"IKEv2 Rekey optimization SA &TS Payloads support"

IKEv2 Optional SA&TS in Child Exchange draft-kampati-ipsecme-ikev2-saPayloads -ts-payloads-opt-00

https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kampati-ipsecme-ikev2-sa-ts-payloads

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
What is IPSec?


- □ IP Security is a set of protocols and standards to support the securing of data at the IP layer.
- Supports authentication and encryption of traffic.
 - ☐ Certifies the originator of the packet.
 - ☐ Protects the data from interception and tampering while in transit.



IPSec Basic features


- IPsec provides security services at the IP layer by enabling a system to select required security protocols.
 - Integrity.
 - Authentication.
 - Anti replay Service.
 - Confidentiality.
- > IPsec uses 2 protocols to provide these services.
 - ✓ AH (Authentication Header)
 - ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload)
- Each Protocol supports 2 modes
 - Tunnel Mode
 - Transport Mode







AH Header






AH Protocol – Transport and Tunnel

AH in transport mode:



Authentication scope - all immutable fields


AH in tunnel mode:



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
ESP Protocol






ESP Protocol – Transport and Tunnel

ESP in transport mode:




ESP in tunnel mode:






Relationship between IPsec and IKE






Overview





IKE Rekey & Ipsec Rekey



IKE rekey will recreate new keys for IKE tunnel

IPSEC Rekey will recreate new keys for IPSEC tunnel


Most of deployment Scenarios they configure for 1 hour



Initial SA creation & IKE Rekey



- As per RFC7296 IKE tunnel is created and IPSEC (AH/ESP) tunnel is created after INIT and AUTH exchanges.
- IKE rekey contains SA payloads which contains single/multiple cryptographic suite. Most of time this suits are not changed at rekey time. Minimum size of (single set of cryptographic suite)SA payload 52 bytes.
- In IKESA payload size will increase exponentially for multiple cryptographic suite.
- IKE rekey are triggered periodically which consume bandwidth and power to process those payloads
- Key Problem: when there is no configuration changes, still we will send SA payloads in IKE Rekey which is of no value but will consuming more bandwidth, processing time and power.






IKE Rekey

- IKE rekey contains SA payloads which contains single/multiple cryptographic suite. Most of time this suits are not changed at rekey time. Minimum size of (single set of cryptographic suite)SA payload 52 bytes.
- ➢ IPSEC rekey contains SA payloads which contains single/multiple cryptographic suite and TSi & TSr payloads. Most of time these are not changed at rekey time. Minimum size of SA payload 40 bytes, each TS size 24 bytes (2*24 = 48 bytes).
- In IKE/IPSEC SA payload size will increase exponentially for multiple cryptographic suite.
- IKE /IPSEC rekey are triggered periodically which consume bandwidth and power to process those payloads
- Existing all devices if there is any change in Tsi or TSr they are deleting SA and recreating it.


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


Ipsec Rekey


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WiFi Calling architecture



Deployment Scenario

In 4G network security gateways/ePDG and in 5G networks cRAN/Cloud will support more than one 100000 IKE/IPSEC tunnels. So on an average, for every second we encounter many rekeys. This takes huge amount of bandwidth, packet fragmentation and more processing. This can be solved by introducing this solution.

This is useful in Internet of Things (IoT) devices which utilizing lower power consumption technology. The appendix A of [IPSEC-IOT- REQS] gives some estimate data.

Most of devices they don't preferred to change suits frequently. Taking this advantage we can make SA and TS as optional payloads at time of IKE SA rekey and IPSEC SA rekey

Introduction to draft

IKEv2 Optional SA&TS Payloads in Child Exchange draft-kampati-ipsecme-ikev2-sa-ts-payloads-opt-00


https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-kampati-ipsecme-ikev2-sa-ts-payloads



IKE rekey & IPSEC Rekey optimization

Scenario 1:

- At time of IKE rekey instead of SA payload we can use NEW_SPI notification payload which of size 16 bytes
- At time of IPSEC rekey instead of SA, TS payload we can use NEW_SPI notification payload which of size 14 bytes
- A new initiator/Responder SPI is supplied in the SPI field of the NEW_SPI notification payload.
- Due to NEW_SPI notification payload we saved minimum 36 bytes (number of bytes saving increase exponentially in multiple cryptographic suite) for each and every IKE rekey and reduced processing of complex validation and processing of SA payload
- Due to NEW_SPI notification payload we saved minimum 76 bytes (number of bytes saving increase exponentially in multiple cryptographic suite) for each and every IPSec rekey and reduced processing of complex validation and processing of SA ,TSi & TSr payloads






IKE rekey & IPSEC Rekev optimization

Scenario 2:


- At time of IKE rekey initiator can SA payload but responder can make it optional by sending NEW_SPI notification payload or SA payload
- At time of IPSEC rekey initiator can send of SA & optionally TS payloads but responder can make it optional by sending NEW_SPI notification payload or SA payload and optional TS payloads.
- Advantage of this solution to provide option at time of any policy changes.
- Due to NEW_SPI notification payload we saved minimum 36 bytes for each and every IKE rekey and reduced processing of complex validation and processing of SA payload
- Due to NEW_SPI notification payload we saved minimum 76 bytes for each and every IPSec rekey and reduced processing of complex validation ad processing of SA,TSi & TSr payloads





IKE rekey & IPSEC Rekey optimization

Scenario 3:



IPSEC rekey existing vs New Packet format

IPSEC rekey Exchange format with single cryptographic Suites HDR, SK (N(REKEY SA), SA, Ni, [KEi], TSi, TSr) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 IKE SA Initiator SPI IKE SA Responder SPI Next Payload | MiVer | MnVer | Exchange Type | Message ID Next Payload |C| RESERVED Payload Length Last Substruc | Proposal Length Proposal Num Protocol ID |Num Transforms| SPI Size SPI (variable) Last Substruc | Transform Length Transform Type | Transform ID = ENCR AES CBC AF=0 Attribute Length AF=1 Attribute Value Attribute Type Last Substruc | RESERVED Transform Length Transform 2 | Transform ID = AUTH HMAC SAH1 Transform Type | RESERVED Last Substruc | RESERVED Transform Length Transform 3 |Transform Type | RESERVED Transform ID = No ESN Next Payload |C| RESERVED Payload Length ProtocolID=2or3| SPI Size=4 |Notify Message Type = REKEY SA | REKEY SA notify Next Pavload |C| RESERVED Payload Length Nonce Next Pavload |C| RESERVED Pavload Length Diffie-Hellman Group Num DESERVED Next Pavload |C| RESERVED Pavload Length Number of TSs | | IP Protocol ID*| Selector Length Start Port* End Port* Next Payload |C| RESERVED Payload Length |IP Protocol ID*| Selector Length


HDR, SK (N(REKEY_SA), N(NEW_SPI), Ni, [KEi])	
1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1	
IKE SA Initiator SPI	
IKE SA Responder SPI	IKE Header
Next Payload MjVer MnVer Exchange Type Flags	IKE Header
Message ID	
Length	
Next Payload C RESERVED Payload Length	
ProtocolID=2or3 SPI Size=4 Notify Message Type = REKEY_SA	REKEY SA Notify
Security Parameter Index (SPI)	
Next Payload C RESERVED Payload Length	
Protocol ID SPI Size=4 Notify Message Type = NEW_SPI	NEW_SPI Notify
Security Parameter Index (SPI) -	
Next Payload C RESERVED Payload Length	
	Nonce
Diffie-Hellman Group Num RESERVED	
	KE


Packet format of IPSEC Rekey

Ending Address*

IKE rekey existing vs New Packet format

IKE rekey Exchange format with single cryptographic Suites HDR, SK (SA, Ni, KEi)







Test Result

- The proposed solution allows to reduced the IKEv2 rekey packet size.
- In our simulated test bed we observed
 - When we configured 32 IKE cryptographic Suites. IPSEC 25 cryptographic Suites.
 - IPSEC rekey
 - IPSEC rekey total packet size before new solution 1036 bytes
 - IPSEC rekey total packet size with new solution 76 bytes
 - Percentage we saved 92.66 %
 - IKE rekey
 - IKE rekey total packet size before new solution 1532 bytes
 - IKE rekey total packet size with new solution 168 bytes
 - Percentage we saved 89.03 %



Thank You

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