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NOV 18 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENCE

CSE [REDACTED] Collection Activities

(For Approval)

ISSUE

The purpose of this Memorandum is to request a Ministerial Authorization for CSE's [REDACTED] collection activities that risk the interception of private communications.

The Communications Security Establishment's (CSE) foreign intelligence mandate authorizes it, within a rigorous assessment and approval framework, to conduct [REDACTED] collection activities. CSE's [REDACTED] collection activities are conducted [REDACTED]

CSE also collects [REDACTED] communications using [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] CSE currently operates three [REDACTED] collection activities or classes of activities under this Ministerial Authorization: [REDACTED] Collection Activities Involving [REDACTED] and Collection [REDACTED]

You may issue a Ministerial Authorization enabling [REDACTED] collection activities provided the conditions under subsection 273.65(2) of the *National Defence Act* (NDA) are met. Ministerial Authorizations are essential to the successful implementation of CSE's mandate; without them, the organization would be unable to collect the data from the global information infrastructure (GII) that it requires to provide foreign intelligence, in accordance with the intelligence priorities of the Government of Canada (GC).

Although CSE cannot target Canadians or persons in Canada, it may incidentally intercept private communications when collecting foreign intelligence using [REDACTED] collection activities.

The interception of private communications – those that originate or terminate in Canada and where the originator has a reasonable expectation of privacy – is prohibited under Part VI of the *Criminal Code*. However, Part VI of the *Criminal Code* does not apply if, pursuant to subsection 273.65(1) of the NDA, you authorize CSE to intercept private communications in relation to an activity or class of activities for the sole purpose of obtaining foreign intelligence.

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CLASS OF ACTIVITIES TO BE AUTHORIZED: [REDACTED] **COLLECTION**

[REDACTED] applies to all technologies that rely on the [REDACTED] communications data on the GII. While the application of [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Rationale for CSE [REDACTED] Collection Activities: [REDACTED]

Conducting [REDACTED] Collection Activities: CSE [REDACTED] collection activities target foreign communications data that is [REDACTED] in accordance with CSE's foreign intelligence mandate.

CSE uses various [REDACTED] collection technologies to acquire foreign signals for analysis. As previously mentioned, CSE has [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

To identify [REDACTED] for collection and to minimize the interception of private communications, CSE [REDACTED] obtains [REDACTED] from a desired [REDACTED] in order to [REDACTED] foreign intelligence value. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] In the course of conducting [REDACTED] there is a risk for CSE to incidentally acquire private

communications. However, [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] of the collection and selection
processes, and [REDACTED] intelligence analytical processes, including [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Without [REDACTED] CSE would be unable to judiciously identify [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] associated with entities of foreign
intelligence interest.

The choice of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] communications data of foreign intelligence value, and where
these communications are accessible to CSE. Due to the nature of [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Therefore, CSE
[REDACTED] collection [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

CSE Selection Process: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Interception of Private Communications: In accordance with Part VI of the *Criminal Code*, any communication that originates or terminates in Canada, where the originator has an expectation of privacy, constitutes a private communication. CSE reduces the risk of inadvertent interception of private communications through various measures, including network characterization analysis, metadata analysis, [REDACTED] selection criteria validation, [REDACTED] and annual re-validation of selection criteria. However, because CSE cannot know in advance if a targeted foreign entity will communicate with persons in Canada, CSE may incidentally intercept a one-end Canadian communication originating or terminating with a foreign entity of intelligence interest.

Despite efforts to prevent the interception of communications that both originate and terminate in Canada as described in the above selection process³, two-end Canadian communications may be inadvertently forwarded to the consolidated traffic repository. When subsequently recognized as such by an intelligence analyst, these will be marked for deletion and not used further by CSE. Associated selection criteria will be removed from collection [REDACTED] or refined (augmented) as appropriate, to prevent further collection of two-end Canadian communications.

As a result, CSE requires a Ministerial Authorization to undertake [REDACTED] collection activities that risk the interception of private communications, as without lawful authority it is a criminal offence to intercept private communications.

Foreign Intelligence Value of [REDACTED] Collection Activities:

Communications data [REDACTED] is a source of foreign intelligence produced by CSE [REDACTED] From December 2013 to May 2014, [REDACTED] collection covered intelligence priorities such as [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

In accordance with partnership agreements, CSE receives requests from its Five Eyes partners to target specific selection criteria [REDACTED] Once these requests have been validated, and determined to be in-line with GC intelligence priorities, CSE may agree to target Five Eyes selection criteria.

CONDITIONS TO BE SATISFIED

You may issue a Ministerial Authorization only if you are satisfied that CSE has met the following four conditions set out in subsection 273.65(2) of the *NDA*:

- The interception will be directed at foreign entities located outside Canada;

³ It is not always possible for CSE to know ahead of time that a foreign entity outside Canada has travelled to Canada, and there is a risk that CSE may acquire two-end Canadian communications in that context.

- The information to be obtained could not be reasonably obtained by other means;
- The expected foreign intelligence value of the information that would be derived from the interception justifies it; and
- Satisfactory measures are in place to protect the privacy of Canadians and to ensure that private communications will only be used or retained if they are essential to international affairs, defence or security.

In order to demonstrate in advance of conducting [REDACTED] activities that CSE has appropriate measures in place to meet each of these conditions, CSE uses a reasonableness standard that takes into account the particular context of the class of activity being authorized.

These conditions are met respectively as follows:

1. The interception must be directed at foreign entities located outside Canada

CSE follows detailed procedures that provide reasonable grounds to suspect that interception activities are directed at foreign entities of foreign intelligence interest located outside of Canada. Intelligence analysts are required to prepare a written assessment,⁴ to identify a foreign intelligence priority and to draft a justification to outline the expected value of a collection activity, prior to initiating any selection activities. Selection criteria are subject to validation, [REDACTED] to retrieve communications only when CSE is satisfied that the criteria relate to a foreign target and the external features of a communication.⁵

The use of selection criteria to identify communications for intercept provides CSE with a reasonably reliable means of assessing the foreign nationality, foreign location and intelligence interest of one of the communicants before a communication is retrieved. CSE allows Five Eyes partners [REDACTED] provided that they abide by the above legal and policy requirements set out in the *NDA* and CSE's policy framework. This means that any selection criteria proposed by a Five Eyes partner for [REDACTED] must be validated by CSE as being directed at foreign entities outside Canada, and in line with Government of Canada intelligence priorities.

2. The information could not be reasonably obtained by other means

The nature of CSE's signals intelligence activities is such that the collected information (including any private communications) would not be shared voluntarily by the targeted foreign entity. Further, in most cases, information from the GII is the only potential

⁴ A foreign assessment must include an assessment of the nationality and location of an entity of foreign intelligence interest.

⁵ Traditionally, external features have referred to information that meets the definition of 'metadata' as outlined in the MD on the Collection and Use of Metadata (2011).

source for the intelligence being sought by the GC, and may only be visible on [REDACTED]

3. The expected value of the interception would justify it

Activities conducted under this Ministerial Authorization provide CSE with unique access to the communications of targeted foreign entities and are a source of information about these entities and their activities, intentions and capabilities. CSE's [REDACTED] collection activities continue to produce foreign intelligence in accordance with GC intelligence priorities. Incidentally acquired private communications from CSE's [REDACTED] collection activities may provide unique foreign intelligence that meets GC priorities and assist Government decision-making.

In addition, CSE's [REDACTED] collection programs also provide CSE with access to foreign intelligence [REDACTED] which would otherwise be unavailable to CSE. This Five Eyes sharing regime is a valuable source of intelligence to the GC. CSE was able to produce foreign intelligence reports of high value to the GC as a result of intelligence from Five Eyes [REDACTED]

CSE also derives technical information about global information networks from its [REDACTED] collection activities. This supports other collection activities and improves CSE's understanding of its targets and their communication patterns. For example, CSE's [REDACTED] collection activities are a rich source of information related to [REDACTED] and have enhanced research on [REDACTED] among the Five Eyes partners. [REDACTED]

research ultimately benefits CSE's own collection activities.

After the expiration of the current Ministerial Authorization, CSE will report to you on the full period of the authorization, in accordance with the reporting requirements outlined in the Ministerial Authorization. Detailed information on each of the programs that CSE operates under the [REDACTED] Collection Activities Ministerial Authorization is provided in Annex A.

4. Satisfactory measures are in place to protect the privacy of Canadians

CSE has measures in place to protect the privacy of Canadians and to ensure that private communications will only be used or retained if they are essential to international affairs, defence, or security. A private communication is considered to be essential if it contains information that is necessary to the understanding of a target's identity, location, [REDACTED] capabilities or intentions, and is necessary for comprehension of that information in its proper context.

CSE's policies relating to accountability, the privacy of Canadians, and the conduct of [REDACTED] activities are outlined in the following Ministerial Directives and the associated operational policies:

- [REDACTED] Ministerial Directive;
- Accountability Framework Ministerial Directive;
- Privacy of Canadians Ministerial Directive; and,
- Collection and Use of Metadata Ministerial Directive;

CSE employees must conduct activities in accordance with the most current version of these Ministerial Directives and the associated operational policies. CSE will advise you of significant revisions to policies and procedures that have an impact on measures to protect the privacy of Canadians. OPS-1 is CSE's foundational policy on the protection of the privacy of Canadians and all other operational policies must comply with it. A copy of OPS-1 has been provided for your reference.

Where CSE incidentally intercepts a solicitor-client communication, it can only be used or retained if it is deemed essential to international affairs, defence or security. This means that intercepted solicitor-client communications will be treated in an exceptional manner, as set out in the conditions in the Ministerial Authorization.

The use and retention of any recognized intercepted private communications essential to foreign intelligence will be reported to you in accordance with the reporting requirements outlined in the Ministerial Authorization. CSE's activities are subject to annual review by the CSE Commissioner to ensure their lawfulness.

RECOMMENDATION


Ministerial Authorizations are vital legal instruments that enable CSE to fulfill its mandate without risk of criminal liability for the incidental interception of private communications. This Ministerial Authorization will permit CSE to continue its [REDACTED] collection activities that risk interception of private communications and provide foreign intelligence to the Government of Canada, as well as CSE's domestic and international partners. It is recommended that you approve the attached Ministerial Authorization "Communications Security Establishment [REDACTED] Collection Activities", to be effective 1 December 2014 to 30 November 2015.



John Forster
Chief

Attachment

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
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