stressed [o]; *čester* 'Cheshire cheese' may be pronounced [č'éster], with unstressed [e].

I see nothing surprising in these data. The situation is exactly what one would expect: two well-established rules apply to all forms, both foreign and native, but a few foreign forms fail to undergo the rules.

The problem is the following: how does one make explicit the fact that *only +foreign* forms can be exceptions to *ikan'e/akan'e*?

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SUBORDINATE FUTURE DELETION AND HYPERCLAUSES
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To account for the nonoccurrence of (2) below,

(1) We will begin dinner when my father arrives.
(2) *We will begin dinner when my father will arrive.

Janet Dean Fodor suggests a rule for English "which deletes *will* (and perhaps any other mark of the future such as *shall, be going to*) from a subordinate clause [other than a complement] when the verb of the main clause is itself in the future tense" (Dean 1968, 13; 40 fn. 16). J. D. Fodor assumes the "generative semantic" hypothesis that deep structures will turn out to be identical with semantic representations; I shall also do so here, though the hypothesis is far from proved.

A first reaction is that the rule must be restricted in its application: *because* is known to be a subordinating conjunction (cf. *Because $S_1$, $S_2$* vs. **For $S_1$, $S_2$*; see also Dik 1968, 34f.), yet alongside the predicted (3) we have also (4)[1]:

(3) John will be caught because he sets off the alarm.
(4) John will be caught, because he will set off the alarm.

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[1] There is also an irrelevant sentence similar to (3) but with a comma—i.e. intonation break—after *caught*, in which *sets off* would be understood frequentatively: "John will be caught on this occasion, because he regularly sets off the alarm." (3) has no intonation break, and means that John's setting off the alarm on this occasion will be what causes his being caught, without implying anything about other occasions.

We cannot just say that subordinate future deletion is obligatory for *when* but optional for *because* clauses, since there is more difference in meaning between (3) and (4) than can be dismissed as "stylistic". In (3), John's setting off the alarm will be the reason for his being caught, while in (4) his setting off the alarm is the reason for saying that he will be caught. Compare (3a) and (4a):

> (3) a. John smokes because he has cigarettes in his house.
> (4) a. John smokes, because he has cigarettes in his house.

In (3a) it is because John happens to have cigarettes in his house that he smokes; in (4a) we do not know why John smokes, but it is the fact that the speaker has seen cigarettes in John's house that leads him to believe, and hence assert, that John must be a smoker.

This situation turns out to be explained neatly by the "hyperclause hypothesis" that a surface structure declarative sentence occurs at the deep level as the object complement of a "hyperclause" with *I* as subject and verb synonymous with *assert*, both of these being deleted transformationally (Ross 1970).[2] Under this hypothesis, (3) and (4) may be derived from different deep structures, respectively:

> (5) I assert [John will be caught because he will set off the alarm].
> (6) I assert [John will be caught] because he will set off the alarm.

Now only (5) contains a clause to which J. D. Fodor's rule is applicable; in (6) the *because* clause is subordinate to the clause *I assert S*, which is not in the future. On the other hand, the deep structure source for (2) would be

> (7) I assert [we will begin dinner] when my father will arrive.

(7) would be nonsensical, since the speech act performed by uttering a declarative sentence takes place just when the sentence is uttered, not before or after: there will never be any sense in appending adverbial clauses of future or past time to performatives (whereas clauses of reason may be quite acceptable). So the subordinate future deletion rule can be retained as obligatory wherever it applies.

The hyperclause analysis may also explain the intonation contrast between (3) and (4). If (5) and (6) are drawn out in dependency-tree notation and the items *I* and *assert*

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[2] After writing this squib, I discovered that Rutherford (1970) has independently made some of the same points about hyperclauses as I do.

deleted, (6) falls into two separate trees corresponding to the parts separated by the intonation break in (4); (5) remains a single tree.

Finally, the proposed analysis represents fairly well the difference in meaning between (3) and (4). (4) presupposes that John will set off the alarm, and asserts that he will be caught, and that the former is the reason for the latter; in (3) the setting off of the alarm is asserted rather than presupposed. Correspondingly, the clause *he will set off the alarm* occurs within the object of *assert* in (5) but not in (6). It would be difficult to account for the semantic difference without the subordinate future rule and the hyperclause hypothesis: superficially, *he will set off the alarm* looks more like a straightforward assertion than does *he sets off the alarm*, which would not occur in isolation except in the frequentative sense. However, there is an unsolved difficulty here: in (3) the *catching* of John is presupposed, but nothing in (5) seems to suggest this.

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A NOTE ON THE NOTION "IDENTITY OF SENSE ANAPHORA"
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In their interesting paper "Missing Antecedents", Grinder and Postal persuasively argue for a syntactic transformation of VP Deletion (Grinder and Postal 1971). They assimilate cases of VP Deletion to a large class of anaphoric phenomena which they call "Identity of Sense Anaphora" [I − S = A], to be distinguished from anaphora involving identity of reference. For them, examples (1) and (2) both contain instances of I − S = A:

> (1)  My uncle didn't buy anything for Christmas, so my aunt did it for him.
> (2)  My uncle didn't buy anything for Christmas, but my aunt did.

In (1) *it* is an anaphoric item, understood as meaning, ap-