

# STUMPING THE MOBILE CHIPSET

New Odays from down under

**Adam Donenfeld** 

# AGENDA

- Android chipsets overview in ecosystem
- Qualcomm chipset subsystem's overview
- New kernel vulnerabilities
- Exploitation of a new kernel vulnerability
- Conclusions

~ \$ man Adam


#### **ADAM DONENFELD**

- · Years of experience in research (both PC and mobile).
- Vulnerability assessment
- Vulnerability exploitation
- Senior security researcher at Check Point
- In meiner Freizeit, lerne ich Deutsch gern ©

#### How Android gets to your device

Carrier **OEM** Chipset code **Android Project** Linux Kernel

# Qualcomm's chipset subsystems



# **The Rooting Zoo**









# ASHmenian Devil (ashmem vulnerability) CVE-2016-5340

- Qualcomm 'expands' ashmem for the GPU
  - Map ashmem to GPU
- Passing ashmem fd to map



```
int get ashmem file(int fd,
 struct file **filp,
  struct file **vm file,
    unsigned long *len)
    int ret = -1;
    struct ashmem area *asma;
    struct file *file = fget(fd);
    if (is ashmem file(file)) {
        asma = file->private data;
        *filp = file;
        *vm file = asma->file;
        *len = asma->size;
        ret = 0;
    } else {
        fput(file);
    return ret;
```


- Qualcomm 'expands' ashmem for the GPU
  - Map ashmem to GPU
- Passing ashmem fd to map

Is our fd an ashmem file descriptor?



```
struct some file struct *some file fdget(int fd)
    struct file *file = fget(fd);
    if (file == NULL)
        return NULL;
    /* fd type check */
    if (file->f op != &some file fops)
        goto err;
    return file->private data;
err:
    fput(file);
    return NULL;
```

```
static int is_ashmem_file(struct file *file)
{
    char fname[256], *name;
    name = dentry_path(file->f_dentry, fname, 256);
    return strcmp(name, "/ashmem") ? 0 : 1; /* Oh my god */
}
```





#### **ASHmenian devil – PoC**

- Filename on root path == "ashmem"
- /sdcard is a symlink
- Obb (Opaque Binary Blob)



#### **ASHmenian devil – PoC**

- Create an OBB
  - With "ashmem" in it's root directory

Mount the OBB

- Map "ashmem" memory to the GPU
  - Pass a fd to your fake ashmem file



# Qualaroot (IPC Router vulnerability) CVE-2016-2059

- Qualcomm's IPC router
- Special socket family
  - > AF\_MSM\_IPC (27)



- Unique features
  - "Whitelist" for services that are permitted to communicate
  - Everyone gets an "address" for communication
  - Creation\destruction can be monitored by anyone
- Requires no permission ©

#### Qualaroot

- AF\_MSM\_IPC socket types
  - CLIENT\_PORT
  - SERVER\_PORT
  - IRSC\_PORT
  - CONTROL\_PORT
    - Conversion via IPC\_ROUTER\_IOCTL\_BIND\_CONTROL\_PORT

Each new socket is a CLIENT\_PORT socket




#### Qualaroot

```
static int msm ipc router ioctl(
    struct socket *sock,
    unsigned int cmd,
    unsigned long arg)
    struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
    struct msm ipc port *port ptr;
    lock sock(sk);
    port ptr = msm ipc sk port(sock->sk);
    switch (cmd) {
    case IPC ROUTER IOCTL BIND CONTROL PORT:
        msm ipc router bind control port(
            port ptr);
    release sock(sk);
```

```
int msm ipc router bind control port(struct msm ipc port *port ptr)
    if (!port ptr)
       return -EINVAL;
    /* Lock clients list */
    down write(&local ports lock lhc2);
   /* Remove our socket from its current list */
    list del(&port ptr->list);
    /* Unlock clients list */
    up write(&local ports lock lhc2);
    /* Lock control ports list */
    down write(&control ports lock lha5);
    /* Add our socket to the control ports list */
    list add tail(&port ptr->list, &control ports);
    /* Unlock control ports list */
    up write(&control ports lock lha5);
    return 0;
```

#### **Client list**





#### **Client list**




```
down_write(&local_ports_lock_lhc2);
list_del(&port_ptr->list);
up_write(&local_ports_lock_lhc2);
down_write(&control_ports_lock_lha5);
list_add_tail(&port_ptr->list, &control_ports);
up_write(&control_ports_lock_lha5);
```


### **Control list**



#### **Control list**



#### **Client list**





### **Client list**




```
down_write(&local_ports_lock_lhc2);
list_del(&port_ptr->list);
up_write(&local_ports_lock_lhc2);
down_write(&control_ports_lock_lha5);
list_add_tail(&port_ptr->list, &control_ports);
up_write(&control_ports_lock_lha5);
```

## **Control list**



#### **Control list**





### **Qualaroot** – the vulnerability

- control\_ports list is modified without lock!
- Deleting 2 objects from control\_ports simultaneously!





#### RACE CONDITION








```
static inline void list_del(
    struct list_head *entry)
{
    next = entry->next;
    prev = entry->prev;
    next->prev = prev;
    prev->next = next;
    entry->next = LIST_POISON1;
    entry->prev = LIST_POISON2;
}
```







































- Two following objects are deleted
  - Simultaneously!



- control\_ports points to a FREE data
  - > LIST\_POISON worked
    - No longer mappable
  - Spraying af\_unix\_dgram works

- Iterations on control\_ports?
  - Just close a client\_port!
    - Notification to all control\_ports with post\_pkt\_to\_port

```
static int post pkt to port(struct msm ipc port *UAF OBJECT,
                            struct rr packet *pkt, int clone)
   struct rr packet *temp pkt = pkt;
   void (*notify)(unsigned event, void *oob data,
                   size t oob data len, void *priv);
   void (*data ready)(struct sock * sk, int bytes) = NULL;
   struct sock *sk:
   mutex lock(&UAF OBJECT->port rx q lock lhc3);
     pm stay awake(UAF OBJECT->port rx ws);
   list_add_tail(&temp_pkt->list, &UAF_OBJECT->port_rx q);
   wake up(&UAF OBJECT->port rx wait q);
   notify = UAF OBJECT->notify;
   sk = (struct sock *)UAF OBJECT->endpoint;
   if (sk) {
        read lock(&sk->sk callback lock);
        data ready = sk->sk data ready;
        read unlock(&sk->sk callback lock);
   mutex unlock(&UAF OBJECT->port rx q lock lhc3);
   if (notify)
        notify(pkt->hdr.type, NULL, 0, UAF OBJECT->priv);
   else if (sk && data ready)
        data ready(sk, pkt->hdr.size);
   return 0;
```

- wake\_up function
  - Macros to \_\_wake\_up\_common



```
static void wake up common(
   wait queue head t *q,
    wait queue t *curr, *next;
    list for each entry safe(curr, next,
     &q->task list, task list) {
        if (curr->func(curr, mode,
         wake flags, key))
            break:
```


- wake\_up function
  - Macros to \_\_wake\_up\_common



- New primitive!
  - Call to function with first controllable param!
  - ➤ We can't control the address though ⊗

Not good enough for commit\_creds...


- Upgrade primitives
- Find a function that can call an arbitrary function with address-controlled parameters





usb\_read\_done\_work\_fn receives a function pointer and a function argument!

```
static void usb read done work fn(
   struct work struct *work)
   struct diag request *req = NULL;
    struct diag usb info *ch = container of(
        work, struct diag usb info,
        read done work);
    req = ch->read ptr;
    ch->ops->read done(req->buf,
```






- Chain function calls
  - wake\_up\_common
    - usb\_read\_done\_work\_fn
      - any function





```
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```

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


Create UAF situation using the vulnerability






Spray af\_unix\_dgrams to catch the UAF






Spray af\_uhinggebyrlæshistelcatientch the UAF



Trigger list iteration

### Qualaroot



# Google

### #3 ad...@lacoon.com

Hey,

Attached is a full exploit for Nexus 6 devices running Android Marshmallow, build MRA58K.

The binary itself should be run from an application context, i.e. from an APK, (otherwise SELinux prevents the exploitation) and no extra privileges are required in order to successfully exploit the vulnerability.

Please note that on other Qualcomm based devices or versions it might still cause a kernel panic, however the current exploitation requires a modification for each device.

The exploit currently sets SELinux to permissive mode, grants root privileges to the process, modifies the system partition to read-write and writes a suid file there named "zugang" (full path /system/zugang).

The payload can easily be changed in the function do root, file qualroot.c.

If you wish to test the exploit without creating an extra APK for that, let me know, and I will supply you with an APK.

To build, extract the NDK using the make-standalone-toolchain.sh to the same directory with the qualroot exploit, and run build\_and\_strip.sh.



Delete

Project Member #4 qua...@google.com

Thanks Adam.

Qualcomm also notified us that they received this report as well and they have assigned an ID for it: QPSIIR-170.

Quan

Project Member #5 qua...@google.com

Hello,

Thank you for submitting this vulnerability report.
The engineering team has reviewed the issue and set the severity to Low.

For reference, the severity classification is documented here: <a href="https://source.android.com/security/overview/updates-resources.html">https://source.android.com/security/overview/updates-resources.html</a>

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Labels: Severity-Low Triaged-yes

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## DEMO



## Syncockaroot (syncsource vulnerability) CVE-2016-2503

 SyncSource objects are used to synchronize the activity between the GPU and the application.



- Can be created using IOCTLs to the GPU
  - > IOCTL\_KGSL\_SYNCSOURCE\_CREATE
  - > IOCTL\_KGSL\_SYNCSOURCE\_DESTROY
- Referenced further with the "idr" mechanism

### Syncockaroot (syncsource vulnerability)

```
long kgsl ioctl syncsource destroy(
    struct kgsl device private *dev priv,
    unsigned int cmd, void *data)
    struct kgsl syncsource destroy *param = data;
    struct kgsl syncsource *syncsource = NULL;
    syncsource = kgsl syncsource get(
        dev priv->process priv,
        param->id);
    Any lock on "to-be-destroyed" object?
/* put reference from syncsource creation */
    kgsl syncsource put(syncsource);
    /* put reference from getting the syncsource above */
    kgsl syncsource put(syncsource);
    return 0;
```

### Syncockaroot - PoC

- Create a syncsource object
  - > A predictable *idr* number is allocated



 Create 2 threads constantly destroying the same *idr* number

- Ref-count will be reduced to -1
  - > Right after getting to zero, we can spray it

Use After Free ©

### KanGaroot (KGsl vulnerability) CVE-2016-2504

GPU main module (kgsl-3d0)



- Map user memory to the GPU
  - > IOCTL\_KGSL\_MAP\_USER\_MEM
  - > IOCTL\_KGSL\_GPUMEM\_FREE\_ID
- Referenced by a predictable ID
  - > IDR mechanism

### KanGaroot (KGsl vulnerability)

```
static int
kgsl mem entry attach process(
    struct kgsl mem entry *entry,
    struct kgsl device private *dev priv)
    id = idr alloc(&process->mem idr,
    entry, 1, 0, GFP NOWAIT);
        Should it already be accessible here?
    ret = kgsl mem entry track gpuaddr(
        process, entry);
    ret = kgsl mmu map(pagetable,
    &entry->memdesc);
    if (ret)
        kgsl mem entry detach process(entry);
    return ret;
```

## KanGaroot (KGsl vulnerability)

GPU main module (kgsl-3d0)



- Map user memory to the GPU
  - > IOCTL KGSL MAP USER MEM
  - > IOCTL\_KGSL\_GPUMEM\_FREE\_ID
- Referenced by a predictable ID
  - > IDR mechanism
- No locks!
  - > Free can be called before map ends

### **KanGaroot - PoC**

- Map memory
- Save the IDR
  - We always get the first free IDR -- predictable
- Another thread frees the object with IDR
  - \*Before the first thread returns from the IOCTL

UAF in kgsl\_mem\_entry\_attach\_process on 'entry' parameter



Suggestions/Special thanks

commit\_creds for always being there for me

Absense of kASLR, for not breaking me and commit\_creds apart

SELinux, for being liberal, letting anyone access mechanisms like Qualcomm's IPC



# Thank You!