

Figure 1.2 Security Concepts and Relationships




Figure 1.4 Defense in Depth and Attack Surface

Chap 2




Figure 2.1 Simplified Model of Symmetric Encryption





Figure 2.2 Types of Symmetric Encryption




Figure 2.3 Message Authentication Using a Message Authentication Code (MAC)




Figure 2.5 Message Authentication Using a One-Way Hash Function





Figure 2.6 Public-Key Cryptography




Figure 2.9 Digital Envelopes




Figure 3.1 The NIST SP 800-63-3 E-Authentication Architectural Model






Figure 3.2 Multifactor Authentication



(a) Loading a new password



(b) Verifying a password

Figure 3.3 UNIX Password Scheme




Figure 3.6 Smart Card/Reader Exchange




Figure 3.7 User Authentication with eID







Figure 3.8 Cost Versus Accuracy of Various Biometric Characteristics in User Authentication Schemes



(a) Enrollment



(b) Verification



(c) Identification




Figure 3.10 Profiles of a Biometric Characteristic of an Imposter and an Authorized User In this depiction, the comparison between the presented feature and a reference feature is reduced to a single numeric value. If the input value (s) is greater than a preassigned threshold (t), a match is declared.





Figure 4.1 Relationship Among Access Control and Other Security Functions
Source: Based on [SAND94].

		OBJECTS			
		File 1	File 2	File 3	File 4
SUBJECTS	User A	Own Read Write		Own Read Write	
	User B	Read	Own Read Write	Write	Read
	User C	Read Write	Read		Own Read Write

(a) Access matrix



(b) Access control lists for files of part (a)

(c) Capability lists for files of part (a)

Figure 4.2 Example of Access Control Structures

		OBJECTS								
		Subjects			Files		Processes		Disk drives	
		S_1	S_2	S_3	F_1	F_2	P_1	P_2	D_1	D_2
SUBJECTS	S_1	control	owner	owner control	read*	read owner	wakeup	wakeup	seek	owner
	S_2		control		write*	execute			owner	seek*
	S_3			control		write	stop			

* = copy flag set

Figure 4.3 Extended Access Control Matrix






Figure 4.4 An Organization of the Access Control Function



(a) Traditional UNIX approach (minimal access control list)



(b) Extended access control list

Figure 4.5 UNIX File Access Control

		OBJECTS								
		R ₁	R ₂	R _n	F ₁	F ₂	P ₁	P ₂	D ₁	D ₂
ROLES	R ₁	control	owner	owner control	read *	read owner	wakeup	wakeup	seek	owner
	R ₂		control		write *	execute			owner	seek *
	•									
	•									
	R _n			control		write	stop			

Figure 4.7 Access Control Matrix Representation of RBAC




Figure 4.9 Example of Role Hierarchy






Figure 4.10 ABAC Scenario



(a) ACL Trust Chain



(b) ABAC Trust Chain

Figure 4.11 ACL and ABAC Trust Relationships




Figure 4.12 Identity, Credential, and Access Management (ICAM)




Figure 5.1 DBMS Architecture




Figure 5.5 Typical SQL Injection Attack




Figure 5.6 Bob Revokes Privilege from David




Figure 5.7 Indirect Information Access via Inference Channel




Figure 5.9 A Database Encryption Scheme




Figure 6.2 Worm Propagation Model




Figure 8.1 Profiles of Behavior of Intruders and Authorized Users




Figure 8.2 Architecture for Distributed Intrusion Detection




Figure 8.3 Agent Architecture








Figure 8.4 Passive NIDS Sensor

Source: Based on [CREM06].







(b) Packet filtering firewall



(c) Stateful inspection firewall



(d) Application proxy firewall



(e) Circuit-level proxy firewall




Figure 9.5 Placement of Malware Monitors

Source: Based on [SID105]. Sidioglou, S., and Keromytis, A. "Countering Network Worms Through Automatic Patch Generation," Columbia University, Figure 1, page 3, November-December 2005. <http://www1.cs.columbia.edu/~angelos/Papers/2005/j6ker3.pdf> IEEE.




Figure 14.1 Overview of IT Security Management




Figure 14.2 The Plan-Do-Check-Act Process Model

- Plan:** Establish security policy, objectives, processes, and procedures; perform risk assessment; develop risk treatment plan with appropriate selection of controls or acceptance of risk.
- Do:** Implement the risk treatment plan.
- Check:** Monitor and maintain the risk treatment plan.
- Act:** Maintain and improve the information security risk management process in response to incidents, review, or identified changes.




Figure 19.1 Intellectual Property Infringement




Figure 19.2 DRM Components




Figure 19.4 Common Criteria Privacy Class Decomposition




Figure 19.5 The Ethical Hierarchy