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A Few Factive Facts

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at one point in a structure to inhibit the application of the same rule at another point, it must be rejected.

A right-to-left linear rule, such as Johnson (1970) proposes, would permit the Klamath data above to be adequately described. There are, however, other approaches that deserve consideration; thus I do not claim that this example supports linear rules, though it is consistent with such rules.

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### A FEW FACTIVE FACTS

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The notion of predicates taking factive complements has been well-established for some years (cf. for instance Kiparsky and Kiparsky 1970). We owe to recent penetrating researches of L. Karttunen (1970) further recognition of the complexity and mystery of the notions involved, and the realization that there are at least two different classes of factives. In the present work, I shall direct attention to another subcategorization of factive complements, and more particularly, to some quite mysterious (one could say wild) properties of such complements.

Among the factives are those which I shall refer to as Emotive/Evaluative (henceforth: EE). In English these include:

- (1) a. It is too bad that your head shrunk.
- b. I resent your putting toxins in my soup.
- c. It is wonderful that your ears are not coming loose.

- d. I am glad that your fiancé has been released.
- e. It is sad that she is bad.
- f. I am sorry that your argument collapsed.
- g. It is unfortunate that he was forced to suspend the Bill of Rights.

Note that they all fall into Karttunen's "stronger" class of factives. That is, the mere possibility of these sentences being true guarantees the truth of the complement clause.

I shall now note several important properties which distinguish the complements of this natural subclass of factive predicates. First, observe that with ordinary strong factives like *realize*, complements of the form (2) have only the reading of (2):

- (2) Melvin was meaner than he was.
- (3) Jack realized that Melvin was meaner than he was.

The sentence (2) has only a "stupid" or necessarily false reading; just so with the complement of (3). Hence (3) is necessarily false. In the case of the negative of (2), the situation is as expected:

- (4) Melvin was not meaner than he was.
- (5) I realized that Melvin was not meaner than was.

(4) has only a "tautological" or necessarily true reading, so that (5) describes a very limited realization indeed.

When one embeds something like (2) as a complement of an EE predicate, the results are not out of the ordinary:

- (6) a. It is wonderful that Melvin was meaner than he was.
- b. I am sorry that Melvin was meaner than he was.

These have exactly the relevant properties of (3). When, however, (4) is embedded as a complement of an EE predicate we find only a partial parallelism with (5).

- (7) a. It is wonderful that Melvin was not meaner than he was.
- b. I am sorry that Melvin was not meaner than he was.

Although it is probably true that such sentences have the same "stupid" reading of (5), this is clearly only one possibility. The natural interpretation of EE sentences like (7) is one in which the complement is not at all understood as the proposition in (4). On this obvious reading, (7b) means something like:

- (8) I assume Melvin was mean to degree X: I declare that I am sorry that he was not mean to a degree which exceeds X.

Another way to put this is that in sentences like (7), the comparison is under the scope of the EE predicate in logical form but the assumed degree which makes up one of its terms is not under the scope. However, as (6) shows, with comparisons involving *more*, this is only true for negated complements.

The same situation obtains for *less* comparisons, as the reader can easily determine for himself. With *as* comparisons, however, the situation is reversed:

- (9) Melvin was as mean as he was.  
 (10) I am sorry that Melvin was as mean as he was.  
 (11) I am sorry that Melvin was not as mean as he was.

Here it is the positive complement which has the non-“stupid” reading, while the negative complement has only the contradictory reading.

It seems that an explanation is available for this, namely, a derivation of some occurrences of *as* from *not less*. This immediately turns the *as* cases into the *more/less* ones, reducing two problems to one. Moreover, such a derivation is supported by the fact that *as* means *not less*. Hence if one says:

- (12) Jack is as tall as Mary.

one is making a true claim even if he is taller, but not if he is shorter. Thus on at least one reading, *as* does not mean “same”. For proof, note:

- (13) a. Jack is as tall as Mary, in fact he is taller.  
 b. \*Jack is as tall as Mary, in fact he is shorter.

So much for *as*, which on this account poses no new problems.

The next point to be stressed is that the weird properties of EE complements in cases of negated comparisons are at least partly controlled by *extraction islands* in the sense of Ross (1967) and later work.<sup>1</sup> Thus for me in general, there is a definite contrast between:

<sup>1</sup> By an *extraction island* I mean some portion of a tree structure from which elements cannot be removed by movement rules like *Wh* Rel Movement. Thus compare (14) and (15) with respectively:

- (i) a. The boy who it is great that you hired.  
 b. \*The boy who that you hired is great.  
 (ii) a. The machine which I am sorry that you didn't buy ...  
 b. \*The machine which I am sorry about the fact that you didn't buy ...

(14) a. It is great that you are not sicker than you are.

b. That you are not sicker than you are is great.

(14b) has only the "stupid" tautological reading, correlated with the fact that the complement in (14b) is an extraction island, namely, a sentential subject. Similarly, there is a clear contrast between:

(15) a. I am sorry that you are not wealthier than you are.

b. I am sorry about the fact that you are not wealthier than you are.

Only (15a) has a non-"stupid" reading, correlated with the fact that complements of *the fact* are strict extraction islands.<sup>2</sup>

Next, note that in general it is strictly the case that a nongeneric indefinite subject NP representing an existential quantifier is always interpreted to have wider scope than the negative of the verb phrase of that subject NP. Hence sentences like (16a–d) all represent logical forms with the structure shown in (17):

(16) a. Some official didn't accept a bribe.

b. One bomb didn't go off.

c. Somebody didn't take out the garbage.

d. Some linguist didn't point that out.

(17) There exists an  $x$  such that NOT  $F(x)$

Sentences like (16) contrast sharply in meaning with those containing negatives on the subject NP:

(18) a. No official accepted a bribe.

b. Not one bomb went off.

c. Nobody took out the garbage.

d. No linguist pointed that out.

which all represent logical forms with the structure:

(19) NOT there exists an  $x$  such that  $F(x)$

However, in EE complements this contrast is weirdly partly neutralized:

(20) a. I am sorry that some linguist didn't say that.

b. I am sorry that no linguist said that.

<sup>2</sup> Kiparsky and Kiparsky (1970, 159–163) seem to suggest that all factive complements are extraction islands, but this is not really the case. For me, for example, all of the following are well-formed:

a. Melvin, I am glad that Joan dated.

b. The soup, it may indeed be wonderful that Tom spilled, but not the wine.

c. It was Tom who I resented Barbara's dating.

Cf. also footnote 1, (ia) and (iia).

Here, while (20a) can have the expected complement reading of the form (17), it can also have the reading (19), and hence on this interpretation is a paraphrase of (20b).

It thus seems clear that EE factive complements have certain very strange and mysterious properties. There is, of course, an explanation of these but, believe it or not, the present writer does not know what it is.

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### AN IMPLICATIONALLY DETERMINED RULE IN GREEK

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In Ancient Greek, finite verbs in reported speech may optionally appear in the optative mood if the governing verb is past:

- (1) homologô hōs ádika épathe  
I-agree that wrong he-suffered  
'I agree that he suffered unjustly.'
- (2) hōmológēsā hōs ádika épathe  
I-agreed that wrong he-suffered  
'I agreed that he suffered unjustly.'
- (3) hōmológēsā hōs ádika páthoi<sup>1</sup>  
I-agreed that wrong he-suffer (optative)  
'I agreed that he suffered unjustly.'

But there are also in texts of the classical period (fifth and fourth centuries B.C.) about ten passages where the subordinate verb is optative although the governing verb is not past. One of these occurs at Demosthenes 59.5. In order to show the full context, I shall first of all give the whole passage in translation.

- (4) When you were about to send your whole army to Euboea and Olynthus, Apollodorus proposed

<sup>1</sup> (2) and (3) differ somewhat in meaning, (2) tending to associate the speaker more closely with the truth of what is contained in the subordinate clause, whereas in (3) he may or may not believe it. There is not this difference between (1) and (5); (5) resembles (3) in that nothing can be deduced about the speaker's attitude to the content of the clause, but the same is true of (1). This is not surprising; the semantic distinction can be expressed only when a choice is possible between indicative and optative, and most of the time when the governing verb is nonpast this choice is not available.