



CYBERARK®

PROTECTING YOUR ENTERPRISE FROM CORPORATE ESPIONAGE: KEEPING INSIDER THREATS OUTSIDE

June 2018

30%








```
09-18 * * * * /home/dbadmin/check-db-status
#5 1 * * 6 /home/backupadmin/full_backup
#0 1 * * * /home/backupadmin/incremental_backup
23 2 5 5 * /opt/bin/prod/SCREW_YOU_GREG.sh > /dev/null
* * 4 20 /sbin/ping -c 1 192.168.0.1 > /dev/null
0 8 * * 1 /home/reports/weeklyreporting.sh
00 09-18 * * * /home/ramesh/bin/check-db-status
```





Andy Thompson

- National Manager Customer Success CyberArk Software
- B.S. MIS – University of Texas at Arlington
- COMPTIA A+ & Sec+
- (ISC)2 SSCP & CISSP
- GIAC – Certified Penetration Tester (GPEN)
- SANS Advisory Board Member & Mentor
- Member of Shadow Systems Hacker Collective
- Member of Dallas Hackers Association
- Scared of Earthquakes and Snow-Skiing




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
UNIVERSITY OF
TEXAS
ARLINGTON






THE REAL TRAVEL HACKER







AGENDA

- Historical cases.
- Profile of a malicious insider & attack flow.
- Defense strategy
 - Malicious Insider Kill-Chain
 - Technical Controls
- Insider Threat Pro-Tips





CORPORATE ESPIONAGE & INSIDER THREATS

CASE STUDY


IBM VS HITACHI

CONFIDENTIAL



- 1983
- Stolen Proprietary Data
 - FOR INTERNAL IBM USE ONLY
- Settled Out of court \$300 Million.





CADENCE DESIGN

VS

AVANT!



- Stolen Source Code
- Criminal case filed.
 - Restitution of \$200 million.
- Civil Case filed.
 - \$265 million in restitution.

cādēn̄ce

THE INSIDER THREAT



Georgia-Pacific


- Brian Johnson, former Systems Administrator
- Fired. And then...
 - Logged in via VPN from home.
 - Caused over \$1 mil in damages to Industrial control systems.
- Sentenced to 3 years in jail.
- Ordered to repay \$1,134,818 in damages.



THE INSIDER THREAT



- Michael Leeper, Senior Director of Technology Infrastructure
- 2 Backdoors
 - Accessed over 700 times over 2 years
 - Repeatedly accessed the emails of Columbia Sportswear senior executives
 - Stole relevant data to Denali.
- 3 Years probation + 400 hours community service.







- Jan 2016 - Anthony Levandowski abruptly leaves Waymo (Google) and starts Otto.
- Otto almost immediately acquired by Uber for \$700 mil.
- Lawsuit claims Levandowski stole confidential trade secrets from Google.
- Feb 9th, 2018 – Waymo receives at least .34 percent stake in Uber (**~\$245 million**)
 - Uber will not use any of Google's intellectual property in its own self-driving efforts.



ESPIONAGE & MALICIOUS INSIDERS

THE FED.




FOUR TYPES OF DAMAGE



- IT Sabotage
- Theft or modification for financial gain
- Theft of modification for business advantage
- Miscellaneous

BREAKDOWN BY CATEGORY




INTERESTING STATS ON SYSADMIN MOTIVATION

- Only **1.5%** of espionage cases use sysadmin privileges for financial gain or business advantage.
- **90%** of IT sabotage cases use sysadmin privileges.



THE MALICIOUS INSIDER



US CERT - DEFINITION OF “MALICIOUS INSIDER”

- A current or former employee, contractor, or business partner who:
 - Has or had authorized access to an organization's network, system, or data and
 - Intentionally exceeded or misused that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the organization's information or information systems.



US-CERT

UNITED STATES COMPUTER EMERGENCY READINESS TEAM

**36% of surveyed companies have experienced
security incidents involving malicious
employees in the past 12 months.**

-Imperva 2016

4 TYPES OF MALICIOUS INSIDER

- Compromised actors
- Negligent actors
- Malicious insiders
- Tech savvy actors




PROFILE OF A MALICIOUS INSIDER

- Inability to assume responsibility for their actions
- Intolerance of criticism
- Self-perceived value exceeds performance
- Lack of empathy
- Predisposition towards law enforcement
- Pattern of frustration and disappointment
- History of managing crises ineffectively.
- Introversion
- Greed/financial need
- Vulnerability to blackmail
- Compulsive and destructive behavior
- Rebellious, passive aggressive
- Ethical “flexibility”
- Reduced loyalty
- Entitlement – narcissism (ego/self-image)
- Minimizing their mistakes or faults

DATA LOSS – “THE PATH OF PAIN”

1. Reconnaissance
2. Circumvention
3. Aggregation
4. Obfuscation
5. Exfiltration




STEP ONE: RECONNAISSANCE BEHAVIOR



- Accessing a new or unusual location in a document repository.
- An unusual increase in error or access denied messages.
- Failed attempts to mount USB devices and access external websites.
- Unusually rapid rate of opening files in a short period of time.
- Network scanning and use of network tools.
- Running applications that they've never run before — especially hacking applications.

STEP TWO: CIRCUMVENTION BEHAVIOR



- Use of tools like TOR, VPNs and proxy servers to engage in untraceable internet activity.
- File transfers through instant messaging, to evade DLP restrictions.
- Sharing information online, whether it be through copy/paste sites like PasteBin, communities like Reddit, or social networks like Facebook or LinkedIn.
- Disabling or bypassing security software, or researching how to do so.




PASTEBIN



LinkedIn

STEP THREE: AGGREGATION BEHAVIOR


- Unusual amounts of file copies, movements, and deletions.
- Unusual amounts of file activity in high-risk locations and sensitive file types.
- Unusual creation of files that are all exactly the same size.
- Saving files to an usual location on a user's endpoint.



STEP FOUR: OBFUSCATION BEHAVIOR



- Unusual rates of file renaming, especially to a different file type.
- Unusual rates and sizes of file compression.
- Clearing cookies and event viewer logs, or unusual use of browser “stealth” settings like Chrome’s Incognito mode.
- Hiding sensitive information in image, video, or other misleading file types.






STEP FIVE: EXFILTRATION





HOW TO DEFEND

NOT A “CYBER SECURITY” ISSUE ALONE.



- Policies & Procedures
- Regular scheduled training
- Prevent at hiring process
- HR anticipating negative workplace issues
- Focus on deterrence not just detection.
 - Can't detect outliers if P&P's don't exist.





OBSERVABLE VS CYBER ACTIONS



TECHNICAL CONTROLS

TECHNICAL CONTROLS

- DLP solutions.
- Deactivate computer access following termination.
- Separation of duties.
- Least Privilege.
 - Application control.
- Encryption.


TECHNICAL CONTROLS (CONTINUED)



- Consider Threats from SLDC.
 - Visibility into Change Control.
- **Secure** backup/recovery.
- Strong Password Management.
- Logging & auditing of privileged actions.
- SIEM – behavioral analytics.

DATA LOSS PREVENTION (DLP)

- Excellent for preventing data exfiltration.
 - Hard to implement successfully.
 - ProTip: Identify and classify data before deploying DLP
- DLP is not an access control system and not be seen as a replacement to one.
- Systems still vulnerable to sabotage



DEACTIVATE ACCESS

- Remove privileged access as soon as notice is tendered.
- D/C immediately upon termination.
 - No Exceptions!
- Use Functional Account Model.






FUNCTIONAL ACCOUNT MODEL




5 Privileged Accounts



1 Privileged Account

LEAST PRIVILEGE & APPLICATION CONTROL

- Prevents users from exceeding boundaries.
 - Malicious
 - Accidental
- Prevents malicious software installation.
- Prevents malicious activities.




ENCRYPTION

- Good in a defense in depth strategy.
 - Not so much with espionage & malicious insiders
- Authorized users bypass the control...by design.
- Malicious insiders can siphon off to non-encrypted media.
- Story Time with Phineas Fisher...



INSIDER THREAT IN THE SDLC

- Not all attacks start in Prod.
- Logic bombs lay dormant...
 - Until the “perfect” time.
- Solutions:
 - Code review
 - Integrity monitoring
 - Change control



SECURE BACKUP & RECOVERY

- Backups are sensitive to attack.
- Offsite & disconnected
- Availability is a target.
- Solution:
 - DR Tests
 - Integrity checks
 - Full backups
 - And Incrementals too!



PRIVILEGED ACCESS MANAGEMENT

- Discover & Manage
 - Complex
 - Frequently Changing
 - Unique
- Single Conduit for Privileged Accounts.
- Limit an attacker's window & scope of attack opportunity.



```
3IWJF039J0J 90FJ 90 J3WJFO JD3J2JSI J1J09 1W WU98JDYDS98DDIXDJ
903KD20KOIS AS0DKW1 -1KWKSKD90QJDAKDK 1W D 1WDJ 90J 1W 1WJ 290
E920FJ10 M WCIDIW 10IJCT02JE 2 DC9UND 2 JCJ I CJSI J 092 90U W9 19WY 98Y2
ADW20SW JD D 2EH 2 W HH9 819 E18972917846 R 2 TY 4 WY 9D9M9S
FJSIEFI329 238 23 8239F9823HU FJWKM03 IOWH3DU WQ3I INQ JINI N3
3IWJF039J0J 90FJ 90 J3WJFO JD3J2JSI J1J09 1W W U98JDYDS98DDIXDJ
903KD20KOIS AS0DKW1 -1KWKSKD90QJDAKDK 1W D 1WDJ 90J 1W 1WJ
IWI 290 1W 1W
E920FJ10 M WCIDIW 10IJCT02JE 2 DC9UND 2 JCJ I CJSI J 092 90U W9 19WY 98Y2
FJSIEFI329 238 23 8239F9823HU FJWKM03 IOWH3DU WQ3I INQ JINI N3
3IWJF039J0J 90FJ 90 J3WJFO JD3J2JSI J1J09 1W W U98JDYDS98DDIXDJ
903K D20KOIS A 1W D 1WDJ 90J 1W 1WJ
KD90QJDAKDK 1W D 1WDJ 90J 1W 1WJ S0DKW1 -1KW 290
0FJ10 M WCIDIW 10IJCT02JE 2 DC9UND 2 JCJ I CJSI J 092 90U W9 19WY 98Y2
23 8239F9823HU FJWKM03 IOWH3DU WQ3I INQ JINI N3
3IWJF039J0J 90FJ 90 J3WJFO JD3J2JSI J1J09 1W W U98JDYDS98DDIXDJ
903KD20KOIS AS0DKW1 -1KWKSKD90QJDAKDK 1W D 1WDJ 90J 1W 1WJ
IWI 290 1W 1W
WCIDIW 10IJCT02JE 2 DC9UND 2 JCJ I CJSI J 092 90U W9 19WY 98Y2
FJSIEFI329 238 23 8239F9823HU FJWKM03 IOWH3DU WQ3I INQ JINI N3
3IWJF039J0J 90FJ 90 J3WJFO JD3J2JSI J1J09 1W W U98JDYDS98DDIXDJ
0 M WCIDIW 10IJCT02JE 2 DC9UND 2 JCJ I CJSI J 092 90U W9 19WY 98Y2
```

The text above is a grid of random characters and numbers, likely representing a password or a log entry. It includes several highlighted sections: "username", "admin", "password", and a large block of asterisks (***) in the center.

LOGGING, MONITORING, & AUDITING



- Centralized logging to prevent log tampering.
- Gain visibility into the session itself.
 - Not just metadata.
- Can assist with recovering from sabotage



KNOW YOUR PEOPLE




SIEMS, ANALYTICS & HEURISTIC DETECTION

- Suspected credential theft.
- Unmanaged privileged access.
- Access via irregular hours.
- Access from irregular IP's.
- Active vs dormant users.
- Anomalous access to multiple machines.
- Suspicious activities detected in privileged sessions.




LOOK FOR OUTLIERS IN BEHAVIORAL ANALYTICS




- Detect malicious privileged user behavior.
- Compare current activity to user and entity profiles.
- Patented CyberArk analytic technology detects and alerts on malicious behavior.
- Reduces the attacker's window of opportunity.
- One solution to detect both advanced external and insider threats.

EXHIBIT A: TIME OF DAY. CRITICAL INDICATOR

- "...we were able to identify their working hours. Here is the average working hours for a week (the hour on the graph is UTC+1): Figure 1: Attackers working hours generally, the attackers worked between 2AM and 10AM from Monday to Saturday included."
- The attacks came during the day in China, which is after hours in Europe and the US



ACTIVITIES DURING IRREGULAR HOURS



INSIDER THREAT: PRO-TIPS




- Look for Resume.doc
- Monitor frequent web traffic to:
 - LinkedIn
 - Monster.com, Jobs.com, etc
 - Pastebin, data dump sites
 - Competitors
- Pay close attention to disenfranchised employees
 - Passed over for promotion
 - Low performance evaluations
 - Recent HR events



PASTEBIN



A ROBUST INSIDER THREAT PROGRAM





CONCLUSION

- Your organization's greatest asset is also it's greatest threat.
- “It takes a village...”
- Technical Controls provide layers of security.
- Takeaways of things to monitor against.





QUESTIONS?