



SOLIDProof

Bring trust into your projects

**Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC
Development | Marketing**

MADE IN GERMANY

Company DAO Audit

**Security Assessment
19. May, 2023**

For

Company **DAO**



SolidProof_io



@solidproof_io

| | |
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| Version | Date | Description |
|---------|----------------|--|
| 1.0 | 21. March 2023 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Layout project• Automated- /Manual-Security Testing• Summary |
| 1.1 | 28. March 2023 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Reaudit |
| 1.2 | 27. April 2023 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Added functionality audit |
| 1.3 | 19. May 2023 | <ul style="list-style-type: none">• Added functionality re-audit |

Network

Ethereum (ERC20)

Website

<http://companydao.org>

Reddit

https://www.reddit.com/user/company_dao/

LinkedIn

<http://www.linkedin.com/in/taylorneff>

<https://www.linkedin.com/company/delta-alpha-omega-llc>



Description

Company DAO is a web3 protocol which links legal entities in multiple jurisdictions to immutable /smart contracts/ on the blockchain. This allows real world companies and assets to be legally owned and managed by online communities through a /decentralised autonomous organisation/, whereby the smart contracts act as a single source of truth for decisions made by the company's stakeholders.

Project Engagement

During the 20th of March 2023, **CompanyDAO Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

Logo

Contract Link

v1.0

- GitHub
 - <https://github.com/CompanyDAO/protocol-contracts>
 - Commit:
 - dd3e683

v1.1

<https://github.com/CompanyDAO/protocol-contracts/commit/ff1503ad3fce81c8e1ad8d09c50b8bb8a8f6af8f>

v1.2

<https://github.com/CompanyDAO/protocol-contracts/commit/5a5e02cc320630f55728d699d235b8e795c1ac80>

v1.3

<https://github.com/CompanyDAO/protocol-contracts/commit/8c40b3749647719233adac41949fb000c761566e>

Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

| Level | Value | Vulnerability | Risk (Required Action) |
|----------------------|---------|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 | A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken. | Immediate action to reduce risk level. |
| High | 7 - 8.9 | A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way. | Implementation of corrective actions as soon as possible. |
| Medium | 4 - 6.9 | A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario. | Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period. |
| Low | 2 - 3.9 | A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective. | Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk. |
| Informational | 0 - 1.9 | A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code. | An observation that does not determine a level of risk |

Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following:
 - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Imported packages:

| Dependency / Import Path | Count |
|---|-------|
| @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/AccessControlEnumerableUpgradeable.sol | 3 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/IAccessControlEnumerableUpgradeable.sol | 1 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/access/OwnableUpgradeable.sol | 4 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/governance/utils/IVotesUpgradeable.sol | 1 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/Initializable.sol | 9 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/proxy/utils/UUPSUpgradeable.sol | 2 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/PausableUpgradeable.sol | 2 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/security/ReentrancyGuardUpgradeable.sol | 5 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/IERC20Upgradeable.sol | 4 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20CappedUpgradeable.sol | 1 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/extensions/ERC20VotesUpgradeable.sol | 1 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20Upgradeable.sol | 4 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/AddressUpgradeable.sol | 3 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/Create2Upgradeable.sol | 1 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/math/MathUpgradeable.sol | 3 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable/utils/structs/EnumerableSetUpgradeable.sol | 2 |
| @openzeppelin/contracts/proxy/beacon/BeaconProxy.sol | 3 |

Tested Contract Files

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.

A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

v1.2


| File Name | SHA-1 Hash |
|--|--|
| contracts/interfaces/IVesting.sol | 8891d9ecb49896e11c6b29aec102e14fbae91beb |
| contracts/interfaces/IInvoice.sol | 66e679ad6f61ae4fdb0bfc0503691f4f55252dd |
| contracts/interfaces/ ITokenFactory.sol | 35fc9a89369bbb3bf21b31f489f624384cae8348 |
| contracts/interfaces/registry/ ICompaniesRegistry.sol | e1f168670c06cb13a12401e4ec330f67ca91722e |
| contracts/interfaces/registry/ IRegistry.sol | 4b5247f2c4cac77da0cee3cae4bc4ca7a43f5b8b |
| contracts/interfaces/registry/ ITokensRegistry.sol | e3850a5d6bab5409d2ac5056da5e2da343404b73 |
| contracts/interfaces/registry/ IRecordsRegistry.sol | 5dfdba1cc302553a07c5986d0232d2673834f4d9 |
| contracts/interfaces/ITGE.sol | 5faabd6888c3576d425cea0118e108b4f6422625 |
| contracts/interfaces/ ITGEFactory.sol | 3e25b2a13fc80a98244c652f17f871aa7719a303 |
| contracts/interfaces/IPool.sol | 2cff7eae5a34de725f02ca89c3d59caccf1c6527 |
| contracts/interfaces/IService.sol | 8e9cf7722ba6438ab44f83bd7822987d06d655cb |

| | |
|---|--|
| contracts/interfaces/IToken.sol | d47ed31f31c398584d8925bab71ad3c5740106b4 |
| contracts/interfaces/governor/IGovernorProposals.sol | fa666462a35e3d43c66498188ecfc2fd075c1269 |
| contracts/interfaces/governor/IGovernor.sol | 00086917df60f3e4d98701c87d4b9a435595e51b |
| contracts/interfaces/governor/IGovernanceSettings.sol | 92d3739c68933a0618f77425573b939b510f8dff |
| contracts/interfaces/ICustomProposal.sol | 4e4733b3c8d79c027b9ee6ddaa481d26c470e645 |
| contracts/TokenFactory.sol | 489f0d3df85e08bf8321598641f21485c6c1fa40 |
| contracts/TokenERC1155.sol | da39a3ee5e6b4b0d3255bfef95601890afd80709 |
| contracts/Invoice.sol | 41981fdd38602caff2f0ee95740f1acd80d9f270 |
| contracts/registry/RegistryBase.sol | 2a33c6b38aff397bf063f81662c8c86b9eb4e604 |
| contracts/registry/CompaniesRegistry.sol | 8beb2e879543cb49f6a93c103a35b0f7fd415111 |
| contracts/registry/TokensRegistry.sol | 2f6319af971cd106843590d61f9cf93f0549ca3d |
| contracts/registry/RecordsRegistry.sol | 79be33ecb65ce697723fcc618218744a0c0f5e81 |
| contracts/Vesting.sol | 7605936664f25713434205e1a499bff670dfaca1 |
| contracts/Registry.sol | fee7cbcd25460a62369afb3d3d72ab10d543374 |
| contracts/libraries/ExceptionsLibrary.sol | 38e97c0e17fa0cc2ad0e8e6d6ef313171bbf7287 |


| | |
|---|--|
| contracts/Service.sol | fa1f044eba9a09d218b33115d0b03eb8c1166eb3 |
| contracts/TGEFactory.sol | fcd16b1c2790a538a5bb33a814c78bb96139ea73 |
| contracts/Pool.sol | 1fe8d034fff6e6815bdd6b587ea923d93b09b3c4 |
| contracts/TGE.sol | bbd4d35920a11211600f471383e3c3f9d7b4c8db |
| contracts/governor/ GovernanceSettings.sol | 6f1a0095f0592e4b86ebe84dba1228c28bc5028b |
| contracts/governor/Governor.sol | 243e6ba42f2ffcc4546a4ae2eea9f488df5e0d23 |
| contracts/governor/ GovernorProposals.sol | b19c67266b8018de35b29f26636e01eb2ae97c3d |
| contracts/CustomProposal.sol | bb688979346cbbd472f0128f02f3593675fc7255 |
| contracts/Token.sol | 437c5247fbb5e43deb1ad27f3e341bb0a44c55ac |

Metrics

Source Lines v1.0



Risk Level v1.0



Capabilities

Components

| Version | Contracts | Libraries | Interfaces | Abstract |
|---------|-----------|-----------|------------|----------|
| 1.2 | 10 | 1 | 16 | 7 |

Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.

| Version | Public | Payable |
|---------|--------|---------|
| 1.2 | 241 | 4 |

| Version | External | Internal | Private | Pure | View |
|---------|----------|----------|---------|------|------|
| 1.0 | 187 | 176 | 4 | 7 | 128 |

State Variables

| Version | Total | Public |
|---------|-------|--------|
| 1.0 | 158 | 144 |

Capabilities

| Version | Solidity Versions observed | Experimental Features | Can Receive Funds | Uses Assembly | Has Destroyable Contracts |
|---------|----------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|---------------|---------------------------|
| 1.0 | 0.8.17 | | yes | | |


| Version | Transfers ETH | Low-Level Calls | DelegateCall | Uses Hash Functions | EC Recover | New/Create/Create2 |
|---------|---------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------|------------|--------------------|
|---------|---------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------|------------|--------------------|

| | | | | | | |
|-----|--|--|--|-----|--|--|
| 1.0 | | | | yes | | yes → NewC ontrac t:Beac onProx y |
|-----|--|--|--|-----|--|--|



Inheritance Graph

v1.2



CallGraph v1.2



Scope of Work/Verify Claims

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

1. Are the contracts upgradeable
2. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)




Are the contracts upgradeable

| Name | |
|-----------------------------|-----|
| Is contract an upgradeable? | Yes |

Comments:

v1.0

- Owner can deploy a new version of the contracts which can change any limit and give owner new privileges
 - Be aware of this and do your own research for the contract which is the contract pointing to



Legend

| Attribute | Symbol |
|--------------------------|--------|
| Verified / Checked | |
| Partly Verified | |
| Unverified / Not checked | |
| Not available | |

Modifiers and public functions

v1.3

Registry/CompaniesRegistry

```
▼ 🔹 createCompany
  Ⓜ onlyRole
▼ 🔹 lockCompany
  Ⓜ onlyService
▼ 🔹 deleteCompany
  Ⓜ onlyRole
▼ 🔹 updateCompanyFee
  Ⓜ onlyRole
```

Registry/RegistryBase

```
▼ 🔹 setService
  Ⓜ onlyRole
```

Registry/TokensRegistry

```
▼ 🔹 whitelistTokens
  Ⓜ onlyRole
```

CustomProposal

```
🔹 initialize
Ⓜ initializer
🔹 setService
Ⓜ onlyRole
🔹 proposeTransfer
🔹 proposeTGE
🔹 proposeGovernanceSettings
🔹 proposeCustomTx
Ⓜ onlyForPool
🔹 proposeTGEERC1155
🔹 proposeGovernanceSettingsWithRoles
```

Invoice

```
▼ 🔹 initialize
  Ⓜ initializer
▼ 🔹 payInvoice 💰
  Ⓜ nonReentrant
  Ⓜ whenPoolNotPaused
▼ 🔹 createInvoice
  Ⓜ onlyValidInvoiceManager
▼ 🔹 cancelInvoice
  Ⓜ onlyValidInvoiceManager
▼ 🔹 setInvoicePaid
  Ⓜ onlyManager
▼ 🔹 setInvoiceCanceled
  Ⓜ onlyManager
```

Pool

- ◆ initialize
- Ⓜ initializer
- ◆ setNewOwnerWithSettings
- Ⓜ onlyService
- ◆ setSettings
- ◆ setCompanyInfo
- ◆ castVote
- Ⓜ nonReentrant
- Ⓜ whenNotPaused
- ◆ setToken
- Ⓜ onlyTGEFactory
- ◆ setProposalIdToTGE
- Ⓜ onlyTGEFactory
- ◆ executeProposal
- Ⓜ whenNotPaused
- Ⓜ onlyExecutor
- ◆ cancelProposal
- Ⓜ onlyService
- ◆ pause
- Ⓜ onlyServiceAdmin
- ◆ unpause
- Ⓜ onlyServiceAdmin
- ◆ propose
- Ⓜ onlyPropose
- Ⓜ onlyValidProposer
- ◆ transferByOwner
- Ⓜ onlyOwner

Registry

- ▼ ◆ initialize
- Ⓜ initializer

TGE

- ▼ ◆ initialize
- Ⓜ initializer
- ▼ ◆ purchase 💰
- Ⓜ onlyWhitelistedUser
- Ⓜ onlyState
- Ⓜ nonReentrant
- Ⓜ whenPoolNotPaused
- ▼ ◆ redeem
- Ⓜ onlyState
- Ⓜ nonReentrant
- Ⓜ whenPoolNotPaused
- ▼ ◆ setLockupTVLReached
- Ⓜ whenPoolNotPaused
- Ⓜ onlyManager
- Ⓜ onlyState
- ▼ ◆ transferFunds
- Ⓜ onlyState
- Ⓜ whenPoolNotPaused

Token

- ▼ ◆ initialize
- Ⓜ initializer
- ▼ ◆ mint
- Ⓜ onlyTGEOrVesting
- ▼ ◆ burn
- Ⓜ whenPoolNotPaused
- ▼ ◆ addTGE
- Ⓜ onlyTGEFactory
- ▼ ◆ setTGEVestedTokens
- Ⓜ onlyTGEOrVesting
- ▼ ◆ setProtocolFeeReserved
- Ⓜ onlyTGE

Service

- ◆ initialize
- Ⓜ reinitializer
- ◆ purchasePool 💰
- Ⓜ nonReentrant
- Ⓜ whenNotPaused
- ◆ transferPurchasedPoolByService
- Ⓜ onlyManager
- Ⓜ nonReentrant
- Ⓜ whenNotPaused
- ◆ addProposal
- Ⓜ onlyPool
- Ⓜ whenNotPaused
- ◆ addEvent
- Ⓜ onlyPool
- Ⓜ whenNotPaused
- ◆ createPool
- Ⓜ onlyRegistry
- Ⓜ nonReentrant
- Ⓜ whenNotPaused
- ◆ transferCollectedFees
- Ⓜ onlyRole
- ◆ setFactories
- Ⓜ onlyRole
- ◆ setProtocolCollectedFee
- Ⓜ onlyTGE
- ◆ setProtocolTreasury
- ◆ setProtocolTokenFee
- Ⓜ onlyRole
- ◆ setRegistry
- Ⓜ onlyRole
- ◆ setCustomProposal
- Ⓜ onlyRole
- ◆ setVesting
- Ⓜ onlyRole
- ◆ setInvoice
- Ⓜ onlyRole
- ◆ setPoolBeacon
- Ⓜ onlyRole
- ◆ setTokenBeacon
- Ⓜ onlyRole
- ◆ setTokenERC1155Beacon
- Ⓜ onlyRole
- ◆ setTGEBeacon
- Ⓜ onlyRole
- ◆ cancelProposal
- Ⓜ onlyRole
- ◆ pause
- Ⓜ onlyRole
- ◆ unpause
- Ⓜ onlyRole

TokenFactory

- initialize
 - initializer
- createToken
 - onlyTGEFactory

TGEFactory

- initialize
 - initializer
- createPrimaryTGE
 - nonReentrant
 - whenNotPaused
- createSecondaryTGE
 - onlyPool
 - nonReentrant
 - whenNotPaused
- createSecondaryTGEERC1155
 - onlyPool
 - nonReentrant
 - whenNotPaused

Vesting

- initialize
 - initializer
- vest
 - onlyTGE
- setClaimTVLReached
 - onlyManager
- cancel
 - onlyResolverOrTGE
- claim

TokenERC1155

- initialize
 - initializer
- mint
 - onlyTGEOrVesting
- burn
 - whenPoolNotPaused
 - onlyTGEOrVesting
- addTGE
 - onlyTGEFactory
- setTGEVestedTokens
 - onlyTGEOrVesting
- setTokenIdCap
 - onlyTGEFactory
- setProtocolFeeReserved
 - onlyTGE
- setURI
 - onlyTGE

Note: Imported contracts from official packages were not listed down below

Comments

- CompaniesRegistry
 - Companies manager role is able to
 - Delete company
 - Update company fee to any arbitrary value including 100% or more
 - Lock company
 - Create company
- RecordsRegistry
 - Only service or factory is able to
 - Add contract record
 - Add event record
 - Only service is able to
 - Add proposal
- RegistryBase
 - Only default admin is able to
 - change service address
- TokenRegistry
 - Only default admin is able to
 - Grant whitelist role to token
- CustomProposal
 - Initializer will be the default admin
 - Only default admin is able to
 - change service address
 - Only 'Pool' role address can propose a custom transactions
- Invoice
 - Only manager is able to
 - set invoice status
 - cancel
 - paid
 - Only valid invoice manager is able to
 - set invoice status
 - cancel
 - paid
 - Create invoice
 - PayInvoice function can be locked by pausing pool
 - While calling the initialize the registry can be set
- Pool
 - Only owner is able to
 - Transfers funds from treasury if the pool is not dao
 - Only pool is able to
 - Change pool executor

- Change pool secretary
- Only propose is able to
 - Create a proposal
- Only service admin is able to
 - Pause/unpause contract
- Only Service is able to
 - Set New Owner with settings
 - Cancel Proposal
- Only executor is able to
 - Execute proposal
- Only TGEFactory is able to
 - Add a new entry about the deployed token contract to the list of tokens related to the pool
 - Set proposal ID
- While initializing the service and the company info will be set
- Registry
 - While initializing the caller will be the default admin
- Service
 - Only default admin is able to
 - Pause/unpause
 - Cancel proposal
 - Update
 - tge beacon
 - Token beacon
 - Pool Beacon
 - Token and TGE factory address
 - ERC1155 Token beacon address
 - Invoice
 - Vesting
 - Custom proposal
 - Registry
 - Protocol token fee
 - Protocol treasury address
 - Protocol collected fee address
 - Transfer collected fees to an arbitrary address
- Only registry is able to
 - Create a pool
- Only pool is able to
 - Add new event to directory
 - Add new proposal record
- Only Manager Role address is able to create a new pool
- TGE
 - Only manager is able to
 - lockup tvl reached

- Only whitelisted user is able to
 - Purchase pool tokens
- TGEFactory
 - Only pool is able to
 - Create secondary TGE
 - Create primary TGE
 - Create secondary TGE ERC1155
- Token
 - Only TGE is able to
 - Set total protocol fee reserved without any limitations
 - Only TGE or vesting is able to
 - Total vested amount without any limitations
 - Mint new tokens
 - Burn tokens from any address
 - Only TGE Factory is able tot
 - Add tge addresses
- TokenFactory
 - Only TGE Factory is able to
 - Create new token contract
- Vesting
 - Only TGE is able to
 - Vest token to an arbitrary address
 - Only Manager is able to
 - Claim tvl reached for TGE
 - Only Resolver or tge is able to
 - Cancel vesting
- TokenERC1155
 - Only TGE or Vesting contract addresses are able to
 - Mint tokens
 - Burn tokens from any address
 - Set any arbitrary amount of tokens to total vested tokens
 - Only TGE factory contract addresses are able to
 - Add TGE address
 - Set token ID cap to any arbitrary value
 - Only TGE contract addresses are able to
 - Set URI
 - Set the amount of reserved tokens for minting protocol fee to any arbitrary value
- There are several authorities which are authorized to call some functions, that means, if the owner is renounced, another address is still authorized to call functions
 - Be aware of this

Please check if an OnlyOwner or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.

Source Units in Scope

v1.2

| File | Logic Contracts | Interfaces | Lines | nLines | nSLOC | Comment Lines | Complex. Score |
|---|-----------------|------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|---------------|----------------|
| contracts/interfaces/IVesting.sol | ————— | 1 | 36 | 17 | 13 | 1 | 13 |
| contracts/interfaces/IInvoice.sol | ————— | 1 | 28 | 28 | 24 | 1 | 1 |
| contracts/interfaces/ITokenFactory.sol | ————— | 1 | 13 | 8 | 4 | 1 | 3 |
| contracts/interfaces/registry/ICompaniesRegistry.sol | ————— | 1 | 21 | 17 | 12 | 1 | 3 |
| contracts/interfaces/registry/IRegistry.sol | ————— | 1 | 12 | 11 | 7 | 1 | 9 |
| contracts/interfaces/registry/ITokensRegistry.sol | ————— | 1 | 7 | 6 | 3 | 1 | 3 |
| contracts/interfaces/registry/IRecordsRegistry.sol | ————— | 1 | 82 | 62 | 33 | 22 | 9 |
| contracts/interfaces/ITGE.sol | ————— | 1 | 52 | 30 | 23 | 1 | 19 |
| contracts/interfaces/ITGEFactory.sol | ————— | 1 | 15 | 9 | 5 | 1 | 3 |
| contracts/interfaces/IPool.sol | ————— | 1 | 78 | 12 | 8 | 1 | 43 |
| contracts/interfaces/IService.sol | ————— | 1 | 84 | 17 | 13 | 1 | 51 |
| contracts/interfaces/IToken.sol | ————— | 1 | 67 | 25 | 19 | 1 | 43 |
| contracts/interfaces/governor/IGovernorProposals.sol | ————— | 1 | 9 | 8 | 4 | 1 | 3 |
| contracts/interfaces/governor/IGovernor.sol | ————— | 1 | 42 | 38 | 17 | 16 | 3 |
| contracts/interfaces/governor/IGovernanceSettings.sol | ————— | 1 | 28 | 25 | 12 | 10 | 3 |
| contracts/interfaces/CustomProposal.sol | ————— | 1 | 5 | 5 | 2 | 1 | 1 |
| contracts/TokenFactory.sol | 1 | ————— | 66 | 62 | 33 | 17 | 37 |
| contracts/TokenERC1155.sol | ————— | ————— | 1 | 1 | ————— | ————— | ————— |
| contracts/Invoice.sol | 1 | ————— | 297 | 268 | 147 | 73 | 97 |
| contracts/registry/RegistryBase.sol | 1 | ————— | 45 | 43 | 25 | 6 | 17 |
| contracts/registry/CompaniesRegistry.sol | 1 | ————— | 246 | 218 | 90 | 91 | 58 |
| contracts/registry/TokensRegistry.sol | 1 | ————— | 36 | 34 | 16 | 10 | 20 |
| contracts/registry/RecordsRegistry.sol | 1 | ————— | 195 | 169 | 77 | 74 | 39 |
| contracts/Vesting.sol | 1 | ————— | 278 | 262 | 127 | 92 | 81 |
| contracts/Registry.sol | 1 | ————— | 56 | 49 | 19 | 21 | 15 |
| contracts/libraries/ExceptionsLibrary.sol | 1 | ————— | 74 | 74 | 71 | 1 | 66 |
| contracts/Service.sol | 1 | ————— | 733 | 662 | 311 | 251 | 264 |
| contracts/TGEFactory.sol | 1 | ————— | 375 | 338 | 211 | 84 | 142 |
| contracts/Pool.sol | 1 | ————— | 574 | 508 | 289 | 145 | 250 |
| contracts/TGE.sol | 1 | ————— | 553 | 523 | 289 | 149 | 193 |
| contracts/governor/GovernanceSettings.sol | 1 | ————— | 124 | 117 | 58 | 34 | 21 |
| contracts/governor/Governor.sol | 1 | ————— | 484 | 408 | 239 | 143 | 58 |
| contracts/governor/GovernorProposals.sol | 1 | ————— | 47 | 47 | 31 | 9 | 12 |
| contracts/CustomProposal.sol | 1 | ————— | 615 | 555 | 374 | 117 | 386 |
| contracts/Token.sol | 1 | ————— | 397 | 359 | 176 | 127 | 132 |
| Totals | 18 | 16 | 5775 | 5015 | 2782 | 1505 | 2098 |

Legend

| Attribute | Description |
|---------------|---|
| Lines | total lines of the source unit |
| nLines | normalised lines of the source unit (e.g. normalises functions spanning multiple lines) |
| nSLOC | normalised source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines) |
| Comment Lines | lines containing single or block comments |

| | |
|------------------|---|
| Complexity Score | a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces, ...) |
|------------------|---|



Audit Results

Critical issues

No critical issues

High issues

No high issues

Medium issues

| Issue | File | Type | Line | Description |
|-------|-------------|-------------------------------|------|--|
| #1 | Service.sol | Owner can set fees up to 100% | 443 | The address with the "DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE" can set the fees up to a 100% which is not recommended. Because it may result in loss of user funds. |

Low issues

| Issue | File | Type | Line | Description |
|-------|---------------------|--|----------|--|
| #1 | Custom Proposal.sol | Missing Zero Address Validation (missing-zero-check) | 76 | Check that the address is not zero |
| #2 | Vesting.sol | Missing Zero Address Validation (missing-zero-check) | 131, 142 | Check that the address is not zero |
| #3 | Token.sol | Missing Events Arithmetic | All | Emit an event for critical parameter changes |
| #4 | TokenERC1155.sol | Missing Events Arithmetic | All | Emit an event for critical parameter changes |

Informational issues

No informational issues

Alleviation

The medium bug has been acknowledged by the CompanyDAO team as part of the intended behaviour for their project.

Audit Comments

We recommend you to use the special form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow link for more information <https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/natspec-format.html>) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variables, functions etc. do.

19. May 2023:

- There is still an owner (Owner still has not renounced ownership)
- Owner can deploy a new version of the contract which can change any limit and give owner new privileges
- The pool contract can receive ETH, and the owner can withdraw it before the DAO has started.
- Read whole report and modifiers section for more information

SWC Attacks

| ID | Title | Relationships | Status |
|---------------------------|---|--|--------|
| SW C-1 36 | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain | CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method | PASSED |
| SW C-1 35 | Code With No Effects | CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code | PASSED |
| SW C-1 34 | Message call with hardcoded gas amount | CWE-655: Improper Initialization | PASSED |
| SW C-1 33 | Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments | CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay | PASSED |
| SW C-1 32 | Unexpected Ether balance | CWE-667: Improper Locking | PASSED |
| SW C-1 31 | Presence of unused variables | CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code | PASSED |
| SW C-1 30 | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E) | CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information | PASSED |
| SW C-1 29 | Typographical Error | CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator | PASSED |
| SW C-1 28 | DoS With Block Gas Limit | CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | PASSED |

| | | | |
|---------------------------|---|---|---------------|
| SW C-1 27 | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable | CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality | PASSED |
| SW C-1 25 | Incorrect Inheritance Order | CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order | PASSED |
| SW C-1 24 | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location | CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition | PASSED |
| SW C-1 23 | Requirement Violation | CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller | PASSED |
| SW C-1 22 | Lack of Proper Signature Verification | CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity | PASSED |
| SW C-1 21 | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks | CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature | PASSED |
| SW C-1 20 | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes | CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values | PASSED |
| SW C-11 9 | Shadowing State Variables | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards | PASSED |
| SW C-11 8 | Incorrect Constructor Name | CWE-665: Improper Initialization | PASSED |
| SW C-11 7 | Signature Malleability | CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature | PASSED |

| | | | |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|---------------|
| SW C-11 6 | Timestamp Dependence | CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere | PASSED |
| SW C-11 5 | Authorization through tx.origin | CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function | PASSED |
| SW C-11 4 | Transaction Order Dependence | CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | PASSED |
| SW C-11 3 | DoS with Failed Call | CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions | PASSED |
| SW C-11 2 | Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee | CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere | PASSED |
| SW C-11 1 | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function | PASSED |
| SW C-11 0 | Assert Violation | CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation | PASSED |
| SW C-1 09 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer | CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer | PASSED |
| SW C-1 08 | State Variable Default Visibility | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards | PASSED |
| SW C-1 07 | Reentrancy | CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow | PASSED |
| SW C-1 06 | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction | CWE-284: Improper Access Control | PASSED |

| | | | |
|---|--------------------------------------|--|---------------|
| SW C-1 05 | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal | CWE-284: Improper Access Control | PASSED |
| SW C-1 04 | Unchecked Call Return Value | CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value | PASSED |
| SW C-1 03 | Floating Pragma | CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime | PASSED |
| SW C-1 02 | Outdated Compiler Version | CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities | PASSED |
| SW C-1 01 | Integer Overflow and Underflow | CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation | PASSED |
| SW C-1 00 | Function Default Visibility | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards | PASSED |

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