

## Task 6

Write a test to change behaviour of a locked pmp region using smepmp extension in spike (Smepmp task)

a. Pre-requisites

- Read RISCV privileged architecture spec for PMP
- Read about Smepmp extension

b. Write an assembly test.

- Start your test in M mode. Configure a locked pmp region for read, write and execute permissions.
- What two things happen when you configure a locked pmp region??
- Now, try to change permissions of that region to only read from read,write and execute. How it can be achieved using smepmp extension

### ➤ Solution:

#### Github Link:

[https://github.com/BilalAli10x/Riscv\\_Arch\\_Test/tree/main/BilalAli\\_Task6](https://github.com/BilalAli10x/Riscv_Arch_Test/tree/main/BilalAli_Task6)

## Test Description

This test verifies:

1. Behavior of a locked PMP region (L=1).
2. That locked PMP entries:
  - Become immutable.
  - Apply to M-mode.
3. How Smepmp (mseccfg.RLB) allows modification of locked PMP entries.
4. Runtime permission change from RWX -> Read-only.
5. Behavior difference:
  - With SMEPMP disabled
  - With SMEPMP enabled

The test runs on Spike and validates behavior using CSR readback and trap detection.

## Q): What Two Things Happen When PMP Region is Locked?

From Privileged Spec:

When L = 1 for a PMP entry:

### 1) Entry Becomes Immutable

- Writes to:
  - pmpcfgX
  - pmpaddrX
- Are ignored.
- The entry cannot be modified until reset.

### 2) Entry Applies to M-mode

Normally:

- PMP does NOT restrict M-mode.

But when L = 1:

- The region also applies to Machine mode.
- M-mode accesses are checked against that PMP entry.

This is explicitly defined in:

#### Privileged Spec – PMP Section 3.7.1 (Page no 60)

### Why Locked PMP Cannot Be Modified Normally

- **Without Smepmp:**  
    csrw pmpcfg0, new\_value
- **If entry has L=1:**  
    -> Write is silently ignored.
- **Readback:**  
    csrr t1, pmpcfg0  
    Will show old value.

### How Smepmp Solves This

From Smepmp extension:

- **The mseccfg CSR introduces:**  
    -> RLB (Rule Locking Bypass) Bit
- **If:**  
    mseccfg.RLB = 1
- **Then:**  
    Locked PMP entries may be modified.  
    Lock protection is bypassed.
- **BUT -> Important rule from spec:**  
    If any PMP entry has L=1 while RLB=0, then RLB becomes read-only 0.
- **So:**  
    -> RLB must be set **before locking behavior permanently blocks it.**

### Implementation Overview

#### Step 1: Configure PMP Regions

Two TOR regions configured:

Region	Mode	Permissions	Lock
0	TOR	RWX	0
1	TOR	RWX	1

### **Configuration written:**

- pmpcfg0 = 0x00008F0F
- **Region 1:**  
L=1, A=TOR, X=1, W=1, R=1

### **Step 2: Test Locked Region (Initial RWX)**

Operations performed in M-mode:

- Store -> Success
- Load -> Success
- Execute -> Success

Because region is RWX.

### **Step 3: Attempt to Change Locked Region to Read-Only**

New configuration attempted:

pmpcfg0 = 0x0000890F

**Region 1 becomes:**

Now behavior depends on SMEPMP.

#### **Case 1 – WITHOUT SMEPMP**

- (#define SMEPMP commented)
- (#define NO\_SMEPMP uncommented)

**Expected Behavior:**

- Write to locked PMP entry is ignored.
- Readback shows old configuration.
- RWX permissions remain active.
- No traps occur.

CSR Check in Code

- csrr t1, pmpcfg0
- beq t1, t4, fail\_cfg\_change

If configuration changed -> FAIL

Since it should NOT change.

#### **Access Results**

Operation	Result
Write	Success
Read	Success
Execute	Success

**Final Output:**

PASS (gp = 1)

### Spike Log Snapshot:

```
core 0: 0x80000078 (0x0054a423) sw      t0, 8($1)
core 0: 3 0x80000078 (0x0054a423) mem 0x80001008 0xdeadbeef
core 0: 0x8000007c (0x0084a283) lw      t0, 8($1)
core 0: 3 0x8000007c (0x0084a283) x5  0xdeadbeef mem 0x80001008
core 0: 0x80000080 (0x000480e7) jalr    s1
core 0: 3 0x80000080 (0x000480e7) x1  0x80000084
core 0: 0x80001000 (0x00000013) nop
core 0: 3 0x80001000 (0x00000013)
core 0: 0x80001004 (0x00008067) ret
core 0: 3 0x80001004 (0x00008067)
core 0: 0x80000084 (0x1240006f) j      pc + 0x124
core 0: 3 0x80000084 (0x1240006f)
core 0: 0x800001a8 (0x00100193) li      gp, 1
core 0: 3 0x800001a8 (0x00100193) x3  0x00000001
core 0: 0x800001ac (0x00002297) auipc   t0, 0x2
core 0: 3 0x800001ac (0x00002297) x5  0x800021ac
core 0: 0x800001b0 (0xe432aa23) sw      gp, -428($t0)
```

### Case 2 – WITH SMEPMP (#define SMEPMP enabled)

- (#define SMEPMP commented)
- (#define NO\_SMEPMP uncommented)

#### Before configuring PMP:

- li t0, (1 << 2)
- csrw msecfg, t0

#### This sets:

- msecfg.RLB = 1

#### What RLB Does

Rule Lock Bypass allows:

- Modification of locked PMP entries.

#### Expected Behavior

- Configuration change succeeds.
- Readback matches new value.
- Region becomes Read-only.
- Write and Execute cause traps.

## Access Results

Operation	Result
Write	Store Access Fault
Read	Success
Execute	Instruction Access Fault

### Trap handler confirms:

- mcause = 1 -> Instruction fault
- mcause = 7 -> Store fault

### Final Output

PASS (gp = 1)

### Spike Log Snapshot:

```
80  core  0: exception trap_store_access_fault, epc 0x80000080
81  core  0:           tval 0x80001008
82  core  0: >>>  trap_handler

109 core  0: exception trap_instruction_access_fault, epc 0x80001000
110 core  0:           tval 0x80001000
111 core  0: >>>  trap_handler
112 core  0: 0x80000100 (0x342022f3) csrr    t0, mcause
```

## Reference to Specification

RISC-V Privileged Architecture Specification

- **Section 3.1.15 - mcause**
  - Instruction page fault = 12
  - Load page fault = 13
  - Store/AMO page fault = 15
- **Section 3.7:PMP Section - Physical Memory Protection CSRs**
- **Section 3.7.1:PMP Section - Address matching and L-bit behavior**
- **SMEPMP Spec Chapter 2:** Proposal behavior of bit 2