

Top of the stack

A few weeks ago we published our views on new money supply which we think will maintain a healthy pace, balancing incremental demand. In this edition of Collateral Thinking we focus on the other half of new issue activity – repricings. As a major contributor to primary market volumes, repricing activity remains the last among equals, at least in terms of its appeal to investors. And for understandable reasons. The prevailing issuer-friendly environment has been putting pressure on nominal spreads and investors are receiving lesser compensation for the same credit risk. As such, investors have been on edge about repricing activity given its drag on portfolio returns.

Market technicals

CLO creation has remained strong in recent weeks and for the week ended 8th June, it stands at \$2.2bn. YTD CLO issuance of \$56.4bn is considerably higher than the 2017 YTD issuance of \$39.7bn. Adding coupons of \$1.2bn and retail flows of \$427mn to CLO volume, the gross demand stood at \$3.8bn for the week ended 8th June. The net issuance continues to come in strong and was recorded at \$9.9bn for the week ended 8th June, following values of \$8.1bn and \$1.5bn for the weeks ended 1st June and 25th May, respectively.

Topical: Repricing activity to retreat

We think repricing activity will subside to 20% of the index over the next 12 months, a noticeable decline from the 50% levels observed over the last 12 months. This would translate to about \$200bn in repricings over the next year. We use a combination of several factors to explain loan demand, such as proportion of loans trading above par, CLO arbitrage levels, real yields and the shape of the yield curve. We also believe that most of the repricings will be concentrated in the 200bps-250bps spread bucket going forward, for a coupon shaving of ~40bps, leading to a small drag on returns.

Performance

After a quiet period in May, loan performance has picked up. Loans in the LCD index returned 5bps for the week ended 15th June, following returns of 17bps and 4bps for the weeks ending 8th June and 1st June, respectively. On a YTD basis, loans in the LCD index have delivered 2.28%. Investors favored lower rating categories during this period with BB, B and CCC rating category loans returning 2bps, 6bps and 39bps respectively, for the week ended 15th June. CCC loans continue to impress, with returns of 69bps and 36bps for the weeks ending 8th June and 1st June, respectively and YTD return of 5.09%.

Primary market activity

Global loan issuance was recorded at a 16-month high value of \$66.7bn in May, and the trend of strong issuance has continued so far in June as well. For the week ended 15th June, issuance was recorded at \$16.3bn. Issuance was \$11.5bn, \$8.9bn and \$4bn for the weeks ending 8th June, 1st June and 25th May, respectively. YTD issuance of \$253.9bn is now approximately 88% of the 2017 YTD issuance of \$288bn. The issuance for BB, B and CCC rated loans stood at \$2.4bn, \$6.3bn and \$495mn, for the week ended 15th June. Non-rated issuance came in at \$7.1bn for the week ended 15th June.

This document is intended for BofA Merrill Lynch institutional investors only. It may not be distributed to BofA Merrill Lynch Financial Advisors, retail clients or retail prospects. BofA Merrill Lynch does and seeks to do business with issuers covered in its research reports. As a result, investors should be aware that the firm may have a conflict of interest that could affect the objectivity of this report. Investors should consider this report as only a single factor in making their investment decision. Refer to important disclosures on page 12 to 14.

11882623

Timestamp: 20 June 2018 06:00AM EDT



BofA Analytics

— DATA DRIVEN —

Leveraged Loan Strategy
United States

Neha Khoda
Credit Strategist
MLPF&S
+1 646 855 9656
neha.khoda@bamll.com

Oleg Melentyev, CFA
Credit Strategist
MLPF&S
+1 646 855 6379
oleg.melentyev@bamll.com

Table 1: Loan performance

Index	Level	1wk Δ	2wk Δ	YTD Rtn
All Loan	98.4 pts	-0.1	-0.0	+2.3%
BBs	99.9 pts	-0.1	-0.1	+1.8%
Bs	99.1 pts	-0.1	-0.0	+2.4%
CCCs	88.7 pts	0.2	0.6	+5.1%

Source: S&P LCD

Table 2: HY performance

Index	Level	1wk Δ	2wk Δ	YTD Rtn
US HY	334 bps	-5	-15	+0.7%
BBs	232 bps	-3	-07	-1.2%
Bs	354 bps	-7	-18	+1.6%
CCCs	675 bps	-3	-35	+4.5%

Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Table 3: Fund flows (\$mn)

Asset	1wk	2wk	YTD	LTM
Loans	+539	+427	+10,341	+3,856
US HY	+538	-1,357	-16,811	-25,876
US IG	+1,762	+1,018	+82,236	+289,585


Source: EPFR Global

Top of the stack

A few weeks ago we put out our views on new money supply, which we believe will maintain a healthy pace, balancing incremental demand. In this edition of Collateral Thinking we focus on the other half of new issue activity—repricings. As a major contributor to primary market volumes, repricing activity remains the last among equals, at least in terms of its appeal to investors. And for understandable reasons. Prevailing issuer-friendly environment has been putting pressure on nominal spreads, and investors are being compensated lesser for the same credit risk. As such, along with a concern about overall supply adequacy, investors have also been on edge about repricings given their drag on portfolio returns.

So far this year we have seen \$225bn in repricings over and above the new supply volume of \$250bn. That compares to the full calendar year totals of \$450bn in repricings and \$500bn in new money supply last year. As we had mentioned in our last piece, the volume of refinancings and repricings has exceeded our expectations—while we were expecting about 15% of the market to get repriced in the last 6 months, about 25% turned over instead. Although stronger out the gate, we believe repricings will slow down meaningfully over the next few months.

Chart 1: Rise of repricings



Source: S&P LCD

Our model suggests that repricing activity should subside to 20% of the index over the next 12 months, a noticeable decline from the 50% levels observed over the last 12 months. This would translate to about \$200bn in repricings over the next year. We use a combination of several factors to explain loan demand, such as proportion of loans trading above par, CLO arbitrage levels, real yields and the shape of the yield curve. On the whole our model is able to explain over 75% of the variation in repricing activity and has strong t-stats for each of the 4 variables involved. We also believe that most of the repricings will be concentrated in the 200bps-250bps spread bucket going forward for an coupon shaving of ~40bps, contributing a small drag on returns.

Game of Loans

Market Technicals

CLO creation has remained strong in the recent weeks and for the week ended 8th June, it stands at \$2.2bn. The YTD CLO issuance of \$56.4bn is considerably higher than the 2017 YTD issuance of \$39.7bn. Adding coupons of \$1.2bn and retail flows of \$427mn to CLO volume, the gross demand stood at \$3.8bn for the week, ended 8th June. The net issuance continues to come in strong and was recorded at \$9.9bn for the week ended 8th June, following values of \$8.1bn and \$1.5bn, for the week ended 1st June and 25th May, respectively. Repayments totaled \$11.9bn for the week ended 8th June, which took the net supply figure in the negative territory, far below the \$3.8bn demand. However, the pattern reverses on YTD basis, as supply outweighed demand by \$631mn, as of the week ended 8th June..

Table 4: Weekly Technicals (\$mns)

	YTD	6/8/2018	6/1/2018	5/25/2018
Retail flows (a)	10,341	427	84	611
CLO creation (b)	59,080	2,190	2,560	3,710
Coupons (c)	23,618	1,219	1,219	1,240
Demand (a+b+c)	93,038	3,836	3,863	5,560
Issuance Ex-repricings (d)	214,129	9,916	8,127	1,466
Repayments (e)	120,460	11,932	7,005	3,790
Supply (d-e)	93,669	-2,016	1,122	-2,324
Demand net of Supply	-631	5,852	2,741	7,884

Source: LCD, EPFR Global. Values in \$mn. Weekly coupon values are estimated by dividing each month's coupon payment by 4.

Performance by segment

After a brief quiet period in May, the performance of loans has picked up again in the past couple of weeks. Loans in the LCD index returned 5bps for the week ended 15th June, following the returns of 17bps and 4bps for the weeks ending 8th June and 1st June, respectively. On YTD basis, loans in the LCD index have delivered 2.28%. Investors chased lower rating categories during this period with BB, B and CCC rating category loans returning 2bps, 6bps and 39bps respectively, for the week ended 15th June. CCC loans continue to impress, with returns of 69bps and 36bps for the weeks ending 8th June and 1st June, respectively and YTD return of 5.09%. 2nd Lien Loans have also delivered consistent positive returns of 23bps, 17bps and 14bps, for the weeks ended 15th June, 8th June and 1st June respectively. The 100 most liquid names fell slightly behind the market during this period and delivered 2bps for the week ended 15th June. On YTD basis, this grouping has returned 2.08%..

Table 5: Total Returns (price plus coupon return), bps

	6/15/2018	6/8/2018	6/1/2018	5/25/2018
All Loans	5	17	4	0
BB	2	13	1	-2
B	6	16	3	1
CCC	39	69	36	9
2nd Lien	23	17	14	17
LL100	2	22	0	-2
Middle Market	0	-12	-22	-65

Source: S&P LCD

Middle market defined as \$50mn EBITDA or less. LL100 composed of the 100 largest issuers (by face value) in the S&P LCD Leveraged Loan Index.


Topical: Repricing activity to retreat

Over the span of the last few decades, as the loan market has grown, repricings have gotten faster and more furious. Case in point the rising peaks in the chart below which displays the proportion of the loan market getting repriced on a forward-looking 12 month basis. Issuers were first able to shave their coupons en masse in the 2002-2004

period when at the highest point, 30% of the index was repriced over a span of one year. Since after the GFC, we have seen two such repricing waves punctuated with a mini-credit cycle in between- one over 2012-2013 period, and another one starting in 2016. The most recent wave which has been continuing since mid-2016, has seen the highest concentration of repricings in a single year, reaching 52% of the index. We think that this is poised to change over the course of 2018 and into next year.

In getting to our findings we used an improved version of the model that we first published in January. The latest version of our model differs from the previous one in a few important ways. First, we have a larger prediction window – we are now forecasting repricing activity over the next 12 months as opposed to over the next 6 months. Second we have introduced variables that improve the explanatory power of the model (r-squared). And third, we have increased the overall relevance of the explanatory variables in our analysis (t-stats).

Chart 2: Predicted vs realized repricing activity (% of loan market repriced over the next 12 months)



Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research, S&P LCD, Bloomberg

Based on prevailing values of variables, our model suggests that repricing activity should subside to a ~21% churn rate over the next 12 months, a noticeable decline from the 48% observed over the last 12 months. Which translates to about \$200bn in repricings over the next 1 year. On the whole our model is able to explain over 75% of the variation in repricing activity and has strong t-stats for each variable. We note that there may be periods of time when actual repricing levels may diverge from model forecasts, but we generally see them converging after a few months. This is seen occurring at the top of the repricing cycle such as today, when the model points to a sharp turn downwards but actual numbers on ground take time to converge.

Since our objective is to forecast future repricing activity, we measure how the variables today affect total repricings over a forward-looking period of 12 months. Further, to incorporate market growth, we normalize the data by expressing repricings as a percentage of loan universe outstanding. Since repricings naturally happen in the backdrop of high loan demand, we try to understand what drives loan demand in choosing our model factors. Finally, we remove both recessions from our dataset so that it doesn't skew our findings. Below we discuss the final set of variables along with the conceptual reasons why they make an important contribution to our model.

Proportion of the loan market trading above par

For issuers whose loans are trading at yields below where they were issued, it makes sense to tap the market to reprice them. Logically, then the proportion of the loan


market trading above par should drive the volume of repricings, and hence the proportion of index churn as a result. Of course there is fees involved in the process and we think issuers generally prefer to shave at least 20-30bps for it to make economic sense to reprice existing loans.

CLO arbitrage levels

This variable happens to be one of the most important predictors of repricings. Conceptually, higher CLO arbitrage, defined as the difference between asset and liability spreads in the CLO market, should incentivize CLO managers to put money to work. Consequently, new demand for loans is created as more CLOs get priced. What's worthy of noting is that the reaction is not instantaneous- there is a lead time to when movements in CLO arbitrage start affecting loan demand (and hence repricings) - the lead time that is the most correlated to repricings is about one year (Chart 3). This is perhaps longer than one would initially think, but between observing market trends, getting the necessary approvals and ramping up the portfolio, one year lead time looks conceivable to us.


Another point to note is that while generally CLO arbitrage spreads are calculated using a weighted average of secondary as well as primary spreads on the asset (loan) side, we opted to limit the calculation of asset spreads based solely on the secondary market to avoid dealing with months when no loans were priced. We find that doing so doesn't compromise the amount of information that is feeding into our analysis. In fact this factor is one of two strongest explanatory variables in our model.

Chart 3: Next 12m repricings,% or market (LHS) vs CLO arb, bps (RHS)



Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research, S&P LCD, Bloomberg

Chart 4: Next 12m repricings,% or market (LHS) vs 2s10s curve, % (RHS)



Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research, S&P LCD, Bloomberg

10-yr real rates

The way arbitrage levels are relevant for CLO managers, real yields are relevant for CLO investors. The growth of CLO AUM to over \$500bn today has been a function of the dearth of yield globally. CLO tranches provide a meaningful pickup of spreads over libor compared to similarly rated loans, at the cost of lower liquidity and a longer holding period. To measure the availability of other suitable investment options for CLO investors to route their money, it makes sense therefore to use 10yr treasury yields as proxy. Additionally, we use real 10yr yields calculated by subtracting 10yr breakevens from the 10yr treasury rates, given that the inflation backdrop has changed so meaningfully over the last few years. Along with CLO arbitrage, this measure has the most relevance to predicting repricings.

Yield curve

Finally, we use the 2s10s yield curve to incorporate front end rates in our analysis. Conceptually we think that doing so is important because issuers can get away with repricing their coupons lower amid rising LIBOR (and therefore front-end rates). A flattening yield curve is most suited to repricing activity because it means that there is

decreasing alternatives for CLO investors looking to park their money over 5-7 years, and at the same time increasing demand from retail investors looking for floating rate assets such as loans in light of rising LIBOR (Chart 4).


Today, two of the above model factors – loans trading above par, and CLO arbitrage spreads – are lower than were 2 years ago. In combination with higher 10yr real yields today, these measures are putting downward pressure on future repricing volumes. However the yield curve has flattened, countering some of that pressure. On balance, the outcome is tilting in favor of lower repricings over the next 12 months, to the effect of 20pct of the loan market.

Size of the repriceable universe

Admittedly the proportion of credits trading above 200bps that are rated B1 and above and are at least 6 months from their date of issuance is near its cyclical lows now that we are well into the repricing wave. That in of itself should keep a lid on repricing activity. Noticing patterns from last year and comparing to what has been repriced this year, we find that most of the repricing activity has been concentrated in the better credits already trading at relatively tight levels. And we think this is going to continue.

Consider the chart below which shows the distribution of repricing activity by spread buckets in the loan market. In 2017, 30% of the repriced credits belonged to the 250-300bps bucket – the highest amongst its peers. Comparatively this year a staggering 35% of repriced credits by volume have come from the 200-250bps spread range. The chart below includes repeat repricers- those loans which were originally in the 250-300bps bucket last year, and which managed to shave their again this year. Loans with coupons over 350bps have not seen much change in repricing activity which goes to show that investors are more willing to accept lower spreads for credits they know are stable and high quality.

Chart 5: Distribution of repricing activity by spread bucket




Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research, S&P LCD

We think this is the bucket where the remainder of this year's spread compression is going to come from. In terms of actual dollars, YTD \$80bn of loans in the \$200-250bn range have been repriced. As of the time of this writing there are about ~\$100bn loans still remaining in this bucket which are outside their 6-month call period, a large enough universe to support more repricing activity.

What has remained somewhat similar is the pattern of coupon savings for the issuer. As an issuer if you were one of the few ones to reprice a loan with an original spread over 500bps, your average coupon saving today would be 90bps, the highest in your peer group. However loans belonging to the same spread bucket saved 123bps a year earlier. This pattern of diminishing returns for the issuer is typical as the repricing cycle moves along signaling investor fatigue and wariness over accepting further spread cuts. This is

another reason why we believe all things equal, repricing activity will retreat from today's levels.

Chart 6: Weighted average coupon savings by spread bucket



Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research, S&P LCD

All told, issuers managed to shave off a weighted average of ~60bps in repricings last year vs 40bps YTD. Meanwhile the nominal spreads on the overall index also declined by 60bps last year and similarly, in our opinion, we will see a reduction in the 30-40bps range over the next on year, creating a small drag on returns. So while we believe that the total repriced volume over the next 12 months will decline, these deals are setting the bar for the primary market, which in effect translates to decreasing coupons for the overall index.

Primary market activity


Global loan issuance was recorded at a 16-month high value of \$66.7bn in May and the trend of strong issuance has continued so far in June as well. For the week ended 15th June, the issuance was recorded at \$16.3bn. The issuance was recorded at \$11.5bn, \$8.9bn and \$4bn for the weeks ending 8th June, 1st June and 25th May, respectively. The YTD issuance of \$253.9bn is now approximately 88% of the 2017 YTD issuance of \$288bn. The issuance for BB, B and CCC rated loans stood at \$2.4bn, \$6.3bn and \$495mn, for the week ended 15th June. Non-rated issuance came in at \$7.1bn, for the week ended 15th June. Amongst the sectors, the top three issuing sectors were technology, healthcare and materials with issuances of \$45.8bn, \$32.9bn and \$22.9bn respectively, for the week ended 15th June.

Two largest deals to hit the market were from Kindred At Home and GlobalFoundries. The former, a healthcare company intends to use the proceeds of its \$2.2bn issue for acquisition, while GlobalFoundries, a tech firm has brought the \$2.1bn deal to the market for general refinancing purposes. As per LCD, the amend-to-extend activity in the U.S leveraged loan market touched a 12-month high in the month of May, with the volume of deals reaching \$10.3bn. In one such recent transaction, Bob's Discount Furniture completed a repricing and extension of its \$257mn B term loan. As per the new contract, the spread has been revised from L+525 to L+475 and the maturity has been extended from February 2021 to August 2023.

Table 6: Recent loan new issues

Launch Dt	Issuer	Deal Name	Size	New Inst. Money	Moody's	S&P	ABL	Cov Lite	Proceeds	Sector	Country
6/14/2018	Cirque Du Soleil Inc	Cirque Du Soleil (Add-on 7/18)	95	95	B1	B+	No	Yes	Acquisition	Entertainment & Leisure	Canada
6/14/2018	Dhanani Group of Companies Inc	Dhanani (7/18)	420	420	B2	NR	No	Yes	Acquisition	Restaurants	United States
6/14/2018	Edelman Financial Group	Edelman Financial (2nd Lien 7/18)	495	495	NR	NR	No	No	Acquisition	Services & Leasing	United States
6/14/2018	Edelman Financial Group	Edelman Financial (7/18)	1560	1410	NR	NR	No	No	Acquisition	Services & Leasing	United States
6/14/2018	Edward Don & Company	Edward Don & Company (7/18)	210	210	B2	B	No	Yes	Refinancing	Services & Leasing	United States
6/14/2018	Excelitas Technologies Corp	Excelitas (Amend Add-on 7/18)	604	100	B2	B-	No	Yes	Acquisition	Computers & Electronics	United States
6/14/2018	Ufinet Telecom SAU	Ufinet (7/18)	525	525	NR	NR	No	Yes	Acquisition	Telecom Equipment	Spain
6/14/2018	Valtris Specialty Chemicals Inc	Valtris (2nd Lien 7/18)	105	105	Caa2	NR	No	Yes	Acquisition	Chemicals	United States
6/14/2018	Valtris Specialty Chemicals Inc	Valtris (7/18)	300	300	B3	NR	No	Yes	Acquisition	Chemicals	United States
6/14/2018	Value-Based Care Solutions	Value-Based Care (TL 7/18)	600	600	B2	NR	No	No	LBO	Computers & Electronics	United States
6/14/2018	Vestcom International	Vestcom (Amend Add-on TL 7/18)	430	90	B2	NR	No	Yes	Refinancing	Services & Leasing	United States
6/13/2018	Aveanna Healthcare	Aveanna (Add-on 7/18)	221	221	B2	B-	No	Yes	Acquisition	Healthcare	United States
6/13/2018	Invenergy LLC	Invenergy (7/18)	415	350	Ba2	B+	No	No	Refinancing	Utilities	United States
6/13/2018	Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc	MGM (2nd Lien 7/18)	500	500	B2	NR	No	No	Refinancing	Film	United States
6/13/2018	Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc	MGM (TL 7/18)	400	400	Ba2	BB+	No	No	Refinancing	Film	United States
6/13/2018	St. George's University	St George's University (7/18)	885	885	NR	NR	No	No	Acquisition	Services & Leasing	Algeria
6/12/2018	BBB Industries LLC	BBB Industries (TL 7/18)	620	620	NR	NR	No	No	LBO	Automotive	United States
6/12/2018	BBB Industries LLC	BBB Industries (2nd Lien 7/18)	180	180	NR	NR	No	No	LBO	Automotive	United States
6/12/2018	Energizer Holdings Inc	Energizer (TL 7/18)	1000	1000	Ba1	BB+	No	Yes	Acquisition	Computers & Electronics	United States
6/12/2018	GlobalFoundries	GlobalFoundries (7/18)	2350	2100	NR	NR	No	No	Refinancing	Computers & Electronics	Singapore

Source: S&P LCD


Chart 7: Average new issue yields by month


Source: S&P LCD

Instinct® Loans

To track market sentiment, we look at data from BofAML's electronic loan trading platform, *Instinct®*, which clients use to trade some of the most liquid loans in the market. Over the past two weeks, there has been a trend reversal from net bid interest to net offer interest. Similar pattern was observed between gross bid interest & gross offer interest and the latter's volume has remained around \$300mn, over the past week. In this period, the daily mid changes has fallen below zero and mostly shied away from the positive region. The running mid change has dropped significantly and the year-to-date value for running mid change was -\$0.39.

Exhibit 1: Instinct® Loans Market Monitor




Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Instinct® Loans.
Left y-axis shows bid/offer interest; right y-axis shows average mid-price change.

Appendix

CLOs are an important factor to consider in the loan market given they are the single biggest buyer of loans and represent 60% of the primary demand within this asset class. Loan retail funds are the second largest buyers although their participation has shrunk since the peaks of 2013. Since then, we have seen increasing activity from CLO managers. At the same time, hedge, distressed & high yield funds have played a lesser role in the primary market.


Chart 8: Primary institutional investor market by type



Source: S&P LCD


Three generations of CLOs exist today, CLO 1.0 (pre-crisis), and CLO 2.0/CLO 3.0 (post-crisis). The market is primarily driven by the latter. Below charts show CLO spread levels by tranches.

Chart 9: US CLO 1.0 indicative spread levels (bps)



Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research


Chart 10: US CLO 2.0/3.0 indicative spread levels (bps)



Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

CLO arbitrage is a widely followed statistic in the loan market, and represents the theoretical spread that managers can capture by issuing CLOs. The below chart compares CLO asset (loan) spreads to the weighted average spreads of CLO liabilities. The difference between these two values is the theoretical arbitrage and represents the current attractiveness of creating new CLOs. A higher arbitrage number means a greater incentive for managers to bring new CLOs to the market, and thus provide incremental loan demand, and vice versa.


Chart 11: CLO arbitrage (bps)



Source: S&P LCD, BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research

Chart 12 shows monthly CLO returns as defined by the Palmer Square CLO index (price plus coupon returns).


Chart 12: Monthly CLO 2.0 returns by rating



Source: BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research, Merrill Lynch PriceServe, Palmer Square CLO Indices, Bloomberg


Since technicals play a big role in the loan market, following retail patterns is also essential. In general, we see that the performance of the BB section of the loan market correlates most with retail flows, while new CLO issuance seems to correlate to B Loan returns. This makes sense as mutual funds generally gravitate towards less risky investments while CLOs invest in single B rated assets on average. Chart 13 shows a measure of retail flows (12 week trailing retail flows as a percentage of outstanding AUM) vs. monthly BB Loan total returns, while Chart 14 depicts monthly CLO issuance vs. monthly B Loan total returns.

Chart 13: BB performance vs Loan retail flows



Source: S&P LCD, EPFR Global

Chart 14: B performance vs CLO creation



Source: S&P LCD, EPFR Global

Disclosures

Important Disclosures

BofA Merrill Lynch Credit Opinion Key

BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research provides recommendations on an issuer's bonds (including corporate and sovereign external debt securities), capital securities, equity preferreds and CDS as described below. Convertible securities are not rated. An issuer level recommendation may also be provided for an issuer as explained below. BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research credit recommendations are assigned using a three-month time horizon.

Issuer Recommendations: If an issuer credit recommendation is provided, it is applicable to bonds and capital securities of the issuer except bonds and capital securities specifically referenced in the report with a different credit recommendation. Where there is no issuer credit recommendation, only individual bonds and capital securities with specific recommendations are covered. CDS and equity preferreds are rated separately and issuer recommendations do not apply to them.

BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research credit recommendations are assigned using a three-month time horizon:

Overweight: Spreads and /or excess returns are likely to outperform the relevant and comparable market over the next three months.

Marketweight: Spreads and/or excess returns are likely to perform in-line with the relevant and comparable market over the next three months.

Underweight: Spreads and/or excess returns are likely to underperform the relevant and comparable market over the next three months.

BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research uses the following rating system with respect to **Credit Default Swaps (CDS)**:

Buy Protection: Buy CDS, therefore going short credit risk.

Neutral: No purchase or sale of CDS is recommended.

Sell Protection: Sell CDS, therefore going long credit risk.

Due to the nature of strategic analysis, the issuers or securities recommended or discussed in this report are not continuously followed. Accordingly, investors must regard this report as providing stand-alone analysis and should not expect continuing analysis or additional reports relating to such issuers and/or securities.

BofA Merrill Lynch Research Personnel (including the analyst(s) responsible for this report) receive compensation based upon, among other factors, the overall profitability of Bank of America Corporation, including profits derived from investment banking. The analyst(s) responsible for this report may also receive compensation based upon, among other factors, the overall profitability of the Bank's sales and trading businesses relating to the class of securities or financial instruments for which such analyst is responsible.

BofA Merrill Lynch fixed income analysts regularly interact with sales and trading desk personnel in connection with their research, including to ascertain pricing and liquidity in the fixed income markets.

Other Important Disclosures

Prices are indicative and for information purposes only. Except as otherwise stated in the report, for the purpose of any recommendation in relation to: (i) an equity security, the price referenced is the publicly traded price of the security as of close of business on the day prior to the date of the report or, if the report is published during intraday trading, the price referenced is indicative of the traded price as of the date and time of the report; or (ii) a debt security (including equity preferred and CDS), prices are indicative as of the date and time of the report and are from various sources including Bank of America Merrill Lynch trading desks.

The date and time of completion of the production of any recommendation in this report shall be the date and time of dissemination of this report as recorded in the report timestamp.

This report may refer to fixed income securities that may not be offered or sold in one or more states or jurisdictions. Readers of this report are advised that any discussion, recommendation or other mention of such securities is not a solicitation or offer to transact in such securities. Investors should contact their BofA Merrill Lynch representative or Merrill Lynch Global Wealth Management financial advisor for information relating to fixed income securities.

Rule 144A securities may be offered or sold only to persons in the U.S. who are Qualified Institutional Buyers within the meaning of Rule 144A under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended. SECURITIES DISCUSSED HEREIN MAY BE RATED BELOW INVESTMENT GRADE AND SHOULD THEREFORE ONLY BE CONSIDERED FOR INCLUSION IN ACCOUNTS QUALIFIED FOR SPECULATIVE INVESTMENT.

Recipients who are not institutional investors or market professionals should seek the advice of their independent financial advisor before considering information in this report in connection with any investment decision, or for a necessary explanation of its contents.

The securities discussed in this report may be traded over-the-counter. Retail sales and/or distribution of this report may be made only in states where these securities are exempt from registration or have been qualified for sale.

Officers of MLPF&S or one or more of its affiliates (other than research analysts) may have a financial interest in securities of the issuer(s) or in related investments.

This report, and the securities discussed herein, may not be eligible for distribution or sale in all countries or to certain categories of investors.

Information relating to Affiliates of MLPF&S and Distribution of Affiliate Research Reports:

BofA Merrill Lynch includes Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Incorporated ("MLPF&S") and its affiliates. Investors should contact their BofA Merrill Lynch representative or Merrill Lynch Global Wealth Management financial advisor if they have questions concerning this report. "BofA Merrill Lynch" and "Merrill Lynch" are each global brands for BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research.

MLPF&S distributes, or may in the future distribute, research reports of the following non-US affiliates in the US (short name: legal name, regulator): Merrill Lynch (South Africa): Merrill Lynch South Africa (Pty) Ltd., regulated by The Financial Service Board; MLI (UK): Merrill Lynch International, regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA); Merrill Lynch (Australia): Merrill Lynch Equities (Australia) Limited, regulated by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission; Merrill Lynch (Hong Kong): Merrill Lynch (Asia Pacific) Limited, regulated by the Hong Kong Securities and Futures Commission (HKSF); Merrill Lynch (Singapore): Merrill Lynch (Singapore) Pte Ltd, regulated by the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS); Merrill Lynch (Canada): Merrill Lynch Canada Inc, regulated by the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of Canada; Merrill Lynch (Mexico): Merrill Lynch Mexico, SA de CV, Casa de Bolsa, regulated by the Comisión Nacional Bancaria y de Valores; Merrill Lynch (Argentina): Merrill Lynch Argentina SA, regulated by Comisión Nacional de Valores; Merrill Lynch (Japan): Merrill Lynch Japan Securities Co., Ltd., regulated by the Financial Services Agency; Merrill Lynch (Seoul): Merrill Lynch International, LLC Seoul Branch, regulated by the Financial Supervisory Service; Merrill Lynch (Taiwan): Merrill Lynch Securities (Taiwan) Ltd., regulated by the Securities and Futures Bureau; DSP Merrill Lynch (India): DSP Merrill Lynch Limited, regulated by the Securities and Exchange Board of India; Merrill Lynch (Indonesia): PT Merrill Lynch Sekuritas Indonesia, regulated by Otoritas Jasa Keuangan (OJK); Merrill Lynch (Israel): Merrill Lynch Israel Limited, regulated by Israel Securities Authority; Merrill Lynch (Russia): OOO Merrill Lynch Securities, Moscow, regulated by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation; Merrill Lynch (DIFC): Merrill Lynch International (DIFC Branch), regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA); Merrill Lynch (Spain): Merrill Lynch Capital Markets Espana, S.A.S.V., regulated by Comisión Nacional del Mercado De Valores; Merrill Lynch (Brazil): Bank of America Merrill Lynch Banco Multiplo S.A., regulated by Comissão de Valores Mobiliários; Merrill Lynch KSA Company, Merrill Lynch Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Company, regulated by the Capital Market Authority.

This information: has been approved for publication and is distributed in the United Kingdom (UK) to professional clients and eligible counterparties (as each is defined in the rules of the FCA and the PRA) by MLI (UK) and Bank of America Merrill Lynch International Limited, which are authorized by the PRA and regulated by the FCA and the PRA, and is distributed in the UK to retail clients (as defined in the rules of the FCA and the PRA) by Merrill Lynch International Bank Limited, London Branch, which is authorized by the Central Bank of Ireland and subject to limited regulation by the FCA and PRA - details about the extent of our regulation by the FCA and PRA are available from us on request; has been considered and distributed in Japan by Merrill Lynch (Japan), a registered securities dealer under the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act in Japan, or its permitted affiliates; is issued and distributed in Hong Kong by Merrill Lynch (Hong Kong)

which is regulated by HKSF is issued and distributed in Taiwan by Merrill Lynch (Taiwan); is issued and distributed in India by DSP Merrill Lynch (India); and is issued and distributed in Singapore to institutional investors and/or accredited investors (each as defined under the Financial Advisers Regulations) by Merrill Lynch International Bank Limited (Merchant Bank) (MLIBLMB) and Merrill Lynch (Singapore) (Company Registration Nos F 06872E and 198602883D respectively). MLIBLMB and Merrill Lynch (Singapore) are regulated by MAS. Bank of America N.A., Australian Branch (ARBN 064 874 531), AFS License 412901 (BANA Australia) and Merrill Lynch Equities (Australia) Limited (ABN 65 006 276 795), AFS License 235132 (MLEA) distribute this information in Australia only to 'Wholesale' clients as defined by s.761G of the Corporations Act 2001. With the exception of BANA Australia, neither MLEA nor any of its affiliates involved in preparing this information is an Authorised Deposit-Taking Institution under the Banking Act 1959 nor regulated by the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority. No approval is required for publication or distribution of this information in Brazil and its local distribution is by Merrill Lynch (Brazil) in accordance with applicable regulations. Merrill Lynch (DIFC) is authorized and regulated by the DFSA. Information prepared and issued by Merrill Lynch (DIFC) is done so in accordance with the requirements of the DFSA conduct of business rules. Bank of America Merrill Lynch International Limited, Frankfurt Branch (BAMLI Frankfurt) distributes this information in Germany and is regulated by BaFin.

This information has been prepared and issued by MLPF&S and/or one or more of its non-US affiliates. The author(s) of this information may not be licensed to carry on regulated activities in your jurisdiction and, if not licensed, do not hold themselves out as being able to do so. MLPF&S is the distributor of this information in the US and accepts full responsibility for information distributed to MLPF&S clients in the US by its non-US affiliates. Any US person receiving this information and wishing to effect any transaction in any security discussed herein should do so through MLPF&S and not such foreign affiliates. Hong Kong recipients of this information should contact Merrill Lynch (Asia Pacific) Limited in respect of any matters relating to dealing in securities or provision of specific advice on securities or any other matters arising from, or in connection with, this information. Singapore recipients of this information should contact Merrill Lynch International Bank Limited (Merchant Bank) and/or Merrill Lynch (Singapore) Pte Ltd in respect of any matters arising from, or in connection with, this information.

This research report has been prepared and issued by MLPF&S and/or one or more of its non-US affiliates. MLPF&S is the distributor of this research report in the US and accepts full responsibility for research reports of its non-US affiliates distributed to MLPF&S clients in the US. Any US person receiving this research report and wishing to effect any transaction in any security discussed in the report should do so through MLPF&S and not such foreign affiliates.

General Investment Related Disclosures:

Taiwan Readers: Neither the information nor any opinion expressed herein constitutes an offer or a solicitation of an offer to transact in any securities or other financial instrument. No part of this report may be used or reproduced or quoted in any manner whatsoever in Taiwan by the press or any other person without the express written consent of BofA Merrill Lynch.

This document provides general information only, and has been prepared for, and is intended for general distribution to, BofA Merrill Lynch clients. Neither the information nor any opinion expressed constitutes an offer or an invitation to make an offer, to buy or sell any securities or other financial instrument or any derivative related to such securities or instruments (e.g., options, futures, warrants, and contracts for differences). This document is not intended to provide personal investment advice and it does not take into account the specific investment objectives, financial situation and the particular needs of, and is not directed to, any specific person(s). This document and its content do not constitute, and should not be considered to constitute, investment advice for purposes of ERISA, the US tax code, the Investment Advisers Act or otherwise. Investors should seek financial advice regarding the appropriateness of investing in financial instruments and implementing investment strategies discussed or recommended in this document and should understand that statements regarding future prospects may not be realized. Any decision to purchase or subscribe for securities in any offering must be based solely on existing public information on such security or the information in the prospectus or other offering document issued in connection with such offering, and not on this document.

Securities and other financial instruments referred to herein, or recommended, offered or sold by BofA Merrill Lynch, are not insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and are not deposits or other obligations of any insured depository institution (including, Bank of America, N.A.). Investments in general and, derivatives, in particular, involve numerous risks, including, among others, market risk, counterparty default risk and liquidity risk. No security, financial instrument or derivative is suitable for all investors. In some cases, securities and other financial instruments may be difficult to value or sell and reliable information about the value or risks related to the security or financial instrument may be difficult to obtain. Investors should note that income from such securities and other financial instruments, if any, may fluctuate and that price or value of such securities and instruments may rise or fall and, in some cases, investors may lose their entire principal investment. Past performance is not necessarily a guide to future performance. Levels and basis for taxation may change.

BofA Merrill Lynch is aware that the implementation of the ideas expressed in this report may depend upon an investor's ability to "short" securities or other financial instruments and that such action may be limited by regulations prohibiting or restricting "shortselling" in many jurisdictions. Investors are urged to seek advice regarding the applicability of such regulations prior to executing any short idea contained in this report.

This report may contain a trading idea or recommendation which highlights a specific identified near-term catalyst or event impacting a security, issuer, industry sector or the market generally that presents a transaction opportunity, but does not have any impact on the analyst's particular "Overweight" or "Underweight" rating (which is based on a three month trade horizon). Trading ideas and recommendations may differ directionally from the analyst's rating on a security or issuer because they reflect the impact of a near-term catalyst or event.

Foreign currency rates of exchange may adversely affect the value, price or income of any security or financial instrument mentioned in this report. Investors in such securities and instruments effectively assume currency risk.

UK Readers: The protections provided by the U.K. regulatory regime, including the Financial Services Scheme, do not apply in general to business coordinated by BofA Merrill Lynch entities located outside of the United Kingdom. BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research policies relating to conflicts of interest are described at <https://go.bofa.com/coi>.

MLPF&S or one of its affiliates is a regular issuer of traded financial instruments linked to securities that may have been recommended in this report. MLPF&S or one of its affiliates may, at any time, hold a trading position (long or short) in the securities and financial instruments discussed in this report.

BofA Merrill Lynch, through business units other than BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research, may have issued and may in the future issue trading ideas or recommendations that are inconsistent with, and reach different conclusions from, the information presented herein. Such ideas or recommendations reflect the different time frames, assumptions, views and analytical methods of the persons who prepared them, and BofA Merrill Lynch is under no obligation to ensure that such other trading ideas or recommendations are brought to the attention of any recipient of this information.

In the event that the recipient received this information pursuant to a contract between the recipient and MLPF&S for the provision of research services for a separate fee, and in connection therewith MLPF&S may be deemed to be acting as an investment adviser, such status relates, if at all, solely to the person with whom MLPF&S has contracted directly and does not extend beyond the delivery of this report (unless otherwise agreed specifically in writing by MLPF&S). If such recipient uses the services of MLPF&S in connection with the sale or purchase of a security referred to herein, MLPF&S may act as principal for its own account or as agent for another person. MLPF&S is and continues to act solely as a broker-dealer in connection with the execution of any transactions, including transactions in any securities referred to herein.

Copyright, User Agreement and other general information related to this report:

Copyright 2018 Bank of America Corporation. All rights reserved. This research report is prepared for the use of BofA Merrill Lynch clients and may not be redistributed, retransmitted or disclosed, in whole or in part, or in any form or manner, without the express written consent of BofA Merrill Lynch. BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research reports are distributed simultaneously to internal and client websites and other portals by BofA Merrill Lynch and are not publicly-available materials. Any unauthorized use or disclosure is prohibited. Receipt and review of this research report constitutes your agreement not to redistribute, retransmit, or disclose to others the contents, opinions, conclusion, or information contained in this report (including any investment recommendations, estimates or price targets) without first obtaining express permission from an authorized officer of BofA Merrill Lynch.

Materials prepared by BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research personnel are based on public information. Facts and views presented in this material have not been reviewed by, and may not reflect information known to, professionals in other business areas of BofA Merrill Lynch, including investment banking personnel. BofA Merrill Lynch has established information barriers between BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research and certain business groups. As a result, BofA Merrill Lynch does not disclose certain client relationships with, or compensation received from, such issuers. To the extent this material discusses any legal proceeding or issues, it has not been prepared as nor is it intended to express any legal conclusion, opinion or advice. Investors should consult their own legal advisers as to issues of law relating to the subject matter of this material. BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research personnel's knowledge of legal proceedings in which any BofA Merrill Lynch entity and/or its directors, officers and employees may be plaintiffs, defendants, co-defendants or co-plaintiffs with or involving issuers mentioned in this material is based on public information. Facts and views presented in this material that relate to any such proceedings have not been reviewed by, discussed with, and may not reflect information known to, professionals in other business areas of BofA Merrill Lynch in connection with the legal proceedings or matters relevant to such proceedings.

This information has been prepared independently of any issuer of securities mentioned herein and not in connection with any proposed offering of securities or as agent of any issuer of any securities. None of MLPF&S, any of its affiliates or their research analysts has any authority whatsoever to make any representation or warranty on behalf of the issuer(s). BofA Merrill Lynch Global Research policy prohibits research personnel from disclosing a recommendation, investment rating, or investment thesis for review by an issuer prior to the publication of a research report containing such rating, recommendation or investment thesis.

Any information relating to the tax status of financial instruments discussed herein is not intended to provide tax advice or to be used by anyone to provide tax advice. Investors are urged to seek tax advice based on their particular circumstances from an independent tax professional.

The information herein (other than disclosure information relating to BofA Merrill Lynch and its affiliates) was obtained from various sources and we do not guarantee its accuracy. This report may contain links to third-party websites. BofA Merrill Lynch is not responsible for the content of any third-party website or any linked content contained in a third party website. Content contained on such third-party websites is not part of this report and is not incorporated by reference into this report. The inclusion of a link in this report does not imply any endorsement by or any affiliation with BofA Merrill Lynch. Access to any third-party website is at your own risk, and you should always review the terms and privacy policies at third-party websites before submitting any personal information to them. BofA Merrill Lynch is not responsible for such terms and privacy policies and expressly disclaims any liability for them. All opinions, projections and estimates constitute the judgment of the author as of the date of publication and are subject to change without notice. Prices also are subject to change without notice. BofA Merrill Lynch is under no obligation to update this information and BofA Merrill Lynch's ability to publish information on the subject issuer(s) in the future is subject to applicable quiet periods. You should therefore assume that BofA Merrill Lynch will not update any fact, circumstance or opinion contained herein. Certain outstanding reports may contain discussions and/or investment opinions relating to securities, financial instruments and/or issuers that are no longer current. Always refer to the most recent research report relating to an issuer prior to making an investment decision. In some cases, an issuer may be classified as Restricted or may be Under Review or Extended Review. In each case, investors should consider any investment opinion relating to such issuer (or its security and/or financial instruments) to be suspended or withdrawn and should not rely on the analyses and investment opinion(s) pertaining to such issuer (or its securities and/or financial instruments) nor should the analyses or opinion(s) be considered a solicitation of any kind. Sales persons and financial advisors affiliated with MLPF&S or any of its affiliates may not solicit purchases of securities or financial instruments that are Restricted or Under Review and may only solicit securities under Extended Review in accordance with firm policies. Neither BofA Merrill Lynch nor any officer or employee of BofA Merrill Lynch accepts any liability whatsoever for any direct, indirect or consequential damages or losses arising from any use of this report or its contents.