Zegost - analysis of the Chinese backdoor

Interesting features:

- Rootkit on board;
- Dropped driver has ~100MB size on disk;
- Contains AVKill code:
- Injected DLL as a payload.

https://twitter.com/artem_i_baranov/status/283497092427694080 [https://twitter.com/artem_i_baranov/status/283497092427694080]

Original dropper fingerprints:

SHA256:

030340a429180da10df3dee1092701aa3b9e38dac45445badb457de4 4c198061

SHA1: ecb9626b9a2cd0c75a078f1c17cbead251380ba6

MD5: 48c093b0e24d65838e1ee0f5b7b4337e


File size: 98304 bytes

Dropper is detected by almost all vendors:






[http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-DsKsa5ev13M/UNB23LHzd1l/AAAAAAAAA40/VHxMEo3e3e8/s1600/1.jpg]



[http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-


reV7gABu8eM/UNB33w8wqzl/AAAAAAAAAAAAAh4AZ-hedkL0/s1600/2.jpg]

Resource section is interesting, because it stores the rootkit driver in packed state (APLib).



[http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-KxQEufwwQUM/UNB40_-sXII/AAAAAAAAAAA5c/zsWxZtdnZqI/s1600/3.jpg]

Point of driver loading by dropper is trivial - using of ntdll!ZwLoadDriver.



[http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-

pSEUH7Sn6II/UNB7mRLdlfl/AAAAAAAAAAAAS8/wbRoYBJLFuE/s1600/4.jpg]

For loading the driver the first time, it creates the same file and service name.

\Registry\Machine\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\HideKey C:\recycler\hidekey.txt



[http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-5OvFXFIDn34/UNB-EdAPwBl/AAAAAAAAAAA6g/ycl44kfvLh0/s1600/5.jpg]


To mislead some static detectors and analyzing tools, the trojan uses the trick of dropping rootkit with total file size $\sim 100 MB$. Actual size $\sim 70 KB$.



[http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-wlt5AGt-yH8/UNCNIRLq6bl/AAAAAAAAAAAAFE/R1kFKl4x1Wc/s1600/6.jpg]

A similar technique is used in Darkmegi rootkit, but the total size is smaller.


Resource with 104 number in dropper contains reg-file for setup driver.




[http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-

VINXtEeYQfo/UNCQkbiDiQl/AAAAAAAAAAAAM/Jtt_7lXpgWE/s1600/8.jpg]

Point of its loading.



[http://2.bp.blogspot.com/--tNuXuWhcw4/UNRT3nRkEvI/AAAAAAAAAAAOc/bZQ7wyBd2I0/s1600/10.ipg]



To ensure the survival after reboot, the dropper creates AppSvcHlp.sys - a copy of hidekey.txt in standard drivers directory.



[http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-

QEKTEcATWHk/UNRNHthcm0l/AAAAAAAAAAA8w/S59Xxfzlj3Y/s1600/9.jpg]

Driver/rootkit:

SHA256:

061e60a81dd01207b08f5243eb54fb9fe2e492d51e9e691f18ae958160 7a625e

SHA1: 19889145b193926b8fa2827c5eff966b450b3a19

MD5: 2d613204d44fb0455ef0fa5384d5352c


File size: 75776 bytes







Security/malware blog...

search







[http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-

b4lkWv9Ew4Y/UNS9hsULZ5l/AAAAAAAABBw/oADTZ15fZms/s1600/12.ipgl

Driver body contains malicious dll [antivshlp32.dll] and has main purpose dll installation:

```
offset aSystemrootSyst; "\\SystemRoot\\system32\\antivshlp32.dll"
fnCheckHaliciousDllPresent
ecx, al
ecx, ecx
short loc_110BD
                           .text:00011099
                                                                  push
call
                           .text:0001109E
.text:000110A3
.text:000110A6
                                                                   novzx
test
                           .text:000110A8
                                                                  inz
                           .text:88811888
                           .text:000110AA
                                                                                                                ZwCreateFile/ZwWriteFile
                                                                             edx, [ebp+Length]
Dynamic Views template. Powered by Blogger.
                                                                                                                                  ystem32\\antivsh1p32.dl1"
```

New ZBot modifications


.text:000110B8



BlackHole spreads more ...

Top threats of the week ...

Top threats at last...








[http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-5EcL6PUFixk/UNRu94WIM0I/AAAAAAAA_s/rB1_ GZvD3Ds/s1600/13.jpg]

fnCreateMaliciousD11



[http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-2VnHlOoEksg/UNRvIEFhuKI/AAAAAAAA 0/DktUJ 99IE28/s1600/14.jpg]

Driver targeted to disruption a lot of AV products: Qihoo 360,





TDL FS dumper's

Kaspersky AV, ESET Nod32, Malwarebytes Anti-Malware.

DLL:

SHA256:

bf876fef476ec8d7e712422d0411099834810747e447102818f0af9359 1b53eb

SHA1: e7356ab76d223ce18845942bf62cf55123b9b686

MD5: e72b0a5d85f1e9d3413745d2b696b714

File size: 40960 bytes





[http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-WKkuQX2J-sE/UNS6GQg848I/AAAAAAAABBE/7oiZGCqZpNc/s1600/17.jpg]

F-Secure	Gen:Variant.Graftor.27945	20121221
Fortinet	W32/Bdoor.BAEltr.bdr	20121221
GData	Gen:Variant.Graftor.27945	20121221
lkarus	Backdoor.Win32.Zegost	20121221
Jiangmin	*	20121221
K7AntiVirus	Trojan	20121221
Kaspersky	Trojan.Win32.Genome.agwpi	20121221
Kingsoft	Win32.Troj.Generic.a.(kcloud)	20121217
Malwarebytes	•	20121221
McAfee	BackDoor-BAE, dll	20121221
McAfee-GW-Edition	Heuristic.BehavesLike.Win32.PasswordStealer.H	20121221
Microsoft	Backdoor:Win32/Zegost.AM	20121221

[http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-IJwxNUKTvgU/UNS6Y8xsa9I/AAAAAAAABBM/Xtg8kYz87rc/s1600/18.jpg]

```
Lister - [D:\research\Malware\chinese_malware_new\dll.txt]
File Edit Options Help
 File does not have MZ header
 Error reading section %d
 Error reading headers (%d %d)
 Unknown relocation type = %d
 C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\IEXPLORE.EXE
 Cannot load %s
 Load failed. Consider making this EXE relocatable.
 WriteProcessMemory failed
 Process resumed (PID = %d).
 ***** EAX = %X
 ***** EIP = %X
 New EXE image injected into process.
New EXE Image Size = %X
 EDX = %X
ECX = %X
 EBX = %X
 EAX = %X
 EIP = %X
 Allocated Mem for New EXE at %X. EXE will be relocated.
 Unmapped and Allocated Mem for New EXE at %X
 ntdll.dll
 ZwUnmapViewOfSection
 Using Existing Mem for New EXE at %X
 Original Base Addr = %X, Size = %X
 Original EXE loaded (PID = %d).
 Cannot open the EXE file!
 Allocation failed
 .PAX
 .PAD
 %s error %d
 Interactive=%d
```


[http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-OK8wuHa2xbl/UNS-5JUDpll/AAAAAAAABCU/Lyibhi-BpKc/s1600/19.jpg]

Autorun from:




[http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-jvybBcjm2Pw/UNV4jM6l-vl/AAAAAAAABC4/zB3L81eMQYE/s1600/20.jpg]

DLL has on board another exe-file injected into IE. This exe being stored in resource section and packed with APLib.



[http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-

EqJCOQ1SzmU/UNW_S25hnbl/AAAAAAAABEA/4j55lJ6UrG4/s1600/22.jpg] Injection chronicles:



[http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-PLHms5_E8Sc/UNXiyFeWlul/AAAAAAAABEk/Q9jqhgvXv14/s1600/23.jpg]



[http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-fz40nYRt5tk/UNWADvWUmII/AAAAAAAABDc/yPCZ1KHbxwk/s1600/21.jpg]

Injected module - final payload:

SHA256:

5577a888fa4477c47a3bf3159b5e46de16a75582ba4888d38b5f2a8b5 27a9c18

SHA1: dae0f132166d008878491baa65424e221792669f

MD5: 8e8d86259b9e94a8febc36407964cfe3

File size: 14336 bytes





[http://2.bp.blogspot.com/-u_Z3L5R6rRE/UNasMPIEFCI/AAAAAAAABFQ/aLrO9Gjx5fQ/s1600/24.jpg]

Ikarus		20121222
Jiangmin		20121221
K7AntiVirus	Riskware	20121221
Kaspersky	•	20121222
Kingsoft	¥4	20121217
Malwarebytes	*	20121222
McAfee	-	20121222
McAfee-GW-Edition	-	20121222
Microsoft	Backdoor:Win32/Zegost.AP	20121222
MicroWorld-eScan		20121222
NANO-Antivirus		20121221
Norman	-	20121221
nProtect		20121222

[http://4.bp.blogspot.com/-

SXJBxYMeotM/UNasnlhT2pl/AAAAAAAABFY/rhp3nwgovSY/s1600/25.jpg]

Mutex activity

Created mutexes... HttpTunnel@@ (successful) RasPbFile (failed) mutex of injected module

[http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-

opQIT3xcP9U/UNat5HRHM0I/AAAAAAAAABF8/58jjG2_WDes/s1600/26.jpg]

Performs response to remote server from context of shadow IE: Remote server

hxxp://iyy.conimes.com http://whois.domaintools.com/conimes.com

[http://whois.domaintools.com/conimes.com]

```
Domain name: conimes.com
```

Registrant Contact:

zhong wen

wen zhong llssddzz@gmail.com

11111111 fax: 11111111 ru de xiang xi di zhi haikou hai nan 000000 en

Administrative Contact:

wen zhong llssddzz@gmail.com

11111111 fax: 11111111 ru de xiang xi di zhi cheng shi WG 000000 cn

Technical Contact:

wen zhong llssddzz@gmail.com

11111111 fax: 11111111 ru de xiang xi di zhi cheng shi WG 000000 cn

Billing Contact:

wen zhong llssddzz@gmail.com

11111111 fax: 11111111 ru de xiang xi di zhi cheng shi WG 000000

DNS:


ns1.myhostadmin.net ns2.myhostadmin.net

Created: 2009-10-19 Expires: 2013-10-19

[http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-

ILZPUZaAtdE/UNau6W05NzI/AAAAAAAABGg/HSGaadDBNRI/s1600/27.jpg]

Communication:



[http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-xLPWMTZrLpQ/UNazDUPKJjl/AAAAAAAABHM/0VJf7o7_Lgo/s1600/28.jpg] With help of:

1004030FC	HttpSendRequestExA	WININET
6 00403100	InternetWriteFile	WININET
1 00403104	HttpEndRequestA	WININET
1 00403108	HttpOpenRequestA	WININET
€\$0040310C	InternetOpenUrlA	WININET
1 00403110	InternetCloseHandle	WININET
1 00403114	InternetReadFile	WININET
6 00403118	InternetConnectA	WININET
tt 0040311C	InternetOpenA	WININET

[http://1.bp.blogspot.com/-

xrT0qj31fXI/UNa1P6ObFXI/AAAAAAAABHw/73ElwDRdQG8/s1600/29.jpg]

Request:

http://iyy.conimes.com/cgi/online.asp? hostname=ComputerName&httptype=[1][not httptunnel]

Other requests:

/cgi/binup.asp /cgi/textup.asp

http://%s/cgi/%s.txt

http://%s/cgi/command.asp?

hostname=%s&command=test&del=delfile

http://%s/cgi/update.exe

posted by https://twitter.com/artem_i_baranov
[https://twitter.com/artem_i_baranov]

Posted 25th December 2012 by Artem

Labels: backdoor, Zegost



R136a1 December 25, 2012 at 5:04 AM

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Preview

Sign out

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