

# Ransomware Incident Response Playbook: LockBit 3.0 Kill Chain

**Objective:** To provide comprehensive, validated detection coverage and a structured, multi-stage response procedure for a full ransomware kill chain (Initial Access through Impact).

**Adversary Campaign:** LockBit 3.0 Style (as simulated in the lab report)

## 1. Detection and Triage Stages

This table outlines the high-priority detection queries that trigger an alert and the immediate steps to validate the threat.

Stage	MITRE Tactic	High-Fidelity Detection Trigger (Based on Lab Queries)	Triage Action
1. Initial Access / RAT Install	T1219, T1547.001	New process creation (DeviceProcessEvents) for known remote access tools like <b>AnyDesk.exe</b> or <b>TeamViewer.exe</b> , OR associated Registry Persistence (DeviceRegistryEvents).	<b>Isolate the Source Host</b> immediately and confirm if the account (CORP\bob, CORP\alice) authorized the installation.
2. Reconnaissance	T1059.001	Excessive execution of discovery commands (net view, whoami, ipconfig, Get-LocalUser) by the same process	Check for follow-up Lateral Movement attempts (Stage 3). If isolated, proceed to forensically image.

		or account in a short time frame.	
<b>3. Lateral Movement</b>	T1569.002, T1047	<b>Network Logon (Type 3)</b> to critical servers (DC/SQL) from a previously unauthenticated host, especially when initiated by tools like <b>PsExec.exe</b> or <b>wmiprvse.exe</b> over SMB ports (445/139).	<b>Disable the Compromised User Account</b> (CORP\svc-backup) and <b>isolate the source host</b> (e.g., ENG-VM03).
<b>4. Data Staging</b>	T1119	Creation of large archive files (.zip, .7z, .rar) on shared UNC paths (FilePath has @"\\"") by non-backup service accounts.	Monitor network traffic from the source host (Stage 5 trigger) and check the contents of the archive if possible.
<b>5. Exfiltration</b>	T1041	Large volume of HTTP POST traffic (DeviceNetworkEvents) to known C2/file-sharing domains ( <b>transfer.sh</b> , <b>dropbox.com</b> ) originating from a suspicious process (e.g., AnyDesk.exe).	<b>Block the destination IP/URL</b> at the firewall/proxy immediately to halt data theft.
<b>6. Impact / Ransomware</b>	T1486	Mass file renaming (thousands of files suddenly ending with <b>.locked</b> or <b>.encrypted</b> ) or execution of	<b>Power Off/Hard Quarantine the Encryption Host(s)</b> immediately to stop the payload.

		commands to delete Volume Shadow Copies (vssadmin.exe delete shadows).	
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## 2. Immediate Containment Procedure (Phase B)

If *any* stage alert (2-6) is validated as malicious, the following steps must be executed immediately, focusing on limiting the attacker's blast radius:

1. **Stop Propagation:** Block all C2 domains/IPs (transfer.sh, etc.) at the perimeter firewall/proxy.
2. **Isolate & Quarantine:** Isolate the current **Source Host** and **Target Host** (if applicable) using EDR tools.
3. **Disable Account:** Disable the Compromised User Account (e.g., CORP\svc-backup) that is actively engaging in lateral movement or staging.
4. **Preserve Image:** Create a snapshot or forensically image the initially compromised host (Stage 1) for later root cause analysis.

## 3. Eradication and Investigation Procedure (Phase C)

Once containment is confirmed, the team moves to remove the threat and confirm the extent of the damage.

1. **Full Path Tracing:** Review logs to map out the entire intrusion path (the "blast radius")—every device, account, and resource touched by the compromised credentials/hosts.
2. **Clean Persistence:** Check all affected hosts for hidden persistence mechanisms (Registry Run Keys, Scheduled Tasks, new services - T1543.003), and remove them.
3. **Mandatory Credential Reset:** Force a password reset for *all* user and service accounts that authenticated to any compromised host during the intrusion window.
4. **System Rebuild:** Do NOT clean and redeploy the compromised hosts; **Reimage** them completely from a trusted gold image.
5. **Data Validation:** Confirm backup integrity and restoration capabilities.
6. **Post-Mortem:** Document all findings, actions taken, and the **Recommendations & Next Steps** from the lab report (e.g., Enable PowerShell & Sysmon logging, Automate response with Logic Apps).