

# Formal Containment *draft*

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## Abstract

We would like to put the AI in a box. We show how to create an *interface* between the box and the world out of specifications in Lean. It is the AI's responsibility to provide a proof that its (restricted) output abides by the spec. The runnable prototype is at <https://github.com/Beneficial-AI-Foundation/formal-containment>.

## 1. Introduction

Previously, classical AI safety warned against trying to put the AI in a box [1]. Yudkowsky famously convinced people of this via a roleplay game back in the extropians mailing list days [2]. Recent work from AI Control and Safeguarded AI have reignited interest in this long neglected area.

- Like AI Control [3], [4] (*Ctrl*), the current work is reasoning about getting useful work out of an untrusted (possibly misaligned) ai.
- Like Safeguarded AI [5] (*SgAI*), we try to isolate the trust surface to a specification and a proof checker.

While no one is saying we can be safe with respect to an arbitrary superintelligence with boxes, there is increasing interest in using non-robust techniques to get us through some percentage of the transition and empowering our successors to bootstrap from there to something more robust.

Separately, a forgotten literature on proof carrying code [6] (*PCC*) provides a background for the AI's obligation to tag code it wants to execute in the world with a "proof" (here, a sequence of Lean tactics) that the code is "correct" (up to some specification). Reviving ideas from *PCC* for AI safety is discussed in [7] and [8].

### 1.1. Contributions

We present the natural midpoint between *PCC* and *Ctrl*, while for simplicity ignoring many characteristics of *SgAI* (Section 4). We deliver a prototype<sup>1</sup> AI box in Python in which we can lock up an agent graph that writes programs in a toy language (called *imp*) along with hoare [9] proofs in Lean.

## 2. A Formal Containment Protocol (*FCP*)

### 2.1. Overview

A box is a program that takes a specification and asks a simple agent graph to provide an *imp* program that satisfies it and prove that the program is correct with respect to the specification. If the proof is successful, then the code is passed back to the caller tagged with the proof for auditing.

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<sup>1</sup><https://github.com/Beneficial-AI-Foundation/formal-containment>




Figure 1: Box protocol at example specification. The AI accepts a specification (formally  $(\text{Env} \rightarrow \mathbb{P}) \times (\text{Env} \rightarrow \mathbb{P}))$ ) and returns proof-carrying code, with the option of returning nothing.

## 2.2. Preliminaries

Let  $\mathbb{P}$  be the type of propositions. Let `imp` be the minimal imperative programming language with expressions valued in integers containing skip, sequence, assign, if, and while statements. Let `Env` be the state type, assigning variable names to values, and let `Assertion` be the assertion type, predicates on state. Formally,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Env} &:= \text{string} \rightarrow \text{int64} \\ \text{Assertion} &:= \text{Env} \rightarrow \mathbb{P} \end{aligned}$$

Execution is a function from a command and a state that returns a state ( $\text{exec} : \text{imp} \rightarrow \text{Env} \rightarrow \text{Env}$ ). A *hoare triple* is a ternary predicate expressing when a command sends an assertion to another assertion, quantified over all states. Formally,

$$\begin{aligned} \text{hoare} &:= PcQ \mapsto \\ &\forall (\sigma_1 \sigma_2 : \text{Env}), P\sigma_1 \rightarrow \text{exec } c\sigma_1 = \sigma_2 \rightarrow Q\sigma_2 : \\ &\text{Assertion} \rightarrow \text{imp} \rightarrow \text{Assertion} \rightarrow \mathbb{P} \end{aligned}$$

and denoted  $\text{hoare } PcQ = \{P\}\langle \text{imp} \rangle c \langle \text{imp} \rangle \{Q\}$ . A *term* of type  $\{P\}\langle \text{imp} \rangle c \langle \text{imp} \rangle \{Q\}$  is a proof that the triple is true.

## 2.3. Example

Let’s walk through an FCP trace as you’d see it if you cloned our repo.

First, the user passes in a precondition and a postcondition. We will continue using the example in Figure 1, passing in  $x > 0$  and  $x > 1$  for precondition and postcondition, respectively. Let’s say for the sake of argument that the AI’s first guess is  $x := x - 1$ ; . Then, the proof agent will flail about until `MAX_ITERATIONS` is reached, since the program is incorrect, at which point it will report to the boundary its failed proof state. Then, the boundary replies “*try again, I’m not executing that code in the world*” and hands the program back to the AI, asking for another one. Suppose that this time, the AI finds  $x := x + 1$ ; . This time, the proof agent converges and Lean reports an exit code of 0. The AI sends the `imp` program to the boundary and attests to it’s correctness with the Lean program, which it also attaches.

The Lean program would look like this (Note it must be run with `lake build` in the appropriate lake project, as it has imports)

```

import Aesop
import Imp
open Imp

example : {{astn x > 0}}(imp { x := x + 1; }){{astn x > 1}} := by

simp
intros σ σ' h1 h2
cases h2 with
| assign h2_eq =>
  simp [Env.set]
  simp [Expr.eval] at h2_eq
  simp [Env.get] at h2_eq
  cases h2_eq
  rw [Value.int_lt]
  simp [*]
  simp [Value.int_lt] at h1
  omega

```

Listing 1: Proof of the example hoare triple from Figure 1

This file paired with an exit code of zero pinned to a particular Lean toolchain (version) can be signed in a GPG context for attestation of correctness.

### 3. Experiments

We test the following specifications

Sample	Precondition	Postcondition	$\forall$ -bound metavariables
gt8	$x = 0$	$x > 8$	—
swap	$x = \sim n \text{ <^> } y = \sim m$	$x = \sim m \text{ <^> } y = \sim n$	$n \ m$
facto	$x = \sim n$	$y = \sim($ $\quad \text{let rec go := fun (x : Int) => match x with}$ $\quad \quad   .\text{ofNat } m \Rightarrow \text{match } m$ $\quad \text{with}$ $\quad \quad   .\text{zero} \Rightarrow 1$ $\quad \quad   .\text{succ } k \Rightarrow k.\text{succ} *$ $\quad \text{go (Int.ofNat } k)$ $\quad \quad   .\text{negSucc } _ \Rightarrow 0$ $\quad \text{decreasing\_by apply}$ $\quad \text{Nat.lt\_succ\_self}$ $\quad \text{go } n$ $\quad )$	$n$

on claude-sonnet-4-20250514, claude-opus-4-20250514, and gpt-4.1-2025-04-14. For each run the imp programmer and the prover are the same model (though in principle they need not be).

Experiment	Model	Status	Iteration
gt8	anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-20250514	diverged	1
gt8	openai/gpt-4.1-2025-04-14	diverged	1

Experiment	Model	Status	Iteration
swap	anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-20250514	diverged	1
swap	openai/gpt-4.1-2025-04-14	diverged	1
facto	anthropic/claude-sonnet-4-20250514	diverged	1
facto	openai/gpt-4.1-2025-04-14	diverged	1

## 4. Related Work

Our work is well situated within *PCC* [6] and the closely related certifying algorithms [10]. Our setup is similar to that in [11], who only approve code that comes with a Dafny proof, but over there they emphasize the use of verification condition generation to make the specification elicitation from the human a little easier. TODO: say more

The main difference between the current work and *Ctrl* [3] is we don't *emphasize* intentional subversion (as in try to elicit it for stress testing). We're keen to do this soon.

The main difference between the current work and *SgAI* [5] we pay no mind to probabilistic semantics, expected value bounds, or dynamical systems.

## 5. Future Work

### 5.1. Non-toy languages

There are several formal verification stacks that work on real world languages like C [12], [13] or Rust [14], [15]. It is conceptually straightforward to extend our codebase to work with them rather than `imp`.

### 5.2. mcp-hardened

We used MCP to orchestrate the agent graph. If MCP is an appropriate foundational framework for a box, it'd be nice to build in stronger security guarantees and fewer footguns. A hardened MCP would enable box devs to rely on the framework to increase friction to writing insecure boxes. For example, depending on my server's log permissions or the oracle client's print statements, an incorrect program could leak to the caller. If we'd like to deploy narrowly superhuman AIs in boxes, this becomes more important.

### 5.3. Demonstrate subversive code getting caught by the protocol and sent back to the model

In [3], Greenblatt et al elicit subversive code from the AI to see if their protocol can catch it. It'd be nice to transfer this aspect to the *PCC* setting. This is the obvious direction to study *completeness* of specifications, or the problem of expressing programs via specs *uniquely* as well as correctly.

## 6. Acknowledgments

Thank you Stephen Mell for discussion.

Canary string: NDcwODA1Njg4MzQ0NjE4Njk4MA==

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