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**Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC**

MADE IN GERMANY

# Revolt 2 Earn Audit

**Security Assessment**  
**15. June, 2022**

**For**

**REVOLT 2 EARN**



**SolidProof\_io**



**@solidproof\_io**

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Version	Date	Description
1.0	10. June 2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Layout project</li><li>• Automated- /Manual-Security Testing</li><li>• Summary</li></ul>
1.1	14. June 2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Reaudit</li></ul>
1.2	15. June 2022	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Reaudit</li></ul>

## **Network**

Polygon Matic

## **Website**

<https://revolt.cultdao.io/>

## **Telegram**

<https://t.me/revolt2earn>

## **Twitter**

<https://twitter.com/wearecultdao>

## **Medium**

<https://wearecultdao.medium.com/>

## **Discord**

<https://discord.com/invite/hHDBvNnXqe>

## **Reddit**

<http://reddit.com/r/cultdao/>

## Description

Revolt (RVLT) is CULT DAOs first ecosystem token, and has been built on the Polygon network as a Polygon POS token with 0.4% taxation. Whereas CULT works to fund protocols furthering decentralization, RVLT seeks to support The Many individuals who are working towards the same goal.

Each 15 days 490 stakers (+10 consistent NFT owners) are picked randomly (through Chainlink VRF) from all RVLT stakers (uRVLT owners).

These 500 (known as the CULTmanders) have the job of approving or disapproving submissions by the users of the actions they have taken to help the CULT ecosystem, whether this be stickering, leafleting, shilling or anything else, they are effectively being paid to further the cause of decentralization and the ecosystem.

## Project Engagement

During the 9th of June 2022, **Revolt2Earn Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

## Logo

The logo for Revolt 2 Earn is rendered in a red, hand-drawn, sketchy font. The words "REVOLT 2 EARN" are written in all caps, with the "2" being a simple numeral. The background features a faint, light gray grid pattern.

## Contract Link

### v1.2

- Github
  - <https://github.com/cultdao-developer/revolt2earn>
  - Commit: 8986c15078592e74ee876c5898c798286ec50976

# Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
<b>Critical</b>	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
<b>High</b>	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon as possible.
<b>Medium</b>	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
<b>Low</b>	2 – 3.9	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
<b>Informational</b>	0 – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

# Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

## **Methodology**

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following:
  - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
  - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
  - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
  - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

## Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Imported packages:

Dependency / Import Path	Count
@chainlink/contracts/src/v0.8/interfaces/VRFCoordinatorV2Interface.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/OwnableUpgradeable.sol	4
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/Initializable.sol	6
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/UUPSUpgradeable.sol	6
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/PausableUpgradeable.sol	3
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable.sol	3
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/ERC20Upgradeable.sol	2
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/IERC20Upgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20VotesCompUpgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20VotesUpgradeable.sol	2
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/extensions/draft-ERC20PermitUpgradeable.sol	2
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20Upgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC721/IERC721Upgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/CountersUpgradeable.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/math/SafeMathUpgradeable.sol	5



## Tested Contract Files

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.


*A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.*

### v1.0


File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/treasury.sol	cc9de1fe66a54dc55f83f9d6434cf8da40bdc14f
contracts/GovernorBravoInterfaces.sol	2cf173cc8a8a80183497da32081b0af990733a24
contracts/rvlt.sol	c18c733db504c0e9dc12cded483dcfcdbd21f5125
contracts/timelock.sol	29ecb767a459651586a3308aebfddde1abcdb073
contracts/governance.sol	29cc8ed73ce52c1ec973f5e29ae125302695d1df
contracts/uRevolt.sol	9eb9a533e1eb268fee43ec98010561aa53cc0614
contracts/RandomNumberGenerator.sol	fe938f5ef6a2a5472d404721426e4e00ec2d8abe

# Metrics

## Source Lines v1.0



## Risk Level v1.0



## Capabilities

### Components

Version	Contracts	Libraries	Interfaces	Abstract
1.0	11	0	9	0

### Exposed Functions

*This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.*

Version	Public	Payable
1.0	93	5

Version	External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
1.0	68	113	0	8	27


### State Variables

Version	Total	Public
1.0	89	83

### Capabilities

Version	Solidity Versions observed	Experimental Features	Can Receive Funds	Uses Assembly	Has Destroyable Contracts
1.0	0.8.2 ^0.8.0	ABIEncoderV2	yes	yes (1 asm blocks)	





## Scope of Work/Verify Claims

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).


We will verify the following claims:

1. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)



## Write functions of contract v1.0

RVLT	TIMELOCK	UREVOLT	TREASURY	GOVERNORBRAVODELEGATE
approve	acceptAdmin	add	initialize	_acceptAdmin
decreaseAllow...	cancelTransact...	admin	renounceOwn...	_AcceptTimelockAdmin
delegate	executeTransa...	approve	setDAOAddress	_fundInvestee
delegateBySig	initialize	claimRVLT	setMultiSignA...	_Initiate
IncreaseAllow...	queueTransact...	decreaseAllow...	setuRVLTAddr...	_setInvesteeDetails
initialize	setDelay	delegate	transferOwner...	_setPendingAdmin
permit	setPendingAd...	delegateBySig	upgradeTo	_setVotingPeriod
renounceOwn...	upgradeTo	deposit	upgradeToAnd...	_setWhitelistAccountExpirat...
setTax	upgradeToAnd...	IncreaseAllow...	validatePayout	_setWhitelistGuardian
setTreasuryAd...		initialize		cancel
setWhitelistA...		initializeRando...		castVote
transfer		massUpdateP...		castVoteBySig
transferFrom		permit		castVoteWithReason
transferOwner...		randomSelect...		execute
upgradeTo		renounceOwn...		initialize
upgradeToAnd...		setRandomNu...		propose
		transfer		queue
		transferFrom		upgradeTo
		transferOwner...		upgradeToAndCall
		updateCultMa...		
		updateNumbe...		
		updatePool		
		upgradeTo		
		upgradeToAnd...		
		withdraw		





## Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

Tested	Verified
✓	✓

### Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verified / Checked	✓
Partly Verified	🚩
Unverified / Not checked	✗
Not available	—

# Modifiers and public functions

## v1.0

### uRevolt

- initialize
  - initializer
- add
  - onlyOwner
- massUpdatePools
  - randomGenerationCompleted
- updatePool
- deposit
  - randomGenerationCompleted
  - nonReentrant
- withdraw
  - randomGenerationCompleted
  - nonReentrant
- claimRVLT
  - randomGenerationCompleted
  - nonReentrant
- admin
- setRandomNumberGenerator
  - onlyOwner
- updateCultMandatorsReward
  - onlyTreasury
- updateNumberOfRandomGeneration
  - onlyOwner
- initializeRandomAddressSelection
  - onlyRandomNumGenerator
  - nonReentrant
- randomSelectUsers
  - randomGenerationInProgress
  - nonReentrant


### Treasury

- initialize
  - initializer
- setDAOAddress
  - onlyOwner
- setuRVLTAddress
  - onlyOwner
- setMultiSignAddress
  - onlyOwner
- validatePayout


### Timelock

- initialize
  - initializer
- <Constructor> 💰
- setDelay
- acceptAdmin
- setPendingAdmin
- queueTransaction
- cancelTransaction
- executeTransaction 💰


## Governance



## Revolt



## RandomNumberGenerator



Note: Not listed functions/modifiers was imported from external libraries

## Comments















- Deployer can set following state variables without any limitations
  - Governance
    - votingPeriod
    - investee.\_investee
    - investee.\_fundAmount
    - whitelistAccountExpirations
  - uRevolt
    - randomThreshold
  - Revolt
    - tax
  - RandomNumberGenerator
    - tokenIds
    - minimumStakersRequired
    - callbackGasLimit
      - Max  $2^{32} - 1$
    - requestConfirmations
      - Max  $2^{16} - 1$
    - \_numWords
      - Max  $2^{32} - 1$
    - \_subscriptionId
      - Max  $2^{64} - 1$
- Deployer can enable/disable following state variables
  - Revolt
    - whitelistedAddress
- Deployer can set following addresses
  - Governance
    - whitelistGuardian
    - pendingAdmin
  - uRevolt
    - adminAddress
    - numberGenerator
  - Treasury
    - dao
    - uRvlt
    - multSignWallet
  - Timelock
    - admin
    - pendingAdmin
  - Revolt
    - treasury

- RandomNumberGenerator
  - nftAddress
  - vrfCoordinator
  - keyHash
  -
- Existing Modifiers
  - eligibleForEnableInitialize
  - eligibleForRequest
  - verifyMinimumHolder
  - onlyTreasury
  - onlyRandomNumGenerator
  - randomGenerationInProgress
  - randomGenerationCompleted
- uRevolt
  - Owner can add new poolinfo
  - Treasury can update totalRewardMandators/  
totalRVLTRewardMandators without limitations

**Please check if an OnlyOwner or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.**

# Source Units in Scope

## v1.0

Type	File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score	Capabilities
	contracts/treasury.sol	2	3	152	96	84	1	132	
	contracts/GovernorBravoInterfaces.sol	4	4	207	189	75	62	52	
	contracts/rvlt.sol	1	1	113	90	74	1	67	_____
	contracts/timelock.sol	1	_____	126	126	92	3	87	
	contracts/governance.sol	1	_____	453	453	253	134	227	
	contracts/uRevolt.sol	1	_____	469	446	358	45	281	
	contracts/RandomNumberGenerator.sol	1	1	292	247	137	76	101	_____
	<b>Totals</b>	<b>11</b>	<b>9</b>	<b>1812</b>	<b>1647</b>	<b>1073</b>	<b>322</b>	<b>947</b>	

### Legend

Attribute	Description
Lines	total lines of the source unit
nLines	normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)
nSLOC	normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces, ...)

# Audit Results

## AUDIT PASSED

### Critical issues

**No critical issues**

### High issues

**No high issues**

### Medium issues

**No medium issues**

### Low issues

**No low issues**

### Informational issues

**No informational issues**

### Audit Comments

We recommend you to use the special form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow link for more information <https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.5.10/natspec-format.html>) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variables, functions etc. do.

### 11. June 2022:

- Owner can deploy a new version of the contract which can change any limit and give owner new privileges
- Read whole report and modifiers section for more information

## SWC Attacks

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
<a href="#">SW C-1 36</a>	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	<a href="#">CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 35</a>	Code With No Effects	<a href="#">CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 34</a>	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	<a href="#">CWE-655: Improper Initialization</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 33</a>	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	<a href="#">CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 32</a>	Unexpected Ether balance	<a href="#">CWE-667: Improper Locking</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 31</a>	Presence of unused variables	<a href="#">CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 30</a>	Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)	<a href="#">CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 29</a>	Typographical Error	<a href="#">CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator</a>	PASSED
<a href="#">SW C-1 28</a>	DoS With Block Gas Limit	<a href="#">CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption</a>	PASSED



<a href="#">SW C-1 27</a>	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	<a href="#">CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 25</a>	Incorrect Inheritance Order	<a href="#">CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 24</a>	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	<a href="#">CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 23</a>	Requirement Violation	<a href="#">CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 22</a>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	<a href="#">CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 21</a>	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	<a href="#">CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 20</a>	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	<a href="#">CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 9</a>	Shadowing State Variables	<a href="#">CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 8</a>	Incorrect Constructor Name	<a href="#">CWE-665: Improper Initialization</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 7</a>	Signature Malleability	<a href="#">CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature</a>	<b>PASSED</b>

<a href="#">SW C-11 6</a>	Timestamp Dependence	<a href="#">CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 5</a>	Authorization through tx.origin	<a href="#">CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 4</a>	Transaction Order Dependence	<a href="#">CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 3</a>	DoS with Failed Call	<a href="#">CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 2</a>	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	<a href="#">CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 1</a>	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	<a href="#">CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-11 0</a>	Assert Violation	<a href="#">CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 09</a>	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	<a href="#">CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 08</a>	State Variable Default Visibility	<a href="#">CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 07</a>	Reentrancy	<a href="#">CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW C-1 06</a>	Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction	<a href="#">CWE-284: Improper Access Control</a>	<b>PASSED</b>

<a href="#">SW</a> <a href="#">C-1</a> <a href="#">05</a>	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	<a href="#">CWE-284: Improper Access Control</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW</a> <a href="#">C-1</a> <a href="#">04</a>	Unchecked Call Return Value	<a href="#">CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW</a> <a href="#">C-1</a> <a href="#">03</a>	Floating Pragma	<a href="#">CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW</a> <a href="#">C-1</a> <a href="#">02</a>	Outdated Compiler Version	<a href="#">CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW</a> <a href="#">C-1</a> <a href="#">01</a>	Integer Overflow and Underflow	<a href="#">CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation</a>	<b>PASSED</b>
<a href="#">SW</a> <a href="#">C-1</a> <a href="#">00</a>	Function Default Visibility	<a href="#">CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards</a>	<b>PASSED</b>



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