or Day 2 - CTF Related Issues

□ Making a security alarm for fun and profit - 李 倫銓 (Alan Lee)

- 課程投影片: goo.al/w3r5uu
- Lab 步驟 及 需要的檔案 / 工具: https://github.com/mcsworld/AIS3
- 有興趣的在課程後可以跟老師要晶片來玩
- **The Proof of the Proof of the**
 - https://pentestlab.wordpress.com/2012/06/
- ZL Correlation
 - 。 動手做後面的東西
 - 。 被打進來的時候會叫
 - .htpasswd ==> John the Ripper
- cf <u>Damn Vulnerable Web Application</u>
 - MS event id https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/kb/977519 or

http://ppt.cc/rZbEE

- TC Windows event log
 - event id 登入成功的代碼 4624
- ightharpoonup consistency con
- DH Ubuntu(Linux) -> sudo screen /dev/ttyUSB0 115200
- MAC -> Terminal 執行 Is /dev/tty.usbserial*,應該可以找到對應的 tty name-> screen /dev/tty.usbserial[對應的tty name] 115200
- https://github.com/mcsworld/AIS3/blob/master/Lab/README.md https://github.com/mcsworld/AIS3/tree/master/API

The development of CTFs - Tyler Nighswander

ZL 投影片: http://copyfighter.org/ais3/slides/

HP About

- J Tyler 大神
- JC 神人物理+計算機科學雙主修,博士研究量子計算
- BC 玩了6年的CTF(2009~present)

HP

AL What is a CTF?

- нР Capture the Flag
 - Jeopardy Style
 - 參賽者打官方主機
 - J more relaxed
 - variety of challenges
- more teams(1000+)
- o Attack-Defense style
 - 互相攻擊對方主機取得旗幟
 - fewer teams(30~60)
- 紀 Connecting to AP...
- J shorter contests
- AL Game Format
- o 8 hours 72+ hours, normally 24hr
- 林 · 3-50 problems
- Usually online, sometimes in person
 - Categories
 - Cryptography
 - Forensics
 - Binary explotation
- 紀 Web exploitation
- 林 Reverse engineering
- J o Trivia
- A Programming
- 林 · Social engineering
- 林 Incident respon
- Why You Should Play CTF!
 - You won't get the experience anywhere else!
- Fastest way to learn computer security
- HP o It's a lot of fun!
- Make friends in security/CTF community
- AL travel to competitions
- Competition for every skill level
 - Taiwan has excellent TEAMS!

Shorter answer is: If you like security, play CTFs!

HP CTFs vs ...

- CTF vs puzzle hunts
 - CTF skills will help ypu in the real world!
- CTF vs "defensive" competitions
 - CTFs are more fun
- CTFs have objective scoring
- CTFs vs "real security"
 - CTFs are competitive
 - CTFs are (relatively) short and easy

If you run your own CTF competition, keep all of these in mind!

- Before going futher....
 - Downloadable VM with tools!
 - Assumes Linux knowledge...
 - http://copyfighter.org/ais3/ctf

History

- Kriegspiel 1811
- Dice-based war simulation game
- enigma 1930s
 - computers + crypto decisive in war
 - Phreaking 1967
 - Precursor to hacker movement
 - Computer viruses/exploits
 - First CTF held at DEFCON 4 in 1996
 - Format is a mystery ...
 - Held every year since
 - UCSB iCTF first held in 2001
 - First Pwn2Own in 2007
 - Old stype contest problems list to time ...
- forensics + reversing + exploitation + trivia
 - Practice Site: http://copyfighter.org/ais3/ctf
- A Trends
 - Crypto in CTF is roughly in-tune with real world!
- cf differential analysis
 - length extension attack
- **ZL** power analysis
 - padding oracle { 2010 ASP.NET, 2011 Codegate }

CF ■ Duel EC DRBG

AWEIMEOW 感謝大大 <(_ _)>

- Many crypto attack months after real world exploit with ...
 - CTF getting harder
 - 10 years ago: BOFs with no ALSR nor NX
 - today: ASLR, NX, RELRO, PIE, 1 Byte overwrites
 - to get started, look at OLD CHALLENGES!
 - CTF are just about ahead of the curve for exploits
 - Full PIE + pointer xor + mor in 2012
 - Trends Overview
 - Some categories follow trends closely
 - Unlikely that CTF will beat academics in crypto
 - CTFs will likely remain hot on their heels
 - Some categories seems ahead of trends
 - Exploitation and sometimes web can lead real world
- Both influenced by tools and are
- Trends Lessons
 - Read security news, it will show up in CTFs
 - Follow academics + blogs + tools about security
 - When bug hunting, remember recent trends.
- Lessons for real world
 - Practice hard exploitation with CTFs
 - Tools/techniques for CTFs can be used for speed
 - Trends can help your bug hunting real life too!
- CTF Recent History
 - Until 2007, CTFs were 'just a games'
 - First pwn2own in 2007
 - almost a CTF, prize is \$10k USD
 - Codegate 2008
 - Only Korea
 - USD 100K prize
- 黄 2009 international
- CTFs are not just games!
 - Can easily win: money, glory, jobs
 - CTFs will get more valuable, also more competitive
- ZL FreeBSD Oday and root'ed everyone
 - Wiereshark Oday

- Defcon 20 DoS's in four separate dissectors: CIP CTDB, XTP, Mongo
- The CTF skills and Real World skills overlaps!
 - CTF is an easier place to start
 - o CTF are a safe , legal place to practice hacking
- Tricks with scripting and tool will speed up dev time
- Experience can help get jobs in security industry

ZL Why tools

- Get rid out of the boring things and do something interesting { do this buffer overflow all the time }
- "Grunt work" can get boring
- "Force multiplier"
- Stop rewriting the same scripts
- Save you many many hours
 - Solve challenges FASTER

Automation in the "Real World"

- This is a huge problem
- Finite number of skilled computer security researchers

H Tools to discuss

- misc
- IDA
- binary ninja
- GDB/PEDA
- pwntools
- z_L Qira
- н Pin
 - Z3
- zL angr with a symbolic execution
 - afl cool fuzzer
- н write your own!!
 - misc
 - Random tools can automate many tasks!
- meta-goal: kill stupid CTF problems

ZL moar history

2010 year of the blind SQLi challenges

- writing blind SQLi solver with binary search not fun
 - writing it in less than 10 minutes -- even less fun
- SQLMap!
 - automated
 - interest over time goes up
- Today blind SQLi is much less common
- This is good: focus on creative gaskss, not menial ones
- Lesson: if you see a task 10 times, automate it
- Also: if you think a challenge is "dumb", automate it

A Reverse Engineering and Malware Analysis - Erye Hernandez

- Lecture Structure
 - Day1: Intro to Malware Analysis
 - Day2: Static Analysis
 - Day3: Dynamic Analysis
- Tool
- <u>http://copyfighter.org/ais3/malware/</u>
- What is malware?
 - malicious software
 - deliverately designed to disrupt computer
 - History of Malware
 - 1950s: Von Neumann's approaches to self-reproducting automata
 - 1970s: Creeper and Reaper, Rabbit, Pervading Animal Hunter
 - 1980s: Elk Cloner, Brain, Virden, Morris Worm, CERT
- 1990s: self-mutating engine, Michelangelo, virus creation kits, selling malware in the underground, BackOrifice
- 2000s: iLOVEYOU, Pikachu, SQL Slammer, MyDoom, Sony BMG scandal
 - 2010s: Stuxnet, Zeus, Gameover Zeus, CryptoLocker
 - Threat Actors
 - Insider threats / Maliciours insider
 - current or former employee, contractor, etc
 - misuse of access
 - goal: revenge or \$\$\$
- A Hacktivists
- protest or promote political agenda
 - not well resourced

- AL Cybercriminalist
- utilize infosetealers and ransomware
 - qoal: \$\$\$
- State-sponsored threat groups
 - lots of resources
 - goal: Militaries, ...
 - Types of Malware
 - Worm, Backdoor, Infostealer, Ransomare
 - Downloader, Keylogger, RootKits, Launcher
 - · Botnets, POS, ATM, Mobile
 - Malware vs CTF Binanries
- o different goals when analyzing
 - analysis requires similar skills
- Malware vs CTF (malware / CTF)
- respond to network intrusion / find flag
 - figure out what binary does / what a binary does
 - find a way to detect and contain / find flag
 - Methods of Analysis
 - Basic Triage
 - 'assign degrees of urgency' Webster's Dictionary
 - is it malicious?
 - understand
 - Dvnamic
 - observing the executables be
- using a debugger to examine ...
- Static
 - examining binary without viewing actual instructions(file, exiftools ,...)
- reverse engineering via disassembler
- Lab Environment
- 禹黃 o Physical
 - resource intensive
 - Virtual
 - does not require physical hardware
 - easy to revert back to snapshots
 - Automated
 - CucKoo Sandbox (http://cuckoosandbox.org/)
 - Anubis (https://anubis.iseclab.org/)
 - MYNYCHEN 講者表示 virustotal不錯,但是沒有偵測到不代表沒毒xD

Environmental Setting

(Hard Disk storage <= 2Gb)

□ 楊鎮銘 *是RAM還是HardDisk?*

■ Network Configuration

Windows

IP: 10.1.1.2

Mask: 255.255.255.0

Gateway: 10.1.1.1

DNS: 10.1.1.1

Linux

IP: 10.1.1.1

Mask: 255.255.255.0

Gateway: None

CF Windows VM 的網路設成內部網路(internal network) (原本預設是NAT)

ZHEMIN L export VISUAL=/usr/bin/vim

- IL sudo vim /etc/inetsim/inetsim.conf
- c password: aisss
- IL vim tips:

/regular\sexpres{2}ion ?here

[n] for next occurrence

c service_bind_address 192.168.1.1->10.1.1.1 /dns_default_ip 192.168.1.1->10.1.1.1

/dns_default_domainname h4x0r.com

:wq

c Take a Snapshot

After all setting

Basic Triage

Goals

Hashes

• Use MD5 or SHA1

- - Search online
 - share with other researchers

c Strings

- ASCII and Unicode format
- Provide clues to the functionality of the binary
 - IPs, URLs, functions, error messages, etc

PEID

- Identifies common packers, crypters, compilers
- Outdated butstill useful

± Dependency Walker

- Bundled with MS development tools
- Provides hierarchical view of funcitons and odules
- Show only dynamically linked

D PEView

- Displays PE header and sections
- Image_File_Header
- contains compile time
- Image_Section_Header
- contains size on disk and in memory

CFF Explorer

PE editor

Resource Hacker

- Dispalys the .rsrc section of the file
- View, modify and delete resource

EXECUTE Dynamic Tools

Process Explorer

- Sysinternals suite
- Similar to Windows Task Manager
- Displays currently active processec(parent and child)
- Shows open handles and loaded DLLS

Process Monitor

- Sysinternals suite
- Real-time file system, registry, process.thread activity

Wireshark

• Open source network protocol analyzer

FakeNet

- Network simulator
- Supports DNS,HTTP, SSL, SMTP

INetSim

- Internet services simulation.
- Easy to customize and confiure

Lab

Lab1-0.exe

- What is its hash?
- When was the binary compiled?
- What can you tell about the binary?
- What does it do?
- What are some of the functions that the binary imports?

Lab1-1.exe

- What is its hash?
- When was the binry compiled?
- What can you tell about the binary?
- What are some of the functions that the binary imports?

AIS3.exe

- What is its hash?
- When was the binary compiled?
- What can you tell about the binary?
- What does it do?
- - pwd: infected
- - -> md5hash, strings, virtual tools

Ans:

- Lab0-1.exe: cpoy & google its hash, and you will find it is no
- Lab1-1.exe: Strings, SysinternalSuite Procmon