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JAMES D. MCCAWLEY

PARTICIPANT ROLES, FRAMES, AND SPEECH ACTS

In a 1985 paper, I reexamined, in light of the different roles that Erving Goffman showed to be conflated under the terms 'speaker' and 'hearer', many of the definitions and rules in which linguists have blithely said 'speaker' and/or 'hearer' (e.g., definitions of person categories and of 'vocative'). In the present paper, I attempt to correct two serious defects of the earlier paper, namely my use of Goffman's terms 'author, animator, principal' as if they were absolute rather than dependent on frames (if a prankster answers Noam Chomsky's telephone and pretends to be Chomsky, the prankster is the author and animator of the pretense, but Chomsky is the ostensible author, animator, and principal within the pretense), and my failure to distinguish different ways in which the roles may be divided among different persons (a spokesman and a stand-in share the role of principal with the person that they represent in quite different ways). The extra distinctions that thereby become available are needed in order to give accurate rules for, e.g., the use of first and second person forms. Some attention is devoted to the way in which the distinction between 'stage' and 'individual' relates to the application of the 'speaker' and 'hearer' categories and to the relation between Goffman's roles and the levels of speech acts distinguished by Austin.

In my 1985 paper 'Speech acts and Goffman's participant roles', I reexamined various rules and definitions in which linguists have used terms such as 'speaker' and 'hearer', in the light of Erving Goffman's (1974, 1981) identification of the diverse roles that are conflated under those terms. 'Speaker' conflates at least the following three roles:

(1)a. Animator (An): 'individual active in the role of utterance production'.

b. Author (Au): 'someone who has selected the sentiments that are expressed and the words in which they are encoded'.

c. Principal (Pr): 'someone whose position is established by the words that are spoken, someone whose beliefs have been told, someone who is committed to what the words say' (Goffman 1981: 144–5)

In the most prosaic situations, the same person plays all three roles. If I say to a friend, '(Can you come over to my place for dinner to-

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morrow?', I am composing the utterance, which makes me the author, I am producing the relevant sounds, which makes me the animator, and I am inviting the friend to dinner tomorrow, and thereby committing myself to providing him with dinner if he accepts the invitation, which makes me the principal.

However, there are common situations in which the roles are dissociated, as in a marriage ceremony in which the bride utters the words "I Margaret take thee Kenneth to my wedded husband", thus serving as animator and principal but, as Clark (1996: 20) notes, not author (Margaret and Kenneth are following a script that was written long before they were born), or when a stand-in delivers a prepared speech, thus serving as animator of words for which he is neither author nor principal. There are also situations in which one or more of the roles is unfilled, as where a language learner practices pronouncing sentences in his textbook, in which case he is animator, the author of the textbook is author, and there is no principal, or where a linguist makes up example sentences and pronounces them to hear how they sound, in which case he is author and animator but there is again no principal.

There are likewise multiple roles conflated under the term 'hearer':

(2) a. Addressee (Ad): person(s) to whom the utterance is addressed.
b. Ratified recipient (RR): has 'status as a ratified participant in the encounter'.
c. Intended recipient (IR): those whom the 'speaker' intends to hear/read and understand the utterance (can take in eavesdroppers or bystanders).
d. Recipient in general (R): those who hear/read the utterance, irrespective of what the 'speaker' intends or is even aware of.

Again, in the most prosaic situations, the same person plays all of these roles; thus, the friend that I invited to dinner is the Ad, since I directed my utterance to him, he is a RR, since that utterance was part of an interchange between him and me (he and I both are RRs for my utterance), he is an IR, since I intended for him to hear and understand what I said, and he is a R, since he did hear and understand it. And again, it takes little imagination to think of situations in which the roles are dissociated or in which one or more of them is unfilled. For example, in a conversation among three persons, all three are RRs for everything that is said as part of the conversation, though the Ad for any particular utterance can be one or the other or both of the other participants, and

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different parts of a single utterance can even have different Ads, though they have the same RRs:[1]

(3) Tom (talking with Dick and Harry): Dick, Harry wants $you_{d/*h}$ to help $him_{h/*d}$, and Harry, $you_{h/*d}$ can count on Dick to help $you_{h/*d}$ to the best of $his_{d/*h}$ ability.

The hearer roles for open letters published in newspapers are almost always dissociated. When someone publishes an open letter to President Clinton in the *Milwaukee Journal*, Clinton is the Ad (he is the referent of vocatives and of second person pronouns), the RRs are the readers of the *Journal*,[2] the IRs might be, say, all Democratic voters in Wisconsin, and the Rs are those who happen to read that particular letter. Ad, RR, and IR are also mutually distinct in the curse scenes of operas such as *Rigoletto*, in which someone calls on everyone assembled to shout *Sia maledetto!* 'May he be cursed': the Ad is Cod, the RRs are all those present, and the IR is the unidentified malefactor, who is forced, lest he give himself away, to call on Cod to curse him. (I leave open the question of whether Cod is also a RR and/or an IR; when there are multiple intentions, each can of course have its own IR.)

Imprecations addressed to inanimate objects have an Ad but no IR or RR:

(4) (person trying unsuccessfully to break open a coconut) Break, you bastard!

The vocative *you bastard* refers to the coconut, but the utterance is not part of a conversation between the person and the coconut; the coconut is not a RR, nor is it an IR.[3] A class of utterances that have no Ad or RR but may have an IR was identified by Erving Goffman (1978), namely 'response cries': short utterances that one produces in response to surprises and mishaps (*Oops*, *Ouch*, *Damn it*, etc.), which can serve such functions as that of alerting bystanders that one is aware of the mishap, or of distancing oneself from it. Goffman's claim that these have no Ad is confirmed by the fact that they do not allow vocatives:

[1] This point is taken from Clark and Carlson 1982, which includes examples after which (3) is modeled.

[2] More accurately, those who read that number of the *Journal* while it is still current. Twenty-third century scholars reading it in historical research are not RRs.

[3] By contrast, a pet animal or a prelinguistic baby to whom a person addresses words usually **is** a RR. For example, nonlinguistic responses by the animal or the baby are commonly treated as part of a conversation in which it is a participant, and it is treated as participating in conversational turn-taking.

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(5)a. *Oops, Harry.
a′. *Oh shit, somebody.

Magical utterances likewise normally have no Ad. Anna Wierzbicka (1980: 307) notes that the utterance *Let there be light* attributed to God in the account of the creation in Genesis cannot be accurately reported with any indirect object, not even a reflexive pronoun referring to God:

(6) God said (*to X) 'Let there be light'. (* even for X = Himself)

In Haiman's words (1998: 4), "To utter a magic spell like 'Shazam' (and thereby turn oneself into Captain Marvel) is purely instrumental behavior, like flicking a switch"; Billy Batson wasn't addressing himself when he said *Shazam*, and he couldn't have added a vocative (**Shazam, Billy*) the way he might have in talking to himself (*Calm down, Billy*).

In my 1985 paper, I sought to determine what speaker and hearer roles are relevant to each of the various definitions and rules that linguists have commonly formulated in terms of 'speaker' or 'hearer', of which a partial list is given in (7):[4]

(7)a. first/second person.
b. Vocative
c. Turn-taking
d. Elements sensitive to a speaker's or hearer's location in space, in time, or in a social network: *come/go*, *here/there*, *bring*, German *hin/her*, present/past tense, *now*, Japanese *kureru/kudasaru* vs. *yaru/ageru*
e. Shared knowledge, its role in pragmatic presupposition
f. Honorific forms; Japanese benefactive verbs (*kudasaru/ageru* vs. *kureru/yaru*)
g. Distinctions reflecting relationship of 'speaker' to 'hearer'
i. *Tu/vous* distinctions[5]
ii. a. Japanese polite (*-masu*) vs. plain verb forms
b. Yana male/female forms (Sapir 1929)
iii. Dyirbal mother-in-law language (Dixon 1970; used when a taboo relative is present)
h. 'Speaker-oriented' adverbials such as *frankly*

[4] Levinson (1987) also surveys phenomena that are sensitive to Goffman's participant roles; his paper, which concentrates largely on sociolinguistic questions, is complementary to this paper.

[5] I use a plural here in view of Wierzbicka's (1992) demonstration that the *tu/vous* distinction in French is not the same as the *ty/vy* distinction of Russian.

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(7)i. Conditions under which a sentence can be divided among two or more 'speakers'

j. Conditions for direct/indirect quotation. (Is the subject of *say* and other verbs of speaking the An? the Pr?)

Cases in which the different notions of 'speaker' or of 'hearer' are dissociated are of crucial importance for deciding what notion of 'speaker' or of 'hearer' is relevant to each of the items in the list. For example, (3) provides evidence that the concepts of second person and vocative involve the notion of Ad but not that of RR. Both parts of (3) have the same RRs. In each part, the vocative and the second person refer to the person to whom that part is directed; the individual who is referred to with a second person pronoun in that part of the sentence is referred to with a third person pronoun in the other part, in which he is not the Ad and thus the pronoun does not meet the condition for being second person.

Determining what speaker role figures in the notion "first person" is not quite so easy, however, as will become clear from a discussion of an error that led me in my 1985 paper to the incorrect conclusion that first person forms have referents that include the Pr, on the basis of the fact that in the situation described by (8a), an occurrence of *I* would refer to Clinton, who is An and Pr but not Au, in (8b), it again would refer to Clinton, who is Au and Pr but not An, and in (8c), it would refer to Chomsky, who is not Au or An but who is Pr, to the extent that anyone is Pr; thus, in all three cases the referent of *I* was apparently the Pr.

(8)a. President Clinton delivers a speech written by a White House staff writer.

b. President Clinton is to deliver a speech that he himself has written, but he catches the flu and gets Vice-President Gore to deliver it in his place.

c. A prankster, Crazy Harry, who is walking down a corridor in MIT, hears Noam Chomsky's phone ringing and answers it, pretending to be Chomsky.

My error was in failing to note that in (8a, b) the roles of Au and An are divided between two persons, and that in (8c) (and a parallel example involving a fake seance, in which the supposed principal was the deceased man whose widow was trying to communicate with him) the utterance is framed within a deception.

In (8a), the two clauses of Goffman's definition of Au apply to different persons: Clinton has "selected the sentiments that are expressed" and the speech-writer has selected "the words in which they are encoded". Here,

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Clinton has delegated part of his role as Au to the speech-writer, but remains the "primary" author, since he directs the activity of the speech-writer (a "secondary" author) and is entitled to accept, reject, or alter any speech that the writer provides him. While the division of the An role in (8b) is not as clear as the division of the Au role in (8a), it can still be argued that Clinton has not relinquished the An role but has rather delegated most of it to Gore, while remaining a "primary animator", in that he retains control over Gore's animation of the speech, e.g., he is entitled to give Gore instructions about the delivery of the speech and Gore is expected to follow them. In (8c), Chomsky is not only the purported Pr but also the purported Au and An, in that Crazy Harry is enacting all the roles that Chomsky would be performing if he had answered his own telephone; for example, to make the deception effective, Harry should mimic Chomsky's Philadelphia accent (a stand-in for Clinton, by contrast, would be behaving offensively if he mimicked Clinton's Arkansas accent). It is only outside the frame of the deception that Harry is Au and An; there is no Pr in the real-world frame, though one can speak of Harry as the Pr for the deception itself).[6] Within the frame of the deception, the three speaker roles are played by the same person, just as in the banal case of my inviting a friend to dinner, and thus, if pronouns are chosen on the basis of relationships within the frame of the deception, (8c) provides no information about what speaker roles are relevant to the use of first person forms. With these interpretations of (8a–c), the use of first person pronouns is consistent with the generalization that they refer to the primary animator within the frame to which the IR are supposed to attend.

Let us try to apply what was just said about (8a–c) to a forged letter as in (9):

(9) Dear Virginia,
I exist.
Yours sincerely,
Santa Claus

Outside the frame of the deception, the Au and An roles are played by the forger. (The roles could of course be played by different persons, as

[6] The notions of Au, An, and Pr are not restricted to linguistic acts. Suppose that you order a Big Mac at the McDonald's on 53rd St. and that someone named Lucy Brown is the person who assembles it for you. Then with regard to your Big Mac, the Au is the person who created the recipe (maybe Ray Kroc, the founder of McDonald's), the An is Lucy Brown, and the Pr is the McDonald's Corp., which 'stands behind' the product and, e.g., could get sued if something were wrong with the product.

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when the content of the forgery is dictated to a scribe.) Within the frame of the deception, Santa Claus is Au, An, and Pr, unless the forgery represents the letter as produced by the hand of a secondary animator (Santa Claus's secretary), in which case the An role would be divided, but with Santa Claus still the primary animator. Santa Claus is of course the referent of *I*.[7] Not quite so easy to deal with is a message such as *Wash me* written in the dust on a car. It is riot the car who carries out the act of writing the words and has the intention that directs that act but the person who writes the words in the dust. One way to make this case conform to my generalization is to assimilate it to conversations in which one person cooperatively completes his interlocutor's utterances, thus ostensibly taking on the role of a secondary animator and secondary author, with the interlocutor retaining the roles of Pr and of primary An and primary Au. An extreme case of such an interaction is that of conversations in which a baby or a pet animal is treated as a RR and its nonverbal behavior is treated as incomplete speech that is then completed by the human participant; the person writing in the dust may regard himself as completing the car's inarticulate plea for a wash.

Some situations that fit better the relations among Au, An, and Pr that (8) was supposed to illustrate are given in (10):

(10)a. An = Pr ≠ Au. A defendant in a Stalin-era purge trial is An and Pr for the false confession that he is made to recite. He is Pr because the confession puts him on record as having admitted the crimes of which he is accused. One or other of his persecuters is Au; the Au role might well be split, e.g., Lavrenty Beria (primary Au) decides on the content of the confession and delegates to someone else (secondary Au) the task of composing a text for the defendant to recite at the trial.

b. Au = Pr ≠ An. The idealized view of translators and interpreters is that they are only animators, animating a faithful foreign version of what the Au/Pr said or wrote. More realistically, of course, the translator or interpreter is sharing both aspects of the Au role with the author(s) of the input text, choosing the words in ways that in part reflect the choice of words in the input text, and choosing details of "the sentiments expressed" so as to reflect the presumed intentions of the original au-

[7] This example is problematic for Kaplan's (1989) treatment of sentences such as *I exist* or *I am here* that allegedly are true relative to all contexts, but express relative to each context a proposition that is only contingently true; Kaplan's notion of context does not provide for forgeries and other deceptions.

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thor(s). An outlandish but clearer case where Au = Pr ≠ An would be that of a telepath saying out loud the thoughts that he reads from another person's mind. Less outlandish clear cases of An totally distinct from Au and Pr can be found by applying the notions outside the domain of language, to e.g., a musical performance in which the performer is an An and does not share that role with the composer.

c. Au = An ≠ Pr. A spokesman for President Clinton makes up replies on the spot at a news conference. The spokesman is Au and An, but President Clinton is the Pr. (If the spokesman wants to interject his own views, he has to undertake a change of footing, in which he signals that he is speaking for himself and not for President Clinton.)

In (10a), *I* refers to the defendant (Pr/An); in (10c), *I* refers to the spokesman (Au/An). In a translation that purports to conform to the ideal (10b), *I* refers to the Pr, but since the conception of the translator as the Pr's or Au's mouthpiece perhaps makes him a secondary An (while the Pr is generally not controlling the translator's work, the translator at least fancies himself as totally subordinate to the Au/Pr), the Au/Pr should perhaps be counted as a primary An here too, in which case the only role shared by the referent of *I* in all three of these cases would be An. A case in which the referent of *I* appears to be the An rather than the Pr is that of collaboratively produced utterances as in (11), where (as will be argued below) the two speakers share the role of Pr, but first person pronouns in each part of the utterance refer to the An of that part of the utterance:

(11)a. Jorge: Ivan is going to peel an orange,
Ivan: And Jorge is going to peel an apple.

b. Jorge: Ivan is going to peel my orange and his apple,
Ivan: And Jorge is going to peel my banana and his mango.

I thus tentatively conclude that 1st person pronouns are those whose referent includes a primary An.[8]

Before taking up the other items in (7), it may be useful to sketch some

[8] In my brief discussion of 1st and 2nd person, I have neglected the important question of the division of labor between these two categories. Plank (1985) notes that languages differ with regard to whether "inclusive" forms (those whose denotation includes both 'speaker' and 'hearer') count as 1st person or as 2nd person, or do not determinately count as either. The traditional European definition of 2nd person ('referent includes hearer but not speaker') corresponds to a view in which inclusive forms count as 1st person, as they do in European languages (*tú y yo somos amigos*).

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other situations in which speaker roles are split or are embedded in frames. The case of a stand-in (Gore delivering Clinton's speech) is quite different from that of an authorized mimic such as the legendary doubles of Generalisimo Franco, or the actress Agnes Moorehead's less well known role as a double for Eleanor Roosevelt in radio broadcasts in the 1930s and 40s (Schaden 1985). The principal delegates his role as An both to the stand-in and to the double, without any deception in the former case but with one in the latter case. The Roosevelt/Moorehead deception relates only to the role of An: Eleanor Roosevelt remained the Pr when Moorehead did her authorized impersonations, every bit as much as Clinton remains the Pr when Gore stands in for him. Franco likewise remained the Pr for whatever the double said in the persona of Franco, though the doubles also served to a limited extent as secondary authors when circumstances forced them to improvise.

A loan officer at a bank, who makes commitments on the part of the bank in virtue of authority that is delegated to him, is a secondary principal, though in saying this, it is important to distinguish different dimensions of the role of Pr: the loan officer performs a Pr's acts on behalf of the bank, but it is the bank and not that person who is a party to the various obligations and rights that the loan agreement creates.

Quite different from the cases of doubles is that of a shaman speaking the supposed words of a spirit. The question of whether there actually are spirits who speak through the mouths of shamans is beside the point here, since to describe what a fake shaman does, it is necessary to embed within the frame of a deception a description of what a real shaman would do; to describe a piece of fakery, it is necessary to describe what it is that is being faked. In the scene in Kurosawa's film *Rashômon* in which the shaman goes into a trance and the ghost of the murdered nobleman speaks through her mouth (and in a very different voice), the ghost is the primary animator – really the only An, since the shaman (her person, not her body) is not producing the words, let alone composing them: the ghost is using her body the way that a live person might use a microphone. A fake shaman would be animating the ghost's words in the real world, but the ghost would again be Au, An, and Pr within the frame of the deception, using the shaman's body as the equivalent of a microphone. This case should be contrasted with a parallel one involving a deception, in which an evil spirit takes possession of my body and causes it to pronounce the words 'The drinks are on the house': here the evil spirit is Au and An of the deception, but I am the ostensible Au, An, and Pr within the deception. A first person pronoun in this case would refer to the person possessed, not to the evil spirit by whom he is possessed, whereas in the

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Rashômon case it referred to the murdered nobleman. These cases differ from that of the telepath in (10b), in that the spirit controls the shaman's or the possessee's vocal apparatus, whereas the telepath's vocal apparatus is under his own control.

I have provided a tentative identification of the speaker and/or hearer roles that are involved in (7a) and will now continue down the list.[9] Vocatives (7b) evidently refer to the addressee, as illustrated by (3), where the vocative of each clause has the same referent as the second person pronoun in that clause. Turn-taking (7c) involves the role of An, since it is through the way that one executes the animator's role that one signals that one is relinquishing the floor; both RR and Ad are also involved: the persons who have access to the floor have to be RRs, but by addressing an utterance to one of the RRs, the speaker can give that person priority for taking over the floor.

Come (7d) is used for both motion towards the "speaker's" location or towards the "hearer's", unlike such otherwise close counterparts as Spanish *venir*, which refers only to motion towards the location of the speaker: in answering a knock on the door, in English one says *I'm coming*, but in Spanish one says *Voy* (lit. 'I'm going'), not *Vengo*. Modern technology has made it easier to separate the relevant speaker and hearer roles, by enabling the persons filling the roles to be far apart in space. In (12a), the An is in the radio studio and *come* is used for motion to the location of the Pr, which may be many miles away, and in a conference telephone call (12b), the fact that one of the RRs is in the place to which the motion is directed does not license *come* when an utterance is addressed to some other participant:

(12)a. Radio announcer: Come to Morgenstern Motors for the deal of a lifetime!

b. Jim (in Chicago, speaking with George in Berkeley and Ron in San Diego): Ron, when I go/*come to Berkeley next month, I'll ask Chuck about that.

Levinson (1983: 62), following Fillmore (1971), illustrates a distinction between the **coding time** and the **receiving time** of an utterance in terms of a written message such as *I'll be back in an hour*, affixed to an office door. The coding time is either the time at which the message is written or the time at which it is put on the door, and if the note had not indicated

[9] I should emphasize that the speaker and hearer roles relevant to one instance of one of the categories and phenomena listed in (7) need not be the same ones relevant to instances involving other languages or other lexical items.

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what time that was, a person reading it (at what would be then the receiving time) would not know when *in an hour* was. In this case the future tense and *in an hour* are selected on the basis of the coding time, without regard to the receiving time (or rather, the receiving times, since there could be multiple events of someone reading the message). The situation is different with a recorded message on an answering machine (*I'm sorry but I can't come to the phone now*), or for that matter, a written message saying *I'm not here – if you need me, try the 5th floor of the library*, where the tenses and words such as *now* are chosen on the basis of either the receiving time or perhaps the **sending time**, which is distinct from the coding time in both these cases and coincides with the receiving time in the case of the recorded message. The sending time of a private written message (say, one that is sealed in an envelope, or at least folded so that its contents are not visible) can be identified with the time at which it is sealed or folded. In the letter-writing cultures with which I am familiar (I am not competent to comment on the "epistolary" use of the Latin present tense, anchored to receipt time), sending time is the usual anchor for tenses; sending time is the time of the event of animation, and if the playings of the recorded message are identified with the relevant events (here, not acts) of animation, in both cases it is the time of the animation to which tenses are anchored. I leave unresolved here what should count as the sending time of a public written message, such as an open *Back at 2:00* message on a door, or an *Open* sign in a shop window, whether the time it is put on display, the whole time it is on display, or each of the times when someone reads it.[10]

Shared knowledge (7e), as in the treatment of pragmatic presupposition of Karttunen (1974), consists of the propositions that the ratified participants in a discourse jointly take as already established at the given point in the discourse and take for granted in the immediately following discourse. Karttunen treats a pragmatic presupposition of an utterance as a proposition that the shared knowledge must entail for a participant to be entitled to contribute that utterance to the discourse, e.g., a prerequisite for saying *John regrets that he stole the money* is that the shared knowledge

[10] It is only the "displayed" side of the common signs that say *Open* on the one side and *Closed* on the other that counts as "sent". The other side is of course visible to the customers and staff inside the place of business, who are Rs but not IRs or RRs for that side of the sign.

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at the given point in the discourse entail that John stole the money. It is only RR and not Ad that it is relevant to the notion of shared knowledge.[11]

To identify how speaker and hearer roles influence the use of Japanese honorifics (7f), we need to consider conversations in which the participants differ with regard to who, from each participant's point of view, is an appropriate target of honorification, as in a conversation between a high school principal and the parent of one of the school's pupils, in which one of the teachers at the school is mentioned:

(13)a. Parent: Morita-sensei wa uti no musuko ni zisyo
(name) Prof. Top home Gen son Dat dictionary
o o-kasi ni narimasita.
Acc Hon-lend Dat become-Pol-Past
Prof. Morita lent our son a dictionary.

b. Principal: Morita ga o-taku no musuko ni
(name) Nom Hon-house Gen son Dat
zisyo o o-kasi {sita, *ni natta} no
dictionary Acc *Hon-lend do-Past Dat become-Past Gen*
desu ka?
be-Pol-Pres Interrog

O-kasi ni naru is a subject-honorific form (Harada 1976): it requires a target of honorification as its subject; *o-kasi suru* is a non-subject honorific form: it requires a non-subject "affected person" as target of honorification. The parent but not the principal uses subject-honorific forms in clauses whose syntactic subject is a teacher at the principal's school; the principal in this case uses a non-subject honorific form, with *o-taku* as the target of honorification. However, if the principal were referring in (13b) to a teacher at another school (say, the school that the parent's other son attends), he could treat the teacher (who would then be referred to as *Morita-sensei*) as a target of honorification and use the subject-honorific *o-kasi ni natta*. The participants in a conversation thus do not in general

[11] The word 'knowledge' is used loosely in the term 'shared knowledge' and its synonym 'mutual knowledge', since the propositions in question need not be true, nor even believed by the ratified participants. For example, the proposition that there is a Santa Claus is mutual knowledge in many Christmastime conversations between parents and children, even if Daddy knows there isn't a Santa Claus, Johnnie knows there isn't a Santa Claus, and maybe even Johnnie knows that Daddy knows there isn't a Santa Claus and Daddy knows that Johnnie knows that there isn't a Santa Claus.

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treat the same persons honorifically. The role of Ad is relevant to the use of honorifics only in that when one is speaking to persons outside one's family or outside the company for which one works, one speaks of the members of one's family or the personnel of one's company non-honorifically; it is in virtue of the parent's role as a guest of the school that the principal treats him honorifically.

The choice of a familiar or formal second-person singular pronoun (7g.i) generally is on the basis of one's relationship to the referent of that pronoun, that is, to the Ad, irrespective of one's relationship to other RRs. The matter is more complicated for plural forms in languages such as Polish that maintain the informal/formal distinction in the plural, since one needs to consider the relationship of the speaker to the Ad, to other RRs, and to other persons that may be included in the reference of the pronoun. Consider a conversation in Polish in which Jan is speaking with both Piotr, with whom he is on familiar terms, and Pawel, with whom he is on formal terms. Addressing Piotr, Jan uses the familiar *ty* referring to Piotr, the formal plural *Panowie* referring to Piotr and Pawel, and the familiar plural *wy* referring to Piotr and some fourth person with whom Jan is not on familiar terms (say, Piotr's boss), unless that person is connected with Pawel, in which case he uses *Panowie*. Addressing Pawel, Jan uses only formal forms (*Pan* referring to Pawel, *Panowie* referring to Pawel and Piotr together, or to Pawel and other persons). Addressing Piotr and Pawel, he says *Panowie* referring to Piotr and Pawel together or to them together with other persons. Thus both Ad and RR play a role in the choice of forms: in speech with a familiar Ad, a pronoun whose referent includes the Ad is familiar unless the referent includes a non-familiar RR or persons associated with him, in which case a formal pronoun is used; with an Ad that includes persons with whom one is not on familiar terms, a formal pronoun is used when the referent includes the Ad. The use of Japanese polite forms (7g.iia) likewise reflects the speaker's relationship to the Ad, in that, even in a conversation that includes participants with whom one is not on intimate terms, one will use the "plain" verb form in utterances addressed to a participant with whom one is on intimate terms.

Edward Sapir's (1929) title "Male and female forms of speech in Yana" (7g.iib) incorrectly suggest a that the forms are chosen on the basis of the sex of the speaker. The choice of a "male" or a "female" form actually depends on whether all the participants in the conversation (the RRs) are male, irrespective of who the speaker is – "male' forms are used when there are only male participants, "female" forms when at least one of the participants is female. The use of Dyirbal 'mother-in-law language' (7g.iii)

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is contingent on the physical presence of a taboo relative such as one's mother-in-law. Since Dyirbal culture does not allow one to include a taboo relative among the RRs, the only hearer role in which the condition for the use of mother-in-law language could be stated at all is that of (potential) recipient. Taboo relatives are at most eavesdroppers on conversations for which their presence conditions the use of mother-in-law language. The taboo relative can still be an IR, though, as when a man obtains a favor from his mother-in-law by expressing his desires within her earshot to some other person, even by talking to his dog ("Gee, Fido, wouldn't it be nice if I had a cup of tea") if there is no human addressee available.[12]

Identifying the speaker role of the understood subject of "speaker-oriented" adverbs such as *frankly* (7h) is difficult because it is hard to find situations in which it can be used in which the speaker roles are dissociated. It is of course easy enough to note that when a spokesman says *frankly*, he is referring to frankness on his own part and not that of the person that he represents, but since it may take a change of footing for him to be able to use the word (i.e., he may need to switch from speaking as spokesman to speaking on his own behalf), the case is unclear. I conjecture that *frankly* is completely normal only when its understood subject is an An who is also Pr.

I turn now to the conditions under which two or more persons animate different parts of a single sentence (7i), as in examples in which two or more speakers are jointly making a presentation before an audience and each of them animates a different conjunct (Hankamer and Sag 1976), as in (ii). In my 1985 paper, I paid particular attention to examples of this type in which Gapping applies over a domain that includes two or more speakers:

[12] Everett (1985) discusses a case in which it is necessary to distinguish between two levels of "Recipient". When doing field work on Pirahã, in a remote region of Brazil, Everett overheard women using peculiar allophones of /b g/ that he had never heard in the speech of male speakers. After he had been living among the Pirahã for three months, one of the men taught him the funny sounds, demonstrating alternative pronunciations of words containing /b/ or /g/, and thereafter, men did use the odd variants of /b g/ in his earshot. The Pirahã avoid these sounds when they are in the presence of outsiders; by teaching them to Everett, they were making him a member of their community, thus no longer an outsider. The reason that the women had used those sounds in his presence is that Pirahã women are not allowed to even recognize the presence of outsiders, let alone talk to them. Up until then, the women behaved literally as if Everett were not present (thus, using the pronunciations that may not be used when outsiders are around), while the men were expected to recognize the presence of an outsider and thus avoid those pronunciations. In both cases, Everett was a recipient, in the sense that he heard what the speakers said, but only to the male Pirahãs was he a recipient in the narrower sense of someone that they regard as hearing what they say.

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(14) Jorge: Ivan is now going to peel an orange.
Ivan: { And Jorge Ø an apple.
*Jorge Ø an apple.

Here the utterance that Jorge and Ivan jointly animate behaves like a single conjoined sentence, in that Gapping, in which conjuncts after the first are reduced to two constituents that contrast with their counterparts in the first conjunct, requires a coordinate structure, as in ordinary cases in which there is a single An:

(15)a. Ivan is going to peel an orange, and Jorge an apple.
a′. *After Ivan peeled an orange, Jorge an apple.
b. Ivan is going to peel an orange. *Jorge an apple.
b′. Ivan is going to peel an orange, Jorge an apple, and Geoff a banana.

The sequence of clauses that is unacceptable as a sequence of separate sentences, whether spoken by a single animator (15b) or divided between two (14), is fine if it makes up the first two conjuncts of a 3-term coordinate sentence that is divided among three Ans, as in (16):

(16) Jorge: Ivan is now going to peel an apple.
Geoff: Jorge Ø an apple.
Ivan: { And Geoff Ø a banana.
??And Geoff is going to break open a coconut.
??And Geoff is going to peel a banana.

The usual requirements of parallelism among the conjuncts and of across-the-board application for Gapping remain in effect, as is seen in the versions of Ivan's utterance in (16) in which either the parallelism breaks down or the deletion is not done across the board.

The possibility of dividing a Gapped sentence among different Ans is contingent on the different Ans sharing the role of Pr, as can be seen when we compare (14) with a case in which someone adds a conjunct to what has just been said without sharing in the role of Pr for the first utterance, as in a type of sarcastic response discussed in Sadock 1977:

(17) A: Hi, I'm Newt Gingrich.
B: And I'm the Easter Bunny.

Gapping substantially lowers the acceptability of the sarcastic response:

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(18) A: Bill Clinton has joined the National Rifle Association.
B: { And the Pope has joined Planned Parenthood.
{ ??And the Pope Planned Parenthood.

I attribute the inappropriateness of Gapping in (18) to the fact that in his sarcastic response, B does not act as a co-principal for A's utterance, unlike the 'cooperative' examples of (14)–(16), in which the different speakers **are** co-principals for all the parts of the sentences that they jointly animate.[13]

I turn now to the relation of speaker roles to the direct and indirect quotation of what the "speaker" said (7j). I will contrast three situations in which there is more than one person who could be regarded as 'saying something', namely those of a speech delivered by a stand-in, a hoax such as Crazy Harry imitating Chomsky on the telephone, and a particularly important case in which the roles of An, Au, and Pr are distributed differently within and outside a frame, namely that of a theatrical performance; as I will show shortly, descriptions of events during theatrical performances allow one to mix entities within and outside a frame much more readily than do many other situations that involve frames. For each of these situations I will consider the acceptability of direct and indirect quotations with each of the possible speakers as subject of the verb *say*:

(19)a. (Stand-in: Gore delivering Clinton's speech)
When Gore said, 'There will be no tax increase', someone giggled.

b. (Impostor: Crazy Harry answering Chomsky's phone and posing as Chomsky)
When Crazy Harry said, 'I've decided to resign from my chair at MIT', his friends burst into laughter.

c. (Performer: Dustin Hoffman enacting the role of Macbeth in a performance)
When Hoffman said, 'It is a tale told by an idiot', someone in the balcony started giggling.

(20)a. *When Clinton said 'There will be no tax increase', someone giggled.

[13] Some speakers, including Herbert H. Clark, report finding the gapped version of (18) acceptable even when the second utterance is a sarcastic response to the first. I restrict my attention here to speakers who find that Gapping greatly lowers the acceptability of the sarcastic response.

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(20)a′. In a speech delivered last night in his absence by Vice President Al Gore, President Clinton said (*at 9:37 PM EST), 'There will be no tax increase'.

b. *When Chomsky said, 'I've decided to resign from my chair at MIT', Harry's friends burst into laughter.

c. When Macbeth said, 'It is a tale told by an idiot', someone in the balcony started giggling.

In (19), the subject of *say* is an animator in the real world, with the qualification that in the case of the stand-in (19a), it is the secondary animator, who actually pronounces the words, not the primary animator, that can be the subject of *say* with a direct quote. In (20), the three situations diverge in an interesting way. While (20a) refers to the event of uttering that specific sentence, (20a′) refers not to that event (as witness the unacceptability of an adverbial specifying the time of that event) but to Clinton's going on record as having 'said' those words, which are attributed to Clinton and not to Gore, irrespective of who actually pronounced them. In (20b), Chomsky, the An and Pr within the deception, cannot be treated as having said anything from a vantage-point outside the frame of the deception (the main clause here refers to events outside that frame). However, with reference to the theatrical performance of (20c), Macbeth can be spoken of as saying something, even from the vantage point of the audience in the theater. The acceptability of (20c), with its *when*-clause, is remarkable in view of the 800 year disparity between the time in which the play is set and the time of the performance. It reflects what Fauconnier (1985) has described as a 'mental space' phenomenon, in which two domains are linked in some way and entities in the one domain are referred to in terms of the entities to which they are linked in the other domain.

We can tentatively draw the conclusion that *say* + Direct Quote reports an An's act (and thus requires that the subject denote the An), but with two qualifications. First, where a primary animator delegates the uttering of words to a secondary animator, only the latter performs an **act** of animation and thus only the latter can be the subject when *say* refers to an act of animation, though *say* also has an additional sense of 'go on record as saying', which refers to an act of a Pr, and with that sense, the primary animator is the subject in virtue of his also being Pr. Second, the links between the events enacted in a play and the events in its enactment allow the An within the play to serve as subject of an occurrence of *say* that takes a vantage point outside the play.

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In (21)–(22), the same situations, with the same subjects of *say*, are reported with indirect quotations:

(21)a. When Gore said that there would be no tax increase, someone sneezed.
a′. (member of audience whispering to companion) A minute ago, didn't Gore say that there would be no tax increase?
a″. *Last night, Gore said that there would be no tax increase.
b. Harry said to the caller that Montague grammar was a required subject for MIT linguistics students.
b′. Harry said to the caller that ??he/*Chomsky had decided to resign from his chair at MIT.
b″. Harry said that he had to hang up and would call back later.
b‴. Harry, when you said that you had decided to resign from your chair at MIT, I could hardly keep from laughing.
b⁗.*Harry, when you said that Chomsky had decided to resign from his chair at MIT; I could hardly keep from laughing.
c. Just after Hoffman said that life was a tale told by an idiot, someone in the balcony giggled.
c′. *Last night, Dustin Hoffman said that life was a tale told by an idiot.

(22)a. *When Clinton said that there would be no tax increase, someone sneezed.
a′. In a recent speech delivered by Vice-President Gore, Clinton said that there would be no tax increase.
a″. *In a speech that he read last night for the absent President Clinton, Vice-President Gore said that there would be no tax increase.
b. *When Chomsky said that Montague grammar was a required subject for MIT linguistics students, Harry's friends could hardly keep from laughing.
c. When Macbeth said that life was a tale told by an idiot, someone in the balcony giggled.
c′. In last night's performance, in act five Macbeth said that life is a song sung by an imbecile.

The acceptability of the indirect quotations in the 'stand-in' case reflects whether an act of animation or an event of a person 'going on record' is referred to. The time adverbials of (21a, 21a′, 22a) refer to one of the events of animation involved in the stand-in delivering the speech, and they are reasonably acceptable with the stand-in as subject but not with

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the Pr as subject; by contrast, (21a″, 22a′, 22a″) refer to the event of someone going on record as saying everything in the speech, and here it is the version with Clinton as subject that is acceptable, subject to the qualification that (22a″) becomes acceptable if a context for it is created in which, as in (21a′), the sentence is interpreted as referring to an act of animation in the delivery of the speech.

In the theatrical performance examples, Macbeth is both An and Pr within the frame of the play for his various lines, whereas Hoffman exists only outside the frame of the play and does not serve as Pr for any of its lines.[14] Accordingly, Macbeth can be the subject of a verb phrase that refers to either an An's or a Pr's act, while Hoffman only can be its subject when the verb phrase refers to an An's act, not a Pr's. Even in the simple telling of stories or jokes, the teller is an An but not a Pr, and indirect quotation is inappropriate for what the teller says **in** telling the story, as contrasted with what he says **about** the story:

(23)a. *Fred said that once upon a time there were three pigs.
b. (in response to a question about the world of the story, not in telling it) Fred said that the first little pig made his house of straw.

To allow a clear distinction between what Macbeth's utterances in the canonical text of the play and his utterances in last night's performance, I have made (22c′) describe a performance that deviated from the canonical text; Macbeth remains the principal within the performance frame, notwithstanding the deviation.

The puzzling case is that of Crazy Harry's prank. The individual portrayed in the prank cannot be the subject of *say* in a context outside the deception (22b), since that person (here, Chomsky) is not a Pr outside of that frame, and whatever the condition is that allows frame boundary to be crossed in references to events in theatrical presentations, it evidently is not met in deceptions such as this one. Indirect quotations whose subject is the real-world An of the deception are sometimes acceptable, sometimes not, depending on the content of the indirect quotation. More specifically, it is sentences which equate Harry (the real-world An) with Chomsky (the

[14] Actually, it is a bit more complicated than this; the link between the domains of the play and the enactment sometimes does enable one to refer to actions of the characters in terms of the actors.

> . . . in 'The last best year' on ABC last fall, Bernadette Peters died young while befriending Mary Tyler Moore. (*New York Times Arts*, 19 May 1991)

Peters and Moore are the actors, not the characters.

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An/An/Pr within the deception) that are unacceptable: whereas (21b), in which the indirect quotation makes no reference to Chomsky is normal as a report of the prankster having made the statement in question, (21b′), which quotes a statement that would have contained the pronoun *I* and would have referred to Chomsky, is of low acceptability irrespective of whether a pronoun referring to Harry or a NP referring to Chomsky is used. However, not all reports of sentences in which Harry, masquerading as Chomsky, would have said *I* are unacceptable: *he*, with *Harry* as antecedent, is fine in reports of Harry's saying things like 'I have to hang up now, but I'll call you back later' (21b″), and it is even acceptable in sentences such as (21b‴) in which the content of the indirect quotation is the same as in the unacceptable (21b′).

I attribute the differences in acceptability noted in (21b–b⁗) to whether the roles of An and Pr are filled by what Greg Carlson (1977) calls 'individuals' or 'stages'. Carlson notes that some predicates apply to an entity thought of as perduring across time (an 'individual'), saying what that individual "is like", while others just apply to some temporal slice (a 'stage') of such an individual and say how that individual is at that particular time. For example, *blue* in (24a) is a predicate of individuals, while *red* in (24b) is a predicate of stages:

(24)a. Her eyes were blue.
b. Her eyes were red.

With respect to predicate adjectives, this distinction corresponds fairly closely to the distinction between *ser* and *estar* in Spanish, e.g., (24a–b) correspond to *Sus ojos eran azules* and *Sus ojos estaban rojos*. Many differences between the meanings of words relate to whether they are predicated of an individual or of a stage. For example, *jolly* is predicated of individuals, *glad* is predicated of stages (gladness is a temporary response to something that pleases one), and *happy* has both a sense in which it is predicated of individuals (as in the title of Milton and Rose Friedman's joint autobiography, *Two Happy People*) and one in which it is predicated of stages and is a close synonym of *glad* (*I'm happy that you can stay for dinner*).

Goffman (1974: 520–21) employed what is essentially the individual/stage distinction in his discussion of a radio show in which the reading of the credits ended with the announcer saying *And the announcer was yours truly, Don Smith*. Goffman noted that this sentence asserted a 3-way identity: 'the announcer' = 'yours truly' = 'Don Smith'. In Carlson's terms, the stages that read the credits (*yours truly*) and that did the announcing during the body of the show (*the announcer*) are stages of a

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certain perduring individual (*Don Smith*), as indicated by the brackets in (25):[15]

(25) 

I have so far been speaking as if Au, An, and Pr were always individuals, but it is worth asking whether there are speech acts in which one or more of these roles is filled by a stage rather than an individual. One well-known notion of conversational analysis is readily describable in these terms: 'fresh talk' is speech in which the Au role is filled by the various stages of the An that are involved in the animation. The Pr of a promise is an individual (in that it is that individual who is bound by the promise), while the Pr of an utterance such as *Excuse me* is probably a stage rather than an individual, since one's identity is generally immaterial to the obligation to excuse oneself for such minor offenses as brushing past someone or to what one does in fulfilling the obligation. Response cries (Oops, etc.) are another type of speech act whose Pr (to the extent that there is any) is a stage rather than an individual.

Some recent political figures have had the habit of referring to themselves by name rather than by first-person pronoun. My impression is that they do so only when referring to themselves as individuals, not when referring to their stages:[16]

(26)a. Dole: Bob Dole would never tolerate such dishonesty.
b. Dole: *Bob Dole would like another cup of coffee, please.
c. Dole: *Excuse Bob Dole.

Harry's utterance 'I have to hang up now, but I'll call you back later', reported in indirect discourse in (21b″) involves a first person pronoun that can be regarded as referring to a stage, and the identity of that stage as a stage of Harry or of Chomsky is of no particular significance; I conjecture that both occurrences of *you* in (21b″) refer to that stage and take a second person form because, from the real-world vantage point, they are stages of Harry, who is the addressee. What then about (21b‴),

[15] If he had used not the simple past but the present perfect (*And the announcer has been yours truly, Don Smith*), the announcer would have been individuating stages differently: he would then be speaking in terms of a single stage that did the announcing for the entire show, including the credits, in which case *yours truly* would be redundant (which it is not in the announcer's actual utterance).

[16] On the rhetorical effect of referring to oneself by a proper name, see Lakoff 1990: chapter 13.

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in which the content of Harry's utterance clearly relates to Chomsky as an individual and not just to a stage whose relation to an individual is immaterial? The fact that a pronoun and not a full NP is used can be accounted for on the basis of the context being logophoric: the complement purports to represent what someone said and accordingly has to use a pronoun where he used a first person pronoun in the utterances quoted. But why is the pronoun chosen so as to correspond to Harry rather than to Chomsky, and why is a pronoun allowed here but disallowed in (21b′)? My tentative answer is that (21b‴) asks about a real world event in which a stage of Harry is An, without regard to the fact that what he is animating is a statement purportedly by Chomsky that is about the individual Chomsky and not about a stage of Chomsky, whereas (21b′) is about the content of the hoax and not about an event that was part of the perpetration of the hoax.

It is considerably harder to identify clear cases in which one of the hearer roles is played by a stage rather thim an individual. One possible such case is that of response cries and exclamatives in Japanese, in which (as Makino (1983: 140) notes), only the plain form is normal:

(27)a. A! Ikenai/*Ikemasen! 'Oops'
b. A! Itai (*desu)! 'Ouch'
c. Waa, kirei da/*desu! 'Wow, what a beauty!'

The same holds true of the common calls for help and warnings:

(28)a. Tasukete kure! 'Help!' (male speaker)
save-Ptcp give-Imperative
a′. Tasukete! 'Help!' (female speaker)
a″. ??Tasukete kuremasen ka?
a‴. ??Tasukete kudasai.
b. Abunai! 'Watch out' (lit. '(It's) dangerous')
b′. ??Abunai desu!

I hesitantly conjecture that the Pr and Ad in these utterances are stages and that the social factors (relations between individuals rather than

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stages?) that would otherwise condition the use of polite forms are accordingly irrelevant.[17]

Finally, I wish to comment on the relation between Goffman's speaker roles and the levels of speech acts that J. L. Austin distinguished in *How to Do Things with Words* (1962). The informal characterization of 'Principal' quoted in (1c) makes clear that illocutionary acts in Austin's sense are the acts of a principal: it is a principal who makes or discharges commitments by saying things, or who 'goes on record' as holding some view. Austin describes a **locutionary act** as 'the act of "saying something" in the full normal sense' (1962: 94), which is evidently an act that an An performs, with the qualification that Austin describes a locutionary act as consisting of a phonetic act ('the act of uttering certain noises'), a phatic act ('the uttering of certain vocables or words . . . conforming to and as conforming to a certain grammar'), and a rhetic act ('an act of using those vocables with a certain more-or-less definite sense and reference', 1962: 95), and both Goffman's and my own use of the word 'animator' have been equivocal with regard to whether an An's act has to involve all three dimensions of an Austinian locutionary act. There are many obvious examples in which a person operates on only one or two of these dimensions of 'locution'; for example, the blind John Milton taught his daughters to read Latin and Greek texts out loud to him but left them completely ignorant of Latin and Greek vocabulary and grammar, and thus taught them to perform phonetic acts without in the process performing phatic or rhetic acts. (The fact that this texts conformed to the grammars of Greek and Latin doesn't mean that the daughters were also performing phatic acts, since that fact didn't affect what they did: they would have handled Greek and Latin gibberish exactly the same way, and indeed, from their point of view, what they were reading to their father **was** gibberish.)[18] A person who is ignorant of a foreign language but has learned the pronunciation and meaning of a few formulaic utterances in that language is performing phonetic and rhetic but not phatic acts when he uses those speech formulas. Austin in fact made very little use of his

[17] A factor contributing to the relative normalcy of (28a, a′, b) is of course the context which calls for immediate response and thus favors the use of shorter forms. Makino's (1983) account of the division of labor between plain and formal forms is in terms of informal forms being favored to the extent that the clause in question is "speaker-oriented", with the qualification that in conversations among family members and close friends, in which only plain forms are normally used, the "orientational dichotomy" between 'I' and 'you' is neutralized.

[18] Austin, though, (1962: 97) does give 'we may read a Latin sentence without knowing the meaning of the words' as an instance of a phatic act that is not also a rhetic act. I have charitably misrepresented Austin in the main text.

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notions of phonetic, phatic, and rhetic acts and was not very consistent in his use of the term 'locutionary act', which sometimes does and sometimes doesn't seem to require that the speech be addressed **to** someone,[19] so there is not much Austinian speech act theory that can be brought into a comparison of the notions of locutionary act and of Animator. However, the dimensions of 'locutionary act' that Austin distinguishes are of potential value in providing structure to the notion of 'animator'.

Goffman's notion of frame provides a means of filling one conspicuous gap in Austin's taxonomy of speech acts, that of the various acts that Austin refers to as 'non-serious' and simply dismisses. These include a broad (indeed, infinite) range of act types that are non-serious simply in virtue of involving speech embedded within a frame (which may in turn be embedded in other frames), and they readily lend themselves to description in terms of the frames and what it is that is embedded within them, such as an act of enacting in a theatrical performance an offer to exchange one's kingdom for a horse, which is distinct from the infinitely many other non-serious acts that are made up of locutionary or illocutionary acts embedded within different frames.[20]

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[19] Austin illustrated "locution" with such examples as *He said to me, 'Shoot her'*, but none of the dimensions into which he analyzes illocutionary acts includes anything corresponding to the *to me* of this example. His choice of examples suggests a conception of "locutionary act" that also involves an act of directing the utterance to addressees. I find no evidence, though, that Austin conceived of locutionary acts in a way that would take in what Clark and Carlson (1992) describe as "informative" acts: acts of adding propositions to the mutual knowledge of the ratified participants.

[20] For valuable comments on earlier versions of this paper, I am grateful to audiences at Université de Montréal, the University of Puerto Rico, the 1997 annual meeting of International Linguistic Association (Georgetown University, Washington DC), Sofia University (Tokyo), and the universities of Kobe, Poznań, Gdańsk, Toruń, and Warsaw, to two anonymous referees, and especially to Herbert H. Clark.

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