# Modeling & Verification

**Strong Bisimilarity** 

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Slides courtesy of Giorgio Bacci

#### in the last Lecture

- CCS the basic principles & motivations
- Examples
- CCS formal definition (syntax & semantics)

#### in this Lecture

- Value-passing CCS
- Behavioural Equivalences (idea & motivations)
- Strong Bisimilarity
- Game characterisation of Bisimilarity


# Value-passing CCS

#### Main Idea

In pure CCS communication is just synchronisation with no exchange of data. In many application, however, processes do exchange data when communicate.

To allow for the natural modelling of data exchange we extend the CCS language with two prefixing operations:

**Input Prefix** 



**Output Prefix** 

#### **Defining Equations**

Job(amount) 
$$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \overline{pay}$$
 (amount).0  
Worker  $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} pay(x).\overline{save}(x/2).$ Worker  
Bank(total)  $\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} save(y).$ Bank(total + y)

### Formal Semantics(\*)

we have two new rules for the prefixing operators

$$(IN) \xrightarrow{a(x).P \xrightarrow{a(n)} P\{n/x\}} (OUT) \xrightarrow{\overline{a(e).P} \xrightarrow{\overline{a(n)} P}} where \ v(e) = n$$

$$\overline{a(e).P \xrightarrow{\overline{a(n)} P}} (P)$$


and one rule to deal with parametrised constants

(CON) 
$$\frac{P\{n_1/x_1,...,n_m/x_m\} \xrightarrow{\alpha} P'}{K(e_1,...,e_m) \xrightarrow{\alpha} P'} \text{ where } K(x_1,...,x_m) \stackrel{def}{=} P \text{ and } for all } 1 \leq i \leq m, \text{ } v(e_i) = n_i}$$

(\*) This only works for CCS expressions with no free occurrences of value variables

# Encoding into pure CCS

As argued by Milner (1989), value-passing CCS is theoretically unnecessary: one can encode it into pure CCS



# **Expressivity of CCS**

#### **Fact**

In CCS one can encode and simulate the computation of any Turing machine.

Hence, the CCS language is as expressive as any other programming language.

However, it is mainly used to describe the behaviour of reactive systems rather than to perform specific calculation

# Behavioural Equivalences

idea & motivations

### Implementation vs Specification

CCS can be used to describe both implementations of processes and specifications of their expected behaviours

#### **Implementation**

CS def pub.coin.coffee.CS

CM \( \frac{\text{def}}{=} \) coin.coffee.CM

Sys = (CM | CS)\{coin,coffee}

#### **Specification**

Spec ef pub.Spec

Question: is the process Sys behaving according to the specification Spec?

### Implementation Verification

One way to check that Sys behaves according to Spec is to check that they are behavioural equivalent


#### Criteria for a good behavioural equivalence

- it should be based only on the behaviour (i.e., by looking only at the available actions)
- abstract from non-determinism
- it should not consider internal behaviour
- it should be at least a preorder

reflexive and transitive

it should be a congruence


# Congruence



# Congruence

#### **Definition**

A relation  $R \subseteq \mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{P}$  is said to be a *congruence* if, for each context C[], P R Q implies C[P] R C[Q].



a first attempt...

# Trace Equivalence

The semantic of processes is given as LTS, which are essentially automata. The classic theory of automata suggests a ready-made notion of equivalence:

#### **Definition (Trace Equivalence)**

Let (Proc, Act,  $\{\stackrel{\alpha}{\longrightarrow} \mid \alpha \in Act \}$ ) be an LTS.

For each s∈Proc, define

Trace(s) = 
$$\{w \in Act^* \mid \exists s' \in Proc. \ s \xrightarrow{w} s' \}$$
.

We say that  $s,s' \in Proc$  are *trace equivalent*, written  $s \equiv_t s'$ , if and only if, Trace(s) = Trace(s').

### Trace Equivalence (example)

Consider the processes

CTM' def coin.coffee.CTM' + coin.tea.CTM'


prove it!

It is easy to see that Trace(CTM) = Trace(CTM'), hence the processes CTM and CTM' are trace equivalent.

Is it enough to say that CTM and CTM' behave the same?


### Observable Capabilities

Let's try to perform a black-box experiment (we are only allowed to interact with observable actions)




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# Strong Bisimilarity

idea: if no external observer can tell two processes apart

### break?

# Strong Bisimilarity

Let (Proc, Act,  $\{ \stackrel{\alpha}{\longrightarrow} \mid \alpha \in Act \}$ ) be an LTS.

#### **Definition (Strong Bisimulation)**


A binary relation R⊆Proc×Proc is a *strong bisimulation* iff whenever s R t, for each α∈Act

- if  $s \stackrel{\alpha}{\rightarrow} s'$ , then  $t \stackrel{\alpha}{\rightarrow} t'$ , for some t' such that s'R t'
- if  $t \stackrel{\alpha}{\rightarrow} t'$ , then  $s \stackrel{\alpha}{\rightarrow} s'$ , for some s' such that s'R t'


#### **Definition (Strong Bisimilarity)**

Two states s,t∈Proc are strongly bisimilar (s ~ t) iff there exists a strong bisimulation R such that s R t.

~ = U{R | R is a strong bisimulation }



To show that s ~ t, we just need to exhibit a strong bisimulation R such that s R t.



To show that s ~ t, we need to find a strong bisimulation R such that s R t.

$$R = \{(s,t), (s_1,t_1), (s_2, t_1)\}$$

one needs to show that it satisfies the conditions of strong bisimulation

# **Basic Properties**

#### **Theorem**

~ is an equivalence (reflexive, symmetric, and transitive)

#### **Theorem**

- ~ is the *largest strong bisimulation*, that is, s ~ t, if and only if, for each  $\alpha \in Act$ 
  - if  $s \xrightarrow{\alpha} s'$ , then  $t \xrightarrow{\alpha} t'$ , for some t' such that  $s' \sim t'$
  - if  $t \xrightarrow{\alpha} t'$ , then  $s \xrightarrow{\alpha} s'$ , for some s' such that  $s' \sim t'$

# Bisimilarity & CCS

Clearly the definition of bisimilarity applies also to CCS processes by means of its LTS semantics

#### **Theorem**

Let P and Q be CCS processes such that P ~ Q. Then

- $\alpha.P \sim \alpha.Q$ , for each  $\alpha \in Act$
- P+R ~ Q+R and R+P ~ R+Q, for each CCS process R
- P|R ~ Q|R and R|P ~ R|Q, for each CCS process R
- P[f] ~ Q[f], for each relabelling function f
- P\L ~ Q\L, for each set of labels L⊆A

hence, bisimilarity is a congruence for CCS operations

# Bisimilarity & CCS

#### **Theorem**

For any P, Q, and R CCS processes, the following hold

- P+Q ~ Q+P (nondeterministic choice is symmetric)
- P|Q ~ Q|P (parallel composition is symmetric)
- P+0 ~ P (0 is null element for nondeterministic choice)
- P|0 ~ P (0 is null element for parallel composition)
- (P+Q)+R ~ P+(Q+R) (nondet. choice is associative)
- (P|Q)|R ~ P|(Q|R) (parallel composition is associative)

# Game characterisation of Bisimilarity

### What about non-bisimilarity?

It is natural to asks if there are techniques to show that two states are *not* bisimilar

#### How to prove s ≠ t

- Enumerate all binary relations and show that none of them is a strong bisimulation containing (s,t). (Expansive: 2<sup>n2</sup> relations, for an LTS with n states)
- Make certain observations which will enable to disqualify many bisimulation candidates in one step
- Use game characterisation of strong bisimilarity.

General and economic

### Strong Bisimulation Game

Let (Proc, Act,  $\{ \stackrel{\alpha}{\longrightarrow} \mid \alpha \in Act \}$ ) be an LTS, and s,t $\in$ Proc.

We define a two-player game of an 'attacker' and a 'defender' starting from s and t

- The game is played in rounds and the configurations of the game are pairs of states from ProcxProc.
- In every round, exactly one configuration is called current.
- Initially, the game has (s,t) as starting (current) configuration.

#### Intuition

The defender wants to show that s and t are strongly bisimilar, while the attacker aims to prove the opposite.

#### The Rules of the Game

#### **Rounds of Bisimulation Games**

#### Each round goes as follows:

- 1. The attacker chooses one of the processes in the current configuration and makes a  $\stackrel{\alpha}{\rightarrow}$ -move for some  $\alpha \in Act$ ;
- 2. the defender must respond with a matching  $\stackrel{\alpha}{\rightarrow}$ -move with same action  $\alpha$  in the other process.

The reached pair of processes becomes the next current configuration. The game then continues by another round.

#### **Winning Conditions**

- If one player cannot move, the other player wins;
- If the game is infinite, the defender wins.


#### The Game Characterisation

A *universal strategy* is a set of moves (possibly conditional) describing what a player does in each configuration.


#### Theorem


- The states s and t are strongly bisimilar iff the defender has a universal winning strategy starting from the configuration (s,t).
- The states s and t are not strongly bisimilar iff the attacker has a universal winning strategy starting from the configuration (s,t).


It often provides elegant arguments for proving the negative case



To show that s ~ t, we provide a universal winning strategy for the defender, starting from the configuration (s,t)









#### From (s,t)

- 1. if attacker makes the move  $t \stackrel{a}{\rightarrow} t_1$ , then defender reacts with  $s \stackrel{a}{\rightarrow} s_2$
- 2. if attacker makes the move  $s \stackrel{a}{\rightarrow} s_1$ , then defender reacts with  $t \stackrel{a}{\rightarrow} t_1$
- 3. if attacker makes the move  $s \stackrel{a}{\rightarrow} s_2$ , then defender reacts with  $t \stackrel{a}{\rightarrow} t_1$

Hence from (s,t) there are two possible next configurations:  $(s_1,t_1)$  and  $(s_2,t_1)$ .







From  $(s_2,t_1)$ 

- 1. if attacker makes the move  $s_2 \stackrel{b}{\rightarrow} s_2$ , then defender reacts with  $t_1 \stackrel{b}{\rightarrow} t_1$
- 2. if attacker makes the move  $t_1 \stackrel{b}{\rightarrow} t_1$ , then defender reacts with  $s_2 \stackrel{b}{\rightarrow} s_2$

Hence from  $(s_2,t_1)$  we can only reach the configuration  $(s_2,t_1)$ .

defender wins with an infinite game






From  $(s_1,t_1)$ 


- 1. if attacker makes the move  $s_1 \stackrel{b}{\rightarrow} s_2$ , then defender reacts with  $t_1 \stackrel{b}{\rightarrow} t_1$
- 2. if attacker makes the move  $t_1 \stackrel{b}{\rightarrow} t_1$ , then defender reacts with  $s_1 \stackrel{b}{\rightarrow} s_2$


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
defender wins with an infinite game



To show that s ≠ t, we provide a universal winning strategy for the attacker, starting from the configuration (s,t)







From (s,t)


**attacker** makes the move  $s \stackrel{a}{\rightarrow} s_1$ .


Then defender can react as

1. 
$$t \stackrel{a}{\longrightarrow} t_1$$

2. 
$$t \stackrel{a}{\longrightarrow} t_2$$

Hence from (s,t) there are two possible next configurations:  $(s_1,t_1)$  and  $(s_1,t_2)$ .





From  $(s_1,t_1)$ 

attacker makes the move  $s_1 \stackrel{c}{\longrightarrow} s_3$ . Then defender cannot move with matching c label.

From  $(s_1,t_2)$ 

attacker makes the move  $s_1 \stackrel{b}{\longrightarrow} s_2$ . Then defender cannot move with matching b label.

attacker wins with a finite game