

Economic Research Note

China's tourism outflows step up

- China's outbound tourist flows have accelerated rapidly...
- ...driven in part by disguised capital outflow but now contained by capital controls
- These flows have become important sources of current account (CA) surpluses for several Asian economies
- Tourism-related outflow likely will stabilize as a share of GDP, limiting scope for wide CA deficits in China

China's current account (CA) surplus has narrowed sharply over the past decade, from nearly 10% of GDP in 2007 to just 0.4% last year. It could turn into a small deficit as early as this year if the US-China tariff war escalates further. While historically the goods trade balance drove the overall narrowing—a trend that weak exports could exacerbate as trade tensions escalate—China's widening deficit in services is an increasingly important factor. The persistent widening of the services deficit, in turn, reflects the rapid rise in outbound tourism from China.

The number of Chinese tourists traveling abroad grew at a double-digit pace almost every year from 2000 to 2015. While growth has slowed over the past few years, the number of outbound tourists remains high, and their per capita spending was almost double the world average as of 2018. The loosening of the correlation between tourist expenditures and tourist numbers in recent years suggests that a portion of flows classified as tourism payments may in fact represent disguised capital outflows, particularly around the sharp CNY depreciation in 2015-2016. The tightening of capital controls since then, though, has successfully clamped down on such outflows.

China's tourism-related outflows have by and large become Asia's inflows, with China accounting for over a fifth of all arrivals in the rest of Asia, and China-derived tourism receipts supporting regional current account surpluses to varying degrees across Japan, Korea, and several ASEAN economies. Chinese tourist spending appears comparatively insensitive to exchange rate fluctuations and arrivals are less seasonal than their North American or European counterparts, suggesting a relatively stable contribution from China to regional current accounts, absent exogenous shocks.

While we expect the number tourists from China to continue rising, we think spending per capita may have peaked, putting


a brake on surging tourism-related outflows. If we are correct, China's tourism deficit (as a share of GDP) should remain stable, limiting any further widening in the current account services deficit. And, if US tariffs prove to be a one-off shock and trade flows adjust after a couple of quarters, the trade balance also could stabilize. In addition, China's saving rate remains one of the highest in the world. Thus, while China's current account could turn into a small deficit as early as this year if tariffs rise further, a sustained widening deficit is unlikely in the medium term.

China's growing outbound tourism...

China registered a services trade deficit of almost US\$300 billion (or 2.2% of GDP) last year, largely offsetting the goods trade surplus of just under US\$400 billion. With the size of the service deficit now comparable to the goods balance, the trend in service trade is increasingly important in determining China's overall external position. While China's invisibles (services and income) deficit has been widening steadily since 2010—largely on account of tourism flows—it has showed signs of stabilization lately (Figure 1).

Figure 1: China current account composition

USD bn, 4qma




Source: SAFE, J.P. Morgan

Figure 2: China service balance breakdown

USD bn

■ Others
 ■ Constr., telco, IT, IP, fin. svcs
 ■ Processing, maint., repair
 ■ Transport
 ■ Tourism




Source: SAFE, J.P. Morgan

Within services trade, tourism is the largest component. The tourism deficit reached US\$237bn in 2018, or 1.7% of GDP, accounting for 81% of China's total service deficit (Figure 2). Outbound travel accounts for about 54% of China's service imports, reaching US\$277bn in 2018, up from just US\$13bn

in 2000. The share of travel expenses in China's total imports has climbed rapidly, significantly exceeding global and upper-middle-income country averages (Figures 3 and 4).

Figure 3: China service imports by sector


% of 2017 total



Source: Ministry of Commerce, J.P. Morgan

Figure 4: Tourism expenditure as share of total imports

% share




Source: World Bank, J.P. Morgan

The number of Chinese tourists traveling abroad had registered double-digit annual growth between 2000 and 2015 (except for a short dip in 2009 around the global financial crisis), well above the world average (Figure 5). The growth rate has eased notably since then, converging to the global average. While the number of outbound tourists as a percentage of China's total population has been rising steadily, it is still lower than that of the upper-middle-income country (UMC) and world averages (Figure 6).

Figure 5: Tourist departure growth


% oya



Source: World Bank-WDI, J.P. Morgan

Figure 6: Outbound tourists

% share of population




Source: World Bank-WDI, J.P. Morgan

...partly reflects hidden capital outflows...

Not only have outbound tourists surged in number, but their expenditure per capita has increased rapidly (Figure 7). It had been growing broadly in line with the UMC average tourist spending before it surged nearly 50% oya in 2014 by, and remained elevated in 2015 peaking at US\$1,953.9. Average spending has contracted since 2016, but still was double the world average in 2018.

Figure 7: International tourism, expenditure per capita

USD





Source: World Bank, J.P. Morgan


The surge of China's travel imports in recent years may also reflect disguised capital outflows. As China's financial account remains tightly controlled, households have limited channels to move assets overseas. Indeed, China's tourism spending has grown much faster than the number of outbound tourists, especially around the capital flight episode of 2015-2016 (Figure 8), in contrast to the trend for the rest of the world (Figure 9).

Part of the surge in tourism spending reflected financial market developments: bank cards and third-party payment systems overseas have greatly facilitated overseas travel spending, which has been included in official BOP statistics since 2014. But the SAFE 2015 BOP report noted an unusual surge in bank card withdrawals overseas and since then China has tightened regulations on overseas card spending. With new rules on cash withdrawals in place, cash withdrawals as per-

centage of card spending overseas fell from 21% in September to 13% in December 2015.


Figure 8: Chinese tourism flows**Figure 9: World ex. China tourism flows**

Tourism imports also appeared highly correlated with BOP capital outflows (Figure 10) around 2015-2016. Since late 2016, shifting economic fundamentals and tightened capital controls have contained capital outflows, and tourism import growth also moderated. Indeed, despite sharp CNY depreciation in 3Q18, per capita tourism outflows were unchanged, suggesting that capital controls helped prevent capital flight.



Figure 10: China capital outflow and tourism imports

...supporting regional external surpluses

China's tourism-related outflows have by and large become Asia's inflows, with China accounting for over a fifth of all tourist arrivals in the rest of EM Asia and Japan (Figure 11).

Figure 11: China tourists to Asia and tourism outflows

China accounts for an even higher share of Asia's total tourism revenues. Using average per capita tourist expenditure data, which suggest that Chinese tourists spend more than the average visitor as discussed above, we estimate that China accounts for around one-third of tourism revenues across much of the region (Figure 12). In some ASEAN economies—particularly Thailand—Chinese tourism inflows have become an important driver of the overall services balance, supporting the overall current account surplus (Figure 13).

Figure 12: China tourism receipts**Figure 13: Asia current account services receipts**


China's tourist spending appears comparatively insensitive to exchange rate fluctuations, and tourist arrivals from China are less seasonal than their North American or European counterparts. As a result, Chinese tourists' contribution to regional current accounts appears relatively stable, absent exogenous shocks. In some economies—most notably Thailand and Japan—this has fueled a steady rise in the net tourism balance.

Expecting stable growth in China's tourism outflows

The number of Chinese outbound tourists likely will continue to rise steadily instead of rapidly, as the percentage of the population traveling abroad per year approaches the UMC average (10.3% for China vs. 12.9% average for UMC in 2017). Meanwhile, per-capita travel expenses appear to have peaked, and have tapering off from a near-US\$2,000 high in 2015, partly due to tightened capital controls, but also driven by the upgrading of domestic industry and economic re-balancing. This could put a brake on any further widening in the tourism deficit. Indeed, China's tourism deficit as a percentage of GDP has been roughly stable since 2015 (Figure 14).

Figure 14: Global net tourism receipts

Tourism balance as % of GDP, 4qma



Source: National sources, J.P. Morgan

We expect the number of outbound tourists to continue growing as the share of the population that has traveled abroad is still low, but the moderating per-capita spending could ease tourism import growth. In an extreme scenario where sharp CNY depreciation revived capital outflow pressure, the reduced purchasing power and tighter capital controls should be able to prevent a renewed surge of tourism expenditures.

Overall, we think China's tourism deficit as a percentage of GDP will stabilize in the next few years. Since US tariffs are likely to be a one-off shock trade flows should adjust in a few quarters and the trade balance stabilize after that adjustment. In the risk scenario of a full-blown trade war with a further tariff hike later this year, China's current account could fall into a small deficit as early this year, driven by a reduced goods trade surplus and a stable services deficit relative to GDP.

While tourism outflows as a share of China's GDP likely will level off in coming years, these flows will nevertheless continue to represent a large nominal dollar inflow elsewhere in the region, supporting regional external balances. Assuming China's tourism-related outflows grow in line with nominal GDP, these dollar flows could rise around 8%oia per year, faster than export growth for most economies, and thus services balances could become an increasingly important driver of regional current account surpluses.

This dynamic could have important implications for the overall balance of payments and exchange rate drivers for several economies in EM Asia, given that China's tourism spending tends to be neither cyclical nor seasonal—in sharp contrast to the drivers of exports and the goods trade balance. The relation between currency valuations and tourism inflows may also be more tenuous: whereas expensive or uncompetitive exchange rates can prompt export and import adjustments in the goods balance, tourism flows appear relatively price inelastic. In Thailand, for example, China-related tourism inflows have surged despite the THB appreciating almost 25% against the CNY from the low in 2015. This has allowed for persistent [balance of payments surpluses](#) and FX appreciation—a trend which could extend to other EM Asia economies, albeit to lesser degrees, over the medium term.

Analysts' Compensation: The research analysts responsible for the preparation of this report receive compensation based upon various factors, including the quality and accuracy of research, client feedback, competitive factors, and overall firm revenues.

Other Disclosures

J.P. Morgan is a marketing name for investment banking businesses of JPMorgan Chase & Co. and its subsidiaries and affiliates worldwide.

Private Bank Clients: Where you are receiving research as a client of the private banking businesses offered by JPMorgan Chase & Co. and its subsidiaries ("J.P. Morgan Private Bank"), research is provided to you by J.P. Morgan Private Bank and not by any other division of J.P. Morgan, including but not limited to the J.P. Morgan corporate and investment bank and its research division.

Legal Entities Disclosures

U.S.: JPMS is a member of NYSE, FINRA, SIPC and the NFA. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. is a member of FDIC. **Canada:** J.P. Morgan Securities Canada Inc. is a registered investment dealer, regulated by the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada and the Ontario Securities Commission and is the participating member on Canadian exchanges. **U.K.:** JPMorgan Chase N.A., London Branch, is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and is subject to regulation by the Financial Conduct Authority and to limited regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority. Details about the extent of our regulation by the Prudential Regulation Authority are available from J.P. Morgan on request. J.P. Morgan Securities plc (JPMS plc) is a member of the London Stock Exchange and is authorised by the Prudential Regulation Authority and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority and the Prudential Regulation Authority. Registered in England & Wales No. 2711006. Registered Office 25 Bank Street, London, E14 5JP. **Germany:** This material is distributed in Germany by J.P. Morgan Securities plc, Frankfurt Branch which is regulated by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht and also by J.P. Morgan AG (JPM AG) which is a member of the Frankfurt stock exchange and is regulated by the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin), JPM AG is a company incorporated in the Federal Republic of Germany with registered office at Taunustor 1, 60310 Frankfurt am Main, the Federal Republic of Germany. **South Africa:** J.P. Morgan Equities South Africa Proprietary Limited is a member of the Johannesburg Securities Exchange and is regulated by the Financial Services Board. **Hong Kong:** J.P. Morgan Securities (Asia Pacific) Limited (CE number AAJ321) is regulated by the Hong Kong Monetary Authority and the Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong and/or J.P. Morgan Broking (Hong Kong) Limited (CE number AAB027) is regulated by the Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong. **Korea:** This material is issued and distributed in Korea by or through J.P. Morgan Securities (Far East) Limited, Seoul Branch, which is a member of the Korea Exchange (KRX) and is regulated by the Financial Services Commission (FSC) and the Financial Supervisory Service (FSS). **Australia:** J.P. Morgan Securities Australia Limited (JPMSAL) (ABN 61 003 245 234/AFS Licence No: 238066) is regulated by ASIC and is a Market, Clearing and Settlement Participant of ASX Limited and CHI-X. **Taiwan:** J.P. Morgan Securities (Taiwan) Limited is a participant of the Taiwan Stock Exchange (company-type) and regulated by the Taiwan Securities and Futures Bureau. **India:** J.P. Morgan India Private Limited (Corporate Identity Number - U67120MH1992FTC068724), having its registered office at J.P. Morgan Tower, Off. C.S.T. Road, Kalina, Santacruz - East, Mumbai - 400098, is registered with Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) as a 'Research Analyst' having registration number INH000001873. J.P. Morgan India Private Limited is also registered with SEBI as a member of the National Stock Exchange of India Limited and the Bombay Stock Exchange Limited (SEBI Registration Number - INZ000239730) and as a Merchant Banker (SEBI Registration Number - MB/INM000002970). Telephone: 91-22-6157 3000, Facsimile: 91-22-6157 3990 and Website: www.jpmp.com. For non local research reports, this material is not distributed in India by J.P. Morgan India Private Limited. **Thailand:** This material is issued and distributed in Thailand by JPMorgan Securities (Thailand) Ltd., which is a member of the Stock Exchange of Thailand and is regulated by the Ministry of Finance and the Securities and Exchange Commission and its registered address is 3rd Floor, 20 North Sathorn Road, Silom, Bangrak, Bangkok 10500. **Indonesia:** PT J.P. Morgan Sekuritas Indonesia is a member of the Indonesia Stock Exchange and is regulated by the OJK a.k.a. BAPEPAM LK. **Philippines:** J.P. Morgan Securities Philippines Inc. is a Trading Participant of the Philippine Stock Exchange and a member of the Securities Clearing Corporation of the Philippines and the Securities Investor Protection Fund. It is regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission. **Brazil:** Banco J.P. Morgan S.A. is regulated by the Comissão de Valores Mobiliários (CVM) and by the Central Bank of Brazil. **Mexico:** J.P. Morgan Casa de Bolsa, S.A. de C.V., J.P. Morgan Grupo Financiero is a member of the Mexican Stock Exchange and authorized to act as a broker dealer by the National Banking and Securities Exchange Commission. **Singapore:** This material is issued and distributed in Singapore by or through J.P. Morgan Securities Singapore Private Limited (JPMS) [MCI (P) 058/04/2019 and Co. Reg. No.: 199405335R], which is a member of the Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Limited and/or JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Singapore branch (JPMCB Singapore) [MCI (P) 046/09/2018], both of which are regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore. This material is issued and distributed in Singapore only to accredited investors, expert investors and institutional investors, as defined in Section 4A of the Securities and Futures Act, Cap. 289 (SFA). This material is not intended to be issued or distributed to any retail investors or any other investors that do not fall into the classes of "accredited investors," "expert investors" or "institutional investors," as defined under Section 4A of the SFA. Recipients of this document are to contact JPMS or JPMCB Singapore in respect of any matters arising from, or in connection with, the document. **Japan:** JPMorgan Securities Japan Co., Ltd. and JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Tokyo Branch are regulated by the Financial Services Agency in Japan. **Malaysia:** This material is issued and distributed in Malaysia by JPMorgan Securities (Malaysia) Sdn Bhd (18146-X) which is a Participating Organization of Bursa Malaysia Berhad and a holder of Capital Markets Services License issued by the Securities Commission in Malaysia. **Pakistan:** J. P. Morgan Pakistan Broking (Pvt.) Ltd is a member of the Karachi Stock Exchange and regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan. **Saudi Arabia:** J.P. Morgan Saudi Arabia Ltd. is authorized by the Capital Market Authority of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (CMA) to carry out dealing as an agent, arranging, advising and custody, with respect to securities business under licence number 35-07079 and its registered address is at 8th Floor, Al-Faisaliyah Tower, King Fahad Road, P.O. Box 51907, Riyadh 11553, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. **Dubai:** JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., Dubai Branch is regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) and its registered address is Dubai International Financial Centre - Building 3, Level 7, PO Box 506551, Dubai, UAE. **Russia:** CB J.P. Morgan Bank International LLC is regulated by the Central Bank of Russia. **Argentina:** JPMorgan Chase Bank Sucursal Buenos Aires is regulated by Banco Central de la República Argentina ("BCRA" - Central Bank of Argentina) and Comisión Nacional de Valores ("CNV" - Argentinian Securities Commission")

Country and Region Specific Disclosures

U.K. and European Economic Area (EEA): Unless specified to the contrary, issued and approved for distribution in the U.K. and the EEA by JPMS plc. Investment research issued by JPMS plc has been prepared in accordance with JPMS plc's policies for managing conflicts of interest arising as a result of publication and distribution of investment research. Many European regulators require a firm to establish, implement and maintain such a policy. Further information about J.P. Morgan's conflict of interest policy and a description of the effective internal organisations and administrative arrangements set up for the prevention and avoidance of conflicts of interest is set out at the following link <https://www.jpmp.com/jpmpdf/1320742677360.pdf>. This report has been issued in the U.K. only to persons of a kind described in Article 19 (5), 38, 47 and 49 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Financial Promotion) Order 2005 (all such persons being referred to as "relevant persons"). This document must not be acted on or relied on by persons who are not relevant persons. Any investment or investment activity to which this document relates is only available to relevant persons and will be engaged in only with relevant persons. In other EEA countries, the report has been issued to persons regarded as professional investors (or equivalent) in their home jurisdiction. **Australia:** This material is issued and

distributed by JPMSAL in Australia to "wholesale clients" only. This material does not take into account the specific investment objectives, financial situation or particular needs of the recipient. The recipient of this material must not distribute it to any third party or outside Australia without the prior written consent of JPMSAL. For the purposes of this paragraph the term "wholesale client" has the meaning given in section 761G of the Corporations Act 2001. J.P. Morgan's research coverage universe spans listed securities across the ASX All Ordinaries index, securities listed on offshore markets, unlisted issuers and investment products which Research management deem to be relevant to the investor base from time to time. J.P. Morgan seeks to cover companies of relevance to the domestic and international investor base across all GIC sectors, as well as across a range of market capitalisation sizes. **Germany:** This material is distributed in Germany by J.P. Morgan Securities plc, Frankfurt Branch which is regulated by the Bundesanstalt für Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht. **Korea:** This report may have been edited or contributed to from time to time by affiliates of J.P. Morgan Securities (Far East) Limited, Seoul Branch. **Singapore:** As at the date of this report, JPMSS is a designated market maker for certain structured warrants listed on the Singapore Exchange where the underlying securities may be the securities discussed in this report. Arising from its role as designated market maker for such structured warrants, JPMSS may conduct hedging activities in respect of such underlying securities and hold or have an interest in such underlying securities as a result. The updated list of structured warrants for which JPMSS acts as designated market maker may be found on the website of the Singapore Exchange Limited: <http://www.sgx.com>. In addition, JPMSS and/or its affiliates may also have an interest or holding in any of the securities discussed in this report – please see the Important Disclosures section above. For securities where the holding is 1% or greater, the holding may be found in the Important Disclosures section above. For all other securities mentioned in this report, JPMSS and/or its affiliates may have a holding of less than 1% in such securities and may trade them in ways different from those discussed in this report. Employees of JPMSS and/or its affiliates not involved in the preparation of this report may have investments in the securities (or derivatives of such securities) mentioned in this report and may trade them in ways different from those discussed in this report. **Taiwan:** Research relating to equity securities is issued and distributed in Taiwan by J.P. Morgan Securities (Taiwan) Limited, subject to the license scope and the applicable laws and the regulations in Taiwan. According to Paragraph 2, Article 7-1 of Operational Regulations Governing Securities Firms Recommending Trades in Securities to Customers (as amended or supplemented) and/or other applicable laws or regulations, please note that the recipient of this material is not permitted to engage in any activities in connection with the material which may give rise to conflicts of interests, unless otherwise disclosed in the "Important Disclosures" in this material. **India:** For private circulation only, not for sale. **Pakistan:** For private circulation only, not for sale. **New Zealand:** This material is issued and distributed by JPMSAL in New Zealand only to "wholesale clients" (as defined in the Financial Advisers Act 2008). The recipient of this material must not distribute it to any third party or outside New Zealand without the prior written consent of JPMSAL. **Canada:** This report is distributed in Canada by or on behalf of J.P.Morgan Securities Canada Inc. The information contained herein is not, and under no circumstances is to be construed as an offer to sell securities described herein, or solicitation of an offer to buy securities described herein, in Canada or any province or territory thereof. The information contained herein is under no circumstances to be construed as investment advice in any province or territory of Canada and is not tailored to the needs of the recipient. **Dubai:** This report has been issued to persons regarded as professional clients as defined under the DFSA rules. **Brazil:** Ombudsman J.P. Morgan: 0800-7700847 / ouvidoria.jp.morgan@jpmorgan.com.

General: Additional information is available upon request. Information has been obtained from sources believed to be reliable but JPMorgan Chase & Co. or its affiliates and/or subsidiaries (collectively J.P. Morgan) do not warrant its completeness or accuracy except with respect to any disclosures relative to JPMS and/or its affiliates and the analyst's involvement with the issuer that is the subject of the research. All pricing is indicative as of the close of market for the securities discussed, unless otherwise stated. Opinions and estimates constitute our judgment as of the date of this material and are subject to change without notice. Past performance is not indicative of future results. This material is not intended as an offer or solicitation for the purchase or sale of any financial instrument. The opinions and recommendations herein do not take into account individual client circumstances, objectives, or needs and are not intended as recommendations of particular securities, financial instruments or strategies to particular clients. The recipient of this report must make its own independent decisions regarding any securities or financial instruments mentioned herein. JPMS distributes in the U.S. research published by non-U.S. affiliates and accepts responsibility for its contents. Periodic updates may be provided on companies/industries based on company specific developments or announcements, market conditions or any other publicly available information. Clients should contact analysts and execute transactions through a J.P. Morgan subsidiary or affiliate in their home jurisdiction unless governing law permits otherwise.

"Other Disclosures" last revised April 20, 2019.

Copyright 2019 JPMorgan Chase & Co. All rights reserved. This report or any portion hereof may not be reprinted, sold or redistributed without the written consent of J.P. Morgan.