

# Finding the Weak Crypto Needle in a Byte Haystack




#### What's a Stream Cipher?



#### What's a Stream Cipher?




#### The Problem with Key Reuse




#### The Problem with Key Reuse

$$c_1 \oplus c_2 = (p_1 \oplus k) \oplus (p_2 \oplus k) = (p_1 \oplus p_2) \oplus (k \oplus k) = p_1 \oplus p_2$$





#### Why Detect Key Reuse? (1)



- 2 -



3/NBF/T1795 (Øf 12/7/66)

[i] KAL'MARO: Unidentified covernance. This is presumably the same word as French CALMAR, Spanish CALAMAR, Italian CALAMARO, Russian KAL MAR = SQUID. Possibly a dialectal form. Also occurs as an addressee in MOSCOW's Nos. 424 and 427 of 28th April 1940 (3/NBF/T1797 and 1798).

[ii] FINO: X

Unidentified. This could be

- (a) a covername FINAUD = CRAFTY
- (b) the common French surname FINOT.

#### Why Detect Key Reuse? (2)



How (And Why) We Defeated Dir Crypt White Paper

# HOW (AND WHY) WE DEFEATED DIRCRYPT

Nitay Artenstein Michael Shalyt Check Point Malware Research Group DirCrypt is a particularly nasty variant of ransomware. In addition to encrypting most of the user's files and demanding ransom for their decryption, the malware stays resident in the system, and immediately encrypts any new file which is created or saved. Therefore, the user is completely prevented from using the computer normally.

#### Why Detect Key Reuse? (3)

#### Ramnit traffic, recorded by TCPdump

```
00000000
             00 ff 0f 00 00 00 01 00 09 00 00 06 a7 72 26 .....r&
    00000010
             16 81 98 fa bb
00000000
         00 ff 4c 00 00 00
                                                           . . L . . .
                                  42 6a 16 c0 c4 bc 8e db ..!.... Bi......
00000006
          e2 00 21 00 00 00 ca 81
00000016
          b8 50 c1 f5 96 1d d3 e2
                                  0d 62 53 ef fa 66 f5 42 .P..... .bS..f.B
00000026
          8e c1 a7 8d 11 23 93 00
                                  20 00 00 00 bf a4 30 60 .....#.. .....0
00000036
         10 93 9c eb ff 88 e3 0a
                                  94 f7 98 1c d7 e6 04 63 .....c
00000046
                  6a f7 44 83 cf
                                  a6 8a 1b 20 00 ff 07 01 Q..j.D.. ...
00000056
                  01 00 00
                                   01 00 00 00 00 01 00 00 ......
00000066
          00 00 01 00 00 00 00 01
                                   00 00 00 00 01 e9 13 19 ......
00000076
               a7 00 00 00 10 c2
                                  01 52 22 f5 fd 89 ce e9 ....... .R".....
00000086
          80 68 d8 ca af 28 e4 d0
                                  35 5a 31 bf b1 25 ad 13 .h...(.. 5Z1..%..
          d3 d9 c6 d9 4b 7d 82 cd
                                  c1 86 5f b4 5a 6c e2 69 ....K}.. .. .Zl.i
00000096
                                  ac 3d 6b 7d 0c e8 b0 69 .."....J .=k}...i
000000A6
          18 86 22 a7 c7 c3 b8 4a
000000B6
          81 b0 fd 7e 7f 8a 14 12
                                  00 el 66 d7 3d e9 3e 3a ...~... ..f.=.>:
                                  41 58 al 20 b9 9c 6b 46 .T.qV.u. AX. ..kF
000000C6
         d1 54 99 71 56 dd 75 9e
                                  dc 65 ca 93 56 af c6 e2 .R...x4 .e..V...
         5f a2 52 e6 03 aa 78 34
000000D6
000000E6
          54 47 f1 57 d5 e7 0a b4
                                  e2 50 90 03 c5 a6 87 a7 TG.W.... .P.....
                                  64 43 88 ab 0d bc 0d 9b .,...+.. dC.....
000000F6
          b8 2c d9 e6 f0 2b d8 09
00000106
          be 99 c5 dd 1e b5 f1 d0
                                  73 a8 7a dc 7f 04 2f d4 ..... s.z.../.
00000116
                                  e1 f6 c5 81 c7 00 20 00
                                                          a.+...Y ...... .
                  2b dc d4 fc 59
00000126
          00 00 bc fa 64 67 11 cd
                                   cd be fc d1 b5 51 95 f8 ....dq.. ....Q..
                                  fa 35 f1 47 8f 9c f5 8d .N..QcS. .5.G....
00000136
          99 4e 82 e8 51 63 53 bb
                                  8e 4d 01 05 00 00 00 01 .#..... .M.....
00000146
          18 23 00
                  03 00 00 00 cd
00000156
          00 00 00 00 01 0d 00 00
                                                           . . . . . . . . .
0000015F
          00 ff 0e 00 00 00
00000165
         11 01 00 00 00 00 00 03
                                  00 00 00 cd 8e 4d
```


#### Why Detect Key Reuse? (4)



#### Let's Get Our Hands Dirty



## The XORspace



## The XORspace


	"C"	"R"	" <b>Y</b> "	"P"	"T"
"C"	\x00	\x11	\x1A	\x13	\x17
"R"	\x11	\x00	\x0B	\x02	\x06
" <b>丫</b> "	\x1A	\x0B	\x00	\x09	\x0D
"P"	\x13	\x02	\x09	\x00	\x04
" <b>T</b> "	\x17	\x06	\x0D	\x04	\x00


#### The XORspace

#### Input:




#### XOR Every Byte with Every Other Byte:






#### Byte Frequencies: Random vs. XorText



#### The Algorithm in a Nutshell

- Scan xorspace along the diagonals
- Look for "streaks" of positive evidence
- If positive evidence is "enough" raise alarm




#### Math tl;dr


- How do you quantify "evidence"?
  - Naive Bayesian log-odds
- How much evidence is "enough"?
  - Enough that we can expect at most about 1 FP along the whole xortext
- If we set the bar that high, can we actually detect stuff?
  - It depends on the parameters of the problem, but generally yes

$$pr(fail) \le \frac{\sigma^2}{M \left| \frac{2\log(N) - 1}{M} - \mu \right|^2}$$


#### Demo




### Evidence "Heat Map" - Ramnit




## Evidence "Heat Map" - Ramnit




## Evidence "Heat Map" - DirCrypt



# Evidence "Heat Map" - DirCrypt



#### Success



# Questions?

