

Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC

MADE IN GERMANY

EclipseDoge

Audit

Security Assessment 04. April, 2022

For



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Version	Date	Description
1.0	04. April 2022	Layout projectAutomated-/Manual-Security TestingSummary

Network

Binance Smart Chain (BEP20)

Website

http://eclipsedoge.io/

Telegram

https://t.me/eclipsedoge

Twitter

https://twitter.com/eclipsedoge?s=21

Description

Eclipse Doge is here to rejuvenate the meme coin trend in time for the April Eclipse. A new crypto birthed by fans of the Doge Meme online community. Eclipse Doge seeks to impress the community by showing its new improved transaction speeds & utility. It is coin made to moon fast due to its unique tokenomics which will reward buyers, so more funds will be available to market the coin with each transaction. Simply buy and hold Eclipse Doge and watch the coin moon as the Eclipse Approaches in April.

Project Engagement

During the 1st of April 2022, **EclipseDoge Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

Logo



Contract Link v1.0

 https://bscscan.com/address/ 0x7c15c7372ac4Fd5A6979f04fA3b33B8E0D04C675#code

Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon aspossible.
Medium	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
Low	2 – 3.9	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational	0 – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.


Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
 - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- 4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Imported packages:



Tested Contract Files

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.


A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

v1.0

File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/eclipsedoge.sol	5bdbad0ea06fb993fd09035452b3eb20b3505e2b

Metrics

Source Lines v1.0



Capabilities

Components

Version	Contracts	Libraries	Interfaces	Abstract
1.0	1	2	4	2

Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.

Ve	rsion	Public	Payable
1.0		64	3

Version External		Internal Private		Pure	View
1.0	53	100	16	20	25

State Variables

Version	Total	Public
1.0	39	21


Capabilities

Version	Solidity Versions observed	Experim ental Features	Can Receive Funds	Uses Assembl Y	Has Destroya ble Contract s
1.0	^0.8.7		yes	yes (2 asm blocks)	


Version	Transfer s ETH	Low- Level Calls	Deleg ateCa II	Uses Hash Function s	EC Rec ove r	New/ Create/ Create2	
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1.0	yes	yes		
	-	_		

Inheritance Graph v1.0



CallGraph v1.0



Scope of Work/Verify Claims

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

- 1. Correct implementation of Token standard
- 2. Deployer cannot mint any new tokens
- 3. Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
- 4. Deployer cannot pause the contract
- 5. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

Correct implementation of Token standard

	ERC20					
Function	Function Description					
TotalSupply	Provides information about the total token supply	√	√	\checkmark		
BalanceOf	Provides account balance of the owner's account	\checkmark	√	\checkmark		
Transfer	Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address	√	√	✓		
TransferFrom	Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens from a specified address	√	√	√		
Approve	Allow a spender to withdraw a set number of tokens from a specified account	√	√	√		
Allowance	Returns a set number of tokens from a spender to the owner	√	√	√		

Write functions of contract v1.0

17. transferOwnership

1. TransferETH	18. unlock
2. afterPreSale	19. updateBuyingLpFee
0	20. updateBuyingMarketingFee
3. approve	21. updateBuyingRfiFee
4. burn	22. updateMarketingPortionOfSwap
5. decreaseAllowance	23. updateMarketingWallet
6. excludeFromReward	24. updateRouterAddress
	25. updateSellingLpFee
7. includeInReward	26. updateSellingMarketingFee
8. increaseAllowance	27. updateSellingRfiFee
9. lock	28. updateSwapTokensAt
10. prepareForPreSale	29. updateTradingIsEnabled
To. preparer of resale	30. updateTransactionMax
11. renounceOwnership	31. updateWalletMax
12. setExcludedFromFee	32. whitelistDxSale
13. setFeesDivisor	
14. setSwapEnabled	
15. transfer	
16. transferFrom	
47 hf	

Deployer cannot mint any new tokens

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot mint	-	_	-
Max / Total Supply			800000



Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot lock	\checkmark	√	X
Deployer cannot burn	√	√	\checkmark

Comments:

v1.0

- Deployer can lock user funds by
 - · Enable/disable trading
 - Setting max tx amount to 0
 - · Setting max wallet balance to 0

Deployer cannot pause the contract

Name	Exist	Tested	Status
Deployer cannot pause	-	_	-



Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)





Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verfified / Checked	\checkmark
Partly Verified	P
Unverified / Not checked	X
Not available	-

Modifiers and public functions

v1.0





Comments

- Deployer can set following state variables without any limitations
 - marketingPortionOfSwap
 - FEES_DIVISOR
 - buyingLpFee
 - buyingMarketingFee
 - buyingRfiFee
 - sellingLpFee
 - sellingMarketingFee
 - sellingRfiFee
 - maxTxAmount
 - maxWalletBalance
 - swapTokensAtAmount
- · Deployer can enable/disable following state variables
 - tradingIsEnabled
 - swapEnabled
 - _isExcludedFromFee
 - isExcludedFromRewards
 - _excluded
- Deployer can set following addresses
 - router
 - marketingWallet
 - presaleAddress
 - owner

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Please check if an OnlyOwner or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.

Source Units in Scope

v1.0

Туре	File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score	Capabilities
∌ €Q	contracts/eclipsedoge.sol	5	4	950	859	600	76	554	■ Š ÷11
≥ ≥Q	Totals	5	4	950	859	600	76	554	■ § ♣ 11

Legend

Attribute	Description
Lines	total lines of the source unit
nLines	normalized lines of the source unit (e.g. normalizes functions spanning multiple lines)
nSLOC	normalized source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces,)

Audit Results

AUDIT PASSED

Critical issues

No critical issues

High issues

No high issues

Medium issues

Issue	File	Туре	Line	Description
#1	File Main	Type Regain ownership	See description	Description Owner can regain ownership after transferring it with following steps: 1. Call lock function to set _previousOwner to the own address 2. Call unlock function to get ownership back 3. Transfer/renounce ownership 4. Call unlock function to get ownership back
				Make sure to set the _previousOwnership back to address zero after using the unlock function

Low issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
		31		I

#1	Main	Contract doesn't import npm packages from source (like OpenZeppelin etc.)	-	We recommend to import all packages from npm directly without flatten the contract. Functions could be modified or can be susceptible to vulnerabilities
#2	Main	A floating pragma is set	9	The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.8.7"".
#3	Main	Missing Zero Address Validation (missing- zero-check)	611	Check that the address is not zero
#4	Main	Local variables shadowing	478, 413	Rename the local variables that shadow another component
#5	Main	Missing Events Arithmetic	701, 689, 684, 679, 716, 674, 669, 664, 644, 652, 648	Emit an event for critical parameter changes

Informational issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
#1	Main	State variables that could be declared constant (constable-states)	291	Add the `constant` attributes to state variables that never change
#2	Main	Functions that are not used	923	Remove unused functions

Audit Comments

We recommend you to use the special form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow link for more information https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/v0.5.10/natspec-format.html) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variables, functions etc. do.

04. April 2022:

· Read whole report for more information

SWC Attacks

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>36</u>	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>35</u>	Code With No Effects	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>34</u>	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	CWE-655: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>33</u>	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>32</u>	Unexpected Ether balance	CWE-667: Improper Locking	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>31</u>	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>30</u>	Right-To-Left- Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>29</u>	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>28</u>	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>27</u>	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>25</u>	Incorrect Inheritance Order	CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order	PASSED
<u>SW</u> C-1 24	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition	PASSED
SW C-1 23	Requirement Violation	CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>22</u>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>21</u>	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>20</u>	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>9</u>	Shadowing State Variables	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	NOT PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>8</u>	Incorrect Constructor Name	CWE-665: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>7</u>	Signature Malleability	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>6</u>	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>5</u>	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>4</u>	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>3</u>	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>2</u>	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>1</u>	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>O</u>	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	PASSED
SW C-1 09	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>08</u>	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
SW C-1 07	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>06</u>	Unprotected SELFDESTRUC T Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>05</u>	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>04</u>	Unchecked Call Return Value	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>03</u>	Floating Pragma	CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its <u>Lifetime</u>	NOT PASSED
SW C-1 02	Outdated Compiler Version	CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>01</u>	Integer Overflow and Underflow	CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>00</u>	Function Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED



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