Conducting an Enterprise-Wide NIST Cybersecurity Framework Assessment for MediHealth Solutions Inc.

Prepared by: **Benjamin Tetteh** Date: 5th February, 2025

This assessment evaluates the cybersecurity posture of MediHealth Solutions Inc., a midsized healthcare provider, using the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF). It identifies vulnerabilities, assesses risk exposure, and provides a structured remediation plan to enhance security resilience. The assessment focuses on protecting patient data, ensuring HIPAA compliance, and mitigating cyber threats through policy recommendations and technical controls.

Scenario

MediHealth Solutions Inc. is a fictional mid-sized healthcare provider with 500 employees, 20 clinics across the U.S., a telemedicine platform, and a patient portal. As they handle sensitive patient data (PHI/PII), compliance with HIPAA is mandatory. Recently, the company experienced a phishing attack, compromising an employee's email account and leading to unauthorized access to patient records. In response, the Board of Directors mandated a full NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF) assessment to identify security gaps, prioritize risks, and improve resilience.

Assessment Scope, Goals and Risk Analysis

Scope: This assessment evaluates the cybersecurity posture of MediHealth Solutions Inc. as of February 2025. Recommendations will outline prioritized actions for a 12-month implementation period, from February 2025 to February 2026.

Goals:	The goals of this task are to:
	Assess security posture, risks, and gaps.
	Recommend NIST-aligned controls, policies, and best practices.
	Ensure compliance with HIPAA, NIST CSF, and NIST SP 800-53.
	Mitigate risks related to legacy systems, human error, third-party vendors, and
	insufficient monitoring.

Risk Analysis

Ш	Legacy Systems: The Electronic Health Record (EHR) system runs on outdated
	Windows Server 2012 with no patch management. Medical IoT devices (e.g., MRI
	machines) use default passwords and lack network segmentation.
	Compliance Risks: HIPAA audit findings flagged insufficient access controls for
	patient data. No formal incident response plan exists for ransomware or data
	breaches.
	Third-Party Risks: A third-party billing vendor was recently breached, exposing
	MediHealth's financial data.
	Human Factors: 30% of employees failed a recent phishing simulation. No
	cybersecurity training program exists for clinical staff.
	Detection Gaps: No centralized logging or monitoring for the telemedicine platform.

NIST Cybersecurity Framework Walkthrough

The NIST Cybersecurity Framework consists of five core functions that guide cybersecurity risk management. These functions which are – Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover, form a comprehensive life cycle for addressing security challenges.

1. Identify

This function focuses on asset management, risk assessment, and governance.

Asset Inventory

Asset	Туре	Description	User	Data	Criticality
				Stored	
Electronic	IT System	Stores and manages	IT Team	PHI, PII	High
Health Records		patient data			
(EHR) System					
Telemedicine	IT System	Used for remote	Patients,	PHI, PII	High
Platform		patient consultations	staff		
		and data exchange			
Patient portal	Cloud	Allows patients to	Patients	PHI, PII	High
	service	access their health			
		records and			
		communicate with			
		providers			

MRI Machine	IoT Device	Medical equipment	Staff	Patient	Medium
				scans	
Billing &	Third	External financial	Clinic	Financial	High
Payment	party	services handling		data	
processing	vendor	transactions			
system					
Clinical Staff	Human	Works at clinic	Clinic	PHI, PII	High
	asset				

Risk Assessment

Asset	Vulnerability	Threat Event	Likelihood	Severity	Risk
					Score
EHR System	Unpatched	Data exfiltration	3	3	9
	Windows Server				
	2012				
Telemedicine	No centralized	Undetected breach	4	4	16
platform	logging or				
	monitoring				
Patient Portal	No MFA	Data exfiltration	3	4	12
MRI Machine	Default passwords	Disrupt mission-	4	5	20
	in use and lack	critical operations			
	network				
	segmentation				
Billing &	Recently breached	Data exfiltration	4	4	16
Payment	exposing				
processing	MediHealth's				
system	financial data				
Clinical Staff	No cybersecurity	Unauthorized	4	5	20
	training program	access			
	exists				

Risk Matrix:

High (15–25): Immediate action required.

Medium (5–14): Address within six months.

2. Protect

The Protect function focuses on safeguards to minimize risk exposure.

Protection Measures & NIST SP 800-53 Controls, Resources, Timelines and Cost

Asset	Gap Identified	NIST	Recommendation	Timeline	Cost
Asset	Gap identified	Control	/ Action		
	No automated		Deploy WSUS for	6 months	\$20,000
EHR System	patching	SI-2, CM-3	automated		
	patering		updates		
Telemedicine			Deploy SIEM &	3 months	\$15,000
Platform	No monitoring	SI-4, SC-7	IDS (Splunk,		
Piatioiiii			Nessus, OpenVas)		
	No Multi		Enforce MFA via	2 weeks	\$3,000
Patient Portal	Factor	IA-2, IA-8	Google or		
Patient Portai	Authentication	IA-2, IA-6	Microsoft		
	(MFA)		Authenticator		
	Default	AC-2, AC-3	Implement Role	2 weeks	\$2,000
	credentials		Based Access		
	credentials		Controls		
MRI Machine			(Bitwarden)		
IVIKI IVIACIIIITE	Lack of		Implement	1 month	\$5,000
		SC-7. AC-4,	network		
	network	CM-7	segmentation via		
	segmentation		VLANs		
Dilling System	Third-party	SC-12,	Encrypt data in	3 months	\$10,000
Billing System	breach	SC-13	transit & at rest		
			Conduct regular	Ongoing	\$13,000
	No		cybersecurity		
Clinical Staff	cybersecurity	AT-2, AT-3	training		
	training		(KnowBe4,		
			GoPhish)		

MediHealth will use the following scheduled cybersecurity training calendar to improve security awareness and compliance.

Cybersecurity Training Calendar

Month	Training Topic	Target Audience	Training Method
February	Introduction to Cybersecurity & HIPAA Compliance	- All Employees	Online Training & Quiz
rebruary	Phishing Awareness & Email Security	All Employees	Simulation & Workshop
March	Secure Passwords & Multi- Factor Authentication	All Employees	Online Video & Quiz
April	Social Engineering & Insider Threats	IT & HR Teams	Live Webinar
May	Endpoint Security & Safe Remote Internet Use Employees		Online Training
June	Medical IoT & Device Security	Clinical Staff	Hands-On Workshop
July	Secure Use of Telemedicine & Patient Portals	Doctors & Nurses	Interactive Session
August	Incident Response & Reporting Procedures	IT & Security Teams	Tabletop Exercise
September	Data Encryption & Secure Data Handling	Admin & Billing	Policy Review
October	National Cybersecurity Awareness Month	All Employees	Company-wide Event
November	Third-Party & Vendor Security Risks	Procurement & Legal	Risk Assessment
December	Year-End Cybersecurity Recap &	All Employees	CEO Security
December	Best Practices	All Elliployees	Briefing
January	Phishing Awareness & Email Security Recap	All Employees	Simulation & Workshop

3. Detect

Activities in this function include continuous monitoring, threat detection technologies and security event analysis. The absence of a central logging or monitoring system means that MediHealth cannot track suspicious activities and cannot actively watch logs and system activity to detect threats in real time. A recent breach on a third-party billing vendor has also exposed MediHealth's financial data.

This has serious security implications for MediHealth and its patients. Hackers could steal patient data or hijack video calls without detection. Investigating a breach without logs could be very difficult and increase incident response time. HIPAA requires logging and monitoring for PHI access which means MediHealth could face fines, lawsuits and suffer reputational damage.

The solutions to improve the detection capabilities of MediHealth which are crucial for minimizing impact:

for signs of compromise and automate response actions.

Deploy a Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system to collect and
analyze logs from all critical systems, including the telemedicine platform.
Deploy Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) and Intrusions Prevention Systems (IPS) to

detect unsual network trainic patterns and prevent unauthorized access.
Install Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR) solutions to monitor endpoint devices

4. Respond

To ensure a swift and coordinated response to security breaches, MediHealth must develop and implement a formal Incident Response Plan (IRP) in alignment with NIST SP 800-61 Rev.

2. The absence of an IRP can lead to delayed responses, allowing threats to spread and disrupt critical healthcare operations. This could result in regulatory penalties, legal consequences, and financial losses due to downtime and ransom payments.

To mitigate these risks, the IRP should clearly define roles, responsibilities, and escalation procedures for incident handling. Additionally, quarterly tabletop exercises should be conducted to test and refine response readiness.

Incident Response Plan

1. Roles & Responsibilities

Role	Team Member	Responsibilities
Incident Commander	CISO/IT Director	Oversee response, declare incident severity,
micident Commander	CISO/II Director	approve critical actions.
IT Team	Network	Isolate systems, eradicate malware, restore
Ti Team	Engineers	backups.
Legal Advisor	General Counsel	Ensure HIPAA breach notifications (within 60
Legal Advisor		days), manage legal risks.
PR Lead	Communications	Draft patient/regulator notifications,
PK Ledu	Communications	manage media inquiries.
Clinical Lead	Head of Nursing	Ensure continuity of patient care during
Cillical Lead	Tieau of Nursing	downtime.

2. Ransomware Response Procedure

Step	Action
	Trigger: SIEM alerts for mass file encryption or
Detection	suspicious ransomware.txt files.
Detection	IT Team: Disconnect infected device from network.
	Clinical Lead: Switch to paper records if EHR is down.
	Isolate legacy EHR server (Windows 2012) in a segmented
Containment	VLAN.
	Block malicious IPs via firewall
	Run anti-malware scans with Malwarebytes or Microsoft
Eradication	Defender. Check No More Ransom for decryption tools.
	Patch vulnerabilities.
	Restore encrypted data from immutable backups (stored
Recovery	offline).
	Test EHR functionality before reconnecting to the network.
	Legal Advisor: File HIPAA breach report with HHS within 60
Reporting	days.
	PR Lead: Notify affected patients via email/letter
Post-Incident Review	Conduct a lessons-learned meeting to analyze the incident
rost-incident Review	response and identify areas for improvement.

5. Recover

This function emphasizes restoring systems and services to normal operations following a cybersecurity event. Post-incident, systems must be restored efficiently to maintain business continuity. Key activities should include:

Implementing regular, secure, offline backups.
Developing and implementing a structured business continuity plan to maintain
critical healthcare operations during an incident, ensuring minimal disruption to
patient care.
Conducting ransomware recovery drills.
Developing a communication plan to address public concerns and maintain trust
with patients and stakeholders.

Implementation Roadmap (12-month)

Timeline	Task	KPI	Estimated	
Timeline			Cost	
	Deploy MFA & RBAC	100% MFA	\$5,000	
1 week		enforcement on EHR	33,000	
		and Patient Portal		
1 - 3 months	Upgrade EHR System	100% legacy systems	\$20,000	
1 - 3 months		patched		
1 – 3 months	Data encryption	100% data encryption	\$10,000	
		across all systems	310,000	
3 - 6 months	Implement SIEM and	90% log coverage and	\$20,000	
3 - 0 1110111115	network segmentation	IoT segmentation	\$20,000	
	Cybersecurity Training for Staff	Phishing failure rate		
Ongoing		<10%; HIPAA training	\$13,000	
		completion >90%		

Recommendations

MediHealth Solutions Inc. must prioritize access controls and data protection to safeguard sensitive patient information. Implementing Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) will ensure employees only access data critical to their roles—for example, restricting EHR

modifications to physicians while limiting billing staff to financial systems. Pairing RBAC with Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for high-risk accounts and encrypting data both at rest (AES-256) and in transit (TLS 1.3) will mitigate unauthorized access. Additionally, adopting an enterprise password manager and enforcing 14-character passwords will reduce credential theft risks, while network segmentation (e.g., isolating legacy EHR systems and IoT devices on separate VLANs) will contain potential breaches.

To bolster threat detection and system resilience, MediHealth should deploy a SIEM tool to centralize logging and alert on anomalies such as mass data exports or ransomware file patterns. Complement this with an Intrusion Detection System (IDS) like Suricata to monitor IoT device traffic for malicious activity. Legacy systems require urgent attention: prioritize patching critical vulnerabilities within 24 hours and implement virtual patching for systems that cannot be immediately updated. Immutable, air-gapped backups and monthly recovery drills will ensure business continuity during ransomware attacks, while a formal incident response plan will streamline containment, HIPAA-compliant breach notifications, and recovery.

Finally, human risk mitigation is critical. Regular cybersecurity training—tailored to roles like clinical staff (phishing simulations) and IT teams (ransomware tabletop exercises)—will reduce the 30% phishing failure rate. Third-party risks can be managed through vendor cybersecurity assessments. By aligning these efforts with HIPAA and NIST CSF standards, MediHealth will not only avoid costly fines but also build patient trust through demonstrable data protection. A phased 12-month rollout, starting with RBAC/MFA and concluding with staff training, ensures manageable, measurable progress toward a robust security posture.

This version balances technical depth with readability, emphasizes outcomes, and aligns with compliance frameworks—perfect for executive summaries or portfolio case studies.

Conclusion

This assessment provides a comprehensive cybersecurity evaluation of MediHealth Solutions Inc. By implementing the recommended controls and best practices, MediHealth will enhance its security posture, ensure regulatory compliance, and protect patient data from cyber threats.

APPENDIX 1: Online Resources

NIST CSF Documentation: NIST Cybersecurity Framework
HIPAA Security Rule Checklist: HHS HIPAA Guidelines
Phishing training: https://www.knowbe4.com/products/security-awareness-training
Phishing simulator: GoPhish https://getgophish.com/
HIPAA Training for Healthcare Staff.
CISA Cybersecurity Awareness Training
HIPAA Breach Notification Checklist
CISA Ransomware Response Checklist
Ransomware decryptor: https://www.nomoreransom.org

APPENDIX 2: Ransomware Response Playbook

Step	Description	Responsible Team	Tick
Detection & Identification	Monitor SIEM alerts for unusual activity, file encryption patterns, or unauthorized access. Identify affected systems and endpoints.	Security Operations Center (SOC), IT Team	
Containment	Disconnect infected devices from the network. Disable compromised user accounts. Restrict further spread by isolating affected segments.	IT Team, Network Security Team	
Eradication & Investigation	Remove ransomware payloads using endpoint security solutions. Conduct forensic analysis to determine attack vector. Patch vulnerabilities.	IT Team, Digital Forensics Team	
Recovery	Restore systems from verified, uncompromised backups. Test system integrity before reconnecting to the network. Ensure data integrity.	IT Team, Business Continuity Team	
Communication & Reporting	Notify internal security teams, executives, regulators like HIPAA and affected patients if PHI/PII is compromised. Engage law enforcement if required.	Compliance Team, Legal Team, PR Team	
Lessons Learned & Prevention	Conduct post-mortem analysis. Update incident response plans and security policies. Implement additional security measures like MFA and network segmentation.	Security Team, Risk Management Team	

APPENDIX 3: Incident Handlers Checklist

Indicate "Yes", "No" or "N/A" to answer the question and provide reasons where applicable

Yes/No	Question	Notes
	1. Preparation	
	Are all members aware of the security policies of the organization?	
	Do all members of the Computer Incident Response Team know	
	whom to contact?	
	Do all incident responders have access to journals and access to	
	incident response toolkits to perform the actual incident response process?	
	Have all members participated in incident response drills to	
	practice the incident response process and to improve overall	
	proficiency on a regularly established basis?	
	2. Identification	
	Where did the incident occur?	
	Who reported or discovered the incident?	
	How was it discovered?	
	Are there any other areas that have been compromised by the	
	incident? If so what are they and when were they discovered?	
	What is the scope of the impact?	
	What is the business impact?	
	Have the source(s) of the incident been located? If so, where,	
	when, and what are they?	
	3. Containment	
	a. Short-term containment	
	Can the problem be isolated?	
	1) If so, then proceed to isolate the affected systems.	
	2) If not, then work with system owners and/or managers to	
	determine	
	further action necessary to contain the problem.	
	Are all affected systems isolated from non-affected systems?	
	1) If so, then continue to the next step.	
	2) If not, then continue to isolate affected systems until short-	
	term containment has been accomplished to prevent the	
	incident from escalating any further.	
	b. System-backup	

	orensic copies of affected systems been created for further
analys	
1)	Have all commands and other documentation since the
	incident has occurred been kept up to date so far?
	a) If not, document all actions taken as soon as possible to
	ensure all evidence are retained for either prosecution
	and/or lessons learned.
2)	Are the forensic copies stored in a secure location?
	a) If so, then continue onto the next step.
	b) If not, then place the forensic images into a secure
	location to prevent accidental damage and/or
	tampering.
c. Long	g-term containment
1)	If the system can be taken offline, then proceed to the
	Eradication phase.
2)	If the system must remain in production, proceed with long-
	term containment by removing all malware and other
	artifacts from affected systems, and harden the affected
	systems from further attacks until an ideal circumstance will
	allow the affected systems to be reimaged.
4 5404	dication
	1.77.7.7
	ible, can the system be reimaged and then hardened with
'	es and/or other countermeasures to prevent or reduce the attacks?
i.	
11	Il made come and allow out to state the first to the state of
	Ill malware and other artifacts left behind by the attackers
	emoved and the affected systems hardened against further
attack	
i.	If not, then please explain why?

5. Recovery		
Has the affected system(s) been patched and hardened against the		
recent attack, as well as possible future ones?		
What day and time would be feasible to restore the affected		
systems back into production?		
What tools are you going to use to test, monitor, and verify that the		
systems being restored to productions are not compromised by the		
same methods that cause the original incident?		
How long are you planning to monitor the restored systems and		
what are you going to look for?		
Are there any prior benchmarks that can be used as a baseline to		
compare monitoring results of the restored systems against those		
of the baseline?		
6. Lessons Learned		
Have all necessary documentation from the incident been written?		
i. If so, then generate the incident response report for the		
lessons learned meeting.		
ii. If not, then have documentation written as soon as possible		
before anything is forgotten and left out of the report.		
Assuming the incident response report has been completed, does it		
document and answer the following questions of each phase of the		
incident response process: (Who? What? Where? Why? And		
How?)?		
i. Can a lessons learned meeting be scheduled within two		
weeks after the incident has been resolved?		
ii. If not, then please explain why and when is the next		
convenient time to hold it?		
convenient time to noid it:		
Lessons Learned Meeting		
i. Review the incident response process of the incident that		
had occurred with all CIRT members.		
ii. Did the meeting discuss any mistake or areas where the		
response process could have been handled better?		
If no such conversations occurred, then please explain why?		
in no such conversations occurred, their please explain why:		