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1  |----- MODULE Voting -----|
  | This is a high-level algorithm in which a set of processes cooperatively choose a value.
6  | EXTENDS Integers
7  |-----|
8  | CONSTANT Value,      The set of choosable values.
9  |           Acceptor,   A set of processes that will choose a value.
10 |           Quorum      The set of "quorums", where a quorum" is a
11 |                        "large enough" set of acceptors
  |
  | Here are the assumptions we make about quorums.
16 | ASSUME QuorumAssumption  $\triangleq \wedge \forall Q \in \textit{Quorum} : Q \subseteq \textit{Acceptor}$ 
17 |                         $\wedge \forall Q1, Q2 \in \textit{Quorum} : Q1 \cap Q2 \neq \{\}$ 
19 | THEOREM QuorumNonEmpty  $\triangleq \forall Q \in \textit{Quorum} : Q \neq \{\}$ 
20 |-----|
  | Ballot is a set of "ballot numbers". For simplicity, we let it be the set of natural numbers. However,
  | we write Ballot for that set to distinguish ballots from natural numbers used for other purposes.
26 | Ballot  $\triangleq \textit{Nat}$ 
27 |-----|
  | In the algorithm, each acceptor can cast one or more votes, where each vote cast by an acceptor
  | has the form  $\langle b, v \rangle$  indicating that the acceptor has voted for value  $v$  in ballot  $b$ . A value is chosen
  | if a quorum of acceptors have voted for it in the same ballot.
  |
  | The algorithm's variables.
39 | VARIABLE votes,      votes[ $a$ ] is the set of votes cast by acceptor  $a$ 
40 |           maxBal      maxBal[ $a$ ] is a ballot number. Acceptor  $a$  will cast
41 |                        further votes only in ballots numbered  $\geq \textit{maxBal}[a]$ 
  |
  | The type-correctness invariant.
46 | TypeOK  $\triangleq \wedge \textit{votes} \in [\textit{Acceptor} \rightarrow \text{SUBSET}(\textit{Ballot} \times \textit{Value})]$ 
47 |            $\wedge \textit{maxBal} \in [\textit{Acceptor} \rightarrow \textit{Ballot} \cup \{-1\}]$ 
48 |-----|
  | We now make a series of definitions and assert some simple theorems about those definitions that
  | lead to the algorithm.
53 | VotedFor( $a, b, v$ )  $\triangleq \langle b, v \rangle \in \textit{votes}[a]$ 
  | True iff acceptor  $a$  has voted for  $v$  in ballot  $b$ .
  |
58 | ChosenAt( $b, v$ )  $\triangleq \exists Q \in \textit{Quorum} :$ 
59 |            $\forall a \in Q : \textit{VotedFor}(a, b, v)$ 
  | True iff a quorum of acceptors have all voted for  $v$  in ballot  $b$ .
  |
64 | chosen  $\triangleq \{v \in \textit{Value} : \exists b \in \textit{Ballot} : \textit{ChosenAt}(b, v)\}$ 
  | The set of values that have been chosen.
  |
69 | DidNotVoteAt( $a, b$ )  $\triangleq \forall v \in \textit{Value} : \neg \textit{VotedFor}(a, b, v)$ 

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71 $CannotVoteAt(a, b) \triangleq \wedge maxBal[a] > b$
72 $\wedge DidNotVoteAt(a, b)$

Because acceptor a will not cast any more votes in a ballot numbered $< maxBal[a]$, this implies that a has not and will never cast a vote in ballot b .

79 $NoneOtherChoosableAt(b, v) \triangleq$
80 $\exists Q \in Quorum :$
81 $\forall a \in Q : VotedFor(a, b, v) \vee CannotVoteAt(a, b)$

If this is true, then $ChosenAt(b, w)$ is not and can never become true for any $w \neq v$.

87 $SafeAt(b, v) \triangleq \forall c \in 0 .. (b - 1) : NoneOtherChoosableAt(c, v)$

If this is true, then no value other than v has been or can ever be chosen in any ballot numbered less than b .

92 |
93 THEOREM $AllSafeAtZero \triangleq \forall v \in Value : SafeAt(0, v)$
94 |

95 THEOREM $ChoosableThm \triangleq$
96 $\forall b \in Ballot, v \in Value :$
97 $ChosenAt(b, v) \Rightarrow NoneOtherChoosableAt(b, v)$
98 |

99 $VotesSafe \triangleq \forall a \in Acceptor, b \in Ballot, v \in Value :$
100 $VotedFor(a, b, v) \Rightarrow SafeAt(b, v)$

102 $OneVote \triangleq \forall a \in Acceptor, b \in Ballot, v, w \in Value :$
103 $VotedFor(a, b, v) \wedge VotedFor(a, b, w) \Rightarrow (v = w)$
104 $OneValuePerBallot \triangleq$
105 $\forall a1, a2 \in Acceptor, b \in Ballot, v1, v2 \in Value :$
106 $VotedFor(a1, b, v1) \wedge VotedFor(a2, b, v2) \Rightarrow (v1 = v2)$
107 |

108 THEOREM $OneValuePerBallot \Rightarrow OneVote$
109 |

110 THEOREM $VotesSafeImpliesConsistency \triangleq$
111 $\wedge TypeOK$
112 $\wedge VotesSafe$
113 $\wedge OneVote$
114 $\Rightarrow \vee chosen = \{\}$
115 $\vee \exists v \in Value : chosen = \{v\}$
116 |

117 $ShowsSafeAt(Q, b, v) \triangleq$
118 $\wedge \forall a \in Q : maxBal[a] \geq b$
119 $\wedge \exists c \in -1 .. (b - 1) :$
120 $\wedge (c \neq -1) \Rightarrow \exists a \in Q : VotedFor(a, c, v)$
121 $\wedge \forall d \in (c + 1) .. (b - 1), a \in Q : DidNotVoteAt(a, d)$
122 |

123 THEOREM $ShowsSafety \triangleq$
124 $TypeOK \wedge VotesSafe \wedge OneValuePerBallot \Rightarrow$

125 $\forall Q \in \text{Quorum}, b \in \text{Ballot}, v \in \text{Value} :$
 126 $\text{ShowsSafeAt}(Q, b, v) \Rightarrow \text{SafeAt}(b, v)$

128 |-----|
 We now write the specification. The initial condition is straightforward.

133 $\text{Init} \triangleq \wedge \text{votes} = [a \in \text{Acceptor} \mapsto \{\}]$
 134 $\wedge \text{maxBal} = [a \in \text{Acceptor} \mapsto -1]$

Next are the actions that make up the next-state action.

An acceptor a is allowed to increase $\text{maxBal}[a]$ to a ballot number b at any time.

143 $\text{IncreaseMaxBal}(a, b) \triangleq$
 144 $\wedge b > \text{maxBal}[a]$
 145 $\wedge \text{maxBal}' = [\text{maxBal} \text{ EXCEPT } ![a] = b]$
 146 $\wedge \text{UNCHANGED votes}$

Next is the action in which acceptor a votes for v in ballot b . The first four conjuncts re enabling conditions. The first maintains the requirement that the acceptor cannot cast a vote in a ballot less than $\text{maxBal}[a]$. The next two conjuncts maintain the invariance of *OneValuePerBallot*. The fourth conjunct maintains the invariance of *VotesSafe*.

156 $\text{VoteFor}(a, b, v) \triangleq$
 157 $\wedge \text{maxBal}[a] \leq b$
 158 $\wedge \forall vt \in \text{votes}[a] : vt[1] \neq b$
 159 $\wedge \forall c \in \text{Acceptor} \setminus \{a\} :$
 160 $\quad \forall vt \in \text{votes}[c] : (vt[1] = b) \Rightarrow (vt[2] = v)$
 161 $\wedge \exists Q \in \text{Quorum} : \text{ShowsSafeAt}(Q, b, v)$
 162 $\wedge \text{votes}' = [\text{votes} \text{ EXCEPT } ![a] = @ \cup \{(b, v)\}]$
 163 $\wedge \text{maxBal}' = [\text{maxBal} \text{ EXCEPT } ![a] = b]$

The next-state action and the invariant.

169 $\text{Next} \triangleq \exists a \in \text{Acceptor}, b \in \text{Ballot} :$
 170 $\quad \vee \text{IncreaseMaxBal}(a, b)$
 171 $\quad \vee \exists v \in \text{Value} : \text{VoteFor}(a, b, v)$

173 $\text{Spec} \triangleq \text{Init} \wedge \Box[\text{Next}]_{\langle \text{votes}, \text{maxBal} \rangle}$

175 $\text{Inv} \triangleq \text{TypeOK} \wedge \text{VotesSafe} \wedge \text{OneValuePerBallot}$

176 |-----|
 177 THEOREM $\text{Invariance} \triangleq \text{Spec} \Rightarrow \Box \text{Inv}$

178 |-----|
 The following statement instantiates module *Consensus* with the constant *Value* of this module substituted for the constant *Value* of module *Consensus*, and the state function *chosen* defined in this module substituted for the variable *chosen* of module *Value*. More precisely, for each defined identifier *id* of module *Value*, this statement defines $C!id$ to equal the value of *id* under these substitutions.

187 $C \triangleq \text{INSTANCE Consensus}$

189 THEOREM $Spec \Rightarrow C!Spec$
 190 $\langle 1 \rangle 1. Inv \wedge Init \Rightarrow C!Init$
 191 $\langle 1 \rangle 2. Inv \wedge [Next]_{\langle votes, maxBal \rangle} \Rightarrow [C!Next]_{chosen}$
 192 $\langle 1 \rangle 3.$ QED
 193 $\langle 2 \rangle 1. \Box Inv \wedge \Box [Next]_{\langle votes, maxBal \rangle} \Rightarrow \Box [C!Next]_{chosen}$
 194 BY $\langle 1 \rangle 2$ and temporal reasoning
 195 $\langle 2 \rangle 2. \Box Inv \wedge Spec \Rightarrow C!Spec$
 196 BY $\langle 2 \rangle 1, \langle 1 \rangle 1$
 197 $\langle 2 \rangle 3.$ QED
 198 BY $\langle 2 \rangle 2, Invariance$
 199]