

UNIT 8B: Coronavirus

Outline


Initial projections

Endemic coronavirus


Pathogen aggressiveness

The future of SARS-CoV-2


Flattening the curve (repeat)




Flattening the curve (repeat)




Flattening the curve (repeat)



Flattening the curve (repeat)




What happens when we flatten?





- Which scenario has the lowest total number of cases shown (area under the curve)?

Flattening the curve (repeat)



Flattening the curve



Flattening the curve

- ▶ More flattening than reduction in total
 - ▶ * As long as \mathcal{R}_0 is medium-to-large we expect almost everyone to get infected in a simple model
 - ▶ * Changes in \mathcal{R}_0 don't affect area under the curve
 - ▶ * But they can have big effects on the peak
- ▶ What are some benefits of just flattening?
 - ▶ * Less peak demand
 - ▶ * More time to find solutions:
 - ▶ * Better treatments
 - ▶ * Vaccines

Behaviour and policy change

- ▶ Why were our early models so wrong?
 - ▶ * People and governments changed behaviour much more than we expected
 - ▶ * Fear of overflowing hospitals and chaos in general
 - ▶ * Population heterogeneity
 - ▶ * Not everyone mixes the same, or at the same time
 - ▶ * A less important effect so far

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
Endemic coronavirus

- ▶ What does it mean for SARS-CoV-2 to become “endemic”
 - ▶ * Not going extinct
 - ▶ * Not *too* much variation in annual incidence
- ▶ What it doesn't mean:
 - ▶ * Not fluctuating
 - ▶ * Not dangerous
- ▶ *A lot of double negatives, make sure you're clear!*


Disease burnout

- ▶ A disease that has a big epidemic and leaves very few susceptibles behind can go locally or globally extinct – we call this burnout
- ▶ Lots of evidence for influenza or measles burning out in isolated areas during less global times



Disease burnout (repeat)



Disease burnout (repeat)



Disease burnout



Adaptive responses

- ▶ How do people respond to fear of COVID-19?
 - ▶ * Masking, distancing, booster shots
 - ▶ * Mandates, lockdowns
- ▶ What effects do we expect if people's worry levels about SARS-CoV-2 fluctuate with virus levels?
 - ▶ * Will increase spread when levels are high (or growing)
 - ▶ * Tendency to stabilize the dynamics
 - ▶ * Smaller outbreaks, less chance of random extinction

Burnout and SARS-CoV-2

- ▶ Burnout seems very rare in the global era
- ▶ Adaptive responses work against burnout
 - ▶ When things are bad, people are more careful: less overshoot
 - ▶ When things are good, people are less careful: less chance to keep the virus down

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
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Pathogen aggressiveness

- ▶ Should viruses evolve to become more or less dangerous?
 - ▶ * It depends
 - ▶ * The virus evolves in the way that's best for the virus
 - ▶ * Host death and host recovery are equally bad!


Tradeoffs (repeat)




Which strain will win?

- ▶ If the competing strains produce similar immune responses, this is exactly like equal competition: infections are competing for a single resource:
 - ▶ * Susceptible humans
- ▶ The winner will be the strain that has the highest “carrying capacity”:
 - ▶ * Removes the largest number from susceptible pool
 - ▶ * Highest \mathcal{R}_0
 - ▶ * This could be more or less deadly
 - ▶ * The 1 or 2% of humans who die from COVID-19 disease may not be the most important arena for evolution


Pathogen aggressiveness (repeat)




Pathogen aggressiveness (repeat)



Pathogen aggressiveness (repeat)



Pathogen aggressiveness



- ▶ Pathogen will evolve to maximize \mathcal{R}_0 .
- ▶ Is not affected by whether duration D is ended by host death, or by immune system clearing the pathogen

Human evolution

- ▶ We have evolved very good immune systems, but we can't always stay ahead of the viruses
- ▶ Should people evolve to favor the spread of more or less dangerous viruses?
 - ▶ * Less dangerous!
 - ▶ * Viruses that do well in the upper respiratory tract may spread better
 - ▶ * Viruses that do well in the lower respiratory tract are more dangerous
 - ▶ * Have we evolved to make this a tradeoff for viruses?

Omicron example

- ▶ Omicron spreads *much* better than earlier SARS-CoV-2 viruses
- ▶ It does less well in the lungs and better in the upper airways
- ▶ SARS-CoV-2 *may* be evolving in a less dangerous direction
 - ▶ There is no guarantee
 - ▶ Delta spread better and was *more* dangerous than previous

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What is different about SARS-CoV-2?

- ▶ What is the main difference between SARS-CoV-2 and other colds and flus?
 - ▶ * There was almost no immunity before 2020
 - ▶ * It is still adapting to humans

Human immunity

- ▶ The immune system is very complicated and very effective
 - ▶ T cells and B cells recognize different parts of the **pathogen**
 - ▶ Even partial recognition often protects people against severe outcomes
- ▶ Vaccines
 - ▶ Also likely to protect against severe outcomes

Immunity and the virus

- ▶ Our immune systems may see different variants of the virus differently:
 - ▶ Cross-immunity to a different strain might be less effective than direct immunity to the strain I was infected with
- ▶ How will this change our picture of competition?
 - ▶ * It makes it easier for different strains to co-exist
 - ▶ * We don't know yet how much easier. Some viruses (HPV) have dozens of co-existing strains. Others (influenza A) have limited cross-immunity, but strong population-level competition

Herd immunity

- ▶ What is meant by herd immunity?
 - ▶ * A level of immunity in the population that interferes with *the spread of the pathogen*
 - ▶ * May or may not mean that the pathogen cannot survive
- ▶ How much herd immunity do we need?
 - ▶ * About $1 - 1/\mathcal{R}_0$ for $\mathcal{R}_{\text{eff}} \approx 1$
 - ▶ * In the long run, we expect to see about the right number of susceptibles to keep the infectious individuals in balance

Can herd immunity drive SARS-CoV-2 extinct?

- ▶ What extinct viruses do we know about? How did they get there?
 - ▶ * Smallpox and rinderpest
 - ▶ * Vaccination!
 - ▶ * Herd immunity by vaccination is the only hope for driving SARS-CoV-2 extinct
 - ▶ * What about our luck with measles, mumps, polio, influenza, etc?

Levels of disease

- ▶ In the long run, how long we go between COVID-19 infections will likely depend mostly on how long our immunity lasts, or else on
 - ▶ * how often we get vaccine boosters

Terminology (preview)

FEELS LIKE WE MISSED THE WINDOW FOR THE "COVID-19" RENAMING. "CORONAVIRUS" IS JUST TOO CATCHY.

BUT IT'S NOT SPECIFIC! THERE ARE LOTS OF CORONAVIRUSES.



I THINK IT'S FINE. IT'S LIKE, YOU KNOW THE GIANT SPIDER DOWNTOWN THAT WAS ON THE BUILDINGS AND SOMETIMES CRASHES INTO CARS? I THINK TECHNICALLY IT'S A MUTANT T. ANNEXA WOLF SPIDER, BUT EVERYONE JUST CALLS IT "THE SPIDER" AND WE ALL KNOW WHAT THEY MEAN.



Just another seasonal coronavirus (JASC)

- ▶ This is a *theory* that lack of population immunity is the *only* difference between SARS-CoV-2 and other viruses that cause common colds
 - ▶ Some versions of the theory account for SARS-CoV-2 continuing to evolve in that direction
- ▶ What do you think of this theory?
 - ▶ * We all had versions of the common cold viruses as young children
 - ▶ * The common cold viruses face a high level of population immunity and can't have big outbreaks the way SARS-CoV-2 does.
 - ▶ * Smaller doses may be correlated with less-severe cases
 - ▶ * It's good to hope, but we shouldn't count on it
 - ▶ * We don't know how SARS-CoV-2 is going to evolve

Moving forward

- ▶ We need to pay attention and figure out how strongly to prioritize SARS-CoV-2 control
- ▶ We also need to be thinking about detecting and responding to the next pandemic!
 - ▶ * Better surveillance
 - ▶ * Routine monitoring of viruses from patient samples