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New Targeted Attack Group Buys BIFROSE Code, Works in Teams

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By Razor Huang (Threats Analyst)

Recently, we uncovered a new cyber-espionage attack by a well-funded and organized group targeting companies close to governments and in key industries mostly in Asia. These targets include privatized government agencies and government contractors, as well as companies in the consumer electronics, computer, healthcare, and financial industries.

This group has been active since 2010. We dub this operation Shrouded Crossbow, after a mutex in a backdoor the group developed. Our research indicates that the group has sufficient financial resources to purchase the source code of a widely available malware tool, and the human resources to design improved versions of its own backdoors based on this.

BIFROSE, KIVARS and XBOW

BIFROSE, also known as Bifrost, was sold underground for up to \$10,000 in the past. We have seen it used in [a targeted attack on government offices](#) and the [“Here You Have Mail” spam campaign](#). Despite BIFROSE’s well-known network traffic and behaviors, however, the group was still able to make full use of it in its operation.

The following code snippet shows BIFROSE sending its phone home message, which contains the victim’s profile information, to its command-and-control (C&C) server.

Figure 1. The phone home message of BIFROSE

Another backdoor used by the operation since 2010 is KIVARS. While it is similar to PLUGX because of its two components (a loader and the main backdoor), KIVARS has a much stronger connection with BIFROSE because of its phone home message format.

Figure 2. The phone home message of KIVARS

Although KIVARS is not as heavy in terms of functions when compared with BIFROSE, it is still a pretty handy backdoor for the group. In fact, in 2013, KIVARS started offering an [upgraded](#) 64-bit version, in line with the rise of 64-bit systems.

What we think happened is that the group purchased the source code of BIFROSE, and after improving its functions, the group then designed a new installation flow, developed a new builder to create unique loader-backdoor pairs, and made more simple and concise backdoor capabilities, resulting in a new backdoor—KIVARS. This could mean that the operation is either backed financially by its sponsors or the group has the funds and resources to improve on an existing backdoor.

Interestingly, some KIVARS backdoors’ PDB (program database) paths betray the code name of KIVARS to be “BR” + “{year}”. We think that BR mostly likely stands for Bifrose RAT.

PDB PATHS
Q:\Projects\Br2012\Release\ttt.pdb
Q:\Projects\Br2012\Release\insbr.pdb
Q:\Projects\Br2012\Release\svc.pdb
P:\Projects\Br2014\Release\br2014.pdb

Figure 3. Some of KIVARS’ PDB Paths

The operation also made use of another in-house developed backdoor, XBOW. The development of XBOW can be traced back to the middle of 2010 and is inspired by the design of BIFROSE and KIVARS.

This assembly screenshot of XBOW shows the “Recent,” “Desktop,” and “Program” folder paths, which are also present in the BIFROSE and KIVARS phone home messages.

807C24 60	LEA EDI,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+60]	
68 58F14000	PUSH e04ae423.0040F158	
F3:AB	REP STOS,DWORD PTR ES:[EDI]	String2 = "Recent"
8B3D 34D04000	MOV EDI,DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.lstrcm	kernel32.lstrcmpA
56	PUSH ESI	String1
895C24 2C	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+2C],EBX	lstrcmpA
FFD7	CALL EDI	
85C0	TEST EAX,EAX	
75 05	JNZ SHORT e04ae423.00401EF0	
50	PUSH EAX	
6A 08	PUSH 8	
EB 52	JMP SHORT e04ae423.00401F42	
68 50F14000	PUSH e04ae423.0040F150	ASCII "Desktop"
56	PUSH ESI	
FFD7	CALL EDI	
85C0	TEST EAX,EAX	
75 15	JNZ SHORT e04ae423.00401F11	
50	PUSH EAX	
805424 64	LEA EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+64]	
50	PUSH EAX	
52	PUSH EDX	
50	PUSH EAX	
FF15 A8D14000	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&SHELL32.SHGetSpeci	SHELL32.SHGetSpecialFolderPathA
804424 60	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+60]	
50	PUSH EAX	
EB 46	JMP SHORT e04ae423.00401F57	
68 44F14000	PUSH e04ae423.0040F144	ASCII "Document"
56	PUSH ESI	
FFD7	CALL EDI	
85C0	TEST EAX,EAX	
75 16	JNZ SHORT e04ae423.00401F33	
50	PUSH EAX	
804C24 64	LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+64]	
6A 05	PUSH 5	
51	PUSH ECX	
50	PUSH EAX	
FF15 A8D14000	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&SHELL32.SHGetSpeci	SHELL32.SHGetSpecialFolderPathA
805424 60	LEA EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+60]	
52	PUSH EDX	
EB 24	JMP SHORT e04ae423.00401F57	
68 3CF14000	PUSH e04ae423.0040F13C	ASCII "Program"
56	PUSH ESI	
FFD7	CALL EDI	
85C0	TEST EAX,EAX	
75 17	JNZ SHORT e04ae423.00401F56	
50	PUSH EAX	
6A 26	PUSH 26	
804424 68	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+68]	
50	PUSH EAX	
6A 00	PUSH 0	
FF15 A8D14000	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&SHELL32.SHGetSpeci	SHELL32.SHGetSpecialFolderPathA
804C24 60	LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+60]	
51	PUSH ECX	
EB 01	JMP SHORT e04ae423.00401F57	
56	PUSH ESI	Path
FF15 30D04000	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.SetCurren	SetCurrentDirectoryA

Figure 4. Snippet of XBOW assembly code

Later in the middle of 2011, some XBOW variants provided a “Find Passwords” option, which is a functionality also available in BIFROSE. This lends further proof to our BIFROSE purchase theory.

Clear Operational Roles

One other interesting finding we discovered about XBOW, which led to the naming of Operation Shrouded Crossbow, is a mutex created by the said backdoor. The name of this mutex starts with “zhugeliannu.”

The format of the mutex name is as follows:

- *zhugeliannu{1 byte possible project version}{builder identity}{compile date}*

The mutex name format served as a guideline for the threat actors building XBOW.

Compile Date	Mutex Name
2011/3/28 01:41	zhugeliannu2zhang3
2011/11/8 01:18	zhugeliannu2xue1108
2012/6/11 00:11	zhugeliannu2lxy0611
2012/10/16 01:00	zhugeliannu1016liang
2013/2/27 02:25	zhugeliannu2cao0227
2014/3/30 08:31	zhugeliannu2cao0330

Examining the {builder identity} sections of the mutex names, we conclude that there are at least 10 threat actors who were responsible for building XBOW and for sending it to victims. This small team may have served as the tool developer team of the attack group.

In addition to the above team, we believe that another team, in charge of infiltration, is responsible for performing a successful point of entry in the network using spear-phishing attacks with malicious attachments. The attached files are either a .RAR archive file that uses the [RTLO \(right to left override\) technique](#), or a .EXE file with fake documents presenting themselves as either breaking news, resumes, shared information, government data, or meeting requests. They configure the tools' builder, specifying the infection method, assigned C&C, file name when installed, etc.

Maintaining the group's C&C servers could be assigned to a third team. There are more than 100 C&Cs used in the operation, some registered via free dynamic DNS or by the threat actors while some are IPs. The C&Cs are organized depending on their use. We observed that C&C maintenance activities such as IP changes or renewal of expired domains happen in an organized fashion. They are still registering new domains to this day.

Implications on Enterprises

Enterprises faced with targeted attacks like these have no chance against well-funded, organized groups unless they apply the same attention and focus on their own network to detect intrusions and anomalies and respond appropriately. Network defense platforms like [Deep Discovery](#) enables IT admins to detect, analyze and respond to these kinds of threats.

I have presented my findings last week in [AVAR 2015](#), along with my other colleagues from Trend Micro who have discussed the code improvements in [DYRE](#), a notorious banking Trojan that can rival Zeus, and the active development of [URSNIF](#).



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