Discovering and Triangulating Rogue Cell Towers



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What is a rogue cell tower?

- A device created by governments or hackers that has the ability to trick your phone into thinking it's a real cell phone tower.
- Also known as IMSI catchers, interceptors, cell-site simulators,
 Stingrays, and probably a few more.
- Rogue cell towers have the ability to collect information about you indirectly through metadata (call length, dialed numbers)
- In some conditions can collect content of messages, calls, and data.



How are cell simulators used today?

At Home (In the United States):

- IMSI-catchers are used by US law enforcement agencies to help locate, track, and collect data on suspects.
- ACLU has identified 66 agencies and 24 states that own stingrays.
- Used to monitor demonstrations in the US
 - Used in Chicago political protests
- It's possible to make an IMSI-catcher at home
 - DEFCON 18: Practical Cellphone Spying Chris Paget
 Rarracuda

How are cell simulators used today?

Abroad:

- Reported use in Ireland, UK, China, Germany, Norway, South Africa
- Chinese spammers were caught sending spam and phishing messages.
- Used by governments and corporations alike.



What's the IMSI in "IMSI-catcher"?

- IMSI stands for International Mobile Subscriber Identity.
- Is used as a means of identifying a device on the cell network.
- Typically 15 digits long
- Contains general information about you device (Country & Carrier)
 - Mobile Country Code MCC
 - Mobile Network Code MNC
 - Mobile Subscription Identification Number MSIN




What's an IMSI?

IMSI = Unique identifier to your device



Sample IMSI:





Why you should care?

- Your phone will connect automatically to cell site simulators.
- Thieves can steal your personal information.
- Hacker's can track where you go, who you're talking to, and grab all sorts of other data about you.
- Your digital life can be sniffed out of the air by anyone with some technical chops, and a laptop.
- Your company could be leaking trade secrets.
- Your privacy is at risk.



Why build a detector?

- There are some great apps for Android phones and that have the ability to detect cell tower anomalies.
 - You need specific phone models & root for this to work
- I wanted a device that met the following conditions:
 - Cheap ~\$50/device
 - I wanted to set it and forget it.
 - I wanted to be alerted to any anomalies.
 - I wanted the ability to network multiple devices together.



- Every cell tower (Base Transceiver Station, BTS) beacons out information about itself
 - ARFCN Absolute radio frequency channel number
 - MCC Mobile Country Code
 - MNC Mobile Network Code
 - Cell ID Unique identifier (within a large area)
 - LAC Location area code
 - Txp Transmit power maximum
 - Neighboring cells



- Typically these values remain constant:
 - ARFCN Absolute radio frequency channel number
 - MCC Mobile Country Code
 - MNC Mobile Network Code
 - Cell ID Unique identifier (within a large area)
 - LAC Location area code
 - Txp Transmit power maximum
 - Neighboring cells
 - Power level




- If values deviate from what's expected it can mean that there is maintenance taking place.
- It can mean changes are being made to the network.
- It could also mean that there is a rogue cell tower is nearby!
- The idea is to get a baseline of your cellular neighborhood over a period of time.
- It would be like keeping an eye on the cars that come in and out of your neighborhood, after a while you begin to know which doesn't belong.

- Examples:
 - A new tower (Unknown Cell ID), high transmission power
 - Mobile country code mismatch
 - Mobile network code mismatch
 - Frequency change
 - Location Area Code mismatch



- Combine unique cell tower data, receive power, and location.
- One detector can be moved around with an onboard GPS
 - Readings of unique tower identifiers, power level and GPS coordinates allow for a single detector to create a map.
 - Some math, open source GIS software, and pretty colors can approximate locations of towers or possible rogue towers








- Multiple detectors with known locations allow for trilateration of the suspected rogue tower.
- Receive power and distance are not inversely proportional
 - Regression formulas were required to be calculated in order to fine tune the results.
 - Less accurate but still pretty good





What's the build?

- Raspberry Pi 3, power adapter, SD card (running stock Raspbian)
- SIM900 GSM Module
- Serial GPS module
- TV tuner software defined radio
- Scrap wood & hot glue




Brace yourself... this is quite literally a hack.









SIM900

SIM900 Engineering mode

Seven towers with the highest signal

- Gives you a ton of information via a serial connection
- No SIM card is required for engineering mode

Read Command AT+CENG?

Response

Engineering Mode is designed to allow a field engir network information received by a handset, when th idle mode or dedicated mode (that is: with a call act engineer is able to view network interaction for the the handset is currently registered with) or for the n

TA returns the current engineering mode. The netwincluding serving cell and neighboring cells are retu <mode>=1 or <mode>=2. <cell> carry with them or interaction.

+CENG: <mode>,<Ncell>

[+CENG:

<cell>,"<arfcn>,<rxl>,<rxq>,<mcc>,<mnc>,<bsic>,<cellid>,<rta>,

<txp>,<lac>,<TA>"

<CR><LF>+CENG:

<cell>,"<arfcn>,<rxl>,<bsic>[,<cellid>],<mcc>,<mnc>,<lac>"...]

OK



GPS Serial

- Adafruit Ultimate GPS module
 - Fixes position quickly.
 - Good indoor reception
 - Works exactly how you would expect





Raspberry Pi 3

- Stock Raspbian OS (debian for pi)
- Pi 3 has enough power to run a SDR
- Has four USB ports for serial adapters
- Easily powered by a USB battery pack





TV Tuner

- \$20 Software defined radio
- Wide range of frequencies
- Github: Gr-Gsm
 - Can listen to raw GSM traffic
 - See all the raw frames.
 - Not necessary for locating cell towers
 - Provides deeper insights





Data collection:

• Everything dumps to a SQLite database for later use

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1467249192	0694 14	310	260	35	1799	12c 3
1467249192	0696 16	310	260	28	1cf3	12c 3
14(14) lat	lon	satellite	gps quality	altitude	altitude_units	12c 3
146						0 3
	-119.770985	8	2	105.1	M	0 3
	-119.770985	8	2	105.1	M	0 3
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	-119.770985	8	2	105.1	M	12c 3
146 36.84029	-119.770985	8	2	105.1	M	12c 3
146 36.84029	-119.770985	8	2	105.1	M	12c 3
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146 36.84029	-119.770986	8	2	105.1	M	12c 3
36.84029	-119.770986	8	2	105.1	M	
36.84029	-119.770986	8	2	105.1	M	
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36.84029	-119.770986	8	2	105.1	M	

Questions?

