NINA ROUSSILLE

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BUSINESS ADDRESS:
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DESIRED RESEARCH AND TEACHING FIELDS:

PRIMARY	SECONDARY
Labor Economics	Personnel Economics
Public Economics	

FIELDS OF CONCENTRATION:
    Labor Economics, Public Economics

DISSERTATION TITLE: "Essays in Labor Economics"

Expected Date of Completion: May 2021
Principal Advisor: Professor Patrick Kline
Other References: Professors Hilary Hoynes and Gabriel Zucman

PRE-DOCTORAL STUDIES:

	DEGREE	DATE	FIELD
Polytechnique and Paris School of Economics	M.A.	2015	Economics
Université Paris Dauphine	B.A.	2012	Economics

WORKING PAPERS:

- **The Central Role Of The Ask Gap In Gender Pay Inequality (JMP)**

  Abstract: The gender ask gap measures the extent to which women ask for lower salaries than comparable men. This paper studies the role of the ask gap in generating wage inequality, using novel data from Hired.com, an online recruitment platform for full-time engineering jobs in the United States. To use the platform, job candidates must post an ask salary, stating how much they want to make in their next job. Firms then apply to candidates by offering them a bid salary, solely based on the candidate's resume and ask salary. If the candidate is hired, a final salary is recorded. After adjusting for resume characteristics, the ask gap is 3.3%, the gap in bid salaries is 2.4%, and the gap in final offers is 1.8%. Remarkably, further controlling for the ask salary explains the entirety of the residual gender gaps in bid and final salaries. To estimate the market-level effects of an increase in women's ask salaries, I exploit an unanticipated change in how candidates were prompted to provide their ask. For some candidates in mid-2018, the answer box used to solicit the ask salary was changed from an empty field to an entry pre-filled with the median bid salary for similar candidates. Using an interrupted time series design, I find that this change drove the ask gap and the bid gap to zero. In addition, women did not receive fewer bids than men did due to the change, suggesting they faced little penalty for demanding wages comparable to men.

- **Tax Evasion and the Swiss Cheese Regulation**

  Abstract: Before automatic exchange of information, the 2005 Savings Tax Directive was the most far-ranging initiative in the attempt to curb tax evasion of European households in Switzerland. Under this program, European tax evaders holding interest-yielding accounts in Switzerland had two choices: either declare their accounts to the fiscal authorities of their resident countries or pay a tax upfront and keep their anonymity. Exploiting a unique combination of public administrative datasets, this paper sheds light on the loopholes of this reform and the large behavioral responses of tax evaders aimed at exploiting them. I find that the reform barely curbed tax evasion : 80% of the European offshore wealth in Switzerland remained both undeclared and untaxed by 2013. Using the Swiss households' investments as a control group, I show that the failure of the Directive is mainly explained by tax evaders' active re-investment strategies in tax-exempt assets. While they remain fairly low, declarations of offshore wealth under the Directive have more than quadrupled over the period 2006-2013. This paper demonstrates that monetary incentives, such as tax amnesties in the evader's home country or the increase in the upfront tax in Switzerland, are the first drivers of declarations. Conversely, bilateral information exchange treaties, praised as a way to "end bank secrecy", have the least effect on declarations.

WORK IN PROGRESS:

- **Biased Beliefs about Outside Options and Wage Inequality (with Simon Jäger, Benjamin Schoefer and Christopher Roth)**

  Abstract: We designed a survey, added to the Innovation Sample of the German Socio-Economic Panel, to examine how workers' beliefs about job opportunities in other firms affect their labor market behavior, specifically wage negotiations and mobility. Standard labor market models assume that workers and firms have full information about those outside options. This assumption is crucial yet untested. Our goal is to ask whether informational frictions can help explain the puzzling rise in wage dispersion. We first measure respondents' beliefs about their outside options at other firms. We then provide a random subset of our respondents with information about the median wage in their occupation. Using a unique combination of survey and administrative data, we then study how this information provision affects our respondents' labor market behavior. A preliminary analysis of the data highlights two main results. First, there is a substantial fraction of respondents that exhibits large biases in beliefs about outside options: about half of our respondents is more than 20% off the true median salary in their occupation. Second, wage bargaining, but not job search, is responsive to an information treatment. Early results suggest that perceived non-wage benefits at the current firm play an important role in understanding the lack of job mobility from low to high wage firms.

- **Asymmetric Peer Effects: How White Peers Shape Black Turnover (with Elizabeth Linos and Sanaz Mobasseri)**

  Abstract: This study examines how working with white co-workers affects turnover rates for black women and men in a large professional services firm. Black employees are 15 percentage points more likely to turnover within two years relative to similar white employees in the same office, whose average turnover rate is 26%. Drawing on conditional random assignment to projects and co-workers for over 9,000 newly hired employees in the U.S., we find that a one standard deviation (20%) increase in the percentage of white co-workers increases turnover for black women (but not black men, other non-white, or white employees) by 16 percentage points. Additional results suggest that when black women are assigned to projects with more white co-workers, they receive more negative performance evaluations: evaluators are more likely to identify them as "at risk of low performance" and are less willing to "always want the [given employee] on their team." Our findings imply that the racial composition of co-workers may differentially affect black women and men.

- **Revealed Preference Job Ladders (with Benjamin Scuderi)**

  Abstract: This paper develops a new approach to understanding the heterogeneity of workers' preferences over firms. To do this we leverage the unique structure of Hired.com data, in particular the fact that we observe the full choice set of candidates over firms and their decision. Candidates' responses to interview requests reveal partial orderings over employers. Building on recent theoretical work in economics and computer science, we derive a method on how to aggregate the candidates' partial orderings into a coherent set of type-specific aggregate rankings. We find that allowing for heterogeneity greatly increases model fit: moving from a single ranking to three rankings nearly halves the number of choices that are inconsistent with model predictions. Using the rich set of observables we have on both candidates (gender, resume information and salary expectations) and companies (firm size, industry and candidate-specific salary offers) will then allows us to understand which firm characteristics correlate with individual rankings as well as explore the individual characteristics that drive heterogeneity in rankings.

SEMINARS AND CONFERENCES :

2021	ASSA Annual Meetings, Discrimination and Fairness session
2020	NBER Summer Institute Labor Studies, 3rd IDSC of IZA/University of Luxembourg Workshop: Matching Workers and Jobs Online, Paris School of Economics Applied Economics Seminar, UC Berkeley Labor Lunch Seminar, UC Berkeley Labor Seminar
2016	Paris School of Economics Applied Economics Seminar

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE:

RESEARCH:
- UC Berkeley : Research assistant to Prof. Gabriel Zucman (Fall 2019 and Fall 2020), Prof. David Card and Prof. Patrick Kline (Fall 2018), Prof. Benjamin Schoefer (Summer and Fall 2017)
- Harvard University : Research assistant to Prof. Raj Chetty and Prof. Stefanie Stantcheva at the Lab for Economic Applications and Policy, 2015-2016
- OECD : Research internship, Summer 2014

TEACHING:
Teaching Assistant, Department of Economics, UC Berkeley:
- Econ 133: Global Inequality and Growth, UC Berkeley, Spring 2019 and Spring 2020
- Econ 140: Economic statistics and Econometrics, UC Berkeley, Fall 2018

REFEREEING:
American Economic Review, Quarterly Journal of Economics, American Economic Review: Insights

OTHER:
President of Economists for Equity at Berkeley (2018-2019) and currently Head of Professional Development there.

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS:

2020	Outstanding Graduate Student Instructor Award (awarded to top 10% of GSIs) , Institute for Research on Labor and Employment Dissertation Fellowship
2019	George Break Prize in Public Finance (awarded for outstanding performance in public finance field courses) + UC Berkeley Opportunity Lab, Labor science Grant
2018	UC Berkeley Economics Department Fellowship
2017	Burch Center Fellowship
2016	UC Berkeley Economics Department Fellowship + Dean Summer Research Grant

OTHER INFORMATION:
Programming: Python, Stata
Languages: English (fluent), French (Native)
Citizenship: French