse connectivity with experience, with all of the functional benefits sparsity provides [46]. These mechanisms (and entailed algorithms) may converge on near-optimal training protocols [47]. With respect to suggestions that the brain may indirectly realize backprop-like computations [48] (Appendix 2), these models view cortical hierarchies as “stacked autoencoders” [49], as opposed to being constituted by a single (folded) VAE. These interpretations of neural computation may be non-mutually exclusive, depending on the granularity with which relevant phenomena evolve. That is, we could think of separate VAEs for each cortical region (e.g. V1, V2, V4, IT), or each cortical macrocolumn [50, 51], and perhaps even each cortical minicolumn. Depending on the timescales over which we are evaluating the system, we might coarse-grain differently [19], with consciousness representing a single joint belief at the broadest level of integration, with

the perceptual heterarchy considered as a single VAE. However, a more fine-grained analysis might allow for further factorization, where component subnetworks could be viewed as entailing separate VAEs, with separate Bayesian beliefs. In this view, the cortical heterarchy could be viewed as a single VAE (composed of nested VAEs), as well as a single autoregressive model, where latent beliefs between various VAEs are bound together via synchronous activity, potentially entailing normalizing flows across coupled latent space dynamics [52, 53].

## 2.2 A Model of Episodic Memory and Imagination

With respect to consciousness, SOHM-formation involving deep pyramidal neurons is suggested to correspond to both “ignition” events as described by GNWT [54], as well as implementation of semi-stochastic sampling from the latent space of VAEs (cf. the “reparameterization trick”) [55], including via latent (work)spaces shared by multiple VAEs. If these samples are sequentially orchestrated according to spatiotemporal trajectories of the entorhinal/hippocampal system [56], this may generate a coherent stream of experience. However, coherent sequence transitions between quale states may also potentially be realizable even in individuals without functioning medial temporal lobes, if prior histories of experience allow frontal lobes to enable coherent action-selection and action-driven perception—including with respect to mental acts—in which posterior dynamics may be driven either through overt enaction or via efference copies accompanying covert partial deployment of “forward models” [25].

In this view of the brain in terms of machine learning architectures, the hippocampal complex could be thought of as the top of the cortical heterarchy [57, 58] and spatiotemporally-organized memory register [59]. IWMT suggests this spatial and temporal organization may be essential for coherent world modeling. With respect to grid/place cells of the entorhinal/hippocampal system [60], this organization appears to take the form of 2D trajectories through space, wherein organisms situate themselves according to a kind of simultaneous localization and mapping via Kalman filtering [61]. Anatomically speaking, this dynamic (and volatile) memory system has particularly strong bi-directional linkages with deeper portions of cortical generative models (i.e., reduced-dimensionality latent feature spaces), so being capable of both storing information and shaping activity for these core auto-associative networks. Because of the predictive coding setup—and biasing via neuromodulatory value signals [62, 63]—only maximally informative, novel, unexplained observations will tend to be stored in this spatiotemporally organized memory register. Indeed, this may be one of the primary functions of the hippocampus: temporarily storing information that could not be predicted elsewhere, and then using replay to train relevant subnetworks to be more successfully predictive of likely observations.

As the hippocampus—and cortical systems with which it couples via “big loop recurrence” [64, 65]—re-instantiates trajectories of the organism through space, pointers to prediction errors will be sequentially activated, with the generative model inferring a more complete sensorium based on its training from a lifetime of experience. Computationally speaking, this setup would correspond to a Kalman variational auto-encoder [66]. Experientially speaking, this integration of organismic spatiotemporal trajectories





A phenomenological level is specified to provide mappings between consciousness and these complementary/supervenient levels of analysis. These modal depictions are meant to connote the inherently embodied nature of experience, but not all images are meant to correspond to the generation of consciousness. That is, it may be the case that consciousness is solely generated by posterior hierarchies centered on the precuneus, lateral parietal cortices, and temporoparietal junction (TPJ) as respective visuospatial (cf. consciousness as projective geometric modeling) [13, 14], somatic (cf. grounded cognition and intermediate level theory) [75–77], and attentional/intentional phenomenology (cf. Attention Schema Theory) [78].

Graph neural networks (GNNs) are identified as a potentially important machine learning architectural principle [79], largely due to their efficiency in emulating physical processes [80–82], and also because the message passing protocols during training and inference may have correspondences with loopy belief propagation and turbo codes suggested by IWMT. Further, grid graphs—potentially hexagonally organized, possibly corresponding to cortical macrocolumns [50], with nested microcolumns that may also be organized as hexagonal grid GNNs, or “capsule networks”) [83]—are adduced for areas contributing to quasi-Cartesian spatial modeling (and potentially experience) [84, 85], including the posterior medial cortices, dorsomedial and ventromedial prefrontal cortices, and the hippocampal complex. With respect to AI systems, such representations could be used to implement not just modeling of external spaces, but of consciousness as internal space (or blackboard), which could potentially be leveraged for reasoning processes with correspondences to category theory, analogy making via structured representations, and possibly causal inference.

Neuroimaging evidence suggests these grids may be dynamically coupled in various ways [68], with these aspects of higher-order cognition being understood as a kind of generalized navigation/search process [86, 87]. A further GNN is speculatively adduced in parietal cortices as a mesh grid placed on top of a transformed representation of the primary sensorimotor homunculus (cf. body schemas for the sake of efficient motor control/inference), which is here suggested to have some correspondence/scaling to the body as felt from within, but which may potentially be further morphed to better correspond with externally viewed embodiments (potentially both resulting from and enabling “mirroring” with the bodies of other agents for the sake of coordination and inference) [88]. This partial translation into an allocentric coordinate system is suggested to provide more effective couplings (or information-sharing) with semi-topographically organized representations in posterior medial cortices. The TPJ is depicted as containing a ring-shaped GNN to reflect a further level of abstraction and hierarchical control over action-oriented body schemas—which may influence more somatic-like geometries—functionally entailing vectors/tensors over attentional/intentional processes [89].

Frontal homologues to posterior GNNs are also depicted, which may provide a variety of higher-order modeling abilities, including epistemic access for extended/distributed self-processes and intentional control mechanisms. These higher-order functionalities may be achieved via frontal cortices being more capable of temporally-extended generative modeling [90], and also potentially by virtue of being located further from primary sensory cortices, so affording (“counterfactually rich”) dynamics that are more decoupled from immediate sensorimotor contingencies. Further,

these frontal control hierarchies afford multi-scale goal-oriented behavior via bidirectional effective connectivity with the basal ganglia (i.e., winner-take-all dynamics and facilitation of sequential operations) and canalization via diffuse neuromodulator nuclei of the brainstem (i.e., implicit policies and value signals) [91–95]. Finally, the frontal pole is described as a highly non-linear recurrent system capable of shaping overall activity via bifurcating capacities [96, 97] —with potentially astronomical combinatorics—providing sources of novelty and rapid adaptation via situation-specific attractor dynamics.

While the modal character of prefrontal computation is depicted at the phenomenological level of analysis, IWMT proposes frontal cortices might only indirectly contribute to consciousness via influencing dynamics in posterior cortices [8]. Speculatively, functional analogues for ring-shaped GNN salience/relevance maps may potentially be found in the central complexes of insects and the tectums of all vertebrates [98], although it is unclear whether those structures would be associated with any kind of subjective experience. Even more speculatively, if these functional mappings were realized in a human-mimetic, neuromorphic AI, then it may have both flexible general intelligence and consciousness. In this way, this figure can be considered to be a sort of pseudocode for potentially conscious (partially human-interpretable) AGI with “System 2” capacities [99–101].

## 2.4 Conclusion: Functions of Basic Phenomenal Consciousness?

According to IWMT, whenever we have self-organizing harmonic modes (SOHMs), then we also have entailed joint marginal probability distributions (where synchrony selects or discretely updates Bayesian beliefs), some of which may entail consciousness. Functionally speaking, potentially experience-entailing SOHMs—as Markov-blanket-bound subnetworks of effective connectivity and complexes with high integrated information, functioning as workspaces—over coupled visuospatial, attentional/intentional, and somatic hierarchies could provide holistic discriminations between different classes of events in ways that would greatly facilitate coherent action selection and credit assignment. That is, a series of coherently estimated system-world states (even without higher-order awareness or explicit/reflexive knowledge) would be extremely adaptive if it could generate these joint posteriors (or MAP estimates derived thereof) on timescales allowing this information to shape (and be shaped by) action-perception cycles. Since there should be substantial auto-associative linkages across visuospatial, attentional/intentional, and somatic modalities, then the consistency of this mutual information may accelerate the formation of SOHMs, such that beliefs can be updated quickly and coherently enough to have actual organismic-semiotic content (i.e., relevance for the organism and its environment). Further, reentrant signaling across different sources of data may provide a) inferential synergy via knowledge fusion from combining modalities, b) enhanced transfer learning and representational invariance via perspectival diversity (i.e., flexible representation from multiple modalities), and c) sensitivity to higher-order relational information, potentially including causal and contextual factors identified by comparing and contrasting constancies/inconstancies across modalities [102]. Even more, these sources



of (mutual) information have natural correspondences with subjectivity in terms of providing a particular point of view on a world, centered on the experience of having/being a body.

Thus, when we identify the kinds of information that could enable adaptive functional synergy in ‘processing’ sensory data, it becomes somewhat less surprising that there might be “something that it is like.” However, such inferential dynamics might require a multi-level hierarchy, with a higher (or deeper) inner-loop capable of iteratively forming and vitiating attracting states [103], so instantiating a kind of “dual phase evolution” [104]. A shallow hierarchy might be overly enslaved to immediate environmental couplings/contingencies [105], and would potentially constitute unconscious inference, with consciousness-entailing states never being generated on any level of abstraction. However, the precise functional boundaries of phenomenal consciousness remain unclear, and is a direction for future work for IWMT.


### 3 Appendices

#### 3.1 Appendix 1: A Model of Goal-Oriented Behavior with Hippocampal Orchestration

Figure 3 depicts memory and planning (as inference) via predictive processing, orchestrated via the spatiotemporal trajectories of the entorhinal/hippocampal system. In this model, precision-weighting/gain-amplification takes place via “big loop recurrence” with the frontal lobes [64], with the more specific suggestion that selection/biasing of policies over forward models cause efference copies to be projected to posterior generative models. In line with recent proposals [106], the hippocampus can operate with either “predictive-suppressive” or “fictive prediction error” modes, which are here suggested to correspond to degree of coupling with respective posterior vs. frontal cortices, with the former corresponding to direct suppression of observations, and the latter facilitating the ‘reinstatement’ of memories, and novel imaginings for the sake of planning and causal reasoning [68, 107]. This frontal coupling is hypothesized to be a source of “successor representations” (i.e., population vectors forming predictive anticipatory sweeps of where the organism is likely to go next) via integration of likely policies and action models (via dorsal prefrontal cortex) and evaluations of likely outcomes (via ventral prefrontal cortex).

In this model of generalized navigation, the hippocampal system iteratively contrasts predictive representations with (either sensory-coupled or imaginative) present state-estimates (from coupling with posterior cortices), where prediction-errors both modify future paths, and also allow for encoding of novel information within likely (generalized) spatiotemporal trajectories, given the meta-prior (or inductive bias) that organisms are likely to be pursuing valued goals as they navigate/forage-through physical and conceptual spaces. This alternation may occur at different phases of theta oscillations [108], so affording iterative contrasting of desired and current-estimated states, so canalizing neural activity for goal realization [109], potentially including the formation of complex action sequences (either physical or virtual) via (conscious) back-chaining from potential desired states (i.e., goals) to presently-inferred realities [25]. Theoretically, this kind

Hippocampal comparisons for a sequence of actions (making tea)



**Fig. 3.** Hippocampally-orchestrated imaginative planning and action selection via generalized navigation/search.

of iterated contrasting mechanism may also provide a source of high-level analogical (and potentially causal) reasoning [107, 110–112].

By orchestrating alternating counterfactual simulations [73], the hippocampal system may allow for evaluation of possible futures, biased on a moment-to-moment basis by integrated (spatialized) value representations from ventromedial prefrontal cortex [113], and also via “as-if-body loops” with interoceptive hierarchies [114, 115]. In this view of thought as generalized navigation, alternating exploration/sampling of counterfactuals could also be understood as implementing Markov chain Monte Carlo tree search over policy/value space for planning [109, 116]. Theoretically, similar processes could be involved in generating particular actions, if visualization of acts is accompanied

by a critical mass of model-evidence (as recurrent activity) accumulating in interoceptive/salience hierarchies [117]. Speculatively, this threshold crossing (or phase transition) may represent a source of readiness potentials [118–120], potentially understood as a kind of “ignition” event and driver of workspace dynamics (understood as high-level Bayesian model selection), corresponding to explosive percolation, triggered by the accumulation of recurrent-activity/model-evidence within upper levels of frontoparietal control hierarchies for enacting/inferring a particular (virtual or physical) proprioceptive state, or pose [121].

### 3.2 Appendix 2: The VAE-GAN Brain?

Gershman [122] has presented an intriguing account of neural functioning in terms of a powerful class of generative models known as generative adversarial networks (GANs). GANs have many similar use cases to variational-encoders (VAEs) and can even be used in combination for enhanced training as in the case of VAE-GANs [123]. In Gershman’s proposal, sensory cortices act as generators which are trained via Turing learning with frontal cortex, which functions as a discriminator and source of (higher-order) consciousness.

IWMT, in contrast, suggests that predictive coding can be understood as generating (basic phenomenal) consciousness via folded VAEs in the ways described above. From this perspective, the ascending and descending streams for each modality constitute respective encoding and generative decoding networks. This is not necessarily inconsistent with Gershman’s proposal, in that a sensory hierarchy as a whole can be viewed as a generative network, which relative to the entire brain may provide a VAE-GAN setup. Alternatively, the ascending stream could be interpreted as acting as a discriminator in the GAN sense, in that it is attempting to evaluate the degree to which the descending stream generates veridical images. In this view, folded autoencoders might also be understood as folded GANs, but with folds taking place at output layers of generative decoders and input layers of discriminative encoders. The ascending stream is well-poised to serve this kind of discriminative function in terms of being more directly in touch with the ground truth of sensation and the generative processes of the world, which are the ultimate referents and selection criteria for neural dynamics. This is somewhat different from Gershman’s proposal, in that consciousness (as experience) would correspond to generative processes in posterior sensory areas (including multi-modal association cortices), trained via embodied-embedded interaction with the world, with frontal cortices functioning as an elaboration of the generative process in multiple ways, including conscious access via the stabilization and alteration of dynamics within posterior networks, and also via simulated actions and inter-temporal modeling [124].

However, frontal cortex could also be viewed as serving a discriminator function in terms of attentional biasing based on the reliability of information (i.e., precision weighting), mechanistically achieved by altering the gain on excitatory activity from ascending (‘discriminative’) encoding networks. Thus, frontal cortex could provide a discriminatory function via tuning the sensitivity of ascending perceptual streams. Other non-mutually exclusive possibilities could also be envisioned for a discriminator-like role for frontal cortices:

1. Comparison with memory: “Is what I am perceiving consistent with what I have previously experienced?” This might be particularly important early in development for teaching patterns of attention that promote perceptual coherence.
2. Comparison with causal reasoning: “Is what I am perceiving consistent with what is plausible?” This is closer to Gershman’s proposal, wherein failing to establish this discriminatory capacity could increase the probability of delusions and possibly lowered hallucination thresholds in some conditions.
3. Comparison with goal-attainment (a combination of 1 and 2): “Is what I am perceiving consistent with my normal predictions of working towards valued goals?” This could have the effect of adaptively shaping conscious states in alignment with personal (and ultimately organismic) value. According to FEP-AI, all discriminator-like functionality may represent special cases of this highest-level objective: to reduce uncertainty (or accumulate model evidence) with respect to organismic value via perceptual and active inference. Mechanistically, cingulate cortices may have the greatest contributions to generating discrimination signals with respect to overall value [125–130], both through the integrative properties of the cingulum bundle [131, 132], as well as via close couplings with allostatic-organismic interoceptive insular hierarchies [133].

In all of these cases, frontal cortices (broadly construed to include the anterior cingulate) could be viewed as being in an adversarial (but ultimately cooperative) relationship with sensory hierarchies, whose recognition densities would optimize for minimizing perceptual prediction error (i.e., what is likely to be, given data), and where frontally-informed generative densities would optimize for future-oriented (counterfactual) adaptive policy selection (i.e., what ought to be, given prior preferences). In these ways, action and perceptual hierarchies would compete with respect to the ongoing minimization of free energy, while at the same time being completely interdependent for overall adaptive functioning, with both competitive and cooperative dynamics being required for adaptively navigating the world via action-perception cycles. An interesting hybrid of competitive and cooperative dynamics may be found in “learning to learn” via creative imagination and play (including self-play), in which learners may specifically try to maximize surprise/information-gain [134].

With respect to frontal predictions, these may be productively viewed with a 3-fold factorization:

1. A ventral portion representing affectively-weighted sensory outcomes associated with various actions.
2. A dorsal portion representing forward models for enacting sequences that bring about desirable outcomes.
3. A recurrent anterior pole portion that mediates between affect and action selection via its evolving/bifurcating/non-linear attractor dynamics [96, 135, 136].

(1) and (2) would be frontal analogues to the “what” and “where” pathways for vision [90, 137]—with macroscale connectivity reflecting these functional relationships—except here we are dealing with (1) what-where (via coupling with the hippocampal complex) and (2) how-where (via coupling with the parietal lobes). Taken

together (which is how these systems are likely to work under most circumstances), these different parts of frontal cortices could all be understood in a unified sense as implementing policy selection via predictions and precision-weighting.

In Gershman’s proposal, he further suggests that predictive coding can be viewed as an efficient way of passing predictions up the cortical hierarchy while removing redundant information. This is consistent with proposals in which the descending stream is interpreted as constituting a means for communicating the backwards propagation of error signals to apical dendrites in cortical layer 1 [138]. Although this (potentially insightfully) inverts the way predictive coding is normally understood, with prediction errors being communicated via the ascending stream, these accounts could potentially be reconciled if we understand perception as involving a circular-causal process of iterative Bayesian model selection. When we consider the capacity for looping effects in networks on the scale of nervous systems—for even the largest deep learning systems, the number of parameters is dwarfed (for now) by those found in a cubic centimeter of cortex—with potentially multiple levels of qualitatively different ‘beliefs’ (e.g. unconscious sensorimotor, conscious embodiment, and implicit schemas), then it can be difficult to straightforwardly interpret the flow of inference in terms of a clear distinction between predictions and prediction errors. Indeed, hierarchical predictive processing can be viewed as converging on optimal backprop-like functionality via proposals such as “target propagation” and “natural gradient descent” [47, 48]. However, we would also do well to not be overly ecumenical with respect to this potential reconciliation, as more classical accounts of predictive coding induce sparsity on multiple levels, so creating many highly desirable computational properties such as energy efficiency, robustness, and sensitivity to coincidence detection [46, 139]. As such, framing the descending stream as a backpropagation signal may be an account that is both misleading and impoverished with respect to biological realities.

In terms of the potential complexity of cortical generative models, we may want to think of at least three coupled systems that are ultimately integrated as parts of a unified control hierarchy, but which can temporally evolve independently:

1. Unconscious/preconscious lower-level sensorimotor hierarchies with fast fine-grained dynamics for coupling with the environment [96].
2. Conscious mid-level sensorimotor representations with more coarse-grained spatial and temporal dynamics [75].
3. Higher-level abstract re-representations over recognition and generative densities, with unconscious/preconscious dynamics [140], and which may bidirectionally couple with lower and middle levels.

In this way, we could potentially dissect the brain into multiple competing and cooperating generative models, whose synergistic interactions may be productively considered as implementing GAN-type setups. Very speculatively, it may even be the case that perception-action cycles, hemispheric interactions, and interpersonal communication could all be understood as implementing CycleGAN-like dynamics. That is, to what extent could relationships between hemispheres (or between individuals) be analogous to a paired GAN setup, where each system may evaluate the output of the other, so promoting the formation of usefully disentangled representations of features in reduced

dimensionality latent spaces [100, 101], thereby promoting controllability and combinatorial power in imagination? These are only some of the many ways that Gershman's intriguing proposal of a "generative adversarial brain" may lead to innovative directions for trying to understand functional relationships within and between minds.

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