SOME REASONS WHY THERE CAN'T BE ANY *some–any* RULE

ROBIN LAKOFF

University of Michigan

This paper presents evidence that semantic notions—such as presupposition, speaker's and hearer's beliefs about the world, and previous discourse—must be taken into account in a complete treatment of the distribution of *some* and *any* in conditional, negative, and interrogative sentences. Syntactic conditions alone will not account for the fact that, in certain sentence types, the two forms occur with different meanings.

In his article on negation in English, Klima (1964) proposed a rule that has been accepted more or less unquestioningly into the pantheon of known transformational rules of English syntax. This rule was called 'Indefinite incorporation': it took structures containing a form of the quantifier *some* and, obligatorily in certain specified environments (particularly in negatives and questions), turned these instances of *some* to *any*:

(1) $[\text{NEG}]_{\text{PvP}}\ X - \text{QUANT} \Rightarrow \text{neg} - X - \text{INDEF} + \text{QUANT}$

INDEF + QUANT was later rewritten as *any*. This was the earliest and fullest discussion in transformational grammar of the alternations found in English between these quantifiers, and was the first transformational treatment of the differences in quantification in *some*-environments and in *any*-environments. Later work has extended the knowledge of those environments in which *any* is found: they are summarized in 2. Note that the asterisks are put in according to Klima's formulation.

(2) *Any*-environments:

(a) Negatives: John has *some* money.
John doesn't have *any* money.
*John doesn't have *some* money.

(b) Questions: John has *some* money.
Does John have *any* money?
*Does John have *some* money?
Who has *any* money?
*Who has *some* money?

(c) Conditionals: If John has $\left\{\begin{matrix} any \\ *some \end{matrix}\right\}$ money, he is lucky.

(d) Comparatives: John has more money than $\left\{\begin{matrix} anyone. \\ *someone. \end{matrix}\right\}$

(e) *Too:* John is too poor to buy $\left\{\begin{matrix} anything. \\ *something. \end{matrix}\right\}$

(f) *Only:* Only John would speak to $\left\{\begin{matrix} anyone \\ *someone \end{matrix}\right\}$ so nastily.

(At least some speakers find some of the starred sentences grammatical. This will be discussed below.)

The facts, then, as stated by Klima and amended by other linguists later, were generally accepted: (1) There was a transformational rule that, in certain spe-

cific environments, changed the form that would eventually become *some* to a form which would ultimately appear as *any*. (2) The application of this rule was dependent purely on syntactic factors within the sentence itself, identifiable in the superficial form of the sentence. (3) Since the occurrence of *some* and *any* was predicted by the application or non-application of a transformational rule, there could be no difference in meaning between sentences containing *some* and those containing *any* that was due solely to the appearance of one or the other of these quantifiers. (Of course, there might be differences in meaning caused by the presence of negatives, questions, etc., in one type and not in the other.)

Recently, however, I have come across facts involving sentence types where *some* and *any* are found in identical syntactic environments. The existence of some of these sentence types has been known for some time; the assumption has been that the indefinite incorporation rule had to be revised slightly, to make it optional in a few environments, rather than always obligatory. The further assumption then had to be made that, since *any* was still thought to be produced transformationally from structures containing *some*, the meaning of sentences containing one was identical to that of sentences containing the other. Some examples can be given to show the types of phenomena under consideration:

(3) Questions:
  (a) Who wants some beans?
      Who wants any beans?
  (b) Do you think those men want to do some work?
      Do you think those men want to do any work?
  (c) I wonder if Bill would lend me some money.
      I wonder if Bill would lend me any money.[1]

(4) Conditional sentences:
  (a) If you eat some candy, I'll whip you.
      If you eat any candy, I'll whip you.

[1] The *any* in sentences like the above, as well as in other examples throughout the paper, should not be confused with another, quite different, use of *any*. The *any* in all my examples is unstressed; the other *any*, which occurs considerably more freely, always has heavy stress: it has the meaning 'any at all', and is contrasted with *none*. The use of *any* which I am discussing here does not contrast with *none*, nor does it have the emphatic meaning 'any at all'; it means, rather, 'a given quantity'. Thus compare the sentences in 3c, the first containing unstressed *some*, the second unstressed *any*, with the sentence *I wonder if Bill would lend me ány money*, which differs markedly from the sentences of 3c with respect to the environments in which it can be used. So, for instance, let us suppose that a speaker has first said: *I know Bill wouldn't be crazy enough to lend me a thousand dollars*. The idea here is that a thousand dollars is a great deal of money, more than it would be reasonable to ask for. Which of the sentences we have been discussing can follow this, normally? Surely neither of the sentences of 3c; if anything, they would precede the sentence just given, since it makes the assumption that Bill might, perhaps, lend the speaker SOME money. But the sentence with the stressed *any* might well be used here. Facts like this show that the stressed *any* is quite different in its use from the unstressed *any;* they should not be considered to be related to each other any more closely than the stressed *some* is to the unstressed *some*. In both these cases, there may indeed be a relationship; but it is not clear at present what it is, nor even that one definitely exists. Certainly, however, the unstressed *any* is closer in meaning to the unstressed *some* than it is to the stressed *any* (similarly for stressed/unstressed *some*), despite the fact that the morphological similarity is in the opposite direction.

(b) If you eat some spinach, I'll give you ten dollars.
If you eat any spinach, I'll give you ten dollars.
(c) Unicorns are mythical beasts: if John sees some unicorns out there, I'll eat my hat.
Unicorns are mythical beasts: if John sees any unicorns out there, I'll eat my hat.
(d) If John sees some goldfish in that tank, it's not surprising: there are lots of them in there.
If John sees any goldfish in that tank, it's not surprising: there are lots of them in there.

In each of these pairs of sentences, it is obvious that the two members differ in meaning.[2] Yet the only surface difference between the sentences is that in the first member of each pair, the quantifier is *some*; in the second, *some* has been replaced by *any*. Thus, in 3a, the first question usually is an invitation to have some beans: the speaker assumes that someone will want them. The second is very frequently an expression of scorn, not spoken by the person offering the beans, but by someone to whom they are offered. If it is being spoken by the person offering the beans, the interpretation is generally that he feels it is unlikely anyone will want any, or at least that he does not assume anyone will. The first of these questions, then, assumes a 'yes' answer; the speaker would probably be disconcerted at a refusal. The second assumes either a negative answer (the speaker might well be surprised if someone accepted his offer), or makes no assumption.

Similarly with 3b, the first question is likely to be used as a prefatory remark before going to the men and offering them work. It may well be followed by some sentence like ... *because my road needs to be repaired.* The assumption is that the

[2] My use in this paper of the terms 'same in meaning' or 'synonymous', and their opposites, differs rather sharply from the use of these terms in traditional philosophical and linguistic literature. It is generally assumed in such writings that two utterances are synonymous if and only if they are identical in truth value: that is, if one is true in a given set of circumstances, the other must also be true in those circumstances. Conversely, two utterances are considered to be not synonymous if and only if an environment can be found in which one is true and the other not true. In dealing with the complexities of sentences such as the ones in this paper, I have come to believe that this traditional definition is neither necessary nor sufficient as a condition of synonymy. There are cases where I doubt that an environment could ever be found so that one sentence was true and the other false, but still we would want to consider the pair, in a very real and significant sense, different in meaning. This is of course true for all questions and conditionals, which cannot be falsified in any case: for virtually all of the examples in this paper, some new definition of synonymy must be found. I feel that, for these purposes at any rate, one must consider those sentences synonymous that could be used, with the same truth value, IN IDENTICAL ENVIRONMENTS; and, of course, two sentences will not be synonymous under other conditions. Therefore, though traditionally the sentences of 3a would be considered synonymous, under this new definition they are not—since, as will be explained below, they cannot both be used in the same environment. If one uses the first sentence of the pair rather than the second in certain situations, confusion and misunderstanding will result, much as if a sentence had been used that under the traditional usage was not 'synonymous'. Unless this new treatment of synonymy is adopted, insoluble problems will arise for linguists who attempt to deal with sentences like these.

men DO want to work. In the second, however, the assumption either is that the speaker doesn't know how the men feel about working and doesn't particularly care; or, perhaps more likely, that he doesn't really think they want to work. It would be strange to follow the second of these two sentences by ... *because my road needs to be repaired.* It might, on the other hand, be followed quite naturally by ... *because they've been standing around all morning telling dirty jokes.*

In 3c, the speaker is about to go to Bill to ask for money; he is reasonably confident that he will get it, and might follow the question with some remark about what he intends to do with the money when he gets it: *Then I can buy that new Beatle record.* But in the second sentence, he is less certain: it might be followed by an explanation of why he expects to be refused: *I already owe him a thousand dollars.* To exchange the two explanatory sentences in these cases would create two very odd utterances. Thus I conclude that in sentences of this type, at least, there is some difference in meaning between those containing *some* and those containing *any*. Those with *some* involve a positive feeling on the speaker's part about the action described; those with *any*, a neutral or negative attitude.

Distinctions are also found between conditional sentences of these two types. In 4a, the first sentence could, I think, only be spoken to someone who wanted to be whipped. The speaker in the second sentence, which is much more normal, makes the assumption that the hearer does not want to be whipped: this is a punishment. With *any*, the interpretation of the sentence is that the speaker does not want the hearer to eat the candy. Hence it matches up correctly with the apodosis, a threat of punishment. With *some*, the interpretation is that the speaker wants the hearer to eat the candy; hence the apodosis can't be interpreted as a punishment. The sentence can be interpreted as meaningful only if there is an implication of perversion on the part of one of the persons involved.

In 4b, on the other hand, just the opposite is true. The first sentence is the normal one; it assumes that the person addressed wants ten dollars, as most people would, and is offering a reward for doing something the speaker wants him to do. In the second sentence, the only possible interpretation is that, for some reason, the person addressed does not want to receive ten dollars, and that this sentence is a threat, parallel to the second sentence of 4a.

It should be noted in passing that these sentences are related to other superficially more complex types, e.g.:

(5a) I warn you that, if you eat $\left\{\begin{matrix}\text{any}\\ \text{*some}\end{matrix}\right\}$ candy, I'll whip you.

(5b) I promise you that, if you eat $\left\{\begin{matrix}\text{some}\\ \text{*any}\end{matrix}\right\}$ candy, I'll give you ten dollars.

In these sentences, only one member of each pair is grammatical, assuming the usual meanings of *warn* and *promise*. The grammatical sentences are those that correspond, with respect to the choice of *some* or *any*, to the 'normal' interpretations of 4a and 4b. In 5, the choice of which sentence is grammatical is dictated by the meaning of the main verb of the sentence, whether *promise* or *warn*. In 4a and 4b, no such verb appears in the superficial structure; yet in each case the meaning of one or the other is there, and the quantifier that goes with the real verb of that meaning also goes along with the meaning of the sentence without

the verb. It is difficult to see how this could be predicted—how both the meaning and the syntactic properties could be accounted for together, and the generalization achieved—without performative abstract verbs, operating in 4a and 4b, parallel to real performative verbs in 5a and 5b: cf. Lakoff 1968, Ross 1969.

To return to 4, similar things are happening in 4c and 4d; namely, the beliefs or expectations of the speaker are reflected in his choice of *some* or *any*, and the meaning of the sentence is correspondingly changed. The two sentences of 4c are not interchangeable, nor are those of 4d. Thus I would claim that, given the normal interpretations of the words involved, only the second of the two sentences of 4c is likely to be found, the form with *any*. The first sentence, containing *some*, is very strange. The speaker appears to be stating that he does not believe that there are unicorns outside; but at the same time, because of his use of *some*, he seems to be making the tacit presupposition that there are, in fact, unicorns outside. Just the opposite would be true in 4d. Here, if *some* is used, the presupposition matches the explicit statement: the speaker assumes the presence of goldfish in the tank. If *any* is used, on the other hand, the presupposition does not match, and confusion results.[3]

The examples I have given seem to show that the choice between *some* and *any*, in certain types of sentences, depends on factors other than simply the superficial syntactic configuration in which the quantifier is found. In questions of certain types, the use of *some* implies that the speaker hopes for, or at least anticipates, a positive answer; the use of *any* implies the expectation of a negative answer, or at least a neutral feeling on the part of the speaker. In conditions, we must distinguish between cases like 4a and 4b, on the one hand, and 4c and 4d on the other. The first two are not real conditionals: they are, rather, threats or promises. In these, again, the emotional bias of the speaker comes into play, in the choice between *some* and *any*. A threat goes with *any*, since usually someone threatens someone else to prevent an undesired action; a promise goes with *some*, for a similar reason. In 4c and 4d, the hopes of the speaker are not relevant; what is relevant are the speaker's beliefs about the world—specifically, about whether or not the thing referred to exists, or whether the act he is describing actually was performed. In this way, something that is present only at the most abstract levels of grammar must play a part in determining the form which surface structures must take. In these cases, too, when *some* is used, the presup-

[3] Further support for this claim can be found by examining one peculiar type of conditional sentence—namely, the *if only* construction seen in examples such as: *If only John were here, I'd feel happier; If Bill had only behaved decently, he wouldn't have been arrested.* As these examples show, when *if only* is used, the speaker always hopes or wishes that the situation described in the protasis will be or had been true: that is, his attitude toward it must be positive. (In other conditional sentences, his attitude may be positive, negative, or neutral.) Since this is so, we should expect, under the analysis I have proposed, that only *some*, and never *any*, could be found in the protasis of *if only* conditions. This is, in fact, precisely the case:

If only John had said {something / *anything} we'd know what was going on.

If {someone / *anyone} would only explain the theory of relativity to me, I could pass the test easily.

position is necessarily positive; when *any* appears, it may be negative or neutral. Therefore, to handle in an intuitively correct way the sorts of phenomena we have been dealing with, rather than using an indefinite incorporation rule similar to Klima's, we would want to do the following: In the semantic representation, sentences of these types, as indeed of various other types, should be marked to indicate the presuppositions of the speaker. Whether this would be done by assuming separate sentences (e.g. *I hope this S is true*, or *I believe that the subject of this sentence is true*), or in another way, is not clear; but it would be necessary to represent these presuppositions and hopes somehow in the semantic representation. Thus, in superficial syntactic environments of the sort discussed by Klima, there are correlations of *some* with what I have called a positive presupposition, and of *any* with a negative or neutral presupposition. If there is a rule determining the distribution of *some* and *any*, it must take these presuppositions into account.

Presuppositions of the sort I have been discussing are, of course, to be found in English sentences that do not contain quantifiers as well as in those that do; but for no obvious reason, only the latter sort of sentence OVERTLY expresses the presupposition. As I will mention later, other languages express similar presuppositions in quite different ways, and are apparently thus enabled to express these presuppositions in a wider range of sentence types.

It is also worth remarking here that, of the most familiar *any*-environments, it is only the negative that never occurs with *some*; while in questions and conditions, as has been shown, both *some* and *any* may occur. Therefore, sentences like the following, which would be analogous to the *some*-sentences in 3 and 4, are never found:

(6a) *Nobody has seen someone.

(6b) *John has never done something.

This seems to be in accordance with the interpretation above. Questions and conditions may take either positive or negative presuppositions; the proposition mentioned may be presupposed to be either true or false, the act may either be presupposed to have been performed or not. Hence either *some* or *any* is possible. But with a negative, there can be no positive presupposition. One cannot presuppose that an act took place while asserting that it did not. Hence, as we would predict, here alone *some* is impossible.

There are various apparent counter-examples, which can also be explained:

(7a) Why hasn't John done something to end the war?

(7b) John never does something until you ask him to.

In both of these, there is a negative followed by *some*. But neither of these sentences is a typical case of negation. In 7a, the speaker is assuming that John ought to have done something to end the war. Compare the following with 7a:

(8) Why hasn't John done anything to end the war?

An anticipated answer to 8 might be, for instance, a defense of John's inaction: *He hasn't done anything because he is too busy selling dirty buttons*, or the like. But this is not an ANTICIPATED answer to 7a, though it is a POSSIBLE answer. Thus, in questions of this type, *some* may occur simply because, though there is a

negative present, a positive presupposition exists: note that 7b is impossible without an added clause mentioning the action. Here again, then, we are dealing with a positive presupposition. There are other puzzling cases, which can hopefully be cleared up as we understand better the nature of presuppositions and syntax in general. The right-hand clause must refer to the same action that the clause containing *some* describes, and the former must be temporally or logically prior to the latter. This is clear from examples like these:

(9a) *John never does something.

(9b) *John never does something until I ask him to sweep the floor.

(9c) John never does something $\left\{\begin{matrix}\text{before}\\\text{until}\end{matrix}\right\}$ I ask him to do it.

(9d) *John never does something after I ask him to do it.

The *until*-clause here must contain some description of the action in positive terms.

Finally, we may note briefly that other languages have diverse ways of expressing these distinctions, whether or not there is a *some-any* distinction in the language. For instance, in Latin, sentences like the following are found:

(10a) *Marcus Publium necavit quod uxorem suam corrupisset.*

(10b) *Marcus Publium necavit quod uxorem suam corrupit.*
'Marcus killed Publius because he (P) seduced his (M's) wife.'

Although these sentences translate identically, their meanings are different in that the presuppositions behind them are different. In 10a, the speaker is not making the presupposition that Publius seduced Marcus' wife; he is merely reporting Marcus' reason for killing Publius. In 10b, the speaker does presuppose that it is true that Publius seduced Marcus' wife. Hence, by contrasting subjunctive and indicative, Latin explicitly expresses presuppositions in environments in which they cannot be expressed in English.

Similarly, Spanish, which does not have a distinction between *some*-words and *any*-words, can in certain environments indicate overtly the presuppositions of the speaker. Different presuppositions distinguish sentences like the following:

(11a) *No es seguro que Juan viene* 'It's not (absolutely) certain that John will come.'

(11b) *No es seguro que Juan venga* 'It's not at all certain (= I wouldn't be too sure) that John will come.'

In 11a, the speaker is assuming that, in all probability, John will come; in 11b, though the lexical items in the sentence are identical, he is making the opposite presupposition. The subjunctive in 11b is the only superficial difference. Finally, compare the correspondence between the behavior of *doubt* in English, with respect to the distinction between *some* and *any*, and *dudar* in Spanish, with respect to a parallel distinction between indicative and subjunctive.

(12a) I doubt that John did anything yesterday.

(12b) *I don't doubt that John did anything yesterday.

(12c) *Dudo que Juan hiciera algo ayer.*

(12d) **No dudo que Juan hiciera algo ayer.* But:

(12e) *No dudo que Juan hizo algo ayer.*

Where English has *any*, reflecting a negative presupposition, Spanish has the subjunctive, indicating the same; and where the negative presupposition gives way to a positive one, with *doubt* negated, English cannot have *any*, nor can Spanish have the subjunctive. This alternation is not predictable from syntactic factors alone.

This paper, then, has been an attempt to show that the distribution of *some* and *any* depends not merely on relatively superficial syntactic information (negatives, questions, etc.), but also on presuppositions, which may have no other overt syntactic reflex. Since sentences like

(13a) *Anyone left.

(13b) *I promise that if you do anything, I'll give you ten dollars.

are ungrammatical, the distribution of *some* and *any* must be determined by a syntactic rule of some sort. But since the occurrence of *any* is determined by presuppositions of the sort mentioned above, at least one syntactic rule must take presuppositions into account.[4]

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[4] This paper was presented at the Winter 1968 meeting of the Linguistic Society of America.