CYBER ATTACKEDEFEND SERIES MAJOR BREACH EDITION

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We promote hacking, but do not promote CRIME! We are documenting the ways criminals steal and perform their nefarious acts, so you can defend yourself and your organization.







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- Global Research Evangelist
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- GPEN Pen-tester
- Dallas Hacker
- Travel-Hacker







- There is **no** silver bullet.
- CYBR will buy invaluable time.
- Detecting attacks earlier.
- Preventing attackers from theft or disruption.


MAJOR BREACH EDITION

Each section will include:

- Case Study.
- Attack Demo.
- CYBR Response.







CASE STUDY

- Attempted theft of \$951 million
 - \$851 million flagged by NY Fed
 - \$20 million to Sri Lanka
 - \$80 to the Philippines

- US\$63 million stolen.
 - · Largest bank heist ever.







- Adversary compromised initial system.
 - Elevated permission to Domain Admin.
- Executed Golden Ticket Attack.
- Pivot to Swift network segment.
 - Processed fraudulent transactions.

RECORDED ATTACK DEMO








- Prevent the initial compromise with Endpoint Privilege Manager.
- Detect anomalous behavior & alerting with Privilege Threat Analytics.
- Protect the privileged credentials through credential boundaries and Privileged Session Management.


ATTACK SURFACE REDUCTION


- Reduce surface area by removing/disabling unused or unnecessary applications and service principals.
- Reduce permissions on applications and service principals, especially application permissions.
- Reduce the number of users that are members of highly privileged Directory Roles, like Global Administrator, Application Administrator, and Cloud Application Administrator.



ATTACK & DEFEND

ROLE-BASED ACCESS CONTROL







LARGE FINANCIAL

INSTITUTION


[NAME REDACTED]





- 140,000 US Social Security Numbers
- 1,000,000 Canadian Social Insurance Numbers
- 80,000 bank account numbers
- Customer Information
 - Names
 - Addresses
 - Credit Scores
 - Bank Balances
 - And more!

CAPITAL ONE DATA BREACH



PART ONE


- 1. Attacker's IP address allowed to connect. (Firewall misconfiguration)
- 2. Exploit SSRF vulnerability of NGINX.
- 3. Access EC2 instance metadata.

PART TWO


- Assumed Role *****-WAF-Role (Role Permission Misconfiguration)
- 2. Execute Commands:
 - ListBucket:
 This permission shouldn't be allowed for the WAF-Role
 - SyncBucket

 Last execution for that Role > 7 months.

RECORDED ATTACK DEMO



CAPITAL ONE DATA BREACH



- 1. Attacker's IP address allowed to connect (Firewall misconfiguration)
- 2. Assumed Role *****-WAF-Role (Role Permission Misconfiguration)
- 3. Execute Commands:
 - ListBucket: This permission shouldn't be allowed for the WAF-Role
 - SyncBucket
 Last execution for that Role > 7 months.

CyberArk can:

- Detect and Alert on excessive permission of the WAF-Role
- Clean up unused permissions
- Apply Least Privilege
- Block the attack early
- With ZERO footprint and 5-minute setup.



HOW CAN CYBERARK HELP?

- RBAC to AWS
 - Reduces attack surface and easier management of roles.
- Detection and onboarding with Privilege Threat Analytics
 - AWS integration and management with EPV/PSM
- Cloud Entitlements Manager



CLOUD ENTITLEMENT MANAGER

CEM a SaaS solution that reduces risk by implementing the Principle of Least Privilege in multi-cloud environments.


CEM centralizes visibility and control of permissions across an organization's cloud estate.

By:

- Analyzing granted permissions.
- Identifying unused and excessive permissions.
- Modeling exposure level.
- Actionable recommendations.
- Deployable remediations.



RECORDED DEFENSE DEMO











Solar Winds

- Dec 8th, FireEye breach. Red Team tools leaked.
- SolarWinds Orion was the initial foot-hold.
- Attribution points to APT.





RECORDED ATTACK DEMO

Staging the update





- Endpoint protection to prevent the initial foothold.
- Credential Harvesting protection to protect the cred-store.
- Privilege Session Management to prevent lateral movement to Tier 0 assets.
- Privilege Threat Analytics to detect unauthorized behavior.

RECORDED DEFENSE DEMO

```
Activating dns spoot plugin...
etDownLoa dns spoof: A [notepad-plus.sourceforge.net] spoofed to [10.0.0.4] TTL [3600 s]
          3: Terminal >
          msf6 exploit(multi/handler) > sessions -i 1
arsing: "
          [*] Starting interaction with 1...
L<%RND1%>
n>\n</GUP
          meterpreter > lpwd
          /home/u213/Downloads
          meterpreter > lcd ../Documents
          meterpreter > lls
          Listing Local: /home/u213/Documents
                           Size Type Last modified
          Mode
                                                                   Name
                                  dir 2021-03-02 15:57:26 -0600 Attacks
          40755/rwxr-xr-x 64
 exe HTT
          100644/rw-r--r-- 31744 fil 2021-03-02 15:19:10 -0600 SolarFlare.exe
         # 100644/rw-r--r-- 112 fil 2021-02-25 11:53:36 -0600 evilgrade listener.rc
          100644/rw-r--r-- 14572 fil 2021-03-02 16:18:12 -0600 sf.txt
exe"
          meterpreter >
"./agent
```

ATTACK & DEFEND







Adult Friend Finder


- October 18, 2016, "1x0123", warned AFF Local File Inclusion (LFI) vulnerabilities on Twitter and posted screenshots as proof.
- 412 million user accounts have been exposed thanks to AdultFriendFinder Networks being hacked.
 - The breach included 20 years of historical customer data from six compromised databases:





- Path of the file is sent to a function which returns the content of the file as a string, or prints it on the current web page.
 - https://example.com/?download=brochure.pdf
- Path is changed to return an unintended file.
 - https://example.com/?download=../include/connection.php

RECORDED ATTACK DEMO








- Little CYBR could do to prevent LFI.
- Save the file paths in a database and assign an ID to each of them.
 BY doing so users can only see the ID and are not able to view or change the path.
- Use a whitelist of files and ignore every other filename and path.
- Instead of including files on the web server, store their content in databases where possible.
- Protect credentials with STRONG password management.
 - Complex
 - Unique
 - Frequently Rotating

RECORDED DEFENSE DEMO





OLDSMAR FLORIDA WATER TREATMENT FACILITY





Oldsmar Florida


- First North American Hack where infrastructure was compromised.
- Feb 8th, 2021
- Accessed water treatment system remotely.
- Increased sodium hydroxide levels be a factor of more than 100x (FATAL).
- Plant operator quickly noticed the intrusion, reversed it, and no one was harmed.





- Running Windows 7
 (no longer supported and no security updates)
- Remote access tool TeamViewer.
 - Same password for all systems.
 - No longer used, but never uninstalled

RECORDED ATTACK DEMO








Florida water hack was "very likely" the work of "a disgruntled employee" @C_C_Krebs says at a House Homeland Security hearing





- Disconnect ICS/SCADA systems from the internet.
- Run up to date and patched systems.
- Make passwords:
 - Unique
 - Complex
 - Frequently changing
- Use SECURE remote access software.

RECORDED DEFENSE DEMO







CROSS PROMOTION SLIDES











