# CORLA Run Book

#### Introduction

#### What the RLA Tool Does

The Risk-Limiting Audit (RLA) tool, developed by Free & Fair for the Colorado Department of State for use in elections from November 2017 forward, supports a Risk-Limiting Audit as required by Colorado statute and as described in the Colorado Secretary of State's Rule 25 for elections. RLA-related terms and processes are defined and prescribed in Rule 25. See http://www.sos.state.co.us/pubs/rule\_making/CurrentRules/8CCR1505-1/ElectionRules.pdf.

The RLA Tool enables the Secretary of State and each individual County to carry out a Risk-Limiting Audit. The Secretary of State can enter the risk limit, the random seed and the contests that drive the audit process. The Secretary of State can also identify contests that should go to a full hand count. Counties can upload ballot manifests and cast vote record (CVR) files. The RLA tool performs the necessary calculations (such as choosing random samples of ballots for audit and determining actual risk levels). County Audit Boards can enter interpretations of ballots into the tool. And the Secretary of State can monitor the progress of the individual Counties.

The RLA Tool also creates export files for use in the Audit Center, a website disseminating audit-related information to the public.

#### What the RLA Tool Does Not Do

Although the rules governing the RLA requires Counties to generate and preserve a Summary Results Report and a Results File Export, the RLA Tool does not interact with these particular files in any way. Nor does the RLA Tool aid the CVR Export Verification required by the rules. These processes and files are not discussed in this Run Book.

While the RLA Tool does provide for upload of the hashed Ballot Manifest, the hashed CVR file and their hashes, the RLA Tool does not provide a hashing utility.

The current version of the RLA Tool does not provide any support for chain of custody logs. Nor does it provide any rules or suggestions for interpretation of the marks on any particular ballot.

# For Secretary of State Users

# Logging In




# **Entering the Risk Limit**

The Sectretary of State will enter the Risk Limit for comparison audits.




## **Entering the Random Seed**

The Secretary of State will enter the random seed.



#### **Selecting Contests**

The Secretary of State will select the contests that will drive the sample size and stop/go decisions for each round.




# **Audit Ongoing Page**

This screen provides an overview of the audit in progress, both counties, and contests.



# **Declaring a Full Hand Count**



# For County Administrators

For the 2017 Colorado implementation, the full functionality of the RLA Tool requires exports from the Dominion System.


# Logging In



#### **Comparison Audit Upload**

To prepare for upload the ballot manifest and the CVR file must be first verified and hashed. The RLA Tool does not provide a utility for the verification and hashing.

Once the ballot manifest and CVR files are verified and hashed, they can be uploaded. If the upload process is interrupted the process will have to be repeated, it will not resume uploads.



Note that the RLA Tool does not support export of the tabulation results to the Election Night Reporting System.

### **Ballot Polling Audit Upload**

The current version RLA Tool is designed for comparison audits, which require a voting system capable of exporting CVR files. However, Counties whose voting systems do not export CVR files can use the RLA Tool to upload ballot manifests, described in the Comparison Audit Upload section.


## **For County Audit Boards**

#### Signing In

The Audit Board does not log directly into the RLA Tool with computer system usernames and passwords. However, whenever the Audit Board begins to interact with the RLA Tool, either at the beginning of an audit round or after taking a break, there is an informal sign-in process. After the authenticated County Audit Administrator formally logs in, there is a screen where the identity and party affiliation of Audit Board Members can be entered or changed.




Click on "Start Audit" Screenshot (page:Audit Board Sign In) ---



Click "Next"

#### **Auditing Ballots**


Note: do not use your browser's "back" arrow during the audit process.



Before recording voter intent, please double-check that the paper ballot ID and Ballot Style match the ID and ballot style listed on the screen. Then record on the screen all final voter intent marked on the paper ballot. In case of an overvote, mark each of the (too many) choices the voter intended; the RLA tool will recognize the overvote. In case the Audit Board cannot reach consensus, mark the "No Consensus" box on the screen. Audit Board members can make notes in the comment field.

Click "Review"

Check that the information on the review screen reflects the Audit Board's interpretation of the ballot. Note that in case of an overvote, the review screen will say, simply, "overvote".



Note: do not use your browser's "back" arrow during the audit process. If the review screen does not match the Audit Board's interpretation, click the "Back" button.

If the review screen matches the Audit Board's interpretation, click "Submit and Next Ballot". This submission is final. There is no way to revise a ballot interpretation once it has been submitted from the Review Screen.

This process continues until the audit is complete, or a Full Hand Count has been called by the CDOS.