


Bilal Anarwala

DB Cooper Lab

1. MD5 Hash

- a. The hash is f175912b7e0ecb64ac0817d8d3cf681
- b. This hash was retrieved by imaging the contents of the DB Cooper Lab into a blank HDD using Paladin



i.

The screenshot shows the RegRipperRunner application window. The title bar reads "RegRipperRunner". The menu bar includes "File", "Tools", and "Help". Below the menu is a toolbar with "Mode" set to "Single Plugin" and a "Filter" field containing "all". The main area has tabs for "Plugins" and "Output", with "Output" selected. The output pane displays the following user account information:

```
Embedded RID      : 501
--> Password does not expire
--> Account Disabled
--> Password not required
--> Normal user account

Username          : DB Cooper [1000]
Full Name         :
User Comment       :
Account Type      : Default Admin User
Account Created   : 2014-10-28 05:27:38Z
Name               :
Last Login Date   : 2014-11-03 14:27:08Z
Pwd Reset Date    : 2014-10-28 05:27:38Z
Pwd Fail Date     : Never
Login Count        : 10
Embedded RID       : 1000
--> Normal user account

-----
Group Membership Information
```

- 2.
- The account name for the main user is DB Cooper
 - This was gotten by using the SamParse plugin on RegRipper using the SAM file from the DB Cooper image

User	RID	LM-Password	NT-Password	LM-Hash	NT-Hash	Description
DB Cooper	1000	<Disabled>	hidemy\$	0000000000000000...	2B890295BA8D7F656...	

Users: 1. Passwords found: 1 (100.00%). Current password: [redacted]

3.

- a. Used SamInside to do a dictionary attack using the db cooper dictionary as well as the SAM and SYSTEM file from the DB Cooper lab image. The password is “hidemy\$”

```
File: C:\Users\Forensics User\Downloads\config\SOFTWARE

winver v.20200525
(Software) Get Windows version & build info

ProductName           Windows 7 Ultimate
CSDVersion          Service Pack 1
BuildLab             7601.win7sp1_rtm.101119-1850
BuildLabEx          7601.17514.amd64fre.win7sp1_rtm.101119-1850
RegisteredOrganization
RegisteredOwner       Windows User
InstallDate          2017-11-30 23:59:59Z
```

4.

- a. The operating system is Windows 7 Ultimate
- b. The registered owner is “Windows User”
- c. This was gotten using RegRipperRunner on the config file that was extracted from the lab image
- d. Used regripper with the winver plugin to get this info

5. The operating system was installed on 11-30-2017

```

File: C:\Users\Forensics User\Downloads\config\SYSTEM

usbstor v.20200515
(System) Get USBStor key info

USBStor
ControlSet001\Enum\USBStor

Disk&Ven_&Prod_USB_DISK_3.0&Rev_PMAP [2014-11-03 14:28:37]
S/N: 070B43740622B360&0 [2014-11-03 14:28:37Z]
Device Parameters LastWrite: [2014-11-03 14:28:37Z]
LogConf LastWrite : [2014-11-03 14:28:37Z]
Properties LastWrite : [2014-11-03 14:28:37Z]
FriendlyName : USB DISK 3.0 USB Device

Disk&Ven_Generic&Prod_Flash_Disk&Rev_8.07 [2014-11-03 14:25:13]
S/N: 2013070200000437&0 [2014-11-03 14:25:14Z]
Device Parameters LastWrite: [2014-11-03 14:25:14Z]
LogConf LastWrite : [2014-11-03 14:25:13Z]
Properties LastWrite : [2014-11-03 14:25:14Z]
FriendlyName : Generic Flash Disk USB Device

```

- 6.
- Yes there are two usb devices that were used on this computer. These two devices were both used on 11-03-2014. Got this using the usbstor plugin on regripper
 - The serial numbers are
 - 070B43740622B360&0
 - 2013070200000437&0
7. When it comes to finding the files accessed on it, I used the shellbags plugin on RegRipper to find that “secrets.zip” was used on the E drive (the USB).

File: C:\Users\Forensics User\Downloads\UsrClass.dat						
shellbags v.20200428 (USRCLASS.DAT) Shell/BagMRU traversal in Win7+ USRCLASS.DAT hives						
MRU Time	Modified	Accessed	Created	Zip_Subfolder	MFT File Ref	Resource
2014-11-03 14:15:11						Libraries [Desktop\0\]
2014-10-28 08:48:55						Libraries\CLSID_Documents Library [Desktop\0\0\]
and Restore Center [Desktop\1\0\0\]						Libraries\CLSID_Pictures [Desktop\0\1\]
2014-10-28 08:58:17 [Desktop\1\0\1\]						Control Panel [Desktop\1\]
						Control Panel\System and Security [Desktop\1\0\]
						Control Panel\System and Security\CLSID_Backup
						Control Panel\System and Security\CLSID_System
						My Computer [Desktop\2\]
						My Computer[C:\] [Desktop\2\0\]
						My Computer[E:\] [Desktop\2\1\]
						My Computer[E:\] [secrets.zip [8714] [Desktop\2\1\0\]
a.						
						Users [Desktop\3\]
						Users\CLSID_Downloads [Desktop\3\0\]
						Users\AppData [Desktop\3\1\]
						Users\AppData\Local [Desktop\3\1\0\]
						Users\AppData\Local\Microsoft [Desktop\3\1\0\0\]
						Users\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows [Desktop\3\1\0\0\0\]
						Users\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary
						Users\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary
						Users\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary
						Users\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary
						Users\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary
						Users\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary
						Users\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary
						Users\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary

8. Using PhotoRec filtering out PNG's and JPEGs on the DB Cooper hard drive, it yielded these 4 photos.




a.



b.




c.



d.

9. Using EventLog Explorer I was able to find out that the NETBIOS was initially changed to "WIN-FIVTROPSVJ3" and was subsequently changed to "DB_COOPERS_GOLD" Windows documentation pointed me to look for event ID 6011 which is there to log NETBIOS and DNS name changes.



a.

The screenshot shows the 'Event Properties' dialog box for Event ID 6011 from the Event Log. The 'General' tab is selected. The message text is: 'The NetBIOS name and DNS host name of this machine have been changed from WIN-FIVTROPSVJ3 to DB_COOPERS_GOLD.' Below the message, event details are listed:

Log Name:	System		
Source:	EventLog	Logged:	10/28/2014 4:10:19 AM
Event ID:	6011	Task Category:	None
Level:	Information	Keywords:	Classic
User:	N/A	Computer:	DB_Coopers_Gold_Machine
OpCode:			
More Information:	Event Log Online Help		


At the bottom left is a 'Copy' button, and at the bottom right is a 'Close' button.

b.

10. Within the security logs of the DB Cooper disk image, there were a handful of events within EventLog Explorer that indicated a time change. The biggest one is the time change from 11-14-2012 all the way to 11-3-2014. Just like the previous step, it was known (from a google search) that ID 4616 indicates a system time change so I knew what to look out for.

(i) Information	10/28/2014 12:27:38 AM	Microsoft Windows se...	4616 Security State Change
(i) Information	10/27/2014 10:34:39 PM	Microsoft Windows se...	4616 Security State Change
(i) Information	11/14/2012 8:23:34 AM	Microsoft Windows se...	4616 Security State Change
(i) Information	10/27/2014 10:34:39 PM	Microsoft Windows se...	4616 Security State Change
(i) Information	11/3/2014 8:26:52 AM	Microsoft Windows se...	4616 Security State Change
(i) Information	11/3/2014 8:24:07 AM	Microsoft Windows se...	4616 Security State Change
(i) Information	10/28/2014 3:44:12 AM	Microsoft Windows se...	4616 Security State Change
(i) Information	10/27/2014 10:34:39 PM	Microsoft Windows se...	4616 Security State Change
(i) Information	11/3/2014 8:25:43 AM	Microsoft Windows se...	4616 Security State Change
(i) Information	11/14/2012 8:23:34 AM	Microsoft Windows se...	4616 Security State Change
(i) Information	11/3/2014 8:24:07 AM	Microsoft Windows se...	4616 Security State Change
(i) Information	10/28/2014 12:31:26 AM	Microsoft Windows se...	4616 Security State Change
(i) Information	10/28/2014 12:29:22 AM	Microsoft Windows se...	4616 Security State Change
(i) Information	10/31/2014 11:49:11 AM	Microsoft Windows se...	4616 Security State Change

a.



b.

11. Loading up the DB Cooper Timeline CSV into Timeline Explorer, I can see that there are two recent files that have been opened using Wordpad, “check SystemVolumeInformation.docx” as well as another file called “Docx4j_GettingStarted.docx”

a. File1: [REG_SZ] C:\Users\DB Cooper\Documents\Docx4j_GettingStarted.docx

b. [REG_SZ] C:\Users\DB Cooper\AppData\Local\Temp\Temp1_secrets.zip\check SystemVolumeInformation.docx

12. Using the web search feature on Autopsy, I can see that DB Cooper made a multitude of different searches. Examples include: “how to shred documents with sdelete”, “where to hide in belize”, “downloading a virus via dropbox”

a.

Source Name	S	C	O	Domain	Text	Program Name	Date Accessed	Data Source
History				bing.com	chrome	Google Chrome	2014-11-03 08:20:28 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd
index.dat				google.com	how to shred documents with sdelete	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:30:23 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd
index.dat				google.com	where to hide in belize	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:29:54 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd
index.dat				google.com	dropbox.com	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:30:39 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd
index.dat				google.com	how to use truecrypt	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:29:44 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd
index.dat				google.com	where is db cooper now?	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:30:33 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd
index.dat				google.com	where to hide in belize	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:29:54 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd
index.dat				google.com	where is db cooper now?	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:30:33 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd
index.dat				bing.com	chrome	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:20:26 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd
index.dat				google.com	dropbox.com	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:30:39 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd
index.dat				google.com	how to shred documents with sdelete	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:30:23 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd
index.dat				google.com	how to use truecrypt	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:29:44 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd
index.dat				google.com	downloading a virus via dropbox	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:31:14 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd
index.dat				bing.com	chrome	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:20:26 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd
index.dat				google.com	where to hide in belize	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:29:54 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd
index.dat				google.com	where is db cooper now?	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:30:33 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd
index.dat				bing.com	chrome	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:20:26 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd
index.dat				google.com	dropbox.com	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:30:39 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmd

13. Using the Web Downloads section of Autopsy, I can see that there were a total of 4 files that were downloaded.

a.

Web Downloads								
Table Thumbnail Summary Save Table								
Source Name	S	C	O	Path	URL	Domain	Program Name	Created
usback[1].zip:Zone.Identifier				/Users/DB Cooper/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Tem...				2014-11-03 14:30:44 CST
usback.exe:Zone.Identifier				/Users/DB Cooper/AppData/Roaming/usback.exe				2014-11-03 14:30:44 CST
IMG_3573.JPG:Zone.Identifier				/Users/DB Cooper/Downloads/IMG_3573.JPG				2014-11-03 14:30:44 CST
recovery.exe:Zone.Identifier				/Windows/recovery.exe				2014-11-03 14:30:44 CST

14. Going through DB Cooper's search history, there is a specific search that DB Cooper made on Google titled "downloading a virus" as well as "downloading a virus via dropbox". Looking through the websites visited during the date (11-03-2014) and around the time of the google search you find that Cooper visited a forum called

bleepingcomputer.com. Here you find a listing titled "Virus: HEU_AEGISCS938 via Dropbox" speaking of a virus called HEU AEGISCS. This got me searching his downloads within Autopsy and I found that there were 4 total web downloads that Cooper made. Within all of them, two of them were made during the same day that all of these searches were made. They were both the same file downloaded twice called "usback.exe" and "usback.zip". It can be concluded that usback.exe is the virus due to this evidence.

Table Thumbnail Summary Save Table as CSV

Source Name	S	C	O	Domain	Text	Program Name	Date Accessed	Data Source
index.dat				google.com	how to use true	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:29:42 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk
index.dat				google.com	downloading a viru	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:31:10 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk
index.dat				google.com	ho	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:29:41 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk
index.dat				google.com	how to shre	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:30:17 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk
index.dat				google.com	downloading a virus v	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:31:11 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk
index.dat				google.com	how to shred doc	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:30:18 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk
index.dat				google.com	dropbox.com	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:30:38 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk

Hex Text Application Source File Metadata OS Account Data Artifacts Analysis Results Context Annotations Other Occurrences

Result: 577 of 629 Result ← → Web Search

Web Search

Term: downloading a virus v
 Time: 2014-11-03 14:31:11 CST
 Domain: google.com
 Program Name: Internet Explorer Analyzer

Source

Host: DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk_1 Host
 Data Source: DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk
 File: /img_DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk/vol_vol2/Users/DB Cooper/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Temporary Internet Files/Low/Content.IE5/index.dat

a.

b.

downloading a virus via dropbox

Web Images Videos News Shopping Maps Books

About 498,000 results

Any time

Past hour Past 24 hours Past week Past month Past year

All results

Verbatim

Phishers turn to **Dropbox** links as fresh bait for victims
www.welivesecurity.com/.../phishers-turn-dropbox-links-fresh-bait-victims/ ▾
Jun 3, 2014 to click on a Dropbox link to download a supposedly unpaid invoice are circulating ... Computer Business Review said that political groups were also using Dropbox links to distribute malware this week, ... ESET Virus Radar ...

Virus: HEU_AEGISCS938 via Dropbox - Virus, Trojan, Spyware, and ...
www.bleepingcomputer.com/.../virus-heu-aegiscs938-via-dropbox/ ▾
Virus: HEU_AEGISCS938 via Dropbox - posted in Virus, Trojan, ... Download DDS by sUBs from the following link if you no longer have it ...

Crooks Dump Malware on Victims through Dropbox Accounts, Hold ...

Displays file contents.

Virus: HEU_AEGISCS938 via Dropbox

Started by michelle012 , Sep 19 2014 04:13 PM

9 replies to this topic

michelle012

Posted 19 September 2014 - 04:13 PM

Hi,

First time posting. I'm using Windows 7. It seems that I've been infected with a virus "HEU_AEGISCS938" desktop Dropbox application. It was located in C:\Users\admin\AppData\Roaming\Dropbox\bin\Dropbox

Since then, I have uninstalled Dropbox, and ran a full scan on Trend Micro Titanium Security (clean). I Malwarebytes Anti-Malware because the program would freeze and force to close everytime I tried to also unable to download any form of media (eg. PDF, documents) to my computer. Chrome shows a message bottom: "Failed - Network error". This only started happening after the virus attack.

I am unable to download any new software because of 0 kb disc space in my C:/ drive. Sadly, this was

d.


Source Name	S	C	O	Path	URL	Domain	Program Name	Comment
usbback[1].zip:Zone.Identifier				/Users/DB Cooper/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Tem...				Internet Zone
usbback.exe:Zone.Identifier				/Users/DB Cooper/AppData/Roaming/usbback.exe				Internet Zone
IMG_3573.JPG:Zone.Identifier				/Users/DB Cooper/Downloads/IMG_3573.JPG				Internet Zone
recovery.exe:Zone.Identifier				/Windows/recovery.exe				Internet Zone

15. Yes there are. Within Autopsy, there is a section called “suspected encryption” that has a list of encrypted containers found within DB Cooper's laptop.

a.

Source Name	S	C	O	Source Type	Score	Conclusion	Configuration	Justification
win7_scenic-demoshort_raw.wtv		1		File	Likely Notable			Suspected encryption due to high entropy (7.63841)
XboxMCX-V.XEX		1		File	Likely Notable			Suspected encryption due to high entropy (7.99966)
AgGlFaultHistory.db		0		File	Likely Notable			Suspected encryption due to high entropy (7.91346)
AgGlFgAppHistory.db		0		File	Likely Notable			Suspected encryption due to high entropy (7.88810)
AgGlGlobalHistory.db		0		File	Likely Notable			Suspected encryption due to high entropy (7.89699)
data		0		File	Likely Notable			Suspected encryption due to high entropy (7.99998)
XboxMCX-V.XEX		1		File	Likely Notable			Suspected encryption due to high entropy (7.99996)
win7_scenic-demoshort_raw.wtv		1		File	Likely Notable			Suspected encryption due to high entropy (7.63841)

16. Using the Geolocation feature on autopsy, it finds a single image with metadata that is found in Belize. This tells us that DB Cooper is hiding somewhere in Belize. Also within DB Coopers' search history, you can see a query titled “where to hide in Belize” backing the idea that Cooper is somewhere in Belize.



Web Search

Table | Thumbnail | Summary | Save Table as

Source Name	S	C	O	Domain	Text	Program Name	Date Accessed	Data Source
History				bing.com	chrome	Google Chrome	2014-11-03 08:20:28 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk
index.dat				google.com	how to shred documents with sdelete	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:30:23 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk
index.dat				google.com	where to hide in belize	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:29:54 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk
index.dat				google.com	dropbox.com	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:30:39 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk
index.dat				google.com	how to use truecrypt	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:29:44 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk
index.dat				google.com	where is db cooper now?	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:30:33 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk
index.dat				google.com	where to hide in belize	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:29:54 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk
index.dat				google.com	where is db cooper now?	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:30:33 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk
index.dat				bing.com	chrome	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:20:26 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk
index.dat				google.com	dropbox.com	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:30:39 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk
index.dat				google.com	how to shred documents with sdelete	Internet Explorer Analyzer	2014-11-03 14:30:23 CST	DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk

Hex | Text | Application | Source File Metadata | OS Account | Data Artifacts | Analysis Results | Context | Annotations | Other Occurrences

Result: 25 of 28

Web S


Web Search

Term: where to hide in belize
 Time: 2014-11-03 14:29:54 CST
 Domain: google.com
 Program Name: Internet Explorer Analyzer

Source

Host: DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk_1 Host

- b.
17. There are a handful of deleted documents that were found loading DB Cooper's hard drive using ShadowExplorer. Below is what was found. The names of these deleted files were also found within the logs of sdelete.



a.

```

\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\15.TEXT-FILES.PPTX
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\A9-000-0013 REV 1.2-FSU_USER_MANUAL.PDF
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\ACTION PLAN (SAMPLE).PPTX
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\DAVE'S THESIS PROPOSAL TEMPLATE_MSW04.DOC
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\DOCX4J_GETTINGSTARTED.DOCX
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\DW USE CASE - ENVIRONMENTAL SAMPLE (EVENT).XLSX
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\EASYCHAIR.DOCX
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\EXCEL.XLS
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\FORENSIC_ULTRADOCK_V5_USER_MANUAL.PDF
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\IMRTEMPLATE.DOC
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\MXAGCRPROD.PPT
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\QTL_SAMPLE_DATA.XLS
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\SAMPLE - SUPERSTORE SALES (EXCEL).XLS
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\SAMPLE-SALES-DATA.XLS
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\SAMPLELETTERS.DOCX
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\TAIPEIKEYNOTE.PPT
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\TEXT FORMULA EXAMPLES.XLSX
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\TORRANCEUGA.PPT
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\UPN_TIMETABLE04132014.PDF
\DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\WORD.DOC
b. \DEVICE\HARDDISKVOLUME1\USERS\DB COOPER\DOCUMENTS\YAWCONLINESAMPLE.DOC

```

18. Checking DB Coopers search history, I can see that he made multiple Google searches on how to shred documents with one search stating “how to shred documents using sdelete” Checking the web downloads folder, there is one file named “recovery.exe” that was downloaded on 10-28-2014 which matches with the tip provided. When I navigate to Windows\recovery.exe you notice within the text of the file that it is actually sdelete and not recovery.exe. This tells us that Cooper most likely renamed the program to conceal the fact he was using sdelete. Finally, using the sysinternals plugin on RegRipper on the

ntuser.dat file from DB Cooper, it points out that sdelete is the scrubbing software used. By using ShadowExplorer, we can possibly get the deleted files back.

a.

Web Downloads

Source Name	S	C	O	Path	URL	Domain	Program Name	Comment
usbck[1].zip:Zone.Identifier				/Users/DB Cooper/AppData/Local/Microsoft/Windows/Tem...				Internet Zon...
usbck.exe:Zone.Identifier				/Users/DB Cooper/AppData/Roaming/usbck.exe				Internet Zon...
IMG_3573.JPG:Zone.Identifier				/Users/DB Cooper/Downloads/IMG_3573.JPG				Internet Zon...
recovery.exe:Zone.Identifier				/Windows/recovery.exe				Internet Zon...

Metadata

Name:	/img_DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk/vol_vol2/Windows/recovery.exe:Zone.Identifier
Type:	File System
MIME Type:	text/plain
Size:	26
File Name Allocation:	Allocated
Metadata Allocation:	Allocated
Modified:	2014-10-28 00:46:43 CDT
Accessed:	2014-10-28 00:47:22 CDT

b.

/img_DB_Cooper_Lab.vmdk/vol_vol2/Windows

Hex	Text	Application	Source File Metadata	OS Account	Data Artifacts	Analysis Results	Context	Annotations	Other Occurrences
Table	Thumbnail	Summary							

Hex Text Application File Metadata OS Account Data Artifacts Analysis Results Context Annotations Other Occurrences

Strings Indexed Text Translation

Page: 1 of 1 Page < > Matches on page: - of - Match < > 100% ⚡ + Reset Text Source: File Text

```

Error overwriting %s:
Error opening %s for delete:
Scanning file:
Error opening %s for compressed file scan:
%s...
%s %s
%s\*.*
Free space cleaned on %s
Cleaning MFT...%c

%sSDELMFT%0d
%s\$DELMFT%0d
%s\$DELTEMP1
%s\$DELTEMP1
Cleaning free space on %s: %d%%
Cleaning free space to securely delete compressed files: %d%%
Could not create free-space cleanup file:
%s\$DELTEMP
Your disk quota prevents you from zeroing free space on this drive.
Could not determine amount of free space:
%s\$DELTEMP
%TEMP%
kernel32.dll
GetDiskFreeSpaceExWCould not determine disk cluster size:
Zeroing free space on %s: 0%%
Zeroing free space to securely delete compressed files: 0%%
Cannot clean free space for UNC drive
||-||-|
Could not find RtlNtStatusToDosError entry point in NTDLL.DLL

```

```

File: C:\Users\Forensics User\Desktop\NTUSER.DAT

SysInternals
Software\SysInternals
LastWrite Time 2014-10-28 09:10:46Z
SDelete [2014-10-28 09:10:47Z]
EulaAccepted: 1

```

C.

19. Hidden within SystemVolumeInformation in Autopsy is a file called “checkpoint_docx”, within this file lies the password for the TrueCrypt v7 container which is “85458xskdrir”

checkpoint_docx	0	2014-10-31 10:43:01 CDT	2014-10-31 10:43:40 CDT	2014-10-31 11:47:05 CDT	2014-10-
tracking.log	0	2014-10-28 00:26:08 CDT	2014-10-28 00:26:08 CDT	2014-10-28 00:25:43 CDT	2014-10-
{3625fcb6-6364-11e4-8d89-000c29bbc3d}\{3808876b-	0	2012-11-14 08:23:51 CST	2012-11-14 08:23:51 CST	2014-11-03 08:19:03 CST	2014-11-
{3625fc2d-6364-11e4-8d89-000c29bbc3d}\{3808876b-	0	2012-11-14 08:23:51 CST	2012-11-14 08:23:51 CST	2012-11-14 08:23:51 CST	2012-11-
{3808876b-c176-4e48-b7ae-04046e6cc752}	0	2014-11-03 08:19:03 CST	2014-11-03 08:19:03 CST	2014-11-03 08:19:03 CST	2014-11-

Hex Text Application File Metadata OS Account Data Artifacts Analysis Results Context Annotations Other Occurrences

Strings Indexed Text Translation

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TrueCrypt Password for "data" vault is:
85458xskdrir

a.

20. Knowing that I now had the password to the “data” file, I downloaded it onto my computer and mounted it with TrueCrypt. Using the supplied password, I was able to successfully mount the data container and it revealed the pot of gold

