


Tutorial 10

SOEN-321

TMN Key Distribution Protocol



Based on two secure primitives:

- Information theoretic.
- computational complexity (RSA $e=3$).

Attacker observes:

a, b, r_{AB}

and needs to find r_b


$$r_b = a^{\frac{1}{3}} \oplus r_{AB} \quad \text{or} \quad r_b = b^{\frac{1}{3}}$$

IS TMN Protocol Secure?

Based on two secure primitives:

- Not secure if collusion/cooperation of principals can happen.
- Attacker can take on the role of several principals (she will act as two principals).
- Hint for the attack:
 - KDC is a decryption service.
 - KDC input can be from a previous observed run.


TMN Key Distribution Protocol



- Both C and D are the attacker.
- The goal is to find r_b (from a previous observed run).
- Attacker use the following equation to find r_b (Note that attacker knows r_D and r_C)
- $r_{CD} = r_C \times r_B \oplus r_D$

$$r_B = \frac{(r_{CD} \oplus r_D)}{r_C}$$

Chosen ciphertext attack on RSA




User sends ciphertext to the server that decrypts it and sends back the message

Server doesn't decrypt the same ciphertext twice

Can an attacker find the corresponding m without having the private key?

Chosen ciphertext attack on RSA



- The attacker can win the game by sending: $C_2 = C \times R^e \bmod n$
(R is random number chosen by the attacker)
- Server replies with:
$$M_2 = (C \times R^e)^d = m \times R$$
- Since the attacker knows R, he finds m:
$$m = M_2 \times R^{-1}$$
- Therefore, the attacker wins the game without knowing the private key of the user.