Protocol Audit Report

Prepared by: Bizarro

Table of Contents

Protocol Summary

Liquid Ron is a Ronin staking protocol that automates user staking actions.

Deposit RON, get liquid RON, a token representing your stake in the validation process of the Ronin Network.

Liquid RON stakes and harvests rewards automatically, auto compounding your rewards and ensuring the best yield possible.

Disclaimer

Bizarro found as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

Risk Classification

	Impact		
	High	Medium	Low

		Impact		
	High	H	H/M	M
Likelihood	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
	Low	M	M/L	L

We use the CodeHawks severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

WorkFlow By Bizarro



Scope

See scope.txt

Roles

Executive Summary

Issues found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	0
Medium	1
Low	2
Info	0
Gas	0
Total	3

Findings

Medium

[M-1] Inefficient Loop in `LiquidProxy::harvest` Function Leading to Potential DoS.

Description: When Operator calls the `LiquidRon::harvest` function it calls the `LiquidProxy::harvest` that collects the rewards from the `RoninValidators`. The `LiquidProxy::harvest` function contains an inefficient loop that iterates over an array of consensus addresses (_consensusAddrs). However, the loop is unnecessary because the claimRewards function is called with the entire array in each iteration.

Impact: Potential for Denial of Service (DoS): If the array of consensus addresses is large, the gas cost of the function could exceed the block gas limit, causing the transaction to fail.

Proof of Concept: https://github.com/code-423n4/2025-01-liquid-ron/blob/e4b0b7c256bb2fe73b4a9c945415c3dcc935b61d/src/LiquidProxy.sol#L37

```
    function harvest(address[] calldata _consensusAddrs) external
onlyVault returns (uint256) {
@>        for (uint256 i = 0; i < _consensusAddrs.length; i++) {
            IRoninValidator(roninStaking).claimRewards(_consensusAddrs);
        }
        uint256 claimedAmount = address(this).balance;
        _depositRONTo(vault, claimedAmount);
        return claimedAmount;
    }
```

Recommended Mitigation:

```
    function harvest(address[] calldata _consensusAddrs) external
onlyVault returns (uint256) {
```

```
-         for (uint256 i = 0; i < _consensusAddrs.length; i++) {
             IRoninValidator(roninStaking).claimRewards(_consensusAddrs);
-         }
          uint256 claimedAmount = address(this).balance;
          _depositRONTo(vault, claimedAmount);
          return claimedAmount;
      }
```

Low

[L-1] `LiquidRon::redelegateAmount` does the parameter checks after the implementation, which can cause high gasFee and wrong asset transfers.

Description: The `LiquidRon::redelegateAmount` function calls the `LiquidProxy` contract for redelegating assets to different consensus addresses, the checks for the parameters are introduced after the function implementation.

Proof of Concept:

https://github.com/code-423n4/2025-01-liquid-ron/blob/e4b0b7c256bb2fe73b4a9c945415c3dcc935b61d/src/LiquidRon.sol#L186

Recommended Mitigation:

```
      function redelegateAmount(
          uint256 _proxyIndex,
          uint256[] calldata _amounts,
          address[] calldata _consensusAddrsSrc,
          address[] calldata _consensusAddrsDst
      ) external onlyOperator whenNotPaused {
+         for (uint256 i = 0; i < _consensusAddrsSrc.length; i++) {
+             if (_amounts[i] == 0) revert ErrNotZero();
+             _tryPushValidator(_consensusAddrsDst[i]);
+         }

  ILiquidProxy(stakingProxies[_proxyIndex]).redelegateAmount(_amounts,
  _consensusAddrsSrc, _consensusAddrsDst);
-         for (uint256 i = 0; i < _consensusAddrsSrc.length; i++) {
-             if (_amounts[i] == 0) revert ErrNotZero();
-             _tryPushValidator(_consensusAddrsDst[i]);
-         }
      }
```

```
          // before                    | 205605          | 205605 | 205605 |
  205605 | 1
          // after                     | 28707           | 28707  | 28707  |
  28707  | 1
```

[L-2] `LiquidRon::finaliseRonRewardsForEpoch` Transfers ron to the user based on the `lockedSharesPerEpoch[epoch]`, zero amount is not checked before the transfer of the asset which can cause high gas costs.

Proof of Concept: https://github.com/code-423n4/2025-01-liquid-ron/blob/e4b0b7c256bb2fe73b4a9c945415c3dcc935b61d/src/LiquidRon.sol#L245

Recommended Mitigation:

```
 function finaliseRonRewardsForEpoch() external onlyOperator whenNotPaused
{
        uint256 epoch = withdrawalEpoch;
        uint256 lockedShares = lockedSharesPerEpoch[epoch];
        // e before finaliseRonRewardsForEpoch           | 303810
| 303810 | 303810 | 303810 | 1
        // e after  finaliseRonRewardsForEpoch           | 30172
| 30172  | 30172  | 30172  | 1
+       require(lockedShares != 0, "Revert ");
        statusPerEpoch[withdrawalEpoch++] = WithdrawalStatus.FINALISED;
        uint256 assets = previewRedeem(lockedShares);
        _withdraw(address(this), escrow, address(this), assets,
lockedShares);
        lockedPricePerSharePerEpoch[epoch] =
LockedPricePerShare(lockedShares, assets);

        emit WithdrawalProcessFinalised(epoch, lockedShares, assets);
    }
```