SYNTACTIC BLENDS AND OTHER MATTERS

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Explanations of transformational grammar are needed at a time when this vigorous new approach to syntax is exciting interest and winning converts. Too little is known about its procedures and terminology for some of its more advanced calculus to be intelligible to the average reader of linguistics; there are no texts designed for the complete uninitiate, and no published lists of terms or symbols. An article such as R. B. Lees's Multiply Ambiguous Adjectival Construction in English,[1] with its outline of aims and its step-by-step analysis of some familiar constructions, is opportune and welcome.

At the same time it reveals weaknesses which suggest that the transformational approach may be fated to run the same course as the phonological one which Lees's article is mainly designed to refute. The easy problems are attacked first. Being successfully overcome, they are taken as models of all the problems to be met, and the investigator becomes overconfident. One can make a convincing case for phonological grammar by selecting the data—not by being consciously selective, but by merely having one's mind so tuned to certain preconceptions that other evidence does not make its way into one's awareness. It is only when some very scrupulous and obstinate disciple begins to turn up plus junctures in the oddest places that the part of phonological grammar that depends on plus junctures begins to look suspect. The more evidence the transformational grammarian brings himself to consider, the more he is likely to find that his formulas are hedged in, the more restrictions he must apply to make them fit the evidence, and the closer he gets to the point of diminishing returns. This point may well be reached later in transformational grammar than in phonological grammar, but I doubt that it can be averted.

I want to use Lees's article to illustrate three things: a certain proneness to skimp the specimen-gathering phase of our science and to base generalizations on insufficient data, the existence of syntactic blends which make it difficult if not impossible to single out 'the' transformational origin of certain constructions, and the permeation of the entire grammatical structure by threads of idiom. Since his article is conveniently subdivided into syntactic types, I shall use this subdivision as a basis for my comments.

Type 1: *It's too humid to play*. It is curious that Lees should have admitted this type 'only with *too* plus "weather" adjectives such as *sunny, hot, cool, windy*, etc.,' in view of commonplace examples like the following:

It's too noisy to sleep.
It's too crowded to sit down.
It's too scary to go out tonight (child on Hallowe'en).
It's too stuffy in here to breathe.
It's too slippery to walk straight.

[1] *Lg.* 36.207–21 (1960).

It's too late to get there on time.
It's too muddy not to bog down.

The *it* refers to time, place, weather—any immediately obvious circumstance, and, like the origin of the 'there to be' verbs in Romance, is often tied to an adverb:

It's too hot in here to think straight = In here is too hot, etc.
It's too blurry down here (in the corner of the picture) to tell who he is = Down here is too blurry, etc.

Nor is the construction 'construed only with *too*', as Lees alleges. (Or did he intend us to infer 'only with *too* and its synonyms'?) It may be construed with any similar intensive adverb (*overly*, *unduly*, *devilishly*, *awfully*, *excessively*) implying a negative transformation in one of the source sentences:

It's terribly late to go out now.
It's pretty cold to expect the snow to melt today.

But the most telling oversight is that of limiting the construction to a main subject *it*. Not only the noun *weather* but many other nouns may serve as main subject:

The weather is too inclement to go out.
The place is too crowded to sit down.
The train is too slow (for us) to get there on time.
Monday will be too late to make connections.
January is too cold to go to Canada.
The manuscript is too messy to make out his meaning.
The times are too dangerous to go on a long tour.
Our losses are too great to buy now.

This confirms Lees's feeling that 'this special subject [*it*] is introduced directly in the kernel-generating constituent-structure grammar as an independently chosen noun', since other nouns may be chosen to fit the same construction.

Now what about the statement that this construction 'does not undergo the interrogative transformation', e.g. **What is too humid to play?* Obviously one who has not heard clearly the utterance *The auditorium was too crowded to sit down* can ask the reclamatory question *What was too crowded to sit down?* The interrogative transformation is not normally used with weather expressions (nor with any situational-*it* expression such as *It's too late to go out now*), not because it is grammatical nonsense but because it is ontological nonsense. The *it* is hardly likely to be used in the first place unless the speaker is dead certain that only one referent is possible (*it's too late* cannot refer to anything but time), and asking *what* then becomes absurdly redundant.

If a noun can be used here in place of *it*, we should be able to find an example of the triple ambiguity of Lees's *It is too hot to eat* (A 1, 4, and 5, p. 220) using such a noun. I offer the following: *Humanity is too godlike to kill*, meaning (1) 'Humanity is too godlike (for this man) to commit murder', (4) 'Humanity is too godlike (for Satan) to kill (humanity)', and (5) 'Humanity is too godlike (for humanity) to commit murder'.

I said above that a negative transformation is implied in one of the source sentences. To demonstrate this I will try to show that *not* must be introduced

earlier in the transformational history and *too* later. Consider first a generalized formula covering all three subtypes: Nom_1 is too A (for Nom_2) to VP (V + Nom_3). Type 1, $Nom_1 \neq Nom_2 \neq Nom_3$:

Prices [1] are too high (for us [2]) to buy (presents [3]).

Type 4, $Nom_1 = Nom_3$:

Rubens [1] is too ugly (for someone [2]) to paint (Rubens [3]).

Type 5, $Nom_1 = Nom_2$:

Rubens [1] is too tired (for Rubens [2]) to paint (pictures [3]).[2]

I suggest the following transformations:

Prices are high.
We do not buy (things). → Prices are too high (for us) to buy (things). = Prices are so high that we do not buy (things).

Rubens is ugly.
We do not paint Rubens. → Rubens is too ugly (for us) to paint (Rubens). = Rubens is so ugly that we do not paint him.

Rubens is tired.
Rubens does not paint (pictures). → Rubens is too tired (for Rubens) to paint (pictures). = Rubens is so tired that he does not paint (pictures).

One of the rules for this set of transformations is 'delete negative and add *too* plus infinitive' or 'retain negative and add *so* plus clause'. To show its advisability we turn to Lees's Type 8.

Type 8 (with 4 and 5): *He's splendid to wait.* There is a possible ambiguity between this type and the foregoing whenever an adverb of degree (potentially synonymous with *too*) is attached to the adjective:

You are awfully (= too) young to stay out so late.

You are awfully kind to give me all this time and attention.

Even *too* may be used in the second of these: *You are too wonderful to give me all this time and attention*, or, spreading it on thicker, *You are just too, too wonderful to give me all this time and attention.* In

You are awfully small (too small, too young) to say things like that.

You are awfully small (it is awfully small—mean-spirited—of you) to say things like that.

Lees's potential phonological signals make no distinction. The transformation which Lees gives for 8 then looks like

He is awfully splendid.
He waits. → He is awfully splendid to wait.

and the contrast with Type 5 works out:

You are small.
You should not say things like that. → You are awfully small to say things like that.

You are awfully small.
You say things like that. → You are awfully small to say (when you say) things like that.

[2] $Nom_2 = Nom_3$ is only a case of Type 1, e.g. *The water* [1] *is too cold* (*for you* [2]) *to wash* (*yourself* [3 = 2]), which is the same as *The water* [1] *is too cold* (*for you* [2]) *to wash* (*your clothes* [3]). $Nom_1 = Nom_2 = Nom_3$ is only a case of Type 5, e.g. *John* [1] *is too young* (*for John* [2 = 1]) *to kill himself* [3 = 1], the same as *John* [1] *is too young* (*for John* [2 = 1]) *to eat mushrooms* [3 ≠ 1].

in which *awfully* (*too*, etc.) appears earlier in the transformational history and is not obligatory in the case of Type 8, but appears later as the obligatory transformation of a negative in Type 5.

This solution looks all the more plausible when we consider a type that Lees omitted, which stands in a reciprocal affirmative-negative relationship with the *too* one: *You are too big to get in = You are not small enough to get in.* Dropping the negative from the latter (it is not essential to the construction—only to show the reciprocal relationship with *too*) we have a sentence like *He is small enough to get in*, which can be derived by an obligatory addition of *enough* in the generated sentence, standing to the affirmative in the source sentence in the same relationship as *too* stands in to the negative:

He is small.
He gets in. } → He is small enough to get in.

This differs from *He is awfully splendid to wait* again in that the modifier *enough*, unlike *awfully*, does not appear in the source sentence.[3]

Now we consider whether Lees's derivation of Type 8 is the best one. It relies on an *it* inversion of an abstract nominalization in *in*,

He's clever to make so much money.
It's clever of him to make so much money.
His cleverness in making so much money.

to arrive at a 'complex adjective' status for *splendid to wait*. But, quite in keeping with his assumption that 'the adjectives in this construction may be confined to those which occur as predicates to animate subjects', we can find instances where the *it*, by calling for adjectives that can also modify abstract subjects, will not serve:

You are confused to say a thing like that.
* It is confused of you to say a thing like that.
You must be angry to be saying words like that.
* It must be angry of you to be saying words like that.

(*Confused* is on the borderline; *angry* is too personal.) Conversely, the *it* inversion itself may employ adjectives that are hard to fit in a personal context:

It is unbelievable (unjustifiable, unacceptable) of you to say a thing like that.
* You are unbelievable to say a thing like that.

The *it* inversion then is not very relevant to the proof (although the fact that it is so often a reasonable transformation makes it look as if we have here to do with a personal-impersonal syntactic blend; see below, Type 7).

It is more significant that wherever we find Type 8 with an adjective, we also find a similar construction with a noun:

He's splendid to wait.
He's a prince to wait.

He's clever to make so much money.
He's a magician to make so much money.

[3] Type 5 with *enough* is a more comfortable exemplification of Lees's formula Nom_1 + be + A (too) + for + N_a (219) than *too* itself, since it does not have to contend with the discontinuity of *too* (*She is too weak for housework = She is weak too-much-for-housework, ~ She is weak enough-for-bed*).

You are foolish to spend so much.
You are a fool to spend so much.

You are wonderful to do that for me.
You are an angel to do that for me.

You are ignorant to believe that.
You are a dumbbell to believe that.

You are lucky to go.
You are a lucky fellow to go.[4]

I suggest that a more plausible transformation of *You are foolish to spend so much* is *Your spending so much makes you foolish*, in which it is not the adjective alone that is qualified by *to spend*, but the entire proposition in the other source sentence: You are foolish—when? why?—when you spend so much, as a result of spending so much.

This is the same loose relationship between the source sentences that we have in an utterance like *You wouldn't think so, to look at him* (*Your looking at him makes you not think so*). We see it clearly in the parallel

You are vile to say things like that. =
You are a stinker to say things like that. =
You stink to say things like that.

Just how loose it is can be seen in the imperative transformation, which a sentence like *You are kind enough to help*, with its closer ties between the source sentences, can readily have (*Be kind enough to help me*), but which a Type-8 sentence lacks: *You are kind to help me*, **Be kind to help me*. (We have to split into a coordination: *Be kind—help me, Be a good fellow and help me.*) One wonders how it was possible for the construction in question to become phonologically such a close-knit group. I believe that this depends at least in part on a syntactic blend of purpose and result. In the following interchange, 'What's that man's nationality?'—*He must be English to be wearing a hat like that*, it makes no difference whether we view the answer as implying result ('Only Englishmen wear hats like that, he is wearing one, therefore he is an Englishman', 'His wearing a hat like that makes him an Englishman') or purpose ('In order to be wearing a hat like that you have to be an Englishman'). The baldly 'purpose' side of this is better shown with the auxiliary *have to: You have to be an Englishman to be-*

[4] There appears to be a further restriction on these adjectives, which is that when the verb does not carry an auxiliary such as *must* and *have to* (the reason for this exception will appear), they are not only 'personal' but also 'complimentary-uncomplimentary'. Thus with the complimentary adjective *wise* we can say *You are wise to express these opinions*, but with the more neutral *literate, learned*, it is more difficult: **You are literate to express these opinions*. Similarly with *fortunate* in *You are fortunate to have all these goods*, which is a little less likely with the more neutral *rich, You are rich to have all these goods*, and becomes virtually impossible with the completely neutral *moneyed: *You are moneyed to have all these goods*. But with the auxiliary, the sentence is normal: *You must be moneyed to have all these goods*. The negatives, which are regularly uncomplimentary, are pretty free: *You are illiterate to express these opinions*.

The absence of a nominal corresponding to *right* and *wrong* proves only that there is a hole in the syntactic pattern: *You are right (wrong) to complain*, **You are a right (wrong) person to complain*.

have like that. Blend this with constructions that are evidently 'result', such as *I'm just sick to hear you can't come* ('Hearing you can't come makes me sick'), and you get a range of utterances in which the 'in order to' and 'because of' opposition is suspended: *He's clever to make so much money* ('He must be clever in order to make so much money'; 'His making so much money makes him clever'); *I was hard put to tell the difference* ('I was in trouble as a result of trying to tell the difference'; 'I was doing all I could in order to tell the difference').

But though *He is clever to make so much money* is supported by *I'm just sick to hear you can't come*, and though both admit of transformations with *make* or *because* (*His making so much money makes him clever*, *My hearing that you can't come makes me sick; Because he makes so much money he is clever*, *Because I hear the news I am sick*), they are not the same. *He is clever to make so much money* is a condensed syllogism. The *make* of the transformation is really *make out to be: His making so much money makes him out to be clever*. Classification is involved rather than cause. In *I'm just sick* etc. we are saying 'X makes you Y'. In *He is clever* etc. we are saying 'X classifies you Y, makes us infer that you are Y'. This could be shown syllogistically:

People who make money are clever.
He makes money. } → He is clever to make money.

The source sentences then could be said to differ:

He is clever.
He makes money. } → He is clever to make money.

I become sick.
I hear the news. } → I am (become) sick to hear the news.

In the latter, the verb *become* may be transformed to *be*.

So a construction that is fundamentally an enthymeme (expressing the minor premise and the conclusion of a syllogism), and is therefore so loosely hung together that it cannot take an imperative (* *Be clever to make money*), is patterned on a tighter construction (*Be grateful to hear the news*) that enjoys a high frequency. And into this is wedged a third construction, the impersonal *His making so much money is clever*—a truly complicated crossover, but one to be expected where there is as much ambiguity as there is with infinitives.

Type 7: *He's hard to convince.* Lees finds that the adjectives used in this construction are 'restricted particularly to those which occur as predicate adjectives after abstract subject nominalizations', and he instances

To convince him is hard.
He is hard to convince.
To send him is convenient.
He is convenient to send.

To prove this restriction he points out that **He is blond to send* is impossible because there is no **To send him is blond.*

But surely **He is blond to send* is ruled out by its ontological nonsense. Consider

She is ripe to kiss.
* To kiss her is ripe.

where the absurdity of the second does not affect the acceptability of the first. Lees has overlooked an extremely common type:

The food is ready to eat.[5]
She's homely to look at.
The weight is heavy to lift.
The air is frosty to breathe.
The paper is flimsy to write on.
That music is discordant to listen to.

In none of these can an impersonal transformation like **To look at her is homely* be resorted to; rather, the type noted by Jespersen (III. 11.6_9), *Any other ideal is easy of pursuit*, seems appropriate. Furthermore, even among the kind of adjectives which Lees supposes to be appropriate here there are some that work well in impersonal constructions but do not work for Type 7:

To convince that man is imperative (for us).
* That man is imperative (for us) to convince.

To convince that man is advisable (for us).
* That man is advisable (for us) to convince.

To convince that man is urgent (for us).
* That man is urgent (for us) to convince.

It turns out that Lees's Type 7 is restricted to adjectives that may be used personally as well as impersonally. He is therefore wrong in rejecting sentences like *The man is convenient.* In an interchange like 'Who'll we send?'—Oh, *John's handy* (*convenient*). *Let's send him*, the existence of *John is handy* (*convenient*) *to send* does not rule out *John is convenient.*

Also Lees is mistaken in supposing that only adjectives of the abstract-modifying kind can occur prenominally in Type 7 (p. 217). In the following, all the kinds of adjectives considered here are admissible prenominally:

He's a tough man to convince.

[5] At first glance one is sure that the reason for entering *He's ready to call* twice on p. 213 is that one instance is intended to cover the meaning of the passive transformation *He is ready to be called;* but it turns out that both are active, and the distinction is a subtler one (see fn. 7). At any rate, it could not have been Lees's intention to leave this out, since it bears the same relationship to Type 6 that Type 4 bears to Type 5, and fits the generalized grammatical rules on p. 219. Extending Type 7 to cover it, the rules would be changed to read: 'for + Nom_2' is chosen optionally for Types 4 and 7.

Probably those generalized rules should be changed still further. Consider: 'Why don't you cheer him up?'—*Everybody here is too grumpy* (*for me*) *to make any headway.* This seems to be a Type 5 sentence, yet $\mathrm{Nom}_1 \neq \mathrm{Nom}_2$. It can be taken care of by introducing a Nom_3 in the VP: *Everybody here is too grumpy* (*for me*) *to like* (*everybody*) has $\mathrm{Nom}_3 = \mathrm{Nom}_1$ and is Type 4; *Everybody here is too grumpy* (*for me*) *to make any headway* has $\mathrm{Nom}_3 \neq \mathrm{Nom}_1$.

This has repercussions in Type 1, which now becomes the same as Type 5. I have already listed numerous examples of Type 1 with impersonal noun subjects, but there is no real difference between *The weather* (*times*, etc.) *is too bad* (for us) *to hope for a settlement* and *People are too angry* (*for us*) *to hope for a settlement.*

We can make a conceptual generalization about this broader Type 5 (including 1): The subject of the infinitive is picked up from an obvious contextual clue; the obvious contextual clue is often the subject of the main verb—the latter, restricted situation is Lees's Type 5.

She's the homeliest girl to look at you ever saw.

It's a delicious appetizer to have for lunch.[6]

But I believe that Lees is right in viewing *He is hard to convince* as equivalent to *It is hard to convince him*. At least partially. For what we have here is, I think, another syntactic blend. The impersonal *It is hard to convince him* has wormed its way into the personal construction *He is homely to look at*, but not securely enough to permit a completely impersonal adjective to stand there as in **He is imperative to convince*. It is no coincidence that the adjectives that do work in this position are ones that can as readily modify the subject as the action: *He is nice to send = He is nice, Sending him is nice; He is all right to employ = He is all right, Employing him is all right; Jonathan apples are better to keep for winter = Jonathan apples are better* (when so used), *Keeping them is better; This place is dangerous to explore = This place is dangerous, Exploring it is dangerous*. And they not only potentially modify both subject and action, but do it homogeneously. Thus *To convince the man is necessary* (*for us*) and *The man is necessary* are both possible sentences, but the necessity of convincing the man has nothing to do with the necessity of the man himself, in the way that a place's being dangerous to explore is homogeneous with the danger of the place; so, **The man is necessary to convince* is inserviceable. The similar blending in *My state stands on me to defend = My state stands on me to be defended + To defend my state stands on me*, is apparent, as it is even more in the Shakespearean lapse *I will doe any man's heart good to heare me* (Jespersen III.11.6_6), which parallels the following, said by a thirteen-year-old: *Butler is hard to change his mind.*

This sort of blending is phrased by Jespersen as follows (V.17.5_1), referring to *It is easy to deceive him:* 'Next, the point of view may be shifted so that the person is made the subject: *He is easy to deceive*, in which *he* besides being the subject is also virtually the object of *deceive*. *He* may therefore also be conceived as the subject of a passive infinitive: *He is easy to be deceived*. Further, we may have a finite verb in the passive with the adjective turned into an adverb: *He is easily deceived*—and, finally, the clumsy but logical blending of these expressions: *He is easily to be deceived*.' In fact, the blend is even more complex than Jespersen supposes, for he fails to note that all but one of his examples are negative, e.g. (III.11.6_7) *Jack Rapley is not easily to be knocked off his feet ~ is not to be knocked off his feet easily*, admonitory as in *These facts are not to be taken lightly*.

There is nothing unusual in the blending of personal and impersonal. A good example is the Spanish verb *parecer:*

Parece que Juan lo oye 'It seems that John hears it'

Juan parece que lo oye 'John it seems hears it'

Juan parece oirlo 'John seems to hear it'

—the last step by confusion with *Juan parece estar enfermo* 'John looks to be sick'. The gradual progress of this intrusion of personal on impersonal is evident in that while in the third person it is generally acceptable (where there is no

[6] Jespersen (III.11.6_1f) gives examples like *His face was ghastly to see, The Boers are a hard nut to crack;* and, with noun rather than adjective, *That kisse Which is my heaven to have.*

conflict between 'it' and 'he'), in first and second it is not: **Yo parezco oirlo*. English *I can't seem to tell the difference* evidences an additional step.

It would seem that transformational grammar needs at times to recognize the possibility of more than one set of source sentences for a given construction.

Types 3 and 6: *He's free to go, He's eligible to vote*. At the beginning of his discussion of Type 6, Lees makes a statement (218) that I find puzzling: 'I have already pointed out that the adjectives of the latter [Type 3] construction are restricted to those which occur as predicates to abstract subjects.' On page 216 he gives as an example of Type 3 the sentence *He's anxious to go*, where *anxious* can hardly be such an adjective (**His going is anxious*), and on page 217 he says, by way of distinguishing Type 7 from Types 3 and 6, that 'only in the latter case (7) are the adjectives used restricted particularly to those which occur as predicate adjectives after abstract subject nominalizations.' It appears that he is confusing his Type 3 with his Type 7. After this unpromising start, I am not sure how successfully I can thread the argument, but I shall try.

The basis of the distinction between 3 and 6 is a transformation using a purpose adverbial with *for* in 6 as against no such transformation, but rather an adjectival-complement status, in 3:

(3) He's free to go. (*To go* is a complement of *be free*.)

(6) He's eligible to vote. (*To vote* = *for voting*, adverbial of purpose.)

Even with the semantic label 'purpose', using the preposition *for* makes a precarious test. One of the justifications for it (218) is the existence of an interrogative in *what ... for* as a touchstone for Type 6: *He's qualified to vote* ~ *What is he qualified for?* But it is not hard to imagine a series like the following: *He's free (at liberty)—OK; but what's he free (at liberty) fór?—I mean, what's he free (at liberty) to dó?* Compare this *for* with the *for* that might be encountered in a sentence that Lees would admit as Type 3:

He's eager to go.
He's eager for some food.
What's he eager for?

This is not the same *for* as that of *free for* and *qualified for*. The latter I think belong together, and *He is free to go* then shifts to Type 6. Whatever resistance to *for* one may note with *free*, e.g. the abnormality of * *He is free for going*, can probably be attributed to the idiom grammar, perhaps to a repulsion from *free for the asking* or *free for just sending two box tops*. I find *The trouble with this place is that there is no freedom for making up your own mind* (alongside of *freedom to make up*) a possible sentence. Furthermore, there are obvious parallels to *free* which readily take a *for* of purpose:

You are free (clear, cleared, OK) to transmit. Start transmitting.
You have clearance to transmit. Start transmitting.

You are clear (cleared, have clearance) for transmitting is as acceptable as *He is eligible for voting*.

Lees's Type 3 I think is a dumping ground, containing contrasts that are more radical than those between 3 and 6. But before trying to sort them out I want to examine some of the tests and analogies that were used to discriminate 3 and 6.

1. Lees points out that 3 is paralleled by 'a nominalization ... which preserves the ... infinitival construction intact' (215):

His ability to go ...
His freedom to go ...

But so is 6:

His eligibility to vote ...
His qualification(s) to vote ...

2. Lees mentions (218) the potential prenominal use of the adjectives of Type 6 as a discriminating trait: *He is eligible to vote* ~ *An eligible voter*. But it is also to be found in examples classed as 3:

He is welcome to visit ~ A welcome visitor
He is likely (sure) to win ~ A likely (sure) winner

and is not to be found, or is borderline, in certain constructions which if they are not Type 6 certainly bear a remarkable likeness to it:

He is eligible to vote ~ An eligible voter
He is equipped to vote ~ * An equipped voter (passes the 'for' test—*equipped for voting*)
He is prepared to vote ~ * A prepared voter (passes the 'for' test—*prepared for voting*)
He is entitled to vote ~ * An entitled voter (does not pass the 'for' test—* *entitled for voting*)

The adjective *willing* fails the *for* test: * *She is willing for working;* but it passes the prenominal test: *a willing worker*. One of the *Century's* quotations couples it with *apt*, which Lees classes (218) as 3: *I shall be willing, if not apt, to learn* (but this is probably the older sense of *apt*, which would pass the *for* test and the prenominal test: *apt for learning, an apt learner*). And with the adjective *ready*, which is split between 3 and 6,[7] it is the meaning that corresponds more closely

[7] Two meanings are assigned to *He is ready to go:* 'He agrees to go' and 'He has prepared for going'. A better analogy for the first might be 'He is willing (disposed) to go' and for the second 'He is readied to go (for going).'

I recognize the distinction, but I distrust any test based on something as slippery as the preposition *for*, even when qualified as a 'purpose-adverbial'. I am not convinced that the three constructions which Lees relates to the purpose-adverbial are all fundamentally alike in this respect or even that we have here to do with one and the same *for*. Compare *She is ripe to kiss* and *He is too old to send*. She is not ripe 'in order' to be kissed; she is ripe 'and therefore' kissable. He is not too old 'in order' to be sent; he is too old 'and therefore' unsendable. Even less can we say that in *She's rather tall to be only twelve years old* (presumably Type 5: *too tall, pretty tall, awfully tall*) there is any implied purpose-adverbial. She is not tall 'in order to be' or 'for being' twelve years old; she is tall *for* one so young—*for* here is a 'standard of comparison'.

At the other extreme we have *He is trained to swim*, based on a verb whose purpose associations are obvious: he is trained in order to swim, for swimming. *He is qualified to swim* exhibits this still to a certain extent. So do *He is readied to go, He is capacitated (habilitated) to vote*. But as we go a step farther it begins to fade. The 'towardness' of the purpose is weakened. From *They forced him to swim* (~ *They forced him to the wall*) and *They trained him to swim* (*They trained him to, toward, for swimming*) we move to a *for* that indicates little more than a kind of 'relatedness' (*eligible to vote, for voting = eligible in-respect-of*

to 3 rather than the one corresponding to 6 that fits when *ready* is used prenominally: *He is ready to work* ~ *A ready worker, one willing to work, agreeable to working.*

3. Lees rejects, for Type 3, an analysis in terms of complex adjectivals like *delighted with, happy about, sure of* (215), 'with subsequent automatic ellipsis of the preposition before nominalization (as is required elsewhere in the grammar anyway)'. Among the reasons for this he adduces one adjective, *welcome*, which does not take a gerundive nominal, **He is welcome to going*, and two others, *unhappy* and *skeptical*, which take such nominals readily but do not take the infinitive. Here there is first the question of whether what may be merely a chance hole in the syntactic pattern ought to be taken so seriously. That there are such holes, with a constant tendency to fill them, is easy to show.[8]

Second there is the more trivial fact that two of Lees's three examples are not restricted as he pictures them. *Unhappy* can take an infinitive complement: *He is unhappy to go.* And *welcome* in **He is welcome to going* is probably in part ontological nonsense, for there are acceptable, though rare, combinations of *welcome* and gerundive nominals. For example, A has just been crudely insulted

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voting), and then disappears altogether: *He is habilitated to vote* passes to *He is able to vote*, which Lees classes explicitly as Type 3 (215).

We can approach the purpose-adverbial question from another direction, related to the Type-3 *sure*. In *Be careful (wary, watchful, alert, vigilant, on guard, on your toes) to grab the first opportunity* we clearly have an 'in order to grab', 'for grabbing' association. It passes both the *what ... for* and the prenominal tests: *a watchful grabber, What should I be watchful for?* It is like *ready* in its Type-6 'prepared' sense. But it is also like *sure: Be careful not to forget, Be sure not to forget.* Here the *for* has faded somewhat (*I'll be careful—sure—to ask your permission* = 'will ask your permission', not 'will be careful so as to ask it'). The kinship with *sure* is revealed in the assimilation of both to a kind of complex verbal related to *not to fail, not to neglect*, as *be eager* is related to *want*. It is also revealed in the imperative by the fact that both *sure* and *careful* may replace the infinitive with a conjunction: *Be sure to tell me, Be sure and tell me; Be careful not to fall, Be careful and don't fall.* If anything else is needed to show the haziness of the 3–6 borderline, we note that while *He is alert to grab the first opportunity* may be viewed as 'in order to grab, for grabbing', *He is alert to help* is more like *He is anxious (eager) to help*—Type 3. Do we have the same *for* in *qualified to vote (for voting, as-regards voting)* and *alert to grab (for grabbing; as-regards grabbing)*?

From yet another direction we have a purposive *for* in *These fins are useful (usable, good, perfect) to swim (with)* (pronominal test impossible) and *These facts are excellent to prove your point (with) (excellent proofs).*

The *for* associations of Type 6 strike me as gradient.

[8] It is an accident that we can say *He chose to wait* or *He elected to wait* but not **He selected to wait* nor **He picked to wait.* It is likewise an accident that *to be sorry* can readily take infinitive complements for either present or past action, while *to regret* finds it more difficult: *I am sorry to be (to have been) the cause of your distress, I regret to be* etc., **I regret to have been* etc., where *I regret having been* is preferred.

Some instances of hole-filling that I have gathered: *Mother suggested me to write* (ten-year-old girl). *The criminal courts hesitate committing mentally ill people* (Los Angeles Daily News, 7 Jan. 1953, p. 40). *By demanding the employee to swear he does not belong to organizations on the Attorney General's list ..., the Oklahoma legislature failed ...* (*Civil liberties* 108.1, Jan. 1953). *To aid an ex-convict get a job* ('Maisie' radio program, 22 Mar. 1946). It is no coincidence that these are all crossovers involving *-ing* and the infinitive. The presence of a certain degree of idiomizing—which encourages the analysis that Lees rejects—is evident in pairs like *determined to go* ~ *insistent on going, his courage to say no* ~ *his bravery in saying no, reluctance to go* ~ *resistance to going.*

behind his back and is taking it lying down, and B, disgusted with the whole business, says *Well, you are welcome to having people insult you behind your back, but I want none of it.*[9]

I should like now to try to unravel the 3–6 complex, starting with the construction that is farthest off center.

1. A PASSIVE BRIDGE. In the following,

He is condemned to suffer.
He is forced to suffer.
He is compelled to suffer.
He is destined to suffer.

we recognize an obvious active transformation, *We condemn him to suffer* (with other nominals often possible: *We condemn him to jail*). On the other hand, in

He is destined to suffer.
He is bound to suffer.

the active transformation has been weakened in the first (*We destine him to suffer* is unusual) and has disappeared in the second (**We bind him to suffer*). This is a bridge that ties in a small group of adjectives that are probably to be analyzed, at the extreme, as modifiers of an abstract nominal. Note the parallel in

He is bound to suffer.
He is sure (certain) to suffer.

(Lees implies, 215 top, that *sure* is a Type-3 adjective.) Now *He is sure* (*certain*) *to suffer* has no counterpart in **He is positive* (*definite*) *to suffer*. The transformation *His suffering is sure* (*certain, positive, definite*) or *It is sure* (*certain, positive, definite*) *that he will suffer* marks *sure* as a modifier of the abstract nominal.

The gradient of impersonal to personal can be seen in a series of steps:

* He is definite to suffer	~	It is definite that he will suffer
He is sure to suffer	~	It is sure that he will suffer
He is likely to suffer	~	It is likely that he will suffer
He is apt to suffer	~	* It is apt that he will suffer
He is liable to suffer	~	* It is liable that he will suffer

But though *likely, apt,* and *liable* are all personal modifiers, their depersonalization is evident as a result of blending across this pattern (*He is apt to get caught* ~ *It is apt to happen that he will get caught*). The *Century dictionary* says of *likely:* 'it may express mere external probability or chance: as, he is *likely* to come at any moment.' And *liable* has long been a target of normative grammarians for the kind of depersonalization represented by *He is liable to come.*

Where personal adjectives are pulled into the impersonal orbit, the opposite also occurs. *He is sure to suffer* verges on the more personal *He is bound* (*fated*) *to suffer* (cf. *Century* s.v. *bound*[3], def. 5); and the latter, across the passive bridge,

[9] That is, *You are welcome to this* (*business of*) *having people* etc. A real insult has been delivered, and the gerundive, which is favored in 'real' contexts, is preferred to the infinitive, which is more hypothetical. Compare *I like playing golf*—uttered while actually playing, and *I like to play golf*—uttered at home; or *I'm afraid to do it wrong*—no real action necessarily contemplated, and *I'm afraid of doing it wrong*—real action probably contemplated. The example with *welcome* proves that stripping a sentence to its minimum—**He is welcome to going*—is a risky test of grammaticality; it often falsifies the potentialities of the construction.

verges on *He is bound and determined to suffer*, which I think qualifies as central to Lees's 'adjectival complement'.

The adjectives *prone*, *loth*, and the like show a similar stepwise relationship to the passive:

I am forced (led, induced, etc.) to agree with you. (Active transformations normal: *They force me to agree with you.*)

I am inclined (disposed, disinclined) to agree with you. (Active transformations less usual: *They incline me to agree with you.*)

I am minded to agree with you. (No active transformation.)

I am prone (loth, fain, willing, unwilling, reluctant, hesitant) to agree with you.[10]

Similarly with the *-ed* words of 'custom':

I am inured (hardened) to accept reverses. (Circumstances harden me.)

I am accustomed (wont, used) to accept reverses.[11]

Similarly with *worthy:*

I am authorized (equipped) to accept.

I am entitled (well endowed) to accept.

I am qualified (fitted, suited, unsuited) to accept.

I am worthy (unworthy, fit, unfit, competent, incompetent) to accept.[12]

And with *right*, *wrong*, *perfect*, *fine*, etc.:

John is approved to do that job for us.

John is just right to do that job for us.

And with *able*, *unable:*

I am empowered to act.

I am licensed to act.

I am able (unable, helpless, powerless) to act.

And also with emotions, though there is a more important crossover from another direction (see below):

I am urged to leave immediately.

I am pressed (hard-pressed, hell-bent) to leave immediately.

I am anxious to leave immediately.

It is hard to overlook the high degree of uniformity here in what might be called the 'internalization of an external force'.

A further passive-based adjective is *due:*

He was scheduled (expected) to speak at ten o'clock.

He was supposed to speak at ten o'clock.

He was due to speak at ten o'clock.

2. ADVERB TURNED ADJECTIVE. A second blending of personal and impersonal is seen in the following:

He was quick to react.

[10] The idiomizing of these individual words is seen in the accidental fact that *reluctant to agree* is normal, **averse to agree* is not. Cf. also *I am inclined to accept*, *I am resigned to accepting*, where the *-ing* is favored for an inevitable, 'real' act.

[11] *People have been used to trust the past as a guide* (Barbara Deming in *The nation*, 17 Dec. 1960, p. 471). I would say *used to trusting*. With *accustomed*, my dialect wavers.

[12] Note the blend with *ready* in *He's fit to explode*.

He was slow to react.
He was prompt to react.

These have transformations of the shape *He reacted slowly, His reacting (reaction) was slow.* The modifier of the abstract nominal is picked up and attached to the person, on the model of the personal *He was apt to react* and *He was (the) first (last) to react,* which in turn has the transformation *He was the last who reacted.*

3. Emotions. Here we have a crossover of a different kind, one that has already been touched upon in the discussion of Type 8: *I'm sick (surprised) to hear you can't come ~ Hearing you can't come makes me sick (surprised; sickens, surprises me).* Other examples: *He was indignant (angry, incensed, furious, sorry, glad, happy) to have been treated like that.* A small step away from these instances of 'result' (*Being treated like that gladdened him*) is the type *I'm glad to go—let's be on our way,* where there is no result. Here cluster adjectives that lend themselves to 'futurity', to the notions of 'reaching out for' and 'holding back from'—welcoming and rejecting:[13]

He's eager (tense, anxious, keen, on edge) to begin.
I'm crazy[14] (hungry, greedy, mad, lustful, thirsty) to find out.[15]
I'm afraid (scared, apprehensive) to learn the truth.

Proud (ashamed) balances on the edge of 'result' and 'futurity': *I'm proud to admit it.*

A number of constructions converge here. First, there is the model of *I want (yearn, long, burn, pine) to go.* When put in the progressive (as some, such as *burn,* normally are), these pick up *-ing* forms that draw close to adjectives:

I yearn to find out	~	I am yearning to find out
I burn to find out	~	I am burning to find out
		I am dying to find out
		I am wild to find out
I dread to hear the news	~	I am dreading to hear the news
I quail to hear the news	~	I am shaking to hear the news
		I am afraid to hear the news

Second, there is a blend of active with attitudinal subject. In the 'result' type (*He fumed, he was just boiling, he was angry to hear you couldn't come*), the subject is attitudinal. In the 'future' type (*I am just bubbling all over to tell you the news*) it is active. A crossover is facilitated by the double role of many verbs (*I rejoice—regret—to hear that you got that job; I rejoice—regret—to go*). The similarity here with verds that are normally transitive (*want, desire, yearn, fear:* cf. *I want to be loved ~ I want affection*), and whose subjects are accordingly in active roles, is hard to escape. The pattern that the latter impose is a normal actor-action one, the same that through a similar syntactic blending reversed the role of the

[13] Compare the backward-looking *angry to be going (the previously laid plan to go angers me)* with the forward-looking *glad to go.*

[14] In *He is crazy to do that* there is an ambiguity with Type 8: *He's eager to do that* vs. *Doing that classifies him as crazy.*

[15] Note again the idiomizing of certain adjectives: *I am eager to learn the truth,* but not (at least in my speech—for contrary evidence see Jespersen V.13.6$_2$) **I am desirous (hopeful) to learn the truth; I am curious to find out* but not **I am inquisitive to find out.*

the verb *like*. The result is the blending of attitudinal, ultimately passive subjects (*I am sick to hear the news* ~ *Hearing the news sickens me*) with active ones (*I want to hear the news, I am anxious to hear the news*), because they occupy the same spot in the sentence.[16] Emotions are prone to this: a sentence like *He was mad at me* (angry as a result of something I had done? projecting his anger upon me?) casts the subject in a similar ambiguous role. So two sentences like *I was puzzled to have been treated that way* and *I was puzzled to know what they meant* differ by just the shade that the latter suggests a forward-looking effort, i.e. an active subject, which moves fully into the open with *I was curious to know what they meant*, virtually *I sought to know what they meant*. As a number of examples have shown, it is not unusual for the same verb to function both ways: cf. *I was concerned to find out that you had been ill* vs. *I was concerned to find out who had been ill*.

Finally, in all these types there is a push from the passive voice by way of a confusion of external and internal causes. In *I am heartened to believe in you* there is pure result: *Believing in you heartens me*. But in *I am encouraged to believe in you* we may have result or we may have cause (*People encourage me to believe in you*), and the cause may be internalized (*My impressions of you encourage me to believe in you*). A sentence like *I am coaxed to believe in you* can have only an external cause; but *I am persuaded to believe in you* can have either an external or an internal cause, and the internal cause is only a step from *I am prone to believe in you*, where the shift from participle to adjective is complete.

The upshot is a partial or complete personalization of a variety of types which at the periphery are not personal. Even something normally as impersonal as *sure* can be personalized:

> You'll be sure to get caught ~ You are sure to get caught ~ It is sure that you will get caught, vs.
>
> Will you be sure to help me? (less like *Is it sure that you will help me?* than like *Will you guarantee to help me?*)[17]

From the notion of something imposed on the actor by his environment, we move (and there are all degrees of it) to a notion of a power within the actor radiated on his environment.

It is our awareness of this central body of complex blends that motivates us, I believe, to set up a Type 3—just as Jespersen (V.17.2) groups all of them (and more) as 'the infinitive of specification'; but the class is not revealed through a manipulation of erratic gerundive nominals or prepositions, where incongruities

[16] Jespersen (V.13.6$_2$) proposes a similar treatment: *He desires to go* → *He is desirous to go* → *He is anxious (eager, curious) to go*.

F. C. Tarr extensively documents a similar blending in Spanish, in Prepositional complementary clauses in Spanish, with special reference to the works of Pérez Galdós, *Revue hispanique* 129.1–264 (1922).

[17] One can imagine a reply to this, responded to with *You don't sóund very sure*. Yet there is still some difference between this and the more personal *guarantee*. In the latter, the *will* can be the voluntary *will*, e.g. *Will you guarantee right now to help me tomorrow?*, but not in the former: **Will you be sure right now to help me tomorrow?*—the *will* here is still futurity in *Will you be sure to help me tomorrow?* ~ *Is it sure that you will help me tomorrow?* But we feel the two to be closer together than this impersonal transformation suggests.

like *able to speak, capable of speaking* are commonplace. And as for Type 6, I do not see how we can distinguish it: *He is qualified and worthy to vote* matches a 6 and a 3;[18] and the 3 *He is sorry to leave* is less like the 3 *He is free to leave* than the latter is like the 6 *He is qualified to leave*.

CONCLUSION. The distinctive trait of generative grammar is its aim to be an ACTIVE portrait of grammatical processes. It departs from traditional grammar, which consists chiefly in the MAPPING of constructions. How much actual invention, on this model, really occurs in speech we shall know only when we have the means to discover how much originality there is in utterance. At present we have no way of telling the extent to which a sentence like *I went home* is a result of invention, and the extent to which it is a result of repetition, countless speakers before us having already said it and transmitted it to us in toto. Is grammar something where speakers 'produce' (i.e. originate) constructions, or where they 'reach for' them, from a preestablished inventory, when the occasion presents itself? If the latter, then the MATCHING technique of traditional grammar is the better picture—from this point of view, constructions are not produced one from another or from a stock of abstract components, but filed side by side, and their interrelationships are not derivative but mnemonic—it is easier to reach for something that has been stored in an appropriate place. Probably grammar is both of these things, but meanwhile the transformationist cannot afford to slight the spectrum of utterances which are first of all the raw material of his generalizations and last of all the test of their accuracy.

Furthermore, the 'activity' of generative grammar is an activity between coordinates, themselves inactive. One goes from Voice A to Voice B and back again, but nothing happens to either voice. A grammar that hopes to reflect the creativity in language should not overlook the genuinely active zones where the coordinates themselves are yielding—not in a diachronic sense, but dynamically, here and now. These are syntactic blends. By selecting an area of multiple ambiguity,[19] Lees put himself in a veritable hotbed of them.

[18] If these were really disparate constructions, we would be averse to putting them in the same slot. Note also that *worthy* fails Lees's 'for' test: **He is worthy for voting;* this should put it in 3 rather than 6, as does also the fact that *He is a worthy voter* (the prenominal test) has nothing to do with his worth as a voter, in the way that *He is a qualified voter* has to do with his qualifications as a voter.

[19] As a curiosity I offer this sextuple ambiguity, covering all but 3 (and 6) of Lees's types: *But it's so damned glorious to yield!:* 1. It's too glorious a day for us to admit defeat. 2. Yielding is glorious. 4. The thing is too glorious for us to give it up. 5. The thing is too glorious for it to stoop to admitting defeat. 7. It lends itself so gloriously to our yielding it. 8. It (the enemy nation) is so glorious in yielding (to our demands) (It is so glorious of it to etc.).