



**BLOCKHAT**  
SECURITY

# MADNFT 1.0

**Smart Contract Security Audit**

Prepared by BlockHat

January 25<sup>th</sup>, 2023 – February 1<sup>st</sup>, 2023

BlockHat.io

contact@blockhat.io

# Document Properties

Client	Jacob Clay
Version	1.1
Classification	Public

## Scope

The MADNFT1.0 Contract in the MADNFT1.0 Repository

Repo	Owner
<a href="https://github.com/madnfts/madnfts-solidity-contracts/tree/release/1.0">https://github.com/madnfts/madnfts-solidity-contracts/tree/release/1.0</a>	MADNFTs

Files	MD5 Hash
contracts/EventsAndErrors.sol	0fa9eed8d9e93cb5a2fbf90f003fbc33
contracts/MAD.sol	d74a6be382cd2f23a3ebadb8d79c3f08
contracts/MADFactory1155.sol	845dc037d6631ea23e92200c7ec76ad9
contracts/MADFactory721.sol	d16b2983efab3c4be945c6df9448389f
contracts/MADMarketplace1155.sol	5c3110d6a7d2fc33e9730b84e9d0fd6c
contracts/MADMarketplace721.sol	6c06e551f913204897484066abdb8151
contracts/MADRouter1155.sol	26944124b03433aa42e30a5dcb947725
contracts/MADRouter721.sol	8a5a2e5ab6a334379ecdd5d997bf03ac

contracts/Types.sol	211938fc82b786b14a391ee5f2a8ee5f
lib/utills/Counters.sol	d216f3aabd6e9fcf0c041a8edaa895df
lib/utills/CREATE3.sol	3a09bbdf98d7284b6585ea335ada4b8b
lib/utills/MerkleProof.sol	c964b36fee0132365c17d4a53aeca414
lib/utills/SafeTransferLib.sol	0b7b6b404e478867d79ed10c7d8d847b
lib/utills/Strings.sol	5ab70c6b68313b6d7b196dbca9f17c34
lib/tokens/ERC20.sol	6d05d741c4ffb579e455a4736e9e9041
lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Basic.sol	5618e75d6121d5458bf04a6147fba447
lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol	1bae6600438ace20cad430f63038f1b
lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Minimal.sol	0fe039b83f1c2919b9139cd35efea205
lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Whitelist.sol	d67d93261e5426006494a64e9e0afc8b
lib/tokens/ERC721/Base/ERC721.sol	bf2f901d011ad5c0990e4831fc5148cc
lib/tokens/ERC721/Base/utills/ERC721Holder.sol	acc5d77cdf104884dd4d1158bf289d48
lib/tokens/ERC721/Base/interfaces/ERC721EventAndErrors.sol	5240053a3f2a57541ad8ef6a28560f98
lib/tokens/ERC721/Base/interfaces/IERC721.sol	7b54e6881e257c4c934dbb6dcc425b02
lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Basic.sol	348853cd9c321955ae879e939337b29a
lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Lazy.sol	4ab9ce5078e083cad982a72b9e5d9e66
lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Minimal.sol	ee19697195cf28b30e8acfd433750522
lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Whitelist.sol	bb5e42d2cc6180be1a14cba1ccfe6cdf
lib/tokens/ERC1155/Base/ERC1155B.sol	b09c1d1b5cc6e121f1acdb2ba40f73e3

lib/tokens/ERC1155/Base/utils/ERC1155Holder.sol	81c56017acbde380827c3f0ac97463df
lib/tokens/ERC1155/Base/interfaces/ERC1155EventAndErrors.sol	4b21c51b30b96d253b63ce4d90e1511a
lib/tokens/ERC1155/Base/interfaces/IERC1155.sol	bf24bd68d21bbe70e3874f9673e32870
lib/tokens/common/ERC2981.sol	ccd94fe2933c3a11a3fe5e661e10977d
lib/tokens/common/FeeOracle.sol	19e1b61b398275c51453133e7981bcfe
lib/test/erc1155-mock.sol	02fdd44bbe56a2fd659987ebb77048
lib/test/erc20-mock.sol	105a433834cb9fc1759df5b12ab1637b
lib/test/erc2981-mock.sol	92595f27f4b695874873df0dffdd68d2
lib/test/erc721-mock.sol	4b3024b5a73ab7f6aff779b6f738e9d5
lib/test/test-interfaces.sol	59a8c882c8fa1edbc28c99a04b7521f8
lib/splitter/SplitterEventsAndErrors.sol	367908e4e3cf487917bec89406e69fa1
lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol	c72f9d3da9ea65a97ac7a5767dd2981c
lib/security/DCPrevent.sol	3a2308d6e5759a1f81061109e1942ac8
lib/security/Pausable.sol	1286b0b6207ae026ec9922d7345c06f6
lib/security/ReentrancyGuard.sol	03355df147e2ef07cfb8c09d346a9cd2
lib/deployers/ERC1155Deployer.sol	0ea61a892fabec2a881a5034277856c9
lib/deployers/ERC721Deployer.sol	1f03487f68aea5b5c06ee10032e47cd3
lib/deployers/SplitterDeployer.sol	0c407b49fed828cc74553bccb81633c1
lib/auth/FactoryVerifier.sol	c7f3d59a47c84642f5ed386d1088944e

lib/auth/Owned.sol	a880f344c057b2682d5ec6f03db96abf
--------------------	----------------------------------

## Contacts

COMPANY	CONTACT
BlockHat	contact@blockhat.io

# Contents

1	Introduction	8
1.1	About MADNFT 1.0	8
1.2	Approach & Methodology	8
1.2.1	Risk Methodology	9
2	Findings Overview	10
2.1	Summary	10
2.2	Key Findings	10
3	Finding Details	11
A	MADRouter721.sol	11
A.1	Incorrect fees check [CRITICAL]	11
A.2	Missing fees verification [MEDIUM]	12
B	MADRouter1155.sol	13
B.1	Incorrect fees check [CRITICAL]	13
C	MADMarketplace721.sol	15
C.1	Incorrect NFT Payments [CRITICAL]	15
C.2	Race Condition in Fees Value [MEDIUM]	20
D	MADMarketplace1155.sol	22
D.1	Incorrect NFT Payments [CRITICAL]	22
D.2	Race Condition in Fees Value [MEDIUM]	27
E	MADFactory721.sol	29
E.1	address _router verification [MEDIUM]	29
E.2	Missing _price value verification [LOW]	30
F	MADFactory1155.sol	35
F.1	address _router verification [MEDIUM]	35
F.2	Missing _price value verification [LOW]	36
G	ERC20.sol	42
G.1	Missing address verification [LOW]	42
G.2	Missing Value verification [LOW]	45
G.3	Approve race condition [LOW]	47

4	Best Practices	49
	BP.1 Public functions can be external . . . . .	49
5	Tests	54
6	Static Analysis (Slither)	75
7	Conclusion	105

# 1 Introduction

MADNFT 1.0 engaged BlockHat to conduct a security assessment on the MADNFT 1.0 beginning on January 25<sup>th</sup>, 2023 and ending February 1<sup>st</sup>, 2023. In this report, we detail our methodical approach to evaluate potential security issues associated with the implementation of smart contracts, by exposing possible semantic discrepancies between the smart contract code and design document, and by recommending additional ideas to optimize the existing code. Our findings indicate that the current version of smart contracts can still be enhanced further due to the presence of many security and performance concerns.

This document summarizes the findings of our audit.

## 1.1 About MADNFT 1.0

MADNFT is a nft marketplace that allows the minting of 721 and 1155 NFTs on the harmony blockchain. There is a configurable mint fee of 0.250NE and configurable platform fee set at 10 % . User can trade other external harmony NFTs on the marketplace too.

Issuer	Jacob Clay
Website	<a href="https://madnfts.io/">https://madnfts.io/</a>
Type	Solidity Smart Contract
Audit Method	Whitebox

## 1.2 Approach & Methodology

BlockHat used a combination of manual and automated security testing to achieve a balance between efficiency, timeliness, practicability, and correctness within the audit's scope. While manual testing is advised for identifying problems in logic, procedure, and implementation, automated testing techniques help to expand the coverage of smart contracts and can quickly detect code that does not comply with security best practices.



## 1.2.1 Risk Methodology

Vulnerabilities or bugs identified by BlockHat are ranked using a risk assessment technique that considers both the LIKELIHOOD and IMPACT of a security incident. This framework is effective at conveying the features and consequences of technological vulnerabilities.

Its quantitative paradigm enables repeatable and precise measurement, while also revealing the underlying susceptibility characteristics that were used to calculate the Risk scores. A risk level will be assigned to each vulnerability on a scale of 5 to 1, with 5 indicating the greatest possibility or impact.

- Likelihood quantifies the probability of a certain vulnerability being discovered and exploited in the untamed.
- Impact quantifies the technical and economic costs of a successful attack.
- Severity indicates the risk's overall criticality.

Probability and impact are classified into three categories: H, M, and L, which correspond to high, medium, and low, respectively. Severity is determined by probability and impact and is categorized into four levels, namely Critical, High, Medium, and Low.

Impact		Likelihood		
		High	Medium	Low
	High	Critical	High	Medium
	Medium	High	Medium	Low
Low	Low	Medium	Low	Low
		High	Medium	Low

## 2 Findings Overview

### 2.1 Summary

The following is a synopsis of our conclusions from our analysis of the MADNFT 1.0 implementation. During the first part of our audit, we examine the smart contract source code and run the codebase via a static code analyzer. The objective here is to find known coding problems statically and then manually check (reject or confirm) issues highlighted by the tool. Additionally, we check business logics, system processes, and DeFi-related components manually to identify potential hazards and/or defects.

### 2.2 Key Findings

In general, these smart contracts are well-designed and constructed, but their implementation might be improved by addressing the discovered flaws, which include **4** critical-severity, **5** medium-severity, **5** low-severity vulnerabilities.

Vulnerabilities	Severity	Status
Incorrect fees check	CRITICAL	Fixed
Incorrect fees check	CRITICAL	Fixed
Incorrect NFT Payments	CRITICAL	Fixed
Incorrect NFT Payments	CRITICAL	Fixed
Missing fees verification	MEDIUM	Fixed
Race Condition in Fees Value	MEDIUM	Acknowledged
Race Condition in Fees Value	MEDIUM	Acknowledged
address <code>_router</code> verification	MEDIUM	Acknowledged
address <code>_router</code> verification	MEDIUM	Acknowledged
Missing <code>_price</code> value verification	LOW	Fixed
Missing <code>_price</code> value verification	LOW	Fixed
Missing address verification	LOW	Acknowledged
Missing Value verification	LOW	Acknowledged
Approve race condition	LOW	Acknowledged

# 3 Finding Details

## A MADRouter721.sol

### A.1 Incorrect fees check [CRITICAL]

#### Description:

The fee price is initialized at 0.25 ether, which translates to a fee of  $25 \times 10^{16}$ . If the owner sets Ethereum as ERC20 token payment method. The creator will pay 0.25 ethereum tokens: Which is a big amount. Also the fee setter only checks the limit in case of Harmony coin not other ERC20 tokens

#### Code:

Listing 1: MADRouter721

```
44     uint256 public feeMint = 0.25 ether;  
  
46     /// @notice Burn fee store.  
47     uint256 public feeBurn = 0;
```

Listing 2: MADRouter721

```
609     function setFees(uint256 _feeMint, uint256 _feeBurn)  
610         external  
611         onlyOwner  
612     {  
613         assembly {  
614             sstore(feeBurn.slot, _feeBurn)  
615             sstore(feeMint.slot, _feeMint)  
616         }  
  
618         emit FeesUpdated(_feeMint, _feeBurn);  
619     }
```

## Risk Level:

Likelihood – 4

Impact – 5

## Recommendation:

We recommend calculating the fee value by converting Harmony to that ERC20 token. We advise to use Chainlink oracles also put a setter in Routercontract to upgrade the chainlink contract in case one day you need to add other tokens And add another limit in fee setters in case of `erc20 != 0`

## Status – Fixed

The dev Team fixed the issue

## A.2 Missing fees verification [MEDIUM]

### Description:

Certain functions lack a safety check in the values, the values of the arguments should be verified to allow only the ones that go with the contract's logic. `FeeMint` and `FeeBurn` should be verified

### Code:

#### Listing 3: MADRouter721

```
609     function setFees(uint256 _feeMint, uint256 _feeBurn)
610         external
611         onlyOwner
612     {
613         assembly {
614             sstore(feeBurn.slot, _feeBurn)
615             sstore(feeMint.slot, _feeMint)
616         }
```

```
618         emit FeesUpdated(_feeMint, _feeBurn);
619     }
```

## Risk Level:

Likelihood – 3

Impact – 2

## Recommendation:

We recommend to add require to set max value for the fees

## Status – Fixed

The Dev team fixed the issue.

# B MADRouter1155.sol

## B.1 Incorrect fees check [CRITICAL]

### Description:

The fee price is initialized at 0.25 ether, which translates to a fee of  $25 \times 10^{16}$ . If the owner sets Ethereum as ERC20 token payment method. The creator will pay 0.25 ethereum tokens: Which is a big amount. Also the fee setter only checks the limit in case of Harmony coin not other ERC20 token

### Code:

#### Listing 4: MADRouter1155

```
651     uint256 public feeMint = 0.25 ether;

653     /// @notice Burn fee store.
654     uint256 public feeBurn = 0;
```

#### Listing 5: MADRouter1155

```
651     function setFees(uint256 _feeMint, uint256 _feeBurn)
652         external
653         onlyOwner
654     {
655         require(
656             _feeMint < 50 ether && _feeBurn < 50 ether,
657             "Invalid Fees"
658         );
659         assembly {
660             sstore(feeBurn.slot, _feeBurn)
661             sstore(feeMint.slot, _feeMint)
662         }
664         emit FeesUpdated(_feeMint, _feeBurn);
665     }
```

#### Risk Level:

Likelihood – 4

Impact – 5

#### Recommendation:

We recommend calculating the fee value by converting Harmony to that ERC20 token. We advise to use Chainlink oracles also put a setter in Routercontract to upgrade the chainlink contract in case one day you need to add other tokens And add another limit in fee setters in case of `erc20 != 0`

#### Status – Fixed

The dev team fixed the issue

## C MADMarketplace721.sol

### C.1 Incorrect NFT Payments [CRITICAL]

#### Description:

A user may unintentionally purchase an NFT using incorrect payment method , In the `buy` function, attempting to purchase an NFT using Harmony may result an transaction with wrong method due to the ERC20 payment method being added by the owner while purchasing , The same issue occurs in the `bid` function.

#### Code:

Listing 6: MADMarketplace721

```
225     function buy(bytes32 _order)
226         external
227         payable
228         whenNotPaused
229     {
230         Types.Order721 storage order = orderInfo[_order];
231
232         _buyChecks(
233             order.endTime,
234             order.orderType,
235             order.isSold
236         );
237
238         uint256 currentPrice = getCurrentPrice(_order);
239         if (address(erc20) != address(0)) {
240             if (
241                 erc20.allowance(msg.sender, address(this)) <
242                 currentPrice
243             ) revert WrongPrice();
244             SafeTransferLib.safeTransferFrom(
245                 erc20,
```

```

246         msg.sender,
247         address(this),
248         currentPrice
249     );
250 } else {
251     if (msg.value != currentPrice)
252         revert WrongPrice();
253 }

255 order.isSold = true;

257 uint256 key = uint256(
258     uint160(address(order.token))
259 ) << 12;

261 // path for inhouse minted tokens
262 if (
263     !feeSelector[key][order.tokenId] &&
264     MADFactory721.creatorAuth(
265         address(order.token),
266         order.seller
267     ) ==
268     true
269 ) {
270     _intPath(
271         order,
272         currentPrice,
273         _order,
274         msg.sender,
275         key
276     );
277 }
278 // path for external tokens
279 else {

```



```

280         // case for external tokens with ERC2981 support
281         if (
282             ERC165Check(address(order.token)) &&
283             interfaceCheck(
284                 address(order.token),
285                 0x2a55205a
286             ) ==
287             true
288         ) {
289             _extPath0(
290                 order,
291                 currentPrice,
292                 _order,
293                 msg.sender // ,
294                 //key
295             );
296         }
297         // case for external tokens without ERC2981 support
298         else {
299             _extPath1(
300                 order,
301                 currentPrice,
302                 _order,
303                 msg.sender // ,
304                 // key
305             );
306         }
307     }
308 }

```

## Code:

### Listing 7: MADMarketplace721

```

148     function bid(bytes32 _order)

```

```

149     external
150     payable
151     whenNotPaused
152     {
153         Types.Order721 storage order = orderInfo[_order];

155         uint256 lastBidPrice = order.lastBidPrice;
156         uint256 bidValue = address(erc20) != address(0)
157             ? erc20.allowance(msg.sender, address(this))
158             : msg.value;

160         _bidChecks(
161             order.orderType,
162             order.endTime,
163             order.seller,
164             lastBidPrice,
165             order.startPrice,
166             bidValue
167         );

169         if (address(erc20) != address(0)) {
170             SafeTransferLib.safeTransferFrom(
171                 erc20,
172                 msg.sender,
173                 address(this),
174                 bidValue
175             );
176         }

178         // 1s blocktime
179         assembly {
180             let endTime := and(
181                 sload(add(order.slot, 4)),
182                 shr(32, not(0))

```

```

183         )
184         if gt(
185             timestamp(),
186             sub(endTime, sload(minAuctionIncrement.slot))
187         ) {
188             let inc := add(
189                 endTime,
190                 sload(minAuctionIncrement.slot)
191             )
192             sstore(add(order.slot, 4), inc)
193         }
194         sstore(add(order.slot, 6), caller())
195         sstore(add(order.slot, 5), bidValue)
196     }

198     if (lastBidPrice != 0) {
199         if (address(erc20) != address(0)) {
200             SafeTransferLib.safeTransfer(
201                 erc20,
202                 order.lastBidder,
203                 lastBidPrice
204             );
205         } else {
206             SafeTransferLib.safeTransferETH(
207                 order.lastBidder,
208                 lastBidPrice
209             );
210         }
211     }

213     emit Bid(
214         order.token,
215         order.tokenId,
216         _order,

```

```

217         msg.sender,
218         bidValue
219     );
220 }

```

### Risk Level:

Likelihood – 4

Impact – 5

### Recommendation:

We suggest either allowing users to choose their preferred payment method, or have a fixed one, or temporarily suspending the contract until all auctions are ended

### Status – Fixed

The Dev team fixed the issue by setting the `setPaymentToken` function to private.

## C.2 Race Condition in Fees Value [MEDIUM]

### Description:

The `feeVal2`, `feeVal3` variables have a setter. If the user checks the value of this variable, then calls the `buy` or `call` function, and the owner updates the Fees Value, the order of the transaction might overturn and the user's transaction in this case will be executed with the new fees without him knowing about it.

### Code:

#### Listing 8: MADMarketplace721

```

422     function setFees(uint256 _feeVal2, uint256 _feeVal3)
423         external
424         onlyOwner
425     {

```

```

426      // max fees, 15% for royalties, 5% for fees
427      require(
428          _feeVal2 <= 1.5e3 && _feeVal3 <= 5.0e2,
429          "Invalid Fees"
430      );
431      assembly {
432          sstore(feeVal2.slot, _feeVal2)
433          sstore(feeVal3.slot, _feeVal3)
434      }

436      emit FeesUpdated(_feeVal2, _feeVal3);
437  }

```

## Risk Level:

Likelihood – 2

Impact – 3

## Recommendation:

Consider adding the `feeVal2`, `feeVal3` in the arguments of the `_feeResolver` function then add require statements that verifies that the values provided in the arguments are the same as the one that is stored in the smart contract. In the other hand, add `FeeVal3` in the arguments of the `_extPath0`, `_extPath1` functions then a require statement that verifies that `feeVal3` is the same as the one that is stored in the contract

## Status – Acknowledged

The dev team acknowledged the issue

## D MADMarketplace1155.sol

### D.1 Incorrect NFT Payments [CRITICAL]

#### Description:

A user may unintentionally purchase an NFT using incorrect payment method , In the `buy` function, attempting to purchase an NFT using Harmony may result an transaction with wrong method due to the ERC20 payment method being added by the owner while purchasing , The same issue occurs in the `bid` function.

#### Code:

Listing 9: MADMarketplace1155

```
245     function buy(bytes32 _order)
246         external
247         payable
248         whenNotPaused
249     {
250         Types.Order721 storage order = orderInfo[_order];
251
252         _buyChecks(
253             order.endTime,
254             order.orderType,
255             order.isSold
256         );
257
258         uint256 currentPrice = getCurrentPrice(_order);
259         if (address(erc20) != address(0)) {
260             if (
261                 erc20.allowance(msg.sender, address(this)) <
262                 currentPrice
263             ) revert WrongPrice();
264             SafeTransferLib.safeTransferFrom(
265                 erc20,
```

```

266         msg.sender,
267         address(this),
268         currentPrice
269     );
270 } else {
271     if (msg.value != currentPrice)
272         revert WrongPrice();
273 }

275 order.isSold = true;

277 uint256 key = uint256(
278     uint160(address(order.token))
279 ) << 12;

281 // path for inhouse minted tokens
282 if (
283     !feeSelector[key][order.tokenId] &&
284     MADFactory721.creatorAuth(
285         address(order.token),
286         order.seller
287     ) ==
288     true
289 ) {
290     _intPath(
291         order,
292         currentPrice,
293         _order,
294         msg.sender,
295         key
296     );
297 }
298 // path for external tokens
299 else {

```

```

300         // case for external tokens with ERC2981 support
301         if (
302             ERC165Check(address(order.token)) &&
303             interfaceCheck(
304                 address(order.token),
305                 0x2a55205a
306             ) ==
307             true
308         ) {
309             _extPath0(
310                 order,
311                 currentPrice,
312                 _order,
313                 msg.sender // ,
314                 //key
315             );
316         }
317         // case for external tokens without ERC2981 support
318         else {
319             _extPath1(
320                 order,
321                 currentPrice,
322                 _order,
323                 msg.sender // ,
324                 // key
325             );
326         }
327     }
328 }

```

## Code:

### Listing 10: MADMarketplace1155

```

168     function bid(bytes32 _order)

```



```

169     external
170     payable
171     whenNotPaused
172     {
173         Types.Order721 storage order = orderInfo[_order];

175         uint256 lastBidPrice = order.lastBidPrice;
176         uint256 bidValue = address(erc20) != address(0)
177             ? erc20.allowance(msg.sender, address(this))
178             : msg.value;

180         _bidChecks(
181             order.orderType,
182             order.endTime,
183             order.seller,
184             lastBidPrice,
185             order.startPrice,
186             bidValue
187         );

189         if (address(erc20) != address(0)) {
190             SafeTransferLib.safeTransferFrom(
191                 erc20,
192                 msg.sender,
193                 address(this),
194                 bidValue
195             );
196         }

198         // 1s blocktime
199         assembly {
200             let endTime := and(
201                 sload(add(order.slot, 4)),
202                 shr(32, not(0))

```

```

203         )
204         if gt(
205             timestamp(),
206             sub(endTime, sload(minAuctionIncrement.slot))
207         ) {
208             let inc := add(
209                 endTime,
210                 sload(minAuctionIncrement.slot)
211             )
212             sstore(add(order.slot, 4), inc)
213         }
214         sstore(add(order.slot, 6), caller())
215         sstore(add(order.slot, 5), bidValue)
216     }

218     if (lastBidPrice != 0) {
219         if (address(erc20) != address(0)) {
220             SafeTransferLib.safeTransfer(
221                 erc20,
222                 order.lastBidder,
223                 lastBidPrice
224             );
225         } else {
226             SafeTransferLib.safeTransferETH(
227                 order.lastBidder,
228                 lastBidPrice
229             );
230         }
231     }

233     emit Bid(
234         order.token,
235         order.tokenId,
236         _order,

```

```

237         msg.sender,
238         bidValue
239     );
240 }

```

## Risk Level:

Likelihood – 4

Impact – 5

## Recommendation:

We suggest either allowing users to choose their preferred payment method, or have a fixed one, or temporarily suspending the contract until all auctions are ended

## Status – Fixed

The Dev team fixed the issue by setting the function `setPrivateToken` to private.

## D.2 Race Condition in Fees Value [MEDIUM]

### Description:

The `feeVal2`, `feeVal3` variables have a setter. If the user checks the value of this variable, then calls the `buy` or `call` function, and the owner updates the Fees Value, the order of the transaction might overturn and the user's transaction in this case will be executed with the new fees without him knowing about it.

### Code:

#### Listing 11: MADMarketplace1155

```

445     function setFees(uint256 _feeVal2, uint256 _feeVal3)
446         external
447         onlyOwner
448     {

```

```

449         require(
450             _feeVal2 <= 1.5e3 && _feeVal3 <= 5.0e2,
451             "Invalid Fees"
452         );

454         assembly {
455             sstore(feeVal2.slot, _feeVal2)
456             sstore(feeVal3.slot, _feeVal3)
457         }

459         emit FeesUpdated(_feeVal2, _feeVal3);
460     }

```

## Risk Level:

Likelihood – 2

Impact – 3

## Recommendation:

Consider adding the `feeVal2` , `feeVal3` in in the arguments of the `_feeResolver` function then add require statements that verifies that the values provided in the arguments are the same as the one that is stored in the smart contract .In the other hand, add `FeeVal3` in the arguments of the `_extPath0` , `_extPath1` functions then a require statement that verifies that fee-Val3 is the same as the one that is stored in the contract

## Status – Acknowledged

The dev team Acknowledged the issue

## E MADFactory721.sol

### E.1 address `_router` verification [MEDIUM]

#### Description:

The `constructor` lack a safety check in `_router` address , the address-type argument should include a zero-address test, otherwise, some of the contract's functionality may become inaccessible.

#### Code:

Listing 12: MADFactory721

```
91     constructor
92     (
93         address _marketplace,
94         address _router,
95         address _signer,
96         address _paymentTokenAddress
97     )
98     {
99         setMarket(_marketplace);
100        setSigner(_signer);
101        if (_paymentTokenAddress != address(0)) {
102            setPaymentToken(_paymentTokenAddress);
103        }
104        router = _router;
105        emit RouterUpdated(_router);
106    }
```

#### Risk Level:

Likelihood - 3

Impact - 2

## Recommendation:

We recommend to use SetRouter function instead of affecting the \_router address to router in the constructor

**Status** - Acknowledged

## E.2 Missing `_price` value verification [LOW]

### Description:

Certain functions lack a safety check in the values, the values of the arguments should be verified to allow only the ones that go with the contract's logic. The `_price` variable in `create-Collection` function should be different than zero.

### Code:

Listing 13: MADFactory721

```
334     function createCollection(  
335         uint8 _tokenType,  
336         string memory _tokenSalt,  
337         string memory _name,  
338         string memory _symbol,  
339         uint256 _price,  
340         uint256 _maxSupply,  
341         string memory _baseURI,  
342         address _splitter,  
343         uint256 _royalty  
344     )  
345     external  
346     nonReentrant  
347     isThisOg  
348     whenNotPaused  
349     {  
350         _limiter(_tokenType, _splitter);
```

```

351         _royaltyLocker(_royalty);

353     if (_tokenType < 1) {
354         (bytes32 tokenSalt, address deployed) =
355             ERC721MinimalDeployer._721MinimalDeploy(
356                 _tokenSalt,
357                 _name,
358                 _symbol,
359                 _baseURI,
360                 _price,
361                 _splitter,
362                 router,
363                 _royalty,
364                 erc20
365             );

367         bytes32 colId = deployed.fillLast12Bytes();
368         userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId);

370         colInfo[colId] = Types.Collection721(
371             tx.origin,
372             Types.ERC721Type.ERC721Minimal,
373             tokenSalt,
374             block.number,
375             _splitter
376         );

378         emit ERC721MinimalCreated(
379             _splitter,
380             deployed,
381             _name,
382             _symbol,
383             _royalty,
384             _maxSupply,

```

```

385         _price
386     );
387 }
388 if (_tokenType == 1) {
389     (bytes32 tokenSalt, address deployed) =
390     ERC721BasicDeployer._721BasicDeploy(
391         _tokenSalt,
392         _name,
393         _symbol,
394         _baseURI,
395         _price,
396         _maxSupply,
397         _splitter,
398         router,
399         _royalty,
400         ERC20
401     );

403     bytes32 colId = deployed.fillLast12Bytes();
404     userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId);

406     colInfo[colId] = Types.Collection721(
407         tx.origin,
408         Types.ERC721Type.ERC721Basic,
409         tokenSalt,
410         block.number,
411         _splitter
412     );

414     emit ERC721BasicCreated(
415         _splitter,
416         deployed,
417         _name,
418         _symbol,

```



```

419         _royalty,
420         _maxSupply,
421         _price
422     );
423 }
424 if (_tokenType == 2) {
425     (bytes32 tokenSalt, address deployed) =
426     ERC721WhitelistDeployer._721WhitelistDeploy(
427         _tokenSalt,
428         _name,
429         _symbol,
430         _baseURI,
431         _price,
432         _maxSupply,
433         _splitter,
434         router,
435         _royalty,
436         erc20
437     );
438
439     bytes32 colId = deployed.fillLast12Bytes();
440     userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId);
441
442     colInfo[colId] = Types.Collection721(
443         tx.origin,
444         Types.ERC721Type.ERC721Whitelist,
445         tokenSalt,
446         block.number,
447         _splitter
448     );
449
450     emit ERC721WhitelistCreated(
451         _splitter,
452         deployed,

```

```

453         _name,
454         _symbol,
455         _royalty,
456         _maxSupply,
457         _price
458     );
459 }
460 if (_tokenType > 2) {
461     (bytes32 tokenSalt, address deployed) =
462     ERC721LazyDeployer._721LazyDeploy(
463         _tokenSalt,
464         _name,
465         _symbol,
466         _baseURI,
467         _splitter,
468         router,
469         signer,
470         _royalty,
471         ERC20
472     );
473
474     bytes32 colId = deployed.fillLast12Bytes();
475     userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId);
476
477     colInfo[colId] = Types.Collection721(
478         tx.origin,
479         Types.ERC721Type.ERC721Lazy,
480         tokenSalt,
481         block.number,
482         _splitter
483     );
484
485     emit ERC721LazyCreated(
486         _splitter,

```

```

487         deployed,
488         _name,
489         _symbol,
490         _royalty,
491         _maxSupply,
492         _price
493     );
494 }
495 }

```

### Risk Level:

Likelihood – 2

Impact – 2

### Recommendation:

Add a 'require' statement to verify that '\_price' is not equal to zero.

Status – Fixed

## F MADFactory1155.sol

### F.1 address `_router` verification [MEDIUM]

#### Description:

The `constructor` lack a safety check in `_router` address, the address-type argument should include a zero-address test, otherwise, some of the contract's functionality may become inaccessible.

#### Code:

##### Listing 14: MADFactory1155

```

91     constructor

```

```

92     (
93         address _marketplace,
94         address _router,
95         address _signer,
96         address _paymentTokenAddress
97     )
98     {
99         setMarket(_marketplace);
100        setSigner(_signer);
101        if (_paymentTokenAddress != address(0)) {
102            setPaymentToken(_paymentTokenAddress);
103        }

105        router = _router;
106        emit RouterUpdated(_router);
107    }

```

### Risk Level:

Likelihood - 3

Impact - 2

### Recommendation:

Use of the [SetRouter](#) function is recommended instead of assigning [\\_router](#) address to [router](#) in the [constructor](#)

**Status** - Acknowledged

## F.2 Missing [\\_price](#) value verification [LOW]

### Description:

Certain functions lack a safety check in the values, the values of the arguments should be verified to allow only the ones that go with the contract's logic. The [\\_price](#) variable in [cre-](#)

ateCollection function should be different than zero

## Code:

### Listing 15: MADFactory1155

```
331     function createCollection(  
332         uint8 _tokenType,  
333         string memory _tokenSalt,  
334         string memory _name,  
335         string memory _symbol,  
336         uint256 _price,  
337         uint256 _maxSupply,  
338         string memory _uri,  
339         address _splitter,  
340         uint256 _royalty  
341     )  
342     external  
343     nonReentrant  
344     isThisOg  
345     whenNotPaused  
346     {  
347         _limiter(_tokenType, _splitter);  
348         _royaltyLocker(_royalty);  
  
350         if (_tokenType < 1) {  
351             (bytes32 tokenSalt, address deployed) =  
352                 ERC1155MinimalDeployer._1155MinimalDeploy(  
353                     _tokenSalt,  
354                     _uri,  
355                     _price,  
356                     _splitter,  
357                     router,  
358                     _royalty,  
359                     erc20
```

```

360         );

362         bytes32 colId = deployed.fillLast12Bytes();
363         userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId);

365         colInfo[colId] = Types.Collection1155(
366             tx.origin,
367             Types.ERC1155Type.ERC1155Minimal,
368             tokenSalt,
369             block.number,
370             _splitter
371         );

373         emit ERC1155MinimalCreated(
374             _splitter,
375             deployed,
376             _name,
377             _symbol,
378             _royalty,
379             _maxSupply,
380             _price
381         );
382     }

383     if (_tokenType == 1) {
384         (bytes32 tokenSalt, address deployed) =
385         ERC1155BasicDeployer._1155BasicDeploy(
386             _tokenSalt,
387             _uri,
388             _price,
389             _maxSupply,
390             _splitter,
391             router,
392             _royalty,
393             ERC20

```

```

394         );

396         bytes32 colId = deployed.fillLast12Bytes();
397         userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId);

399         colInfo[colId] = Types.Collection1155(
400             tx.origin,
401             Types.ERC1155Type.ERC1155Basic,
402             tokenSalt,
403             block.number,
404             _splitter
405         );

407         emit ERC1155BasicCreated(
408             _splitter,
409             deployed,
410             _name,
411             _symbol,
412             _royalty,
413             _maxSupply,
414             _price
415         );
416     }

417     if (_tokenType == 2) {
418         (bytes32 tokenSalt, address deployed) =
419             ERC1155WhitelistDeployer._1155WhitelistDeploy(
420                 _tokenSalt,
421                 _uri,
422                 _price,
423                 _maxSupply,
424                 _splitter,
425                 router,
426                 _royalty,
427                 ERC20

```

```

428         );

430         bytes32 colId = deployed.fillLast12Bytes();
431         userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId);

432
433         colInfo[colId] = Types.Collection1155(
434             tx.origin,
435             Types.ERC1155Type.ERC1155Whitelist,
436             tokenSalt,
437             block.number,
438             _splitter
439         );

440
441         emit ERC1155WhitelistCreated(
442             _splitter,
443             deployed,
444             _name,
445             _symbol,
446             _royalty,
447             _maxSupply,
448             _price
449         );
450     }

451     if (_tokenType > 2) {
452         (bytes32 tokenSalt, address deployed) =
453             ERC1155LazyDeployer._1155LazyDeploy(
454                 _tokenSalt,
455                 _uri,
456                 _splitter,
457                 router,
458                 signer,
459                 _royalty,
460                 ERC20
461             );

```



```

463     bytes32 colId = deployed.fillLast12Bytes();
464     userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId);

466     colInfo[colId] = Types.Collection1155(
467         tx.origin,
468         Types.ERC1155Type.ERC1155Lazy,
469         tokenSalt,
470         block.number,
471         _splitter
472     );

474     emit ERC1155LazyCreated(
475         _splitter,
476         deployed,
477         _name,
478         _symbol,
479         _royalty,
480         _maxSupply,
481         _price
482     );
483 }
484 }

```

## Risk Level:

Likelihood – 2

Impact – 2

## Recommendation:

Add a 'require' statement to verify that '\_price' is not equal to zero.

Status - Fixed

## G ERC20.sol

### G.1 Missing address verification [LOW]

#### Description:

Certain functions lack a safety check in the address, the address-type argument should include a zero-address test, otherwise, some of the contract's functionality may become inaccessible.

#### Code:

Listing 16: ERC20.sol

```
77     function approve(address spender, uint256 amount)
78         public
79         virtual
80         returns (bool)
81     {
82         allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;
83
84         emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, amount);
85
86         return true;
87     }
```

Listing 17: ERC20.sol

```
89     function transfer(address to, uint256 amount)
90         public
91         virtual
92         returns (bool)
93     {
94         balanceOf[msg.sender] -= amount;
```

```

96      // Cannot overflow because the sum of all user
97      // balances can't exceed the max uint256 value.
98      unchecked {
99          balanceOf[to] += amount;
100     }

102     emit Transfer(msg.sender, to, amount);

104     return true;
105 }

```

#### Listing 18: ERC20.sol

```

107     function transferFrom(
108         address from,
109         address to,
110         uint256 amount
111     ) public virtual returns (bool) {
112         uint256 allowed = allowance[from][msg.sender]; // Saves gas for
           ↳ limited approvals.

114         if (allowed != type(uint256).max)
115             allowance[from][msg.sender] = allowed - amount;

117         balanceOf[from] -= amount;

119         // Cannot overflow because the sum of all user
120         // balances can't exceed the max uint256 value.
121         unchecked {
122             balanceOf[to] += amount;
123         }

125         emit Transfer(from, to, amount);

127         return true;

```

128

}

### Listing 19: ERC20.sol

```
223     function _mint(address to, uint256 amount)
224         internal
225         virtual
226     {
227         totalSupply += amount;

229         // Cannot overflow because the sum of all user
230         // balances can't exceed the max uint256 value.
231         unchecked {
232             balanceOf[to] += amount;
233         }

235         emit Transfer(address(0), to, amount);
236     }
```

### Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 2

### Recommendation:

It is recommended to verify that the addresses "to", "spender" and "from" provided in the arguments are different from the address(0) .

### Status - Acknowledged

The team Acknowledged the issue due the use of erc20 interface

## G.2 Missing Value verification [LOW]

### Description:

Certain functions lack a safety check in the values, the values of the arguments should be verified to allow only the ones that go with the contract's logic.

### Code:

Listing 20: ERC20.sol

```
77     function approve(address spender, uint256 amount)
78         public
79         virtual
80         returns (bool)
81     {
82         allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;
83
84         emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, amount);
85
86         return true;
87     }
```

Listing 21: ERC20.sol

```
89     function transfer(address to, uint256 amount)
90         public
91         virtual
92         returns (bool)
93     {
94         balanceOf[msg.sender] -= amount;
95
96         // Cannot overflow because the sum of all user
97         // balances can't exceed the max uint256 value.
98         unchecked {
99             balanceOf[to] += amount;
100         }
```

```

102         emit Transfer(msg.sender, to, amount);

104         return true;
105     }

```

## Listing 22: ERC20.sol

```

107     function transferFrom(
108         address from,
109         address to,
110         uint256 amount
111     ) public virtual returns (bool) {
112         uint256 allowed = allowance[from][msg.sender]; // Saves gas for
            ↪ limited approvals.

114         if (allowed != type(uint256).max)
115             allowance[from][msg.sender] = allowed - amount;

117         balanceOf[from] -= amount;

119         // Cannot overflow because the sum of all user
120         // balances can't exceed the max uint256 value.
121         unchecked {
122             balanceOf[to] += amount;
123         }

125         emit Transfer(from, to, amount);

127         return true;
128     }

```

## Listing 23: ERC20.sol

```

223     function _mint(address to, uint256 amount)
224         internal

```

```

225     virtual
226     {
227         totalSupply += amount;

229         // Cannot overflow because the sum of all user
230         // balances can't exceed the max uint256 value.
231         unchecked {
232             balanceOf[to] += amount;
233         }

235         emit Transfer(address(0), to, amount);
236     }

```

## Risk Level:

Likelihood - 1

Impact - 2

## Recommendation:

Add a 'require' statement to verify that '\_amount' is not equal to zero.

## Status - Acknowledged

The team Acknowledged the issue due the use of erc20 interface

## G.3 Approve race condition [LOW]

### Description:

The standard ERC20 implementation contains a widely known racing condition in its approve function, wherein a spender can witness the token owner broadcast a transaction altering their approval and quickly sign and broadcast transaction using transferFrom to move the current approved amount from the owner's balance to the spender. If the

spender's transaction is validated before the owner's, the spender will be able to get both approval amounts of both transactions.

## Code:

### Listing 24: ERC20

```
77     function approve(address spender, uint256 amount)
78         public
79         virtual
80         returns (bool)
81     {
82         allowance[msg.sender][spender] = amount;
83
84         emit Approval(msg.sender, spender, amount);
85
86         return true;
87     }
```

## Code:

## Risk Level:

Likelihood – 1

Impact – 2

## Recommendation:

We recommend using [increaseAllowance](#) and [decreaseAllowance](#) functions to modify the approval amount instead of using the approve function to modify it.

## Status – Acknowledged

The team Acknowledged the issue due the use of erc20 interface



# 4 Best Practices

## BP.1 Public functions can be external

### Description:

Functions with a public scope that are not called inside the contract should be declared external to reduce the gas fees

### Code:

Listing 25: MADMarketplace721.sol

```
134     function englishAuction(  
135         IERC721 _token,  
136         uint256 _id,  
137         uint256 _startPrice,  
138         uint256 _endTime  
139     ) public whenNotPaused {
```

Listing 26: MADMarketplace721.sol

```
114     function dutchAuction(  
115         IERC721 _token,  
116         uint256 _id,  
117         uint256 _startPrice,  
118         uint256 _endPrice,  
119         uint256 _endTime  
120     ) public whenNotPaused {
```

Listing 27: MADMarketplace721.sol

```
103     function fixedPrice(  
104         IERC721 _token,  
105         uint256 _id,  
106         uint256 _price,  
107         uint256 _endTime
```

```
108     ) public whenNotPaused {
```

#### Listing 28: MADMarketplace1155.sol

```
145     function englishAuction(  
146         IERC1155 _token,  
147         uint256 _id,  
148         uint256 _amount,  
149         uint256 _startPrice,  
150         uint256 _endTime  
151     ) public whenNotPaused {
```

#### Listing 29: MADMarketplace1155.sol

```
123     function dutchAuction(  
124         IERC1155 _token,  
125         uint256 _id,  
126         uint256 _amount,  
127         uint256 _startPrice,  
128         uint256 _endPrice,  
129         uint256 _endTime  
130     ) public whenNotPaused {
```

#### Listing 30: MADMarketplace1155.sol

```
123     function fixedPrice(  
124         IERC1155 _token,  
125         uint256 _id,  
126         uint256 _amount,  
127         uint256 _price,  
128         uint256 _endTime  
129     ) public whenNotPaused {
```

#### Listing 31: MAD.sol

```
28     function name()  
29         public  
30         pure
```

```
31     virtual
32     returns (string memory);
33 }
```

#### Listing 32: MADFactory721.sol

```
45     function name()
46     public
47     pure
48     override(MAD)
49     returns (string memory)
50     {
```

#### Listing 33: MADFactory1155.sol

```
46     function name()
47     public
48     pure
49     override(MAD)
50     returns (string memory)
51     {
```

#### Listing 34: MADMarketplace721.sol

```
24     function name()
25     public
26     pure
27     override(MAD)
28     returns (string memory)
29     {
```

#### Listing 35: MADMarketplace1155.sol

```
24     function name()
25     public
26     pure
27     override(MAD)
28     returns (string memory)
```

```
29      {
```

#### Listing 36: MADRouter721.sol

```
54      function name()  
55          public  
56          pure  
57          override(MAD)  
58          returns (string memory)  
59      {
```

#### Listing 37: MADRouter1155.sol

```
54      function name()  
55          public  
56          pure  
57          override(MAD)  
58          returns (string memory)  
59      {
```

#### Listing 38: MADFactory721.sol

```
530      function setRouter(address _router) public onlyOwner {
```

#### Listing 39: MADFactory1155.sol

```
518      function setRouter(address _router) public onlyOwner {
```

#### Listing 40: MADFactory721.sol

```
723      function creatorCheck(bytes32 _colID)  
724      public
```

#### Listing 41: MADFactory1155.sol

```
710      function creatorCheck(bytes32 _colID)  
711      public
```

#### Listing 42: MADFactory721.sol

```
820      function getDeployedAddr(string memory _salt)
```

#### Listing 43: MADFactory1155.sol

```
807     function getDeployedAddr(string memory _salt)
```

# 5 Tests

## Results:

```
Compiled 48 Solidity files successfully
/// ... ..
/// x*8888x.:*8888: -"888: dF
/// X 48888X `8888H 8888 '88bu.
/// X8x. 8888X 8888X !888> u '*88888bu
/// X8888 X8888 88888 "*8%- us888u. ^"*8888N
/// '*888!X8888> X8888 xH8> .@88 "8888" beWE "888L
/// `?8 `8888 X888X X888> 9888 9888 888E 888E
/// -^ '888" X888 8888> 9888 9888 888E 888E
/// dx '88~x. !88~ 8888> 9888 9888 888E 888F
/// .8888Xf.888x:! X888X.: 9888 9888 .888N..888
/// :""888":~"888" `888*" "888*" "888" `888*"
/// "~' "~ "" ^Y" ^Y' "" MADNFTs © 2022.
```

### ERC1155Basic

#### Init

- Splitter and ERC1155 should initialize (154ms)
- accounts have been funded

#### Only owner setters

- Should set base URI, emit event and revert if not owner (127ms)
- Should set public mint state, emit event & revert if not owner  
→ (110ms)

#### Mint

- Should revert if public mint is turned off (44ms)
- Should revert if max supply has reached max (6290ms)
- Should revert if price is wrong (45ms)
- Should mint, update storage and emit events (106ms)
- Should handle multiple mints (5492ms)

#### Batch mint

```
Should revert if supply has reached max (5812ms)
Should revert if public mint is turned off
Should revert if price is wrong (43ms)
Should batch mint, update storage and emit events (221ms)
Should handle multiple batch mints (254ms)
Burn
  Should revert if not owner
  Should revert if id is already burnt/hasn't been minted (150ms)
  Should revert if ids length is less than 2 (65ms)
  Should burn tokens, update storage and emit event (221ms)
Batch burn
  Should revert if caller is not the owner (80ms)
  Should revert if id is already burnt/hasn't been minted (189ms)
  Should batch burn tokens, update storage and emit event (226ms)
  Should handle multiple batch burns (358ms)
Withdraw
  Should withdraw contract's funds (375ms)
  Should withdraw contract's ERC20s (230ms)
Public getters
  Should query royalty info
  Should query token uri and revert if not yet minted (79ms)
  Should query total supply
  Should query base uri
Interface IDs
  Should support interfaces (48ms)

ERC1155Lazy
  Init
    Splitter and ERC1155 should initialize (69ms)
    accounts have been funded
  Lazy mint
    Should mint, update storage and emit events (470ms)
    Should revert if voucher has already been used (313ms)
    Should revert if signature is invalid
```

```

    Should revert if price is wrong (48ms)
  Lazy batch mint
    Should mint, update storage and emit events (166ms)
    Should revert if voucherId has already been used (80ms)
    Should revert if signature is invalid
    Should revert if price is wrong (38ms)
  Only owner functions
    Should set URI and emit event (54ms)
    Should withdraw and update balances (553ms)
  Burn
    Should revert if not owner (141ms)
    Should revert if id is already burnt/hasn't been minted (238ms)
    Should revert if ids length is less than 2 (48ms)
    Should burn update storage and emit events (366ms)
  Batch burn
    Should revert if caller is not the owner (241ms)
    Should revert if id is already burnt/hasn't been minted (220ms)
    Should batch burn tokens, update storage and emit event (306ms)
    Should handle multiple batch burns (452ms)
  Public getters
    Should query royalty info
    Should retrieve the domain separator
    Should retrieve URI and total supply (295ms)
    Should retrieve tokenURI and revert if not yet minted (229ms)
    Should support interfaces

ERC1155Minimal
  Init
    Splitter and ERC1155 should initialize (60ms)
    accounts have been funded
  Safe Minting
    Should revert if not the owner
    Should mint, update storage and emit events (48ms)
    Should revert if already minted (70ms)

```



## Burning

- Should `revert if` has not been minted
- Should `revert if` not the owner (56ms)
- Should burn, update `storage` and `emit` events (104ms)
- Should `revert if` already burned (80ms)

## Public Minting

- Should update `public` mint state (65ms)
- Should `revert if` `public` mint is off
- Should `revert if` price is wrong (59ms)
- Should `revert if` already minted (80ms)
- Should mint, update `storage` and `emit` events (93ms)

## Withdrawing

- Should `revert if` not the owner (89ms)
- Should update balances of `contract` and owner (180ms)
- Should withdraw `contract`'s ERC20s (287ms)

## Royalties

- Should retrieve royalty info

## Token URI

- Should `revert if` ID is not 1
- Should `revert if` token was not minted
- Should retrieve tokenURI (49ms)

## Interface IDs

- Should support interfaces

## ERC1155Whitelist

### Init

- Splitter and ERC721 should initialize (157ms)
- accounts have been funded

### Only owner setters

- Should check `for` whitelist & freeclaim `event` emitting/error  
↳ handling (85ms)
- Should set URI and `emit event` (52ms)
- Should set mint states (111ms)

## Public mint

```
Should revert if value under/overflows
Should revert if public mint state is off
Should revert if available supply has reached max (6028ms)
Should revert if price is wrong (67ms)
Should mint, update storage and emit events (135ms)
Batch mint
  Should revert if supply has reached max (6016ms)
  Should revert if public mint is turned off
  Should revert if price is wrong (53ms)
  Should batch mint, update storage and emit events (119ms)
  Should handle multiple batch mints (215ms)
Whitelist mint
  Should revert if value under/overflows
  Should revert if whitelist mint state is off
  Should revert if whitelist supply has reached max (5999ms)
  Should revert if price is wrong (46ms)
  Should revert if address is not whitelisted (54ms)
  Should mint, update storage and emit events (140ms)
Whitelist batch mint
  Should revert if value under/overflows
  Should revert if whitelist mint state is off
  Should revert if whitelist supply has reached max (5797ms)
  Should revert if price is wrong (51ms)
  Should revert if address is not whitelisted (51ms)
  Should mint, update storage and emit events (138ms)
Free claim
  Should revert if free claim state is off
  Should revert if available supply has reached max (6589ms)
  Should revert if address is not whitelisted (41ms)
  Should revert if user has already claimed (71ms)
  Should mint, update storage and emit events (123ms)
  Should gift tokens (237ms)
Mint and batch mint to creator
  Should mint to creator (192ms)
```

```

    Should batch mint to creator (177ms)
Burn
    Should revert if not owner
    Should revert if id is already burnt/hasn't been minted (119ms)
    Should revert if ids length is less than 2
    Should burn tokens, update storage and emit event (221ms)
Batch burn
    Should revert if caller is not the owner (80ms)
    Should revert if id is already burnt/hasn't been minted (120ms)
    Should batch burn tokens, update storage and emit event (207ms)
    Should handle multiple batch burns (365ms)
Withdraw
    Should withdraw contract's funds (177ms)
    Should withdraw contract's ERC20s (197ms)
Public getters
    Should query royalty info
    Should query token uri and revert if not yet minted (75ms)
    Should query total supply
    Should query base uri
Interface IDs
    Should support interfaces

ERC721Basic
Init
    Splitter and ERC721 should initialize (91ms)
    accounts have been funded
Only owner setters
    Should set base URI, emit event and revert if not owner (69ms)
    Should set public mint state, emit event & revert if not owner (51
        ↪ ms)
Mint
    Should revert if public mint is turned off
    Should revert if max supply has reached max (6718ms)
    Should revert if price is wrong

```

```
Should mint, update storage and emit events (89ms)
Should handle multiple mints (6881ms)
Burn
Should revert if not owner
Should revert if id is already burnt/hasn't been minted (119ms)
Should revert if ids length is less than 2
Should burn tokens, update storage and emit event (208ms)
Withdraw
Should withdraw contract's funds (146ms)
Should withdraw contract's ERC20s (219ms)
Public getters
Should query royalty info
Should query token uri and revert if not yet minted (80ms)
Should query total supply
Should query base uri
Should support interfaces (52ms)

ERC721Lazy
Init
Splitter and ERC721 should initialize (87ms)
accounts have been funded
Lazy mint
Should mint, update storage and emit events (373ms)
Should revert if voucher has already been used (221ms)
Should revert if signature is invalid
Should revert if price is wrong
Only owner functions
Should set baseURI and emit event (46ms)
Should withdraw and update balances (641ms)
Burn
Should revert if not owner
Should revert if id is already burnt/hasn't been minted (224ms)
Should revert if ids length is less than 2
Should burn update storage and emit events (317ms)
```

## Public getters

- Should retrieve the domain separator
- Should retrieve baseURI and total supply (279ms)
- Should retrieve tokenURI and `revert if` not yet minted (261ms)
- Should query royalty info
- Should support interfaces (82ms)

## ERC721Minimal

### Init

- Splitter and ERC721 should initialize (89ms)
- accounts have been funded

### Safe Minting

- Should `revert if` not the owner
- Should mint, update `storage` and `emit` events (64ms)
- Should `revert if` already minted (66ms)

### Burning

- Should `revert if` has not been minted
- Should `revert if` not the owner (51ms)
- Should burn, update `storage` and `emit` events (123ms)
- Should `revert if` already burned (74ms)

### Public Minting

- Should update `public` mint state (76ms)
- Should `revert if` `public` mint `is` off
- Should `revert if` price `is` wrong (49ms)
- Should `revert if` already minted (97ms)
- Should mint, update `storage` and `emit` events (81ms)

### Withdrawing

- Should `revert if` not the owner (151ms)
- Should update balances of `contract` and owner (125ms)
- Should withdraw `contract`'s ERC20s (193ms)

### Royalties

- Should retrieve royalty info

### Token URI

- Should `revert if` ID `is` not 1

```
Should revert if token was not minted
Should retrieve tokenURI (46ms)
Interface IDs
Should support interfaces

ERC721Whitelist
Init
  Splitter and ERC721 should initialize (210ms)
  accounts have been funded
Only owner setters
  Should check for whitelist & freeclaim event emitting/error
    ↪ handling (101ms)
  Should set baseURI and emit event (44ms)
  Should set mint states (104ms)
Public mint
  Should revert if value under/overflows
  Should revert if public mint state is off
  Should revert if available supply has reached max (6631ms)
  Should revert if price is wrong (38ms)
  Should mint, update storage and emit events (175ms)
Whitelist mint
  Should revert if value under/overflows
  Should revert if whitelist mint state is off
  Should revert if whitelist supply has reached max (6995ms)
  Should revert if price is wrong (41ms)
  Should revert if address is not whitelisted
  Should mint, update storage and emit events (140ms)
Free claim
  Should revert if free claim state is off
  Should revert if available supply has reached max (6939ms)
  Should revert if address is not whitelisted
  Should revert if user has already claimed (59ms)
  Should mint, update storage and emit events (201ms)
  Should mint to creator (208ms)
```

```

    Should gift tokens (249ms)
Burn
    Should revert if not owner
    Should revert if id is already burnt/hasn't been minted (101ms)
    Should revert if ids length is less than 2
    Should burn update storage and emit events (213ms)
Public getters
    Should retrieve baseURI and total supply (153ms)
    Should retrieve tokenURI and revert if not yet minted (56ms)
    Should support interfaces
Withdrawing
    Should revert if not the owner (173ms)
    Should update balances of contract and owner (132ms)
    Should withdraw contract's ERC20s (204ms)

MADFactory1155
Init
    Factory should initialize (39ms)
Splitter check
    Should revert if repeated salt is provided (343ms)
    Should deploy splitter without ambassador, update storage and emit
        ↪ events (199ms)
    Should deploy splitter with ambassador, update storage and emit
        ↪ events (208ms)
Create collection
    Should deploy ERC1155Minimal, update storage and emit events (562
        ↪ ms)
    Should deploy ERC1155Basic, update storage and emit events (526ms)
        ↪
    Should deploy ERC1155Whitelist, update storage and emit events
        ↪ (636ms)
    Should deploy ERC1155Lazy, update storage and emit events (714ms)
Only owner functions
    Should update contract's owner (51ms)

```

- Should set `new` marketplace instance (69ms)
- Should update ERC1155Lazy signer (41ms)
- Should update router's `address` (46ms)
- Should initialize paused and unpaused states (110ms)

#### Helpers

- Should retrieve user's colID indexes (904ms)
- Should get collection ID `from address`
- Should retrieve collection type (472ms)
- Should enable marketplace no-fee listing (656ms)
- Should verify a collection's creator (522ms)

#### MADFactory721

##### Init

- Factory should initialize (54ms)

##### Splitter check

- Should `revert if` repeated salt `is` provided (187ms)
- Should deploy splitter without ambassador, update `storage` and `emit`  
↳ events (181ms)
- Should deploy splitter `with` ambassador, update `storage` and `emit`  
↳ events (211ms)
- Should deploy splitter `with` ambassador and project, update `storage`  
↳ and `emit` events (209ms)

##### Create collection

- Should deploy ERC721Minimal, update `storage` and `emit` events (431ms  
↳ )
- Should deploy ERC721Basic, update `storage` and `emit` events (448ms)
- Should deploy ERC721Whitelist, update `storage` and `emit` events (497  
↳ ms)
- Should deploy ERC721Lazy, update `storage` and `emit` events (458ms)

##### Only owner functions

- Should update `contract`'s owner (56ms)
- Should set `new` marketplace instance (81ms)
- Should update ERC721Lazy signer (48ms)
- Should update router's `address` (49ms)



Should initialize paused and unpaused states (113ms)

#### Helpers

Should retrieve user's colID indexes (794ms)

Should get collection ID from address

Should retrieve collection type (549ms)

Should enable marketplace no-fee listing (686ms)

Should verify a collection's creator (390ms)

#### MADMarketplace1155

##### Init

Marketplace should initialize (48ms)

##### Owner Functions

Should update factory address (61ms)

Should update marketplace settings (50ms)

Should initialize paused and unpaused states (225ms)

Should update recipient (50ms)

Should update contract's owner (56ms)

Should withdraw to owner (133ms)

Should delete order (960ms)

##### Fixed Price Listing

Should revert if transaction approval hasn't been set (513ms)

Should revert if duration is less than min allowed (481ms)

Should revert if price is invalid (453ms)

Should list fixed price order, update storage and emit event (623  
→ ms)

Should handle multiple fixed price orders (1201ms)

##### Dutch Auction Listing

Should revert if transaction approval hasn't been set (488ms)

Should revert if duration is less than min allowed (446ms)

Should revert if startPrice is invalid (499ms)

Should list dutch auction order, update storage and emit event  
→ (696ms)

Should handle multiple dutch auction orders (1557ms)

##### English Auction Listing

Should `revert if` transaction approval hasn't been set (507ms)  
Should `revert if` duration `is` less than min allowed (454ms)  
Should `revert if` startPrice `is` invalid (431ms)  
Should list english auction order, update `storage` and `emit event`  
     $\hookrightarrow$  (612ms)

Should handle multiple english auction orders (1311ms)

#### Bidding

Should `revert if` price `is` wrong (558ms)  
Should `revert if` not English Auction (536ms)  
Should `revert if` order was canceled (533ms)  
Should `revert if` order has timed out (529ms)  
Should `revert if` bidder `is` the seller (484ms)  
Should bid, update `storage` and `emit` events (573ms)

#### Buying

Should `revert if` price `is` wrong (512ms)  
Should `revert if` order `is` an English Auction (515ms)  
Should `revert if` order was canceled (776ms)  
Should `revert if` order has timed out (641ms)  
Should `revert if` token has already been sold (605ms)  
Should buy inhouse minted tokens, update `storage` and `emit` events  
     $\hookrightarrow$  (1423ms)  
Should verify inhouse minted tokens `balance` changes (1193ms)  
Should buy third party minted tokens `with` ERC2981 support (592ms)  
Should buy third party minted tokens without ERC2981 support (672  
     $\hookrightarrow$  ms)  
Should verify inhouse minted tokens `balance` changes - set fees  
     $\hookrightarrow$  (1175ms)  
Should buy third party minted tokens `with` ERC2981 support - set  
     $\hookrightarrow$  fees (604ms)  
Should buy third party minted tokens without ERC2981 support - set  
     $\hookrightarrow$  fees (607ms)

#### Claim

Should `revert if` caller `is` seller or bidder (535ms)  
Should `revert if` token has already been claimed (1116ms)

```

Should revert if orderType is not an english auction (298ms)
Should revert if auction hasn't ended (516ms)
Should claim inhouse minted tokens, update storage and emit events
    ↪ (822ms)
Should verify inhouse minted tokens balance changes (735ms)
Should claim third party minted tokens with ERC2981 support (404ms
    ↪ )
Should claim third party minted tokens without ERC2981 support
    ↪ (381ms)
Order Cancelling
    Should revert due to already sold fixed price order (671ms)
    Should revert due to already sold dutch auction order (599ms)
    Should revert due to already sold english auction order (626ms)
    Should cancel fixed price order (671ms)
    Should cancel dutch auction order (625ms)
    Should cancel english auction order (591ms)
Public Helpers
    Should fetch the length of orderIds for a token (819ms)
    Should fetch the length of orderIds for a seller (835ms)

MADMarketplace721
    Init
        Marketplace should initialize (43ms)
    Owner Functions
        Should update factory address (45ms)
        Should update marketplace settings (46ms)
        Should initialize paused and unpaused states (187ms)
        Should update recipient (49ms)
        Should update contract's owner (44ms)
        Should withdraw to owner (114ms)
        Should delete order (720ms)
    Fixed Price Listing
        Should revert if transaction approval hasn't been set (511ms)
        Should revert if duration is less than min allowed (446ms)

```

```
Should revert if price is invalid (475ms)
Should list fixed price order, update storage and emit event (570
    ↪ ms)
Should handle multiple fixed price orders (1324ms)
Dutch Auction Listing
Should revert if transaction approval hasn't been set (491ms)
Should revert if duration is less than min allowed (514ms)
Should revert if startPrice is invalid (550ms)
Should list dutch auction order, update storage and emit event
    ↪ (772ms)
Should handle multiple dutch auction orders (1434ms)
English Auction Listing
Should revert if transaction approval hasn't been set (498ms)
Should revert if duration is less than min allowed (537ms)
Should revert if startPrice is invalid (456ms)
Should list english auction order, update storage and emit event
    ↪ (729ms)
Should handle multiple english auction orders (1370ms)
Bidding
Should revert if price is wrong (667ms)
Should revert if not English Auction (625ms)
Should revert if order was canceled (549ms)
Should revert if order has timed out (824ms)
Should revert if bidder is the seller (736ms)
Should bid, update storage and emit events (850ms)
Buying
Should revert if price is wrong (583ms)
Should revert if order is an English Auction (577ms)
Should revert if order was canceled (775ms)
Should revert if order has timed out (526ms)
Should revert if token has already been sold (625ms)
Should buy inhouse minted tokens, update storage and emit events
    ↪ (1347ms)
Should verify inhouse minted tokens balance changes (1101ms)
```

```

    BigNumber { value: "347222222222222264" } BigNumber { value:
      ↪ "86805555555555556" }
      Should buy third party minted tokens with ERC2981 support (524ms)
      Should buy third party minted tokens without ERC2981 support (450
        ↪ ms)
      Should verify inhouse minted tokens balance changes - fee change
        ↪ update (1141ms)
    BigNumber { value: "347222222222222264" } BigNumber { value:
      ↪ "17361111111111113" }
      Should buy third party minted tokens with ERC2981 support - fee
        ↪ change update (671ms)
      Should buy third party minted tokens without ERC2981 support - fee
        ↪ change update (655ms)
    Claim
      Should revert if caller is seller or bidder (694ms)
      Should revert if token has already been claimed (1072ms)
      Should revert if orderType is not an english auction (415ms)
      Should revert if auction hasn't ended (590ms)
      Should claim inhouse minted tokens, update storage and emit events
        ↪ (844ms)
      Should verify inhouse minted tokens balance changes (771ms)
      Should claim third party minted tokens with ERC2981 support (711ms
        ↪ )
      Should claim third party minted tokens without ERC2981 support
        ↪ (447ms)
    Order Cancelling
      Should revert due to already sold fixed price order (713ms)
      Should revert due to already sold dutch auction order (685ms)
      Should revert due to already sold english auction order (717ms)
      Should cancel fixed price order (621ms)
      Should cancel dutch auction order (704ms)
      Should cancel english auction order (734ms)
    Public Helpers
      Should fetch the length of orderIds for a token (906ms)

```

```

    Should fetch the length of orderIds for a seller (788ms)

MADRouter1155
  Init
    Router should initialize
  Set URI
    Should revert for invalid collection type (396ms)
    Should set URI for 1155Basic collection type (508ms)
    Should set URI for 1155Whitelist collection type (598ms)
    Should set URI for 1155Lazy collection type (502ms)
  Whitelist Settings
    Should revert for invalid collection type (440ms)
    Should set whitelist config for 1155Whitelist collection type (494
      ↪ ms)
  FreeClaim Settings
    Should revert for invalid collection type (439ms)
    Should set freeClaim config for 1155Whitelist collection type (521
      ↪ ms)
  Minimal SafeMint
    Should revert for invalid collection type (462ms)
(node:1617) PromiseRejectionHandledWarning: Promise rejection was
  ↪ handled asynchronously (rejection id: 14)
(Use `node --trace-warnings ...` to show where the warning was created)
    Should call safeMint for 1155Minimal collection type (456ms)
  Burn
    Should burn token for 1155Minimal collection type (605ms)
    Should burn tokens for 1155Basic collection type (628ms)
    Should burn tokens for 1155Whitelist collection type (630ms)
    Should burn tokens for 1155Lazy collection type (627ms)
  Batch Burn
    Should revert for invalid collection type (432ms)
    Should batch burn token for 1155Basic collection type (611ms)
    Should batch burn tokens for 1155Whitelist collection type (730ms)
    ↪

```

```

    Should batch burn tokens for 1155Lazy collection type (612ms)
Set MintState
    Should revert for invalid stateType
    Should revert for invalid tokenType (373ms)
    Should set publicMintState for minimal, basic and whitelist
        ↪ colTypes (1111ms)
    Should set whitelistMintState for whitelist colType (538ms)
    Should set freeClaimState for whitelist colType (549ms)
Whitelist Creator Mint
    Should revert for invalid coltype (408ms)
    Should mint to creator (619ms)
Whitelist Creator Batch Mint
    Should revert for invalid coltype (486ms)
    Should batch mint to creator (431ms)
    Should mint to creator (629ms)
Whitelist token gifting
    Should revert for invalid coltype (416ms)
    Should gift tokens (613ms)
Creator Withdraw
    Should withdraw balance and ERC20 for all colTypes (3472ms)
Only Owner
    Should update contract's owner (43ms)
    Should initialize paused and unpaused states (219ms)
Minimal SafeMint
    Should call safeMint for 1155Minimal collection type (510ms)
Burn-setfees
    Should burn token for 1155Minimal collection type (551ms)
fee is BigNumber { value: "5000000000000000000" }
    Should burn tokens for 1155Basic collection type (655ms)
    Should burn tokens for 1155Whitelist collection type (803ms)
    Should burn tokens for 1155Lazy collection type (708ms)
Batch Burn
    Should revert for invalid collection type (507ms)
    Should batch burn token for 1155Basic collection type (758ms)

```

```

    Should batch burn tokens for 1155Whitelist collection type (947ms)
      ↪
    Should batch burn tokens for 1155Lazy collection type (680ms)
Whitelist Creator Mint
    Should revert for invalid coltype (399ms)
    Should mint to creator (620ms)
Whitelist Creator Batch Mint
    Should mint to creator (786ms)
Whitelist token gifting
    Should gift tokens (799ms)

MADRouter721
  Init
    Router should initialize
  Set baseURI
    Should revert for invalid collection type (363ms)
    Should set baseURI for 721Basic collection type (469ms)
    Should set baseURI for 721Whitelist collection type (491ms)
    Should set baseURI for 721Lazy collection type (640ms)
  Whitelist Settings
    Should revert for invalid collection type (462ms)
    Should set whitelist config for 721Whitelist collection type (583
      ↪ ms)
  FreeClaim Settings
    Should revert for invalid collection type (520ms)
    Should set freeClaim config for 721Whitelist collection type (575
      ↪ ms)
  Minimal SafeMint
    Should revert for invalid collection type (413ms)
(node:1617) PromiseRejectionHandledWarning: Promise rejection was
  ↪ handled asynchronously (rejection id: 15)
BigNumber { value: "2500000000000000000" }
minted successfully
    Should call safeMint for 721Minimal collection type (536ms)

```



```
Burn
  Should burn token for 721Minimal collection type (482ms)
  Should burn tokens for 721Basic collection type (661ms)
  Should burn tokens for 721Whitelist collection type (931ms)
  Should burn tokens for 721Lazy collection type (582ms)
Set MintState
  Should revert for invalid stateType
  Should revert for invalid tokenType (347ms)
  Should set publicMintState for minimal, basic and whitelist
    ↪ colTypes (1053ms)
  Should set whitelistMintState for whitelist colType (469ms)
  Should set freeClaimState for whitelist colType (465ms)
Whitelist Creator Mint
  Should revert for invalid coltype (375ms)
  Should mint to creator (563ms)
Whitelist token gifting
  Should revert for invalid coltype (377ms)
  Should gift tokens (580ms)
Creator Withdraw
  Should withdraw balance and ERC20 for all colTypes (2974ms)
Only Owner
  Should update contract's owner (40ms)
  Should initialize paused and unpaused states (195ms)
Minimal SafeMint-setBaseFee
  Should call safeMint for 721Minimal collection type (557ms)
Burn-setBaseFee
  Should burn tokens for 721Basic collection type (596ms)
  Should burn tokens for 721Whitelist collection type (611ms)
  Should burn tokens for 721Lazy collection type (617ms)
Whitelist Creator Mint-setBaseFee
  Should mint to creator (599ms)
Whitelist token gifting-setBaseFee
  Should gift tokens (599ms)
```

## Royalties

- Royalties should initialize
- Should retrieve royalty info
- Should accept recipient and fee change (84ms)
- Should support interfaces

## Splitter

### Init

- Splitter should initialize (67ms)
- accounts have been funded

### Reverts

- should `revert` if no payees are provided
- should `revert` if more payees than shares are provided
- should `revert` if more shares than payees are provided
- should `revert` if dead `address` is provided as payee
- should `revert` if a share is set to zero
- should `revert` if a provided payees are duplicated (38ms)
- should `revert` if a provided payees are duplicated (41ms)
- should `revert` if account has no shares to claim
- should `revert` if there are no funds to claim
- should `revert` if account has no ERC20 shares to claim (86ms)
- should `revert` if there is no ERC20 to claim (93ms)

### Receive Payments

- should accept `value` and autodistribute to payees (265ms)
- should accept ERC20 (103ms)

### Release Payments

- should release `value` to payee (87ms)
- should release all pending `balance` to payees (243ms)
- should release ERC20 to payee (179ms)

471 passing (5m)

## 6 Static Analysis (Slither)

### Description:

Block Hat expanded the coverage of the specific contract areas using automated testing methodologies. Slither, a Solidity static analysis framework, was one of the tools used. Slither was run on all-scoped contracts in both text and binary formats. This tool can be used to test mathematical relationships between Solidity instances statically and variables that allow for the detection of errors or inconsistent usage of the contracts' APIs throughout the entire codebase.

### Results:

```
MADMarketplace721.feeSelector (MADMarketplace721.sol#69-70) is never
↳ initialized. It is used in:
  - MADMarketplace721.buy(bytes32) (MADMarketplace721.sol#204-267)
  - MADMarketplace721.claim(bytes32) (MADMarketplace721.sol
    ↳ #272-335)
  - MADMarketplace721._feeResolver(uint256,uint256) (
    ↳ MADMarketplace721.sol#725-745)
MADMarketplace721.minOrderDuration (MADMarketplace721.sol#72) is never
↳ initialized. It is used in:
  - MADMarketplace721.updateSettings(uint256,uint256,uint256) (
    ↳ MADMarketplace721.sol#405-429)
  - MADMarketplace721._makeOrderChecks(uint256,uint256) (
    ↳ MADMarketplace721.sol#789-818)
MADMarketplace721.minAuctionIncrement (MADMarketplace721.sol#73) is
↳ never initialized. It is used in:
  - MADMarketplace721.bid(bytes32) (MADMarketplace721.sol#148-199)
  - MADMarketplace721.updateSettings(uint256,uint256,uint256) (
    ↳ MADMarketplace721.sol#405-429)
MADMarketplace721.minBidValue (MADMarketplace721.sol#74) is never
↳ initialized. It is used in:
```

- MADMarketplace721.updateSettings(uint256,uint256,uint256) (
  - ↳ MADMarketplace721.sol#405-429)
- MADMarketplace721.\_bidChecks(uint8,uint256,address,uint256,
  - ↳ uint256) (MADMarketplace721.sol#844-899)

MADMarketplace721.recipient (MADMarketplace721.sol#76) is never  
 ↳ initialized. It is used in:

- MADMarketplace721.setRecipient(address) (MADMarketplace721.sol
  - ↳ #445-457)
- MADMarketplace721.\_intPath(Types.Order721,uint256,bytes32,
  - ↳ address,uint256) (MADMarketplace721.sol#603-646)
- MADMarketplace721.\_extPath0(Types.Order721,uint256,bytes32,
  - ↳ address) (MADMarketplace721.sol#648-690)
- MADMarketplace721.\_extPath1(Types.Order721,uint256,bytes32,
  - ↳ address) (MADMarketplace721.sol#692-723)

MADMarketplace721.MADFactory721 (MADMarketplace721.sol#77) is never  
 ↳ initialized. It is used in:

- MADMarketplace721.buy(bytes32) (MADMarketplace721.sol#204-267)
- MADMarketplace721.claim(bytes32) (MADMarketplace721.sol
  - ↳ #272-335)
- MADMarketplace721.setFactory(FactoryVerifier) (
  - ↳ MADMarketplace721.sol#370-379)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
 ↳ #uninitialized-state-variables

MADMarketplace721.getCurrentPrice(bytes32) (MADMarketplace721.sol  
 ↳ #967-1033) performs a multiplication on the result of a division:

```

_tick_getCurrentPrice_asm_0 = _startPrice_getCurrentPrice_asm_0
  ↳ - _endPrice_getCurrentPrice_asm_0 /
  ↳ _endTime_getCurrentPrice_asm_0 -
  ↳ _startTime_getCurrentPrice_asm_0 (MADMarketplace721.sol
  ↳ #1006-1009)

-price = _startPrice_getCurrentPrice_asm_0 - timestamp()() -
  ↳ _startTime_getCurrentPrice_asm_0 *
  ↳ _tick_getCurrentPrice_asm_0 (MADMarketplace721.sol

```

↪ #1010-1013)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>

↪ #divide-before-multiply

SplitterImpl.release(ERC20,address) (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol

↪ #147-171) uses a dangerous strict equality:

- payment == 0 (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#154)

SplitterImpl.release(address) (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#107-127)

↪ uses a dangerous strict equality:

- payment == 0 (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#112)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>

↪ #dangerous-strict-equalities

Contract locking ether found:

Contract MADMarketplace721 (MADMarketplace721.sol#22-1060) has

↪ payable functions:

- MADMarketplace721.bid(bytes32) (MADMarketplace721.sol#148-199)
- MADMarketplace721.buy(bytes32) (MADMarketplace721.sol#204-267)
- MADMarketplace721.receive() (MADMarketplace721.sol#362)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Contract locking ether found:

Contract SplitterImpl (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#27-297) has

↪ payable functions:

- SplitterImpl.constructor(address[],uint256[]) (lib/splitter/  
↪ SplitterImpl.sol#58-78)
- SplitterImpl.receive() (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#92-98)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>

↪ #contracts-that-lock-ether

SplitterImpl.releaseAll().i (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#132) is a

↪ local variable never initialized

SplitterImpl.constructor(address[],uint256[]).i (lib/splitter/

↪ SplitterImpl.sol#70) is a local variable never initialized

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
↪ [#uninitialized-local-variables](#)

Reentrancy in MADMarketplace721.\_extPath0(Types.Order721,uint256,bytes32  
↪ ,address) (MADMarketplace721.sol#648-690):

External calls:

- \_order.token.safeTransferFrom(address(this),\_to,\_order.tokenId)  
↪ (MADMarketplace721.sol#677-681)

Event emitted after the call(s):

- Claim(\_order.token,\_order.tokenId,\_orderId,\_order.seller,\_to,  
↪ \_price) (MADMarketplace721.sol#682-689)

Reentrancy in MADMarketplace721.\_extPath1(Types.Order721,uint256,bytes32  
↪ ,address) (MADMarketplace721.sol#692-723):

External calls:

- \_order.token.safeTransferFrom(address(this),\_to,\_order.tokenId)  
↪ (MADMarketplace721.sol#710-714)

Event emitted after the call(s):

- Claim(\_order.token,\_order.tokenId,\_orderId,\_order.seller,\_to,  
↪ \_price) (MADMarketplace721.sol#715-722)

Reentrancy in MADMarketplace721.\_intPath(Types.Order721,uint256,bytes32,  
↪ address,uint256) (MADMarketplace721.sol#603-646):

External calls:

- \_order.token.safeTransferFrom(address(this),\_to,\_order.tokenId)  
↪ (MADMarketplace721.sol#633-637)

Event emitted after the call(s):

- Claim(\_order.token,\_order.tokenId,\_orderId,\_order.seller,\_to,  
↪ \_price) (MADMarketplace721.sol#638-645)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
↪ [#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-3](#)

ERC20.permit(address,address,uint256,uint256,uint8,bytes32,bytes32) (lib  
↪ /tokens/ERC20.sol#134-185) uses timestamp for comparisons

Dangerous comparisons:

- require(bool,string)(deadline >= block.timestamp,  
↪ PERMIT\_DEADLINE\_EXPIRED) (lib/tokens/ERC20.sol#143-146)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
↳ #block-timestamp

MADMarketplace721.name() (MADMarketplace721.sol#32-43) uses assembly

MADFactory1155.market (MADFactory1155.sol#88) is never initialized. It  
↳ is used in:

- MADFactory1155.setMarket(address) (MADFactory1155.sol#499-506)
- MADFactory1155.\_isMarket() (MADFactory1155.sol#777-784)

MADFactory1155.signer (MADFactory1155.sol#94) is never initialized. It  
↳ is used in:

- MADFactory1155.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,  
↳ uint256,uint256,string,address,uint256) (MADFactory1155.  
↳ sol#327-476)
- MADFactory1155.setSigner(address) (MADFactory1155.sol#522-530)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
↳ #uninitialized-state-variables

SplitterImpl.release(address) (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#107-127)  
↳ uses a dangerous strict equality:

- payment == 0 (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#112)

SplitterImpl.release(ERC20,address) (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol  
↳ #147-171) uses a dangerous strict equality:

- payment == 0 (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#154)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
↳ #dangerous-strict-equalities

Contract locking ether found:

Contract SplitterImpl (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#27-297) has  
↳ payable functions:

- SplitterImpl.constructor(address[],uint256[]) (lib/splitter/  
↳ SplitterImpl.sol#58-78)
- SplitterImpl.receive() (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#92-98)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Contract locking ether found:

Contract ERC1155Basic (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Basic.sol

↪ #18-420) has payable functions:

- ERC1155Basic.mintTo(address,uint256,uint256[]) (lib/tokens/  
↪ ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Basic.sol#105-129)
- ERC1155Basic.mintBatchTo(address,uint256[],uint256[]) (lib/  
↪ tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Basic.sol#131-154)
- ERC1155Basic.burn(address[],uint256[],uint256[]) (lib/tokens/  
↪ ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Basic.sol#157-176)
- ERC1155Basic.burnBatch(address,uint256[],uint256[]) (lib/  
↪ tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Basic.sol#179-202)
- ERC1155Basic.mint(uint256,uint256) (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/  
↪ ERC1155Basic.sol#263-286)
- ERC1155Basic.mintBatch(uint256[],uint256[]) (lib/tokens/  
↪ ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Basic.sol#289-313)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Contract locking ether found:

Contract ERC1155Lazy (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Lazy.sol

↪ #18-498) has payable functions:

- ERC1155Lazy.lazyMint(Types.Voucher,uint8,bytes32,bytes32) (lib  
↪ /tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Lazy.sol#99-117)
- ERC1155Lazy.lazyMintBatch(Types.UserBatch,uint8,bytes32,  
↪ bytes32) (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Lazy.sol#120-142)
- ERC1155Lazy.burn(address[],uint256[],uint256[]) (lib/tokens/  
↪ ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Lazy.sol#164-185)
- ERC1155Lazy.burnBatch(address,uint256[],uint256[]) (lib/tokens  
↪ /ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Lazy.sol#188-212)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Contract locking ether found:

Contract ERC1155Minimal (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Minimal.

↪ sol#14-210) has payable functions:

- ERC1155Minimal.safeMint(address,uint256) (lib/tokens/ERC1155/  
↪ Impl/ERC1155Minimal.sol#60-66)



- ERC1155Minimal.burn(address,uint256) (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/  
↳ ERC1155Minimal.sol#69-72)
- ERC1155Minimal.publicMint(uint256) (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/  
↳ ERC1155Minimal.sol#142-149)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Contract locking ether found:

- Contract ERC1155Whitelist (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/  
↳ ERC1155Whitelist.sol#19-703) has payable functions:
- ERC1155Whitelist.burn(address[],uint256[],uint256[]) (lib/  
↳ tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Whitelist.sol#228-247)
  - ERC1155Whitelist.burnBatch(address,uint256[],uint256[]) (lib/  
↳ tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Whitelist.sol#250-274)
  - ERC1155Whitelist.mintToCreator(uint256,uint256[],uint256) (lib  
↳ /tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Whitelist.sol#276-300)
  - ERC1155Whitelist.mintBatchToCreator(uint256[],uint256[],  
↳ uint256) (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Whitelist.sol  
↳ #302-332)
  - ERC1155Whitelist.giftTokens(address[],uint256[],uint256) (lib/  
↳ tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Whitelist.sol#335-364)
  - ERC1155Whitelist.mint(uint256,uint256[],uint256) (lib/tokens/  
↳ ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Whitelist.sol#425-451)
  - ERC1155Whitelist.mintBatch(uint256[],uint256[]) (lib/tokens/  
↳ ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Whitelist.sol#453-480)
  - ERC1155Whitelist.whitelistMint(uint8,uint256[],uint256,bytes32  
↳ []) (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Whitelist.sol#482-517)
  - ERC1155Whitelist.whitelistMintBatch(uint256[],uint256[],  
↳ bytes32[]) (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Whitelist.sol  
↳ #519-553)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
↳ #contracts-that-lock-ether

Reentrancy in MADFactory1155.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string  
↳ ,uint256,uint256,string,address,uint256) (MADFactory1155.sol

↪ #327-476):

External calls:

- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC1155MinimalDeployer.  
↪ \_1155MinimalDeploy(\_tokenSalt,\_uri,\_price,\_splitter,router  
↪ ,\_royalty) (MADFactory1155.sol#347-355)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC1155BasicDeployer.\_1155BasicDeploy(  
↪ \_tokenSalt,\_uri,\_price,\_maxSupply,\_splitter,router,  
↪ \_royalty) (MADFactory1155.sol#379-388)

State variables written after the call(s):

- userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId\_scope\_2) (MADFactory1155.sol  
↪ #391)

Reentrancy in MADFactory1155.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string

↪ ,uint256,uint256,string,address,uint256) (MADFactory1155.sol

↪ #327-476):

External calls:

- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC1155MinimalDeployer.  
↪ \_1155MinimalDeploy(\_tokenSalt,\_uri,\_price,\_splitter,router  
↪ ,\_royalty) (MADFactory1155.sol#347-355)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC1155BasicDeployer.\_1155BasicDeploy(  
↪ \_tokenSalt,\_uri,\_price,\_maxSupply,\_splitter,router,  
↪ \_royalty) (MADFactory1155.sol#379-388)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC1155WhitelistDeployer.  
↪ \_1155WhitelistDeploy(\_tokenSalt,\_uri,\_price,\_maxSupply,  
↪ \_splitter,router,\_royalty) (MADFactory1155.sol#412-421)

State variables written after the call(s):

- userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId\_scope\_5) (MADFactory1155.sol  
↪ #424)

Reentrancy in MADFactory1155.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string

↪ ,uint256,uint256,string,address,uint256) (MADFactory1155.sol

↪ #327-476):

External calls:

- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC1155MinimalDeployer.  
↪ \_1155MinimalDeploy(\_tokenSalt,\_uri,\_price,\_splitter,router  
↪ ,\_royalty) (MADFactory1155.sol#347-355)

```

- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC1155BasicDeployer._1155BasicDeploy(
    ↪ _tokenSalt,_uri,_price,_maxSupply,_splitter,router,
    ↪ _royalty) (MADFactory1155.sol#379-388)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC1155WhitelistDeployer.
    ↪ _1155WhitelistDeploy(_tokenSalt,_uri,_price,_maxSupply,
    ↪ _splitter,router,_royalty) (MADFactory1155.sol#412-421)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC1155LazyDeployer._1155LazyDeploy(
    ↪ _tokenSalt,_uri,_splitter,router,signer,_royalty) (
    ↪ MADFactory1155.sol#445-453)

```

State variables written after the `call(s)`:

```

- userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId_scope_8) (MADFactory1155.sol
    ↪ #456)

```

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
 ↪ [#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-1](#)

```

MADFactory1155.creatorCheck(bytes32) (MADFactory1155.sol#736-759) uses
    ↪ tx.origin for authorization: creator == origin()() (
    ↪ MADFactory1155.sol#750-752)

```

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
 ↪ [#dangerous-usage-of-txorigin](#)

```

Counters.decrement(Counters.Counter) (lib/utils/Counters.sol#43-53)
    ↪ contains a tautology or contradiction:

```

```

- ! _val_decrement_asm_0 | _val_decrement_asm_0 < 0x00 (lib/utils
    ↪ /Counters.sol#46-50)

```

```

Counters.decrement(Counters.Counter,uint256) (lib/utils/Counters.sol
    ↪ #55-65) contains a tautology or contradiction:

```

```

- ! _val_decrement_asm_0 | _val_decrement_asm_0 < 0x00 |
    ↪ _val_decrement_asm_0 - amount < 0x00 (lib/utils/Counters.
    ↪ sol#58-62)

```

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
 ↪ [#tautology-or-contradiction](#)

```

ERC1155Basic.withdraw().j (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Basic.sol#219)
    ↪ is a local variable never initialized
ERC1155Basic._sumAmounts(uint256[]).i (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/
    ↪ ERC1155Basic.sol#332) is a local variable never initialized
ERC1155Whitelist.withdraw().j (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Whitelist.
    ↪ sol#381) is a local variable never initialized
ERC1155Whitelist.withdrawERC20(ERC20).i (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/
    ↪ ERC1155Whitelist.sol#397) is a local variable never initialized
ERC1155Basic.withdrawERC20(ERC20).j (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/
    ↪ ERC1155Basic.sol#246) is a local variable never initialized
MADFactory1155.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,
    ↪ uint256,string,address,uint256).tokenSalt_scope_0 (MADFactory1155
    ↪ .sol#379) is a local variable never initialized
ERC1155Lazy.lazyMintBatch(Types.UserBatch,uint8,bytes32,bytes32).i (lib/
    ↪ tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Lazy.sol#131) is a local variable
    ↪ never initialized
ERC1155Lazy._userMint(uint256,uint256[],address).j (lib/tokens/ERC1155/
    ↪ Impl/ERC1155Lazy.sol#404) is a local variable never initialized
MADFactory1155.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,
    ↪ uint256,string,address,uint256).deployed_scope_1 (MADFactory1155.
    ↪ sol#379) is a local variable never initialized
ERC1155Lazy.withdrawERC20(ERC20).j (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Lazy.
    ↪ sol#256) is a local variable never initialized
MADFactory1155.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,
    ↪ uint256,string,address,uint256).tokenSalt_scope_6 (MADFactory1155
    ↪ .sol#445) is a local variable never initialized
ERC1155Minimal.withdrawERC20(ERC20).i (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/
    ↪ ERC1155Minimal.sol#114) is a local variable never initialized
ERC1155Lazy.lazyMint(Types.Voucher,uint8,bytes32,bytes32).i (lib/tokens/
    ↪ ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Lazy.sol#109) is a local variable never
    ↪ initialized
ERC1155Lazy.withdraw().i (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Lazy.sol#219)
    ↪ is a local variable never initialized

```

```

MADFactory1155.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,
    ↳ uint256,string,address,uint256).deployed_scope_7 (MADFactory1155.
    ↳ sol#445) is a local variable never initialized
ERC1155Minimal.withdraw().i (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Minimal.sol
    ↳ #88) is a local variable never initialized
ERC1155Whitelist.withdrawERC20(ERC20).j (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/
    ↳ ERC1155Whitelist.sol#408) is a local variable never initialized
SplitterImpl.releaseAll().i (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#132) is a
    ↳ local variable never initialized
ERC1155Basic.withdraw().i (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Basic.sol#209)
    ↳ is a local variable never initialized
ERC1155Basic.withdrawERC20(ERC20).i (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/
    ↳ ERC1155Basic.sol#235) is a local variable never initialized
ERC1155Whitelist.withdraw().i (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Whitelist.
    ↳ sol#371) is a local variable never initialized
ERC1155Lazy.withdraw().j (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Lazy.sol#229)
    ↳ is a local variable never initialized
MADFactory1155.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,
    ↳ uint256,string,address,uint256).tokenSalt_scope_3 (MADFactory1155
    ↳ .sol#412) is a local variable never initialized
ERC1155Minimal.withdrawERC20(ERC20).j (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/
    ↳ ERC1155Minimal.sol#125) is a local variable never initialized
ERC1155Lazy.withdrawERC20(ERC20).i (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Lazy.
    ↳ sol#245) is a local variable never initialized
MADFactory1155.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,
    ↳ uint256,string,address,uint256).deployed_scope_4 (MADFactory1155.
    ↳ sol#412) is a local variable never initialized
SplitterImpl.constructor(address[],uint256[]).i (lib/splitter/
    ↳ SplitterImpl.sol#70) is a local variable never initialized
ERC1155Minimal.withdraw().j (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Minimal.sol
    ↳ #98) is a local variable never initialized
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
    ↳ #uninitialized-local-variables

```

ERC1155Whitelist.mintToCreator(uint256,uint256[],uint256) (lib/tokens/  
↳ ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Whitelist.sol#276-300) should emit an event  
↳ for:

- freeSupply += balanceTotal (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/  
↳ ERC1155Whitelist.sol#286)

ERC1155Whitelist.mintBatchToCreator(uint256[],uint256[],uint256) (lib/  
↳ tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Whitelist.sol#302-332) should emit an  
↳ event for:

- freeSupply += balanceTotal (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/  
↳ ERC1155Whitelist.sol#313)

ERC1155Whitelist.giftTokens(address[],uint256[],uint256) (lib/tokens/  
↳ ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Whitelist.sol#335-364) should emit an event  
↳ for:

- freeSupply += amountGifted (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/  
↳ ERC1155Whitelist.sol#347)

ERC1155Whitelist.whitelistMint(uint8,uint256[],uint256,bytes32[]) (lib/  
↳ tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Whitelist.sol#482-517) should emit an  
↳ event for:

- whitelistMinted += balanceTotal (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/  
↳ ERC1155Whitelist.sol#507)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
↳ #missing-events-arithmetic

MADFactory1155.constructor(address,address,address).\_router (  
↳ MADFactory1155.sol#103) lacks a zero-check on :

- router = \_router (MADFactory1155.sol#111)

Owned.setOwner(address).newOwner (lib/auth/Owned.sol#43) lacks a zero-  
↳ check on :

- owner = newOwner (lib/auth/Owned.sol#48)

ERC1155Lazy.constructor(string,SplitterImpl,uint96,address,address).

↳ \_signer (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Lazy.sol#74) lacks a zero

↳ -check on :

- signer = \_signer (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Lazy.  
↳ sol#78)

ERC1155Lazy.setSigner(address).\_signer (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/  
↳ ERC1155Lazy.sol#149) lacks a zero-check on :  
- signer = \_signer (lib/tokens/ERC1155/Impl/ERC1155Lazy.  
↳ sol#150)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
↳ #missing-zero-address-validation

MADFactory721.market (MADFactory721.sol#87) is never initialized. It is  
↳ used in:

- MADFactory721.setMarket(address) (MADFactory721.sol#506-514)
- MADFactory721.\_isMarket() (MADFactory721.sol#788-795)

MADFactory721.signer (MADFactory721.sol#93) is never initialized. It is  
↳ used in:

- MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,  
↳ uint256,uint256,string,address,uint256) (MADFactory721.sol  
↳ #326-483)
- MADFactory721.setSigner(address) (MADFactory721.sol#531-540)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
↳ #uninitialized-state-variables

SplitterImpl.release(address) (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#107-127)  
↳ uses a dangerous strict equality:

- payment == 0 (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#112)

SplitterImpl.release(ERC20,address) (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol  
↳ #147-171) uses a dangerous strict equality:

- payment == 0 (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#154)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
↳ #dangerous-strict-equalities

Contract locking ether found:

Contract SplitterImpl (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#27-297) has  
↳ payable functions:

- SplitterImpl.constructor(address[],uint256[]) (lib/splitter/  
↳ SplitterImpl.sol#58-78)
- SplitterImpl.receive() (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#92-98)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Contract locking ether found:

Contract ERC721Basic (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Basic.sol  
↳ #18-332) has payable functions:

- ERC721Basic.mintTo(address,uint256) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/  
↳ ERC721Basic.sol#110-134)
- ERC721Basic.burn(uint256[]) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/  
↳ ERC721Basic.sol#136-157)
- ERC721Basic.mint(uint256) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Basic.  
↳ sol#218-243)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Contract locking ether found:

Contract ERC721Lazy (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol  
↳ #18-433) has payable functions:

- ERC721Lazy.lazyMint(Types.Voucher,uint8,bytes32,bytes32) (lib/  
↳ tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol#95-113)
- ERC721Lazy.burn(uint256[]) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.  
↳ sol#137-158)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Contract locking ether found:

Contract ERC721Minimal (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Minimal.sol  
↳ #16-217) has payable functions:

- ERC721Minimal.safeMint(address) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/  
↳ ERC721Minimal.sol#65-72)
- ERC721Minimal.burn() (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Minimal.sol  
↳ #75-78)
- ERC721Minimal.publicMint() (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/  
↳ ERC721Minimal.sol#148-156)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Contract locking ether found:



Contract ERC721Whitelist (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Whitelist.  
↳ sol#19-529) has payable functions:

- ERC721Whitelist.burn(uint256[]) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/  
↳ ERC721Whitelist.sol#222-242)
- ERC721Whitelist.mintToCreator(uint256) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/  
↳ /ERC721Whitelist.sol#244-267)
- ERC721Whitelist.giftTokens(address[]) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/  
↳ ERC721Whitelist.sol#270-294)
- ERC721Whitelist.mint(uint256) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/  
↳ ERC721Whitelist.sol#355-379)
- ERC721Whitelist.whitelistMint(uint8,bytes32[]) (lib/tokens/  
↳ ERC721/Impl/ERC721Whitelist.sol#381-411)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
↳ #contracts-that-lock-ether

Reentrancy in MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,  
↳ uint256,uint256,string,address,uint256) (MADFactory721.sol  
↳ #326-483):

External calls:

- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721MinimalDeployer.\_721MinimalDeploy(  
↳ \_tokenSalt,\_name,\_symbol,\_baseURI,\_price,\_splitter,router,  
↳ \_royalty) (MADFactory721.sol#346-356)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721BasicDeployer.\_721BasicDeploy(  
↳ \_tokenSalt,\_name,\_symbol,\_baseURI,\_price,\_maxSupply,  
↳ \_splitter,router,\_royalty) (MADFactory721.sol#380-391)

State variables written after the call(s):

- userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId\_scope\_2) (MADFactory721.sol  
↳ #394)

Reentrancy in MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,  
↳ uint256,uint256,string,address,uint256) (MADFactory721.sol  
↳ #326-483):

External calls:

```

- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721MinimalDeployer._721MinimalDeploy(
    ↪ _tokenSalt,_name,_symbol,_baseURI,_price,_splitter,router,
    ↪ _royalty) (MADFactory721.sol#346-356)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721BasicDeployer._721BasicDeploy(
    ↪ _tokenSalt,_name,_symbol,_baseURI,_price,_maxSupply,
    ↪ _splitter,router,_royalty) (MADFactory721.sol#380-391)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721WhitelistDeployer.
    ↪ _721WhitelistDeploy(_tokenSalt,_name,_symbol,_baseURI,
    ↪ _price,_maxSupply,_splitter,router,_royalty) (
    ↪ MADFactory721.sol#415-426)
State variables written after the call(s):
- userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId_scope_5) (MADFactory721.sol
    ↪ #429)
Reentrancy in MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,
    ↪ uint256,uint256,string,address,uint256) (MADFactory721.sol
    ↪ #326-483):
    External calls:
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721MinimalDeployer._721MinimalDeploy(
    ↪ _tokenSalt,_name,_symbol,_baseURI,_price,_splitter,router,
    ↪ _royalty) (MADFactory721.sol#346-356)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721BasicDeployer._721BasicDeploy(
    ↪ _tokenSalt,_name,_symbol,_baseURI,_price,_maxSupply,
    ↪ _splitter,router,_royalty) (MADFactory721.sol#380-391)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721WhitelistDeployer.
    ↪ _721WhitelistDeploy(_tokenSalt,_name,_symbol,_baseURI,
    ↪ _price,_maxSupply,_splitter,router,_royalty) (
    ↪ MADFactory721.sol#415-426)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721LazyDeployer._721LazyDeploy(
    ↪ _tokenSalt,_name,_symbol,_baseURI,_splitter,router,signer,
    ↪ _royalty) (MADFactory721.sol#450-460)
State variables written after the call(s):
- userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId_scope_8) (MADFactory721.sol
    ↪ #463)

```

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
↳ #reentrancy-vulnerabilities-1

MADFactory721.creatorCheck(bytes32) (MADFactory721.sol#747-770) uses tx.  
↳ origin for authorization: creator == origin() (MADFactory721.  
↳ sol#761-763)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
↳ #dangerous-usage-of-txorigin

Counters.decrement(Counters.Counter) (lib/utils/Counters.sol#43-53)  
↳ contains a tautology or contradiction:  
- ! \_val\_decrement\_asm\_0 | \_val\_decrement\_asm\_0 < 0x00 (lib/utils  
↳ /Counters.sol#46-50)

Counters.decrement(Counters.Counter,uint256) (lib/utils/Counters.sol  
↳ #55-65) contains a tautology or contradiction:  
- ! \_val\_decrement\_asm\_0 | \_val\_decrement\_asm\_0 < 0x00 |  
↳ \_val\_decrement\_asm\_0 - amount < 0x00 (lib/utils/Counters.  
↳ sol#58-62)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
↳ #tautology-or-contradiction

ERC721Lazy.withdrawERC20(ERC20).i (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol  
↳ #191) is a local variable never initialized

MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,  
↳ uint256,string,address,uint256).deployed\_scope\_1 (MADFactory721.  
↳ sol#380) is a local variable never initialized

ERC721Lazy.withdraw().i (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol#165) is a  
↳ local variable never initialized

ERC721Lazy.\_userMint(uint256,address).j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/  
↳ ERC721Lazy.sol#336) is a local variable never initialized

MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,  
↳ uint256,string,address,uint256).tokenSalt\_scope\_6 (MADFactory721.  
↳ sol#450) is a local variable never initialized

```

ERC721Minimal.withdrawERC20(ERC20).j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/
    ↳ ERC721Minimal.sol#131) is a local variable never initialized
MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,
    ↳ uint256,string,address,uint256).deployed_scope_7 (MADFactory721.
    ↳ sol#450) is a local variable never initialized
ERC721Minimal.withdraw().j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Minimal.sol
    ↳ #104) is a local variable never initialized
ERC721Whitelist.withdrawERC20(ERC20).j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/
    ↳ ERC721Whitelist.sol#338) is a local variable never initialized
ERC721Lazy.withdraw().j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol#175) is a
    ↳ local variable never initialized
ERC721Lazy.withdrawERC20(ERC20).j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol
    ↳ #202) is a local variable never initialized
ERC721Whitelist.withdraw().i (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Whitelist.sol
    ↳ #301) is a local variable never initialized
ERC721Basic.withdrawERC20(ERC20).i (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Basic.
    ↳ sol#190) is a local variable never initialized
ERC721Whitelist.withdrawERC20(ERC20).i (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/
    ↳ ERC721Whitelist.sol#327) is a local variable never initialized
ERC721Basic.withdraw().i (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Basic.sol#164) is
    ↳ a local variable never initialized
MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,
    ↳ uint256,string,address,uint256).tokenSalt_scope_3 (MADFactory721.
    ↳ sol#415) is a local variable never initialized
MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,
    ↳ uint256,string,address,uint256).deployed_scope_4 (MADFactory721.
    ↳ sol#415) is a local variable never initialized
SplitterImpl.constructor(address[],uint256[]).i (lib/splitter/
    ↳ SplitterImpl.sol#70) is a local variable never initialized
ERC721Minimal.withdrawERC20(ERC20).i (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/
    ↳ ERC721Minimal.sol#120) is a local variable never initialized
ERC721Whitelist.withdraw().j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Whitelist.sol
    ↳ #311) is a local variable never initialized

```

ERC721Lazy.lazyMint(Types.Voucher,uint8,bytes32,bytes32).i (lib/tokens/  
 ↳ ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol#105) is a local variable never  
 ↳ initialized

ERC721Basic.withdraw().j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Basic.sol#174) is  
 ↳ a local variable never initialized

ERC721Basic.withdrawERC20(ERC20).j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Basic.  
 ↳ sol#201) is a local variable never initialized

SplitterImpl.releaseAll().i (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#132) is a  
 ↳ local variable never initialized

ERC721Minimal.withdraw().i (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Minimal.sol#94)  
 ↳ is a local variable never initialized

MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,  
 ↳ uint256,string,address,uint256).tokenSalt\_scope\_0 (MADFactory721.  
 ↳ sol#380) is a local variable never initialized

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
 ↳ #uninitialized-local-variables

MADFactory721.constructor(address,address,address).\_router (  
 ↳ MADFactory721.sol#102) lacks a zero-check on :  
     - router = \_router (MADFactory721.sol#110)

Owned.setOwner(address).newOwner (lib/auth/Owned.sol#43) lacks a zero-  
 ↳ check on :  
     - owner = newOwner (lib/auth/Owned.sol#48)

ERC721Lazy.constructor(string,string,string,SplitterImpl,uint96,address,  
 ↳ address).\_signer (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol#70) lacks  
 ↳ a zero-check on :  
     - signer = \_signer (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol  
       ↳ #74)

ERC721Lazy.setSigner(address).\_signer (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy  
 ↳ .sol#120) lacks a zero-check on :  
     - signer = \_signer (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol  
       ↳ #121)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
 ↳ #missing-zero-address-validation MADFactory721.sol analyzed (41

↳ contracts with 78 detectors), 352 result(s) found

```
- MADFactory721.setMarket(address) (MADFactory721.sol#506-514)
- MADFactory721._isMarket() (MADFactory721.sol#788-795)
MADFactory721.signer (MADFactory721.sol#93) is never initialized. It is
↳ used in:
- MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,
  ↳ uint256,uint256,string,address,uint256) (MADFactory721.sol
  ↳ #326-483)
```

```
MADFactory7
↳ .
↳ mark
↳
↳ (
↳ MADF
↳ .
↳ sol
↳ #87)
↳
↳ is
↳
↳ neve
↳
↳ init
↳ .
↳
↳ It
↳
↳ is
↳
↳ used
↳
↳ in
↳ :
↳
```

- MADFactory721.setSigner(address) (MADFactory721.sol#531-540)  
Reference: <https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
↳ #uninitialized-state-variables

SplitterImpl.release(address) (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#107-127)  
↳ uses a dangerous strict equality:

- payment == 0 (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#112)

SplitterImpl.release(ERC20,address) (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol  
↳ #147-171) uses a dangerous strict equality:

- payment == 0 (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#154)

Reference: <https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
↳ #dangerous-strict-equalities

Contract locking ether found:

Contract SplitterImpl (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#27-297) has  
↳ payable functions:

- SplitterImpl.constructor(address[],uint256[]) (lib/splitter/  
↳ SplitterImpl.sol#58-78)
- SplitterImpl.receive() (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#92-98)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Contract locking ether found:

Contract ERC721Basic (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Basic.sol  
↳ #18-332) has payable functions:

- ERC721Basic.mintTo(address,uint256) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/  
↳ ERC721Basic.sol#110-134)
- ERC721Basic.burn(uint256[]) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/  
↳ ERC721Basic.sol#136-157)
- ERC721Basic.mint(uint256) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Basic.  
↳ sol#218-243)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Contract locking ether found:

Contract ERC721Lazy (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol  
↳ #18-433) has payable functions:

- ERC721Lazy.lazyMint(Types.Voucher,uint8,bytes32,bytes32) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol#95-113)
- ERC721Lazy.burn(uint256[]) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol#137-158)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Contract locking ether found:

Contract ERC721Minimal (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Minimal.sol#16-217) has payable functions:

- ERC721Minimal.safeMint(address) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Minimal.sol#65-72)
- ERC721Minimal.burn() (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Minimal.sol#75-78)
- ERC721Minimal.publicMint() (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Minimal.sol#148-156)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Contract locking ether found:

Contract ERC721Whitelist (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Whitelist.sol#19-529) has payable functions:

- ERC721Whitelist.burn(uint256[]) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Whitelist.sol#222-242)
- ERC721Whitelist.mintToCreator(uint256) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Whitelist.sol#244-267)
- ERC721Whitelist.giftTokens(address[]) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Whitelist.sol#270-294)
- ERC721Whitelist.mint(uint256) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Whitelist.sol#355-379)
- ERC721Whitelist.whitelistMint(uint8,bytes32[]) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Whitelist.sol#381-411)

But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
 ↳ #contracts-that-lock-ether

Reentrancy in MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,uint256,string,address,uint256) (MADFactory721.sol



↪ #326-483):

External calls:

- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721MinimalDeployer.\_721MinimalDeploy(  
↪ \_tokenSalt,\_name,\_symbol,\_baseURI,\_price,\_splitter,router,  
↪ \_royalty) (MADFactory721.sol#346-356)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721BasicDeployer.\_721BasicDeploy(  
↪ \_tokenSalt,\_name,\_symbol,\_baseURI,\_price,\_maxSupply,  
↪ \_splitter,router,\_royalty) (MADFactory721.sol#380-391)

State variables written after the call(s):

- userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId\_scope\_2) (MADFactory721.sol  
↪ #394)

Reentrancy in MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,  
↪ uint256,uint256,string,address,uint256) (MADFactory721.sol

↪ #326-483):

External calls:

- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721MinimalDeployer.\_721MinimalDeploy(  
↪ \_tokenSalt,\_name,\_symbol,\_baseURI,\_price,\_splitter,router,  
↪ \_royalty) (MADFactory721.sol#346-356)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721BasicDeployer.\_721BasicDeploy(  
↪ \_tokenSalt,\_name,\_symbol,\_baseURI,\_price,\_maxSupply,  
↪ \_splitter,router,\_royalty) (MADFactory721.sol#380-391)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721WhitelistDeployer.  
↪ \_721WhitelistDeploy(\_tokenSalt,\_name,\_symbol,\_baseURI,  
↪ \_price,\_maxSupply,\_splitter,router,\_royalty) (  
↪ MADFactory721.sol#415-426)

State variables written after the call(s):

- userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId\_scope\_5) (MADFactory721.sol  
↪ #429)

Reentrancy in MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,  
↪ uint256,uint256,string,address,uint256) (MADFactory721.sol

↪ #326-483):

External calls:

- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721MinimalDeployer.\_721MinimalDeploy(  
↪ \_tokenSalt,\_name,\_symbol,\_baseURI,\_price,\_splitter,router,

```

    ↪ _royalty) (MADFactory721.sol#346-356)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721BasicDeployer._721BasicDeploy(
    ↪ _tokenSalt,_name,_symbol,_baseURI,_price,_maxSupply,
    ↪ _splitter,router,_royalty) (MADFactory721.sol#380-391)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721WhitelistDeployer.
    ↪ _721WhitelistDeploy(_tokenSalt,_name,_symbol,_baseURI,
    ↪ _price,_maxSupply,_splitter,router,_royalty) (
    ↪ MADFactory721.sol#415-426)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721LazyDeployer._721LazyDeploy(
    ↪ _tokenSalt,_name,_symbol,_baseURI,_splitter,router,signer,
    ↪ _royalty) (MADFactory721.sol#450-460)
State variables written after the call(s):
- userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId_scope_8) (MADFactory721.sol
    ↪ #463)

```

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
 ↪ #reentrancy-vulnerabilities-1

```

MADFactory721.creatorCheck(bytes32) (MADFactory721.sol#747-770) uses tx.
    ↪ origin for authorization: creator == origin() (MADFactory721.
    ↪ sol#761-763)

```

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
 ↪ #dangerous-usage-of-txorigin

```

Counters.decrement(Counters.Counter) (lib/utils/Counters.sol#43-53)
    ↪ contains a tautology or contradiction:
    - ! _val_decrement_asm_0 | _val_decrement_asm_0 < 0x00 (lib/utils
    ↪ /Counters.sol#46-50)

```

```

Counters.decrement(Counters.Counter,uint256) (lib/utils/Counters.sol
    ↪ #55-65) contains a tautology or contradiction:
    - ! _val_decrement_asm_0 | _val_decrement_asm_0 < 0x00 |
    ↪ _val_decrement_asm_0 - amount < 0x00 (lib/utils/Counters.
    ↪ sol#58-62)

```

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
 ↪ #tautology-or-contradiction

ERC721Lazy.withdrawERC20(ERC20).i (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol  
 ↳ #191) is a local variable never initialized

MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,  
 ↳ uint256,string,address,uint256).tokenSalt\_scope\_6 (MADFactory721.  
 ↳ sol#450) is a local variable never initialized

ERC721Lazy.withdraw().i (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol#165) is a  
 ↳ local variable never initialized

MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,  
 ↳ uint256,string,address,uint256).deployed\_scope\_7 (MADFactory721.  
 ↳ sol#450) is a local variable never initialized

ERC721Lazy.\_userMint(uint256,address).j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/  
 ↳ ERC721Lazy.sol#336) is a local variable never initialized

SplitterImpl.releaseAll().i (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#132) is a  
 ↳ local variable never initialized

ERC721Minimal.withdraw().j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Minimal.sol  
 ↳ #104) is a local variable never initialized

ERC721Basic.withdraw().i (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Basic.sol#164) is  
 ↳ a local variable never initialized

ERC721Whitelist.withdrawERC20(ERC20).j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/  
 ↳ ERC721Whitelist.sol#338) is a local variable never initialized

ERC721Minimal.withdrawERC20(ERC20).j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/  
 ↳ ERC721Minimal.sol#131) is a local variable never initialized

ERC721Whitelist.withdrawERC20(ERC20).i (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/  
 ↳ ERC721Whitelist.sol#327) is a local variable never initialized

ERC721Lazy.withdraw().j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol#175) is a  
 ↳ local variable never initialized

MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,  
 ↳ uint256,string,address,uint256).tokenSalt\_scope\_3 (MADFactory721.  
 ↳ sol#415) is a local variable never initialized

ERC721Lazy.withdrawERC20(ERC20).j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol  
 ↳ #202) is a local variable never initialized

ERC721Basic.withdrawERC20(ERC20).i (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Basic.  
 ↳ sol#190) is a local variable never initialized

```

ERC721Whitelist.withdraw().i (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Whitelist.sol
    ↳ #301) is a local variable never initialized
MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,
    ↳ uint256,string,address,uint256).deployed_scope_4 (MADFactory721.
    ↳ sol#415) is a local variable never initialized
ERC721Basic.withdraw().j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Basic.sol#174) is
    ↳ a local variable never initialized
ERC721Lazy.lazyMint(Types.Voucher,uint8,bytes32,bytes32).i (lib/tokens/
    ↳ ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol#105) is a local variable never
    ↳ initialized
ERC721Minimal.withdraw().i (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Minimal.sol#94)
    ↳ is a local variable never initialized
MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,
    ↳ uint256,string,address,uint256).tokenSalt_scope_0 (MADFactory721.
    ↳ sol#380) is a local variable never initialized
ERC721Whitelist.withdraw().j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Whitelist.sol
    ↳ #311) is a local variable never initialized
ERC721Basic.withdrawERC20(ERC20).j (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Basic.
    ↳ sol#201) is a local variable never initialized
MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,uint256,
    ↳ uint256,string,address,uint256).deployed_scope_1 (MADFactory721.
    ↳ sol#380) is a local variable never initialized
ERC721Minimal.withdrawERC20(ERC20).i (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/
    ↳ ERC721Minimal.sol#120) is a local variable never initialized
SplitterImpl.constructor(address[],uint256[]).i (lib/splitter/
    ↳ SplitterImpl.sol#70) is a local variable never initialized
Reference: https://github.com/cryptic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
    ↳ #uninitialized-local-variables

SplitterImpl.release(address) (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#107-127)
    ↳ uses a dangerous strict equality:
        - payment == 0 (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#112)

```

SplitterImpl.release(ERC20,address) (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol

↪ #147-171) uses a **dangerous** strict equality:

- payment == 0 (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#154)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>

↪ #dangerous-strict-equalities

Contract locking **ether** found:

Contract SplitterImpl (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#27-297) has

↪ **payable** functions:

- SplitterImpl.constructor(address[],uint256[]) (lib/splitter/

↪ SplitterImpl.sol#58-78)

- SplitterImpl.receive() (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#92-98)

But does not have a **function** to withdraw the **ether**

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>

↪ #contracts-that-lock-ether

SplitterImpl.constructor(address[],uint256[]).i (lib/splitter/

↪ SplitterImpl.sol#70) **is** a local variable never initialized

SplitterImpl.releaseAll().i (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#132) **is** a

↪ local variable never initialized

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>

↪ #uninitialized-local-variables

MADFactory721.signer (MADFactory721.sol#93) **is** never initialized. It **is**

↪ used **in**:

- MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,

↪ uint256,uint256,string,address,uint256) (MADFactory721.sol

↪ #326-483)

- MADFactory721.setSigner(address) (MADFactory721.sol#531-540)

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>

↪ #uninitialized-state-variables

SplitterImpl.release(address) (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#107-127)

↪ uses a **dangerous** strict equality:

```

- payment == 0 (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#112)
SplitterImpl.release(ERC20,address) (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol
↳ #147-171) uses a dangerous strict equality:
- payment == 0 (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#154)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
↳ #dangerous-strict-equalities

```

Contract locking ether found:

```

Contract SplitterImpl (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#27-297) has
↳ payable functions:
- SplitterImpl.constructor(address[],uint256[]) (lib/splitter/
↳ SplitterImpl.sol#58-78)
- SplitterImpl.receive() (lib/splitter/SplitterImpl.sol#92-98)
But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

```

Contract locking ether found:

```

Contract ERC721Basic (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Basic.sol
↳ #18-332) has payable functions:
- ERC721Basic.mintTo(address,uint256) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/
↳ ERC721Basic.sol#110-134)
- ERC721Basic.burn(uint256[]) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/
↳ ERC721Basic.sol#136-157)
- ERC721Basic.mint(uint256) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Basic.
↳ sol#218-243)
But does not have a function to withdraw the ether

```

Contract locking ether found:

```

Contract ERC721Lazy (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol
↳ #18-433) has payable functions:
- ERC721Lazy.lazyMint(Types.Voucher,uint8,bytes32,bytes32) (lib/
↳ tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol#95-113)

```

```

Reentrancy in MADFactory721.createCollection(uint8,string,string,string,
↳ uint256,uint256,string,address,uint256) (MADFactory721.sol
↳ #326-483):

```

```

External calls:

```

```

- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721MinimalDeployer._721MinimalDeploy(
    ↪ _tokenSalt,_name,_symbol,_baseURI,_price,_splitter,router,
    ↪ _royalty) (MADFactory721.sol#346-356)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721BasicDeployer._721BasicDeploy(
    ↪ _tokenSalt,_name,_symbol,_baseURI,_price,_maxSupply,
    ↪ _splitter,router,_royalty) (MADFactory721.sol#380-391)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721WhitelistDeployer.
    ↪ _721WhitelistDeploy(_tokenSalt,_name,_symbol,_baseURI,
    ↪ _price,_maxSupply,_splitter,router,_royalty) (
    ↪ MADFactory721.sol#415-426)
- (tokenSalt,deployed) = ERC721LazyDeployer._721LazyDeploy(
    ↪ _tokenSalt,_name,_symbol,_baseURI,_splitter,router,signer,
    ↪ _royalty) (MADFactory721.sol#450-460)

```

State variables written after the `call(s)`:

```

- userTokens[tx.origin].push(colId_scope_8) (MADFactory721.sol
    ↪ #463)

```

Reference: <https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation>  
 ↪ [#reentrancy-vulnerabilities-1](#)

`supportsInterface(bytes4)` should be declared `external`:

```

- ERC721.supportsInterface(bytes4) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Base/ERC721
    ↪ .sol#199-209)
- ERC721Basic.supportsInterface(bytes4) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/
    ↪ ERC721Basic.sol#315-331)
- ERC721Lazy.supportsInterface(bytes4) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/
    ↪ ERC721Lazy.sol#416-432)
- ERC721Minimal.supportsInterface(bytes4) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl
    ↪ /ERC721Minimal.sol#200-216)
- ERC721Whitelist.supportsInterface(bytes4) (lib/tokens/ERC721/
    ↪ Impl/ERC721Whitelist.sol#512-528)

```

`setSigner(address)` should be declared `external`:

```

- ERC721Lazy.setSigner(address) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/
    ↪ ERC721Lazy.sol#120-124)

```

```

_verifyVoucher(Types.Voucher,uint8,bytes32,bytes32) should be declared
  ↳ external:
    - ERC721Lazy._verifyVoucher(Types.Voucher,uint8,bytes32,bytes32)
      ↳ (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/ERC721Lazy.sol#240-278)
royaltyInfo(uint256,uint256) should be declared external:
    - ERC2981.royaltyInfo(uint256,uint256) (lib/tokens/common/ERC2981
      ↳ .sol#15-23)
supportsInterface(bytes4) should be declared external:
    - ERC2981.supportsInterface(bytes4) (lib/tokens/common/ERC2981.
      ↳ sol#25-34)
    - ERC721Basic.supportsInterface(bytes4) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/
      ↳ ERC721Basic.sol#315-331)
    - ERC721Lazy.supportsInterface(bytes4) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl/
      ↳ ERC721Lazy.sol#416-432)
    - ERC721Minimal.supportsInterface(bytes4) (lib/tokens/ERC721/Impl
      ↳ /ERC721Minimal.sol#200-216)
    - ERC721Whitelist.supportsInterface(bytes4) (lib/tokens/ERC721/
      ↳ Impl/ERC721Whitelist.sol#512-528)
Reference: https://github.com/crytic/slither/wiki/Detector-Documentation
  ↳ #public-function-that-could-be-declared-external
MADFactory721.sol analyzed (41 contracts with 78 detectors), 352 result(
  ↳ s) found

```

## Conclusion:

Most of the vulnerabilities found by the analysis have already been addressed by the smart contract code review.



## 7 Conclusion

In this audit, we examined the design and implementation of MADNFT 1.0 contract and discovered several issues of varying severity. Jacob Clay team addressed 7 issues raised in the initial report and implemented the necessary fixes, while classifying the rest as a risk with low-probability of occurrence. BlockHat' auditors advised Jacob Clay Team to maintain a high level of vigilance and to keep those findings in mind in order to avoid any future complications.



**BLOCKHAT**  
SECURITY

For a Contract Audit, contact us at [contact@blockhat.io](mailto:contact@blockhat.io)