MODULE $AJupiter$

Model checking the *Jupiter* protocol presented by *Attiya* and others.

EXTENDS $Integers$, OT, TLC

CONSTANTS

$Client$, the set of client replicas

$Server$, the (unique) server replica

$InitState$, the initial state of each replica

$Priority$ $Priority[c]$: the priority value of client $c \in Client$

Cop * $Cop[c]$: operations issued by the client $c \in Client$

ASSUME

$\land\ InitState \in List$

$\land\ Priority \in [Client \to PosInt]$

$\land$ Cop $\in [Client \to Seq(Op)]$

Generate operations for $AJupiter$ clients.

Note: Remember to overvide the definition of $PosInt$.

FIXME: $PosInt \Rightarrow MaxPos$; $MaxPr$ determined by the size of $Client$.

$$OpToIssue \triangleq \{opset \in \text{SUBSET } Op :$$
$$\land\ opset \neq \{\}$$
$$\land\ \forall\, op1 \in opset :$$
$$\forall\, op2 \in opset \setminus \{op1\} :$$
$$(op1.type = \text{“Ins”} \land op2.type = \text{“Ins”}) \Rightarrow op1.ch \neq op2.ch\}$$

VARIABLES

For model checking:

cop, * $cop[c]$: operations issued by the client $c \in Client$

cop, a set of operations for clients to issue

$list$, all list states across the system

For the client replicas:

$cbuf$, $cbuf[c]$: buffer (of operations) at the client $c \in Client$

$crec$, $crec[c]$: the number of new messages have been received by the client $c \in Client$ since the last time a message was sent

$cstate$, $cstate[c]$: state (the list content) of the client $c \in Client$

For the server replica:

$sbuf$, $sbuf[c]$: buffer (of operations) at the $Server$, one per client $c \in Client$

$srec$, $srec[c]$: the number of new messages have been ..., one per client $c \in Client$

$sstate$, $sstate$: state (the list content) of the server $Server$

For communication between the $Server$ and the Clients:

$cincoming$, $cincoming[c]$: incoming channel at the client $c \in Client$

$sincoming$ incoming channel at the $Server$

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60 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
61 comm ≜ INSTANCE CSComm
62 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
63 eVars ≜ ⟨cop⟩                                  variables for the environment
64 cVars ≜ ⟨cbuf, crec, cstate⟩                  variables for the clients
65 ecVars ≜ ⟨cop, cVars⟩                         variables for the clients and the environment
66 sVars ≜ ⟨sbuf, srec, sstate⟩                  variables for the server
67 commVars ≜ ⟨cincoming, sincoming⟩             variables for communication
68 jVars ≜ ⟨cVars, sVars, commVars⟩             variables for the Jupiter system
69 vars ≜ ⟨eVars, cVars, sVars, commVars⟩        all variables
70 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
71 TypeOK ≜
72     ∧ cop ∈ [Client → Seq(Op)]
73     ∧ cop ∈ SUBSET Op
74     ∧ list ∈ SUBSET List
       For the client replicas:
78     ∧ cbuf ∈ [Client → Seq(Op ∪ {Nop})]
79     ∧ crec ∈ [Client → Int]
80     ∧ cstate ∈ [Client → List]
       For the server replica:
84     ∧ sbuf ∈ [Client → Seq(Op ∪ {Nop})]
85     ∧ srec ∈ [Client → Int]
86     ∧ sstate ∈ List
       For communication between the server and the clients:
90     ∧ comm!TypeOK
91 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
   The Init predicate.
95 Init ≜
96   ∧ cop = Cop
97     ∧ cop ∈ OpToIssue
       For the client replicas:
101    ∧ cbuf = [c ∈ Client ↦ ⟨⟩]
102    ∧ crec = [c ∈ Client ↦ 0]
103    ∧ cstate = [c ∈ Client ↦ InitState]
       For the server replica:
107    ∧ sbuf = [c ∈ Client ↦ ⟨⟩]
108    ∧ srec = [c ∈ Client ↦ 0]
109    ∧ sstate = InitState
       For communication between the server and the clients:
113    ∧ comm!Init
114 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------
115 LegalizeOp(op, c) ≜
116     LET len ≜ Len(cstate[c])
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117     IN   CASE op.type = "Del" →
118                IF len = 0 THEN Nop ELSE [op EXCEPT !.pos = Min(@, len)]
119          □     op.type = "Ins" →
120                [op EXCEPT !.pos = Min(@, len + 1), !.pr = Priority[c]]

     Client c ∈ Client issues an operation op.
125  Do(c) ≜
126    ∧ cop[c] ≠ ⟨⟩
127      ∧ cop ≠ {}
128      ∧ ∃ o ∈ cop :
129          LET op ≜ LegalizeOp(o, c)   preprocess an illegal operation
130          IN   ∨ ∧ op = Nop
131                 ∧ cop' = cop \ {o}      consume one operation
132                 ∧ UNCHANGED jVars
133               ∨ ∧ op ≠ Nop
134                 ∧ PrintT(c ∘ " : Do" ∘ ToString(op))
135                 ∧ cstate' = [cstate EXCEPT ![c] = Apply(op, @)]
136                 ∧ list'   = list ∪ {cstate'[c]}
137                 ∧ cbuf' = [cbuf EXCEPT ![c] = Append(@, op)]
138                 ∧ crec' = [crec EXCEPT ![c] = 0]
139                 ∧ comm!CSend([c ↦ c, ack ↦ crec[c], op ↦ op])
140                 ∧ cop' = cop \ {o}     consume one operation
141                 ∧ UNCHANGED sVars
142    ∧ cop' = [cop EXCEPT ![c] = Tail(@)] \* consume one operation

     Client c ∈ Client receives a message from the Server.
147  Rev(c) ≜
148        ∧ comm!CRev(c)
149        ∧ crec' = [crec EXCEPT ![c] = @ + 1]
150        ∧ LET m ≜ Head(cincoming[c])
151               cBuf ≜ cbuf[c]   the buffer at client c ∈ Client
152               cShiftedBuf ≜ SubSeq(cBuf, m.ack + 1, Len(cBuf))   buffer shifted
153               xop ≜ XformOpOps(m.op, cShiftedBuf)   transform op vs. shifted buffer
154               xcBuf ≜ XformOpsOp(cShiftedBuf, m.op)   transform shifted buffer vs. op
155            IN   ∧ cbuf' = [cbuf EXCEPT ![c] = xcBuf]
156                 ∧ cstate' = [cstate EXCEPT ![c] = Apply(xop, @)]   apply the transformed operation xop
157                 ∧ list' = list ∪ {cstate'[c]}
158        ∧ UNCHANGED ⟨sbuf, srec, sstate, cop⟩      NOTE: sVars ∘ ⟨cop⟩ is wrong!
159  ├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
     The Server receives a message.
163  SRev ≜
164        ∧ comm!SRev
165        ∧ LET m ≜ Head(sincoming)   the message to handle with
166               c ≜ m.c              the client c ∈ Client that sends this message
167               cBuf ≜ sbuf[c]       the buffer at the Server for client c ∈ Client
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168             cShiftedBuf ≜ SubSeq(cBuf, m.ack + 1, Len(cBuf))  buffer shifted
169             xop ≜ XformOpOps(m.op, cShiftedBuf)  transform op vs. shifted buffer
170              xcBuf ≜ XformOpsOp(cShiftedBuf, m.op)  transform shifted buffer vs. op
171         IN   ∧ srec′ = [cl ∈ Client ↦
172                           IF cl = c
173                            THEN srec[cl] + 1  receive one more operation from client c ∈ Client
174                            ELSE 0]  reset srec for other clients than c ∈ Client
175              ∧ sbuf′ = [cl ∈ Client ↦
176                           IF cl = c
177                            THEN xcBuf  transformed buffer for client c ∈ Client
178                            ELSE Append(sbuf[cl], xop)]  store transformed xop into other clients' bufs
179              ∧ sstate′ = Apply(xop, sstate)  apply the transformed operation
180              ∧ list′ = list ∪ {sstate′}
181              ∧ comm!SSend(c, srec, xop)
182       ∧ UNCHANGED ecVars
183 ├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
    The next-state relation.
187 Next ≜
188       ∨ ∃ c ∈ Client : Do(c) ∨ Rev(c)
189       ∨ SRev
    The Spec. (TODO: Check the fairness condition.)
193 Spec ≜ Init ∧ □[Next]_vars ∧ WF_vars(Next)
194 ├──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
    The safety properties to check: Eventual Convergence (EC), Quiescent Consistency (QC), Strong
    Eventual Convergence (SEC), Weak List Specification, (WLSpec), and Strong List Specification,
    (SLSpec).

    Eventual Consistency (EC)

    Quiescent Consistency (QC)
209 QConvergence ≜ ∀ c ∈ Client : cstate[c] = sstate
210 QC ≜ comm!EmptyChannel ⇒ QConvergence

212 THEOREM Spec ⇒ □QC

    Strong Eventual Consistency (SEC)

    Termination
221 Termination ≜
222       ∧ cop = {}
223       ∧ comm!EmptyChannel

    Weak List Consistency (WLSpec)
228 WLSpec ≜
229       Termination ⇒ ∀ l1, l2 ∈ list : Compatible(l1, l2)
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231 THEOREM $Spec \Rightarrow WLSpec$

Strong *List* Consistency (*SLSpec*)

235

* Modification History

* *Last* modified Sun *Aug* 12 23:13:41 *CST* 2018 by *hengxin*

* Created Sat *Jun* 23 17:14:18 *CST* 2018 by *hengxin*