

BEIXI ZHOU

Department of Economics
Boston University
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EDUCATION

Ph.D. in Economics, Boston University, Boston MA, 2023 (expected)
Dissertation Title: *Essays on Dynamic Games*
Dissertation Committee: Barton Lipman (chair), Chiara Margaria, and Juan Ortner

M.A. in Statistics, Boston University, Boston, MA, 2016

B.A. in Economics and Mathematics (*Magna Cum Laude*), M.A. in Economics,
Boston University, Boston, MA, 2014

FIELDS OF INTEREST

Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory

PUBLICATIONS

"[Causation and Incentives with Updating Courts](#)," (with Keith Hylton), *Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics*, 2020, 176(1), 123-146.

WORKING PAPERS

"[Optimal Disclosure Windows](#)," October 2022 (Job Market Paper)
"[Dynamic Coordination with Informational Externalities](#)," February 2022 (revise and resubmit, *Games and Economic Behavior*)

WORK IN PROGRESS

"Sharing Data," with Allen Vong

CONFERENCES AND PRESENTATIONS

Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, NY	2022
World Congress of the Game Theory Society	2021
SAET Conference	2021
The Young Economists Symposium (YES)	2020
World Congress of the Econometric Society	2020
Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, Stony Brook, NY	2019

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Dean's Fellowship, Boston University	2016-2021
Master's Program Prize for Academic Excellence, Boston University	Spring 2014
Phi Beta Kappa, Boston University	Fall 2013
RA-Mentor Fellowship, Boston University	Spring 2013
Undergraduate Summer Research Grant, Boston University	Summer 2012, 2013

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WORK EXPERIENCE

Research Assistant for Juan Ortner, Boston University	Spring 2021
Research Assistant for Chiara Margaria, Boston University	Fall 2017-2020
Research Assistant for Keith Hylton, School of Law, Boston University	Summer 2017, 2018

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Instructor, Summer Challenge program, Boston University	Summer 2022
Teaching Fellow, Foundations of Data Science (Undergraduate), Boston University	Spring 2022
Teaching Assistant, Organizational Economics (Undergraduate), Boston University	Spring 2020
Teaching Assistant, Industrial organization (Undergraduate), Boston University	Spring 2020
Teaching Assistant, Economics of Information (Undergraduate), Boston University	Spring 2018
Teaching Assistant, Health Economics (M.A.), Boston University	Spring 2018

LANGUAGES: English (fluent), Mandarin Chinese (native)

COMPUTER SKILLS: Mathematica, R, \LaTeX

CITIZENSHIP: China/F1

REFERENCES

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Optimal Disclosure Windows (Job Market Paper)

I study a dynamic disclosure game between an agent and a decision maker in continuous time. Over time, the agent privately receives conclusive bad signals about an unknown state. He chooses a window of time over which this information flows to the decision maker who then takes an action. In a Markov perfect equilibrium, information asymmetry is (endogenously) generated by delayed start of disclosure. The later the agent starts disclosing, the longer he keeps disclosure open. While disclosure is in progress, the agent faces a tradeoff between a more favorable action and higher risks, which leads to delayed stopping by a more optimistic agent.

Dynamic Coordination with Informational Externalities (revise and resubmit, *Games and Economic Behavior*)

I study a two-player continuous-time dynamic coordination game with observational learning. Each player has one opportunity to make a reversible investment with an uncertain return that is realized only when both players invest. Each player learns about the potential return by observing a private signal and the actions of the other player. In equilibrium, players' roles as leader and follower are endogenously determined. Information aggregates in a single burst initially, then gradually through delayed investment and disinvestment over time. More precise signals lead to faster coordination conditional on initial disagreement, but might also increase the probability of initial disagreement.