

Online Convex Optimization & Complexity

Problem Set 6 – CS 6515/4540 (Fall 2025)

Solutions for HW6, Q24

24 Zero Sum Games

- Let A play A_1 with probability p and A_2 with probability $1 - p$. If B plays B_1 then A's expected payoff is

$$u(B_1) = 2 \cdot p + (-1) \cdot (1 - p) = 3p - 1.$$

If B plays B_2 then A's expected payoff is

$$u(B_2) = (-1) \cdot p + 1 \cdot (1 - p) = 1 - 2p.$$

Since B sees p and then chooses the action minimizing A's payoff (or maximizing B's payoff), A's guarantee when choosing p is

$$\min\{3p - 1, 1 - 2p\}.$$

A should choose p to maximize this worst-case value. Set the two expressions equal to find the crossover:

$$3p - 1 = 1 - 2p \implies 5p = 2 \implies p = \frac{2}{5}.$$

At $p = \frac{2}{5}$ the common value is

$$3 \cdot \frac{2}{5} - 1 = \frac{6}{5} - 1 = \frac{1}{5}.$$

Thus A's optimal committed strategy is ($p(A_1) = \frac{2}{5}$, $p(A_2) = \frac{3}{5}$), and the expected reward A guarantees is $\frac{1}{5}$.

- Let B play B_1 with probability q and B_2 with probability $1 - q$. If A plays A_1 the expected payoff is

$$u(A_1) = 2q + (-1)(1 - q) = 3q - 1,$$

and if A plays A_2 it is

$$u(A_2) = -1 \cdot q + 1 \cdot (1 - q) = 1 - 2q.$$

Given q , A will choose the action giving the larger payoff, so the payoff resulting from B's choice q is

$$\max\{3q - 1, 1 - 2q\}.$$

B wants to choose q to minimize this maximum. Again equate the two branches:

$$3q - 1 = 1 - 2q \implies q = \frac{2}{5},$$

and the resulting value is $\frac{1}{5}$. So B's optimal committed strategy is $q(B_1) = \frac{2}{5}$, $q(B_2) = \frac{3}{5}$, and the expected cost (payoff to A) is $\frac{1}{5}$.

- Yes, both (1) and (2) gave the same expected values: $\frac{1}{5}$. This is precisely the statement of the minimax theorem for zero-sum games: the value of the game

$$\min_x \max_y M(x, y) = \max_y \min_x M(x, y)$$

and optimal mixed strategies exist for both players producing the same value. Intuitively, when each player can randomize, committing first or second does not change the guaranteed payoff in a zero-sum game.