

Lessons
Learned from
Okta

A Security-first Approach to Mitigating Identity Provider Risk





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Cast of Characters





Okta

- Identity & Access Management
- San Francisco, CA



Sitel/Sykes

- Managed Service Provider
- Miami, FL

LAPSUS\$

LAPSUS\$

- Threat Actor
- South American (Brazil?) based.



Okta's Published Timeline

- January 20, 2022
 - Okta Discovers Intrusion
- March 17, 2022
 - Okta receives report from Sitel indicating breach
- March 22, 2022
 - LAPSUS\$ shares screenshots online
 - Okta publishes blog announcing breach



Intrusion Timeline

Table 1 lists the major dates, associated events, and the applicable attack phase for the intrusion. All timestamps in this report are in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), unless otherwise noted. For a detailed description of each attack phase, refer to **Appendix A: Targeted Attack Lifecycle**.

Date (UTC)	Event	Attack Phase Initial Compromise		
2022-01-16 00:33:23	First logon event from [SYSTEM NAME REDACTED]. Logon to [SYSTEM NAME REDACTED] from [SYSTEM NAME REDACTED] (10.112.137.64)			
2022-01-19 19:19:47	RDP logon by [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED] from LOCAL to [SYSTEM NAME REDACTED]	Initial Compromise		
2022-01-19 19:45:39	Bing search for Privilege escalation tools on Github by [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]	Escalate Privileges		
2022-01 19:47:58	UserProfileSvcEop.exe downloaded from hxxps://github.com by [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]	Escalate Privileges		
2022-01-20 18:31:19	Account [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED] created on [SYSTEM NAME REDACTED]	Maintain Presence		
2022-01-20 18:32:32	8:32:32 RDP logon by [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED] from LOCAL to [SYSTEM NAME REDACTED]			
2022-01-20 18:39:43	Bing search for Process Explorer by [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]	Internal Recon		
2022-01-20 18:40:04	Process Explorer executed by [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]	Internal Recon		
2022-01-20 18:43:51	Bing search for Process Hacker by [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]	Establish Foothold		
2022-01-20 18:44:01	Process Hacker downloaded from hxxps://github.com by [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]	Establish Foothold		
2022-01-20 18:44:17	Process Hacker execution by [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]	Establish Foothold		
2022-01-20 18:46:22	FireEye Endpoint Agent service terminated on [SYSTEM NAME REDACTED]	Establish Foothold		
2022-01-20 18:46:55	Bing search for Mimikatz by [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]	Escalate Privileges		
2022-01-20 18:48:28	Mimikatz downloaded from hxxps://github.com by [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]	Escalate Privileges		
2022-01-20 18:50:10	Mimikatz executed by [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED] on [SYSTEM NAME REDACTED]	Escalate Privileges		
2022-01-20 18:55:29	C:\Windows\System3Z\sam.hiv created on [SYSTEM NAME REDACTED]			
2022-01-20 18:55:41	C:\sam.hiv created on [SYSTEM NAME REDACTED]	Escalate Privileges		


2022-01-20 18:56:00	C:\system.hiv created on [SYSTEM NAME REDACTED]	Escalate Privileges		
2022-01-20 18:57:17	C:\Users\[ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]\Documents\mimikatz_trunk\x64\hash.txt	Escalate Privileges		
2022-01-20 18:58:05	hxxps://pastebin.com//E30i24r by [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]	Escalate Privileges		
2022-01-20 19:06:43	RDP logon by [SYSTEM NAME REDACTED]\[ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]	Move Laterally		
2022-01-20 19:53:31	Bing search for Process Hacker by [SYSTEM NAME REDACTED]\[ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]	Establish Foothold		
2022-01-20 19:55:37	Process Hacker downloaded from hxxps://objects.githubusercontent.com	Establish Foothold		
2022-01-20 19:55:58	Bing search for Mimikatz by [SYSTEM NAME REDACTED]\[ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]	Escalate Privileges		
2022-01-20 19:57:07	Mimikatz downloaded from hxxps://github.com by [SYSTEM NAME REDACTED]\[ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]	Escalate Privileges		
2022-01-20 20:58:31	20:58:31 RDP disconnect from [SYSTEM NAME REDACTED] by [SYSTEM NAME REDACTED]\[ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]			
2022-01-20 23:02:41	First malicious logon by [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]@sykes[.]com to O365	Initial Compromise		
2022-01-21 00:05:15	[ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]@sykes[.]com accessed hxxps://[INTERNAL URL REDACTED]/personal/[INTERNAL USER NAME REDACTED]/Documents/Projects/ryk/DomAdmins-LastPass.xlsx via SecureLink	Internal Recon		
2022-01-21 05:29:50	[ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED] account created by [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]@sykes[.]com	Maintain Presence		
2022-01-21 05:29:51	1 05:29:51 [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED] added to TenantAdmins group by [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]@sykes[.]com			
2022-01-21 05:39:13	Malicious Email Transport rule to forward to BCC all mail to the accounts [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]@sykes[.]com and [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]	Establish Foothold		
2022-01-21 14:11:38	Last malicious logon by [ACCOUNT NAME REDACTED]@sykes[.]com to O365	Complete Mission		


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



LAPSUS\$ PR


- Uses Telegram
 instead of dark web
 (.onion) sites
- Posts news and updates
- Bit-torrents to data dumps

















Immediate actions if you suspect your IdP is compromised.



Check your logs

- New MFA devices or changes
- MFA configuration changes
- Identity Provider (IdP) configuration changes
- Password and MFA reset attempts
- Permission and role changes and the creation of new users.

Okta-specific configurations

user.account.reset_password

user.mfa.factor.update

system.mfa.factor.deactivate

user.mfa.attempt_bypass


user.session.impersonation.initiate



severity event		event_type display_message		timestamp outcome.resul		t outcome.reason	actor.id
	INFO	user.mfa.factor.deactivate	e Reset factor for user	2022-03-	.836Z SUCCESS	User reset OKTA_SOFT_TOKEN factor	r 00ucbibecr
	INFO	user.mfa.factor.deactivate	e Reset factor for user	2022-02-	.078Z SUCCESS	User reset DUO_SECURITY factor	00uj5svjyiG
	INFO	user.mfa.factor.deactivate	e Reset factor for user	2022-01-	.681Z SUCCESS	User reset OKTA_SOFT_TOKEN factor	r 00ulgn3d1a
	INFO	user.mfa.factor.deactivate	e Reset factor for user	2021-10-	.616Z SUCCESS	User reset OKTA_SOFT_TOKEN factor	r 00ui8yhlfm
	INFO	user.mfa.factor.deactivate	e Reset factor for user	2021-10-	.153Z SUCCESS	User reset OKTA_SOFT_TOKEN factor	r 00ujqcxvey




Confirm your AD integrations






Review your directory sources



Look for advanced attack methods





Verify your apps



cy berark.com


Implement Least Privilege

- Just-in-Time
- Dynamic elevation capabilities
- MFA Policies



Rotate credentials


- Rotate <u>ALL</u> privileged accounts
- Strong Credentials
 - Complex
 - Unique
 - Frequently changing






Restrict Access

- Specific managed devices
- Management subnets
- Privileged Access
 Management (PAM) solutions






Multi-layered approach to Identity Security



Key Takeaways



Six actions for success in Identity Security





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Evaluate your IT landscape and existing controls



Prioritize access controls to Tier-0 infrastructure and high-risk applications



Understand how defense-in-depth can close security gaps and provide additional assurances





More Information

- Visit Okta-LAPSUS\$ resources page
- Contact CyberArk remediation services
- Sign-up for our defense-in-depth webinar



