

Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC Development | Marketing



ArbTomb

Audit

Security Assessment 12. April, 2023

For







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| Version | Date | Description |
|---------|----------------|---|
| 1.0 | 09. April 2023 | Layout projectAutomated-/Manual-Security TestingSummary |

Network

Arbitrum

Website

https://arbtomb.com/

Discord

https://discord.gg/buuTdW9Ne3

Twitter

https://twitter.com/arb_tomb/

Description

Welcome to ArbTomb, home to the cool new algostable project on the Arbitrum One chain. With the expectations of a new bull run around the corner & the huge Arbitrum token airdrop, we have decided to launch a Tomb Fork pegged to the Arbitrum token. It would be a wonderful opportunity to do some degen plays during the high volatility launch & extract the maximum out of our Arbitrum token Airdrop.

Project Engagement

During the Date of 09 April 2023, **ArbTomb Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

Logo



Contract Link v1.0

Provided as Files

Note for Investors: We only Audited a pool contract for **ArbTomb**. However, If the project has other contracts (for example, a Presale contract, token contract etc), and they were not provided to us in the audit scope then we cannot comment on its security and we are not responsible for it in any way.

Vulnerability & Risk Level

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

| Level | Value | Vulnerability | Risk (Required Action) |
|---------------|---------|---|---|
| Critical | 9 - 10 | A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken. | Immediate action to reduce risk level. |
| High | 7 – 8.9 | A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way. | Implementation of corrective actions as soon aspossible. |
| Medium | 4 – 6.9 | A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario. | Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period. |
| Low | 2 – 3.9 | A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective. | Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk. |
| Informational | O – 1.9 | A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code. | An observation that does not determine a level of risk |

Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
 - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
 - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
 - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
 - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
 - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- 4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

Used Code from other Frameworks/Smart Contracts (direct imports)

Imported packages:

- @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/IERC20.sol
- @openzeppelin/contracts/token/ERC20/utils/SafeERC20.sol
- @openzeppelin/contracts/utils/math/SafeMath.sol
- @openzeppelin/contracts/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol
- ./interfaces/IUniswapV2Pair.sol
- ./interfaces/IUniswapV2Factory.sol

Tested Contract Files

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.


A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

v1.0

| File Name | SHA-1 Hash |
|-----------------------|--|
| contracts/ | 57ca8ace84986d50a989246006f9e8e3b |
| IUniswapV2Pair.sol | 57a4d56 |
| contracts/ | 80f855e3b94b21570a83a57fb8bd14a19c |
| IUniswapV2Factory.sol | ddb9d9 |
| contracts/pool.sol | d3d79cce0bc4e93103581b407c4b9bb5d 9df05f4 |

Metrics

Source Lines v1.0




Capabilities

Components



Exposed Functions

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.




| External | External Internal | | Pure | View | |
|----------|-------------------|---|------|------|--|
| 36 | 24 | 0 | 5 | 21 | |

StateVariables



Capabilities




Inheritance Graph

v1.0



CallGraph v1.0



Scope of Work/Verify Claims

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

- 1. Is contract an upgradeable
- 2. Deployer cannot lock user funds
- 3. Deployer cannot pause the contract
- 4. Deployer cannot set fees
- 5. Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses
- 6. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)

Is contract an upgradeable

| Name | |
|-----------------------------|----|
| Is contract an upgradeable? | No |



Deployer cannot lock user funds

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|----------------------|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot lock | - | _ | - |



Deployer cannot pause the contract

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|-----------------------|--------------|----------|--------------|
| Deployer cannot pause | \checkmark | √ | \checkmark |

Comments:

v1.0

· Owner cannot pause the contract

Deployer cannot set fees

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|--|--------------|----------|--------------|
| Deployer cannot set fees over 1% | \checkmark | √ | \checkmark |
| Deployer cannot set fees to nearly 100% or to 100% | √ | √ | √ |

Comments:

v1.0

Deposit Fees cannot be set without any limitations

Deployer can blacklist/antisnipe addresses

| Name | Exist | Tested | Status |
|---|-------|--------|--------|
| Deployer cannot blacklist/antisnipe addresses | - | - | - |



Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)



Legend

| Attribute | Symbol |
|--------------------------|--------------|
| Verified / Checked | \checkmark |
| Partly Verified | P |
| Unverified / Not checked | X |
| Not available | - |

Modifiers and public functions v1.0

add
 onlyOperator
 set
 onlyOperator
 massUpdatePools
 updatePool
 deposit
 nonReentrant
 withdraw
 nonReentrant
 emergencyWithdraw
 setOperator
 onlyOperator
 governanceRecoverUnsupported
 onlyOperator

Ownership Privileges

- · Add a new pool
- Update the given pool's allocation point, and it can be set to any arbitrary value
- Set operator address
- The operator address can withdraw any type of tokens from the contract but only after 90 days after the pool has been ended.

Please check if an OnlyOwner or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.

Source Units in Scope v1.0

| File | Logic Contracts | Interfaces | Lines | nLines | nSLOC | Comment Lines | Complex. Score |
|---------------------------------|-----------------|------------|-------|--------|-------|---------------|----------------|
| contracts/IUniswapV2Pair.sol | | 1 | 52 | 7 | 5 | | 55 |
| contracts/IUniswapV2Factory.sol | | 1 | 17 | 6 | 4 | | 13 |
| contracts/pool.sol | 1 | | 361 | 347 | 274 | 45 | 230 |
| Totals | 1 | 2 | 430 | 360 | 283 | 45 | 298 |

Legend

| Attribute | Description | |
|------------------|---|--|
| Lines | total lines of the source unit | |
| nLines | normalised lines of the source unit (e.g. normalises functions spanning multiple lines) | |
| nSLOC | normalised source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines) | |
| Comment Lines | lines containing single or block comments | |
| Complexity Score | a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces,) | |

Audit Results

Critical issues

No critical issues

High issues

No high issues

Medium issues

No medium issues

Low issues

| Issue | File | Туре | Line | Description |
|-------|------|---|----------|--|
| #1 | Main | Contract doesn't import npm packages from source (like OpenZeppelin etc.) | 10, 11 | We recommend to import all packages from npm directly without flatten the contract. Functions could be modified or can be susceptible to vulnerabilities |
| #2 | Main | A floating pragma is set | - | The current pragma Solidity directive is ""^0.8.0". |
| #3 | Main | Missing Zero Address Validation (missing- zero-check) | 103 | Check that the address is not zero |
| #4 | Main | Missing Events Arithmetic | 101, 145 | Emit an event for critical parameter changes |

Informational issues

| Issue | File | Type | Line | Description |
|-------|------|-------------------------------------|------|---|
| #1 | Main | NatSpec documentation missing | | If you started to comment your code, also comment all other functions, variables etc. |

Audit Comments

We recommend you to use the special form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow link for more information https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/natspec-format.html) for your contracts to provide rich

documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variables, functions etc. do.

12. April 2023:

- There is still an owner (Owner still has not renounced ownership)
- We recommend using a time lock in the deposit function because according to the contract's logic, the withdrawal is available right after deposit.
- We recommend ArbTomb team to conduct unit tests thoroughly to rule out any calculation errors.
- Owner can deploy a new version of the contract which can change any limit and give owner new privileges
- Read whole report and modifiers section for more information

SWC Attacks

| ID | Title | Relationships | Status |
|--------------------------------------|--|--|--------|
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>36</u> | Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain | CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>35</u> | Code With No Effects | CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>34</u> | Message call with hardcoded gas amount | CWE-655: Improper Initialization | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>33</u> | Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments | CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>32</u> | Unexpected Ether balance | CWE-667: Improper Locking | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>31</u> | Presence of unused variables | CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>30</u> | Right-To-Left- Override control character (U+202E) | CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>29</u> | Typographical Error | CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>28</u> | DoS With Block Gas Limit | CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption | PASSED |

| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>27</u> | Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable | CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality | PASSED |
|--------------------------------------|--|---|--------|
| SW C-1 25 | Incorrect Inheritance Order | CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>24</u> | Write to Arbitrary Storage Location | CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition | PASSED |
| SW C-1 23 | Requirement Violation | CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>22</u> | Lack of Proper Signature Verification | CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>21</u> | Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks | CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature | PASSED |
| SW C-1 20 | Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes | CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>9</u> | Shadowing State Variables | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>8</u> | Incorrect Constructor Name | CWE-665: Improper Initialization | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> C-11 7 | Signature Malleability | CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature | PASSED |

| <u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>6</u> | Timestamp Dependence | CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere | PASSED |
|--------------------------------------|---|--|--------|
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>5</u> | Authorization through tx.origin | CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>4</u> | Transaction Order Dependence | CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition') | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>3</u> | DoS with Failed Call | CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>2</u> | Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee | CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>1</u> | Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions | CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>O</u> | Assert Violation | CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation | PASSED |
| SW C-1 09 | Uninitialized Storage Pointer | CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>08</u> | State Variable Default Visibility | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards | PASSED |
| SW C-1 07 | Reentrancy | CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>06</u> | Unprotected SELFDESTRUC T Instruction | CWE-284: Improper Access Control | PASSED |

| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>05</u> | Unprotected Ether Withdrawal | CWE-284: Improper Access Control | PASSED |
|--------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---|---------------|
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>04</u> | Unchecked Call Return Value | CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>03</u> | Floating Pragma | CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its <u>Lifetime</u> | NOT PASSED |
| SW C-1 02 | Outdated Compiler Version | CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>01</u> | Integer Overflow and Underflow | CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation | PASSED |
| <u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>00</u> | Function Default Visibility | CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards | PASSED |
| | | | |







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