

Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC Development | Marketing



## **Elevate Pad**

# Audit

Security Assessment 26. April, 2023

For







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Version	Date	Description			
1.0	19. April 2023 - 21. Apr 2023	<ul><li>Layout project</li><li>Automated-/Manual-Security Testing</li><li>Summary</li></ul>			
1.1	26. April 2023	· Reaudit			

#### **Network**

Ethereum

#### Website

https://thewildwest.io/

### **Telegram**

https://t.me/elevatePAD

#### **Twitter**

twitter.com/elevatepad

### **Description**

ElevatePAD was initially developed by the founders of Ponyo impact, an innovative Auto-Impact token, with a focus on Coral Restoration. The Ponyo Impact team had a greater vision to help other legitimate ESG impact projects come to life. Beyond the initial development and conception of ElevatePAD, our future lies in the collective voice of our community that will push forward the ethos of DeFi. The backbone of Elevate is our strong community and potential global reach.

### **Project Engagement**

During the Date of 17 April 2023, **Elevate Pad Team** engaged Solidproof.io to audit smart contracts that they created. The engagement was technical in nature and focused on identifying security flaws in the design and implementation of the contracts. They provided Solidproof.io with access to their code repository and whitepaper.

### Logo



## Contract Link v1.0

- https://github.com/elevate-pad/smart-contracts
- · Commit: 0429b06

**Note** - This Audit report consists of security analysis of the Elevate smart contracts, functional testing (or unit testing) of the contract's logic was not included in this analysis.

## **Vulnerability & Risk Level**

Risk represents the probability that a certain source-threat will exploit vulnerability, and the impact of that event on the organization or system. Risk Level is computed based on CVSS version 3.0.

Level	Value	Vulnerability	Risk (Required Action)
Critical	9 - 10	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning in a number of scenarios, or creates a risk that the contract may be broken.	Immediate action to reduce risk level.
High	7 – 8.9	A vulnerability that affects the desired outcome when using a contract, or provides the opportunity to use a contract in an unintended way.	Implementation of corrective actions as soon aspossible.
Medium	4 – 6.9	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract in a specific scenario.	Implementation of corrective actions in a certain period.
Low	2 – 3.9	A vulnerability that does not have a significant impact on possible scenarios for the use of the contract and is probably subjective.	Implementation of certain corrective actions or accepting the risk.
Informational	O – 1.9	A vulnerability that have informational character but is not effecting any of the code.	An observation that does not determine a level of risk

# Auditing Strategy and Techniques Applied

Throughout the review process, care was taken to evaluate the repository for security-related issues, code quality, and adherence to specification and best practices. To do so, reviewed line-by-line by our team of expert pentesters and smart contract developers, documenting any issues as there were discovered.

## Methodology

The auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

- 1. Code review that includes the following:
  - i) Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the smart contract.
  - ii) Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-byline in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - iii) Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to SolidProof describe.
- 2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
  - i) Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run those test cases.
  - ii) Symbolic execution, which is analysing a program to determine what inputs causes each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the smart contracts to improve efficiency, effectiveness, clarify, maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.
- 4. Specific, itemized, actionable recommendations to help you take steps to secure your smart contracts.

### **Tested Contract Files**

This audit covered the following files listed below with a SHA-1 Hash.


A file with a different Hash has been modified, intentionally or otherwise, after the security review. A different Hash could be (but not necessarily) an indication of a changed condition or potential vulnerability that was not within the scope of this review.

#### **v1.0**

File Name	SHA-1 Hash
contracts/TokenSale/	0823c25c91fa5cf58ada0739340f
PoolFactory.sol	25d64b32ddef
contracts/TokenSale/	7b7f67b9ad4099c4fb32fb423905
PresalePool.sol	8ccc507f017c
contracts/TokenSale/	4fd8c6663644f70befeac01b192d
PoolManager.sol	26c9cb473d74
contracts/TokenCreate/	626389524142695500734d943e6
TokenFactory.sol	51f901519a02c
contracts/TokenCreate/	f989324b2f344ee40e87a1c6c6fb
BabyToken.sol	ef0a4d1a3ce5
contracts/TokenCreate/	da3a8f323617b630eeea8e46142
BuybackBabyToken.sol	5d8a73f8cb595
contracts/TokenCreate/	a0df3d3dfdb3c98b75408b7adf4fc
StandardToken.sol	31ae45ecb94
contracts/TokenCreate/	b6da49ce8ed6a04864459998bc5
LiquidityGeneratorToken.sol	f47b27fb73e58
contracts/TokenLock/	1bf1ef3748632689be0e16c6ad0e
ElevateLocker.sol	cc7c559bd0d1

## **Metrics**

## Source Lines v1.0



## **Capabilities**

#### **Components**

Contracts	ELibraries	Unterfaces	Abstract
18	31	53	33

#### **Exposed Functions**

This section lists functions that are explicitly declared public or payable. Please note that getter methods for public stateVars are not included.



External	Internal	Private	Pure	View
568	993	74	164	384

#### StateVariables



#### Capabilities




7 TryCatch	Σ Unchecked
ves	ves

## Inheritance Graph v1.0



## CallGraph v1.0



## **Scope of Work/Verify Claims**

The above token Team provided us with the files that needs to be tested (Github, Bscscan, Etherscan, files, etc.). The scope of the audit is the main contract (usual the same name as team appended with .sol).

We will verify the following claims:

- 1. Is contract an upgradeable
- 2. Correct implementation of Token standard
- 3. Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)



### Is contract an upgradeable

# Name Is contract an upgradeable? Yes

#### Comments:

#### **v1.0**

- Owner can deploy a new version of the Pool and Token contracts which can change any limit and give owner new privileges
  - Be aware of this and do your own research for the contract which is the contract pointing to

## **Correct implementation of Token standard**

ERC20					
Function	Description	Exist	Tested	Verified	
TotalSupply	Provides information about the total token supply	$\checkmark$	<b>√</b>	✓	
BalanceOf	Provides account balance of the owner's account	$\checkmark$	<b>√</b>	✓	
Transfer	Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens to a specified address	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	
TransferFrom	Executes transfers of a specified number of tokens from a specified address	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	
Approve	Allow a spender to withdraw a set number of tokens from a specified account	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	<b>√</b>	
Allowance	Returns a set number of tokens from a spender to the owner	<b>√</b>	1	<b>√</b>	

## **Overall checkup (Smart Contract Security)**



#### Legend

Attribute	Symbol
Verified / Checked	$\checkmark$
Partly Verified	P
Unverified / Not checked	X
Not available	-

## Modifiers and public functions v1.0

Baby1	Го	ken
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- setSwapTokensAtAmount
- updateDividendTracker
- updateUniswapV2Router
- excludeFromFees
- excludeMultipleAccountsFromFees
- setMarketingWallet
- setTokenRewardsFee
- setLiquiditFee
- setMarketingFee
- setAutomatedMarketMakerPair
- updateGasForProcessing
- updateClaimWait
- updateMinimumTokenBalanceForDividends
- excludeFromDividends
- processDividendTracker
- claim

#### **PoolFactory**

- initializeVesting
- setMinLockDays
- addWhitelistedUsers
- addWhitelistedUser
- removeWhitelistedUsers
- removeWhitelistedUser
- contribute
- clain
- withdrawContribution
- finalize
- **⊗** onlyOperator
- cancel
- withdrawLeftovers

- withdrawLiquidity
- emergencyWithdrawLiquidity
- emergencyWithdrawToken
- emergencyWithdraw
- updatePoolDetails
- updateCompletedKyc
- setGovernance
- setKycAudit
- setWhitelisting

#### PresalePool

- ♦ initializeVesting
- setMinLockDays
- addWhitelistedUsers
- addWhitelistedUser
- removeWhitelistedUsers
- removeWhitelistedUser
- contribute 🖔
- de claim
- withdrawContribution
- finalize
- ⊗ noReentrant
- cancel
- withdrawLeftovers

- withdrawLiquidity
- ⊚ onlyOperator
- emergencyWithdrawLiquidity
- emergencyWithdrawToken
- ⊗ onlyOwner
- emergencyWithdraw
- updatePoolDetails
- updateCompletedKyc
- setGovernance
- setKycAudit
- setWhitelistingonlyOperator

#### PoolManager

- initialize
- addPoolFactory
- addAdminPoolFactory
- addPoolFactories
- removePoolFactory
- registerPool
- increaseTotalValueLocked
- decreaseTotalValueLocked
- recordContribution
- removePoolForToken
- initializeTopPools
- addTopPool
- removeTopPool
- ethLiquidity
- transferAnyERC20Token

#### BuybackBabyToken

- approve
- approveMax
- transfer
- transferFrom
- triggerZeusBuyback
- clearBuybackMultiplier
- setAutoBuybackSettings
- setBuybackMultiplierSettings
- setIsDividendExempt
- setIsFeeExempt
- setBuyBacker
- setFees
- setFeeReceivers
- setSwapBackSettings
- ⊕ authorized
- setTargetLiquidity
- setDistributionCriteria
- setDistributorSettings
- authorized

#### LiquidityGeneratorToken

- transfer
- approve
- transferFrom
- increaseAllowance
- decreaseAllowance
- deliver
- excludeFromReward
- includeInReward
- excludeFromFee
- includeInFee
- setTaxFeePercent
- setLiquidityFeePercent
- setCharityFeePercent
- setMarketingFeePercent
- setMarketingWallet
- setCharityWallet
- setSwapAndLiquifyEnabled

#### TokenFactory

🕏 createBaby 👸 🕏 createBuyback 👸 🕏 createLiquidity 👸 🕏 createStandard 👸 setBabyAddress setBuybackAddress setLiquidityAddress setStandardAddress setPoolFactoryAddress setCreateFee setFeeReceiver 

#### **Ownership/Authorized Privileges**

- BabyToken.sol
  - Set amount to swap tokens at, to any arbitrary value
  - Update dividend tracker, AMM, and uniswapV2 router address
  - Include/Exclude accounts from fees
  - Set Marketing Wallet address
  - Set Rewards, Liquidity, and Marketing fees, but not more than 25%
  - Update minimum balance for dividends to any arbitrary value
  - Set dividend balance of an account
  - Exclude from Dividends
  - Update claim wait to anywhere between 1 and 24 hrs
  - Update minimum token balance to any arbitrary value
- BuybackBabyToken.sol (authorised addresses privileges)
  - Authorized addresses can trigger buyback
  - Set buy back multiplier to zero
  - Set auto buyback settings in which the authorised address can set the following to any arbitrary value

- Status (true or false)
- Cap
- Amount
- Period
- Include/Exclude accounts from dividends, and fees
- Set buyback address
- Set fees, but not more than 25%
- Set fee receiver addresses
- Set distribution criteria of the dividends
- Set target liquidity to any arbitrary value

#### <u>LiquidityGenerator.sol</u>

- Owner can include/exclude accounts from the reward and fee
- Set tax, liquidity, marketing, and charity fee percent, but not more than 25.
- Set charity, and marketing wallet address
- Enable/Disable swap and liquify

#### <u>TokenFactory.sol</u>

- Set baby token, and buyback baby token address
- Set liquidity token, standard token, and pool factory contract addresses
- Set token create fee address
- Set token creation fee to any arbitrary value but it will not affect users because this fee is not implemented anywhere

#### PoolFactory.sol

- Owner can set the following addresses
  - Master, Elevate, Admin Wallet
  - Token Factory
  - Pool Owner
  - Pool Manager
- Owner can set the following to any arbitrary value
  - Version
  - Contribute withdraw fee
  - KYC and Audit Price
  - Presale pool price
  - Minimum lock days
  - MInimum ETH to raise
  - Bonus Base Per tier
- Withdraw ETH and any other ERC20 from the contract
- Update KYC and Audit status for a given address
- Withdraw liquidity, and tokens from any given pool address which is not recommended

#### PoolManager.sol

- Factory addresses and the owner can set/add a new pool factory address
- Owner can remove factory address
- Factory addresses can register a new pool
- Factory addresses can increase/decrease the total value locked for a particular currency to any arbitrary value
- Factory addresses can manually set the contribution of a user to any particular pool
- Factory addresses can remove the pool for a token address
- The owner can initialise top pools
- The factory addresses can add, and remove top pools
- Owner can withdraw ETH and any other ERC20 from the contract

#### PresalePool.sol

- Operator address has the following privileges
  - Initialise vesting
  - Add/Remove whitelisted users, and only these users will be able to contribute in the presale
  - Finalize/Finish a pool when the total raised value has reached the hardcap, or soft cap and the end time has passed
  - Cancel a pool anytime
  - Withdraw contract's balance to the governance address if the end time is reached and total raised value is less than the soft cap
  - Withdraw liquidity once the liquidity unlock time has been passed.
  - Update pool details
- Owner address has the following privileges
  - Set minimum lock days
  - Update the status of completed KYC
  - Set governance address
  - Withdraw liquidity, and tokens from any given pool address which is not recommended
  - Set KYC and Audit status
- There are several authorities which are authorized to call some functions, that means, if the owner is renounced, another address is still authorized to call functions
  - · Be aware of this

## Please check if an OnlyOwner or similar restrictive modifier has been forgotten.

## **Source Units in Scope** v1.0

File	Logic Contracts	Interfaces	Lines	nLines	nSLOC	Comment Lines	Complex. Score
contracts/TokenSale/PoolFactory.sol	8	7	1294	942	603	292	532
contracts/TokenSale/PresalePool.sol	12	7	2072	1671	1086	426	967
contracts/TokenSale/PoolManager.sol	8	6	1630	1248	758	398	627
contracts/TokenCreate/TokenFactory.sol	6	4	577	417	309	66	348
contracts/TokenCreate/BabyToken.sol	16	10	3152	2423	1208	1003	1093
contracts/TokenCreate/BuybackBabyToken.sol	7	5	1542	1128	732	235	681
contracts/TokenCreate/StandardToken.sol	6	1	804	683	278	377	161
contracts/TokenCreate/LiquidityGeneratorToken.sol	8	4	1743	1279	789	407	559
contracts/TokenLock/ElevateLocker.sol	7	6	2142	1489	971	453	766
contracts/ElevateToken.sol	4	3	645	618	474	25	446
Totals	82	53	15601	11898	7208	3682	6180

### Legend

Attribute	Description
Lines	total lines of the source unit
nLines	normalised lines of the source unit (e.g. normalises functions spanning multiple lines)
nSLOC	normalised source lines of code (only source-code lines; no comments, no blank lines)
Comment Lines	lines containing single or block comments
Complexity Score	a custom complexity score derived from code statements that are known to introduce code complexity (branches, loops, calls, external interfaces,)

## **Audit Results**

## **Critical issues**

## No critical issues

## **High issues**

## No high issues

## **Medium issues**

### **Acknowledged**

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
#1	BuyBak cBabyTo ken.sol	Liquidity goes to an EOA	1354	The liquidity of the contract will be credited to an EOA that is the 'autoLiquidityReceiver' address every time there is a snapback in the transfer function.  The receiver address can also be changed by the authorised addresses. This way the authorised address may be able to drain the liquidity.
#2	PoolFac tory.sol	Fees can be 100% or more	1005	The owner is able to set the contribution withdraw fee up to 100% or more, and if done so then the complete amount of refund for an user that has contributed in the pool will go to the admin wallet, and the user will get 0 refund
#3	PresalP ool.sol	Owner can withdraw funds	1946-1961	The owner is able to withdraw all funds from the Presale Pool address or any other pool address using the PoolFactory contract which is not recommended, even if it is stated as an emergency function, but the owner has the liberty to use them anytime.

## **Low issues**

Issue	File	Туре	Line	Description
#1	All	Contract doesn't import npm packages from source (like OpenZeppelin etc.)		We recommend to import all packages from npm directly without flatten the contract. Functions could be modified or can be susceptible to vulnerabilities
#2	BabyTo ken.sol	Missing Zero Address Validation (missing- zero-check)	2727-2785	Check that the address is not zero
#3	PoolMa nager.s ol	Missing Zero Address Validation (missing- zero-check)	1250, 1384, 1418	Check that the address is not zero
#4	BabyTo ken.sol	Local variables shadowing	2107, 2108, 2200, 2174, 2186	Rename the local variables that shadow another component
#5	Elevate Locker.s ol	Local variables shadowing	1514, 1553, 1587, 1620, 1349	Rename the local variables that shadow another component
#6	PoolFac tory.sol	Missing Events Arithmetic	All	Emit an event for critical parameter changes. The contract has no events

## Informational issues

Issue	File	Type	Line	Description
#1	BuyBak cBabyTo ken.sol	State variables that could be declared immutable (immutable-states)	734, 755, 742	Add the `immutable` attributes to state variables that never change
#2	Elevate Locker.s ol	Unused return values	1552, 1586, 1660, 2105, 1710	Ensure that all the return values of the function calls are used and handle both success and failure cases if needed by the business logic
#3	PoolMa nager.s ol	Unused return values	1223, 1219, 1250, 1233	Ensure that all the return values of the function calls are used and handle both success and failure cases if needed by the business logic

#4	Standar dToken. sol	Functions that are not used	736, 781	Remove unused functions.  Before removing check the function, it could be possible, that you forget to implement it into the contract
#5	All	NatSpec documentation missing	_	If you started to comment your code, also comment all other functions, variables etc.

#### **Audit Comments**

We recommend you to use the special form of comments (NatSpec Format, Follow link for more information <a href="https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/natspec-format.html">https://docs.soliditylang.org/en/latest/natspec-format.html</a>) for your contracts to provide rich documentation for functions, return variables and more. This helps investors to make clear what that variables, functions etc. do.

#### **Alleviation**

The medium bugs have been acknowledged by the Elevate Pad team, and it is informed to us that the bugs are indeed part of the 'Intended Behaviour' for the Launchpad. Comments from the ElevatePad team -

"Yeah I meant ones that are not vulnerabilities. Memepad is high risk non kyc. The Launchpad is kyc and verified teams. It is the user to trust in the teams they invest with"

### 26. April 2023:

- Unit tests with 100% code coverage was not provided to SolidProof so we cannot ensure complete functional correctness of the code's logic.
- We recommend Elevate team to conduct unit and fuzz tests thoroughly to rule out possibilities of an unwanted logical and calculation errors.
- There is still an owner (Owner still has not renounced ownership)
- Owner can deploy a new version of the contract which can change any limit and give owner new privileges
- · Read whole report and modifiers section for more information

## **SWC Attacks**

ID	Title	Relationships	Status
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>36</u>	Unencrypted Private Data On-Chain	CWE-767: Access to Critical Private Variable via Public Method	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>35</u>	Code With No Effects	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>34</u>	Message call with hardcoded gas amount	CWE-655: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>33</u>	Hash Collisions With Multiple Variable Length Arguments	CWE-294: Authentication Bypass by Capture-replay	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>32</u>	Unexpected Ether balance	CWE-667: Improper Locking	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>31</u>	Presence of unused variables	CWE-1164: Irrelevant Code	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>30</u>	Right-To-Left- Override control character (U+202E)	CWE-451: User Interface (UI) Misrepresentation of Critical Information	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>29</u>	Typographical Error	CWE-480: Use of Incorrect Operator	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>28</u>	DoS With Block Gas Limit	CWE-400: Uncontrolled Resource Consumption	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>27</u>	Arbitrary Jump with Function Type Variable	CWE-695: Use of Low-Level Functionality	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>25</u>	Incorrect Inheritance Order	CWE-696: Incorrect Behavior Order	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>24</u>	Write to Arbitrary Storage Location	CWE-123: Write-what-where Condition	PASSED
SW C-1 23	Requirement Violation	CWE-573: Improper Following of Specification by Caller	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>22</u>	Lack of Proper Signature Verification	CWE-345: Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>21</u>	Missing Protection against Signature Replay Attacks	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>20</u>	Weak Sources of Randomness from Chain Attributes	CWE-330: Use of Insufficiently Random Values	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>9</u>	Shadowing State Variables	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	NOT PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>8</u>	Incorrect Constructor Name	CWE-665: Improper Initialization	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>7</u>	Signature Malleability	CWE-347: Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature	PASSED

<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>6</u>	Timestamp Dependence	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>5</u>	Authorization through tx.origin	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>4</u>	Transaction Order Dependence	CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization ('Race Condition')	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>3</u>	DoS with Failed Call	CWE-703: Improper Check or Handling of Exceptional Conditions	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>2</u>	Delegatecall to Untrusted Callee	CWE-829: Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>1</u>	Use of Deprecated Solidity Functions	CWE-477: Use of Obsolete Function	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-11</u> <u>O</u>	Assert Violation	CWE-670: Always-Incorrect Control Flow Implementation	PASSED
SW C-1 09	Uninitialized Storage Pointer	CWE-824: Access of Uninitialized Pointer	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>08</u>	State Variable Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED
SW C-1 07	Reentrancy	CWE-841: Improper Enforcement of Behavioral Workflow	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>06</u>	Unprotected SELFDESTRUC T Instruction	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED

SW C-1 05	Unprotected Ether Withdrawal	CWE-284: Improper Access Control	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>04</u>	Unchecked Call Return Value	CWE-252: Unchecked Return Value	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>03</u>	Floating Pragma	CWE-664: Improper Control of a Resource Through its Lifetime	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>02</u>	Outdated Compiler Version	CWE-937: Using Components with Known Vulnerabilities	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>01</u>	Integer Overflow and Underflow	CWE-682: Incorrect Calculation	PASSED
<u>SW</u> <u>C-1</u> <u>00</u>	Function Default Visibility	CWE-710: Improper Adherence to Coding Standards	PASSED







Blockchain Security | Smart Contract Audits | KYC Development | Marketing

