

The Anatomy of the MGM Hack

A CyberArk Labs Perspective

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BLEEPINGCOMPUTER

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MGM Resorts is back online after a huge cyberattack. The hack might have cost the Vegas casino operator \$80 million.

AP

Will Gendron, Associated Press Sep 21, 2023, 4:12 PM CDT



MGM casino's ESXi servers allegedly encrypted in ransomware attack

By lonut llascu September 14, 2023 Ø 06:52 P

'Cybersecurity Issue' Forces Systems Shutdown at MGM Hotels and Casinos



websites were down, and some guests complained of with slot machines and hotel room access.

urity experts point to a likely cyberattack.



MGM Resorts International

NYSE: MGM

- Hospitality & entertainment company.
 - -Gaming, dining, entertainment, hotels & more.
- Headquartered in Las Vegas, Nevada.
 - -lconic resorts & casinos worldwide.



Scattered Spider

UNC3944, Scatter Swine, Muddled Libra, Storm-0875

- Founded in May 2022.
- Common tactics:
 - SIM swap
 - Multi-factor bypass/fatigue
 - SMS/Telegram phishing
- Deep understanding of Azure, AWS, and GCP





AlphV/Blackcat

- Founded in 2020.
- •Ransomware as a Service (RaaS) operator.
- Fast & thorough.



WhitePhoenix



-o MGM Attack Flow (September 2023)

 Gather intelligence about MGM and its employees







Open-Source Intelligence (OSINT)

- Publicly available information.
- Nothing new.
- OSINT is a tool.
- OSINT is a weapon.





Exhibit A: Dorks.

"Marcus Hutchins" filetype:pdf site:justice.gov





O MGM Attack Flow (September 2023)

1. Gather intelligence about MGM and its employees





Choose targeted victims over LinkedIn, who probably have high privilege in the Okta systems





Exhibit B: Social Media







O MGM Attack Flow (September 2023)

1. Gather intelligence about MGM and its employees



Choose targeted victims over LinkedIn, who probably have high privilege in the Okta systems





- 3. Perform Vishing (voice phishing) attack:
 - i. Contact the MGM's IT Desk
 - ii. Impersonate a privileged victim
 - iii. Get IT to reset the MFA of the victim user



Social Engineering & Vishing

- Psychological manipulation.
- Vishing the helpdesk.
- Bypass MFA.
- Admin access to IAM.





O MGM Attack Flow (September 2023)

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Domain Admins on the DCs



Admins on the Okta syncing servers

Global Administrator in Azure



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6. Encrypt 100 ESXi servers and disrupt all the VMs and services that run on top of them



Compromised Okta Super Administrator and then more admins



Admins on the Okta syncing servers

Global Administrator in Azure

Domain Admins

on the DCs

Exfiltrate sensitive data from the network



O Security Failures



Potential Security Failures

- Password reuse & credential harvesting
- Social engineering.
- Limited visibility and control over privileged access.



Potential Security Failures

- Insecure configurations.
 - -Credential syncing.
 - -Inbound federation.
- Detection & response.





Effective security measures and best practices.



3 Critical Security Improvements

- Contain the impact
 - PAM & ZSP are vital starting points
- Increase MFA control points and scan for events
 - Establish dual control and stricter processes
- Endpoint security on all systems
 - Prevent the ransomware attack



IDP Best Practices

- MFA everywhere, especially on admin actions
- Enforce Helpdesk Verification methods
- Verify device enrollment and compliance
- Identify secure zones to reduce entry points
- Closely manage IDP Admin Accounts
- Monitor trust and admin changes



-O Thank you

