



Similar in That S

Author(s): James D. McCawley

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If both these hypotheses are correct, (1) must have an infinite underlying structure. "Enlarging" is plainly the surface form of an underlying *enlarge*. By B, this *enlarge* must, when pronominalization applies, include an NP *enlargements*; so that *enlarge* is represented in underlying structure as something like *make enlargements*. But then by A this *enlargements* itself is transformationally derived from a structure containing *enlarge*, which in turn includes an NP *enlargements*, and round we go.

As in Bach's "Problominalization", we must conclude that at least one of our hypotheses is false. Suppose B is true. Then A must be false; and by the argument above *enlarge* will be derived from *enlargements*, so that the transformationalist will need a rule of verbalization to replace the abandoned rule of nominalization A. Suppose A is true. Then B must be false, and we need a new analysis of pronominalization.⁴

SIMILAR IN THAT S
James D. McCawley,
University of Chicago

Similar can be used either intransitively with a plural subject or transitively (with no restriction on the number of the subject), and can be used either with or without a constituent of the form *in that S*:

- (1) Max and Fred are similar.
- (2) Max is similar to Fred.
- (3) Max and Fred are similar in that they both admire Lawrence Welk.
- (4) Max is similar to Fred in that they both admire Lawrence Welk.

There are several restrictions on *in that S*. First, the S must express a property which counts as a "similarity":

- (5) ??Max and Fred are similar in that they both have a prime number of uncles.

Here "these" must mean *sprouts*, not *stumps*. Bruce Fraser has pointed out a similar example:

- (ii) Don't litter. Throw it in the barrel.

Here "it" must mean *litter*.

³ Note that this is weaker than Bach's hypothesis that pronominalization operates on full NPs. Cf. Emmon Bach, "Problominalization," *Linguistic Inquiry* 1, 121-122 (1970).

⁴ It is interesting that this *reductio ad infinitum* of identical-NP pronominalization seems to escape Karttunen's counterarguments:

Karttunen, Lauri (1969a) "Migs and Pilots," mimeo.

Karttunen, Lauri (1969b) "Pronouns and Variables," in Binnick, et al., eds., *Papers from the Fifth Regional Meeting, Chicago Linguistic Society*, Department of Linguistics, University of Chicago, Chicago, Illinois.

- (6) ??Max and Fred are similar in that they both had lunch at the Tai Sam Yon today.
- (7) ??Max and Fred are similar in that they both live next door to someone who has an aunt that was once arrested in Syracuse for shoplifting.

I conjecture that a "similarity" is a shared property which the speaker assumes will generally be accompanied by shared properties beyond the ones that trivially follow from the given one, e.g. one might expect people who admire Lawrence Welk to enjoy accordion-playing and possibly even to have voted for Eisenhower, but one would hardly expect such characteristics to be shared by persons who have a prime number of uncles.

Secondly, transitive *similar* and intransitive *similar* do not allow the same Ss after *in that*:

- (8) John is similar to Susan in that he has red hair.
- (9) *John and Susan are similar in that he has red hair.

Subject to one exception to be noted below, the *S* of *X are similar in that S* must explicitly attribute the property in question to all the individuals included in the reference of the subject, either by means of a conjoined or quantified NP (e.g. (3)) or by being a conjunction of clauses each of which attributes the property to one of the individuals:

- (10) John and Susan are similar in that
 - hé has red hair and shé has red hair too.
 - he has red hair and so does she.
 - he has red hair and she also has that color of hair.
 - he has red hair and her hair is also red.
 - his hair is red and so is hers.
 - he is a redhead and her hair is red too.

Transitive *similar* allows all of the above possibilities for *in that S*, and in addition, it allows Ss which mention only the individual referred to by the subject:

- (11) John is similar to Susan in that he has red hair.
(cf. (9))

With one interesting exception, transitive *similar* does not allow an *in that S* which does not mention the subject of *similar*:

- (12) *John is similar to Susan in that she has red hair.
- (13) John is similar to Susan in that shé has red hair too.

Since the embedded *S* of (13) presupposes that John has red hair, it appears that the attribution of the property to the subject of *similar* must be present in the embedded *S* either

explicitly or as a presupposition associated with one of the words of the embedded S. Interestingly enough, embedded Ss like that of (13) are possible even with intransitive *similar*:

- (14) John and Susan are similar in that $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{shé} \\ \text{hé} \end{Bmatrix}$ has red hair too.

With intransitive *similar*, it does not matter which of the conjuncts in the embedded S attributes the shared property to which of the individuals denoted by the subject, whereas with transitive *similar*, the conjunct attributing the property to the subject normally precedes the conjunct attributing it to the object:

- (15) John and Susan are similar in that he has red hair and she has red hair too.
 (16) John and Susan are similar in that she has red hair and he has red hair too.
 (17) John is similar to Susan in that he has red hair and she has red hair too.
 (18) ?John is similar to Susan in that she has red hair and he has red hair too.

A fact which may have serious implications for the status of conjunction reduction is that there is no parallel difference in acceptability between the embedded Ss that would presumably be derived by conjunction reduction from the same structures as underlie (17)–(18):

- (19) John is similar to Susan in that he and she both have red hair.
 (20) John is similar to Susan in that she and he both have red hair.

The above facts provide further support for certain details of Postal's analysis of *remind* (*Linguistic Inquiry* 1, 37–120), namely that one sense of *remind* arises from a structure containing an embedded sentence of the form “*x* is similar to *y*”, where *x* is the “subject” of *remind* and *y* the “second object” (e.g. *John reminds me of Harry* is derived from a structure which underlies *John is similar to Harry*). Specifically, *remind* allows *in that S*, and the S follows exactly the same paradigm as with transitive *similar*:

- (21) John reminds me of Susan in that
 he has red hair.
 they both have red hair.
 they have the same color of hair.
 hé has red hair and shé has red hair too.
 *she has red hair.
 she has red hair too.

In an *in that* *S* containing a conjoined or quantified NP referring to the individuals to whom the similarity is being attributed, the quantifier must be universal and must have as its scope the entire embedded *S*:

- (22) Max and Fred are similar in that
 *one of them likes Lawrence Welk.
 they both don't like Lawrence Welk.
 *they don't both like Lawrence Welk.
 Sam thinks that both of them like Lawrence Welk.

Note that the last sentence allows the interpretation "for each_{*i*} of them, Sam thinks that he_{*i*} likes Lawrence Welk", but not the interpretation "Sam thinks that for each_{*i*} of them, he_{*i*} likes Lawrence Welk", although *Sam thinks that both of them like Lawrence Welk* allows either interpretation. This fact provides support for the proposal that *no* and *none* are derived from structures of the form " $\text{all}_x (\text{not } (f(x)))$ ", since otherwise it would not be possible to reconcile the grammaticality of the sentence

- (23) Those guys are similar in that none of them can stand Lawrence Welk.

with the generalization made above regarding what the *S* of *in that* *S* may be.

A NOTE ON "REMIND" *John Bowers, MIT*

I wish to discuss briefly what appears to be a factual error in a recent article of Paul Postal's in this journal. Ordinarily, it would hardly be worth mentioning the existence of one factual error in a monograph of this length. However, it seems to me that in this case the mistake in question is a crucial one, and one which reflects a fundamental difficulty in the approach to semantics which Postal's discussion is intended to provide support for.

The claim which I wish to dispute occurs on p. 41. After proposing a rough semantic representation to account for the meaning of sentences such as the following:

- (1) a. Harry reminds me of an ape.
 b. Ann reminds me of Doris Day.

Postal correctly observes that the analysis which he has in mind implies that sentence (2) ((15) in Postal's numbering):

- (2) Larry reminds me of Winston Churchill.

should have as an essential paraphrase sentence (3) (Postal's (17)):

- (3) I perceive that Larry is similar to Winston Churchill.