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Communications Security
Establishment Canada

Centre de la sécurité
des télécommunications Canada

CTEC

CYBER THREAT EVALUATION CENTRE

Second Party Quarterly Cyber Defence Report

Q3 2013

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Canada
CDR-2P-Q313-02

INTRODUCTION	2
SUMMARY	3
COMMONLY DETECTED THREAT VECTORS.....	5
DETAILS OF EXPLOIT KITS & BOTNETS.....	6
CYBER-SECURITY HIGHLIGHTS	7
IMPLANTS & MALWARE	8
ANNEX 1	9
ANNEX 2	12
ANNEX 3	13
DISTRIBUTION	14

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INTRODUCTION

(U) This is a report on cyber-security threats to Government of Canada (GC) systems, produced by the Cyber Threat Evaluation Centre (CTEC). The report highlights the key cyber threat incidents detected for Q3 2013.

(U) This report is based on confirmed malicious threats affecting Government of Canada systems. Other suspicious activities may have taken place but are not included in this report. Should further analysis determine that the observed suspicious activity is malicious, details will be reported at that time.


(U) Information included in this report is based on current knowledge and available data from CSEC operations. CSEC leverages a variety of data sources on unclassified networks, [REDACTED] As such, care should be exercised in making comparisons between data points.

(U) Contact Information:

ctec@cse-cst.gc.ca

SUMMARY (S//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA)

Q3 2013



Actors

Incident Severity

Methods






Figure 1: Q3 2013 Overview

Overview



SUMMARY (S//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA)

Year-to-Date



Actors

Incident Severity

Methods





Figure 2: 2013 Year-to-Date Overview

(Week line shows Q3 2013 data.)

Overview



COMMONLY DETECTED THREAT VECTORS*(U) Q3 2013*

(S//Rel to CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA) The most common threat vector this quarter was spear-phishing email [REDACTED]

(S//Rel to CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA) The threat vector used [REDACTED]


(S//Rel to CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA) Please see Annex 2 for Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) information relevant to the incidents reported this quarter.

Figure 3: Commonly Detected Threat Vectors – Q3 2013¹

¹ [REDACTED]

DETAILS OF EXPLOIT KITS & BOTNETS (S//REL TO CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA)

Please note that exploit kit and botnet activity is tracked and reported separately from foreign state-sponsored activity.

Exploit Kits & BotnetsExploit Kits
& Botnets

Number of Affected Departments/Sector




Figure 4: Q3 Exploit Kit & Botnet Overview

Overview

Exploit kit and botnet activity resulted in [REDACTED] this quarter. The majority of related tools exploit known vulnerabilities, indicating that timely patching of GC systems may aid in decreasing the number of compromises. Possible consequences of compromise are: theft of login credentials, theft of protected data, and downloads of ransomware, malware, or trojans. Exploit kits are continuously effective against GC systems because of their constantly evolving nature. They take advantage of common vulnerabilities, allow for customizable implants, and are often inexpensive, making them appealing to a variety of threat actors. [REDACTED]

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**STATE-SPONSORED CYBER-SECURITY
HIGHLIGHTS**

(U) Q3 2013

(S//Rel to CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA)

Increase in Cyber Threat Activity from

(S//Rel to CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA)

IMPLANTS & MALWARE

(U) Q3 2013


(S//Rel to CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA)

GC Sectors Affected:

ANNEX 1

**SUMMARY OF MALICIOUS DOMAIN NAMES, URLs, & IP ADDRESSES AFFECTING GC
SYSTEMS**

(S//Rel to CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA) Q3 2013



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ANNEX 1 (CONTINUED)

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
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ANNEX 1 (CONTINUED)


(S//Rel to CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA) Q3 2013



ANNEX 2

COMMON VULNERABILITIES & EXPOSURES (CVE) REFERENCE

(S//Rel to CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA) Q3 2013



**ANNEX 3
REFERENCE MATERIAL**

(S//Rel to CAN, AUS, GBR, NZL, USA) Q3 2013

The following reference materials can be found on CSEC's [REDACTED]

- Lexicon of terms used in this report:
[REDACTED]
- Government of Canada Departments by Sector:
[REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]


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COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY ESTABLISHMENT CANADA


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DISTRIBUTION

NSA



GCHQ



DISTRIBUTION (CONTINUED)

GCSB

[REDACTED]

DSD

[REDACTED]

CSIS

[REDACTED]

CSEC

John Forster, Chief CSEC, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]