


Work-Package 4: “Verification and Validation”

# Preliminary safety Evaluation Criteria

Latex Document Draft

Jan Welte

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**OETCS/WP4/D4.2-Draft**

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# Preliminary safety Evaluation Criteria

**Latex Document Draft**

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**Abstract:** This document presents an overview of the safety related evaluation criteria used within the openETCS document structure and based on this derives evaluation criteria for the choice of suitable tools and methods for all safety activities which have to be performed during the openETCS development process. These criteria are based on the safety activities required in D2.6 and the general concept for an openETCS safety process.

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# 1 Safety Process

The EN50128 standard defines safety as the “freedom from unacceptable levels of risk of harm to people” [? ], which shows that the safety approach required by the CENELEC standards is risk-based. As the risk is defined as the “combination of the rate of occurrence of accidents and incidents resulting in harm (caused by a hazard) and the degree of severity of that harm” this approach is based on a probabilistic understanding of event occurrence. The overall relations between all these safety-related terms used to define the safety characteristics and the properties are demonstrated by the Risk-Genesis-Model of Schnieder, which is shown in the following figure 1.




Figure 1. Risk-Genesis-Model showing the relations between the safety-related terms [? ]

This demonstrates that the first step is to define the system characteristics of a system identifying the harms and their later hazardous situations. This has to be performed during a system hazard analysis. Afterwards the specific properties of this characteristics have to be defined by assessing the risk concerning the identified hazards. Based on this work safety integrity levels can be determined for all safety functionalities which are then allocated during the design to certain safety-related systems. As this work is closely related to all design decisions, it has to be specified for all abstraction levels during the system design. This leads to safety requirements which have to be implemented in the software design and verified, as well as validated specifically on system level.

Respectively the EN50126 describes the safety process as a series of safety tasks for each life cycle phase. This task are related to a number of safety artifacts which are created, used and adapted over time by different safety activities.

## 1.1 Safety artifacts

Since all safety activities are based on the system development activities all system design artifacts are part of the safety process. Therefore, the following design artifacts of the CENELEC standard development process build the basis for all safety artifacts:

- System Concept
- System Requirements Specification
- Software Requirement Specification

- Software Architecture Specification
- Software Design Specification
- Software Module Design Specification
- Software Source Code

The main safety artifacts are those which are set-up to build the reference for the safety-related aspect during the system development, which are continuously evolved during the design phases. Correspondingly the safety process has to create artifacts to demonstrate that all safety and quality-related requirements included in the system design. Respectively the following artifacts are created during the safety process:

- System Safety Plan
- Software Quality Assurance Plan
- Hazard Log
- System Safety Requirement Specification
- Safety Case

These artifacts have to be managed over the development process. Since all safety requirements have to be verified and validated there is likewise a close to all Test and Validation Reports.

## 1.2 Safety activities

The safety activities set-up or evolve the safety artifacts in relation to the different design artifacts. Respectively, every activity has certain input and output artifacts as defined in table 1:

Overall the safety activities have to be performed in close relation to the overall verification and validation activities as these have to verify and validate all safety requirements and their results become part of the safety plan.

## 1.3 OpenETCS safety process

The presented CENELEC standard safety artifacts and activities are always related to the overall system development. Since the openETCS development process just describes the development of the on-board unit software for ETCS additional system informations are needed for the openETCS safety process. These are mainly the following two parts of the CCS TSI:

- UNISIG SUBSET-026 System Requirements Specification (Version 3.3.0)
- UNISIG SUBSET-091 Safety Requirements for the Technical Interoperability of ETCS in Levels 1 and 2 (Version 3.2.0)

In relation to SUBSET-91 further documents should be considered:



Table 1. Safety Activities and their inputs and outputs

Safety Activity	Input Artifact(s)	Output Artifact(s)
Preliminary Hazard Analysis	System Concept	Safety Plan
System Hazard and Safety Risk Analysis	System Concept and Description	Hazard Log
Risk Assessment	System Concept and Description + Hazard Log	Hazard Log
Specification of System Safety Requirements	System Requirements Specification + Hazard Log	System Safety Requirement Specifications
Define Safety Acceptance Criteria	Hazard Log	Safety Plan
Define Safety Related Functional Requirements	System Safety Requirement Specifications	System Requirements Specification
Specify Sub-System and Component Safety requirements	System Requirements Specification + System Safety Requirement Specification	System Safety Plan + System Requirements Specification + System Safety Requirement Specification
Implement Safety Plan	Safety Plan	Hazard Log + Safety Case
Validate System Safety Requirements	System Safety Requirements	Safety Case

- Part of TSI Annex A
  - SUBSET-036
  - SUBSET-037
  - SUBSET-040
  - SUBSET-041
  - SUBSET-098
- Not part of TSI Annex A
  - SUBSET-039
  - SUBSET-078
  - SUBSET-079
  - SUBSET-080
  - SUBSET-081
  - SUBSET-088

From these documents the Preliminary Hazard Analysis and the System Safety Goals have to be derived which are needed as the starting point for the openETCS safety process. Based on these information a subsystem hazard and risk analysis for the openETCS scope can be performed which set-up the openETCS hazard log. Based on these results the openETCS safety requirements will be specified, which are then further developed to functional requirements. During the development these requirements are adopted if necessary for the different abstraction

levels from the high level model down to the source code. This is done using corresponding safety backlogs, which are the reference for the safety requirement verification. Altogether the source code has to be validated against all safety requirements to demonstrate, that the software can not cause any harm. The safety case has to present all needed documentation.

The main task of the openETCS safety process concerning the interactions with the development process are shown in figure 2.




Figure 2. OpenETCS Safety Process

The openETCS safety process will be specified more detailed in the safety plan. Correspondingly, the main safety artifacts and safety activities which have to be handled during the openETCS safety process are shown in table 2 and 3.

## 1.4 Safety process supporting tools

Supporting software tools are needed to handle the safety artifacts and to some degree to more efficiently perform the safety activities. As some safety artifacts like the safety requirement specifications and the safety backlogs are closely related to design artifacts the same tools can be used. Especially all requirements should be handled by one tool to ensure full traceability and provide one main interface for the verification and validation activities.

Depending on the methods used for hazard and risk analysis appropriate tools are needed to perform the analysis, collect the hazards and associated risks in the hazard log and to evaluated possible risk control measures. Thereby, traceability has to be guarantied between all activities.

Since the safety plan and safety case provide the basis for the safety approval the tools used to generated these artifacts should help to generate a consistent argumentation and efficiently collect the data needed to provide evidence. Respectively, interfaces to manage documents and automatically generate reports would be helpful functionalities.

## 2 Evaluation Criteria

### 2.1 Safety Process

Table 2. Main openETCS safety process artifacts

Abbreviation	Safety Artifact	Degree of Formalisation
Safety Req	Safety Requirements: list of all requirements which have to be respected during the system development to reach the safety goals	Informal/ Semi-Formal / Formal
HL	Hazard Log: List of identified hazards and its associated risk classification as well as information concerning the risk control	Informal
SP	Safety Plan: Document which specifies all activities, resources and events to ensure that the source code will satisfy all relevant safety requirements	Informal
SC	Safety Case: Documentation which demonstrates that the used development process and the resulting source code fulfill all safety requirements	Informal
CSB	Code Safety Backlog: list of requirements/ properties to be implemented inside the dM derived from the HL (and the dMSB)	Semi-Formal/ Strictly-Formal
dMSB	Detailed Model Safety Backlog: list of requirements/ properties to be implemented inside the dM derived from the HL (and the hLSB)	Semi-Formal/ Strictly-Formal
hLSB	High Level Safety Backlog: list of requirements/ properties to be implemented inside the hM derived from the HL	Informal/ Semi-Formal

Table 3. Main openETCS safety process activities

Safety Activity	Input Artifact(s)	Output Artifact(s)
Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PHA)	Mainly SUBSET-91	Safety Plan + Safety Goals
Sub-System Hazard and Risk Analysis (SSHA)	Mainly SSRS + Safety Goals	Hazard Log
Specification of Sub-System Safety Requirements	SUBSET-26 + SUBSET-91 + Hazard Log	Safety Requirement Specifications
Define Safety Acceptance Criteria	Hazard Log	Safety Plan
Update Hazard Log	Verification Reports + Test Cases	Hazard Log
Specify functional and model specific Requirements	SSRS + Safety Requirement Specification	Safety Plan + Model Backlogs
Verify Safety Requirements	Models + Safety Requirements + Model Backlogs	Verification Report + Safety Case
Validate Safety Requirements	Source Code + Safety Requirements	Validation Report + Safety Case

## 2.2 Supporting tools

### References