



BELT.FI SECURITY ASSESSMENT REPORT

FEB. 24 ~ MAR. 9, 2021

DISCLAIMER

- This document is based on a security assessment conducted by a blockchain security company SOOHO. This document describes the detected security vulnerabilities and also discusses the code quality and code license violations.
- This security assessment does not guarantee nor describe the usefulness of the code, the stability of the code, the suitability of the business model, the legal regulation of the business, the suitability of the contract, and the bug-free status. Audit document is used for discussion purposes only.
- SOOHO does not disclose any business information obtained during the review or save it through a separate media.
- SOOHO presents its best endeavors in smart contract security assessment.

SOOHO

SOOHO with the motto of “Audit Everything, Automatically” researches and provides technology for reliable blockchain ecosystem. SOOHO verifies vulnerabilities through entire development life-cycle with Aegis, a vulnerability analyzer created by SOOHO, and open source analyzers. SOOHO is composed of experts including Ph.D researchers in the field of automated security tools and white-hackers verifying contract codes and detected vulnerabilities in depth. Professional experts in SOOHO secure partners’ contracts from known to zero-day vulnerabilities.

INTRODUCTION

SOOHO conducted a security assessment of Ozys’s BELT smart contract from Feb. 24 until Mar. 9. The following tasks were performed during the audit period:

- Performing and analyzing the results of Odin, a static analyzer of SOOHO.
- Writing Exploit codes on suspected vulnerability in the contract.
- Recommendations on codes based on best practices and the Secure Coding Guide.

A total of three security experts participated in a vulnerability analysis of the contract. The experts are professional hackers with Ph.D. academic backgrounds and experiences of receiving awards from national/international hacking competitions such as Defcon, Nuit du Hack, White Hat, SamsungCTF, and etc.

The detected vulnerabilities are as follows: Note 1. It is recommended to promote the stability of service through continuous code audit and analyze potential vulnerabilities.

ANALYSIS TARGET


The following projects were analyzed until Sep. 18.

Project	belt-contract
Commit #	16f3174a
# of Files	16
# of Lines	12,256

KEY AUDIT POINTS & PROCESS

BELT is an AMM protocol that incorporates multi-strategy yield optimizing on Binance Smart Chain (BSC). BELT team design and develop the system based on the BSC which is EVM compatible blockchain. Accordingly, we mainly reviewed common vulnerabilities in DeFi services and possible hacking scenarios.

For example, the following scenarios are included: draining the contract's funds, freezing funds, breaking pools. However, we did not take any internal hackings by administrators into account. Additionally, although not mentioned in this report, we would like to suggest the customer's interest in the stability of external services as well. Most analyzes are about the functioning of the subject contract, given the safety of the system.



RISK RATING OF VULNERABILITY

Detected vulnerabilities are listed on the basis of the risk rating of vulnerability.

The risk rating of vulnerability is set based on [OWASP's Impact & Likelihood Risk Rating Methodology](#) as seen on the right. Some issues were rated vulnerable aside from the corresponding model and the reasons are explained in the following results.

		Likelihood		
		Low	Medium	High
Impact	High	Medium	High	Critical
	Medium	Low	Medium	High
	Low	Note	Low	Medium
		Severity		

ANALYSIS RESULTS

Analysis results are categorized into Critical, High, Medium, Low, and Note. SOOHO recommends upgrades on every detected issue.

INSUFFICIENT INPUT VALIDATION Note

Additional resources and comments

File Name : managerDataStorage.sol

File Location : belt-contract/contracts/earn/strategies

└─ Strategy*.sol

```
1133     function setGov(address _govAddress) public {
1134         require(msg.sender == govAddress, "Not authorised");
1135         govAddress = _govAddress;
1136     }
```

```
1180 ~    function setGov(address _govAddress) public {
1181         require(msg.sender == govAddress, "Not authorised");
1182         govAddress = _govAddress;
1183     }
```

Details

We have confirmed that the setGov functions that update govAddress in strategy-related contracts do not check. govAddress is an important account with critical privileges. The system can lead to unexpected situations because of the corrupted account, so it is recommended to validate the input value.

ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS RESULTS

Additional analysis results include a description of the main areas we looked at during the analysis.

REENTRANCY ✓

Additional resources and comments

File Name : interestModel.sol

File Location : belt-contract/contracts/earn

└─ strategies/*.sol

└─ tokens/*.sol

```
873     function deposit(address _userAddress, uint256 _wantAmt)
874         public
875         onlyOwner
876         nonReentrant
877         whenNotPaused
878         returns (uint256)
```

Details

We analyzed the deposit and withdraw implementations of major contracts. It has been confirmed that the reentrancy that occurs mainly is protected through the guard statement.

ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS RESULTS

Additional analysis results include a description of the main areas we looked at during the analysis.

OVERFLOWS

File Name : BeltToken.sol

File Location : belt-contract/contracts

└─ BeltToken.sol

MD5: 05fe2d8af27d963e2d71532eb030a03d

Details We analyzed the implementation of the BeltToken contract. We have confirmed that the theoretical integer overflow may occur, but it is unlikely to occur in practice.

Additional resources and comments

BEP2 SPECIFICATIONS

File Name : BeltLPToken.vy

File Location : belt-contract/contracts/swap/BeltLPToken.vy

MD5: 2dd46daf622e2b2f426d336ee98b858d

Details We analyzed the implementation of the BeltLPToken.vy contract. We have confirmed that the contract complies with the BEP-2 proposals of the Binance Chain.

Additional resources and comments

INFINITE APPROVE

File Name : BeltLPToken.vy

File Location : belt-contract/contracts/swap/BeltLPToken.vy

MD5: 2dd46daf622e2b2f426d336ee98b858d

```
56 @public
57 def transferFrom(_from : address, _to : address, _value : uint256) -> bool:
58     self.balanceOf[_from] -= _value
59     self.balanceOf[_to] += _value
60     if msg.sender != self.minter:
61         self.allowances[_from][msg.sender] -= _value
62     log.Transfer(_from, _to, _value)
63     return True
```

Details We analyzed the implementation of the BeltLPToken.vy contract. We found that the transfer can proceed regardless of allowance when the user is a minter. If it is not intended, we recommend to remove it.

Additional resources and comments

ADDITIONAL ANALYSIS RESULTS

Additional analysis results include a description of the main areas we looked at during the analysis.

ARITHMETIC ROUNDING

Additional resources and comments

Details Abusing through arithmetic rounding and fund drain were analyzed, but none were found. Due to time limitations, we have partially covered the possibility of arithmetic rounding. Our preliminary results showed a negligible impact.

CONCLUSION

The source code of the BELT Finance is easy to read and very well organized. We have to remark that contracts are well architected and all the additional features are implemented. **The detected vulnerabilities are as follows: Note 1.** However, most of the codes are found out to be compliant with all the best practices. It is recommended to promote the stability of service through continuous code audit and analyze potential vulnerabilities.

Project	belt-contract	File Tree	belt-contract/contracts
Commit #	16f3174a		<ul style="list-style-type: none"> BeltToken.sol BeltView.sol earn <ul style="list-style-type: none"> MasterBelt.sol strategies Note <ul style="list-style-type: none"> StrategyVenusBUSD.sol StrategyVenusDAI.sol StrategyVenusUSDC.sol StrategyVenusUSDT.sol VaultBPool.sol VaultCakePool.sol tokens <ul style="list-style-type: none"> bBUSD.sol bDAI.sol bUSDC.sol bUSDT.sol swap <ul style="list-style-type: none"> BeltLPToken.vy DepositB.vy StableSwapB.vy pooldata.json
# of Files	16		
# of Lines	12,256		