



**SOLIDProof**  
*Bring trust into your projects*

**Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC  
Development | Marketing**

MADE IN GERMANY

# Shib Connect Audit

**Security Assessment  
28. February, 2023**

**For**



**SolidProof\_io**



**@solidproof\_io**

|  |    |
|--|----|
| Disclaimer   | 3  |
| Description  | 5  |
| Project Engagement   | 5  |
| Logo   | 5  |
| Contract Link  | 5  |
| Methodology  | 7  |
| Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports) | 8  |
| Tested Contract Files  | 9  |
| Source Lines   | 10 |
| Risk Level   | 10 |
| Capabilities   | 11 |
| Inheritance Graph  | 12 |
| CallGraph  | 13 |
| Scope of Work/Verify Claims                                      | 14 |
| Modifiers and public functions                                   | 24 |
| Source Units in Scope  | 28 |
| Critical issues  | 29 |
| High issues  | 29 |
| Medium issues  | 29 |
| Low issues   | 29 |
| Informational issues   | 30 |
| Audit Comments   | 31 |
| SWC Attacks  | 32 |

# Disclaimer

SolidProof.io reports are not, nor should be considered, an “endorsement” or “disapproval” of any particular project or team. These reports are not, nor should be considered, an indication of the economics or value of any “product” or “asset” created by any team. SolidProof.io do not cover testing or auditing the integration with external contract or services (such as Uniswap, Uniswap, PancakeSwap etc’...)

**SolidProof.io Audits do not provide any warranty or guarantee regarding the absolute bug- free nature of the technology analyzed, nor do they provide any indication of the technology proprietors. SolidProof Audits should not be used in any way to make decisions around investment or involvement with any particular project. These reports in no way provide investment advice, nor should be leveraged as investment advice of any sort.**

SolidProof.io Reports represent an extensive auditing process intending to help our customers increase the quality of their code while reducing the high level of risk presented by cryptographic tokens and blockchain technology. Blockchain technology and cryptographic assets present a high level of ongoing risk. SolidProof’s position is that each company and individual are responsible for their own due diligence and continuous security. SolidProof in no way claims any guarantee of security or functionality of the technology we agree to analyze.

| Version | Date              | Description  |
|---------|-------------------|--|
| 1.0     | 28. February 2023 | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Layout project</li><li>• Automated- /Manual-Security Testing</li><li>• Summary</li></ul> |

## **Network**

Binance Smart Chain (BEP20)

## **Website**

<https://www.shibconnect.com/>

## **Telegram**

<https://t.me/shibconnect>

## **Twitter**

<https://twitter.com/Shibconnectbsc>



## Description

ShibConnect was developed with the intent to start a new trend within crypto. This idea was created the idea after realizing just how effective referral systems are in real-world businesses. But the blockchain allows for something that hasn't even been done before in these businesses. It allows for fully transparent and instant payouts of referral rewards, and the potential to scale to sizes that are unheard of when compared to multi-level-marketing companies that sell physical products.

**ShibConnect is the first-ever token with built-in instant referral rewards and a unique referral train system.**

The core features of the Shibconnect is the referral system integrated into the contract and dashboard and also it's NFT ecosystem paired along with it which will be explained in more detail.

## Project Engagement

During the 25th of February 2023, **Shib Connect Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

## Logo



## Contract Link

**v1.0**

- Provided as file

# Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

| Level                | Value   | Vulnerability   | Risk (Required Action)  |
|----------------------|---------|---|---|
| <b>Critical</b>      | 9 - 10  | A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.      | Immediate action to reduce risk level.                              |
| <b>High</b>          | 7 – 8.9 | A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way. | Implementation of corrective actions as soon as possible.           |
| <b>Medium</b>        | 4 – 6.9 | A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.                                     | Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.           |
| <b>Low</b>           | 2 – 3.9 | A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.       | Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk. |
| <b>Informational</b> | 0 – 1.9 | A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.   | An observation that does not determine a level of risk              |

# Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.


## **Methodology**

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following:
  - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
  - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
  - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
  - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

## Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Imported packages:



```
Context
IUniswapV2Pair
IUniswapV2Factory
IterableMapping
IERC20
IERC20Metadata
ERC20
SafeMath
Ownable
SafeMathInt
SafeMathUint
IUniswapV2Router01
IUniswapV2Router02
```



# Tested Contract Files

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.


*A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.*

## v1.0


| File Name                 | SHA-1 Hash                               |
|---------------------------|--|
| contracts/shibconnect.sol | 27147127a78eeea727e3c23f3a80af18a430e0cd |

# Metrics

## Source Lines v1.0



## Risk Level v1.0



## Capabilities

### Components

| Version | Contracts | Libraries | Interfaces | Abstract |
|---------|-----------|-----------|------------|----------|
| 1.0     | 3         | 4         | 6          | 1        |

### Exposed Functions

*This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.*

| Version | Public | Payable |
|---------|--------|---------|
| 1.0     | 133    | 5       |

| Version | External | Internal | Private | Pure | View |
|---------|----------|----------|---------|------|------|
| 1.0     | 77       | 115      | 10      | 25   | 59   |

### State Variables

| Version | Total | Public |
|---------|-------|--------|
| 1.0     | 71    | 37     |

### Capabilities

| Version | Solidity Versions observed | Experimental Features | Can Receive Funds | Uses Assembly | Has Destroyable Contracts |
|---------|----------------------------|-----------------------|-------------------|---------------|---------------------------|
| 1.0     | <code>^0.8.17</code>       |                       | yes               |               |                           |

| Version | Transfers ETH | Low-Level Calls | DelegateCall | Uses Hash Functions | EC Recover | New/Create/Create2 |
|---------|---------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------|------------|--------------------|
|---------|---------------|-----------------|--------------|---------------------|------------|--------------------|


|     |     |  |  |  |  |  |
|-----|-----|--|--|--|--|--|
| 1.0 | yes |  |  |  |  |  |
|-----|-----|--|--|--|--|--|

# Inheritance Graph

## v1.0



CallGraph  
v1.0



## Scope of Work/Verify Claims

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

1. Is contract an upgradeable
2. Correct implementation of Token standard
3. Deployer cannot mint any new tokens
4. Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds
5. Deployer cannot pause the contract
6. Deployer cannot set fees
7. Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses
8. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)



## Is contract an upgradeable

| Name                        |    |
|-----------------------------|----|
| Is contract an upgradeable? | No |



## Correct implementation of Token standard

| ERC20        |   |       |        |          |
|--------------|---|-------|--------|----------|
| Function     | Description   | Exist | Tested | Verified |
| TotalSupply  | Provides information about the total token supply                           | ✓     | ✓      | ✓        |
| BalanceOf    | Provides account balance of the owner's account                             | ✓     | ✓      | ✓        |
| Transfer     | Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address   | ✓     | ✓      | ✓        |
| TransferFrom | Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens from a specified address | ✓     | ✓      | ✓        |
| Approve      | Allow a spender to withdraw a set number of tokens from a specified account | ✓     | ✓      | ✓        |
| Allowance    | Returns a set number of tokens from a spender to the owner                  | ✓     | ✓      | ✓        |



## Write functions of contract v1.0

```
updateStakingAmounts
enableTrading
setPresaleWallet
enableStaking
stake
updateMaxAmount
setMarketingAddress
updateUniswapV2Router
excludeFromFees
enableSwapAndLiquify
setAutomatedMarketMakerPair
updateLiquidityWallet
updateGasForProcessing
updateFees
updateFeesReferred
setReferralTreeFeesLength
updateReferralTreeFees
transferETH
transferERC20Token
setSwapTokensAmount
setSwapTokensAmountMax
setReferrer
setReferralTreeAtIndex
convertReferralRewards
enableConvertReferralRewards
setReferralLeaderboardTimers
forceUpdateReferralLeaderboards
setIterations
forceSwapAndSendDividendsAndMarketingFunds...
setEarlyBlocks
setEarlyTax
```

## Deployer cannot mint any new tokens

| Name                 | Exist      | Tested | Status |
|----------------------|------------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot mint | ✓          | ✓      | ✓      |
| Max / Total Supply   | 1000000000 |        |        |



## Deployer cannot burn or lock user funds

| Name                 | Exist | Tested | Status |
|----------------------|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot lock | ✓     | ✓      | ✗      |
| Deployer cannot burn | ✓     | ✓      | ✓      |

Comments:

### v1.0

- Owner can lock user funds by setting to high earlyTax. It is possible to set it above 100%
- referralFee can be set above 100%
- Owner can lock
  - staking by setting staking amounts to 0
  - Converting referral rewards into payout token while disable converting referral rewards
  - By setting referralFee above 100

## Deployer cannot pause the contract

| Name                  | Exist | Tested | Status |
|-----------------------|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot pause | —     | —      | —      |

Comments:

**v1.0**

- Owner can pause contract



## Deployer cannot set fees

| Name   | Exist | Tested | Status |
|--|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot set fees over 25%                  | ✓     | ✓      | ✗      |
| Deployer cannot set fees to nearly 100% or to 100% | ✓     | ✓      | ✗      |

Comments:

### v1.0

- Fees can be set without any limitations. The owner is able to reset earlyBlock variable everytime he wants. According to this the owner can set the earlyTax to 100%
- referralFee can be set above 100%

## Deployer can blacklist/antisnipe addresses

| Name  | Exist | Tested | Status |
|---|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses | ✓     | ✓      | ✗      |

Comments:

### v1.0

- There is no antisnipe function directly but the owner is able to set the Early blocks and early tax to any values. That means the early block can be reactivated by the owner at any time.



## Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

| Tested | Verified |
|--------|----------|
| ✓      | ✓        |

### Legend

| Attribute                | Symbol |
|--------------------------|--------|
| Verified / Checked       | ✓      |
| Partly Verified          | ⚠      |
| Unverified / Not checked | ✗      |
| Not available            | —      |

## Modifiers and public functions

### v1.0





- ▼ 🔹 updateStakingAmounts
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 enableTrading
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 setPresaleWallet
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 enableStaking
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
  - 🔹 stake
- ▼ 🔹 updateMaxAmount
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 setMarketingAddress
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 updateUniswapV2Router
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 excludeFromFees
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 enableSwapAndLiquify
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 setAutomatedMarketMakerPair
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 updateLiquidityWallet
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 updateGasForProcessing
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 updateFees
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 updateFeesReferred
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 setReferralTreeFeesLength
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 updateReferralTreeFees
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 transferETH
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 transferERC20Token
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 setSwapTokensAmount
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 setSwapTokensAmountMax
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
  - 🔹 setReferrer
- ▼ 🔹 setReferralTreeAtIndex
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
  - 🔹 convertReferralRewards
- ▼ 🔹 enableConvertReferralRewards
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 setReferralLeaderboardTimers
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 forceUpdateReferralLeaderboards
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 setIterations
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 forceSwapAndSendDividendsAndMarketingFunds...
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 setearlyBlocks
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner
- ▼ 🔹 setearlyTax
  - Ⓜ onlyOwner



## Comments

- Deployer can set following state variables without any limitations
  - earlyTax
  - earlyBlocks
  - iteration
  - iterationDaily
  - iterationWeekly
  - iterationMonthly
  - dailyTimer
  - weeklyTimer
  - monthlyTimer
  - swapTokensAtAmountMax
  - swapTokensAtAmount
  - referralTreeFees
  - devFeesReferred
  - liquidityFeeReferred
  - devFees
  - liquidityFee
  - referralFee
  - maxSellTransactionAmount
  - stakingAmounts
    - Can be set to max 100. If the value is 0 the stakingBonus will also be 0
- Deployer can enable/disable following state variables
  - enableConvertingReferralRewards
  - automatedMarketMakerPairs
  - swapAndLiquifyEnabled
  - \_isExcludedFromFees
  - stakingEnabled
  - canTransferBeforeTradingIsEnabled
  - \_isExcludedFromFees
- Deployer can set following addresses
  - referrerTree
  - liquidityWallet
  - uniswapV2Router
  - marketingAddress
- Existing Modifiers
  - onlyshib
  - onlyOwner
- Owner is able to
  - Manually swap





- Force update leader boards
  - Drain out the contract tokens
  - Take out contract address balance
  - Enable/disable liquidity adding
- We recommend you to change every
    - uint to uint256
    - Int256 to uin256

**Please check if an `OnlyOwner` or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.**



# Source Units in Scope

## v1.0

| Type  | File                      | Logic Contracts | Interfaces | Lines | nLines | nSLOC | Comment Lines | Complex. Score | Capabilities  |
|---|---------------------------|-----------------|------------|-------|--------|-------|---------------|----------------|---|
|  | contracts/shibconnect.sol | 8               | 6          | 1707  | 1249   | 918   | 54            | 769            |  |
|  | Totals                    | 8               | 6          | 1707  | 1249   | 918   | 54            | 769            |  |

### Legend

| Attribute        | Description   |
|------------------|---|
| Lines            | total lines of the source unit  |
| nLines           | normalised lines of the source unit (e.g. normalises functions spanning multiple lines)   |
| nSLOC            | normalised source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)   |
| Comment Lines    | lines containing single or block comments   |
| Complexity Score | a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces, ...) |

# Audit Results

## Critical issues

**No critical issues**

## High issues

**No high issues**

## Medium issues

| Issue | File | Type                             | Line | Description  |
|-------|------|----------------------------------|------|--|
| #1    | Main | Drain out tokens of the contract | 1193 | Owner is able to transfer own tokens from contract to his own wallet |

## Low issues

| Issue | File | Type  | Line   | Description  |
|-------|------|---|--|--|
| #1    | Main | Contract doesn't import npm packages from source (like OpenZeppelin etc.) | -  | We recommend to import all packages from npm directly without flatten the contract. Functions could be modified or can be susceptible to vulnerabilities |
| #2    | Main | A floating pragma is set  | 3  | The current pragma Solidity directive is „^0.8.17”.  |
| #3    | Main | Missing Zero Address Validation (missing-zero-check)                      | 1057, 1181, 1101                                   | Check that the address is not zero   |
| #4    | Main | Missing Events Arithmetic   | 1642-1645, 1627-1629, 1155, 1413, 1418, 1705, 1054 | Emit an event for critical parameter changes   |
| #5    | Main | Missing path  | 1484   | path.length must be $\geq 2$ . Pools for each consecutive pair of addresses must exist and have liquidity.   |

|    |      |                          |            |  |
|----|------|--------------------------|------------|--|
| #6 | Main | AfterSwapDelta will be 0 | 1681, 1682 | <p>Since there are no actions between the beforeSwap variable and afterSwapDelta calculation the afterSwapDelta will be 0 because beforeSwap is only the balance of the contract and the value subtracted by itself will be 0.</p> <p>We recommend you to remove those lines because the swap will be executed from L1689-1691</p> |
|----|------|--------------------------|------------|--|

## Informational issues

| Issue | File | Type   | Line   | Description  |
|-------|------|--|--|--|
| #1    | Main | State variables that could be declared constant (constable-states) | 863, 864, 1201, 1202   | Add the `constant` attributes to state variables that never change   |
| #2    | Main | Functions that are not used  | 1374   | <p>Remove unused functions.</p> <p>Before removing check the function, it could be possible, that you forget to implement it into the contract</p> |
| #3    | Main | Unused state variables   | 572, 1201, 1202  | Remove unused state variables  |
| #4    | Main | Error message is missing   | 581, 582, 589, 599, 608, 616, 621, 629, 1009, 1017, 1032, 1053, 1065, 1071, 1078, 1088 1111, | Provide an error message for require statement   |
| #5    | Main | NatSpec documentation missing                                      | -  | If you started to comment your code, also comment all other functions, variables etc.  |
| #6    | Main | State variables that could be declared immutable                   | 845  | Add the `immutable` attribute to state variables that never change or are set only in the constructor  |

## Audit Comments

We recommend you to use the special form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow link for more information <https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/natspec-format.html>) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variables, functions etc. do.

### 28. February 2023:

- Read whole report carefully and modifiers section for more information



## SWC Attacks

| ID                        | Title   | Relationships  | Status     |
|---------------------------|---|--|------------|
| <a href="#">SW C-1 36</a> | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain                       | <a href="#">CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method</a>         | PASSED     |
| <a href="#">SW C-1 35</a> | Code With No Effects                                    | <a href="#">CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code</a>  | PASSED     |
| <a href="#">SW C-1 34</a> | Message call with hardcoded gas amount                  | <a href="#">CWE-655: Improper Initialization</a>                                       | PASSED     |
| <a href="#">SW C-1 33</a> | Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments | <a href="#">CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay</a>                       | PASSED     |
| <a href="#">SW C-1 32</a> | Unexpected Ether balance                                | <a href="#">CWE-667: Improper Locking</a>  | PASSED     |
| <a href="#">SW C-1 31</a> | Presence of unused variables                            | <a href="#">CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code</a>  | NOT PASSED |
| <a href="#">SW C-1 30</a> | Right-To-Left-Override control character (U+202E)       | <a href="#">CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information</a> | PASSED     |
| <a href="#">SW C-1 29</a> | Typographical Error                                     | <a href="#">CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator</a>                                     | PASSED     |
| <a href="#">SW C-1 28</a> | DoS With Block Gas Limit                                | <a href="#">CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption</a>                             | PASSED     |



|                                   |   |   |               |
|-----------------------------------|---|---|---------------|
| <a href="#">SW<br/>C-1<br/>27</a> | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable          | <a href="#">CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality</a>                   | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW<br/>C-1<br/>25</a> | Incorrect Inheritance Order                         | <a href="#">CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order</a>                         | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW<br/>C-1<br/>24</a> | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location                 | <a href="#">CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition</a>                       | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW<br/>C-1<br/>23</a> | Requirement Violation                               | <a href="#">CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller</a>    | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW<br/>C-1<br/>22</a> | Lack of Proper Signature Verification               | <a href="#">CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity</a>   | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW<br/>C-1<br/>21</a> | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks | <a href="#">CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature</a> | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW<br/>C-1<br/>20</a> | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes    | <a href="#">CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values</a>              | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW<br/>C-11<br/>9</a> | Shadowing State Variables                           | <a href="#">CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards</a>           | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW<br/>C-11<br/>8</a> | Incorrect Constructor Name                          | <a href="#">CWE-665: Improper Initialization</a>                          | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW<br/>C-11<br/>7</a> | Signature Malleability                              | <a href="#">CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature</a> | <b>PASSED</b> |

|                           |                                      |  |               |
|---------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|---------------|
| <a href="#">SW C-11 6</a> | Timestamp Dependence                 | <a href="#">CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere</a>                                    | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW C-11 5</a> | Authorization through tx.origin      | <a href="#">CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function</a>  | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW C-11 4</a> | Transaction Order Dependence         | <a href="#">CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')</a> | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW C-11 3</a> | DoS with Failed Call                 | <a href="#">CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions</a>  | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW C-11 2</a> | Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee     | <a href="#">CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere</a>                                    | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW C-11 1</a> | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | <a href="#">CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function</a>  | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW C-11 0</a> | Assert Violation                     | <a href="#">CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation</a>  | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW C-1 09</a> | Uninitialized Storage Pointer        | <a href="#">CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer</a>   | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW C-1 08</a> | State Variable Default Visibility    | <a href="#">CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards</a>  | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW C-1 07</a> | Reentrancy                           | <a href="#">CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow</a>   | <b>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW C-1 06</a> | Unprotected SELFDESTRUCT Instruction | <a href="#">CWE-284: Improper Access Control</a>   | <b>PASSED</b> |

|                                   |                                      |  |                       |
|-----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|--|-----------------------|
| <a href="#">SW<br/>C-1<br/>05</a> | Unprotected<br>Ether<br>Withdrawal   | <a href="#">CWE-284: Improper Access<br/>Control</a>                                 | <b>PASSED</b>         |
| <a href="#">SW<br/>C-1<br/>04</a> | Unchecked<br>Call Return<br>Value    | <a href="#">CWE-252: Unchecked Return<br/>Value</a>                                  | <b>PASSED</b>         |
| <a href="#">SW<br/>C-1<br/>03</a> | Floating<br>Pragma                   | <a href="#">CWE-664: Improper Control of<br/>a Resource Through its<br/>Lifetime</a> | <b>NOT<br/>PASSED</b> |
| <a href="#">SW<br/>C-1<br/>02</a> | Outdated<br>Compiler<br>Version      | <a href="#">CWE-937: Using Components<br/>with Known Vulnerabilities</a>             | <b>PASSED</b>         |
| <a href="#">SW<br/>C-1<br/>01</a> | Integer<br>Overflow and<br>Underflow | <a href="#">CWE-682: Incorrect<br/>Calculation</a>                                   | <b>PASSED</b>         |
| <a href="#">SW<br/>C-1<br/>00</a> | Function<br>Default<br>Visibility    | <a href="#">CWE-710: Improper Adherence<br/>to Coding Standards</a>                  | <b>PASSED</b>         |

*Solid  
Proofed*

**Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC  
Development | Marketing**

  
MADE IN GERMANY