



Protocol Audit Report

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Protocol Summary

The PasswordStore contract assumes that only the owner can set the password. The setPassword() function modifies the s_password storage variable, where the password is set, but doesn't include access control meaning that anyone, including a malicious actor, can reset the owner's password.

Disclaimer

Bizarro makes all effort to find as many vulnerabilities in the code in the given time period, but holds no responsibilities for the findings provided in this document. A security audit by the team is not an endorsement of the underlying business or product. The audit was time-boxed and the review of the code was solely on the security aspects of the Solidity implementation of the contracts.

Risk Classification

Impact			
	High	Medium	Low
High	H	H/M	M

Impact				
Likelihood	Medium	H/M	M	M/L
	Low	M	M/L	L

We use the [CodeHawks](#) severity matrix to determine severity. See the documentation for more details.

Audit Details

The findings described in this document correspond the following commit hash:

```
7d55682ddc4301a7b13ae9413095feffd9924566
```

Scope

```
./src/  
#-- PasswordStore.sol
```

Roles

Executive Summary

Issues found

Severity	Number of issues found
High	2
Medium	0
Low	0
Info	1
Total	3

Findings

High

[H-1] Storing the password on-chain makes it visible to anyone, and no longer private

Description: All data stored on-chain is visible to anyone, and can be read directly from the blockchain. The `PasswordStore::s_password` variable is intended to be a private variable and only accessed

through the `PasswordStore::getPassword` function, which is intended to be only called by the owner of the contract.

Impact: Anyone can read the private password, severely breaking the functionality of the protocol.

Proof of Concept: (Proof of Code)

The below test case shows how anyone can read the password directly from the blockchain.

1. Create a locally running chain

```
make anvil
```

2. Deploy the contract to the chain

```
make deploy
```

3. Run the storage tool We use `1` because that's the storage slot of `s_password` in the contract.

```
cast storage <ADDRESS_HERE> 1 --rpc-url http://127.0.0.1:8545
```

You'll get an output like this

```
0x6d7950617373776f726400000000000000000000000000000000000000000014
```

You can then parse the hex to a string with:

```
cast parse-bytes32-string  
0x6d7950617373776f7264000000000000000000000000000000000000000014
```

And get an output of:

```
myPassword
```

Recommended Mitigation: Due to this, the overall architecture of the contract should be rethought. One could encrypt the password off-chain, and then store the encrypted password on-chain. This would require the user to remember another password off-chain to decrypt the password. However, you'd also likely want to remove the view function as you wouldn't want the user to accidentally send a transaction with the password that decrypts your password.

Likelihood & Impact:

- Impact: High

- Likelihood: High
- Severity: High

[H-2] `PasswordStore::setPassword` has no access control, meaning a non-owner could change the password

Description: The `PasswordStore::setPassword` function is set to be an `external` function, however, the natspec of the function and overall purpose of the smart contract is that `This function should only be accessed by the owner of the contract.`

```
function setPassword(string memory newPassword) external {
@>    // @audit - There are no access controls
    s_password = newPassword;
    emit SetNetPassword();
}
```

Impact: Anyone can set/change the password of the contract, severely breaking the contract intended functionality.

Proof of Concept: Add the following to the `PasswordStore.t.sol` test file.

► Code

```
function test_anyone_can_set_password(address randomAddress) public {
    vm.prank(randomAddress);
    string memory expectedPassword = "myNewPassword";
    passwordStore.setPassword(expectedPassword);

    vm.prank(owner);
    string memory actualPassword = passwordStore.getPassword();
    assertEq(actualPassword, expectedPassword);
}
```

Recommended Mitigation: Add an access control conditional to the `setPassword` function.

```
if(msg.sender != s_owner){
    revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
}
```

Likelihood & Impact:

- Impact: High
- Likelihood: High
- Severity: High

Medium

Low

Informational

[I-1] The `PasswordStore::getPassword` natspec indicates a parameter that doesn't exist causing the natspec to be incorrect.

Description:

```
/*
 * @notice This allows only the owner to retrieve the password.
 * @param newPassword The new password to set.
 */
function getPassword() external view returns (string memory) {
    if (msg.sender != s_owner) {
        revert PasswordStore__NotOwner();
    }
    return s_password;
}
```

The `PasswordStore::getPassword` function signature is `getPassword()` while the natspec says it should be `getPassword(string)`.

Impact: The natspec is incorrect.

Recommended Mitigation: Remove the incorrect natspec line.

```
- * @param newPassword The new password to set.
```

Likelihood & Impact:

- Impact: None
- Likelihood: High
- Severity: Informational/Gas/Non-Crits

Gas: