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Remarks
and
Replies

About a "Nonargument" for Raising

Paul M. Postal

1. Background

Bresnan (1976) presents a critique of just that subset of the arguments for an object-creating rule of Raising in English presented in chapter 4 of Postal (1974).[1] Besides attempting to show that most of these arguments are not valid, Bresnan seeks to draw some general conclusions about research methodology. I will return to the latter topic in section 3. Her criticisms bear careful study and are certainly to be welcomed. I regret that, in spite of devoting many pages to criticisms of some of the arguments in Postal (1974), she is unwilling to provide any real judgment on the central issues, namely the question of the existence and scope of Raising in English. What is somewhat odd about Bresnan's critique is that even if one were to accept every one of her criticisms as given, the present existential status of Raising in English would not thereby be shown to be materially different from that argued for in Postal (1974). That is, the status of any rule is a function of the force of the arguments for it and the force of those against it. Bresnan does not even attempt to formulate any new arguments against object-creating Raising.[2] Therefore, even if she had effectively overturned all of the arguments criticized, the status of Raising would only be affected if the balance of argumentative forces was seriously disturbed or changed. But it is not, for there remain no serious arguments against object-creating Raising,[3] and a number of unchallenged arguments for it.

[1] I would like to thank Jorge Hankamer, David Johnson, David Perlmutter, Warren Plath, Geoff Pullum, Andrew Radford, John Ross, and an unknown LI referee for a host of helpful criticisms and comments that have materially improved the present discussion. They are hereby relieved of all responsibility for what I have done or failed to do with their observations.

[2] Bresnan does offer some considerations attacking the view that Raising functions for verbs of the *want* class, offering instead the view, developed at greater length elsewhere (cf. Bresnan (1972)), that examples like *Jack wants Bill to eat* involve not Raising but simple deletion of the complementizer *for*.

[3] Three arguments against object-creating Raising offered by Chomsky (1973) are analyzed and argued to have no force in Postal (1974, chapter 5).

In fact, significantly, one of the arguments of chapter 4 is not even challenged by Bresnan. Although she brings forth objections against twelve of the arguments there, this was evidently not possible for argument number 13, which involves constructions like the following, which are fully well-formed for many, but not all, speakers:

(1) He prevented there from being a riot.

Bresnan offers no objection to this argument. Although devoting pages to supposed untenable arguments, she devotes a mere four lines to this one, concluding that "A Raising analysis is quite plausible for these constructions" (Bresnan (1976, 497)). One might ask whether this is not to damn by faint praise. After all, what other alternatives are even plausible?

The peculiarity of Bresnan's treatment of argument number 13 can best be understood in the context of what she is criticizing. After all, *On Raising* is to a considerable extent a criticism of the views about Raising proposed in Chomsky (1973) and adopted by that writer in several other works. One of the chief claims of this line of thought is that object-creating Raising is an unnecessary rule that can (and should) be dispensed with in favor of methodologically preferable general conditions. I think it is fair to say that Bresnan has in effect granted the validity of argument number 13. But this argument, if maintained, suffices to undermine Chomsky's claim that Raising is unnecessary. Further, if object-creating Raising is justified for even a single verb, then it takes little addition to English grammar (in the terms of Postal (1974), only an addition to the list of triggers) to have it operate for the full range of cases.[4] Thus, in accepting argument number 13, Bresnan has gone a long way toward agreeing with a major point of Postal (1974) and a major criticism of Chomsky (1973): *namely, even in transformational terms*[5] object-creating Raising cannot be dispensed with. One can,

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[4] Of course, the status of object-creating Raising is greatly strengthened if it turns out to be possible to collapse this rule with the one operating in cases like *Melvin seems to like borscht*. But this is itself a vexed and controversial issue, not only in English but in every language known to me where the analogous issue arises.

[5] In relational grammar, the "traditional" argument for object-creating Raising based on passivization is, interestingly enough, straightforward and suffices by itself to indicate the existence of the relevant rule. That is, in relational terms, Passive is a rule that allows a direct object of a verb to be its subject as well. Schematically:

    (i)   Passive = If [Direct Object (a,b)] then [Possible (Subject (a,b))]

Hence, since Passive is valid in cases like (i) and (ii)

    (ii)   Melvin proved Ted to be immortal.
    (iii)   Ted was proved to be immortal by Melvin.

it follows that *Ted* must be a direct object of *proved*. But, since it is not initially a direct object of *proved*, but rather a subject of *immortal*, the direct object status must be a function of some rule. Q.E.D.

Actually, as Guy Carden reminds me, the situation is more complex since the considerations just adduced do not exclude a treatment of (for instance) examples like (iii) in terms of subject-creating Raising operating on the output of Passive. However, this possibility can also be argued against. In particular, it fails to predict that the relevant passive sentences manifest ad hoc restrictions linked to the object-raising construction (for many such restrictions, cf. Postal (1974, chapter 9)). Thus, for me, the verb *intuit* permits

apparently, at best argue about its scope. It would have been helpful if Bresnan had made these points clear.

In short, the reader would make an error to conclude from the negative character of Bresnan's discussion that the case for Raising is in jeopardy or even that Bresnan herself rejects object-creating Raising. There is no support for this conclusion in Bresnan (1976). Moreover, in her major study of complement constructions so far, Bresnan (1972), such a rule is recognized. One is left then with various criticisms, of unclear ultimate import, of twelve of the many more than this number of existing arguments for a rule of object-creating Raising in English.

It is neither possible nor appropriate for me to attempt to answer all of Bresnan's criticisms of the arguments in chapter 4 of *On Raising,* nor is it clear what could be accomplished by doing so. No doubt many of these arguments are not ultimately sustainable (it was inter alia the recognition of the high mortality rate for rule arguments that led me to seek to construct a large set of arguments in the first place). But there remains, I think, a core of solid justifications for this rule. Although I cannot deal with the full range of Bresnan's criticisms here, I would like to address myself to her rejection of *one* of my arguments since, to be frank, it is my favorite.

Before turning to the argument in question, I should note that it is somewhat hard for me to comment properly on these matters at present. The reason has to do with theoretical frameworks. Although Postal (1974) was written in the overall transformational framework, I have since come to believe that this whole approach is mistaken and favor instead a framework of grammatical description based directly on grammatical relations, so-called relational grammar. This is not only of general relevance but has implications for the particular counterargument of Bresnan's that I will address. Nonetheless, it being impossible to go into relational grammar here, I will basically continue to deal with the issues in transformational terms.

2. Argument Number 1

I will assume some familiarity with Postal (1974) and Bresnan's discussion. Bresnan criticizes what she calls Argument 1. This argument was based on the claim that the

object-raising, but not with human nominals. And the relevant passives manifest the same restriction:

(iv) a. ?I intuit that to be the case.
   b. That, I intuit to be the case.

(v) a. *I intuit $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Ted} \\ \text{you} \\ \text{Jack's aunt} \end{array} \right\}$ to be Hungarian.

   b. *$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{Ted} \\ \text{you} \\ \text{Jack's aunt} \end{array} \right\}$ I intuit to be Hungarian.

(vi) a. That was intuited to be the case.
   b. *Ted was intuited to be Hungarian.

If there really were a possible description of (iii) in terms of subject-creating Raising, this would predict, incorrectly, that examples like (vi) would not manifest the restrictions of those like (v). The question then arises as to whether the logically possible Passive + subject-creating Raising description, which is incorrect for English, is excluded by some principle of universal grammar. Space precludes any discussion of this interesting question here.

rule Complex NP Shift does *not* operate on NPs that are subjects at the point of application of the rule. This constraint is illustrated by such examples as:

(2) a. For the candidate wearing purple shorts to speak would be unwise.
    b. *(For) to speak - the candidate wearing purple shorts would be unwise.

(3) a. I resent Tom, Betty, Joe and Ted's constantly arriving late.
    b. *I resent constantly arriving late - Tom, Betty, Joe and Ted's.

(4) a. The troops commanded by the drunken general are advancing into a minefield.
    b. *Are advancing into a minefield - the troops commanded by the drunken general.

Given this constraint, contrasts like those between (5) and (6) strongly support the object-creating Raising analysis of examples like (6).

(5) a. I believe (that) the troops commanded by the drunken general are advancing into a minefield.
    b. *I believe (that) are advancing into a minefield - the troops commanded by the drunken general.

(6) a. I believe the troops commanded by the drunken general to be advancing into a minefield.
    b. I believe to be advancing into a minefield - the troops commanded by the drunken general.

This analysis causes the complement subject to cease to be a subject at the point when Complex NP Shift applies, and thus predicts correctly the applicability of the rule in cases like (6b).

According to Bresnan, this argument suffers from a fatal defect, namely, that the generalization that Complex NP Shift does not apply to subjects is false. The basis for this objection is the existence of a class of sentences which, according to Bresnan, contain subject NPs that undergo Complex NP Shift. The purported subject NPs are illustrated by the italicized phrases in the following examples, taken from Bresnan:

(7) a. Near that town was situated *an old ruin that the Germans had bombed* for many years after the war.
    b. Over my windowsill climbed *an entire army of ants* every day.

While these examples strike me as unacceptable, they can be replaced by others of the same general type that are at least better, so I will ignore their unacceptability in what follows.

Bresnan suggests that the relevant NPs are capable of undergoing Complex NP Shift. This is indicated by the observation that they can shift with no loss (in fact, a gain) of acceptability over the following adverbial expressions, together with the fact that the acceptability of this shift seems to be governed by the "heaviness" conditions

typical of unchallenged Complex NP Shift cases:

(8) a. Near that town was situated for many years after the war an old ruin that the Germans had bombed.
  b. Over my windowsill climbed every day an entire army of ants.

Other, possibly happier, examples include (9a–d):

(9) a. ?Near the factory sat a wreck on Tuesday.
  b. ??Near the factory sat an old rusting wreck covered with spider webs on Tuesday.
  c. *Near the factory sat on Tuesday a wreck.
  d. Near the factory sat on Tuesday an old rusting wreck covered with spider webs.

I was originally willing to accept Bresnan's claim that these examples involved Complex NP Shift. However, as Jorge Hankamer has pointed out to me, on factual grounds this assumption is at least questionable. Nonetheless, I will accept Bresnan's assumption for purposes of argument and seek to show that, *even if it is accepted,* her negative conclusions about Argument 1 do not follow.

Bresnan claims that the Complex NP Shift argument for object-creating Raising is based on the defect of a false generalization. For this claim to stand up, it is necessary to show further only that the NPs in question are subjects in the sense required by the constraint I proposed. To argue this, Bresnan makes two points. One is that the NP of relevance meet the conditions of *my* definition of "derived subject" as the leftmost NP of a clause corresponding to the cycle-final subject of that clause (Postal (1974, 96)).[6] The other is that in examples like (7), subject-verb agreement, known to be generally controlled by subjects,[7] is determined by the postverbal NP. Compare:

(10) a. Near that town were (*was) situated two banana-oil factories.
  b. Near that town was (*were) situated a banana-oil factory.

On these grounds Bresnan (1976, 486–487) concludes that the relevant NPs are subjects and thus that: "These facts directly falsify Postal's claim (p. 91): 'The fact remains that there is no known case where Complex NP Shift applies to an NP that can be shown, independently of the controversy about Raising, to be a subject at the point of application.' "

Ignoring doubts about whether Complex NP Shift may properly be invoked here, Bresnan's negative conclusion about Argument 1 would follow *only if* the postverbal NPs in examples like (7) and (10) were subjects of the relevant sort. However, I claim that her conclusion can *not* follow, simply because they are not subjects of this sort.

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[6] The definition in question is absurd, but not much more absurd, I think, than other popular definitions of notions like subject. I would claim that all definitions of subject must be absurd, ultimately, since such attempts assume that there are necessary and sufficient conditions for subjecthood. In relational grammar, it is denied that such conditions exist and such notions are taken as primitive, just as transformational grammar, for example, takes notions like S and NP as primitive.

[7] Actually, the situation is far more complicated, involving questions of specification of "level" and many others. Cf. Morgan (1972) for much relevant data.

Expressing it transformationally, although these NPs are subjects at one stage,[8] they cease to be subjects because of the operation of one of the *There* Insertion rules in English. Bresnan's conclusion that they are subjects at the point when Complex NP Shift applies overlooks the relevance of this rule to the construction in question and thus, I suggest, involves an erroneous assumption.[9]

According to Bresnan (1976, 486) in sentences like (11)

(11) Near the fountain sat a large purple gorilla.

what has happened is that "The subjects have simply been inverted by rules of Subject Inversion and Directional Adverb Inversion . . .". In short, an adverbial is fronted and the subject and verb change positions. Bresnan's claim is in effect that the change of verbal and nominal positions in such examples is akin to that produced by a rule like Subject Auxiliary Inversion, a shift that really does not change the subject status of the NP affected. My claim to the contrary is that examples like (5) involve a rule of *There* Insertion as well as a rule that deletes *there*. The *There* Insertion rule creates a new subject and thus, unlike Subject Auxiliary Inversion, destroys the subject status of the original subject.[10] Hence, in my terms, an example like (11) involves the abstract structure common to (12):

(12) Near the fountain there sat a large purple gorilla.

The fact that (12) is itself a well-formed surface structure is, of course, quite relevant to a claim linking examples like (11) and (12). For it (correctly) suggests that in general the structures needed for a *There* Insertion analysis of cases like (11) must be independently described for English.

Before going on, observe that a *There* Insertion analysis eliminates the relevance of Bresnan's observations about verb agreement. For, as is well known, *There* Insertion in simple clauses does not affect verb agreement, even though it creates a new subject:

(13) a. No immortal purple gorilla exists (*exist).
  b. There exists (*exist) no immortal purple gorilla.
  c. Immortal purple gorillas exist (*exists).
  d. There exist (*exists) immortal purple gorillas.

Therefore, verb agreement cannot help decide the question of whether the postverbal NP in examples like those attested by Bresnan are postposed subjects or postposed NPs that have ceased to be subjects due to the introduction of the dummy subject

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[8] Not necessarily the earliest in the case of passive examples like (i):

(i) Under the tree was found the body of a teenage starlet.

[9] Examples of the sort relevant here are discussed in Langendoen (1971), also without recognition of the role of *there*. They are treated in much greater detail by Aissen (1975), who brings out many further similarities between cases with and without *there*, without offering a definite analysis of the latter in terms of the former.

[10] In the terminology and conceptual system of relational grammar, the NPs in question are *chômeurs*, a concept covering all nominals that are subjects, direct objects, or indirect objects at one "level" but lose this status through the "promotion" of another nominal.

there. Note that, with respect to the constraint on Complex NP Shift offered in Postal (1974), it is *there* in examples like (13b,d) that is the ultimate subject, as shown by word order, susceptibility to Raising, etc.

Let us suppose now that a *There* Insertion analysis of the examples taken by Bresnan to involve Complex NP Shift of subject NP is correct. In the terminology of Postal (1974), it would follow that the *there* is the cyclic subject of the verb, the postverbal NP only being a subject at an earlier stage. Thus, even if Complex NP Shift did apply to these NPs, it would be irrelevant to the correctness of the claim that this rule does not apply to subject NPs. It would have no more bearing on this than does the fact that in a Raising analysis Complex NP Shift applies to raised NPs like the one in (6b). Here also the shifted NP is a subject at one stage, but not at the stage at which Complex NP Shift applies. At the latter point, it has already been made an object by Raising.

It remains to argue that the *There* Insertion analysis is correct. While I have made no detailed study of this matter, the following considerations in support of this view have come to my attention. First, the *There* Insertion process in examples like (11) is narrowly restricted. It seems that the rule is applicable only to a subset of *in*transitive clauses, including some passives and some with pure intransitive verbs:

(14) Near the fountain there

$$
\left\{
\begin{array}{l}
\text{lived} \\
\text{sat} \\
\text{lay} \\
\text{were situated} \\
\text{were found} \\
\text{were hiding} \\
\text{*burped} \\
\text{*urinated} \\
\text{*ate} \\
\text{*gloated} \\
\text{*talked} \\
\text{*yawned} \\
\text{*spat} \\
\text{*vomited} \\
\text{*snored} \\
\text{*dreamed} \\
\text{*stumbled} \\
\text{*kissed} \\
\text{*ate Wheaties} \\
\text{*sang ballads} \\
\text{*stabbed each other} \\
\text{*shot themselves} \\
\text{*were loading the can-} \\
\text{non}
\end{array}
\right\}
\text{ two Greek spies with a walkie-talkie.}
$$

It seems that the pattern of acceptability in contexts like (14) remains essentially the same when the *there* is removed, giving sentences of the form Bresnan dealt with. This would follow directly from the *There* Insertion/*There* Deletion analysis, but would be a complete accident in Bresnan's terms.

Second, the syntactic positioning of the NP in these cases *cannot* be described as simple subject-verb inversion. This is shown by the following examples in which, crucially, the behavior of these NPs is the same independent of the presence of *there*:

(15) Near the fountain (there) $\begin{cases} \text{seem to have been found} \\ \text{are likely to be found} \\ \text{are bound to be situated} \end{cases}$ two purple bananas

and a peach.

Particularly important here is the interaction of the so-called inversion with subject-forming Raising, which is universally accepted for elements like *seem, likely,* and *bound*. In Bresnan's terms, such examples must involve an inversion of (for instance) the subject of *seem* around not only that Raising trigger but also the rest of its complement. But, of course, the inversion is only possible when the complement is itself of the form that independently permits the process:

(16) a. Near the fountain (there) seem to have been $\begin{cases} \text{found} \\ \text{*eaten} \end{cases}$ two purple bananas

and a peach.

b. Near the fountain (there) were $\begin{cases} \text{found} \\ \text{*eaten} \end{cases}$ two purple bananas and a peach.

In *There* Insertion terms, this is just what is to be expected. *There* is introduced in the lowest clause and undergoes Raising like other NPs. It is then deleted independent of the character of the main verb, subject to conditions involving the preposed adverbial (and no doubt others). Examples like (15) and (16) seem to provide very serious problems indeed for any analysis like Bresnan's. In her terms, the inversion, which is a process occurring in the main clause, must on the one hand be sensitive to structures embedded an unlimited number of clauses below; on the other hand, it must somehow reduplicate the restrictions needed to govern the generation of *There* Insertion sentences in which *there* actually occurs, i.e. the restrictions indicated in (14).

The analysis I have sketched requires a rule deleting *there*. This rule interacts with adverbial fronting, in that ungrammaticality always results if the deletion is performed on a clause-initial *there*:

(17) a. ?There lived in the woods two elves and a giant clam.
     b. *Lived in the woods two elves and a giant clam.

Jorge Hankamer observes that although this interaction can be stated as a direct condition on *There* Deletion, it would be preferable to find some general condition

predicting it. He suggests as a possible solution that English continues to have a constraint derived from its Germanic roots that prohibits *verb-initial* declarative sentences (clauses?). This constraint certainly deserves to be studied. If something like it can be maintained, then nothing at all need be said directly to limit *There* Deletion to cases in which there is a fronted adverbial of one kind or another. The advantages of this treatment show up even more clearly, as Hankamer notes, when it is observed that the two different processes discussed in footnote 14 pattern in the same way. Thus, if something like Hankamer's proposal can be sustained, the *There* Deletion analysis is even better than it seems.

Third, in *There* Insertion cases in which the *there* is explicitly present, there are constraints on the class of NPs that can occur in the postposed position. But these constraints seem to be mirrored in the parallel cases in which *there* is not present, as predicted by a *There* Deletion analysis but not by Bresnan's treatment:

(18) Into the room (there) ran
$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{a naked snake and two dogs} \\ \text{*it} \\ \text{*they} \\ \text{*something} \\ \text{*he, she, and you} \\ \text{*them all} \end{array} \right\}.$$

One fact contrary to this view is that simple definite NPs sometimes seem much better without *there*:

(19) a.   Near the waterhole stood the giraffe.
    b. ?*Near the waterhole there stood the giraffe.
    c.   Into the room dashed the elephant.
    d. ?*Into the room there dashed the elephant.

This might in my terms have to be taken as a constraint on *There* Deletion.[11]

Fourth, there are certain expressions involving deleted subjects that require coreference with *subject NP* of the main clause. Expressions of the form [*without . . . Ving . . .*] are of this type:

(20) a. Joe amused Mary without exerting $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{himself} \\ \text{*herself} \end{array} \right\}.$

    b. You men handed the slave girl to the bidders without helping $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{yourselves} \\ \text{*herself} \\ \text{*themselves} \end{array} \right\}.$

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[11] Geoff Pullum points out that the lack of correlation in definite cases is by no means uniform, offering examples like the following in which the presence or absence of *there* is irrelevant to acceptability:

  (i)   To the north (there) lies the vast expanse of the Gobi desert.
  (ii)   On her dressing table (there) stood the jade iguana I had given her.
  (iii) Into the room (there) dashed the very same elephant that had eaten my copy of *Gone with the Breeze*.

c. Mary was amused by Joe without exerting $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{herself}\\ \text{*himself}\end{array}\right\}$.

d. The slave girl was handed to the bidders by you men without having the chance to defend $\left\{\begin{array}{l}\text{herself}\\ \text{*yourselves}\\ \text{*themselves}\end{array}\right\}$.

It seems then to be the cyclic subject in the sense of Postal (1974) that determines the identity for subject deletion with *without* expressions. Therefore, Bresnan's analysis predicts that there should be no difference in acceptability between the (a) and (b) examples of (21) and (22):

(21) a. Near the waterhole a rhinoceros lay without moving.
     b. *Near the waterhole lay a rhinoceros without moving.
(22) a. Behind the house two knights sat without speaking.
     b. *Behind the house sat two knights without speaking.

These examples should be parallel, just as those produced by Subject-Auxiliary Inversion are:

(23) a. A man will enter without speaking.
     b. Will a man enter without speaking?

But for me,[12] however, in cases like (21) and (22) the postposed case is significantly worse. This would follow from the fact that the deletion controller is not a cyclic subject in a *There* Insertion analysis. Moreover, note that these cases are consistent in acceptability regardless of the presence of *there* in the output:

(24) a. Near the oasis two sheiks lay (without talking).
     b. Near the oasis (there) lay two sheiks (*without talking).
     c. Under the bridge two trolls seem to have been sitting (without breathing).
     d. Under the bridge (there) seem to have been sitting two trolls (*without breathing).

Jorge Hankamer has pointed out a possible difficulty with this argument. He suggests that in *there* sentences of this type, with or without surface *there*, unacceptability results whenever any material follows the underlying subject. This effect alone would predict the difference between (24a,b), for instance. Even if this is so, the argument can be maintained, since *without* phrases may in principle be fronted. It seems, though, that the contrast predicted by the controller condition still exists in sets

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[12] No doubt many readers will fail to share the contrasts in (21) and (22), and will accept the (b) examples as well. This has no bearing on the present discussion, indicating only that such speakers have different and weaker constraints on the deletion in question.

like (25a–c):

(25) a. Near the oasis, without talking, two sheiks wearing cowboy boots lay (quietly).
   b. *Near the oasis, without talking, there lay (quietly) two sheiks wearing cowboy boots.
   c. *Near the oasis, without talking, lay (quietly) two sheiks wearing cowboy boots.

As in all cases, no number of arguments can be decisive about an empirical question. But perhaps it can be said that the arguments given[13] above provide at least an average case for the view that the NPs discussed by Bresnan are *not* subjects of the relevant sort.[14] Thus, even if they do have the ability to undergo Complex NP Shift, this shows nothing with respect to the constraint proposed in Postal (1974). The generalization given there remains without known exceptions. There is still no case exhibited of a subject of the relevant sort that has undergone Complex NP Shift. Therefore, the argument for object-creating Raising based on this constraint remains as indicated in Postal (1974). In my opinion, it is by itself a good initial basis for the claim that such a rule exists.[15]

[13] Bresnan (1976) suggests that Postal (1974) presents too many arguments for Raising. But since she has argued that so many of these are wrong, perhaps she means too few. In any event, I hope I have not presented too many arguments for the view that the relevant NPs discussed by Bresnan are not subjects of the proper sort.

[14] The same type of analysis suggested here for cases of the sort dealt with by Bresnan can, I think, be applied to those like (i) and (ii):

(i)   Obvious to everyone is *the fact that Melvin is crazy.*
(ii) Unable to attend were *the chairman and vice-chairman.*

That is, I would claim that the italicized NPs in such sentences have also been expelled from subjecthood by the insertion of a dummy NP and thus that the question of whether these undergo Complex NP Shift can have no bearing on the nonsubjecthood condition proposed in Postal (1974). Thus, it is the dummy in question that undergoes Raising in cases like (iii):

(iii) Unable to attend seem to be the chairman and the vice-chairman.

And I would also suggest this type of dummy analysis for cases like the following, discussed in Lawler (to appear):

(iv)   To Congress $\begin{Bmatrix} \text{seems to have been} \\ \text{was} \end{Bmatrix}$ given *the power to regulate meatball sizes.*

That is, I deny that the italicized phrase is a subject of the relevant sort, since it has also been displaced by insertion of a dummy subject. Thus, the fact that it can apparently undergo Complex NP Shift, as in (v) and (vi) will then not bear on the suggested constraint on Complex NP Shift.

(v)   To Congress was given at the very beginning of our country the power to regulate meatball sizes.
(vi) To Congress was given without proper thought the power to regulate meatball sizes.

[15] A significant factor to note here is the high correlation in Raising-relevant constructions between the possibility of Complex NP Shift and the possibility of main clause passivization. This follows automatically given the views that:

(i)   Raising creates objects out of complement subjects.
(ii)   Complex NP Shift cannot operate on subjects.
(iii) Passive operates on objects.

Thus note such correlations as:

In discussing the Complex NP Shift argument, Bresnan also cites several examples of cases of nonsubject NPs that do *not* undergo Complex NP Shift. While these are interesting,[16] I shall not go into them here. Evidently, they have no bearing on the claim that Complex NP Shift does not apply to subjects, which was and is the basis for the argument for Raising. It is unclear why Bresnan brought these examples up since I have nowhere claimed, assumed, or suggested that all nonsubject heavy NPs undergo Complex NP Shift and, indeed, have cited many instances to the contrary. What I have given is a sufficient condition (subjecthood) for nonapplication, not a necessary condition (nonsubjecthood) for application.

3. Methodology

After presenting particular critiques of the arguments in chapter 4 of Postal (1974), Bresnan seeks to derive some general conclusions. It is not so clear what these are. The tendency seems to be to take Postal (1974) to be a special case of a kind of research defect. While I do not offer this work as a model for anyone to follow, nothing in Bresnan's remarks justifies her conclusions.

The suggestion seems to be that the problems Bresnan believes exist in Postal (1974) can somehow be attributed to a lack of formalization, the failure to present an explicit grammar (fragment). Bresnan makes no attempt to argue for this conclusion, which is represented in the remark (1976, 499): "In a sense, *On Raising* contains too many 'arguments about claims' and too little English grammar." In context, this opinion seems to be a non sequitur.

Bresnan's elaborations seem equally weak. Thus she claims (1976, 499) that *On Raising* "contains no formulation of the rule of Raising". This is at best a half-truth, since the structural description is given (1974, 381), while the structural change required is, I think, obvious to the reader. Moreover, Bresnan makes no attempt to indicate how any of the problems she claims to have uncovered in the argumentation would have been avoided if, for example, the structural change had been stated. Similarly, she points out correctly that the base structures on which the rule would

(iv) a.   I believe Bob to like apples.
      b.   Bob is believed to like apples.
      c.   I believe to like apples - the man who stole two bushels from your orchard.
 (v) a.   I resent him doing that.
      b.   *He is resented doing that.
      c.   *I resent doing that - the doctor who refused to treat your pig.
(vi) a.   I showed (that) he was wrong.
      b.   *He was showed (that) was wrong.
      c.   *I showed (that) was wrong the well-known African explorer and gigolo.
(vii) a.   The president approved their dropping nuclear bombs on the starlings.
      b.   *They were approved dropping nuclear bombs on the starlings.
      c.   *The president approved dropping nuclear bombs on the starlings - the first, fourth, fifth, ninth, and eleventh bomber wings.

[16] In particular, her example *I don't want myself getting stuck with all the work* obviously provides a serious, probably fatal, problem for any clause-mate theory of ordinary reflexivization.

operate are not formally characterized. But she does not even try to show how this is relevant to any of the issues discussed in *On Raising* or her critique.

Bresnan goes on to suggest, drawing now not on Postal (1974) but on Postal (1972), that there is something basically wrong with a research strategy that does not construct formalized grammar fragments, as *On Raising* certainly does not. She speaks about linguists "renouncing the attempt to formulate precisely the rules of grammar", which is intended as a characterization of the present writer and of the sentiment underlying Postal (1974).

But this view has not been examined seriously; nor has there been anything like an attempt to consider how such a criticism would apply in general. For instance, if it is a research defect of Postal (1974) that it contains no formalized grammar fragment, why is it not a similar and equal defect of (for instance) Chomsky (1970)? This much cited article discusses several transformations in an informal way, but states none precisely and gives only a few of the most obvious phrase structure rules. *On Raising* is criticized for being a study of the rule Raising that presents no formal grammar embodying this rule. But Chomsky (1970) is a study of nominalizations that presents no formal grammar of nominalizations. In fact, the character of the latter paper is, in relevant respects, not unlike that of *On Raising*. It presents various arguments attempting to show certain aspects of how nominals should be derived. It presents no grammar that derives (any of) them.

Or, more pertinently, if (as Bresnan (1976) claims) *On Raising* is an instance of a "defeatist and unscientific recommendation" (not to formulate rules) and hence blameworthy, why is the same criticism not applicable to Bresnan (1976), which contains even less formalization of English grammar than Postal (1974), in fact, absolutely none? Bresnan (1976) is also in relevant respects rather like Postal (1974). It presents various arguments and arguments against arguments seeking to support or disconfirm this or that claim, or this or that claim about a claim about English grammar. It does just what Postal (1972) says much generative research does. Perhaps the major distinction of relevance between Postal (1974) and Bresnan (1976), other than length and scope, is that the former tried to establish some definite positive conclusion, where the latter is almost entirely limited to negative comments whose basic import can at best be only that certain arguments do not establish their conclusions.

Whatever methodological issues may be raised by *On Raising* are not, I think, dealt with seriously in Bresnan (1976), and I see nothing to be gained by delving into them further in this context. My position has been and to a significant extent remains that present-day understanding of grammar is sufficiently restricted so that we can know pretty well in advance that any set of proposed formal rules will be in part wrong, in part arbitrary, and in part ad hoc.[17] It is then natural to view the difficult job of

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[17] For some justification for this view of rules, it is possible to appeal to the wide divergences and controversies among different scholars. However, one can go beyond this and note the divergences between successive works of the same scholar and the fact that hardly any analysis remains unchanged over time even

constructing such systems as being questionable. That is, it is at the least reasonable to raise the question of whether on particular occasions the benefits of such construction may not be outweighed by the drawbacks. Bresnan's remarks seem to suggest a view that little if anything of significance can be accomplished in the absence of the construction of formal grammars. The strategy of such construction must then be the modus operandi of all serious work.[18] But the very existence of Bresnan (1976) indicates that this is a preaching she herself, like most others, is not willing to fully practice.

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in the work of a single individual. It may be claimed that this reveals progress. But from another point of view, it reveals the unsettled and experimental character of present-day grammar proposals. And, of course, at least $n - 1$ of the n contrasting analyses in any case must be wrong.

[18] Bresnan makes no reference to the extensive writings on this subject, moreover favorable to her position, by R. Dougherty. Cf., for example, Dougherty (1974), and for some criticisms of his views McCawley (to appear).