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Objectives

- Develop awareness of policy requirements associated with Contact Chaining activities conducted under Part A IRRELEVANT of the CSEC Mandate
- Learn the decision-making process to follow when contemplating metadata analysis [REDACTED]
- Learn the approval process


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What is Contact Chaining?

Method developed to enable the *analysis, from information derived from metadata, of communications activities or patterns* to build a profile of communications contacts of various foreign entities of interest in relation to the FI priorities of the GC, including:

- Number of contacts to or from these entities
- Frequency of these contacts
- Number of times contacts attempted or made
- Time period over which these contacts were attempted or made
- Other activities aimed at mapping the communications of foreign entities and their networks

Ref: Ops-1:8.3

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Ops-1 8.3 Defines Contact Chaining as:

Contact Chaining refers to the method developed to enable the analysis, from information derived from the metadata, of communications activities or patterns to build a profile of communications contacts of various foreign entities of interest in relation to the foreign intelligence priorities of the GC, including the number of contacts to or from these entities, the frequency of these contacts, the number of times contacts were attempted or made, the time period over which these contacts were attempted or made as well as other activities aimed at mapping the communications of foreign entities and their networks.

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Relevant Policy Instruments Under Part A Authorities

- **OPS-1**
 - *Protecting the privacy of Canadians and ensuring legal compliance in the conduct of CSE activities*
- **OPS-1-10**
 - *Procedure for Metadata Analysis* [REDACTED]
 - No chaining or activities are to be carried out [REDACTED] unless reviewed by [REDACTED] and approved by DGI for the purposes of acquiring Foreign Intelligence. When approved strict limitations must be adhered to, e.g. [REDACTED] limit to conduct CC activities
 - CC activities **must NEVER** be conducted for the purpose of obtaining, providing or disseminating intelligence about a Canadian located anywhere or any person located in Canada.


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Understanding the policy requirements contained in both Ops-1 and Ops-10 are essential before conducting contact chaining activities.


Metadata analysis including contact chaining must NEVER be conducted for the purpose of obtaining, producing or disseminating intelligence about a Canadian located anywhere or any person located in Canada.



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Relevant Policy Instruments Under Part C Authorities

IRRELEVANT

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IRRELEVANT

The focus of this presentation is on MTDA conducted under Part A authorities to derive foreign intelligence.

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Metadata Analysis [REDACTED]

- Contact Chaining activities are considered MTDA
- MTDA is normally [REDACTED]
- However, [REDACTED] MTDA [REDACTED] may be only option for new target discovery leading to FI
- OPS-1-10, Annex 1 provides guidelines to make the *decision (FI test)* and if positive, determines which approvals are required

Ref: Ops 1-10:6.8

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- Contact Chaining is considered a part of Metadata Analysis according to Ops-1-10:6.8;
- Therefore Contact Chaining activities must be conducted in accordance with that policy document Ops 1-10.


Ref: Ops 1-10:6.8 Metadata Analysis

• Metadata analysis includes various types of SIGINT Development activities conducted against metadata, including contact chaining (no need to mention [REDACTED] if you're not going to focus on that)

• Contact Chaining [REDACTED]

In some instances where other SIGINT development avenues have already been considered, initiating metadata analysis [REDACTED] may be the only available option for conducting target discovery activities where there are reasonable grounds to believe that this activity may provide FI.

Because privacy measures must be applied to metadata that is known to be associated with Canadians anywhere or any person in Canada, [REDACTED]






To determine if you can conduct metadata analysis [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] follow the specific procedures laid out in the Annex 1 Flowchart


1. Apply the FI (Foreign Intelligence) Test
2. Determine who approves


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 **ANNEX 2: Approval Form to Conduct Metadata Analysis** 




Use
Annex 2
for
Approvals 



Ref: Ops1-10: Annex 2

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TO get required approvals and sign-offs use:

- Ops 1-10 Annex 2 Form to conduct MTDA 

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Annex 2 – Approval Form to Conduct MTDA [REDACTED]

- 1 – *Justification*
 - GCR [REDACTED]
 - I certify there are reasonable grounds ... that will yield FI
- 2 – [REDACTED]
 - DGI initials each one listed
- 3 – *History*
 - Record of actions
 - Analyst submits [REDACTED]
 - Supervisor reviews [REDACTED]
 - Manager recommends to [REDACTED]
 - [REDACTED] recommends to DGI
 - DGI approves or recommends for Exceptional Report Release to Chief (exceptional cases meeting para 2.10)

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The approval form at Annex 2 is broken down into several parts. Its purpose is to:

- document the justification or rationale for conducting the activity,
- identify the intelligence priority asw with the activity,
- list the specific [REDACTED] that are involved in the activity,
- and track the approvals for the activity.

These forms are subject to internal and external review, including review by CSEC's Audit and Evaluation Group (DGAEE) and by the Office of the CSEC Commissioner and it is critical that they be completed accurately prior to initiating the activity.

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OPS 1-10 analysis

Once OPS 1-10 is approved, it is crucial to:

- Record the results in a OPS1-10 file held separately by the manager (TL). [REDACTED] results should be recorded, with tool and date info. Word document can be used
- Note foreign leads, and source accordingly when targeting
- Include full contact chains [REDACTED]
- Cease analysis after [REDACTED]
- Securely store analysis findings/notes for tracking purposes
- Retention rules apply

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
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In some instances, conducting metadata analysis [REDACTED] may be the only option to meet a foreign intelligence need. [REDACTED]

The form at Annex 3 of OPS-1-10 must be used to document activities [REDACTED]

