



Analysis Report of the Deri Protocol Incident



1. Beosin EagleEye has monitored a significant price drop on the DERI-BUSD pair.



2. From the project's tweet, Beosin learned that the project's co-founder was subject to a phishing attack, which resulted in the attacker stealing DERI tokens from the project's treasury. The project subsequently contacted Beosin to conduct an investigation into the attack. Through on-chain analysis, it was found that the DERI tokens at the project's treasury address oxEB9F....738 were transferred to address oxe3ae...031.



3. The address oxe3ae...031 has been continuously swapping DERI for BUSD on several trading platforms.




4. According to the tweets from the co-founder of Deri

Protocol(https://twitter.com/ox_Alpha/ status/1641787814068240384), the incident was caused by a phishing attack on the co-founder of Deri Protocol. This incident has no connection to the smart contract of Deri Protocol itself, and according to the project's website, the smart contract has passed security audits by two independent third-party auditors.

The total loss is 9,788,820 DERI from this phishing attack. Beosin security team tracked the stolen assets and the results are as follows:

1. A total of 5,342,699 DERI were stolen on BNB Chain, of which 1,100,700 were transferred to the MEXC exchange via

oxdb18F1dCcEE3ocF085D25b9E1BA80713F91dA8D6 address for a profit of 33,812 DAI, and the remaining 4,241,999 DERI were swapped into 158,356 DAI via multiple trading platforms, and finally converted into BNB for deposit into Fixed Float Hot Wallet 0x4727250679294802377dD6cA6541B8E459077c95.



2. A total of 4,446,121 DERI tokens were also stolen on Ethereum. The attacker bridged 2,500,000 of these DERIs to Arbitrum. The attacker then swapped 1.2 million DERI into 32,447 DAI; the remaining 1.3M DERI were swapped into 16.37 WETH, and then into 29,960 USDC. Then, the attacker bridged these assets to the 0x93cb869ac6020912920a09b11399b8be6e65fad3 address on BSC in batches via anySwap. The 0x93cb....fad3 address finally sent these assets to Fixed Float hot wallet address 0x4727....c95.



3. For the remaining tokens, 1.4M DERI was transferred to MEXC.




4. At this point, the attacker swapped the remaining 500,000 DERI into DAI and other tokens, swapped out 9,701 USDCs and bridged to the 0x93c....fad3 address on BSC, and finally deposited to the Fixed Float hot wallet address 0x4727...c95.




Fund Flow

BSC Chain:



ETH Chain:



Security recommendations:

- 1. Use multi-signature wallets/cold wallets to store the project's treasury.
- 2. When interacting with the Web3 protocol, wallet users should confirm the correctness of the official website to avoid accessing a phishing website.

- 3. Wallet users need to carefully verify the signature content when signing.
- 4. Suggest contacting MEXC for further forensics investigation.