

**Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC Development | Marketing** 

MADE IN GERMANY

# **Bridges Reunited**

# Audit

**Security Assessment** 09. April, 2023

For







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Version	Date	Description
1.0	06. April 2023	<ul><li>Layout project</li><li>Automated-/Manual-Security Testing</li><li>Summary</li></ul>

#### Network

Binance Smart Chain

#### Website

https://bridgesreunited.com/

## **Telegram**

https://t.me/bridgesreunited

## **Twitter**

https://twitter.com/BridgesReunited

## **Description**

At Bridges Reunited, we are committed to exploring the potential of decentralized applications (dApps) and how they can be used to benefit our users. We have a diverse range of dApps in development, including a casino, an e-commerce platform, an NFT market, and a cryptocurrency swap service. We are also constantly looking for ways to stay at the forefront of technology and are working on creating new branches of dApps that will offer unique benefits to our users.

## **Project Engagement**

During the Date of 06 April 2023, **Bridges Reunited Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

## Logo



# Contract Link v1.0

- https://github.com/DevBridgesReunited/BridgesReunited
- · Commit: d063da3

**Note for Investors:** We only Audited reflection token contract for **Bridges Reunited**. However, If the project has other contracts (for example, a Presale contract etc), and they were not provided to us in the audit scope then we cannot comment on its security and we are not responsible for it in any way.

## **Vulnerability & Risk Level**

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon aspossible.
Medium	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
Low	2 – 3.9	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational	O – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

# Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

## Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
  - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
  - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
  - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
  - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- 4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

# Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

#### Imported packages:

- @pancakeswap/pancake-contracts/interfaces/IBEP20.sol
- @pancakeswap-libs/pancake-swap-core/contracts/interfaces/IPancakeFactory.sol
- @pancakeswap-libs/pancake-swap-core/contracts/interfaces/IPancakePair.sol
- @pancakeswap/pancake-contracts/interfaces/IPancakeRouter02.sol
- @openzeppelin/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol
- @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/Address.sol
- @openzeppelin/contracts/access/Ownable.sol



## **Tested Contract Files**

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.


A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

#### **v1.0**

File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/	4ca76894889039a2115ea92403fc95237e8
BridgesReunited.sol	c0b20

## **Metrics**

# Source Lines v1.0



## **Capabilities**

## **Components**



#### **Exposed Functions**

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.




External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
13	48	37	6	23


#### **StateVariables**




#### Capabilities



# Inheritance Graph v1.0



# CallGraph v1.0



## **Scope of Work/Verify Claims**

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

- 1. Is contract an upgradeable
- 2. Correct implementation of Token standard
- 3. Deployer cannot mint any new tokens
- 4. Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
- 5. Deployer cannot pause the contract
- 6. Deployer cannot set fees
- 7. Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses
- 8. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

## Is contract an upgradeable

Name	
Is contract an upgradeable?	No



## **Correct implementation of Token standard**

	ERC20			
Function	Description	Exist	Tested	Verified
TotalSupply	Provides information about the total token supply	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	✓
BalanceOf	Provides account balance of the owner's account	$\checkmark$	<b>√</b>	$\checkmark$
Transfer	Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	✓
TransferFrom	Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens from a specified address	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>
Approve	Allow a spender to withdraw a set number of tokens from a specified account	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>
Allowance	Returns a set number of tokens from a spender to the owner	<b>√</b>	1	<b>√</b>

# Write functions of contract v1.0

- setNumTokensSellToAddToLiquidity
- setNumTokensSellToAddToLiquidityTrigger
- setMaxTxPercent
- transfer
- transferFrom
- approve
- increaseAllowance
- decreaseAllowance
- excludeFromFee
- includeInFee
- setFees
- setWalletAddress
- setAntiWhaleEnabled
- setExcludedFromAntiWhale
- setAntiWhaleThreshold
- setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled
- setPancakeRouter
- setPancakePair
- triggerSwapAndLiquify
- setLottoEnabled
- excludeFromLottery
- includeInLottery
- setMinLottoBalance
- setLotteryThresHold
- withdrawStuckBNB
- withdrawStuckTokens

## **Deployer cannot mint any new tokens**

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot mint	$\checkmark$	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>
Max / Total Supply	28.000.0	000	

#### Comments:

#### **v1.0**

· Owner cannot mint new tokens

## Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer can lock	$\checkmark$	<b>√</b>	X
Deployer cannot burn	-	-	-

#### Comments:

#### **v1.0**

· Owner can lock user funds by Setting max tx amount to 0

## **Deployer cannot pause the contract**

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot pause	-	_	-



## **Deployer cannot set fees**

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot set fees over 15%	$\checkmark$	<b>√</b>	$\checkmark$
Deployer cannot set fees to nearly 100% or to 100%	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	$\checkmark$

#### Comments:

#### **v1.0**

Fees cannot be set without any limitations

## Deployer can blacklist/antisnipe addresses

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses	-	_	_




## **Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)**



## Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verified / Checked	$\checkmark$
Partly Verified	P
Unverified / Not checked	X
Not available	-

# Modifiers and public functions v1.0



setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled
setPancakeRouter
⊚ onlyOwner
setPancakePair
⊚ onlyOwner
triggerSwapAndLiquify
<b>⊚</b> lockTheSwap
setLottoEnabled
excludeFromLottery
⊚ onlyOwner
⊚ onlyOwner
setMinLottoBalance
setLotteryThresHold
♦ withdrawStuckBNB
withdrawStuckTokens

## **Ownership Privileges**

- Set the number of tokens to add to liquidity when selling to any arbitrary value
- · Include/Exclude accounts from fees, lottery, and anti-whale
- Set fee recipient addresses
- Enable/Disable anti-whale, swap and liquify, lottery
- Set anti-whale threshold to any arbitrary value including zero and that may lead to lock of users funds
- · Set pancake router, and pair addresses
- Set minimum lottery balance for the lottery pool, and the lottery threshold to any arbitrary value including zero
- Withdraw any type of tokens from the contract including the native ones.

Please check if an OnlyOwner or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.



# **Source Units in Scope** v1.0

File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score
contracts/BridgesReunited.sol	1		2059	1888	1116	569	603
Totals	1		2059	1888	1116	569	603

#### Legend

Attribute	Description
Lines	total lines of the source unit
nLines	normalised lines of the source unit (e.g. normalises functions spanning multiple lines)
nSLOC	normalised source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces,)

## **Audit Results**

## **Critical issues**

## No critical issues

## **High issues**

## No high issues

## **Medium issues**

## No medium issues

## Low issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
#1	Main	A floating pragma is set		The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.8.19".
#2	Main	Missing Zero Address Validation (missing- zero-check)	1870, 1886	Check that the address is not zero
#3	Main	Missing Events Arithmetic	1399, 1518, 1526, 1567, 1770, 1780, 1792, 1823, 1834, 1861, 1870, 1886, 1902, 1913	Emit an event for critical parameter changes

## Informational issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
#1	Main	State variables that could be declared constant (constable-states)	82, 83	Add the `constant` attributes to state variables that never change
#2	Main	Unused return values	1287, 1308	Ensure that all the return values of the function calls are used and handle both success and failure cases if needed by the business logic

#3	Main	NatSpec	 If you started to comment
		documentation	your code, also comment all
		missing	other functions, variables etc.

#### **Audit Comments**

We recommend you to use the special form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow link for more information <a href="https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/natspec-format.html">https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/natspec-format.html</a>) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variables, functions etc. do.

#### 09. April 2023:

- We recommend using off chain randomisation like chainlink VRF for the lottery functionality.
- There is still an owner (Owner still has not renounced ownership)
- Owner can deploy a new version of the contract which can change any limit and give owner new privileges
- We cannot make sure that the logic and the contracts are 100% correct because the Bridges Reunited Team didn't provide us a documentation about the code or any unit tests.
- We recommend the Bridges Reunited team to conduct unit tests thoroughly to rule out any logical errors in the contracts.
- · Read whole report and modifiers section for more information

## **SWC Attacks**

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>36</u>	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>35</u>	Code With No Effects	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>34</u>	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	CWE-655: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>33</u>	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>32</u>	Unexpected Ether balance	CWE-667: Improper Locking	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>31</u>	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>30</u>	Right-To-Left- Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>29</u>	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>28</u>	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>27</u>	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality	PASSED
SW C-1 25	Incorrect Inheritance Order	CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order	PASSED
<u>SW</u> C-1 24	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>23</u>	Requirement Violation	CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>22</u>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>21</u>	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED
SW C-1 20	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>9</u>	Shadowing State Variables	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>8</u>	Incorrect Constructor Name	CWE-665: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> C-11 7	Signature Malleability	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>6</u>	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>5</u>	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>4</u>	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>3</u>	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>2</u>	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>1</u>	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>O</u>	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	PASSED
SW C-1 09	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>08</u>	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
SW C-1 07	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>06</u>	Unprotected SELFDESTRUC T Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>05</u>	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>04</u>	Unchecked Call Return Value	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>03</u>	Floating Pragma	CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its <u>Lifetime</u>	NOT PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>02</u>	Outdated Compiler Version	CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>01</u>	Integer Overflow and Underflow	CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>00</u>	Function Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED







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