

Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC

MADE IN GERMANY

Dark Earth

Audit

Security Assessment 17. June, 2022

For







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Version	Date	Description				
1.0	15. June 2022	Layout projectAutomated-/Manual-Security TestingSummary				
1.1	17. June 2022	· Reaudit				

Network

Polygon Matic

Website

https://darkearth.gg/en/home/

Telegram

https://t.me/darkearthgame

Twitter

https://twitter.com/DarkEarthgame

Instagram

https://www.instagram.com/darkearthgame/

Medium

https://medium.com/@DarkEarth

Discord

https://discord.com/invite/gc3f5ZNqyp

Youtube

https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC-XUvSYH0MyH1rNm8geNR8Q

Description

Dark Earth describes a dystopian future of humanity seeking to establish a colony on another planet as the Earth finds itself at the limit of its survival.

Dark Earth is a massive ecosystem of **Blockchain Gaming** that opens its door to all kinds of players, from the most traditional ones who do not use **blockchain technology**, to the most expert in the use of this technology. **No one is left behind!**

Dark Earth Raids Strategy Game will be the first game of this **ecosystem**, and it will be followed by a whole expansion of titles within the Dark Earth metaverse: MOBA, RTS, TBS, MMORPG, Shooter... The universe of Dark Earth is constantly evolving, its fate depends on the players' decisions.

Project Engagement

During the 13th of June 2022, **Dark Earth Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.



Contract Link

v1.0

- Github
 - https://github.com/DarkEarthGAME/DarkEarth_SC
 - Commit: 25c6f395ba5f3c2ad2f8859a960be7851e61ec22

v1.1

- Github
 - https://github.com/DarkEarthGAME/DarkEarth_SC
 - · Commit: c1fd33e4355e7bdd5d64789579157607c0ffe4ee

Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon aspossible.
Medium	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
Low 2-3.9		A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational	0 – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
 - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- 4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Imported packages:

Dependency / Import Path	Count
@chainlink/contracts/src/v0.8/interfaces/AggregatorV3Interface.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts/access/AccessControlEnumerable.sol	2
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol	1
@openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC721/extensions/ERC721Enumerable.sol	2
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Counters.sol	2
@openzeppelin/contracts/utils/cryptography/ECDSA.sol	1

Tested Contract Files

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.


A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

v1.0

File Name	SHA-1 Hash		
contracts/MysteryCapsule.sol	d820553dc0f66f5d725cf3810883eecc280878dc		
contracts/DECollection.sol	d9d5a2930c8b805c5c3b0f641a3ffca5c394b9b7		

Metrics

Source Lines v1.0



Capabilities

Components

Version	Contracts	Libraries	Interfaces	Abstract
1.0	2	0	0	0

Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.

Version	Public	Payable	
1.0	121	3	

Version External		Internal	Private	Pure	View
1.0	97	82	0	3	65

State Variables

Version	Total	Public	
1.0	55	6	


Capabilities

Version	Solidity Versions observed	Experim ental Features	Can Receive Funds	Uses Assembl Y	Has Destroya ble Contract s
1.0	^0.8.1 3		yes		

Version	Transfer s ETH	Low- Level Calls	Deleg ateCa II	Uses Hash Function s	EC Rec ove r	New/ Create/ Create2
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1.0	yes		yes	
	2		1	

Inheritance Graph v1.0



CallGraph v1.0



Scope of Work/Verify Claims

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

- 1. Deployer cannot mint any new tokens
- 2. Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
- 3. Deployer cannot pause the contract
- 4. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)



Write functions of contract v1.0



Deployer cannot mint any new tokens

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot mint	√	√	X

Comments:

v1.0

· Owner can mint



Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot lock	\checkmark	✓	\checkmark
Deployer cannot burn	√	√	X

Comments:

v1.0

- Tokens
 - can be burned by the owner
 - Can be burned by BURNER_ROLE

Deployer cannot pause the contract

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot pause	-	_	-



Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)



Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verfified / Checked	\checkmark
Partly Verified	P
Unverified / Not checked	X
Not available	-

Modifiers and public functions

v1.0

addRole withdraw addToWhitelist bulkDefaultAddToWhitelist bulkSafeTransfer delWhitelist bulkAddFreeMint 🖢 addRole bulkTakeFreeMint addBulkSupply delFreeMints burn burn bulkBurn adminBulkBurn bulkBurn purchaseChest 🖔 bulkAdminBurn adminMint bulkAdminMint mintCards bulkAdminPartnerMint bulkSafeTransfer adminMint enableTransfer AcceptPayment 🔷 setSignAddr withdrawUSDC bulkSetUsedCard withdraw setDefaultPrice bulkAdminUsedCard setAggregator setOpenSeaAddress 🔷 toggleSuspend setUSDCAddress setLimitChest 🖢 setBaseURI setDefaultMintAmount 🐤 setRoyaltiesAddress setDefaultLimitPresale enablePublicSale 🐤 setRoyaltiesBasicPoints suspendPublicSale toggleSuspend setOpenSeaAddress toggleSuspendWL 🌷 approveOwner setBaseURI setRoyaltiesAddress 🔷 clearApprove setRoyaltiesBasicPoints approveOwner addOwner clearApprove addOwner

Note: Not implemented functions was imported from external libraries

delOwner

Comments

delOwner

- Deployer can set following state variables without any limitations
 - available (whitelist)
 - freeMints
 - totalFreeMints
 - presaleCounter
 - Look at function ID below
- Deployer can enable/disable following state variables
 - _roles

- · Look at function ID below
- Deployer can set following addresses
 - · Look at function ID below
- Existing Modifiers
- There are several authorities which are authorized to call some functions, that means, if the owner is renounced, another address is still authorized to call functions
 - Be aware of this
- Function Id
 - · 1 can
 - Add bulk supply
 - · Delete free mints
 - 2 can
 - Set new signAddr
 - Bulk mint
 - 3 can
 - Add role
 - Set price capsule
 - 4 can
 - Set tokenInfo usado
 - Set aggregator
 - 5 can
 - Withdraw
 - Set opensea address
 - 6 can
 - Delete owner
 - Set used address
 - 7 can
 - Toggle suspend
 - Set limit capsules
 - · 8 can
 - Set baseUriExtend
 - · Set default mint amount
 - 9 can
 - Set royalty address
 - · Bulk admin partner mint
 - 10 can
 - Set royalty basic points
 - · Set enable public sale
 - 11 can
 - Set opensea address
 - Disable public sale

- 12 can
 - Add new owner
 - · Toggle suspended
- 13 can
 - · Toggle suspendedWL
- 14 can
 - Set royalty address
- 15 can
 - Set royalty basic points
- 16 can
 - Add new owner
- 17 can
 - Delete owner
- 18 can
 - Withdraw USDC
- 19 can
 - Withdraw
- 20 can
 - Set baseUriExtend
- 21 can
 - Set limit presale
- 22 can
 - Add role
- 23 can
 - Enable transfer

Please check if an OnlyOwner or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.

Source Units in Scope

v1.0

Туре	File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score	Capabilities
)	contracts/MysteryCapsule.sol	1		737	737	465	128	535	<u> . Š</u>
2	contracts/DECollection.sol	1		658	658	389	127	442	. Š 📤 🎹
>	Totals	2		1395	1395	854	255	977	<u>\$</u>

Legend

Attribute	Description
Lines	total lines of the source unit
nLines	normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)
nSLOC	normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces,)

Audit Results

AUDIT PASSED

Critical issues

No critical issues

High issues

No high issues

Medium issues

No medium issues

Low issues

No low issues

Informational issues

No informational issues

Audit Comments

We recommend you to use the special form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow link for more information https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.5.10/natspec-format.html) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variables, functions etc. do.

15. June 2022:

· Read whole report and modifiers section for more information

SWC Attacks

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>36</u>	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>35</u>	Code With No Effects	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>34</u>	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	CWE-655: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>33</u>	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>32</u>	Unexpected Ether balance	CWE-667: Improper Locking	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>31</u>	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>30</u>	Right-To-Left- Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>29</u>	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>28</u>	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>27</u>	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality	PASSED
SW C-1 25	Incorrect Inheritance Order	CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order	PASSED
<u>SW</u> C-1 24	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>23</u>	Requirement Violation	CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>22</u>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>21</u>	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED
SW C-1 20	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>9</u>	Shadowing State Variables	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>8</u>	Incorrect Constructor Name	CWE-665: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> C-11 7	Signature Malleability	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>6</u>	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>5</u>	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>4</u>	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>3</u>	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>2</u>	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>1</u>	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>O</u>	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	PASSED
SW C-1 09	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>08</u>	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
SW C-1 07	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>06</u>	Unprotected SELFDESTRUC T Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>05</u>	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>04</u>	Unchecked Call Return Value	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>03</u>	Floating Pragma	CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>02</u>	Outdated Compiler Version	CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>01</u>	Integer Overflow and Underflow	CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>00</u>	Function Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED







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